

A photograph of a soldier in camouflage gear and a black beret, looking out over a large camp in Afghanistan. The camp is filled with people and tents, with mountains in the background under a cloudy sky. The image is partially obscured by a black diagonal shape on the right side.

**Report on Progress  
Toward Security and  
Stability in Afghanistan**

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**United States Plan for  
Sustaining the  
Afghanistan National  
Security Forces**

*April 2012*

# Report Documentation Page

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Cover Image:

An Afghan National Army soldier provides security overwatch as more than 3,500 Afghan citizens gathered to celebrate the Persian New Year, known to Afghans as “Nowruz,” at the Shah Maqsud Shrine in Kandahar province's Khakrez district, March 21, 2011. Residents reported that the festival was attended by more people than at any time since the 1970s. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Benjamin Watson).

UNCLASSIFIED

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<sup>1</sup>

Since initial publication in June 2008, the *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* has provided the U.S. Congress semi-annual assessments on developments in Afghanistan and the state of the international coalition's civil-military campaign. The June 2008 report presented a bleak assessment of the situation in Afghanistan: "The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and have coalesced into a resilient insurgency." A year later the situation had declined further; as noted in the June 2009 report: "The security situation continued to deteriorate in much of Afghanistan." However, these trends gradually began to change as shifts in strategy were supported by critical resources, and in November 2010, the report for the first time highlighted "modest gains in security, governance, and development in operational priority areas," noting as well their uneven and fragile character. The last three iterations reported that progress has continued to expand, with the most recent report in October 2011 highlighting "important security gains" and "reversal of violence trends in much of the country."

During the current reporting period of October 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have continued to build on and expand this progress. The year 2011 saw the first year-over-year decline in nationwide enemy-initiated attacks in five years. These trends have continued in 2012. The performance of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the close partnership between the ANSF and ISAF have been keys to this success. As a result, the ANSF continue to develop into a force capable of assuming the lead for security responsibility throughout Afghanistan. Security progress and the development of the ANSF during the reporting period have enabled the security Transition process to continue in accordance with Lisbon Summit commitments. As of the end of the reporting period, nearly 50 percent of Afghans were living in areas where the ANSF have begun to assume the lead for security.

Despite these and other positive trends during the reporting period, the campaign also continued to face both long-term and acute challenges. The Taliban-led insurgency and its al Qaeda affiliates still operate with impunity from sanctuaries in Pakistan. The insurgency's safe haven in Pakistan, as well as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government, remain the biggest risks to the process of turning security gains into a durable and sustainable Afghanistan. The insurgency benefits from safe havens inside Pakistan with notable operational and regenerative capacity. The insurgency remains a resilient and determined enemy and will likely attempt to regain lost ground and influence this spring and summer through assassinations, intimidation, high-profile attacks, and the emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Additionally, the Afghan Government continues to face widespread corruption that limits its effectiveness and legitimacy and bolsters insurgent messaging.

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<sup>1</sup> This report is submitted consistent with both House Resolution 2219 (Report 112-110) and Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the ninth in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management and Budget, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of September 30, 2011. **NOTE: This is a historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from October 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from April 1, 2012, to September 30, 2012.**

The relationship between ISAF and the Afghan Government and its security forces endured significant shocks during the reporting period stemming from: the video release of U.S. Marines defiling corpses presumed to be Taliban fighters; the inadvertent burning of religious materials, including the Holy Quran, by U.S. personnel at Bagram Air Base; "green-on-blue" attacks in which members of the ANSF killed ISAF personnel, such as the killing of two U.S. military officers at the Afghan Ministry of Interior; and the killing of seventeen Afghan civilians in Panjwa'I District, Kandahar Province, allegedly by a lone U.S. Soldier. Although widespread demonstrations sparked by the Quran burnings triggered violence that led to the death of several Afghan citizens, the vast majority of ANSF personnel across the country responded professionally and played a critical role in managing the demonstrations, containing violence, and protecting both Afghan citizens and numerous ISAF and international community facilities and personnel. The effective ANSF response, conducted in accordance with training, demonstrated preparedness to respond to unexpected challenges, commitment to mission, and durability in the relationship with ISAF that withstood impassioned calls by demonstrators to exact retribution amidst a highly charged environment.

### **KEY MILESTONES (OCTOBER 1, 2011 – MARCH 31, 2012)**

The continuing decline in year-over-year violence (as measured by enemy-initiated attacks) was the most significant security-related development during the current reporting period. After five consecutive years in which enemy-initiated attacks increased sharply, enemy-initiated attacks decreased by 9 percent in 2011 compared to 2010, and decreased by 16 percent in 2012 (as of the end of this reporting period) compared to 2011.

ANSF force growth and training efforts yielded significant operational improvements during the reporting period, and the operational partnership between the ANSF and ISAF remains strong. The ANSF, now responsible for leading security for almost half of Afghanistan's population, partners with ISAF on nearly 90 percent of all coalition operations, of which the ANSF is the lead for more than 40 percent of those partnered operations. Additionally, the number of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units rated as "Independent with Advisors" increased substantially over the last six months. As of September 2011, no ANP unit, and only one ANA *kandak*,<sup>2</sup> had been rated as "Independent with Advisors." As of the end of the current reporting period, 13 ANA *kandaks* and 39 ANP units had achieved this rating. These ratings are regularly substantiated by the field performance of the ANSF, which continues to exceed expectations.

Military progress throughout the country and the continued growth and development of the ANSF during this reporting period have enabled ISAF to transfer lead security responsibility to the ANSF. The inaugural tranche of areas for transition, announced in March 2011, have steadily progressed during this timeframe. In October 2011, Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced the second tranche of provinces, districts, and cities for transition to Afghan security lead. As of March 31, 2012, 20 of 34 provinces had either transitioned entirely or contained districts and cities undergoing transition, accounting for approximately 50 percent of Afghanistan's population. As of publication, discussions are ongoing to designate additional

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<sup>2</sup> "Battalion"

areas that are to transition in the third tranche, accounting for nearly 75 percent of the total population.

During this reporting period, the United States completed the first stage of the phased recovery of the U.S. surge. Consistent with the plan outlined by President Obama in June 2011, 10,000 U.S. troops departed Afghanistan by the end of 2011, and the remaining 23,000 personnel from the surge will return home by the end of September 2012. Despite the surge withdrawal, enemy-initiated attacks continued to decline, due in large part to the increased size and capability of the ANSF.

Following the redeployment of the West Point surge by the end of September 2012, approximately 68,000 U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan, and Department of Defense (DoD) planning on force level requirements for 2013 and 2014 will be considered in late 2012. Although U.S. force levels will gradually decrease over this period, the United States remains committed to the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan, and negotiations are progressing on a long-term strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan.

### **INSURGENCY SEVERELY DEGRADED BY ANSF-ISAF OPERATIONS**

The ANSF and its ISAF partners capitalized on the operational failure of the insurgency's spring and summer 2011 campaign and prevented the insurgency from regaining momentum in the fall and winter while consolidating and expanding security gains throughout the country. ANSF-ISAF operations have widened the gap between the insurgents and the population in several key population centers, limiting insurgent freedom of movement, disrupting safe havens in Afghanistan, and degrading insurgent leadership. Continued success of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program appears to be amplifying this trend by degrading Taliban cohesiveness.

During the reporting period, partnered counter-insurgency (COIN) operations by the ANSF and ISAF, complemented by partnered Special Forces targeting of insurgent leaders, produced sustainable gains that seriously degraded the insurgency's ability to mount a major offensive during the fighting season of 2012. ANSF-ISAF operations remained focused on southern and southwestern Afghanistan. Enemy attacks in Regional Command – Southwest (RC-SW) declined and the overall security situation continued to improve, especially in the critical terrain of the Central Helmand River Valley. Afghan-led security in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province's first district to begin the security transition process, is progressing well. Three additional districts, as well as Nimroz Province, entered transition during the reporting period. Northern Helmand, however, remains contested, and Nahr-e Saraj remains the most kinetic district in Afghanistan.

The security situation in Regional Command – South (RC-S) also improved during the reporting period, as evidenced by security progress in the decisive terrain of Kandahar and the Arghandab River Valley west of Kandahar City. Afghan-led security in and around Kandahar City is also expanding. Notably, Daykundi became the first province in RC-S to begin the transition process during the reporting period. Nevertheless, Kandahar remains among the most contested provinces in Afghanistan, due in part to insurgent safe havens and freedom of movement across the border in Pakistan's Balochistan province. RC-S terrain is of central importance to the insurgency, and insurgent operations during the spring and summer will likely focus on regaining

lost territory and influence in the key districts of Maiwand, Zharay, and Panjwa'i in Kandahar Province.

The security situation in Regional Command North (RC-N) improved dramatically, with enemy-initiated attacks down 60 percent compared to the same period last year. The security situation in Regional Command West (RC-W) also continued to improve as insurgents conducted sporadic operations in an effort to divert ISAF resources and attention away from operations in the south and east. The transition process continues in earnest in both RC-N and RC-W, with various districts and cities in eight regional provinces currently undergoing transition to Afghan security lead.

As a result of insurgent safe havens within Pakistan, such as the Haqqani network's sanctuary in North Waziristan, as well as financial and operational support from various outside sources, the security situation in eastern Afghanistan remains volatile. Although enemy-initiated attacks decreased by eight percent during the reporting period as compared to the same period last year, eastern Afghanistan accounted for 34 percent of all enemy attacks throughout the country, a relative increase of three percent compared to the same period last year. In Regional Command Capital (RC-C), ANSF-led operations resulted in improved security throughout Kabul, highlighted by the successful Afghan-led security operations in support of the *Loya Jirga* in November and the re-opening of Ghazi Stadium in December. The ANSF response to the April 15 insurgent attack on Kabul demonstrated the clear progress of the command and control of the Afghan Security Ministries as well as the fighting ability of the Afghan National Security Forces. The coordinated response by the ANSF effectively contained the insurgent threats to such an extent that ISAF response forces, although prepared, were not required to assist. Nevertheless, the capital continues to face persistent threats, many of which are planned in and controlled from Pakistan.

The Taliban-led insurgency remains adaptive and determined with a significant regenerative capacity, and retains the capability to emplace substantial numbers of IEDs and conduct isolated high-profile attacks that disproportionately fuel a sense of insecurity. As insurgent capacity to contest ANSF-ISAF gains has eroded, insurgents have increasingly resorted to asymmetric efforts in an attempt to regain territory and influence, including assassinations, kidnappings, intimidation tactics, and strategic messaging campaigns. The insurgency will likely expand its asymmetric operations as a result of its diminished operational capability and in order to conserve diminishing resources.

### **INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT, THE ANSF CONTINUES TO MAKE PROGRESS**

The ANSF are the backbone of long-term security and stability plans for Afghanistan. During the current reporting period, the ANA and ANP made qualitative progress, displaying growing operational effectiveness.

The ANSF are ahead of schedule to achieve the October 2012 end-strength of 352,000, including subordinate goals of 195,000 soldiers and 157,000 police. Since March 2011, the ANSF have grown from a force of 284,952 to a force of 344,108, including 194,466 soldiers and 149,642 police.

As the ANA and ANP have achieved growth goals, the ANSF and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) have shifted focus from force generation to training and development. More than 112,045 ANSF personnel are currently enrolled in literacy training, which serves as a force multiplier and an incentive for Afghans to join the ANSF. Also during the reporting period, the ANSF, in partnership with NTM-A, gradually developed their nascent logistics, intelligence, communications and other enabling capabilities, which are essential for mission effectiveness and long-term sustainment of the force. In addition, the Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF) have emerged as the most capable component of the ANSF and have made impressive strides toward becoming an independent and effective force.

Nevertheless, the ANSF continue to confront challenges, including attrition, leadership deficits, and limited capabilities in staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement. The ANSF also continue to lack enabling support, including air (both transport and close air support), logistics, ISR<sup>3</sup>, and medical, from coalition resources to perform at the level necessary to produce the security effects required for Transition. Despite polls showing that the ANSF continues to rise in public esteem, corruption and the influence of criminal patronage networks, particularly in the Afghan Air Force (AAF), Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), remain a concern that could jeopardize the legitimacy of the ANSF and pose a threat to the Transition process. The managed force reduction of U.S. and international forces will have a corresponding effect on the number of operational partnering opportunities with the ANSF. It remains to be seen what influence this will have on ANSF development.

## **INSURGENT CAPABILITY DEGRADED AND CONTINUES TO FALL SHORT OF OBJECTIVES**

ANSF-ISAF conventional operations, complemented by Special Operations Forces targeting, continue to steadily degrade the influence and the operational capacity of the insurgency. The insurgency failed to regain momentum during the fall and winter following the operational failure of their summer 2011 campaign, and the gap between insurgent intent and capability continued to grow. This has been further exacerbated by the increasing success of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) where reconciliation efforts appear to be hurting Taliban cohesiveness. Since March of last year, there has been a more than three-fold increase in the number of formal reintegrees choosing to leave the battlefield through the APRP.

The Taliban-led insurgency, however, remains adaptive and determined with a significant regenerative capacity and retains the capability to emplace substantial numbers of IEDs and conduct isolated high-profile attacks. As insurgent capacity to directly contest ANSF-ISAF gains erodes, insurgents have increasingly resorted to asymmetric efforts in an attempt to regain territory and influence, including assassinations, kidnappings, intimidation tactics, and strategic messaging campaigns. The insurgency will likely expand its asymmetric operations as a result of its diminished operational capability and in order to conserve diminishing resources.

