

ENLISTING FUZZY-WUZZY: ARE PAST LESSONS CONCERNING EMPLOYING IRREGULARS RELEVANT TODAY?

BY

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America's dominance on the conventional battlefield compels its adversaries to engage our military in less-governed areas often dominated by tribal and traditional social networks. The U.S. military has historically employed indigenous irregular forces to defeat such enemies. These campaigns have been remarkably effective at countering adversaries, particularly where state security forces have been unwilling or unable to do so. Despite this, U.S. capabilities for employing indigenous irregular forces have been underutilized globally as a component of the U.S. strategy to combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This analysis advocates increasing such employment to marginalize al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and recommends developing amplifying doctrine for employing indigenous irregular forces during joint operations. Historical campaigns in the Philippines, Laos, and Afghanistan are reviewed using the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure) framework to demonstrate where indigenous irregular forces were successfully employed to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

ENLISTING FUZZY-WUZZY: ARE PAST LESSONS CONCERNING EMPLOYING IRREGULARS RELEVANT TODAY?

So 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan; Yore a pore benighted 'eathen but a first-class fightin' man...

—Rudyard Kipling¹

The Sudanese tribal warrior of Kipling's famous poem earned the respect of 19th-century British Expeditionary Forces. He is perhaps symbolic of the many native fighters encountered in European colonial empires: initially scorned, then later respected, and often employed to great effect during expeditionary campaigns. For centuries, professional armies have employed indigenous irregulars, utilizing the prowess and advantages offered by such troops. Indeed, a fully-formed British defensive square was never broken by assault until Hadendoa tribal warriors supporting the Mahdist rebellion in the Sudan breached the British square at the Battle of Tamai in 1884.² A wealth of literature indicates that friendly forces native to the cultural mores, geography, and demographics of the operational area are invaluable.

This analysis uses three historical examples to illustrate the effectiveness of employing irregulars during conflict to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Irregulars earned a proud position in U.S. military heritage. While not employed as extensively as in European colonial armies, Americans employed irregular forces during conflicts on almost every continent. Today, America's dominance on the conventional battlefield compels its adversaries to engage our military in volatile, less-governed areas often dominated by tribal and traditional social networks.³ The U.S. military has historically employed irregular forces to defeat such enemies. These campaigns have been remarkably effective at countering adversaries, particularly where state security forces

have been unwilling or unable to do so. Despite past success, existing U.S. capabilities for employing irregular forces remain underutilized globally in the U.S. strategy to combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

I will present a brief historical overview of American employment of irregulars, and relevant changes in U.S. doctrine, in order to provide insight into how and why our use of this capability has gone from widespread to very limited. Military doctrine is important because it informs decision makers. The capabilities articulated in joint and service publications frame the strategic approach chosen by policymakers and military leadership.

Next, I will analyze historical campaigns in the Philippines (1899), Laos (1959), and Afghanistan (2001) using the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure) framework, to demonstrate where irregulars were successfully employed to advance U.S. strategic objectives. The intent of these reviews is not to provide detailed or exhaustive campaign analysis, but to highlight U.S. examples where employing irregulars was a particularly advantageous means to achieving strategic ends. The PMESII framework is commonly used to assess a strategic environment, and to understand the dynamics of the complex relationships between environmental factors. Using PMESII to frame these historical examples facilitates consistent comparison and contrast between each, as well as with the contemporary strategic environment. This construct also facilitates an assessment in terms of all the instruments of national power.⁴ A frank examination of risk is presented throughout the analysis, to fairly portray the potential costs and benefits of options presented to strategic leadership.

This analysis concludes by advocating increased employment of irregulars by military leadership and U.S. decision-makers, as one feasible and sustainable way to combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates globally. Further recommendations are identified for developing amplifying doctrine for the employment of irregulars during joint operations.

American Employment of Irregulars and the Evolution of Doctrine

A review of U.S. doctrine relating to the employment of irregulars is necessary to understand the capabilities, options, constraints, and ambiguities policymakers face when using this type of military power. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”⁵ This is the body of knowledge our military leadership disseminates through field manuals, official publications, and the curricula of our training institutions. Collectively, this knowledge reflects our nation’s approach to the conduct of war, and to the application of military power. Doctrine is always under review or revision to keep pace with perceived changes in the strategic and operational environment. As understanding of the spectrum of conflict evolved over the course of our nation’s history, so has the direction of our military’s doctrinal roadmap. One limitation of this methodology is that a great deal of American doctrine is fixated on decisive, conventional, maneuver warfare—despite the fact that the vast majority of our military operations during the nation’s history do not fit this category.

Viewed in the context of more than 300 years of American military history and tradition, our nation has employed its military overwhelmingly in support of constabulary requirements, counter-guerrilla and pacification campaigns, counterinsurgency, domestic disturbances, and the performance of myriad operations other than the

conduct of major combat operations against a single nation-state on conventional battlefields. With the two World Wars being notable exceptions, and some six days of armored maneuver warfare in Operation Desert Storm, the vast majority of American military combat experience was hard-earned facing a bewildering array of irregular adversaries.⁶ Even operations during WWII include campaigns that add to a U.S. military tradition rich with experience in unconventional warfare and irregular forces: operations with Kachin tribesmen throughout Japanese-occupied Burma; Colonel Russ Volckmann's employment of Filipino guerrillas after the fall of Corregidor; and support of Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia. Despite this, until very recently most of our doctrine and training has focused nearly exclusively on conventional combat operations. Victor Hansen and other military theorists argue that the European heritage of our professional military, as well as the seminal nature of WWII, predisposes the U.S. to this "American way of war."⁷ Arguably, the threat of large-scale conflict with a peer or regional state competitor is a worst-case scenario for U.S. security interests, and demands resources and attention commensurate with the risk to our national survival. Regardless of the validity of the discrepancy between doctrine and our experience, the observation is valuable for highlighting the often confusing path America has followed regarding employment of irregular forces during conflict.

