

NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: A MEANS FOR STATECRAFT

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STATECRAFT**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The United States must re-emphasize engagement operations in the world by building and cultivating the sources of our strength and influence to enhance partnership capacity to maintain international order and balance. The challenge is to fulfill persistent requirements for engagement forces with a range of military and civilian skills, local knowledge and relationships sustainable and affordable over time. This paper discusses a little known program, the National Guard State Partnership Program (NG-SPP), that is tailored to meet this challenge and assist the United States in achieving a favorable system of order (ends), through phase zero “engagement” operations (ways) to create a “Woven System of Order” (means). The paper also points out that the NG-SPP is sustainable, cost effective, capable and connected. Lastly, this paper will evaluate and compare phase zero operation enablers and suggest networking, commonality theory and connectedness as a new means of statecraft and an instrument of national power.

NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: A MEANS FOR STATECRAFT

“It is a cliché these days to observe that the United States now possesses a global empire-different from Britains and Romans but an empire nonetheless. It is time to move beyond a statement of the obvious. Our recent effort in Iraq, with its large-scale mobilization of troops and immense concentration of risk, is not indicative of how we will want to act in the future. So how should we operate on a tactical level to manage an unruly world? What are the rules and what are the tools?”

Robert D. Kaplan¹

A New Beginning

The United States needs a new grand strategy, methodology and tools to shape international order. There is a revolution occurring in approaches to engage an unsecure world that maintains United States dominance through diplomacy, politics, economics, military and informational policies, doctrine, operations and tactics. As a result of security concerns around the world, the military has frequently led in this revolution and is expected to maintain an enabling position of the government's interaction with this uncertain, complex and unsecured world. “The U.S. cannot do this alone as the world has become increasingly connected.”² As a result of globalization in trade and increasing connectedness through social media, United States efforts should create a fabric of mutual dependency and limited consequence. By focusing on preventing and deterring conflict, “the United States could create a funneling effect on the future of the international system or subsystems of interest; bringing its enormous material capabilities to bear, [and] U.S. shaping efforts may constrain the choices of adversaries and thus reduce the number of possible outcomes.”³

In order to sustain global supremacy in 21st Century statecraft, the United States must focus on phase zero engagement operations to establish and maintain

partnerships that project national interests and shape favorable international order. One of the most suitable and flexible programs to support Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) efforts to create and maintain long-term comprehensive partnership for today and in the future is the National Guard State Partnership Program (NG-SPP). It is an enduring and mutually beneficial partnership between foreign countries and American states through the National Guard Bureau that focuses on civilian and military security activities. The NG-SPP does a great job developing and fostering partnerships with other countries and should be considered in terminating conflicts and returning to phase zero operations (supremacy).

This paper discusses this little known program (NG-SPP), which is tailored to meet 21st Century challenges of statecraft and assist the United States in achieving a favorable system of order (ends), through phase zero “engagement” operations (ways) to create a “Woven System of Order” (means). The paper also points out that the NG-SPP is sustainable, cost effective, capable and connected. Lastly, this paper will evaluate and compare phase zero operation enablers and suggest networking, commonality theory and connectedness as a new means of statecraft and an instruments of national power.

United States Strategy and World Environment

“Just as America helped to determine the course of the 20th Century, we must now build the sources of American strength and influence, and shape an international order capable of overcoming the challenges of the 21st Century.”⁴ – 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS)

“The U.S. will create an environment that it can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concerns, with the recognition that power, in an interconnected world, is no longer a zero-sum game. We are expanding our outreach to emerging nations,

particularly those that can be models of regional success and stability.”⁵ This environment and use of national instruments of power should complement an increasingly global and connected world. The United States must also apply methods that are supportive in the conditions of growing deficit spending and looming defense cuts. “America's military represents a balance between what this country needs to guarantee its security and what this country can afford.”⁶ The 2010 NSS addresses these issues and advances our interests through shaping operations and building relationships.