The insurgency also continues to receive critical support – including sanctuary, training infrastructure, and operational and financial support – from within neighboring Pakistan. In fact,

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<sup>3</sup> Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

key elements of the insurgency remain potent and threatening due to the availability of sanctuary inside of Pakistan including the Afghan Taliban based in Balochistan Province and the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan Agency.

## **AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY REMAINS LIMITED**

The civil-military COIN strategy continues to expand security for the Afghan population, providing the necessary conditions for the Afghan Government to extend effective governance and promote economic and social development.

During the reporting period, the Afghan Government made limited progress towards effective and sustainable governance. The executive branch focused primarily on supporting the security Transition process and negotiating a long-term strategic partnership with the United States. The Loya Jirga, Afghanistan's highest consultative body, reaffirmed the country's commitment to such a partnership with the United States. Afghanistan has reached similar agreements with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Turkmenistan. The Afghan Parliament resumed operations following the resolution of fraud allegations from the September 2010 *Wolesi Jirga*<sup>4</sup> elections and made progress on important legislative initiatives, including approval of the supplementary budget request to recapitalize the Afghan Central Bank for costs related to the Kabul Bank bailout. Importantly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a three-year, \$133.6M extended-credit facility program, which is intended to support strengthened economic and financial governance. Considerable progress was also made in the health and education sectors, and critical infrastructure continued to develop.

However, the capacity of the Afghan Government and the extension of effective governance and rule of law have been limited by multiple factors, including widespread corruption, limited human capacity, and uneven concentration of power among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches. Setbacks in governance and development continue to slow the reinforcement of security gains and threaten the legitimacy and long-term viability of the Afghan Government. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) are working closely with ISAF to develop and implement initiatives to combat corruption. Minister of Defense Wardak has personally taken ownership of anti-corruption reforms within the Ministry of Defense and is fighting to make the MoD an example for the rest of Afghanistan. The United States and the international community will continue to work closely with their Afghan partners to address these challenges.

The closure of the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) as a consequence of the November 26, 2011 cross-border incident in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed remains a strategic concern. The resultant standoff has hampered ANSF equipping and fielding efforts by backlogging thousands of tons of equipment. Failure to settle the GLOC issue will also significantly degrade redeployment and retrograde operations in support of the drawdown of coalition forces. Access to Afghanistan via the Central Asian nations along the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) has ensured the sustainment needs of coalition forces and allowed initial proof of principle shipments for retrograding material from Afghanistan to the United States. Reopening the GLOCs would improve the U.S. and coalition forces' mission flexibility

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<sup>4</sup> Lower House of the Afghan Parliament

and build capacity. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the NDN shows the concern Afghanistan's neighbors have for success in Afghanistan and their leader's willingness to work with the ISAF coalition to achieve shared interests towards Afghanistan's security and stability.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The progress of the civil-military COIN campaign has severely degraded the Taliban-led insurgency, limiting their operational capacity and undermining their popular support. The decline in insurgent capability, coupled with improvements in the operational effectiveness of the ANSF and a resilient ANSF-ISAF partnership, has enabled the security transition process to expand. The transition of security responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014, as agreed at Lisbon, remains on schedule.

The mission in Afghanistan, however, faces long-term challenges. The insurgency draws strength from safe haven and support from within Pakistan and garners popular support by exploiting areas where the Afghan Government has failed to provide sufficient governance, rule of law, and economic opportunities. Afghan Government progress toward key governance and development initiatives remains critical for the sustainability of security gains. Nevertheless, the mission in Afghanistan remains integral to U.S. national security objectives, and the strategy is sound. The United States and its coalition partners are committed to achieving long-term stability and security in Afghanistan to ensure that the country never again becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda or its affiliates.

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# **SECTION 1 – STRATEGY**

## **1.1: U.S. MISSION, STRATEGY, AND OBJECTIVES**

The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda, and to prevent its return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. The specific objectives in Afghanistan are to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government.

To support these objectives, U.S. and coalition forces will continue to degrade the Taliban-led insurgency in order to provide time and space to increase the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan Government so they can assume full responsibility for Afghanistan's security by the end of 2014.

Diplomatic efforts continue to complement military operations. The United States and the international community support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts with the Taliban as a means of achieving a political solution to the conflict. Progress made toward a political settlement, while important, remains nascent.

## **1.2: ISAF CAMPAIGN PLANNING**

The ISAF Operations Plan (OPLAN) 38302 was revised during the reporting period to integrate the COIN strategy, the development strategy for Afghanistan, the transition of security responsibility to Afghan lead, and the development of the ANSF. The revised OPLAN, (Revision 6), also integrates the recovery of U.S. surge forces. The mission statement of the current OPLAN states:

*ISAF, in partnership with the international community, supports the Afghan Government in the conduct of comprehensive, population-centric counterinsurgency operations – to protect the Afghan people, neutralise insurgent networks, develop an Afghan National Security Force that assumes lead responsibility for security, and support development of Afghan Government institutions for legitimate, credible, and enduring governance, security, and sustainable socio-economic growth – in order to deny terrorists safe havens and ensure the Afghan Government's stability and sovereignty not later than 31 December 2014.*

The execution of ISAF OPLAN 38302 centers on a clear-hold-build strategy focused on key terrain and area of interest districts where the majority of the Afghan population lives. Execution of the plan will create the conditions necessary to complete a responsible Transition to Afghan full responsibility for security throughout the country by the end of 2014.


## **1.3: COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Several leadership changes occurred within the ISAF command and control structure during the reporting period.

On November 5, 2011, Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger (US Army) assumed command of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), replacing Lieutenant General William

Caldwell (US Army), who had been in command since 2009. Since October, Major General Mark Gurganus (USMC) replaced Major General John Toolan (USMC) as Commander Regional Command Southwest; Major General Erich Pfeffer (German Army) replaced Major General Marcus Kneip (German Army) as Commander Regional Command North; and Brigadier General Luigi Chiapperini (Italian Army) replaced Brigadier General Luciano Portalano (Italian Army) as Commander Regional Command West.

Figure 1: ISAF Command and Control Structure (as of March 31, 2012)



## 1.4: FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES

### U.S. FORCE LEVELS

As of March 31, 2012, the United States had approximately 86,692 military personnel “boots on the ground” in Afghanistan, down from 97,795 on September 30, 2011.

The drawdown of U.S. forces continued in alignment with President Obama’s troop reduction plan, announced in June 2011, to redeploy all 33,000 U.S. surge forces by the end of September 2012, beginning with the redeployment of 10,000 personnel by the end of December 2011. The first phase of troop reductions, completed as scheduled in December 2011, involved horizontal reductions across many units and functional capabilities, while retaining capabilities in field and

enabler<sup>5</sup> support to the coalition and the ANSF. The United States will have approximately 68,000 military personnel in Afghanistan following the removal of all U.S. surge forces. Force adjustment planning to determine future U.S. force levels in Afghanistan after September 2012 will take place after the surge recovery is complete.

As the Afghan Government and the international community continue to make progress toward completing the transition to Afghan full responsibility for security by the end of 2014 as agreed at the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, the U.S. Government is leading discussions with the Afghan Government and the international community regarding the post-Transition ANSF force structure. These discussions consider the required size and capabilities of the ANSF to maintain security following Transition, the capacity of the Afghan Government to fund its security forces, and the fiscal challenges facing the economies of the international community; that is, sufficiency and sustainability. These discussions are aimed at establishing a plan supported by the Afghan Government and the international community to provide financial, training, and advising support to the ANSF as the Afghan Government assumes greater responsibility to sustain their security forces. ISAF is using semiannual metric and milestones-based assessments of the operational environment, security conditions, and ANSF quality to track the Afghan Government's progress in sustaining security and, as conditions allow, to restructure the ANSF to a sustainable force structure.

#### ***INTERNATIONAL FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES***

The ISAF coalition currently consists of 28 NATO nations and 22 partnering nations. Coalition forces are deployed at all NATO Headquarters, including ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and NTM-A. NATO Allies command three of the six regional commands: Regional Command – North (Germany), Regional Command – West (Italy), and Regional Command – Capital (Turkey). During the last six months, international force levels and pledged contributions from the 50 (non-US) troop contributing nations decreased to 44,247 personnel, down from 46,400 as of September 2011.

Several coalition members pledged additional support during the reporting period. In addition to pledging four additional operational mentor teams and 25 trainers for the ANSF, Turkey also agreed to extend its command of Regional Command – Capital to November 2012. Georgia, Mongolia, and Montenegro also pledged to increase their troop levels during 2012, with the Georgians pledging an additional battalion to their current contingent of 935 troops.

Several ISAF allies and partners announced troop drawdowns during the reporting period. Most notably, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced in January an accelerated timeline for the withdrawal of French forces from Afghanistan. Of the 3,600 French soldiers currently stationed in Afghanistan, 1,000 are planned to be withdrawn by the end of 2012, 400 more than originally planned, and France has announced that it will remove all combat troops by the end of 2013, a year in advance of the timeline agreed upon by the ISAF coalition at the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010. Additionally, Germany will redeploy the 500 troops committed in 2009, in support of the surge, by the end of 2012. Norway will end its operations at Maimanah Provincial

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<sup>5</sup> “Enabler” in this context refers to additional military capabilities, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, airpower, logistics, etc.

Reconstruction Team (PRT) by the end of 2012 but is exploring reinvestment options in other areas. Hungary reduced its commitment to the Baghlan (Pul-e Khomri) PRT from 255 to 190 in March 2012. Albania will withdraw one of its two force protection companies (110 personnel) at Herat in June 2012. Bulgaria will withdraw its force protection company from Kabul International Airport in January 2013. Slovakia will withdraw its engineer platoon from Kandahar in June 2012 and its force protection element from Tarin Kowt in December 2012. New Zealand announced that it will end its contribution of a Special Operations Forces unit, and Norway will fill this requirement as of April 1, 2012.

### *CAVEATS*

National caveats are invoked by individual coalition partners to ensure forces operate in accordance with their respective national laws and policies. Regardless of national caveats, all ISAF coalition partners in Afghanistan operate according to the ISAF Rules of Engagement, which govern the use of force.

Although some allies and partners have reduced these caveats, national caveats continue to constrain ISAF operations by limiting the types of missions a given country's forces are authorized to undertake. Senior U.S. leadership consistently emphasizes the need to reduce national caveats in order to allow for the greatest operational effect.

## SECTION 2 – AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATIONS<sup>6</sup>

Afghan National Security Forces continued to make substantial progress during the reporting period, gradually building a force that will eventually be capable of assuming full responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan.

The ANSF grew steadily during the reporting period and continued to exceed growth targets. As of March 31, 2012, the ANA reached 194,466 soldiers and the ANP reached 149,642 police, and the overall ANSF has grown from 284,952 personnel in March 2011 to 344,108 personnel as of March 2012. Both the ANA and ANP are ahead of schedule to achieve their October 2012 surge-level end-strength of 195,000 soldiers and 157,000 police, respectively.

As the ANA approach and reach its designated surge-level end-strength ahead of schedule, NTM-A, the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) continue their shift in focus from force generation and growth to the qualitative development of the force. Literacy training efforts have expanded, logistics and enabler capability have improved, and the ANSF's 12 branch schools continue to provide higher-level training to promote self-sufficiency and long-term sustainability.

Force generation and development efforts continue to translate into operational effectiveness. During the reporting period, the ANSF made impressive strides in performance, demonstrating their effectiveness as they assumed the lead for security responsibility in transitioning areas in many parts of the country. The ANSF partners with ISAF on nearly 90 percent of all coalition operations, and the ANSF is in the lead for more than 40 percent of partnered operations. Additionally, the number of ANA and ANP units rated as "Independent with Advisors" increased substantially over the last six months. As of September 2011, no ANP unit and only one ANA *kandak* had been rated as "Independent with Advisors." As of the end of the current reporting period, 13 ANA *kandaks* and 39 ANP units have achieved this rating.

The security ministries of the Afghan Government have made measured progress in developing the institutional capacity necessary to oversee, manage, and sustain the ANSF. Both the MoD and MoI continue to have problems with corruption, a condition that threatens to undermine the public perception of the security ministries and the ANSF as capable and legitimate security providers for the Afghan population. The MoD Transparency and Accountability Working Group has identified more than 50 recommendations to counter corruption in the ministry and has made progress on several of them during this reporting period. The MoI has also set-up a Transparency and Accountability Working Group, and it is now in the early stages of its work.

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<sup>6</sup> This section is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. This assessment complements other reports and information provided to Congress regarding Afghanistan; however, it is not intended as a single source of information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan. **NOTE: This is a historical document that covers the United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces from October 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012.**







Despite progress, the ANSF will continue to face significant challenges to its expansion and development, including attrition, leadership deficits, and limited capabilities in staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement. The ANSF also continues to require enabling support, including air (both transport and close air support), logistics, ISR, and medical, from coalition resources to perform at the level necessary to produce the security effects required for transition.