Although doctrinal concepts prior to the 20th century were not formally captured as they are today, they reflect a comfortable familiarity with unconventional war and a culture of employing irregulars; advising, training, leading and liaising closely with local tribal levies, militias and other sub-state and non-state actors. This facility with employing locals as irregulars began even prior to America's founding, as struggles for

the continent ebbed and flowed between the Spanish, British, and French. The founding of Savannah in 1733, now in the state of Georgia, resulted from a guerrilla war between the Spanish and the irregular forces raised by the British. General James Edward Oglethorpe, King George II's representative to the American colonies, sought to create a buffer south of the Savannah River to protect the Carolinas from Spanish Florida and French Louisiana. Enlisting the aid of local Shawnee, Tomochichi, and Yamacraw Indians, with a small band of Highlanders and Rangers, Oglethorpe eliminated the Spanish threat at the Battle of Bloody Marsh.⁸

Major Robert Rogers' Rangers are one of the most famous examples of irregular forces on the American continent prior to U.S. independence. Rogers' independent company served as an attachment under the British Army during the French and Indian War. Under his disciplined command and leadership, these Rangers and provincials were one of the few non-Indian forces able to operate effectively against the British. In one of their most famous operations, Rogers' Rangers successfully raided the village of Saint Francis in 1759. The village had long been the base for French-sponsored raids by the resident Abenakis, Wampanoag, and Narragansett Indians on British colonies to the south. Rogers notably infiltrated his force of Rangers and Mohican Indians through more than 150 miles of enemy terrain, avoided native pickets encamped to interdict his force, and then evaded pursuing French Regulars and Indian scouts for more than 200 miles. Strategically, Rogers' raid had a lingering and demoralizing psychological effect. French irregulars in the region felt newly vulnerable, and more forces were quartered in neighboring settlements to address this. The raid demonstrated the effectiveness irregulars could bring to bear against native forces in otherwise denied territory.⁹

Historian Andrew J. Birtle details how the fledgling U.S. Army's use of irregulars—frontiersmen, rangers, and Indians—during 18th century campaigns against the Eastern woodland Indians, or the Seminole Wars, was institutionalized via oral tradition, personal experiences of officers serving in multiple campaigns, unofficial manuscripts, and even some official literature.¹⁰ Vattel's *The Law of Nations*, and Jomini's seminal *Art of War* addressed partisans and guerrilla warfare. At the new U.S. Military Academy, Dennis Hart Mahan specifically advised cadets to employ friendly Indians as scouts and auxiliaries. As Jominian disciples, students were instructed on the use irregulars for the conduct of *petit guerre*, or "small war." Using native auxiliaries was put into practice by Winfield Scott during the Mexican War of 1846-1848, and had a profound influence on our antebellum Army's use of, and approach to, irregulars in conflict. Henry W. Halleck, George B. McClellan, John Pope, and John Wool were all veterans of Scott's Mexican War campaigns, and they carried their experiences with irregulars forward as commanding generals of Union forces in the Civil War.¹¹

In particular, Generals McClellan and Halleck employed partisans and irregulars skillfully during the Civil War for counter-guerrilla and guerrilla operations. The legitimacy of formal partisan troops had long been recognized by both European and American military tradition. Confederate successes under Mosby's Rangers and other irregulars were credited with tying down as much as one-third of the U.S. Army at certain stages of the war.¹² Union irregulars under Brigadier General Alvan Gillem, George Kirk, and Secretary of War Stanton's own Loudoun County Rangers played active counter-guerrilla roles. These vigorous campaigns led to legal scholar Francis Lieber's 1862 publication, *Guerrilla Parties Considered With Reference to the Laws and*

Usages of War. Though the underlying themes of Lieber's work were balance, moderation and conciliation, he clearly attempted to define combatant and noncombatant, and to categorize degrees of regular and irregular troops. He articulated a hierarchy that legitimized uniformed, paid partisans under military authority as legal combatants. Guerrillas were to be dealt with more harshly, but Lieber recommended humane treatment and prisoner of war status for those captured. Those who took up arms part-time, wore civilian dress, and took shelter amongst the populace were identified less-favorably. Such fighters blurred the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, and they could be subjected to harsh treatment according to their deeds. His efforts were later validated by a commissioned panel of Union officers, and codified under General Orders (GO) 100, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, published under Lincoln's signature on 24 April 1863.¹³

This landmark document had several significant, enduring impacts. As the first official guidance issued by a government concerning civil-military interaction and military conduct, other professional armies in Europe soon followed suit with their own codes of conduct. GO 100 was to become part of the foundation for the Hague Conventions of 1899, and ultimately influenced the Army's first field manual on the laws of war in 1914, as well as the 1940 Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*.¹⁴

Interestingly, despite the fact that both sides had demonstrated considerable facility for employing irregulars during the war, little post-war effort went into analyzing or preserving these Civil War lessons. At the turn of the century, GO 100, Civil War operational experience, military custom, and unofficial manuscripts comprised the basis for the Army's doctrine concerning the employment of irregulars during conflict.

The prevailing consensus validated pre-war notions that conventional small-unit tactics were applicable to this unconventional form of warfare.¹⁵ Clearly, an institutional expectation existed that regular army officers would, very early in the course of operations, establish contacts, liaison, alliances and auxiliaries with local and tribal leaders. Subsequent generations of officers employed this conventional wisdom and tradition on the western frontier and into the twentieth century, where the practice reached a zenith with the formation and employment of the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary. Unfortunately, much like lessons learned during the Indian Wars and the Civil War, operations involving irregulars were considered a sideshow, and were never a catalyst for new operational doctrine.

On the eve of WWII, U.S. Army doctrine concerning irregulars was scattered among several subject areas, including military government, the law of warfare, small wars, and expeditionary operations. These publications—most unofficial—tended to be long on conceptual theory and principles, and short on details for application. The 1940 U.S. Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* was a notable exception. In one reference, the USMC captured much of the American *petit guerre* military experience. Detailed chapters covered the organizing, training, and sustaining of “armed native organizations,” constabularies, and auxiliaries.¹⁶

The employment of irregulars blossomed during WWII, and in all theaters of operations. In Asia, under command of Carl Eifler and William R. Peers, Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) organized more than 10,000 Kachin tribesmen into guerrilla groups to conduct operations against the Japanese in Burma. As General MacArthur evacuated Corregidor and the Philippines fell, Captain Russ

Volckmann remained behind on Luzon. Over the next three years of occupation, Volckmann organized over 15,000 guerrillas from Filipino tribesmen, and Americans and Filipino soldiers who remained behind to resist the Japanese. In 1945, the Japanese commander in the Philippines, General Yamashita himself, surrendered to Volckmann's guerrillas. MacArthur honored Volckmann by reserving him a seat among U.S. leadership at the Baguio formal surrender table.¹⁷

In France, Greece, Yugoslavia, and throughout Europe, OSS Jedburgh teams supported or organized partisan and Resistance elements to great effect. Supporting the Normandy invasion during one week in June 1944, guerrilla attacks and railroad sabotage prevented eight German divisions from immediately reinforcing the beachhead.¹⁸ Despite the vast proliferation of campaigns where irregulars were employed during WWII, these operations were dramatically eclipsed by the conventional maneuver warfare that dominated the seas, skies and landscapes through 1945. The timing of the 1940 publication of the USMC *Small Wars Manual* was inopportune, but even more so, post-WWII events conspired to relegate lessons learned about the use of irregulars far into the background.