In an era when warfare is becoming more multifaceted, individuals possessing a wider repertoire of military and civilian abilities will prove invaluable during complex operations involving military, political, economic and technological lines of effort. The National Guard and reserves offer a cost effective deep repository of such differentiated abilities.⁷ The reserve component possesses capabilities required for the types of operations that the U.S. military is likely to perform over the next 20 years. These forces are uniquely qualified to conduct irregular warfare and post-conflict stabilization operations in failed or failing states; building security capacity to enhance the U.S. military's relationship, operating with allies and strengthen coalitions that prevent and deter conflict.⁸

“How do you identify a problem early and put in the resources - whether it is train and equip or another partnership initiative - so that American men and women in uniform don't have to go fight, that we build indigenous capabilities that provide for stability operations, rather than having to go in and do it ourselves in ungoverned spaces in countries that are under stress?”⁹ The answer is preventing conflict and

building partnership capacity through engagement operations during phase zero. These activities include security cooperation and stabilization operations that occur before direct application of military force.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) implements the overarching goals and strategy in support of the objectives outlined in the NSS and focuses on strengthening alliances and building new partnerships to defeat global terrorism. The NDS objectives include security and deterring conflict by shaping the choices of key states, strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships to integrate and unify joint civil-military efforts to establish a favorable system of international order.¹⁰ “The U.S. has developed military capabilities and alliances and coalitions, participated in and supported international security and economic institutions, [and has] used diplomacy and soft power to shape the behavior of individual states and the international system.”¹¹

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) confirms these objectives and directed the rebalance of U.S. military capabilities, reforms defense processes and institutions to leverage the capacity of conflict prevention and deterrence. The QDR directs the strengthening of relationships by collaborating closely with allies and partners, strengthening interagency partnerships, including U.S. civilian capacity and pursuing cooperative and tailored approaches to the United States global defense posture.

The 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) reaffirms the NSS, NDS and QDR’s commitment to America to retain its global leadership role. The NMS defines U.S. enduring national interests, most notably an international order advanced by U.S.

leadership that promotes peace security and opportunity through stronger cooperation, to meet global challenges.¹²

U.S. strategic approaches and new requirements for the U.S. military to rebalance and reform roles and missions to support phase zero operations is necessary during a period of constraining resources. This emphasis on supporting phase zero assists the United States to better understand the world environment and aids the achievement of a favorable system of order. This rebalance also sets the framework to define the United States in the 21st Century. So after ten years of war - what are new the challenges for the U.S. military?

U.S. Military Challenge

“I am directing the military services, the joint staff, the major functional and regional commands, and the civilian side of the Pentagon to take a hard, unsparing look at how they operate - in substance and style alike.”¹³

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates realizes the need for a bottom up review to address our future challenges. Defining the problem is essential to solving the problem because it involves understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue at hand -- defining the essence of a complex, ill-structured problem.¹⁴ In 2010, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Dennis M. McCarthy, asked the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), General Craig R. McKinley, to examine our future challenge in fulfilling persistent requirements for engagement forces with a range of military and civilian skills, local knowledge and relationships sustainable over time.¹⁵ This is an interesting question, particularly because it was proposed to the NGB. However, this makes sense because of the NG-SPP. The United States must achieve a favorable system of order (ends), through phase zero “engagement” operations (ways) to create a “woven system of order” (means) as an emerging method of statecraft. The

NG-SPP is uniquely capable of supporting this strategy in the current environment and responsive to future requirements.

Assistant Secretary McCarthy's concerns appear to convey the need for the United States to create an enduring cost effective way to build partners and cultivate mutually assured relationships on a regional basis in order to provide a platform that develops civilian and inter-connected military capacity throughout the world. "Although the U.S. does well on military measures, there is increasingly more going on in the world that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics are changing in a way that means America cannot achieve all of their international goals acting alone."¹⁶ Assistant Secretary McCarthy goes on to explain the importance of the reserve component in phase zero operations because of an environmental shifting reliance: "Contextual intelligence, the ability to understand an evolving environment and capitalize on trends, will become a crucial skill enabling leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies."¹⁷

In considering the proposed engagement and cooperation approaches, the United States should use smart power. Smart power was conceived by Joseph Nye who defines smart power as the combination of the hard power of coercion and the payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction. Soft power is not the solution to all problems."¹⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, suggests that soft power is only effective when it rests on the foundation of hard power.¹⁹ This approach suits the emerging environment and challenges as well as the strengths and interests of the United States and programs of the reserve component. The NG can provide "smart power" approaches to United States overseas operations with programs such as the NG-SPP

and Agri-Business Development Teams. NG soldiers and airmen possess a unique blend of civilian and military skills, enabling them to conduct smart power missions with exceptional effectiveness.²⁰ They possess military training and are amplified with civilian skill sets such as business, agriculture, law, medicine, science, politics and engineering.

