

SERVICE CULTURE AND THE JOINT FORCE

BY

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SERVICE CULTURE AND THE JOINT FORCE

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines service cultures and their affect on the development of the joint force and its ability to meet the challenges of the future operating environment. The transformation of the joint force, synergizing the capabilities of the services to meet the nation's needs, requires service cultures open to supporting the higher need of the joint force over service parochialism. Using the concept of how leaders can impact an organization's culture through embedding and reinforcing mechanisms, the paper examines the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision documents and recent quadrennial defense review. This paper determined that the service cultures are aligned with the challenge of the future joint operating environment and will be the foundation upon which joint force capabilities evolve to meet the requirements of the future operating environment.

SERVICE CULTURE AND THE JOINT FORCE

Since the end of World War II the development of US military power and capability has been focused towards *Unified Action* and what was later defined as the *Joint Force*. *Unified Action*, being the objective of *jointness*, involves the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of service elements within military operations to achieve unity of effort.¹ One of the purposes of the National Security Act of 1947 was to put in place a framework that would better allow for Unified Action.² In the intervening years defense policy changes and updates, most notably the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, focused on the development and improvement of our joint warfighting capabilities. Throughout the development of *Jointness* and our nation's joint warfighting capabilities, the services and service culture have often been cited by many experts as a friction point to this effort. National security and defense analyst Mr. Andrew Krepinevich stated, "Preparing to refight the last war is tempting in that it offers defense planners the illusion of certainty, but also because it does not challenge the current dominant military service cultures, which are centered on armored warfare on land, short-range tactical fighters in the air, and carrier battle groups at sea."³ He further stated, "The Services, however, have found it difficult even to contemplate that those combat systems and organizations that have worked so well in the past may be less central in a post-transformation regime."⁴

The nation is involved in two wars and has been involved in conflict longer than at any other period of time in our history except for our own revolution. We have entered a geo-political landscape characterized by great uncertainty and challenge, where the future has been described as a period of persistent conflict.⁵ In addition to

the geo-political challenge the future holds, we are faced with tremendous economic challenges. Unprecedented national debt and a 2008 economic recession followed by slow growth will impact federal and defense budgets for years to come.

In this chaotic, budget constrained environment, it is imperative that the nation invest wisely in its defense structures to ensure we are developing the most efficient and effective military capabilities to meet future challenges, which will require a joint approach. The *joint force* we plan and develop today must be prepared to address the challenges of the Future Operational Environment. As we develop service capabilities it must be done within an integrated construct to ensure the *Joint Force* possesses the required capabilities to meet future challenges. The transformation of the *joint force*, synergizing the capabilities of the services to meet the nation's needs, will require service cultures open to supporting the higher need of the *joint force* over service parochialism. This paper will determine whether the military service cultures are aligned with the challenge of the future joint operating environment.

To examine service culture and their affect on the future joint force, this paper will first assess the military's current view of the Future Operating Environment, which will impact the *Joint Force* and the military capabilities the nation must develop. Then, it will look at the importance of organizational culture on organizational effectiveness. This will include a detailed assessment of the individual organizational cultures of each of the services; the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. This assessment will focus on the influence of individual service culture on the development and desired synergy between the services enabling the *Joint Force*. Finally, it will then assess whether service cultures are aligned with the desired *Joint Force*.

Future Operational Environment

General Mattis in Joint Forces Command's assessment of the future operating environment stated, "Every military force in history that has successfully adapted to the changing character of war and the evolving threats it faced did so by sharply defining the operational problems it had to solve."⁶ This required a detailed analysis of the challenges the military expected to face. The body of work and analysis on the twenty-first century security environment is prolific, but there are common themes that describe the challenges of the future operating environment that our *Joint Force* must be prepared to meet.