## 2.1: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT

NTM-A’s ministerial development activities focus on advising, key leader engagements, combined and joint meetings and working groups, facilitated inter-ministerial coordination, mentor councils, functional boards, and Ministerial Development Boards (MDBs) for the MoI and MoD. Approximately 285 government civilians, military personnel, and contractors, primarily from the United States and Canada, participate in this effort.

The MDBs assess the abilities and capacity of the MoI on a monthly basis and the MoD on a quarterly basis, and assign ratings based on the Capability Milestone (CM) ratings system. Each MDB also assesses and approves ministerial development plans.

**Figure 2: Capability Milestone Rating Definitions**

	CM-4: The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.
	CM-3: Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.
	CM-2B: Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.
	CM-2A: Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.
	CM-1B: Department or institution capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only.
	CM-1A: Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.

### ***ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE***

As of the end of the reporting period, the MoD was assessed as requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish its mission, a CM rating of CM-2B. The CM rating for the MoD has not changed since it achieved CM-2B in October 2010, primarily because of the addition of new departments within the overall ministry.

As of the last evaluation period, of the 47 total offices and cross-functional areas, 5 of the departments had a CM-4 rating, 10 had achieved a CM-3 rating, 15 had achieved a CM-2B rating, 9 had achieved a CM-2A rating, and 4 achieved a CM-1B rating (ANA Recruiting Command, Office of the Minister of Defense, General Staff G6 Communications Support Unit, and

the Parliamentary, Social, and Public Affairs Department). Additionally, several departments were established during the reporting period, including Strategy and Policy (Programs and Analysis), Headquarters Services Support Brigade, and ANA Training Command. The leadership for the Office of the Director of the General Staff and for MoD Health Affairs has not yet been selected and the departments were not assessed.

**Figure 3: Ministry of Defense and General Staff Capability Milestone Ratings (as of February 2012)**

MoD Department or Cross Functional Area (CFA)	Current CM
<b>Support to Operations</b>	
AMoD Intelligence Policy	4
AMoD Reserve Affairs	3
AMoD Disaster Response	2B
Construction & Property Mngt Div	2B
MoD Health Affairs	Not Assessed
<b>Personnel</b>	
AMoD Personnel	2A
AMoD Education	3
Gender Integration (CFA)	4
Civilianization (CFA)	3
<b>National Logistics</b>	
AMoD Acquisition, Tech, & Logistics	2B
Acquisition Agency	2A
Logistics Command	2B
<b>Executive Leadership and Defense Policy</b>	
Office of Minister of Defense	1B
Office of 1 <sup>st</sup> Dep Min of Defense	2B
AMoD Strategy and Policy	2A
MoD Legal	2B
MoD Parliamentary, Soc, & Pub Affairs	1B
MoD Inspector General	2B
Strategic Communications	3
Accountability & Transparency (CFA)	4
<b>Resource Management</b>	
MoD Finance	2A
AMoD S&P (Programs and Analysis) (New)	3

GS Department	Current CM
<b>Support to Operations</b>	
GS G2 Intelligence	2B
GS G3 Operations	2A
GS G5 Plans	2A
GS G6 Communications	2B
GS G6 Communications Support Unit	1B
GS Inspector General	2B
GS Legal	2B
Ground Forces Command	4
ANA Special Operations Command	3
Afghan Air Force	4
Medical Command	2B
Hqs Services Support Brigade (New)	Not Assessed
<b>Personnel</b>	
GS G1 Personnel	2B
Religious and Cultural Affairs	2B
ANA Training Command (New)	Not Assessed
ANA Recruiting Command	1B
GS G7 Force Struc, Trng, & Doctrine	3
Office of Sergeant Major of the Army	3
<b>National Logistics</b>	
GS G4 Logistics	2B
Army Support Command	3
<b>Executive Leadership and Defense Policy</b>	
Office of the Chief of the GS	2A
Office of the Vice Chief of the GS	2A
Office of the Vice Chief of the GS (Air)	3
Office of the Director of the GS	Not Assessed
<b>Resource Management</b>	
GS G8 Finance	2A

The Master Ministerial Development Plan (MMDP), which better integrates NTM-A partnering and advising efforts within the MoD and General Staff (GS) down through the fielded force, was completed in December 2011. The MMDP was developed to support ISAF campaign planning implementation. The MMDP integrates institution building and ministerial development activities, helping to ensure focus on building a transparent and accountable MoD and GS capable of directing and sustaining ANA operations post-2014.

The implementation of the MMDP continues to produce positive results including: initiation of inter-ministerial combined planning between the MoD and ISAF; completion of combined operational planning between the GS and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) staff for calendar year 2012; MoD and GS execution of Tranche Two of transition; numerous briefings and meetings with the National Security Council and Parliament; a force structure adjustment to the Solar Year<sup>7</sup> (SY) 1391 *tashkil*; 8 successful execution of the SY 1390 budget; and the submission of the 1391 budget as scheduled.

Despite progress, the MoD faces a number of significant challenges. Although the MoD is less vulnerable to criminal penetration than the MoI, criminal patronage networks (CPNs) continue to operate within the MoD, particularly within the Afghan Air Force. Further, the MoD is challenged by a lack of human capital in many specialized areas requiring technical expertise, and the development and growth of talent and expertise will remain critical to ensuring the long-term sustainability of the MoD.

Synchronizing the development of the MoD with the Transition to Afghan security lead throughout Afghanistan remains essential, and the MoD will need to take initiatives necessary to ensure that it is, at once, developing autonomous ministerial operations and effectively supporting the Transition process.

### ***ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR***

As of the end of the reporting period, the MoI was assessed as needing significant coalition assistance, a CM rating of CM-3; the MoI is expected to achieve CM-2B next quarter. As of the last evaluation period, of the 30 total offices and cross-functional areas, 3 departments had a rating of CM-4, 11 achieved a CM-3 rating, 9 achieved a CM-2B rating, 4 achieved a CM-2A rating, and 2 achieved a CM-1B rating. Notably, Public Affairs recently transitioned to CM-1B, joining Policy Development. Additionally, several departments were established during the reporting period, including Gender Affairs, Democratic Policing, Counter-IED, and Recruiting Command. Recruiting Command will have its first assessment next rating period. The corruption cross-functional area was dropped as each department now has corruption metrics as part of its evaluation.

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<sup>7</sup> Throughout this report, references to the solar year (SY) refer to the Afghan solar year which runs from approximately March 21<sup>st</sup> to March 20<sup>th</sup> of the following year from the Gregorian (Western) Calendar with the New Year occurring on the vernal equinox. In a solar year, a month typically runs from the 21<sup>st</sup> of one month to the 20<sup>th</sup> of the next month.

<sup>8</sup> The *tashkil* is the manning document which determines a unit's or ministry's authorizations.

**Figure 4: Ministry of Interior Capability Milestone Ratings (as of March 2012)**

Department	Current CM
<b>Chief of Staff/Special Staff</b>	
Public Affairs	1B
Inspector General	3
Legal Affairs/LEGAD	2B
Intelligence	3
Democratic Policing	3
Gender Affairs (New)	4
<b>DM Strategy &amp; Policy</b>	
Strategic Planning	2A
Policy Development	1B
Force Management	2B
<b>DM Counter Narcotics</b>	
Counter Narcotics	3
<b>DM Administration</b>	
Personnel Management	2B
Civil Service	2B
Training Management	3
Recruiting Command (New)	Not Assessed
<b>DM APPF</b>	
Afghan Public Prot Force (APPF)	4

Department	Current CM
<b>DM Security</b>	
Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)	3
Afghan Border Police (ABP)	2B
GDPSU	2A
Anti-Crime Police	2B
ANCOP	2A
Afghan Local Police (ALP)	3
Operations Planning	2A
Force Readiness	2B
Counter-IED (New)	4
<b>DM Support</b>	
Logistics	3
Finance & Budget	3
Facilities & Installation	3
Surgeon, Medical	2B
Information, Communications, & Technology	3
Acquisition & Procurement	2B

Although the MoI demonstrated measured progress during the reporting period, it faces multiple challenges which risk impeding further development. The MoI faces persistent difficulties in creating and maintaining a sustainable force, including civil service reform and a logistics capacity within the ANP pillars. Further, the MoI remains significantly susceptible to penetration by CPNs in the fielded force. Due to the nature of its mission, the dispersed deployment of its forces, and the span of control, the Afghan Border Police is particularly vulnerable to potential influence by CPNs. The Afghan Government, in partnership with ISAF, has made only limited progress toward eliminating corrupt officials. ISAF and the Afghan Government are accelerating efforts to develop internal accountability systems and sustainable processes through ministerial development and reform initiatives that will enable prevention and detection of internal criminal activity, thereby reducing the influence of CPNs.

## 2.2: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING

Literacy is a critical force enabler and force multiplier for the ANSF. Literacy enables ANSF service members to learn required skills at vocational schools, enhances instruction on human rights and the rule of law, and promotes the long-term sustainability of the force as well as post-service economic opportunity.

As focus has shifted from force expansion to force development, literacy training efforts have likewise begun shifting to increase the number of ANSF personnel at the international standard for functional literacy (Level 3). Level 3 literacy is required for ANSF personnel to attend professional military and branch schools, as it allows students to learn technical information and skills. Increasing the number of ANSF personnel at Level 3 literacy will have a significant positive impact on improving the logistics and other technical capabilities of the ANSF.

The size and scope of literacy training efforts for the ANA and ANP remain expansive. As of March 31, 2012, 2958 full-time Afghan literacy teachers were teaching 112,045 soldiers and patrolmen, up from 89,297 as of September 2011. Additionally, there are currently 11,235 ANA personnel at Level 3 literacy and 16,559 ANP personnel at Level 3.

**Figure 5: ANSF Literacy Progress**

Passed Literacy Test	NOV 2009 – OCT 2010	NOV 2010 – SEP 2011	OCT 2011 – MAR 2012	Total
Level 1	16,591	58,962	52,194	127,747
Level 2	8,783	20,016	13,845	42,644
Level 3	4,530	12,045	11,219	27,794
Total	29,904	91,023	77,258	198,185
As of March 31, 2012, 112,045 personnel were in literacy instruction.				

Level 3 literacy training is primarily instructed at the fielded units, and advancement from Level 1 to Level 3 requires an additional 248 hours of instruction. Convincing local commanders to provide troops with time to complete literacy training is a primary challenge, particularly with the ANA. Since spot inspections of the fielded force have shown that only 50 percent attend class, emphasis is being placed on having more students attend literacy training centers. The recent MoD commitment to establish the Darulaman Literacy Centre will aid these efforts, as the initial capacity of 400 students is increased to 800 students in the coming months, building to an eventual capacity of 1,500 students.

Despite the expansive training efforts and significant progress, overcoming the problems caused by illiteracy in the Afghan population will continue to be a challenge. Literacy instruction efforts are expected to increase for the remainder of 2012.

### 2.3: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS

The manning resources necessary to develop the ANSF are identified in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), NATO’s capabilities-based document used to identify campaign plan force requirements. The training mission continues to suffer from shortages of instructors.

In the wake of the high profile attack on NATO mentors at the MoI on February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2012, ISAF temporarily withdrew mentors while commanders conducted force protection assessments and validated that appropriate security measures were in place. That process was conducted expeditiously, and mentors have returned to duty, with additional security protocols in place.

The ANSF continues to face a shortage of NATO/ISAF trainers. The total number of required trainers is currently 2,774 – reflecting a slight adjustment since September 2011 when the requirement was 2778. This change is due to the elimination of 457 positions and the addition of 453 different positions. These changes are indicative of the evolution of the NTM-A mission as Afghans take responsibility for some additional tasks. The percentage of trainers in-place or pledged currently stands at 84 percent with a shortfall of 448 positions. The shortfall of absent trainers previously stood at 26 percent, but a Force Generation Conference hosted by NTM-A and SHAPE in January 2012 substantially lowered the shortfall to 16 percent. Figure 6 illustrates the current status of the CJSOR.

As the campaign supports Transition, establishing the ANSF’s self-training capability is a critical milestone. As a result of the “Train the Instructor” program, the ANA now has 1,913 certified Afghan instructors, of which 453 are Master Skills Instructor Course trainers. The ANP has 879 certified trainers. Additionally, due to the substantial changes associated with the drawdown of U.S. military forces in 2012, CJSOR focus has been to develop the next version of the statement of requirements by identifying when and where trainers will be needed in the future. Employing this approach will prevent other countries from sending personnel to accomplish a task that has been discontinued.

**Figure 6: CJSOR Trainer Status (Version 11.5, as of March 31, 2012)<sup>9</sup>**

<b>Requirement</b>	<b>In-Place</b>	<b>Pledged</b>	<b>Shortfall</b>
2,778	<b>1,916</b>	<b>418</b>	<b>440</b>

### 2.4: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CAPACITY AND GROWTH


The ANA continued to make steady progress towards its goal of assuming full responsibility for security across all of Afghanistan from ISAF by the end of 2014. The ANA is on-pace to meet its current growth targets and has steadily increased its capability ratings. The number of partnered operations continued to increase along with the percentage of these operations that were led by Afghan forces. While progress was not uniform across all sections of the ANA, some units, such as the Afghan National Army Special Forces, have made impressive strides, and are now very capable. Progress has been slower in other areas, such as in developing the ANA logistics capabilities, or the development of the Afghan Air Force.