Enabling Statecraft: The National Guard State Partnership Program

General McKinley recognizes the National Guard linkage to smart power.

“A smart power approach to international relations highlights a core competency of the National Guard. Smart power bolsters America's ability to act as a global leader through increasing not only the military strength of the U.S. through kinetic power, but also by furthering developing relationships with other countries through diplomatic engagement.”²¹

The 2010 National Guard Posture Statement states, “The National Guard State Partnership Program (NG-SPP) establishes enduring and mutually beneficial partnerships between foreign countries and American states through the National Guard. This program is an important component of the Department of Defense's security cooperation strategy, the regional Combatant Commander's theater engagement program, and the U.S. Ambassadors' Mission Strategic Plans. A primary aim is to promote partnerships among the many nations working with us to advance security, stability, and prosperity around the globe. Today, American states are partnered with over 60 foreign nations (a 60% increase over the past five years) to focus on military to military, military to civilian and civilian security activities.

Created in 1993, SPP has helped the European (EUCOM), Africa (AFRICOM), Southern America (SOUTHCOM), Pacific (PACOM), and Central Commands' (CENTCOM) engage military and civil establishments of many countries and in every region of the globe (see figure 1).



Figure 1: Over 60 bilateral NG-SPP partnerships beginning in 1993 to advance security, stability, and prosperity around the globe.

The program benefits combatant commanders and U.S. Ambassadors by building the international, civil-military partnerships and interoperability during peacetime. This is done by linking state capacities to the goals and objectives in the U.S. foreign assistance framework. It also enhances current and future coalition operations by encouraging and assisting partner nation support in international efforts. This viable mutual security cooperation program will continue to expand in size and strategic importance to combatant commanders, ambassadors and broad U.S. agencies as demands increase in the future.”²²

Discussion: NG-SPP Superiority in Supporting Phase Zero Operations

A 2010 U.S. Army War College Graduate, Colonel Kenneth D'Alfonso proposes the challenge of executing this type of statecraft in phase zero operations:

“The principal agents of foreign affairs in the executive branch are the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS). Here lies the dilemma; DoD has great capability in constructive soft power, but is hindered by acceptability. DoS has more acceptability using constructive soft power, but currently lacks capability.”²³

On December 15, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton unveiled how the United States could make the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) more nimble, more effective, and more accountable. She said, referring to the USAID; “A blueprint for how our country can lead in a changing world through the use of what I call ‘civilian power’ - the combined force of all of the civilians across the U.S. government who practiced diplomacy, carry out development projects, and act to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict.”²⁴ What is surreal about Secretary of State Clinton’s announcement is this capability currently exists within the U.S. government. The NG practices diplomacy, develops projects, responses to crisis and conflict, and creates lasting relationships with partner countries every day.

The NG possesses superior capability, capacity and program to support DoD and DoS aims and objectives. The National Guard has the strategic potential to enable DoD and DoS with a largest institutional base of civil-military forces that possess Whole of Government (WOG)²⁵ skill sets. These units are capable of developing, maintaining and sustaining long-term relationships partnerships that builds the regional and local understanding required for successful engagement operations. The National Guard is an affordable option that is networked with civilian agencies, possesses a built-in

security apparatus and is enabled by projection platforms that promotes an image of “below the radar” employment.

The NG is the single largest employer of civilians within DoD and DoS. Almost 500,000 citizen-soldiers possess many skill set to build and train military forces, municipal forces, rule of law institutions, basic infrastructure, institutions of governance and provide humanitarian assistance. They can engage in people-to-people diplomacy, facilitate civilian agency interest with a familiarity and commonality other organization cannot establish or sustain infinitely. What is best, the NG can do all of this at one third the cost.²⁶

With more than 460,000 citizen-Soldiers and Airmen (362,015 Army National Guard and 107,676 Air National Guard) located in more than 3000 communities around the country, the NG is ready and accessible when called.²⁷ “The NG-SPP is one of many tools in the Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC) arsenal to achieve Theater Strategic Campaign objectives. With some improvements, the NG-SPP will truly be a WOG tool to promote international stability and security.”²⁸ Colonel John Jansen, a 2010 U.S. Army War College graduate points out the value of the NG-SPP to America:

“Build genius state partnerships which mobilized the entire social fabric of America support to the democracy abroad. Capitalizing on the unique role of the National Guard citizen-soldier, we will aggressively engage at home and abroad to promote stability by strengthening democracy and free-market economies. We will assist in the construction of democratic institutions and the social infrastructures necessary to sustain a democratic tradition. Partnerships will create long-term personal relations based on openness, confidence, and trust.”²⁹

The National Guard is postured to support WOG solutions in developing partnerships with foreign nations. “The NG has a unique blend of civilian and military skills. It is the dual, citizen-soldier/citizen-airman nature and temperament of the NG

members that allow them to be so effective when conducting smart power missions.”³⁰

All NG members possess military skills and occupations to build security capacity within other militaries; however, they also bring secondary skill sets from their civilian jobs like a mayor of a city, a public works employee, city planner, county sheriff or a farmer.

“Guardsmen today are able to kinetically execute a close-arms firefight on an urban street in Afghanistan just as they can diplomatically arrange a construction project with tribal leaders. Such transitions between these complex situations are incredibly difficult to make, but are exactly where members of the NG excel. Because most members are civilians as well as Soldiers and Airmen, they can readily move between these military and civilian cultures as they have been doing for centuries.”³¹

The ability to move between these military and civilian cultures is the centerpiece of the NG-SPP and forms the basis of the operational construct for the program.

Colonel Jansen goes on to add:

“Through the SPP, the NG will become a lead Department of Defense instrument by advancing civil-military cooperation. They will continue their steadfast support of military to military activities that reinforce the GCCs’ plan, and will leverage the close ties between the State/Territory NGs in their communities to enable and facilitate development of broad civil relationships that foster cooperation across all levels of society.”³²

Enhancing the capacity and capabilities of partner nations are the building blocks of engagement operations and delivering WOG solutions gives depth and effectiveness, but the mortar that makes it all work and fit together is maintaining lasting relationships with these partners. “Any attempt to develop a single index of power is doomed to fail because power depends upon human relationships that vary in different contexts. Whereas money can be used to measure purchasing power across different markets, there is no standard of value that can summarize all relationships and contacts to

The program began in 1993 and since that time, thousands of Illinois National Guardsmen have participated in exchanges with Polish forces (military and civilian). These exchanges include military training for the indoctrination into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the development of expeditionary capacity and peacekeeping operations; professionalization of the military and establishment of a career noncommissioned officer corps; civil military training focusing on emergency response; counterterrorism and disaster relief; new equipment training in support of foreign military sales; youth education exchanges and co-deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.³⁴ After 18 years of partnership, the most senior members of the ILNG have close personal and professional relationships with their Polish counterparts and intimate knowledge of the geographic region of Poland. These connections and experiences provide unique insights to a country's culture and responsiveness to managed relationships during times of crisis and need.

For example, on April 10, 2010, in Western Russia, a plane crashed killing over 96 senior leaders of Poland after the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the World War II-era killing of 22,000 Polish officers in Katyn, Russia. The ILNG leadership mourned the loss of Poland's First Family; Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army; Gen. Franciszek Gajgor; the Commanders all military services and several military religious leaders.³⁵ Once the plane crash occurred, MG William Enyart, the Adjutant General for Illinois (TAG-IL), flew immediately to Poland on April 12, 2010 to show his respect to Poland and comfort the families and friends of these great leaders. "I knew most of these men personally and was blessed to consider them friends and colleagues. Several of my troops served under these officers in combat and will forever

be grateful for their inspired leadership. Today, the Illinois National Guard is in mourning for these men as well as all the civilian leaders lost in this tragedy.”³⁶ Due to an Icelandic volcano eruption in Iceland on April 15, 2010 that prevented U.S. travel to Europe, MG Enyart became the senior U.S. military official to represent President Obama with Ambassador Lee Feinstein at the funeral processions (See Figure 3).



Figure 3: Storyboard of MG William Enyart's (TAG-IL) people-to-people connection to the Republic of Poland. He, along with Ambassador Lee Feinstein, attended President Lech Kaczynski and First Lady Maria Kaczynska on April 18, 2010 in St. Mary's Church in Krakow and 10 other funerals in the weeks following the crash.