The Joint Forces Command's Joint Operational Environment (JOE) analysis of the future operating environment evaluates the constants, emerging trends, and the contextual world influencing the global security environment.⁷ Another view of these trends is articulated in the Marine Corps mid-range Threat Estimate 2005-2015 which states, "The degree to which the United States can maintain its security in the 21st century will be determined by how well the United States responds to a transitioning world."⁸

The JOE identifies some of the "The Constants" in the future operating environment as the nature of war, the nature of change, and the challenge of disruptions.⁹ Warfare past, present or future retains some fundamental constant characteristics associated with its social nature, competition, and change. One of the undeniable constants of warfare is its social nature, as war at its basic level is a social activity. In a social environment, the interaction between individuals and groups will be influenced by human nature, which includes a wide range of passions and motivators that will remain a factor in future war and conflict. Despite war's changing face, its

fundamental underlying nature remains constant. Regardless of the actors involved and the ways and means utilized, war remains, as Clausewitz stated, “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” simply “to impose our will on the enemy is its object.”¹⁰

Another significant trend of the twenty-first century security environment is the explosion and accessibility of information and information technology propelling the evolution of political and social values, actions, and forms of organization.¹¹ The threats we will face in the future operating environment be unconventional, unforeseen, and unpredictable originating, and our adversaries will utilize asymmetric approaches and irregular tactics. Many theorists claim the trends identified above are reducing the significance of the nation-state and increasing the importance of non-state actors on the international stage. The rapid and unpredictable government collapses in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 illustrate the power of information technology along with political and social values. The characteristics just described provide an increasingly dynamic and challenging face of war in the twenty-first century.

A way to appreciate the contextual world is by the basic components of human nature of competition and interest. The Darwinian concept of natural selection and evolution is an example of competition at its most basic level. The collapse of the Soviet Union and decline of communism has left the capitalist free market model as the dominant socio-economic influence in the world, of which competition is a fundamental component. Competition is a fundamental component of individual human nature, as well as group dynamics and interaction. A common concept associated with the nation-state is interest. For example, in a speech to the House of Commons in 1948 Lord Palmerston said; “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our

interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”¹² The concept is often paraphrased as, "Nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies. Only permanent interests.”¹³ The ongoing events in Libya in early 2011 illustrate the tensions associated with competing interests among the various factions within the country and external geopolitical organizations. Another fundamental component of the past and future geo-political environment is change. Change is a fundamental component of all human endeavors. While the face of war is changing and will continue to change as both state and non-state actors leverage changing social dynamics, technology, information, and force in various forms to pursue and achieve their interest.

Organizational Culture; its Impact and Influence

Responding to the constants, trends and contextual world requires organizations that have the proper culture to operate effectively within this future environment. Over the past several decades the theory and study of organizational culture has significantly grown as academics and managerial professionals have analyzed organizations, organizational effectiveness, leadership and leading change. Dr. Schein in the preface of his book *Organization Culture and Leadership* states that organizational culture and organizational leadership are intertwined.¹⁴ He goes on to say that culture can aid or hinder organizational effectiveness, while highlighting the importance of embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to the effort of changing an organization's culture.¹⁵

The following are some common meanings of organizational culture.¹⁶

- Observed behavioral regularities
- The norms that evolve in working groups

- Dominant values espoused
- Philosophy that guides an organizations policy
- Rules of the game for getting along in the organization
- Feeling or climate that is conveyed in an organization¹⁷

Dr. Schein states that all of these meanings reflect parts of the organization's culture, but none of them is the essence of culture. He defines organizational culture as: "the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic taken for granted fashion an organizations view of it and its environment."¹⁸ He identifies three levels of organizational culture and their interaction. The first most visible level he calls "artifacts," which are visible and audible behavior patterns.¹⁹ The next level, level two, he calls "values," which provide a greater level of awareness and are testable in the physical environment by social consensus.²⁰ His third level is "basic assumptions," which are taken for granted, invisible, and preconscious.²¹ These basic assumptions describe the organizations relationships to the environment and the nature of human activity and relationships.

Leaders create and transmit culture through mechanisms described by Dr. Schein as embedding and reinforcing mechanisms. Embedding mechanisms are what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control.²² These embedding mechanisms create the climate of an organization, which Dr. Schein states must exist before the existence of group culture. Reinforcing mechanisms, which can be policy, statements, organization or structure, support the creation and sustainment of the climate and desired organizational culture created by the embedding mechanisms.²³ These

mechanisms, embedding and reinforcing, are the tools by which leaders create, transmit, and change organizational culture.