In the aftermath of WWII, several events impacted the U.S. military's general familiarity with employing irregular forces. For a military already preoccupied with decisive conventional maneuver warfare, the advent of the Cold War heralded an even greater focus for American military leaders on these types of operations. The U.S. war machine began to prepare for WWIII. The specter of Soviet mass armored formations on the plains of Europe, NATO commitments, mutual assured destruction, and the Space Race captured imaginations as well as doctrine. The OSS was deactivated, and

from its ranks evolved the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, and soon thereafter the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) in 1952. In this division of effort, a series of National Security Council memos from the Truman Administration placed responsibility for covert action programs squarely with the CIA. These responsibilities included intelligence gathering, and infrastructure preparation for paramilitary and guerrilla operations.¹⁹ There was great concern that WWII with the Soviets was inevitable. Dissolution of the OSS had left the U.S. without an unconventional warfare capability during the Korean War. Consequently, Colonel Aaron Bank and the U.S. Army championed re-establishing the military's unconventional warfare capability that had formally vanished with the dissolution of the OSS. Called Army Special Forces, these units would be specially selected and trained officers and men. These units would be assigned the niche mission of unconventional warfare, support to insurgencies, and guerrilla operations "once hostilities broke out."²⁰ Even this soon after the CIA and Army SF were established, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began dialogue with the CIA on the coordination of activities in this very sensitive mission area. A milestone appeared to have been reached concerning how America would employ irregulars in the future: regulatory responsibility of the missions where irregular force employment typically occurred had gone from a local commander's prerogative, to the realm of a fledgling CIA with few resources, and a small band of increasingly specialized elite Army units.²¹

During the Kennedy years, following JFK's disappointment over the CIA's handling of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1961 Bay of Pigs, new directives

were issued. National Security Council Action Memorandum 57 directed that covert action “may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the Agency,” but stipulated that any operations that were out of the ordinary in terms of equipment, military training required, or needing peculiar military experience, “is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.”²² These documents further blurred how responsibilities and resources might be allocated if the mission called for U.S. employment of irregular forces.

U.S. commitments to Southeast Asia certainly spurred rapid growth in SF during the 1960s and early 1970s. Both the Army and the CIA re-learned lessons about large-scale employment of indigenous irregular troops, and conducted operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.²³ With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military struggled to define its role as the world’s sole superpower.

After nearly ten years of conflict combatting al-Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide, new challenges confront the U.S. capability to employ irregulars on the battlefield. Operations in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. heavily leveraged our SF unconventional warfare capabilities to employ irregulars of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. True to the operational concepts of some visionaries in the 1950s, CIA covert operatives leveraged existing agent contacts to connect Northern Alliance leadership with Army SF operators after the September 11th attacks. The campaign was highly successful, but some events illustrate that the Army no longer has the institutional facility with this once familiar capability. For example, battlefield experiences revealed there was no legal provision for SF units to pay the guerrilla units established in 2001 and 2002—a routine practice during past conflicts.

During the Philippine Insurrection and many campaigns prior to WWII, all Army officers would be expected to know how to raise, equip, train, and pay irregular troops in support of their local operations. Within the Department of Defense, these operations are now confined to the U.S. Army SF community. Today, the Army SF community continues to doctrinally debate restricting the definition of the unconventional warfare mission to a very narrow niche environment, including only “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”²⁴ Doctrinal clarity is laudable, but the fact remains that in the units designated responsible for insurgency and unconventional warfare by our military, no unclassified doctrine exists detailing the employment of irregulars. In the USSOCOM Commander’s FY2012-2017 Integrated Priority Requirement List, he states, “There is no standing process to recruit and employ local foreign nationals as Scouts in critical regions.”²⁵ A great deal has changed since Army commanders implemented widespread employment of irregular forces throughout the Philippine archipelago at the dawn of the 20th Century.

The Philippine Insurrection, 1899-1902

From the outset of the U.S. campaign to counter Filipino patriot Emilio Aguinaldo’s insurrection, the employment of irregulars facilitated accomplishment of America’s strategic objectives. Though successive military commanders in the Philippines would struggle with President McKinley’s initially vague, ambiguous strategic guidance, America’s policy concerning the insurrection crystallized over time: no joint occupation; Filipino insurgents must recognize the authority of U.S. sovereignty; and “benevolent assimilation” was preferable to fighting our erstwhile Filipino allies if

possible. If not, “use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this end.”²⁶

Now that the war with Spain was over, McKinley was keen to use only the manpower and resources absolutely necessary—“within actual military needs.”²⁷ The 1900 presidential election was rapidly approaching, and he saw no need to provide his opponents with political ammunition. McKinley’s instructions revealed his desire to avoid any entangling alliances with the native insurgents “that would incur our liability to maintain their cause in the future.”²⁸ Annexation and U.S. sovereignty would secure the port of Manila and access to China and Asian markets, denying other imperial powers exclusive advantage.

The 1899 Treaty of Paris had ended America’s war with Spain, but opened an entirely new chapter of conflict in the Philippines. Spain ceded Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba to the American government, and then sold the Philippines to the United States for \$20 million. Other annexations included Hawaii, Wake, and Samoa. Only eight months in duration, this “splendid little war” left the U.S. responsible for the governance of more than ten million colonial inhabitants.²⁹ Subsequent efforts at nation-building in Cuba and Puerto Rico were relatively peaceful, but this was not the case in the Philippines.

Feeling betrayed by the Americans he supported against Spain, Emilio Aguinaldo organized an insurrection against the U.S. forces now busy consolidating occupied Manila. He and his fiery field commander, General Antonio Luna, initially chose to fight a conventional war against the expeditionary American Army. At the outset, some 80,000 Filipinos were under arms to oppose the Spanish—a confrontation that had not materialized. The entrenched 20,000 that surrounded Manila faced only 11,000

Americans that were deployed thinly across a 16-mile front. More importantly, the *insurrectos* enjoyed a wealth of intelligence on the disposition of their erstwhile allies.³⁰ These advantages proved false, however: though courageous, the poorly trained, ill-disciplined Filipinos proved no match for a modern Western army. Under the field command of Major General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. commanders quickly overran Filipino positions. Driven fully across the island of Luzon into the northern mountains during the first few months of fighting, Aguinaldo and his badly mauled forces retreated into the jungle to undertake a protracted guerrilla war.³¹

The political landscape MacArthur navigated throughout the campaign was somewhat complex. As the sun set on the nineteenth century, U.S. strategic horizons were expanding dramatically for the progressive McKinley administration. Inspired by the closing of the American western frontier, the new American imperialism was reflected by many contemporary military theorists. Perhaps foremost, Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783*, stressed “command of the seas” as paramount to any nation’s power and influence on the global stage.³² During the Spanish-American War, a new expeditionary outlook would take the U.S. military to its first significant employment on foreign shores. Perhaps for the first time, the manpower demands of occupation and pacification of large areas overseas would tax the capabilities of America’s young military.