It is feasible that one of the reasons why the Republic of Poland is the strongest Eastern European ally to the United States is because of these deep and lasting relationships created by the SPP. From the practitioner level through the highest levels of Polish government, the Illinois NG has created a mutual trust and dependency that cannot be achieved through diplomacy and cooperation alone.

“Neither the eloquence of Churchill nor the humanness of Roosevelt, no Charter, no four freedoms or fourteen points, no dreamer’s diagram so symmetrical and so flawless on paper, no plan, no hope, no treaty –none of these things can guarantee anything. Only man can guarantee, only the behavior of man under pressure.”³⁷

Forming a deep understanding of personalities and influencers within the military cooperation framework is key to shaping operations and interests. As T.E. Lawrence wrote in remarkable account of the campaign, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, “I found Abdullah too clever, Ali too clean, Zeid too cool. Then he met the 31-year-old Faisal, who was the leader with the necessary fire.”³⁸ Achieving sustainable relationships within the SPP program promotes cultural competence and awareness of the centers of influence to shape approaches and interests. In 2008 and 2009, there were growing tensions between General Waldemar Skrzypczak, Chief of Generals Staff of the Polish Army, the Ministry of Defense, and the Executive Branch of the Poland. This tension was a result of the government not supplying its 2000 troops in Afghanistan with adequate training, weapons or equipment. This dispute and dialogue occurred for three years with the number of Polish troops lost in Afghanistan. Ultimately, General Skrzypczak resigned after a long fight with politicians in order to show how critical the need was in Afghanistan.

MG Enyart and the senior leadership of the Illinois National guard were keenly aware of General Skrzypczak’s passion, determination and love for soldiers. The Illinois National Guard also knew that General Skrzypczak’s resignation was a possibility and his successor would need to be more diplomatic. It was no surprise to see General Franciszek Gagor selected as Chief of General Staff. General Gagor was described as

a 'peaceful warrior;' He served in numerous joint assignments in NATO and an advisor with the European Union. He was a man of consensus and perfect to lead profound reforms within the Polish Army.³⁹ These insights are only possible through sustained engagement and developed relationships. These relationships provide optimal conditions to shape mutual interests to achieve separate goals while navigating the political environment to ensure unity of effort. General Gagor's savvy diplomatic approach and mutual commitment of the ILNG assured continued support of forces for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) during a period of intense opposition from the media and elected representatives within Poland.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Poland has provided over 30,000 service members to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF over the past 8 years and has become one of the largest providers of deployment expeditionary forces among United States allies.⁴¹

Robert D. Kaplan suggests in his 2003 article: "*Supremacy by Stealth*," that individual relationships at the practitioner level that are savvy, sensitive to cultural considerations, and compassionate gives the United States its greatest advantage in establishing a new system of order in the 21st Century.⁴² "Once you come under fire, you get to be pretty good buddies," SSG Chad Markham said. He was a member of the 2009 Polish Bilateral Embedded Staff Team with the Polish Attack Brigade in the Kandahar province in Afghanistan. During patrols with the Polish soldiers, the group encountered improvised explosive devices and small arms fire. "I was never afraid to go out with them." ⁴³ said SSG Markham recounting his experiences co-deploying with Polish Land Forces to Afghanistan in 2009.

In the 21st Century, relationships, approach and design are not the only considerations of success in cultivating a favorable system of order and statecraft. It is the sustainable solution in an environment of budget reductions and reduced defense spending that is the U.S. reality. "By every economic measure, the reserve component delivers capability at a lower cost per capita".⁴⁴ "With the NG the nation gets a capable military force that is able to carry out both domestic and overseas missions with only 5% of the total base budget of the Department of Defense. The central reason for the National Guard's cost-effectiveness is the part-time/full-time force mix".⁴⁵ Providing routine part-time forces in phase zero operations within a particular geographical region over time is a powerful force-multiplier. It provides an economic advantage and sustained relationship advantage. "For FY 2008 budget, the total amount budgeted is approximately \$51,000 for the reserve component service member and \$223,000 for each active component service member. An active component service member costs about four times as much as a reserve component service member when he or she is not activated."⁴⁶ The use of the reserve component is critical to the 2010 QDR; "Preventing and deterring conflict will likely necessitate the continued use of some elements of the reserve component -- especially those that possess high -- demand skill sets -- and in operational capacity well into the future."⁴⁷