Dr. Schein's work closely intertwines organizational culture and organizational leadership. He goes as far to say that, "the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture and that unique of leaders is their ability to work with culture."²⁴ Organizational change requires a change in the culture of the organization and "leadership is the fundamental process by which organizational cultures are formed and changed."²⁵ In summary, organizational culture is the most important element to any attempt to change an organization's behavior for it defines the organization, its internal and external activities, and its interaction with its environment. Therefore, for the military to properly respond to the challenges of the future operating environment, the service's cultures are examined for their key characteristics and ability to enable Unified Action.

Service Culture

Military services normally provide easily identifiable artifacts, have clear espoused values, and operate with basic assumptions. They are complex organizations very often with an overarching culture, as well as sub-cultures. Within the United States defense establishment there is an overarching military culture that enables services to share some common artifacts, values, and basic assumptions. A key characteristic of defense culture shared by all the services is that they are communities bound together by trust.²⁶ Trust and loyalty are the bedrock of effective and coherent military organizations, no matter what environment they operate within.

Within this shared military culture there are very distinctive individual service cultures, and within the individual services there are distinct sub-cultures. Military

expert Roger Barnett stated, “Derived over time from their assigned domain of war on land, sea, and in the air; these individual services have developed very different ideas and concepts that in turn strongly influenced their institutional cultures and behavior, particularly their strategic approach to war that establishes, their claim on the nations assets.”²⁷ As Don Snider has written, “It should be obvious to any observer, not to mention participant, that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps display sharply divergent cultures.”²⁸

The culture of the individual services reinforces key aspects of the organization. Culture is central to defining the organization’s purpose and provides an identity for its members.²⁹ It promotes the organization’s core values and provides for a common identity across the organization. Culture is also central to creating a sense of value and recognition for members of the organization.

Additionally, over the past couple of decades there is evidence of an emerging joint culture. Dr. Don Snider in his article *The US Military in Transition to Jointness* states, “the services’ activities points clearly to the creation of a new joint culture, one built around increasingly defined and accepted ways of integrating the war-fighting capabilities of the services.”³⁰ The development of the joint force, particularly, since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has introduced significant change into the defense establishment. A significant element of this change has been the role of the services within the defense establishment, from warfighter to force provider. In reference to this role change and interservice rivalry Dr. Snider goes on to say, “although interservice rivalry still exists it is now focused on a much more refined and more important issue—how best to provide military capabilities for the common purpose of enhancing the war-

fighting effectiveness of the Joint Force Commander.”³¹ This transition from a service oriented defense establishment to one focused on the joint force required cultural change within the individual services.

U.S. Air Force Culture

The U.S. Air Force, the youngest of the four services, has developed a distinctive culture revolving around the idea of Air Power. The Air Force’s culture has evolved over the course of its history, but constant throughout its history has been the concept of Air Power. Central to this view of Air Power is air and space superiority, and that with air and space superiority the joint force can dominate enemy operations in all dimensions of land, sea, air, and space.³² Another key aspect of the Air Force’s culture is, technological superiority, which is considered paramount to the organizations success. Global attack is another aspect of the Air Force’s culture, which is the ability to attack anywhere, anytime, and do so quickly and with greater precision than ever before.³³ Rapid global mobility and precision engagement have also become key components of the Air Force’s culture.³⁴ The core values that are the foundation of the Air Force’s culture are integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do.

In the last five years, the Air Force senior leadership identified what they believe to be a deficiency in the Air Force’s culture. This deficiency was a stronger identification by members of the organization with a particular weapon system or skill instead of identification with the larger organization.³⁵ In response to this perceived deficiency, the Air Force’s senior leaders changed their message to the members of the organization to emphasize the team. Consequently, the wingman concept of airmen taking care of airman is a large part of this message, and central to this message is the emphasis of the warfighting ethos of the airmen regardless of specialty.³⁶

U.S. Navy Culture

The U.S. Navy, one of our nation's oldest services, has a history rich in tradition. Its culture has been shaped by these rich traditions and the environment in which it operates. Roger W. Barnett, the author of the book *Navy Strategic Culture*, describes the environmental differences that have shaped the U.S. Navy. He states that, "ships are truly home to sailors – an oceangoing home" and that the environment in which they operate as "A different world – that of seagoing warriors."³⁷ Barnett describes the three core cultural concepts of the U.S. Navy as order and discipline, fighting spirit, and self reliance.