<sup>9</sup> The United States currently sources 1,409 non-CJSOR trainer positions.

**MANNING**

The current approved end-strength for the ANA – the projected end-strength required to support transition to Afghan security lead – is 195,000 personnel by October 2012.

**Figure 7: ANA End-Strength (March 2011-March 2012)**



As of the end of the reporting period, the overall ANA force level reached 194,466 personnel. The ANA has effectively met its surge level end strength with an increase of 23,685 from the force level at the end of the previous reporting period in September 2011.

Recruiting remained steady throughout the reporting period. The ANA met or exceeded its monthly recruiting goal in three of the six months during the reporting period. NTM-A and the MoD also maintained efforts to recruit southern Pashtuns as well as improve the overall ethnic balance of the ANA. Using the MoD and NTM-A-agreed definition for Southern Pashtuns<sup>10</sup>, this ethnic segment made up 6.6 percent of enlisted recruits during the reporting period. Despite persistent efforts, the impact of the initiatives on the security situation in the south and elsewhere remains marginal.

<sup>10</sup> Southern Pashtuns are defined as belonging to the following tribes: Ghilzai, Durrani, Zirak, Mohammadzai, Barakzai, Alikozai, Achakzai, Popalzai, Panjpao, Alizai, Ishaqzai, Tokhi, Hotaki, Khogiani.

Retention<sup>11</sup> rates fluctuated throughout the reporting period and did not meet the targeted level in four out of the six months. January and March were both at 59 percent, slightly below the goal of 60 percent.

Monthly attrition<sup>12</sup> rates also did not meet the targeted level of 1.4 percent for the first five months of the reporting period: 2.4 percent in October, 2.6 percent in November, 2.3 percent in December, 1.9 percent in January, 1.8 percent in February, and 1.2 percent in March, for a six-month average of 2.0 percent. However, there was consistent improvement due to improvements in leadership, providing more leave to soldiers, enhanced living conditions, and pay system improvements.

ISAF remains focused on making further improvements, and ANA officials have partnered with NTM-A and IJC to re-activate the Attrition Working Group to determine further potential solutions to reduce the overall attrition rate, beginning with a more robust personnel report that will better define and facilitate tracking of attrition levels. Should ANA attrition rates consistently fail to meet target levels, there is a risk that the Afghan Government will not be able to sustain the training costs incurred to maintain the 195,000 soldier force.

Future force levels of the ANA remain to be determined and are a part of ongoing discussions between the U.S. Government, the Afghan Government, and the international community. These discussions consider the required size and capabilities of the ANSF to maintain security following transition, the capacity of the Afghan Government to fund its security forces, and the fiscal challenges facing the economies of the international community.

### ***FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING***

NTM-A continued to concentrate on the development of Afghan institutions and capabilities necessary to train and sustain the ANA. As part of this process, NTM-A shifted focus from increasing personnel quantity to developing quality and technical capabilities. To support this shift, the MoD approved the conversion of a training center in Darulaman into a literacy center, providing graduates with the Level 3 literacy skills which are necessary to progress to technical training within the Branch Schools. Over the course of the reporting period, more than 9,838 soldiers have received advanced training from the 12 functioning branch schools.

Additionally, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) continued to increase the quality of the ANA. The MTT concept was developed to provide professional training to soldiers previously fielded without professional training at the ANA's branch schools.

During the reporting period, the Afghan National Security University became the Afghan National Defense University (ANDU). Over the next 18 months, the ANDU will consolidate seven professional development schools under the administrative control of one headquarters to improve the future development and quality of graduates.

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<sup>11</sup> Retention is defined as the re-contracting of those soldiers who are eligible for separation from the force and also includes re-accessions (former members of the ANA who have re-enlisted following a period of separation).

<sup>12</sup> Attrition is defined as the unanticipated loss of a soldier, NCO, or officer, and includes personnel dropped from rolls, killed in action, permanently disabled, captured, and non-combat deaths. A soldier is listed as absent without leave (AWOL) after 24 hours of not reporting for an assigned duty; soldiers and NCOs are dropped from rolls after 45 days, and officers after 30 days.

The capacity of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), the premier military training center in Afghanistan, grew significantly during the reporting period. Upon completion of construction in September 2012, KMTC will have 16,000 bed spaces and approximately 11,000 classroom spaces for ANA trainees.<sup>13</sup>

In addition to training, the ANA made progress in developing force management tools critical to long-term sustainment. For example, the Computerized Pay System (CPS), contracted in the Fall of 2011, began the fielding phase in March 2012 within ANA units located in Kabul and will gradually expand to the regional corps. Once fully instituted, the CPS, which uses fingerprint biometrics to identify soldiers, is designed to expedite the pay process and provide oversight to an increasingly complex pay system. The CPS will also provide ANA leaders and staff with an automated ability to properly account for pay and query payroll data.

### ***LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT***

The MoD continued to improve and increase leadership development by focusing on increasing both the quality and capacity of officer and NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer) training programs. A total of 1,893 officers were trained between October 1, 2011 and March 31, 2012, including 812 graduates from Officer Candidate School (OCS) and 1,081 graduates from the Mujahedeen Integration Course. Officers are also produced at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA). NMAA has expanded its original capacity from the first class of 84 students that graduated in 2009 to the recently matriculated 2016 class of 640 students.

The pool of potential NCOs increased with continued growth of the literacy program and recruitment focus on literate candidates. A total of 8,083 NCOs were generated between October 1, 2011 and March 31, 2012, including 5,908 from the Team Leader Courses and 2,175 from initial entry 1 Uniform courses<sup>14</sup> (1UC).


Nevertheless, the ANA is challenged by a significant current shortfall of nearly 10,600 NCOs as well as needed growth of 6,800 additional NCOs this year. The shortage of NCOs will gradually be reduced through 2014 as experienced, qualified soldiers are identified, trained, and promoted.

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
<sup>13</sup> The difference in spaces takes into account an ability to accommodate class turnover as well as having a portion of the training in nearby field environments.

<sup>14</sup> The 1 Uniform Course (1UC) is a direct-entry training course for qualified candidates who enter the force as NCOs.

**Figure 8: ANA Officer End-Strength Objectives and Actual (November 2009-November 2012)**



**Figure 9: ANA NCO End-Strength Objectives and Actual (November 2009-November 2012)**



Training efforts continued to develop effective ANA leadership during the reporting period. As the ANA reaches its target end-strength, the Afghan National Army Officers Academy (ANAOA), modeled after the UK Sandhurst Military Academy, is expected to replace the current 20-week OCS course with a one-year course designed to improve the professionalism and leadership of junior officers. The ANAOA is a joint project of the United Kingdom and Australia, which are expected to provide the majority of the mentors. The first instructor course is expected to begin in Spring 2013 and the first OCS course is scheduled to begin in the Fall of 2013.

### ***SPECIAL FORCES***

The Afghan National Army Special Forces<sup>15</sup> are the most capable component of the ANSF and have made impressive strides towards becoming an independent and effective force. Since activation of the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) headquarters by the Chief of the General Staff in April 2011, ANASOC has continued to develop and implement its plans for the manning, training, and equipping of its forces, all while simultaneously achieving effects on the battlefield. The development of the ANASOC remains a critical component of the overall force structure and strategy to sustain the transition to Afghan security lead.

Training efforts continued to expand the capacity and capability of the ANA Commandos<sup>16</sup> (ANACDO) and ANASF during the reporting period. The ANASOC currently consists of 7,809 ANACDO and 646 ANASF. Graduation rates for both ANACDO and ANASF operators remained steady and are on schedule to meet end-strength targets. From October 2011 through March 2012, the ANASOC's School of Excellence produced a total of 1,817 new CDO and 183 new SF operators. Based on current recruiting and graduation trends, ANASF are anticipated to achieve their end-strength force level by March 2013. ANACDO are expected to reach their end-strength force level by December 2012.

Approval of the SY 1391 *tashkil* in March 2012 enabled the full establishment of the headquarters and included two Special Operations brigades containing a mix of ANACDO and ANASF. Each brigade has five Special Operations *kandaks*,<sup>17</sup> with one *kandak* working directly for the ANASOC Commander.

Additionally, the SY1391 *tashkil* added one general support *kandak* and the forward support companies and military intelligence detachments to each Special Operations *kandak*, which gives the ANASOC Commander the ability to provide tactical- and operational-level logistical support to all ANASOC forces. The restructuring of the forward support company in each of the existing nine Special Operations *kandaks* creates support assets at the company-level, which better sustains operational units whose reach spans multiple provinces. Furthermore, the approved fielding plan also calls for the creation of a military intelligence capability within ANASOC, which will increase ANASOC's capacity to generate its own intelligence-driven operations. The development and restructuring of the ANASOC headquarters, the continued development and growth of enablers in the form of logisticians and intelligence personnel, and the establishment

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<sup>15</sup> ANA Special Forces specialize in foreign internal defense and COIN operations.

<sup>16</sup> Similar to U.S. Army Rangers, ANA Commandos specialize in direct action.

<sup>17</sup> "Battalion"

and growth of a Special Operations Forces aviation capability remain priorities for the near to medium term.

### ***WOMEN IN THE ANA***

NTM-A continues to work with the ANA to increase female recruitment, as female security forces play a key role in enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of the ANSF. However, the effort to integrate women into the ANA has been largely ineffective. Currently, there are 350 female members of the ANA, which is only a fraction of the ambitious goal of 19,500. Nevertheless, training capacity continues to be set aside for female recruits; for 2012, there are two ANA Officer Candidate classes (each with a capacity of 60 women) scheduled. Three 1-UC, 16-week classes (each with a capacity of 75) are also scheduled. The NMAA will enroll 60 women, or 10 percent of the total 2016 class, starting in March 2012. NMAA will continue the practice of offering 10 seats to female medical students during their first year.

The gender integration Ministerial Development Plan serves as the foundation and implementation tool for increasing female representation in the force by improving the culture and climate for women currently in the ANSF, paying particular attention to female senior leaders. However, the MoD lacks the combination of policies, procedures, and execution to promote opportunity and fair and respectful treatment of women in the force. As a result, female representation will likely remain at extremely low levels in the near to medium term.

Nonetheless, the issue of women in the ANA remains a focus; during this reporting period, ISAF hosted a Gender Integration Conference that brought together leading stake-holders in the Afghan Government, the ANSF (including senior female ANSF members), and civil society to discuss ways in which the participants and others can work together to advance the role of women in the ANSF.

### ***EQUIPPING***

Building a sustainable combat capacity in the ANA depends on the acquisition and fielding of equipment that allows ANA soldiers to shoot, move, and communicate. NTM-A's capacity-building efforts, through the acquisition and fielding of equipment, continue to improve ANA capabilities.

The dynamics of the Afghan COIN campaign and terrain necessitate sustainable and reliable vehicles. As a result, vehicles issued to the ANA have similar standards as those issued to U.S. forces. Individual weapons are primarily standard U.S. weapons, while crew-served weapons are a combination of former Warsaw Pact weapons and standard U.S. weapons.

ANA equipment fielding continued over the course of the reporting period. However, beginning with ANA units fielded during March 2012, there will be increasing shortages of equipment, particularly vehicles, of which nearly 4,194 are currently stranded in Pakistan due to the closure of the Pakistani ground lines of communication (GLOCs). The closure of the GLOCs has had a more limited effect on communications equipment and weapons, the delivery of which continues via air lines of communication (ALOCs). Fielding priorities for the next 180 days are expected to be met if Pakistani GLOCs are restored. Fielding new equipment to units training at the Consolidated Fielding Center will remain the focus throughout 2012. As additional equipment

becomes available, NTM-A will continue to backfill corps units to 100 percent of *tashkil* authorizations.

### ***LOGISTICS CAPABILITY***

As a result of a deliberate decision made when the plan for expanding the ANSF was formulated, the initial focus for the ANSF was building combat capability and leveraging ISAF enablers to support the ANSF. As ANSF achieves its end strength goals, ISAF is increasingly focusing on development of ANA enablers, particularly logistics capabilities

At the national level, ANA logistics nodes are complete, and development efforts are expected to increasingly focus on improving logistics effectiveness in the coming year. On a regional level, the future structure of ANA logistics began to take shape in early 2012 as a merging of Forward Supply Depots and Corps Logistics Battalions into Regional Logistics Support Commands (RLSCs) started, with four mergers having been completed. Six RLSCs will report to the Army Support Command (ASC) of the GS, building the hub for logistical support. As a sign of Afghan development, the Commander of the ASC published the implementation plan for this effort in November 2011. Notably, the nascent logistics system successfully distributed packages of cold weather clothing and equipment to ANA units during this reporting period.

During the coming period, logistics development efforts will focus on facilitating distribution and using completed infrastructure in order to develop an ANA logistics system better able to respond to specific requests from the ANA units. However, despite progress, the ANA is expected to lack combat enablers and logistics support for the foreseeable future.

### ***AFGHAN AIR FORCE***

The Afghan Air Force's long-term development strategy includes the creation of an air force that can support the needs of the ANSF and Afghan Government by 2016. This force will be capable of presidential airlift, air mobility, rotary and fixed-wing close air support, casualty evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance. The AAF also plans to be able to sustain its capacity through indigenous training institutions, including a complete education and training infrastructure. The air fleet will consist of a mix of Russian and Western airframes. Afghan airmen will operate in accordance with NATO procedures and will be able to support the Afghan Government effectively by employing the instruments of airpower.