As the 1900 presidential election approached, disheartening news of continued pacification difficulty was not well received in Washington. Political maneuvering in Washington was not MacArthur’s only challenge to prosecuting his counterinsurgency in the Philippines. When he assumed command from MG Elwell Otis in May, 1900,

MacArthur faced a number of obstacles in the military dimension, as well. Otis had severely underestimated Aguinaldo's support and the level of Filipino opposition. His overly-optimistic assessments to political leadership in Washington badly slowed the troop buildup required to pacify the island nation. After Aguinaldo dispersed his forces and took to the jungle, Otis correctly followed suit, instinctively dispersing his units to maintain presence, and protect and isolate the population from the *insurrectos*. The dispersal incurred significant cost in terms of logistics, administration, and security—it required manpower. America's new mobilization process was evolving in San Francisco to receive, stage, and deploy new troops, and Otis' incremental requests for manpower ultimately required seven successive mobilizations and deployments to transport reinforcements. New units arrived as old enlistments expired, causing the effect of replacing one army with another in the face of a determined enemy, with little increase in capability.³³

One of MacArthur's first decisions was to issue General Order 87, directing "the arming of municipal police and the creation of mounted 'constabulary bodies,' which henceforth would be the 'conservators of the peace and safety of districts, instead of confirming [sic] their operations to areas limited by the boundaries of towns and barrios."³⁴ As a result, many of his senior commanders—themselves veterans of irregular campaigns during the Civil War and Indian Wars—set about facilitating the induction of large amounts of native troops. West Point texts and other contemporary references urged opposing partisan forces with "forces of a similar character."³⁵ The U.S. Army began recruiting Filipino auxiliaries even prior to the insurrection, and despite

a slow start, thousands of irregulars were in service before greater hostilities ended in mid-1902.

Economically, the demands of the industrial revolution continued to fuel U.S. desire for a new commercial frontier, with fresh markets and opportunities. This overarching objective motivated many of the McKinley Administration's policy decisions, so that even as the Army felt its way through its new expeditionary role in the Philippines, competing requirements for troops would sap focus from MacArthur's effort. Although U.S. forces struggled to meet manpower requirements to pacify the archipelago, more than 2,500 of these troops were sent to Peking in 1900, to assist in quelling the Boxer Rebellion that threatened national interests as expressed in America's "Open Door" policy. Irregular troops offered a low-cost alternative to requesting another costly mobilization, and it was an alternative readily available to MacArthur.

Encountering Filipino tribal, ethnic and religious social structures foreign to their Western way of war, the U.S. military responded by implementing lessons that were hard-learned on the western frontier. Defeating this adversary by leveraging historical animosities between Tagalogs, Macabebes, and Illocanos demanded adaptability, and approaches similar to those applied during the Indian Wars. U.S. commanders found the cultural fluency with which their irregulars traversed the human terrain of Filipino tribal society to be an invaluable combat multiplier. On the island of Negros, the Ilonggo- and Cebuano-speaking Negrenses formed the nucleus of the military governor's entire constabulary.³⁶ On the island of Luzon, units composed of Macabebes, Illocanos, and other ethnic groups hostile to the Tagalog tribes leading the

insurrection were utilized. Because of their ability to circulate amongst the island populace, these indigenous units were able to collect—and interpret—intelligence that American regulars were unable to deliver or understand.

Few examples highlight the multitude of advantages these irregulars brought to the societal dimension of conflict better than the renowned Macabebe Scouts, established by Lieutenant Matthew Batson, a commander in the 1st Division stationed on Luzon. In 1901, Macabebe Scouts under Brigadier General Frederick Funston intercepted a courier from Aguinaldo. One of the captured dispatches from Aguinaldo directed a subordinate guerrilla leader to immediately transfer 400 troops to Aguinaldo's location. According to the courier, Aguinaldo was operating his headquarters from the mountains of northeastern Luzon, in the Isabela province. Funston and four other officers disguised themselves as prisoners and, led by 81 Macabebe Scouts masquerading as *insurrecto* replacements, marched over 100 miles to penetrate Aguinaldo's base camp. Taken completely by surprise, Aguinaldo was captured and returned to American lines. He subsequently swore allegiance to the U.S. and issued a proclamation of surrender.³⁷

Assessing the role of information in the conflict environment adds an interesting component to study of the insurrection. The American media was prolific in the run up to the 1900 presidential election, and Filipinos were well aware that many Americans opposed the imperialism of McKinley's Progressive party. Aguinaldo and his cadre desperately sought to undermine American popular support for the war by extending the conflict; preserving Filipino fighting strength while continuing to harass the U.S. Army. By intensifying his offensive operations as November 1900 approached, Aguinaldo

hoped to sway U.S. voters to support the avowed anti-imperialist, William Jennings Bryan.³⁸ Irregular troops contributed to the factors that ultimately caused Aguinaldo's influence campaign to fail. Filipino insurgents found it particularly demoralizing to face the fact that these fellow Filipinos had turned against them. Although the *insurrectos* stepped up the pressure as Election Day approached, so did MacArthur's military leadership.

Despite aggressive increases in offensive operations, limited manpower led military leaders to realize they had to defeat the insurgents' clandestine infrastructure, or shadow government, that was always several steps ahead of American operations. With the issuance of General Order 87, local commanders leveraged newly formed irregular units to establish networks of agents that provided the intelligence necessary to break the guerrillas' control over the population. So successful were these techniques, their application was formally organized under the Division of Military Information in Manila, late in 1900. Charged with the collection and dissemination of military and political intelligence, this division enjoyed a great degree of success compromising and dismantling the insurgent supply network in many areas. Ultimately, perceived connections between the insurgents and Democrats back home proved disastrous for both; Bryan was portrayed as unpatriotic, and the McKinley-Roosevelt Republicans won by a landslide. Aguinaldo and his leadership were devastated by the election results. The U.S. would stay the course in the Philippines, and the campaign would be prosecuted with renewed vigor.

By the spring of 1900, irregular intelligence operations were becoming more and more common, and the U.S. Army began to devote greater and greater resources to

intelligence and counter-infrastructure activities. From January to June 1901, the number of Filipinos serving in military units increased from 1,402 to over 5,400. Additionally, over 6,000 Filipinos served as police officers.