The U.S. Navy as an organization considers itself, and believes that U.S. policy makers consider the Navy, the first line of defense of U.S. active defense.³⁸ Barnett states, "Because of its flexibility, its sustainability, its ability to deploy autonomously, and to retract without political liability, the Navy has been the U.S. force of choice for peacekeeping and crisis since the end of WW II."³⁹ As a result, the Navy considers the ability to control the seas and project power ashore as its core capabilities central to the ethos of the organization. The Navy values its fundamental tradition of independence in operations, success in battle distinguished by courage and sacrifice, and technological excellence.⁴⁰ A characteristic of the Navy's culture shared by the Air Force that is distinctly different from the Army and Marine Corps is that the Navy "mans the equipment," while the Army and Marine Corps "equips the man." This is a cultural characteristic born out in the culture of the two capital intensive services. In essence, the key characteristic that has shaped the culture of the U.S. Navy and its main contribution to the national security of the nation is its conduct of operations at and from the sea.

Central to the culture of the U.S. Navy is its core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. Foundational to military culture is a code of honor and ethics by which the organization and its members conduct themselves.⁴¹ This code of honor and ethics underwrites discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps.⁴² The U.S. Navy's core values of honor, courage and commitment are the espoused values of the Navy to develop and foster the discipline, professional ethos, and cohesion and esprit de corps.

U.S. Army Culture

The culture of the U.S. Army has been shaped by the environment in which it operates as it is responsible for the development, application and mastery of land warfare.⁴³ The Army, as a profession and an organization, has a social responsibility to the people of the United States of America to fight and win the nation's wars and to preserve and protect the American way of life.⁴⁴ As such, the Army's cultural foundation was simply described by Gen Douglas MacArthur's farewell speech to West Point that extolled Duty, Honor, and Country.

Duty, Honor, and Country is an espoused value inculcated in the Army's warrior ethos that begins with the tenet, "I will always place the mission first."⁴⁵ The Army's culture places a high value on the team and team work.⁴⁶ Within the Army this leads to the idea of service over self, which has become a key component of the service's ethos and core values.

The Army's culture can clearly be seen in its core values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personnel courage. These are espoused values that are the foundation of the Army's culture. It is a culture that takes its greatest pride in their skill as opposed to their possessions.⁴⁷ The Army's culture has also been

shaped by the knowledge that the U.S. Army is the nation's principle element to fight and win the nation's wars.

U.S. Marine Corps Culture

The U.S. Marine Corps may have one of the most distinctive service cultures of the four services. As described above, aspects of the culture of each service is derived from the domain in which they operate. The Marine Corps demands excellence in the three domains of land, sea, and air. Its culture also encompasses some shared Naval heritage; expeditionary nature, forward deployed, nation's crisis response force. The culture of the Marine Corps is rich in history and traditions. In fact, a defining aspect of the Marine Corps culture is the strong bond, present to past, of history, heritage, symbols, and ethos.⁴⁸ The warrior ethos, with its roots in discipline and professionalism and the organization imperative of every Marine a rifleman, is the cornerstone of the organizational culture of the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps' historic motto of "first to fight" also provides another insight of the culture of the Marine Corps. From its inception to present day, a key characteristic of the Marine Corps culture has been readiness, which is the mission requirement to be the most ready when the nation is the least ready. The current day motto that espouses this aspect of its culture is their description of the organization as the nation's "911 Force."

As describe above each of the services throughout their history's have developed unique cultures. These cultures are a result of the environment and domains in which they operate and the behavior, skills, values, and philosophy that have contributed to their success and defined their organizations. The service cultures also share many common characteristics such as duty, honor, courage, professionalism, and discipline,

which are the key characteristic that have been the foundation for the developing Joint culture. Indeed these common characteristics help define a common overarching military culture within the U.S. defense establishment.