Establishing 21st Century Statecraft-Woven System of Order-(WSO)

"The United States must be seen as using the [its] power to bring the world together, and not be seen as steering the world apart. Understanding and being able to articulate the links that tie together the world order is essential. Furthermore, the new world order must work towards a peaceful and prosperous world by seeking cooperative solutions consistent with the wider world order and not just for the sake of the security of the United States. Crafting preventative measures should not be done in a vacuum but only after consulting with allies."⁴⁸

Lieutenant Colonel Carla Campbell, 2010 U.S. Army War College graduate suggests the need to bring the world together and seek cooperative solutions. This paper introduces a term “Woven System of Order” which helps describe a favorable system of order that creates a fabric multi-lateral connectedness and dependency which controls the actions of other nations and states through multiple and mutually supportive relationship and partnerships to facilitate good order and responsibility.⁴⁹

In the future, limited strong relationships that anchor international order around superpowers will not survive globalism and transnational influence. The United States needs to build many lasting partnerships based on people-to-people relationships that form numerous ties at the practitioner level. By having numerous links and nodes of connectedness, the United States can limit the turbulence in the world. For example, if a flag is tethered to two strong points; it will still flap violently in strong winds. If the flag is tethered by four solid points; it exhibits extreme tension and strong winds and could possibly tear. However, if a flag is turned horizontal and flattened and threaded to numerous ties, it creates a solid network of bonds that can withstand the high winds of international complexity. This same analogy is true with statecraft within a VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity) environment and provides more stability in a flat global world.

Strong statecraft ties must be woven into a fabric of responsibility using good order and open opportunities of cooperation through mutual relationships, different interests and backgrounds. The United States must use threaded connectedness to prevent entanglements and facilitate each partner’s interests. In a recent article by Retired General Stanley A. McChrystal, he discovered that kinetic or counter-insurgency

operations would not stop our enemy, it takes a network. “It became apparently that an effective network involves much more than relaying data. A true network starts with communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal relationships and trust.”⁵⁰

In *Six Degrees, The Science of a Connected Age*, Duncan J. Watts theorizes that degrees of connection can influence perception and behavior. These theories suggest that random people can connect with anyone within 6 people regardless of whether they are strong or weak ties; they still have a networking effect.⁵¹ Additionally, people who share experiences and broker information facilitate networking and have a special gift to bring people together and create an epidemic of influence that start small and at once become a viral.⁵² This theory and sociological phenomenon is the energy behind the uniqueness of the NG-SPP program. The result of the frequency and persistence of engagements and constant reinforcement can influence relationships to connect in an international order and shape statecraft.

An example of networking to create a WSO is the 18-year relationship between the State of Illinois and the Republic of Poland supporting United States and European Command priorities and objectives. Senior officials of the IL-NG and the Republic of Poland are interconnected within the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, the Bureau of Education and the four branches of military service spanning every region of the country. Poland currently cooperates with Belarus and Ukraine and has future plans to cooperate militarily with China and Vietnam.⁵³ These countries have similar backgrounds and interests and each of these countries have communist beginnings and capitalist interests. The United States can still cultivate strong diplomatic ties despite

historical and ideological differences. Through personal relations and ties with Poland, the United States can create supportive perceptions by inter-connected ties and proxy state representation to cultivate new realities and appreciations for WSO.

Additionally, Poland could open cooperation efforts to multi-laterally partner with Vietnam and the Illinois National Guard. NG-led delegations would appear non-threatening to non-United States allies and help emerge democracy, professional militaries and economic opportunities.⁵⁴

If considering conflict termination, it is possible to envision the WSO vehicle through a multinational partnership with the Illinois and Poland to engage Vietnam or perhaps Iraq. Poland has a long standing foreign military sales relationship with Iraq and is a popular vacation location for many senior officers of the Iraqi Army. As Illinois proposes to partner with Kosovo, it may be possible to cooperate with the State of Pennsylvania to improve relationships between Serbia and Kosovo and develop multinational events and training that are similar to the Polish and Ukrainian Peace Shield Exercise and the World Cup 2012 Civil Support and Interagency Exercise.⁵⁵ Lastly, the United States could partner in SPP operations with key moderate Islamic countries to build bonds and personal relationships to rid global media and social misperceptions of ideological interests of the west and Islam to build nodes of common humanity ties.⁵⁶ This approach could influence the uninformed through personal ties and quell the most difficult ideological divide and precipitant for war in the 21st Century. The purpose of power is not power itself; it is the fundamental liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world.⁵⁷