The use of indigenous irregulars during the Philippine Insurrection was a decisive factor in the overall success of the campaign, principally because the level of manpower required to subdue the geographically challenging archipelago was not otherwise readily available. This fact was made more urgent by competing expeditionary requirements and the realities of American strategic mobilization at the turn of the century. The employment of irregulars certainly proved effective in achieving U.S. strategic objectives. Using irregulars was a common practice borne of necessity in the Army of the 19th century, but one valuable unintended consequence was that McKinley was able to sidestep the potential political fallout of otherwise higher American casualties on distant shores. Equally difficult to explain, the rising resource costs of sustaining an army 7,500 miles away, long after the war with Spain had ended, had reached a staggering \$400 million—twenty times the price paid to Spain for the islands.³⁹ Irregular forces saved the U.S. the cost of mobilizing, transporting, and sustaining many thousands more troops. With U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia half a century later, the U.S. would realize additional political benefits to employing irregulars.

Operation White Star, 1959-1962

Shortly after his inauguration in January 1961, President John F. Kennedy authorized Operation White Star in Laos, ushering in a new American foray into employing surrogate indigenous forces.⁴⁰ U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) advisors were present in Laos for White Star in 1959, but due to the Geneva Accords of 1954

establishing Laotian neutrality, their role as advisors in support of Laotian government forces needed to be concealed with civilian clothes and identification cards. The Pentagon hid its Military Assistance Advisory Group-Laos (MAAG-Laos) within an economic aid mission called the Program Evaluation Office (PEO).⁴¹ With the issuance of National Security Action Memoranda 55, 56, and 57, the Department of Defense was elevated to a more prominent role.⁴² Under White Star, the MAAG-Laos advisors put their uniforms back on, expanded to more than 400 SF personnel, and shifted their mission focus from training Laotian government security forces, to training and employing tribal irregulars against the communist Pathet Lao insurgents.⁴³

The strategic objectives of Operation White Star included keeping “the Mekong Valley out of Pathet Lao control, thus easing the pressure on the Thai government, and consolidating a bargaining position vis-à-vis the communist bloc in the increasingly likely event of a new international conference.”⁴⁴ An option employing indigenous surrogate forces was particularly attractive, because the U.S. feared that any direct, overt military intervention would spark confrontation with the Soviet Union or China, and risk world war.⁴⁵ In *The Secret War Against Hanoi*, Richard Schulz maintains that the outcome of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution had a traumatizing effect on the U.S. national security bureaucracy in general, and the CIA in particular.⁴⁶ While U.S. policy prior to 1956 may have been liberation for democratic uprisings, afterward it was clear that America would not so easily risk escalation to nuclear conflict with China or the Soviets. Perhaps more than any other, the conflicted political domain defined the context of America’s involvement in Southeast Asia. The decision to expand military intervention to Laos was made against a backdrop of the expanding Iron Curtain. Following stalemate on

the Korean Peninsula in 1953, to the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the global march of Communism appeared a very real and credible threat to U.S. decision-makers, and a “siege mentality” pervaded the White House.⁴⁷ Cautiously traversing this policy tightrope, at least three American presidents would eventually resolve not to let the “domino theory” become reality in Southeast Asia.⁴⁸

White Star teams established, equipped, and trained irregular forces among Lao Theung, Kha, and Hmong mountain tribes in northern Laos. The Army’s fluency working in this type of human terrain of conflict was rusty, and many of the skill sets leveraged at the turn of the century in the Philippines were now the sole domain of the CIA and U.S. Army SF. Nevertheless, the advantages of using native inhabitants to fill this requirement were undeniable. Colonel Arthur “Bull” Simons orchestrated the first operations that targeted the key area for NVA north-south movement through Laos, the Bolvens Plateau. White Star operators enjoyed particular success recruiting and employing indigenous Meo tribal forces, eventually rising to a strength of of 8,000 armed Meo warriors, most under the military command of Colonel Vang Pao. By 1960, the Meo had already earned a reputation for fierce, tenacious opposition of the Pathet Lao, as well as against incursions by Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) forces in their native northern Laos. Unlike other Buddhist Lao tribes, the animist Meo was unconstrained by pacifist religious dogma, and had no qualm about killing their enemies.⁴⁹

The decision to expand conflict to Laos came with definite restrictions, and an inordinate level of political oversight that frustrated command and control (C2). While the newly established Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) fell under

General Paul D. Harkins' C2, Laos fell under the authority of Pacific Command (PACOM).⁵⁰ Reconnaissance mission requests by SF teams, for example, were forwarded in 30-day schedules to the MACV for approval, sent to PACOM for comment, then to the Office of the Special Assistant for COIN and Special Activities (SACSA) at the Pentagon, where the request was coordinated through the Defense and State Departments, to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and finally to the White House. After all this, missions within the Laotian border region could be disapproved by the U.S. Ambassador to Laos—which occurred more often than not.⁵¹

While the Ho Chi Minh Trail network through Laos was necessary to sustain the Viet Cong guerrillas, and invited U.S. interdiction, the struggling regime in Laos beckoned American support to prevent communist takeover. The apathetic U.S.-sponsored government under Prince Phouma had met with little military success against the communist Pathet Lao guerrillas. When Phouma was ousted in 1961, a cycle of tit-for-tat military aid from the Soviets led to an intensification of the Laotian civil war, and provided opportunities for U.S. covert military intervention to bolster interdiction of the Trail, including the ambitious OPLAN 34A—a comprehensive unconventional warfare campaign incorporating the training of resistance fighters in North Vietnam, sabotage and subversion throughout the north, and employing indigenous guerrillas in Laos and Cambodia to interdict Viet Cong supply lines on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.⁵²

Efforts to expand the scope of White Star into Cambodia proved problematic. Early U.S. military initiatives to interdict Viet Cong sanctuary there were intercepted and derailed by the State Department, whose strategists felt that any direct intervention

would compromise their negotiations with Prince Sihanouk.⁵³ Long after White Star was officially terminated, MACVSOG finally gained limited approval for cross-border operations in 1967. The limitations were monumental, including: no use of helicopters; no tactical air strikes; no more than 10 missions in any 30-day period; and “engage in combat only as a last resort.”⁵⁴ Had exceptions been approved, coordination for airpower or transport needed to be conducted across two combatant commands and multiple country teams. These employment and resource constraints illustrate the lack of a regional approach to denying the sanctuary the Pathet Lao and Vietcong enjoyed.