The Joint Force 1995-2010

Dr. Schein states that senior leaders can, and that they are the key to creating, embedding, and transmitting an organization's culture.⁴⁹ Transformation or change within the individual services and the joint force is a function of the vision and direction provided by senior civilian and military leadership. The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Secretary of Defense are central to change with the overall objective to develop the joint capabilities to meet the nation's security requirements. Hence, the four CJCS vision documents and current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will now be examined for their joint influences.

A key document that has shaped the development of our *Joint force* has been the CJCS Joint Vision documents, which are a key leader embedding mechanism to institute organizational change. Joint Vision 2010 was developed in 1996 by CJCS General Shalikashvili. He states, "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be an imperative tomorrow."⁵⁰ This vision called for a more seamless integration of Service capabilities, and to achieve this we must be fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically.⁵¹ It provided a common direction for the services as they developed their service specific capabilities within a joint framework to meet the challenges of the future operating environment. Joint Vision 2010 focused on four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics to achieve dominance across the range of military

operations.⁵² Joint Vision 2010 influenced service resource decisions and was the first substantive effort to tailor service capabilities to support an integrated joint force construct.

The continuation of that vision was published in Joint Vision 2020 in 2000 by CJCS General Shelton. This document built upon the vision established in JV 2010 to continue the transformation of U.S. armed forces. The vision's goal remained the development of a force dominant across the full spectrum of military operations, while highlighting the rapid pace of development in the information environment and the need for information superiority.⁵³ General Shelton's initial focus when he became Chairman in 1997 was the implementation of JV 2010; development of processes, experimentation and operationalization of the vision were key reinforcing mechanisms utilized to institute change.⁵⁴ Later in 2000 when he developed JV 2020, he highlighted the requirement for the joint force to be flexible, and that the source of that flexibility is the synergy of the core competencies of the individual services, integrated into the joint team.⁵⁵

The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), developed under then CJCS Gen Myers included a section that described a vision for the future military. Concerning the *Joint Force*, the strategy stated, "Joint teamwork is an integral part of our culture and focus as we develop leaders, organizations, systems and doctrine. We must continue to strengthen trust and confidence among the Service components that comprise the Joint Force."⁵⁶ Full spectrum dominance remained the objective for joint force. The vision contained within the 2004 NMS is another example of an embedding mechanism utilized by CJCS to influence force development and institute change.

Admiral Mullen identified the Chairmen's vision, in the 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). This document stated, "that future joint force commanders will combine and subsequently adapt some combination of four basic categories of military activity -- combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction."⁵⁷ Consequently, the future Joint Force must address these four basic categories of military activity. Admiral Mullen went on to state, "The individual Services have evolved capabilities and competencies to maximize their effectiveness in their respective domains."⁵⁸ The CCJO highlights the importance of integrating and synchronizing these capabilities and that our strategic advantage will come not from the individual service capabilities, but the ability to integrate and synchronize.⁵⁹ The passage above highlights the importance of the development of the Joint Force and the leaders use of a cultural embedding mechanism.

The Quadrennial Defense Review of February 2010 signed by Secretary of Defense Gates provides the roadmap for the continued development of our joint warfighting capabilities required to meet the challenges of the future operating environment. It states that the QDR initiatives described below will significantly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to protect and advance U.S. interests in both the near and longer-term future.⁶⁰ The joint warfighting capabilities described in the QDR are as follows:⁶¹

- U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.

- U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. The rapid growth in sea and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders and allies in several regions.
- U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters join the force. Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater average range, flexibility and multi-mission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities. We will also enhance our air forces' contributions to security force assistance operations by fielding within our broader inventory aircraft that are well-suited to training and advising partner air forces.
- The U.S. will continue to increase the capacity of its special operations forces and will enhance their capabilities through the growth of organic enablers and key support assets in the general purpose forces.
- The capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of U.S. forces across the board will be improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including ISR, electronic attack, communication networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced cyber capabilities.

The joint warfighting capabilities described above, while focused in specific domains, when integrated and synchronized are the desired capabilities of the *Joint Force*.

The development of the joint force described in the above vision documents has required organizational and cultural change within the services. The vision documents

are an example of the embedding mechanisms utilized by our senior civilian and military leadership to affect change within the services. The joint strategic planning system is the overarching reinforcing mechanism utilized by our senior leadership to influence the services and ensure attainment of desired joint capabilities.⁶² Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) are additional reinforcing mechanisms that our senior leaders utilize to influence resource allocation and shape the development of service capabilities.⁶³ These embedding and reinforcing mechanisms are the primary tools utilized by our senior leaders to affect change within service cultures and ensure attainment of the desired joint force.

