Knowing What We Knew: Intelligence Failures and Knowledge Management
Abstract
Terrorism intelligence failures such as the 9/11 attacks and others can be directly attributed to the U.S. Intelligence Community's Knowledge Management (KM) shortfalls. These intelligence failures all share a common element. The knowledge required to uncover these plots was already present in the counterterrorism community, but the threat could not be countered because the information was not effectively managed. This is indicative of a convoluted, ineffective U.S. Intelligence Community that for all its many components has a sum that is less than the parts. While KM is a proven practice utilized with measured results within private industry, it remains an enigma to the Intelligence Community, where it is seldom spoken of, understood by its leaders, or mentioned in policy. Countless resources have been expended to fix the Intelligence Community after each intelligence failure, but by all accounts the efforts have not produced the desired results. A unifying KM vision and strategy from the Intelligence Community's senior leadership is an obvious solution; the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) should take the initiative to develop, source, and enforce a comprehensive KM program for the Intelligence Community to more effectively counter increasingly complex national security threats.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 28, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA560094
Entities
People
- Jeffrey J. Jarvensivu
Organizations
- United States Army War College