Despite operational successes of the White Star program, MACV leadership began to have misgivings over the use of its SF units by the CIA. Senior Army leaders voiced disapproval that these teams were being improperly utilized, and should be returned to conventional offensive operations as soon as possible. Later, Secretary of Defense MacNamara would comment, “the CIA doesn’t think big enough...[DoD] could put more horsepower behind it and make it more effective.”⁵⁵ In a much later 1997 interview, MACV commander General Westmoreland bluntly stated of these operations, “It was basically a waste of effort,” and the impact of these operations was more of “an annoyance than anything else.”⁵⁶ In South Vietnam, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program was enjoying similar success, where SF teams trained and employed Rhade tribesmen in strike forces, and to defend their villages. Part of MACV’s role was to provide an evaluation of SF performance under this CIA program. In efforts to wrest control of the program from the CIA, MACV reports praising CIDG success also requested dramatic increases in SF detachments to expand the scope of the program. By submitting these requests, the SF contingent in South Vietnam

exceeded 400 men. Under NSAM 57 directed by President Kennedy, the Army Staff argued that the CIDG program should be transferred to the control of MACV.⁵⁷ Colonel (later General) William Depuy revealed that the Army Staff “thought Special Forces had a role to play but we didn’t want them to play it under the CIA.”⁵⁸

On 12 June 1962, political parties in Laos consented to form a coalition government. This agreement re-established the neutrality originally imposed under the 1954 Geneva Accords. After a declaration of neutrality was signed on 23 July, all foreign military personnel were ordered withdrawn not later than 6 October 1962 by the United Nations. The 48 SF teams actively conducting operations with irregular forces in Laos were withdrawn, effectively ending Operation White Star. Only a reduced SF presence remained to conduct limited operations with Meo tribesmen and supported by the CIA’s Air America.⁵⁹

From 1959 to 1962, Special Forces teams and the CIA conducted Operation White Star to keep the Mekong Valley out of Pathet Lao control, ease communist pressure on the Thai government, and improve the U.S. bargaining position in the event of a new international conference. U.S. teams recruited and raised unconventional forces among the Lao Theung, Hmong, and Meo tribesmen as surrogates to fight the Pathet Lao communist guerrillas, and later to take the fight to the North Vietnamese transiting Laos on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.⁶⁰

White Star ultimately diverted a great deal of North Vietnamese combat power from their conventional forces engaging the U.S. Army in Vietnam. The use of indigenous irregulars reduced the risk of U.S. casualties, reduced exposure of U.S. forces—on overt and covert levels—thereby lowering the risk of direct Soviet or Chinese

confrontation, and employed the most capable adversary possible given the terrain—a native inhabitant. Indigenous tribesmen enabled unparalleled intelligence collection, and countered infiltration along the Trail with effectiveness American forces could not match.

Ultimately, the restrictive and often conflicting policy intent of Washington decision-makers confounded the ability of the military and the CIA to decisively defeat the Pathet Lao, or to deny Viet Cong sanctuaries in Laos. Solid, successful interagency working relationships between the CIA and Army SF were demonstrated time and again, despite an apparent mistrust and lack of understanding on the part of MACV leadership. These operator-level successes between the CIA and Army SF would be repeated to great effect in Central Asia at the dawn of the next century.

Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001-2006

Analysis of the use of indigenous irregulars in Afghanistan at the outset of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) illustrates that although the U.S. still recognizes the value of surrogates on the battlefield, our military has lost a great deal of its aptitude for employing these forces.

In the wake of the devastating “acts of mass murder” on the morning of September 11, 2001, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld presented a plan to leverage the Northern Alliance opposition in Afghanistan against the Taliban.⁶¹ The ambitious plan called for U.S. ground forces to link up with insurgent forces in some of the most austere terrain on the globe, and take the fight to the enemy across northern Afghanistan. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton therefore presented a course of action coordinating airstrikes with “boots on the ground”—Army Special Forces (SF)—to accomplish this

intent.⁶² The subsequent resounding success of the campaign in 2001 and 2002 validated the Army's proficiency at conducting Unconventional Warfare.

Perhaps surprisingly, the political environment surrounding operations in Afghanistan bears both similarities and pronounced contrasts with our involvement in Southeast Asia 50 years ago. There is single-mindedness for containing and defeating al-Qaeda and their affiliates wherever we confront them, similar to our united commitment to contain the spread of communism in the 1950s and 1960s. Also, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan surely continues to struggle with command and control issues, national caveats, and divergent national interests. Unlike the early years in Southeast Asia, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is the main effort, and has our full attention; however, prior to 2009, Operation Iraqi Freedom was the main effort.

Our force is one with a great deal of recent experience in central and southwest Asia, and lessons learned in COIN—not one outfitted for major conventional combat operations against a superpower on the plains of Europe. Likewise, our senior leaders and methods have matured significantly with regard to joint, interagency and multinational employment, and are generally more attuned to the political processes and constraints they operate within.⁶³

The geopolitics of OEF in Afghanistan is similarly complex, with Pakistan and India as adversarial nuclear powers watching U.S. intentions closely. Pervez Musharraf's weakened secular regime in Pakistan is already besieged by Islamist insurgents allied to al-Qaeda. A successful Pakistani insurgency that topples the current civilian government risks allowing nuclear weapons to fall into al-Qaeda's hands. The recent expansion of U.S. combat operations into the Federally Administered Tribal

Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan border enflamed Pakistani dissent over collateral damage and civilian casualties, but did not escalate further. Attempts to expand the conflict more may actually exacerbate dissatisfaction with Musharraf, but do little to deny insurgents sanctuary.

While OEF has been somewhat off the radar for the American public for several years, public support for the war in Afghanistan has begun to wane. As recently as January 2011, a CNN opinion poll cited only 35% of Americans as supporting the US military mission in Afghanistan, and 63% opposing it. Even among Republicans, where there is a slight majority in favor, some 44% oppose the war. Overall, 56% of Americans think the war is going badly.⁶⁴

The Northern Alliance was an anti-Taliban opposition group consisting of a loose conglomeration of several different ethnic groups that included the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the Hazaras. The southern Pashtun tribes, which represent the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan, were not a part of the Northern Alliance, but they also were opposed to the Taliban regime. U.S. SF leadership identified potential partners in their unconventional warfare campaign early. General Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, had served in the Soviet army and fought against the mujahideen until he switched sides and joined Massoud to fight against the communist puppet regime in Afghanistan. Dostum had formed his own militia, approximately 10,000 to 15,000 strong.⁶⁵