AAF plans, however, are ambitious and indicative of a need to balance Afghan Government aspirations, necessity, and affordability. As of the current reporting period, AAF capacity and capability remained extremely limited and future progress is challenged by significant obstacles, including inadequate national education and literacy levels as well as a nascent pilot training program.

Corruption also remains a significant problem in the AAF, where a criminal patronage network is involved in numerous illegal activities. ISAF and the Afghan Government continue to work together to combat corruption, and as of the end of the reporting period, numerous investigations were ongoing. Nevertheless, the Afghan Government has yet to demonstrate the political will to address corruption and remove and prosecute corrupt officials on a consistent basis.

## ***AAF CAPACITY***

The NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A) focuses on building Afghanistan's airpower along four lines of operation: aircraft build, airmen build, infrastructure build, and operational capability. All lines of operation made limited progress during the reporting period, but remain immature. The AAF build timeline lags the rest of the ANSF, as it started its training mission two years later, and more time is needed for technical training to produce pilots, mechanics, and several other technical skill sets.

The AAF airmen build remains underdeveloped. The overall strength of the AAF was 5,541 at the end of the reporting period, with 1,577 currently in training. The pilot training program currently has 55 candidates progressing through the self-paced (normally 18 months) English language training course and 64 progressing through 12-month pilot training courses. New accession pilot candidates are required to possess an 80 English Competency Level score before beginning a formal pilot training course. Future training can now be conducted entirely within Afghanistan with the opening of the training center in Shindand, but the March course was cancelled due to a lack of progression by pilot candidates in the English language course. Shindand is capable of producing 70 pilots per year. There are also Afghan pilots attending courses in the United States, United Arab Emirates, and the Czech Republic.

In November 2011, NTM-A and the AAF conducted a data call to assess the training level of AAF airmen, evaluating 2,800 personnel, or more than half of the force. The assessment revealed that 1,918 of those surveyed were undertrained but remained assigned to units. Combining the data call and subsequent investigations, only 973 personnel were found to be fully trained for their position. NTM-A and the AAF responded with additional training programs, resulting in 557 additional personnel that have now completed training. The existing shortfall in trained airmen is significant; the lack of a sufficient aircrew impedes the growth of the capability and infrastructure for the AAF and undermines the ability to grow the force.

The AAF aircraft build continued to make progress during the reporting period. Basic pilot training is now supported by six Cessna 182 aircraft. Six Cessna 208 aircraft are also in place to support initial fixed wing pilot training. On the rotary wing side, six MD-530 helicopters have now been delivered to support the initial rotary wing pilot training requirements. Afghan-instructed basic fixed wing and rotary wing courses started in February.

On the operational side, additional Mi-17 deliveries during summer 2012 will complete the contingent of 56 aircraft providing Afghanistan's primary tactical air mobility support for the six ANA corps. Recapitalization of the Mi-17 fleet has also been initiated to replace aircraft that suffered irreparable damage this past year. This recapitalization will also ensure the fleet remains healthy for the foreseeable future.

The AAF's medium airlift capability is also growing and expected to reach its full fleet size of 20 C-27A/G222 aircraft in the spring of 2012 with the final five deliveries from Alenia North America. Efforts to improve the daily operational availability of these aircraft have been initiated, and improvements in C-27A maintenance performance and maintenance training are underway.

The AAF's light-lift mission capability is expanding rapidly. In addition to the six Cessna 208 aircraft now in place for fixed wing pilot training, two more Cessna 208s are now in country to begin operational airlift missions. This number will continue to grow through the summer of 2013 to reach its full fleet of 20 operational C-208s.

Limited air-to-ground attack capabilities are being delivered by seven of the 11 Mi-35 helicopters. The operational life of the remaining four has now expired. This air-to-ground capability will transition in the future to the much more capable and modern Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft, currently in its early acquisition phase. The LAS will provide a highly capable western air-interdiction platform.

As of the end of the reporting period, the AAF has three remaining contracts open to complete the inventories of three aircraft: Mi-17s, C-208s, and C-27s.

The AAF's infrastructure build has made significant progress during the reporting period, reaching nearly 56 percent completion of all facilities projects. Kabul Air Wing facilities lead the way at nearly 83 percent complete, with Kandahar Air Wing following closely at 75 percent complete. The main training base at Shindand will soon begin Phase II of its four phases of construction, with training operations already underway. In parallel, planning and initial construction for the AAF's air detachments at Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Jalalabad are also underway. Construction of AAF infrastructure is expected to be completed in late 2014.

### ***AAF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY***

As of March 2012, the AAF was rated as CM-4 (exists but cannot accomplish its mission) because not all manpower billets are sourced, and those that are filled often lack appropriate training. Kabul Air Wing is still awaiting its programmed allocation of aircraft. Currently, Kabul aircraft include 15 C-27s, 18 Mi-17s (with expected arrival of six additional aircraft in Spring 2012), and 11 Mi-35s, of which four have expired. As part of this fleet, Kabul also hosts the Presidential airlift, with three Mi-17s and two C-27A aircraft dedicated to this important mission.

Kandahar Air Wing is assessed as CM-4, due to the absence of all programmed mission aircraft (C-27, LAS, C-208). Additionally, the wing lacks manpower and training, which will follow once it begins to receive additional mission aircraft. Kandahar currently has seven of the planned 11 Mi-17s. Activities are underway now to permanently base four C-27As as the final five C-27As are delivered later this spring. Kandahar will also be receiving the C-208 light lift aircraft as deliveries continue through summer 2013.

Although Shindand Air Wing is assessed as CM-4, it has continued to mature as the AAF's training wing. During the reporting period, Shindand has begun initial pilot training with the newly delivered C-182 trainer aircraft. The AAF's English Language Training immersion program, "Thunder Lab," will move to Shindand during the spring of 2012.

## **2.5: AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE CAPACITY AND GROWTH**


The ANP continued to make steady progress, increasing in size and capabilities during this reporting period. While progress was not uniform across all sections of the ANP, some units,

such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), are now highly effective, frequently partnering with ISAF forces in successful operations. Progress has been less rapid in other areas, such as the development of ANP logistics capabilities or the development of the Afghan Border Police.

### ***MANNING***

The current approved end-strength for the ANP – the projected end-strength required to support transition to Afghan security lead – is 157,000 personnel by October 2012.

**Figure 10: ANP End-Strength (March 2011-March 2012)**



As of the end of the reporting period, the overall ANP force level reached 149,642 personnel, an increase of 13,520 from the force level at the end of the previous reporting period in September 2011. This force includes 25,195 officers, 39,943 NCOs, 77,653 patrolmen, and 6,851 initial entry trainees.

Recruiting in the ANP remained steady, meeting or exceeding overall growth goals each month during the reporting period. The ANP generally reflects the ethnic make-up of local communities, as personnel typically serve in the area where they join the force. However, when aggregated at the national level, Tajiks are significantly overrepresented in the force, Pashtuns are represented proportionately to the Afghan population, but Hazara, Uzbeks, and others are underrepresented to varying degrees.

ANP patrolmen manning is currently in excess of 100 percent of the goal for both AUP and ABP, and approximately 8,333 patrolmen were manning NCO billets as of the end of March. Accordingly, recruiting has been adjusted to focus on qualified direct-entry NCOs, and recruiting goals and training seats for new patrolmen have been reduced in favor of NCO and quality training opportunities for those already in the force.

These efforts are needed to address the current NCO shortage of 8,316 and the 16,700 untrained patrolmen. During March, MoI successfully took their first steps to self govern the imbalances in the ANP. In addition to temporarily freezing recruitment, the Minister of the Interior also created a commission to address the imbalances in rank and location. Initial indications are that this self initiated Afghan commission will emphatically state that over-strength police officers

and NCOs will need to meet the needs of the ANP and either accept a new position, move to a different zone, or accept a reduction in rank.

Attrition in the ANP remained relatively steady during the reporting period, averaging 1.2 percent, consistent with the goal of 1.4 percent.

### ***AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE***

As the premiere police force in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police operate in a gendarmerie capacity in response to significant events and deploy in support of large-scale civil order operations throughout the country, serving as the lead police organization in the COIN effort and working closely with military counterparts as needed.

As of March 2012, the total strength for the ANCOP, including policemen in training, was 17,442, an increase of 3,042 personnel from the previous reporting period.

Although ANCOP units' effectiveness initially suffered from high attrition that stemmed largely from extended deployments and high operations tempo, the adoption of a 12-week recovery and retraining period between deployments has improved this situation.

In addition, the commander of the ANCOP continues to use new processes to reduce attrition rates and ensure that leaders are held accountable for poor performance. As a result of these efforts, ANCOP attrition in March 2012 was only 0.5 percent, one of the lowest rates since tracking began. Though the ANCOP still suffers from significant attrition levels, averaging 1.9 percent over the past six months, the ANCOP continues to meet growth objectives.

At any given time, there are 14 ANCOP battalions supporting coalition and MoI operations, primarily in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The ANCOP has received the highest density of coalition partnering during training and employment cycles, which has resulted in a highly effective operational force. More recently, ANCOP units were involved in anti-riot situations that followed the accidental burning of Korans at the Bagram Air Base in Parwan province, and demonstrated professionalism, sound judgment, courage, and effectiveness in their performance.

### ***AFGHAN BORDER POLICE***

The ABP is the pillar of the ANP responsible for securing and safeguarding the Afghan border as well as providing security up to 50 km away from the border. As of March 2012, the total strength for the ABP, including police in training, was 24,927 an increase of 2,968 personnel from the previous reporting period. However, the ABP continued to face a shortfall of NCOs, with only 4,041 of a total 5,622 authorized billets filled and an additional 942 officers and patrolmen assigned to NCO billets. The NCO shortfall remains the primary focus of ABP training efforts.

ABP attrition has averaged 1.5 percent monthly over the reporting period (October 2011 through March 2012).

At present, the ABP's most significant challenge remains the development and training of its Blue Border mission (defined as rule of law enforcement at Border Crossing Points and Air and

Rail Ports of Entry), as opposed to the Green Border mission (defined as patrolling borders between the points of entry). ABP also face challenges in the development of its other core institutions such as Border Coordination Centers, Operational Coordination Centers, training facilities, and headquarters. In the absence of these capabilities, the ABP is not effectively securing and controlling Afghanistan's borders. In the near future, NTM-A will work with the MoI and ABP to better define the Blue Border force structure requirements, identify and procure essential Blue Border mission-specific equipment, and develop a Program of Instruction to satisfy Blue Border development requirements. Green Border planning teams will continue to work with IJC to find the right balance and cooperation between ABP and ANA for border security outside the Blue Border mission.

Similar to the AAF, the ABP is also challenged by corruption and the penetration of CPNs. Although many police units are performing well, some police units still undermine the rule of law, fail to take action against criminal or insurgent threats, extort the population, and engage in a range of other criminal activities. ISAF and the Afghan Government continue to work together to address ANSF corruption and have successfully removed numerous members of the ABP involved in criminal activity.

### ***AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE***

The AUP, the largest pillar of the ANP, are responsible for maintaining public order and supporting rule of law through community-based policing, which is locally referred to as democratic policing. The democratic policing approach was instituted to create within the AUP methods to build responsibility towards the community and thereby increase service to and reduce criminal actions against the community.

As of March 2012, the total strength for the AUP was 85,434, an increase of 6,002 personnel from the previous reporting period. The AUP is slated to grow to an end-strength of 85,532 personnel by November 2012.

Untrained patrolmen and the lack of a sustainable logistics system remain the biggest challenges for the AUP. NTM-A and the MoI continue to emphasize recruiting in order to ensure all available training seats are used. As of March 2012, the AUP had a total of 12,500 (20 percent) untrained patrolmen and NCOs. AUP attrition remains the lowest of all police pillars, averaging 1.0 percent per month during the reporting period.

### ***SPECIAL FORCES***

The ANP continued to recruit and field elite police units that are trained by and partnered with ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) in support of the COIN strategy.

Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) are provincially-based Special Police Units (SPU) that specialize in civil order security and high-risk arrests, and partner with ISAF SOF and U.S. forces for training and operations. Currently, 19 PRCs, each comprised of approximately 100 police, have been fielded. ISAF SOF also partners with other SPU, such as Commando Force (CF) 333, a special police commando unit originally developed by UK Special Forces for counternarcotics and interdiction, but now considered a multi-functional commando force capable of high-risk arrests. The Crisis Response Unit, a national response unit based in Kabul, is

partnered with ISAF SOF in high-risk arrest and hostage rescue missions, primarily in the capital region.

Over the reporting period, training efforts focused on the successful completion of the first PRC Basic Course at the Special Police Training Centre (SPTC) in Wardak Province. The SPTC conducts centralized Special Police courses for PRCs, a fundamental requirement for the force generation and expansion of this organization, and ensures that a common standard is set country-wide. The first eight-week PRC Advanced Course is currently underway.

The Foundation and Advanced Training of national-level special police units continues to be conducted by the units themselves at individual locations, enabled by the units' coalition mentor teams. Work to consolidate and centralize these specialist courses through the establishment of a Special Police Training Wing in 2012, co-located with CF333 at Fort Hunter in Logar Province, continues.