Service Culture Impact on the Joint Force

Service culture has impacted the development of the joint force both positively and negatively. Many would argue that the affect of service culture has predominately been negative, illustrated by the comments from Krepinivich discussed earlier. The pursuit of service specific equipment and development of service doctrine without thought to joint interoperability are examples of the negative impact of service culture. This effect was seen in both training and operational environments of the 70's and 80's, illustrated by the interoperability problems associated with Operation Eagle Claw, the 1981 failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran and Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 invasion of Grenada.⁶⁴ However, the emerging joint culture garners much of its origin from common key characteristics of the service cultures discussed earlier.

Each operational experience of the past twenty years has seen increasing efficiency and capability of joint integration and joint force capabilities. Maj Tucker in his analysis of the integration of the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division in 1991 operation

Desert Storm states, “this unique blend of Army armor and Marine infantry melded into a tight organization which conducted extraordinarily successful combat operations.”⁶⁵ This was the integration of very distinct organizational cultures that required a willingness to adapt and learn from both organizations, but yet resulted in very effective operational results.⁶⁶ Both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom are replete with examples of integration of unique service capabilities into an effective joint team. Indeed today nearly every operation undertaken by the nation’s military in the 21st century is executed by the joint team.

Our military experience of the last twenty years reveals a significant evolution of the joint force within an environment where services had to operate together vice independently.⁶⁷ The development of the joint team and the effectiveness of joint capabilities have their roots in the overarching military culture shared by all the services and their core cultural similarities are greater than their differences. These shared cultural characteristics, most significantly the belief in selfless service and mission accomplishment, allow service elements to overcome other cultural differences to meet the nation’s security requirements. The 1986 Goldwaters-Nichols act changed the construct of interaction between the services and the joint community.⁶⁸ This was followed by the CJCS’s use of vision and associated systems that have focused on the capabilities needed by the Joint Force. From this paper’s research, this change over the past twenty years has resulted in positive interservice rivalry and service cultures that are aligned with and support the joint force and will enable the joint force to meet the challenges of the future operating environment.⁶⁹ For it is these service cultural differences that has provided the nation with unique service capabilities that are

superior in each of their respective domains and functional areas in which they operate while still enabling the jointness.

Conclusions

The U.S. military establishment has a long history of joint action. Throughout much of that history, service capabilities were developed in a vacuum and when needed forced to operate together. This vacuum was impacted initially by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and then later filled by the Chairman of the Joint Chief's leadership, vision documents and associated systems to determine joint capabilities since 1996. In the future, we need to ensure that service capabilities are being developed in light of the joint force requirement to ensure the desired full spectrum of capabilities are both effective and efficient.

Senior leaders, whether they be joint, or DOD, are key to achieving the development of the desired joint force and their vision of the joint force is needed to achieve that objective.⁷⁰ The vision they establish is the organizational embedding mechanism utilized to change the organizational culture of the services and transform the force to meet the requirements of the future operating environment. A coherent and consistent message through which they convey the objective for a joint force, and influence service culture by what they say and resource is needed to continue the development of a joint culture. JCIDS, joint doctrine and its associated tactics, techniques, and procedures are organizational reinforcing mechanisms to establish the standards for joint interoperability. It is through these mechanisms that our senior joint and DOD leaders influence service culture, develop joint culture, and transform the force.

As the nation defines the defense capabilities to meet the requirements of the future operating environment the “joint force” is the overarching construct within which those capabilities will be developed. The services possess distinct organizational cultures, and as they are melded to create the joint force for forward presence, force projection, and contingency operations, those cultures will merge with increasing regularity.⁷¹ As we transforms current service capabilities to meet the requirement of the future operating environment, we will benefit from the unique service cultures as the synergy developed from the integration of the individual service cultures will be greater than the individual parts. The service cultures will be the foundation upon which joint force capabilities evolve to meet the requirements of the future operating environment.

Endnotes

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