U.S. SF working with the Northern Alliance at the outset of OEF adapted cultural skills and experience developed during other training missions in the Middle East to the unique tribal social constructs in Afghanistan. Task Force Dagger was also sensitive to the implications of cultural awareness. For example, the task force recognized that

rivalries existed between tribal factions. As more anti-Taliban groups were identified, leadership took care to ensure equitable distribution of ODAs among the various factions, thus preventing any perception of favoritism.⁶⁶ While the U.S. did enjoy great success with the Northern Alliance briefly at the start OEF in Afghanistan, and toppled the Taliban regime, these forces were rarely utilized after 2003, and were fully demobilized by 2007.⁶⁷ This is unfortunate; there remain vast, ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan where state security forces are unwilling or unable to secure the populace. Some authors have pointed out that early SF involvement with the Northern Alliance was principally to facilitate terminal-guidance direct action missions for precision-guided munitions, and that the potential for unconventional warfare remains untapped. The unparalleled advantages indigenous forces bring to the counterinsurgency mission, and the power of the unconventional warriors that wield these capabilities, are still in demand.⁶⁸

The conduct of unconventional warfare operations against non-state actors is not without precedent. Well before the fall of the Taliban, the CIA was conducting unconventional warfare with the Northern Alliance as the U.S.-sponsored resistance force. After regime change in Afghanistan, U.S. Special Forces teams worked side by side with the CIA, continuing to enlist the aid of irregular paramilitary forces, under the direction of local warlords, and conducted operations against remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In March 2002, U.S. SF based out of Khowst used the forces of two rival warlords to maintain a viable irregular force for combat operations. U.S. military operations were not conducted against a government or occupying power but toward operations against non-state actors.

Conclusion

Throughout the history of our nation's conflicts, as illustrated by the examples here, the U.S. employment of indigenous irregulars proved an effective tool for achieving U.S. strategic objectives. In the Philippines and in Southeast Asia, adversaries at times confronted the U.S. with conventional forces, but America's dominance on the conventional battlefield compels its adversaries to engage our military in volatile, less-governed areas often dominated by tribal and traditional social networks. The U.S. military has historically employed irregular forces to defeat such enemies. During the Philippine Insurrection, the use of irregulars overcame strategic manpower shortages and competing operational requirements. This facilitated the depth necessary to pacify the large archipelago despite commitments to the Cuban and Boxer Rebellions, facilitating the McKinley Republicans to boast of unrestricted access to new Asian markets in China. Macabebe irregulars penetrated the cultural barriers American soldiers could not. The thought of fellow Filipinos acting against the insurrection was psychologically demoralizing to the Tagalog rebellion, and ultimately prevented Aguinaldo from getting the momentum he sought to sway U.S. public opinion prior to the 1900 election.

During Operation White Star in Laos, the CIA and U.S. SF employed Lao Theung, Hmong, and Meo tribesmen as irregular surrogates to contain the Pathet Lao and the spread of communism, without risking direct confrontation with China. The smaller operational footprint, during overt and covert phases of the program, allowed the U.S. to advance its policy of containment without the risk of escalation that an overt troop deployment might trigger.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. SF and CIA organization and employment of Northern Alliance forces enabled a timely response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. Homeland. The austere nature of the landlocked operational area, and extremely restrictive basing and overflight rights was prohibitive for conventional force application. Similarly, the proximity to Iran and Pakistan meant that operations would potentially impact larger regional tensions, risking escalation beyond Afghanistan to a regional conflict. The initial use of irregulars in the Afghanistan conflict proved very successful, but these forces were demobilized by 2007, even though conflict continues for the U.S. As the fledgling government of Afghanistan struggles to achieve greater capability and legitimacy, operations against the insurgents could benefit greatly from continued support of irregulars, particularly where government forces are unwilling or unable to do so. Despite past successes, existing U.S. capabilities for employing irregular forces remain underutilized globally in the U.S. strategy to combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

In consideration of employing indigenous irregulars, strategic and operational risk are very closely intertwined. Illicit or immoral surrogate activity such as war crimes, and narco-trafficking; the loss of surrogate control, especially in changing political landscapes where loyalties can shift quickly; and moral obligations that develop toward those who take the risks to themselves and their families and join in the irregular warfare effort (e.g., Montagnards, Meo, Lao Theung, and Kurds). These factors can rapidly and significantly influence decisions to employ, and how to employ, irregular forces.

The historical review presented here illustrates that the employment of indigenous irregular forces can successfully advance U.S. strategic objectives, with a

limited operational footprint, and relatively low cost in resources. Similarly illustrated is that the capability so easily implemented over a century ago has today become the domain of a select few within the CIA and Army Special Forces. Operational responsibility for employing irregular forces went from a local commander's prerogative, to a small niche capability. Little wonder then that these U.S. capabilities are underutilized globally as a component of the U.S. strategy to combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Under the current paradigm, if we are to increase the employment of irregulars during future operation, our Special Forces require new, detailed doctrine and support for doing so. The USSOCOM Commander's assertions remain troubling; we need to remove any regulatory or doctrinal barriers to employing what has been such an effective strategy during past conflicts.

Endnotes

¹ *Fuzzy-Wuzzy* is a poem by the English author and poet Rudyard Kipling. Published in 1892 as part of *Barrack Room Ballads*, it describes the respect of the ordinary British soldier for the bravery of the Hadendoa warriors who fought the British army in North Africa. See *Fuzzy-Wuzzy*, <http://www.daypoems.net/poems/1791.html> (accessed March 10, 2011); for scholarly notes on line-by-line interpretation of the text, see *Fuzzy-Wuzzy, Notes by Roger Ayers*, http://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_fuzzywuzzy1.htm (accessed March 10, 2011) and *Notes on the Text*, http://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_fuzzywuzzy_notes.htm (accessed March 10, 2011); for a brief overview on Rudyard Kipling's works covering British imperialism and irregulars, see *Rudyard Kipling*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudyard_Kipling (accessed March 10, 2011).

² Donald Featherstone, *Khartoum 1885: General Gordon's Last Stand* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1993), 47; *Battle of Tamai*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tamai (accessed March 10, 2011).

³ The assertion does not imply that contemporary conflict will occur exclusively in areas under tribal governance; conflict can occur anywhere, and within any social construct. In geographic areas beyond the reach of state security forces, the state is often not the construct through which governance is accomplished. Tribal and traditional social structures fill this void, and many U.S. adversaries seek the sanctuary of such places. The anthropology of conflict is a rapidly expanding field of study. See: Anna Simons, "War: Back to the Future", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 28 (1999), 73-108; Lincoln Keiser, *Friend By Day Enemy By Night*:

Organized Vengeance in a Kohistani Community (Fort Worth: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1991).

⁴ Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations (DMSPO), U.S. Army War College (USAWC), *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DMSPO, USAWC, AY2011), 25.

⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001, As Amended Through 31 July 2010), 143.