Comparison of Phase Zero Operational Enablers

The U.S government's apparatus for phase zero operations is the DoS and DoD. When comparing the components of the DoS and DoD and evaluating each organizations' effectiveness and efficiency to provide comprehensive sustained engagement, the evaluation must include each organization's *capability*, *capacity* and ability to *sustain relationships*. These components are:

1. Embassies and country teams.
2. USAID.
3. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and assigned theater cooperation forces (TCF).
4. Other agencies, such as the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) and Peace Corps (PC).

Capacity is defined as depth of personnel and equipment, diversity of organizations, ability to deploy and redeploy and the ability to protect itself. *Capability* is defined as knowledge and skills in foreign affairs, nation-building, civil-military skills and relationships within interagency operations (WOG). Finally, *sustainable relationships* are defined as the ability to conduct people-to-people activities within the hierarchy of partnered agencies that that will last more than 10 years.

The Embassies with country teams and USAID have the capability and sustainable relationship links to provide effective engagement operations. GCCs and TCFs have the capacity to support engagement operations but do not have capability or the ability to sustain effective relationships. The CRC and PC do not have the capacity, capability or sustainable relationships for effective peacetime engagement. The NG-SPP is the only element that has capacity, capability and conditions for sustainable relationships to support comprehensive and effective engagement operations of the

DoS and DoD. Support to these agencies is facilitated through GCC, Country Plans and official requests through the Embassy and country team.

Embassies and country teams, USAID, PC and CRC possess less than 37,000 employees in total (DoS-11,500; USAID-8,000; PC-14,600; and CRC-4,250). The National Guard is almost 13 times larger than all these agencies combined.

Furthermore, the National Guard is the only component of these four that is trained, manned and equipped to provide its own force protection and aligned with the DoD to use mobility airlift and possible tactical air insertion (if required). GCC and TCF have the same ability to protect and deploy, but they lack the depth of assigned forces to engage with all partnered nations in their regions. The GCC must request engagement forces from the services to execute their theater security cooperation plans. Many of these forces are reservists and National Guardsmen. This has been a common practice for almost 30 years. “In the 1980s, US Southern Command developed more responsive and effective forms of defense involvement by using active duty, reserves, and NG units to conduct engineering exercises to support President Reagan's Central American policy.”⁵⁸

All of these agencies, with the exception of the PC and GCCs possess the capability to support WOG approaches from within the skill sets of the personnel assigned to their organizations. DoS may possess all the skill sets but only through contracting to fulfill the requirements. Geographic Combatant Commands would not possess these skill sets either with support from the on NG and reserve units to meet their theater security cooperation objectives. A critical component to effective WOG

engagement operations is the ability to access civilian capabilities and work from and interagency platform to assist partnered nations.

“The US government must find a way to better incorporate the talent and insights of the private sector into all levels of planning.”⁵⁹ In July 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice officially unveiled the CRC, designed to help stabilize and rebuild parts of the world facing conflict and distress. Congress officially authorized the program in October 2008.⁶⁰ This program has the strategic potential to provide required sustain relationships with partner nations and facilitate civilian relationships to meet the needs of engagement operations. The CRC is too new to assess how assignments and tours are managed and it is not possible to assess whether the CRC can create an environment of sustained relationships. Within the GCCs and the PC, tour lengths are 2 to 3 years and follow-on assignments do not incorporate relationships established in partner nation development. The DoS and USAID have regional specificity and deployment support requirements, but they are unable to maintain lasting country engagement beyond five years. As stated previously, the National Guard has the potential to maintain partnered nation relationships for a career of service.