Following lessons learned from the initial PRC Basic Course, a proposal for a dry training facility has been developed for funding consideration. This facility would consist of several compounds and buildings of local style, to allow SPTC (and others) to conduct realistic contextual training in building/compound assault and clearance, sensitive site exploitation, search, and other related tactical activities.

### ***FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING***

The ANP training effort continued to focus on developing the quality of the force, in particular, training NCOs. As of October 2011, the ANP needed approximately 20,000 more NCOs within the following year. An increased emphasis on NCO training during the reporting period added 9,003 NCOs to the ANP, reducing the shortfall to 10,997. In addition to a shortage of NCOs, the ANP also faces a significant amount of assigned but untrained patrolmen.

Between October 1, 2011 and March 31, 2012, ANP training capacity increased from nearly 14,500 to 14,584. The ANP was expected to reach approximately 16,000 personnel by the end of December 2011; however, severe delays at National Police Training Center (NPTC) – Wardak impeded achievement of this goal. NTM-A continues to seek efficiencies while developing the necessary capacity to grow the size of the ANP, develop the force, and create a mature, sustainable ANP Training Management System infrastructure to support force training. Training is currently conducted at 30 formal training sites, but this total will eventually decrease to approximately 11 permanent sites in 2014. Across all police pillars and all courses, 21,907 students have graduated since the beginning of October 2011.

The establishment of the Afgan National Police Training General Command (ANPTGC) was completed in March 2011, with 859 positions approved by MoI under the *tashkil* for SY1390. ANPTGC requested an additional 1,000 positions under Command Plan Review for SY1391. The MoI approved a total of 1,123 ANPTGC positions. A comprehensive planning process was implemented jointly with ANPTGC headquarters to best restructure the command in order to balance ANP training objectives while remaining within the *tashkil* resource constraints. The result was a new series of SY1391 *tashkils* for all ANPTGC headquarters and training sites.

With a commander and high level staff now in place, the focus of ANPTGC has shifted from generating forces to creating a permanent, capable training organization to support development of a quality force. The ANP Professional Development Board (PDB), chaired by the ANPTGC Commander, supports partnership in course instruction development and standardization across the major stakeholders including ANPTGC, NTM-A, the German Police Project Team, and the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL). The key to the ANP's professional sustainability following the 2014 transition is an enduring and effective training management capability.

Future training objectives for the ANP include: 1) training NCOs and untrained patrolmen; 2) enabling balanced growth in the size and quality of the force; and, 3) shifting the focus of the ANP from COIN missions to a rule of law-based police force. Part of this effort includes planning for a class of 400-500 training instructors who will augment the decentralized Permanent Training Teams, Zone Training Teams, and Provincial Training Companies. These training units will provide the quality training needed to transform the ANP from a COIN-focused security force to one capable of investigating and deterring crimes. ANP's goal is to have an additional 861 instructors trained and certified by the end of 2012.

### ***WOMEN IN THE ANP***

Women currently account for less than 0.9 percent of the total ANP force. As of March 2012, there were 1,340 female members of the ANP: 558 patrolwomen, 576 NCOs, and 206 officers. Women are likely to remain underrepresented in the ANP for the foreseeable future; the ANP failed to meet its recruiting goal in 2010 and 2011, and only 54 women have been recruited in 2012.

The effort to promote gender equality in the ANP faces significant challenges. Many Provincial Headquarters Commanders do not accept policewomen, as they prefer male candidates and lack adequate facilities to support females. Further, similar to the MoD, the MoI faces significant challenges in fully integrating and protecting women in the ANP workforce, especially among operational units at the provincial and district levels. While women are greatly needed to support police operations, a combination of cultural impediments, weak recruitment, and uneven application of policies hinder significant progress. Although stronger documentation, implementation, and enforcement of policies, procedures, and guidance to better integrate women will help, time will be needed to change the cultural mores that form the basis of many of the current impediments. Without significant adjustments, the ANP will not achieve the goal of 5,000 women by the year 2014, as set forth in MoI Decree 55.<sup>18</sup>

### ***EQUIPPING***

Building a capable and sustainable ANP depends on acquiring the equipment necessary to support the three basic police functions: shoot, move, and communicate. Accordingly, significant ANP equipment fielding efforts took place during the reporting period. This is expected to increase the ANP's on-hand equipment to approximately 95 percent of *tashkil* by the summer of 2012.

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<sup>18</sup> MoI Decree 55, signed in September 2010, aimed to increase the number of women serving in the ANP to 5,000 over the next five years, establishing an annual goal of 1,000 additional women per year until 2014.

The ANP remains under-equipped as a result of fielding challenges, including battle loss replacement needs and the closure of Pakistani GLOCs. Due to equipment shortages, the MoI has developed fielding priorities based on operational requirements. To address the delay in processing supply/equipment requests, the MoI Material Management Center established a Customer Care Center in April 2011. This single point-of entry clearinghouse for supply/equipment requests has been a success, significantly reducing response times.

Night vision devices (NVDs) and other high-end equipment continued to be issued to ANP Special Forces, dramatically increasing the capability of ANP Special Forces to conduct high-risk counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions. Sensitive items such as NVDs require monthly inventory; the DoD Inspector General verified Afghan adherence to this policy during a July 2011 audit. The ANP also has a monthly inventory requirement for a variety of explosive ordinance device/counter-IED, personnel protective equipment, and specialty/tool items.

Commensurate with current deliveries, NTM-A is working to extend accountability processes and gain further fidelity of unit-level on-hand quantities. As part of the documentation of ANP force structure decisions for SY 1391 *tashkils*, there will be a review of equipment requirements, ensuring that types and quantities are operationally sufficient and sustainable.

### ***LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES***

As a result of a deliberate decision to place initial focus of force generation on ANP policing units, the development of enablers – in particular logistics capabilities – was delayed and is not expected to be fully self-sufficient until late 2014. NTM-A began to shift its efforts to logistics development in mid-2011, and it will continue to be a key focus in 2012.

Major objectives for the development of the ANP logistics system during the reporting period included preparing the system to sustain the ANP for the 2012 fighting season. In addition to developing the logistics annex for the operational plan, preparations will focus on increasing logistics stocks at the Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs) in order to set conditions for logistical success during summer operations, as well as establishing a national maintenance plan for the MoI.

The ANP logistics system requires significant coalition assistance at the regional level and below in order to effectively sustain the ANP. The biggest challenges to improvement in the logistics system are the recruitment of qualified police and civilian logisticians and the training of personnel to use the approved MoI logistical system.

Further, the ANP's logistics system remains particularly limited in personnel system accountability, primarily in managing the assignment and training of logistics personnel. A major challenge in developing long-term logistics support to the ANP is the hiring and training of civilian personnel, as civilian authorizations make up 50 percent of the logistics workforce. Due to pay disparity between the MoI civilians, other opportunities for literate candidates with technical skills, and shortfalls in hiring processes and civilian personnel management, civilian hiring will continue to be a challenge until the MoI institutes civil service pay reforms. Additionally, the MoI completed the manpower build-out of the sustainment system by adding approximately 2,100 logistics positions (1,400 uniformed, 700 civilian) into the SY1391 *tashkil*.

Reforms to personnel management and training processes are critical to ensuring the viability of these new hires; the Afghan Parliament has not yet addressed these needs.

Future objectives for the ANP logistics team include: 1) completing planning and initiating the final required infrastructure builds to meet enduring future needs of the force; and 2) assisting MoI commodity item managers and budget program managers in improving supply throughput at RLCs by finalizing requirements for the SY1391 budget, initiating contracts, and establishing inventory; and 3) maintaining accountability of all property acquired by the MoI and ANP from any source, paid or donated.

## **2.6: FIELDLED FORCE PARTNERING, OPERATIONS, AND ASSESSMENT**

### ***ANSF PARTNERING AND ADVISING***

Following initial recruitment and training of Afghan soldiers and police by NTM-A, the operational development of the ANSF is the responsibility of the IJC. IJC partnering and advising teams provide a critical bridge from individual and collective training, received during basic training and at various specialty schools, to the practical necessities of operating in a combat environment. Partnering and advising teams coach, teach, mentor, and support operational planning and employment of partnered ANSF units.

Regional Commands (RCs) establish partnering relationships based on the number of available coalition forces and campaign plan priorities and objectives. Partner and mentor teams are assigned to ANSF units and areas that are essential to accomplishment of campaign objectives. With the recent change to the IJC Operation Plan, ANA and ANP partnering requirements have adjusted accordingly and are now based upon the Security Force Assistance (SFA) concept. The SFA concept is a means for providing necessary partnering and advising assets to develop ANSF operational effectiveness and support ANSF units. SFA methodology focuses partnering efforts on units in Key Terrain Districts (KTD) that are essential for campaign success. IJC is responsible for providing partnering assistance to the ANA (Ground Forces Command and below); AUP; ANCOP; ABP; and Operational Coordination Center – Regional (OCC-R) and Operational Coordination Center – Provincial (OCC-P).

The United States provides the ANSF with the majority of required mentor teams. The drawdown in U.S. forces will result in a decreased number of partnered units, creating additional requirements for other coalition partners.

**Figure 11: ANSF-ISAF Partnering Relationship Definitions**

<b>Embedded Partner</b>	Combined Team units in which a trust-based, assigned relationship exists where both share the same battle space and live together on the same installation. The Partner Units share the same goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operational Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better whilst working together to defeat the insurgency. The IJC Partner Unit shares comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, intelligence and IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and the primary readiness oversight responsibility. If there is also an assigned mentor team, the partnering unit is the lead in providing operational direction and guidance to ensure unity of effort in the conduct of operations.
<b>Partnered</b>	Combined Team units in which a trust-based, assigned relationship exists where both share the same battle space but do not live together on the same installation. The Partner Units share the same goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operational Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better whilst working together to defeat the insurgency. The IJC Partner Unit shares comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, intelligence and IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and the primary readiness oversight responsibility. If there is also an assigned mentor team, the partnering unit is the lead in providing operational direction and guidance to ensure unity of effort in the conduct of operations.
<b>Limited Partnering</b>	Combined Team units in which an assigned relationship exists where both share the same battle space. The Partner Units share the same goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operational Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better whilst working together to defeat the insurgency. The IJC Partner Unit shares limited operations guidance, strategy, information, intelligence and IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and the primary readiness oversight responsibility. If there is also an assigned mentor team, the partnering unit is the lead in providing operational direction and guidance to ensure unity of effort in the conduct of operations.
<b>Mentoring Only</b>	Combined Team units in which an assigned relationship exists where both share the same goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operational Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better. The IJC Partner Unit shares no comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, intelligence and IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership is primarily an active mentoring role.
<b>Uncovered</b>	Coalition unit not present / assigned. ANSF Unit is uncovered.
<b>Not Assessed</b>	No data available; unable to assess.

The Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) and Rating Definition Levels (RDLs) are used to assess ANSF operational effectiveness. Resulting reports cover quantitative data (personnel, equipment, and training) as well as qualitative assessments in areas affecting the effectiveness of the unit (communications, equipping, intelligence, logistics, leadership, maintenance, operations, personnel, partnering, and training and education). Reports conclude with an overall assessment of operational effectiveness. Each assessment area uses the RDL scale specified for that assessment area, supported with comments from the coalition partner assigned to the ANSF unit.

In August 2011, RDL titles were changed to reflect the concept of partnering with units at lower effectiveness levels and advising with more capable units. Thus, the “Independent” rating changed to “Independent with Advisors”; “Effective with Advisors” remained unchanged; “Effective with Assistance” changed to “Effective with Partners”; and “Developing” changed to “Developing with Partners.”

Prior to January 31, 2012, the Validation Transition Team (VTT) was tasked by IJC with validating any unit that received a CUAT rating of “Independent with Advisors” by the Regional Commands. The IJC procedure was to not report a unit assessed by the RCs as “Independent with Advisors” until the VTT could validate the rating. Instead, units would remain rated at the “Effective with Advisors” level until the validation was complete. However, after January 31, 2012, the requirement for outside validation for newly reported “Independent with Advisors” units was eliminated, which has resulted in the recent increase in “Independent with Advisors” units. The new process places greater emphasis on the ratings from the units partnered with the ANSF, who have first-hand knowledge of the unit’s performance. In the future, there will







continue to be increases in the number of independent units, although this is expected to be at a more gradual rate.

The assessment process has been modified to include a thorough evaluation of operational performance. This data will allow IJC to evaluate the volume of long-term coalition assistance required throughout theater. As units move toward independence with advisors, the use of coalition enablers must be continually reviewed, revised, and planned.

Long-term reforms to the operational assessment process include a separation of ANA and ANP reports. Currently, the CUAT report template is uniform for all ANSF elements. The February 2012 CUAT report, with the support of the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), implemented ANP-specific focus questions and began collecting data on community policing and rule of law capabilities.

Within each of the ratings below, there are detailed explanations and parameters to guide partners or mentors in properly assigning an RDL. RDL ratings, along with leadership assessments (very positive, positive, neutral, negative, and very negative) and partnering data, are incorporated into current CUAT reports.