⁶ A wealth of literature exists emphasizing the prevalence of small wars, low intensity conflict, or military operations other than war throughout the American military experience. Among many, see Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 332-335; Ronald Schaffer, "The 1940 Small Wars Manual and the Lessons of History," *Military Review* (April 1972): 46; Allen S. Ford, *The Small War Manual and Marine Corps Military Operations Other Than War Doctrine*, Master's Thesis (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 2003) 2-3; Andrew James Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998), 3; Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1998) 1; Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 632.

⁷ America's military is not predisposed to unconventional approaches to warfare. In *The American Way of War*, Russell Weigley portrays Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz as the principal influence on American military strategy, explaining why U.S. doctrine overwhelmingly seeks to destroy enemy military forces by concentrating firepower and combat forces in decisive battle. His maxim, "The fighting forces [of the enemy] must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight," has been the guiding principle for American maneuver warfare for over a century. Blitzkrieg, the Arab-Israeli Wars, AirLand Battle, and Desert Storm all validate Clausewitzian theory - although "other means" may be important, they are subordinate to military means. Indeed, in the insightful book *The Western Way of War*, Victor Hanson argues that our concept of decisive battle is inextricably enmeshed with our Western democratic heritage. Many military leaders see this "pitched battle" concept as "the only way to defeat an enemy," where superior mass and firepower "find and engage [the enemy] in order to end the entire business as quickly as possible." This approach was evident in Vietnam, as American forces - denied the clear-cut certainty of decisive battle - used body count to gauge when enemy forces would be "put in such a condition that they [could] no longer carry on the fight." When faced with an opponent that refuses to meet our conventionally superior forces on equal terms, but seeks to attack them indirectly, we react with distaste. We neatly label such enemies guerrillas, irregulars, or unconventional. Our predisposition for overwhelming conventional might is apparent. See Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1998) 22; Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973) 210-212; Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *Carl von Clausewitz: On War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976) 90.

⁸ Thomas E. Greiss, ed., *The West Point Military History Series: The Dawn of Modern Warfare* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1984), 101-102.

⁹ John Arquilla, ed., *From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times* (New York: University Press of America, 1996), 56-79; Marge Bruchak, "Reading Abenaki Traditions and European Records of Rogers' Raid," August 2006, http://www.vermontfolklifecenter.org/childrens-books/malians-song/additional_resources/rogers_raid_facts.pdf (accessed March 10, 2011).

¹⁰ Andrew James Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998), 11.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 14-16.

¹² Jeffrey D. Wert, *Mosby's Rangers* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 290-293; Andrew James Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1998), 23; Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 485.

¹³ Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, 34.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁶ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual 1940* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 12(1)-12(28).

¹⁷ Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986), 137-150.

¹⁸ Charles M. Simpson, III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1983), 3-5; Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Volume II* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 438-442.

¹⁹ William J. Daugherty, *Executive Secrets: Covert Action & the Presidency* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 119-124.

²⁰ Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces*, 159.

²¹ Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years*, 15-19; Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces*, 157-158.

²² National Security Council Action Memorandum 57, "Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations," memorandum for The Special Group (5412 Committee), June 28, 1961, <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/USO/appE.html#NSAM57> (accessed March 10, 2011).

²³ John A. Nagle, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 200s), 126-128.

²⁴ David M. Witty, "The Great UW Debate," *Special Warfare* (March-April 2010): 15; Mark Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special

Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) Publication 09-1 (Fort Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWCS, November 2009), 35.

²⁵ Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral Eric T. Olson, "USSOCOM FY12-17 Integrated Priority List," memorandum for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C, 1 October 2010. All material cited from this source is UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁶ Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 289.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 290.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 283.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 284.

³⁰ Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, 108.

³¹ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 950.

³² Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, 260.

³³ Stephen D. Coats, *Gathering at the Golden Gate: Mobilizing for War in the Philippines, 1898* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 260.

³⁴ Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 204.

³⁵ Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, 116.

³⁶ Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, 79.

³⁷ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 118-119; U.S. Department of the Army, *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-104 (Washington, D.C: Special Operations Research Office, 1966), 238-240.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 113.

³⁹ Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, 294.

⁴⁰ Richard H. Schulz, Jr., *The Secret War Against Hanoi* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 18.

⁴¹ Shelby L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1985), 18.

⁴² George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002), 102.

⁴³ Schulz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi*, 19-21.

⁴⁴ MAJ Dean S. Newman, "Operation White Star," *Special Warfare* (April 2005): 30.

⁴⁵ James E. Parker, Jr., *Covert Ops: The CIA's Secret War in Laos* (New York: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1995), xiii; Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, 293, 315.

⁴⁶ Schulz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi*, 164.

⁴⁷ George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 2002), 92.

⁴⁸ The Domino Theory refers to the common perception of the era that, should Soviet containment fail in Laos or Vietnam, subsequent regimes of Southeast Asia would fall, resulting in regional blocs of communist influence and potentially global hegemony.

⁴⁹ Schulz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi*, 218-221.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 277.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 227.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 57.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 234.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 235.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 312.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 276.

⁵⁷ NSAM 57 states, "Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of military trained personnel, amounts to military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role."

⁵⁸ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 72.

⁵⁹ Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975*, 22-30.

⁶⁰ Newman, "Operation White Star," 30.

⁶¹ Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, "At Camp David: Advise and Consent," *Washington Post*, 15 September 2001, A01.

⁶² Dr. Richard L. Kiper, "Find Those Responsible: The Beginnings of Operation Enduring Freedom," *Special Warfare* 15, no. 3 (September 2002): 4.

⁶³ Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 50-56.

⁶⁴ Taliban Getting Stronger, As US Public Support for Afghanistan War Collapses, <http://www.juancole.com/2011/01/taliban-getting-stronger-as-us-public-support-for-afghanistan-war-collapses.html> (accessed 25 January 2011).

⁶⁵ Major Isaac Peltier, *Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces*, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph (Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 26 May 2005), http://www.jezail.org/03_archive/manuals_monogrms/Surrogate_war_UW.pdf (accessed 10 March 2011); Briscoe et al., *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan*, 59.

⁶⁶ Cultural & Geographic Research: Tribal Analysis Center, "Starfish, Spiders, and the Jellyfish: Pashtun Cultural Factors Limiting Warlord Development," December 2008, <http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Pashtun%20Cultural%20Factors%20Limiting%20Warlord%20Development.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2011).

⁶⁷ This observation reflects the author's personal experience as a project officer assisting with the demobilization of irregular forces in Afghanistan throughout 2005 and 2006, while assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).

⁶⁸ Hy S. Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 166-172; Jim Gant, "One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan," http://rohrabacher.house.gov/UploadedFiles/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf (accessed 10 March 2011); Robert F. Baumann, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*, Leavenworth Papers Number 20 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 211-214.