The NG-SPP possesses enabling capability, capacity and sustainability compared to its phase zero operational counterparts; however, its capacity to partner with all nations is limited to state size, force availability in relation to the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) and funding to support theater cooperation. NG states are categorized as large (9,500 and above), medium (9500- 5500) and small (less than 5500). Large and medium states possess the capacity to effectively support two nations and small states one nation. Limitations are a result of force availability and

full-time manning to conduct state-level coordination (Embassies, Nation Representatives, Geographic Combatant Commands and Service Commands) for theater cooperation. This limitation suggests that potentially only 100 of the 280 countries worldwide could establish partnerships; however, all countries will not be a priority or aligned with U.S. interests and therefore total number of partnership requirements could be significantly less.

The ARFORGEN model projects units scheduled for deployment expeditionary missions, contingency expedition missions and helps identify available forces to support phase zero operations and identifies limitations as forces are scheduled for deployment.⁶¹ This will not preclude states from partnering; only limit the amount of engagement activities within a given year. Lastly, to support an increase in phase zero operations, the Secretary of Defense would be required to limited call up authority to support expanded theater security cooperation while units are available for contingency expeditionary missions and provide greater funding which will augment current funding for limited training and humanitarian assistance operations.

Obstacles and Recommendations

“The U.S. government still is not investing sufficiently in the policies, laws and budgets required to enable the guard and reserve to fulfill their critical operational roles and US national security.”⁶²

John Nagel and Travis Shape suggest that the greatest obstacle facing the NG is senior policymakers and active duty officers remain uninformed about strategic capabilities and opportunities of the reserve component. This correlates with a lack of understanding with the NG-SPP. Additionally, the NG-SPP lacks standardization across states to create consistent effects and DoD has not embraced the emergence of connectedness and interdependency created through SPP as an enabling source of

national power to shape international order and statecraft. This paper suggests that these obstacles can be mitigated through:

1. Creating mechanisms to promote greater organizational synergy.
2. Establishment of NGB policies and regulations.
3. Proposing future research regarding connectedness as a new source of national power.

First, many senior policymakers and active-duty officers remain uninformed about the guard and reserves. This is a result of lingering anti-NG and reserve bias among some full-time active-duty personnel and this lack of awareness damages active reserve unity by stifling improvements.⁶³ The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs should incorporate the NG-SPP in professional development at senior service schools and support policies and funding reform to support engagement operations as a core mission of the NG. Second, the NGB has executed the SPP program under policy since 1993 and has not developed specific guidance to execute the program. The NGB needs to expand policy, develop regulatory guidance and operating procedures to standardize execution among NG states. Lastly, “Changes in the global environment over the past two decades have led to a world that is increasingly interconnected. This interconnection has changed the dynamics of international relations.”⁶⁴ This SRP suggests that connectedness and interdependency is an unidentified emerging new form of national power and should be considered in forming NSS in order to lubricate a favorable system of order in phase zero operations as observed in the SPP. OSD and NGB should direct research be conducted regarding the NG-SPP and connectedness a source of U.S. national power to enable statecraft.

Conclusion

If the United States aspires to maintain global leadership, a VUCA environment requires an understanding of different cultures, different kinds of national objectives, and the different means that other nations employ to achieve their objectives. The logic for working effectively with nations around the globe must include not only competitive advantages for the United States, but how does a partnership with the United States provide 'value added' for other nations.⁶⁵

Predicting ways to shape the future is often wrong as history has shown; however, investing in people and building trust makes the science of statecraft more of an art. The methods and tools to shape and develop United States national interests abroad will be one of smart power that embraces the increasingly interconnectedness of the world. Investing in people-to-people relationships to create common bonds established from a position of military commonality and practitioner unifying engagement is the surest path of success.

The NG-SPP links the communities of America to the communities of the world and can facilitate multi-lateral partnerships to create a WSO of dependency, trust and reliance. The NG-SPP possesses exceptional capacity, capability and sustainable relationships that enable the DoD and DoS to achieve supremacy in phase zero operations more efficiently than any other program or organization. Its advantage is its ability to take military, civilian and family common bonds through engagement operations and create sustainable connections that shape attitudes, change behaviors and illicit support to create a fabric of interdependency. "The hard work is formulating policy objectives that are compatible with the world that will emerge over the next three or four decades. These are the policy decisions that will add value to the world

community as well as to the nation itself. This “New World” is now being shaped both by environmental forces and by the actions of key players on the world scene.”⁶⁶

Endnotes

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