**Figure 12: Rating Definition Levels**

<p><b>Independent w/ Advisors</b></p> 	<p>The unit is able to plan and execute its missions and maintain command and control of subordinate elements, calling on and controlling a QRF and, MEDEVAC assets when required. When necessary the unit can call for and integrate joint effects from coalition forces and is capable of exploiting intelligence and operating within a wider intelligence system. Unit personnel and equipment levels are <math>\geq 75\%</math> of the authorized strength (Present for Duty) and are sufficient for the unit to undertake its assigned tasks. The unit can operate, account for and maintain its equipment and meet its basic logistic needs with no assistance from Coalition Forces. The unit is able to co-ordinate its operations with other ANSF units and headquarters.</p>
<p><b>Effective w/ Advisors</b></p> 	<p>Effective planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status. Coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units. Maintains effective readiness reports. Leaders, staff, and unit adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GIRoA. All unit enablers are present and effective in this unit, and are providing most of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition Forces provide only limited, occasional guidance to the staff. Coalition Forces may provide enablers that are missing from HIGHER or LOWER ANSF levels. Coalition Forces augment support only on occasion. Equipment and personnel levels <math>\geq 75\%</math>. OCC P and R are always integrated, and links are usually effective.</p>
<p><b>Effective w/ Partners</b></p> 	<p>Requires routine mentoring for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status; coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; and maintaining effective readiness reports. Leaders, staff, and most of the unit adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GIRoA. Most unit enablers are present and effective. Those enablers present are providing most of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition Forces may provide enablers that are missing from this level, and augment enabler support at this level. Equipment and personnel levels <math>\geq 65\%</math>. OCC P and R are always integrated, and links are sometimes effective.</p>
<p><b>Developing w/ Partners</b></p> 	<p>Requires partner unit presence and assistance for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status; coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; and maintaining effective readiness reports. Leaders and most of the staff usually adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GIRoA. Some unit enablers are present and effective at this level of unit. Those present provide some of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition Forces provide the missing enablers and most of the support at this level. Equipment and personnel levels <math>&lt; 65\%</math>. OCC P and R are usually integrated.</p>
<p><b>Established</b></p> 	<p>This unit is at the beginning of organization. It is barely capable of planning, synchronizing, directing, or reporting operations and status, even with the presence and assistance of a partner unit. It is barely able to coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units. It has barely effective or missing personnel, logistics, training, or readiness reports. Leadership and staff may not adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, or may not be loyal to GIRoA. Most of this units' unit enablers are not present or are barely effective. Those enablers present provide little or no support to the ANSF unit. Coalition Forces provide for the missing enablers and most of the support at this level. Equipment and personnel levels <math>\leq 50\%</math>. OCC P and R are sometimes integrated.</p>
<p><b>Not Assessed</b></p> 	<p>Areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.</p>

Cycle 13 CUAT data showed the number of partnered units within the ANA increased from 175 in August 2011 to 201 in February 2012. The number of units reported as uncovered/unassessed or not reported was 37. The total number of ANA *kandaks* was also increased to show the number of units lacking any assessment data.

**Figure 13: ANA Partnering Status**

Afghan National Army Regional Command	Embedded		Partnered		Limited Partnering		Mentored		Total Partnered		Uncovered / Not Assessed		Total Reported		Not Reported		Total Kandaks	
	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ
RC Capital (111)	0	0	9	0	0	0	11	1	20	1	0	1	20	2	0	0	20	2
RC East (201)	14	4	9	0	3	0	0	0	26	4	1	0	27	4	0	0	27	4
RC East (203)	16	2	10	3	11	0	1	0	38	5	1	0	39	5	0	0	39	5
RC West (207)	0	0	0	1	6	2	7	1	13	4	9	0	22	4	3	0	25	4
RC North (209)	0	0	5	2	6	1	7	1	18	4	3	0	21	4	0	0	21	4
RC Southwest (215)	8	2	8	2	6	1	3	1	25	8	1	0	26	6	0	0	26	6
RC South (205)	11	1	14	1	4	2	3	1	32	5	3	0	35	5	2	0	37	5
SOF CDO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	1	12	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Grand Totals</b>									<b>201</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>238</b>					

Source: IJC CUOPS ANSF Development / CUAT Cycle 13  
 Table displays reported Kandaks, Bn units, and Coy plus Unit HQ (does not include Roll Up reports)  
 Date: 5 Feb 2012

Cycle 13 CUAT data showed the number of reports for partnered units within the ANP increased from 231 in August 2011 to 347 in February 2012. This total number may also include ANP units that did not previously submit a CUAT report (e.g., in the case of newly fielded or recently partnered units). The number of units reported as uncovered or unassessed increased from 31 to 88, due to an overall increase in units reporting.

While surge recovery will decrease the number of personnel available to partner with the ANP, the projected impact of the surge recovery on the performance of the ANP is unclear. ANP partnering levels have consistently lagged behind those of ANA units. An important aspect of the Security Force Assistance concept is the deployment of partner and mentor units trained specifically for police missions. This focused effort is anticipated to result in a more productive partnering/advising relationship and increased ANP capabilities, especially in the civil policing missions and functions.

**Figure 14: ANP Partnering Status**

Afghan National Police	Embedded		Partnered		Limited Partnering		Mentored		Total Partnered ANP Units		Uncovered / Not Assessed		Total Reported	
	Units	HQ/PHQ	Units	HQ/PHQ	Units	HQ/PHQ	Units	HQ/PHQ	Units	HQ/PHQ	Units	HQ/PHQ	Units	HQ/PHQ
AUP Districts	18	7	92	11	34	4	22	3	166	25	46	7	212	32
AUP Precincts	10	0	25	0	7	0	5	0	47	0	23	0	70	0
ABP	9	2	21	1	5	0	6	2	41	5	4	0	45	5
ANCOP	2	0	6	0	3	0	2	2	13	2	6	1	19	3
Provincial Response Companies (PRC)	5	0	12	0	1	0	1	0	19	0	0	0	19	0
Operations Coordination Centers (OCC)	17	0	3	0	3	0	6	0	29	0	1	0	30	0
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Grand Totals</b>									<b>347</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>435</b>			

Source: IJC CUOPS ANSF Development / CUAT Cycle 13  
 Date: 3 Feb 2012

**ANSF OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT PROCESS**

Assessing performance in operations is an important method for evaluating ANSF progression. A partnered operation is a distinct event in which ISAF and ANSF units work together in the planning and execution of a combined joint tactical operation. The number and type of these operations, and whether they are Afghan-led, are monitored in the ISAF campaign assessment framework. Operational partnering efforts are aimed at improving the overall operational effectiveness of ANSF units, while at the same time protecting the population and accomplishing overall campaign objectives.

Ensuring the ability of the ANSF to plan and conduct operations unilaterally is the ultimate goal of partnering relationships. Units are performing exceptionally well when the ANSF are capable not only of planning, preparing, and executing missions, but are also able to incorporate and coordinate other ANSF elements for a joint operation. ISAF is also focusing on improving the sustainability of the combat formations through the ANSF logistic mechanisms.

ANSF-ISAF operations include: 1) ANA Partnered (ANA conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 2) ANP Partnered (AUP, ABP, or ANCOP conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 3) Joint ANSF Partnered (ANA and ANP conducted the operation jointly with ISAF); 4) ANSF Led (ANSF conducted the mission with support from ISAF).

In the past six months, the number of partnered operations as well as ANSF-led operations increased. A decrease in total number of operations in January and February 2012 is attributable to the extreme winter weather across the country. The total percentage of ANSF-led operations also increased, rising from 14 percent (16 of 112) in September 2011 to almost 33 percent (31 of 95) in February 2012.

The majority of reported Level 1 and Level 2 partnered operations, as defined in figure 16, occurred in Regional Commands South (RC-S), Southwest (RC-SW), and East (RC-E) between August 2011 and January 2012; ANSF-led operations typically occurred in RC-S, RC-E, and Regional Command North (RC-N). Partnered operations are generally expected to yield an increase in ANSF-led operations as ANSF unit capabilities increase. This trend is evident in RC-S and RC-E but not in RC-SW. A more thorough analysis of Cycle 13 CUAT data for units in RC-SW shows an improvement in ANSF ability to plan and lead Level 0 operations, which are not reported through formal channels. CUAT data indicates that ANSF-led operations are most frequently lower-risk operations. This conclusion is substantiated by data in Figure 15: ANSF-led Operations, which compares Level 1 and 2 operations. There was, however, one ANSF-led Level 2 operation in Khost (RC-E) in February 2012. The success of this operation illustrates the developing Afghan capacity to successfully lead operations in this sensitive border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**Figure 15: ANSF-ISAF Partnered Operations**

Level 1 and 2 Operations	2011				2012		
	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Total Level 1 Operations	105	112	107	116	112	91	
Level 1 Operations Partnered with ANSF	86	97	97	111	102	75	
Level 1 Operations Partnered with ANSF that were ANSF-led	16	48	46	44	45	30	
% of Total Level 1 Operations that were ANSF-led	15%	43%	43%	38%	40%	33%	
Total Level 2 Operations	7	7	10	6	4	4	
Level 2 Operations Partnered with ANSF	6	6	9	5	3	3	
Level 2 Operations Partnered with ANSF that were ANSF-led	0	0	0	0	0	1	
% of Total Level 2 Operations that were ANSF-led	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%	
Total Level 1 and 2 Operations	112	119	117	122	116	95	
Level 1 and 2 Operations Partnered with ANSF	92	103	106	116	105	78	
Level 1 and 2 Operations Partnered with ANSF that were ANSF-led	16	48	46	44	45	31	
% of Total Operations Level 1 and 2 Operations that were ANSF-led	14%	40%	39%	36%	39%	33%	

**Figure 16: Levels of Contingency Operations**

<b>Level 0 (Low Risk)</b>	Day-time deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive “soft-knock” and “hard-knock”)
	Political consequences offer minimum potential of prejudicial IO, media, or political impact
<b>Level 1 (Medium Risk)</b>	Operations involving entry into houses or compounds at night to include deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive “soft-knock” and “hardknock”)
	May have minor to moderate unfavorable regional media impact, detrimental IO and/or undesirable political consequences, manageable at the regional level
<b>Level 2 (High Risk)</b>	Pre-planned kinetic operations within 10km of border with Pakistan or Iran
	SOF conducting deliberate operations with company size force or greater within 1km of border with Pakistan, or 10km of border with Iran
	Arrest, apprehension, or detainment of any current or prominent former Afghan Government appointed official
	Potential for collateral damage, unfavorable media impact, severely detrimental IO, and/or undesirable political consequences at the national level

### ***ANA OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT***

The overall operational effectiveness of the ANA continued to improve during this reporting period. Although the number of CUAT reports decreased from 158 in October 2011 to 156 in February 2012, the number of units (*kandaks*) rated as “Independent with Advisors” increased from 1 to 13. The percentage of all ANA units and headquarters assessed as “Effective with Partners” or higher increased from 72 percent in August 2011 to 90 percent in February 2012.

**Figure 17: ANA Operational Effectiveness Ratings from CUAT Cycle 13 (January 2012)**

Rating Definition Level (RDL)	Headquarters			Unit Type			Total Kandak	Total Units & HQs	Percent of Total
	Corps	Div	BDE	Kandak	GSU	Coy			
Independent w/ Advisors	0	0	1	8	5	1	13	15	7%
Effective w/ Advisors	1	1	14	69	5	11	74	101	46%
Effective w/ Partners	5	0	7	47	8	13	55	80	37%
Developing w/ Partners	0	0	0	8	1	9	9	18	8%
Established	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	3	1%
Not Assessed	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	1%
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>100%</b>


RDLs for "Headquarters" are for Corps, Division, and Brigade headquarters only, not a roll-up.  
 Kandaks = all w arfighting Kandaks, CS, CSS, and Commando Kandaks; Coys not included.  
 GSU = General Support Unit (Kandak equivalent).  
 Coys = Independent Coys; not part of a Kandak.  
 Total Kandaks = Kandaks plus GSUs.  
 A Kandak is a battalion-sized unit; a Coy is a company-sized unit.  
 Source: IJC CTAG ANSF Development - CUAT Cycle 13 (31 January 2012)

ANA units rarely operate completely independently; nevertheless, there are increasing instances of ANA units operating with limited ISAF support. For example, as of February 2012, 13 *kandaks* have achieved a rating of “Independent with Advisors,” up from 1 *kandak* in August 2011, and the number of units rated as “Effective with Advisors” increased from 56 to 74 over in the same period. Rating increases are attributable in some part to the change in the “Independent with Advisors” RDL that reduced unit personnel and equipment levels from not less than 85 percent to not less than 75 percent.<sup>19</sup> More importantly, rating increases are attributable to improved ANA performance and ability to plan and execute missions and maintain command and control of subordinate units.

The surge recovery is challenging the reporting capabilities of the Regional Commands; however, increased emphasis on assessments resulted in a decrease in the number of unassessed units. Decreases in the number of partnered/advised units as a result of the surge recovery will make completion of CUAT reports increasingly difficult. IJC has therefore implemented measures to help mitigate effects of force reductions, such as adjusting the CUAT reporting cycle from 6 weeks to 12 weeks and refining the number and type of priority units requiring CUAT assessments. The partnering/mentoring coverage requirements were also adjusted, moving from one-to-one partnering to one-to-many with the Security Force Assessment Team model, which requires fewer forces with the ANSF unit as the overall effectiveness of the unit increases.

<sup>19</sup> Change effective August 2011.

**Figure 18: ANA *Kandak* Assessment**



Finally, the ANA is gradually developing the capability to conduct its own assessments, and the MoD ANSF Combined Assessment Team is currently at initial operating capability across the Regional Commands. Additionally, the MoD has mobile teams that are sent out to assess units at the discretion of MoD leadership. This plan is expected to expand ANA capability and eventually transition all ANA external unit assessments to the MoD.

***ANP OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT***

The ANP improved its ability to conduct limited independent policing operations and coordinate operations with other ANSF elements.

Overall, the number of units that were not assessed decreased from 17 percent in August 2011 to 14 percent in January 2012. As of February 2012, data from the Provincial Response Company and all Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs), both provincial and regional, were added to the overall ANP effectiveness ratings, accounting for the slight increase in the overall number of submitted reports versus October 2011 data. Overall, 74 percent of units are rated as “Effective with Partners” or higher, compared to 69 percent in August 2011.

RC assessments highlight improvements in the overall performance of the ANP across all of the police pillars in the overall planning and execution of operations. The ANP display increased independence when: conducting security patrols; operating and developing permanent and temporary check points; providing security on Main Supply Routes; and providing security for local government and joint operations.

Joint Operations Center (JOC) reports show ANP across the country conduct offensive engagements, mounted and dismounted security patrols, and static operations. ANP forces, especially ANCOP, are still heavily engaged in COIN missions, such as: responding to insurgent activities; detaining insurgents; seizing property; identifying, responding to, and neutralizing IED

threats; and reacting to direct and indirect fire during offensive engagements both in coordination with and independent of coalition forces. The ANP are beginning to transition to accomplishing civil policing functions, primarily in areas where security is highest, such as Kabul. During major political events such as the *Loya Jirga*, the ANP were effective in providing security, responding to threats, and preventing potential threats with the establishment of temporary check points and manning of permanent check points. During high-profile incidents, such as the recent accidental Quran burnings, the ANP were responsive and effective in providing crowd and riot control. There were no significant attacks reported during these periods and there has been a noticeable improvement in the performance of the ANP.

The ANP continues to show improvement, with 50 percent (219 of 435) of ANP units currently rated as "Effective with Advisors" or higher compared to 37 percent (80 of 218) in August of 2011. The number of ANP units covered by the CUAT system has increased dramatically – from 218 in August 2011 to 435 as of January 2012. The number of units rated “Independent with Advisors” increased from 0 in August 2011 to 39 in January 2012.

**Figure 19: ANP Operational Effectiveness Ratings from CUAT Cycle 13 (January 2012)**

Rating Definition Level (RDL)	AUP	ABP	ANCOF	PRC	OCC	Total	Percent of Total
Independent w/ Advisors	29	4	6	0	0	39	9%
Effective w/ Advisors	130	25	4	1	20	180	41%
Effective w/ Partners	65	10	4	14	9	102	23%
Developing w/ Partners	22	5	5	3	1	36	8%
Established	12	2	1	1	0	16	4%
Not Assessed	56	4	2	0	0	62	14%
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>435</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: IJC CTAG ANSF Development - CUAT Cycle 13 (31 January 2012)

## 2.7: BUDGET

### *AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND*

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) provides funding to grow, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. For FY 2012, Congress appropriated \$11.2B, a decrease of \$1.6B from the President’s FY 2012 budget request. This reduction followed COMISAF’s August 2011 review of ANSF requirements as well as efficiencies and cost avoidance opportunities that had been realized at the time. The FY 2013 request of \$5.75B reflects adjustments following reviews that were concluded in the winter of 2011, as well as continued efficiencies. Moreover, the FY 2013 budget request represents a shift from the more expensive investment in new equipment, infrastructure, and new unit training, to developing and sustaining the ANSF.

### *INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FUNDING FOR THE ANSF*

The international community also provides funding for the ANSF. Several nations have provided significant contributions to the Trust Fund, with donations totaling more than \$550M.

Funding for police salaries, as well as other police development programs, is supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which oversees the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA). From 2002-2011, the United States donated \$914M to LOTFA, while the international community donated approximately \$1.5B.

The United States, as well as NTM-A, continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage allies and partners to provide greater assistance in sustaining the ANSF. While the United States will likely continue to provide the majority of the ANSF funding for the foreseeable future, the issue of international financial assistance will assume greater importance as U.S. funding in support of the ANSF decreases over time.

### ***DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE***

For SY 1390 (March 2011 - March 2012), NTM-A provided \$585.8M in direct contributions to the MoD to expand the ministry's capability and capacity to procure items in their operations and acquisition accounts. The ministry used these contributions for payment of salaries, goods and services, and procurement achieved solely through Afghan financial systems and procurement systems.

For SY 1390 NTM-A provided \$84.7M in direct contributions to the MoI to expand the ministry's ability to procure items in their operations and acquisitions accounts. The ministry used these contributions to pay Afghan Local Police (ALP) salaries, goods and services, and procurements achieved solely through Afghan financial systems and procurement systems. Both ANP salaries and food are delivered through LOTFA.

NTM-A cooperates with its Afghan partners to closely monitor these systems through liaison personnel embedded in Afghan ministries. Further improvement of these key ministerial processes will minimize risks to Transition and develop self-sufficient Afghan institutional capabilities that will ensure success in the long term.

### ***INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS***

The NTM-A Office of the Deputy Commanding General for International Security Cooperation evaluates all known infrastructure, equipment, and weapon donations to the Afghan Government to ensure that each item adds capability and is affordable and sustainable. MoD or MoI subsequently evaluates, approves, and accepts these donations. NTM-A may also evaluate equipment or munitions offered by a donor nation to verify technical specifications and quality, and will work with the Afghan Government to coordinate shipping, receipt, and accountability for all equipment, materials, and munitions.

Nations intermittently approach the Afghan Government directly and negotiate a bilateral donation, which may or may not come to the attention of NTM-A. When the Afghan Government and the donor nation advise NTM-A early in the process, NTM-A is able to track these cases and provide assistance as necessary. NTM-A solicits and tracks infrastructure, equipment, and weapon donations, and in conjunction with other staff elements, tracks overall international monetary donations, including bilateral donations. Since 2002, nearly 50 nations, NATO, and six international funding agencies have contributed more than \$2.9B in assistance to the Afghan Government. For example:

- In November 2011, Slovenia donated 6,880 AK-47 assault rifles. Bosnia and Herzegovina donated 52 D-30s (32 in October 2011; 16 in December 2011; 4 in February 2012).

Future solicitations will focus on literacy materials, equipment, infrastructure, and monetary donations for both the ANA and ANP. Monetary donations are particularly critical due to the need for contracted institutional training centers, medical facilities, and standardized equipment.

## **2.8: INFRASTRUCTURE**

During the reporting period, NTM-A improved its facilities planning capability to effectively meet the mission while drawing down the workforce. Processes are in place to ensure that disciplined planning principles are met for every funded project. For each installation, NTM-A has a master plan that describes the intended purpose of each facility and its intended location, and ensures that all facility designs meet ANSF Austere Guidelines. This allows for cost controls in infrastructure projects and ensures that facilities are sustainable by Afghan facility engineers in the future.

During the reporting period, NTM-A executed the infrastructure program to support ANSF fielding with an emphasis on building a sustainable facilities maintenance program. In support of this effort, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Air Force Center for Engineering and Environment, and USCENTCOM Contracting Command have awarded program management contracts. Working with these execution agents, NTM-A has initiated several programs to improve construction execution, including quarterly conferences that are conducted with Regional Command engineers and local ANSF leaders to discuss specific issues in the battle space. Additionally, monthly facilities *shuras*<sup>20</sup> are held with the MoD and MoI to discuss national-level concerns and issues.

### ***FACILITIES MAINTENANCE***

NTM-A made significant gains with regard to Afghan facility maintenance during the reporting period. The Infrastructure Training Advisory Group (ITAG) has key embedded training teams at ANSF sites in order to ensure future ANSF-led facility sustainment; these teams are charged with providing training, advising, and synchronization of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) efforts. The initial 22-person ITAG group grew to nearly 50 personnel by the end of September 2011 and is now at a strength of 113; ITAG teams are currently operating at 28 ANA sites and 3 ANP sites.

ITAG will continue to integrate three important components: contracted maintenance, training of Afghan facilities engineers to build the long-term capacity of the Afghans to care for their own facilities, and the development of the garrison management structure that will be responsible for maintenance on a day-to-day basis. Besides encouraging the growth of maintenance capabilities over the last six months, ITAG has been able to develop partial solutions to systemic problems and challenges including manning, training, equipping, and budgeting. Through the

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<sup>20</sup> “Council” (religious connotation)

force integration process, ITAG was able to work with the ministerial mentors to increase authorizations for the ANA facility personnel *tashkil* and improve on its corresponding equipment set, which will provide the ANA with a more effective workforce to maintain its facilities. ITAG recognizes the continuing need for ANSF Facility Engineers to delegate more technical services such as power plant, waste water treatment, and well operations to contractors; however, a more robust, in-house capability will reduce the need for expensive O&M services.

With respect to training, NTM-A is finalizing plans for a second semester of trade-specific coursework for approximately 50 students at the MoD's Construction and Property Management Department (CPMD) course and 70 students at the Afghan Vocational Technical Trade Center (AKVTC). AKVTC, located in Kabul, trains students from both the MoD and MoI. Complementing this centralized training approach are increases in contractor and ITAG leadership of on-the-job training, the focus of which is more active learning, tailored to specific garrisons. ITAG and Ministerial Development are also working with the ministries on developing training opportunities at local trade schools. This third training option is an Afghan solution and produces more graduates at a lower cost than U.S.-contracted instruction.

Also during the reporting period, ITAG continued close coordination with the Ministerial Development Advisors during interface with both the MoD and MoI. Increased interaction with the ministries will help ITAG solve the challenges faced at the garrison level. The transfer of facilities from the national O&M contract to Afghan facility engineers is an area that requires close coordination with ITAG and Ministerial Development. Through February 2012, ITAG has identified 2,566 buildings to transition and facilitated transition of 217 of those to ANSF control. The transfer of this initial set was a major milestone and has provided an example to follow at every site. Continued support from the ministries will be important for future facility transition progress.

### ***FACILITY MANAGEMENT MINISTERIAL DEVELOPMENT***

NTM-A continues to advise the MoD CPMD in building capacity to run all facility operations and maintenance for the ANA by 2014. With the signing of a decree by the Minister of Defense, CPMD now has direct control over all ANA Facility Engineers. This decree and control enables CPMD to provide oversight in hiring and training of facility engineers and provide budgeting and technical direction. NTM-A mentors coordinate directly with ITAG to link the Facility Engineer training and transition at the ANA bases with CPMD to coordinate hiring and budgeting and ensure the MoD is prepared to support the new facility engineer departments and provide stewardship of the NTM-A constructed facilities.

As previously stated, the *shuras* address facility construction, facility maintenance, and *tashkil* requirements to support facilities maintenance throughout the country. These events complement NTM-A's participation in the Facilities Department's plan to conduct quarterly meetings in Kabul with zone and provincial facilities engineers. NTM-A is focused on re-examining the areas of focus in the Ministerial Development Plan (MDP) that, through mentoring and advising the leadership of the facilities department, will develop the capability and capacity of the organization to progress from CM-3 to CM-2B. Due to the challenges associated with growing the facilities organization personnel, NTM-A is working with the MoI Facilities Department to restructure facility maintenance from a "hub-and-spoke" maintenance

model to a contracted maintenance model, and to resolve challenges associated with this approach.

### ***ANA INFRASTRUCTURE***

NTM-A continued construction to field the current Afghan Government-approved end strength of 195,000 personnel.

At the end of the reporting period, NTM-A had 144 projects valued at \$3.1B under construction for the ANA. During the reporting period, 30 projects valued at \$764M were awarded and 16 projects valued at \$256M were completed. Another 163 projects for \$3.2B are actively being planned.

There are currently more than 400 projects valued in excess of \$6.7B to support the ANA. For FY2012, a total of 135 projects valued at more than \$1.8B are planned at 17 sites. Three major contract awards occurred during the last six-months: 3/207 Brigade Garrison in Badghis, 2/205 Brigade Garrison Expansion in Zabul, and ANAREC HQ in Kabul.

### ***ANP INFRASTRUCTURE***

NTM-A is currently tracking more than 1,000 projects valued in excess of \$4.2B to support all police pillars. For FY2012, a total of 71 projects valued at more than \$557M are planned at 63 sites. The resulting construction will provide facilities for the current approved end-strength of 157,000 police personnel and serve as a key cornerstone in Afghan Government's future success. Three major contract awards occurred during the last six-months: ANCOP Headquarters in Panjwa'i, ANCOP Headquarters in Tarin Kot, and MoI Headquarters in Kabul.

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## SECTION 3 – TRANSITION

### 3.1: THE SECURITY TRANSITION PROCESS

The security Transition process was jointly conceived and developed by the Afghan Government, the United States, the NATO, and ISAF nations at a variety of international fora, beginning with the 2010 London Conference and culminating in the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010. Transition to Afghan security lead began in July 2011 and transition to full Afghan security responsibility will be complete country-wide by the end of 2014.

According to the 2010 *Inteqal*<sup>21</sup> Framework, which governs the Afghan-led process, the Joint Afghan-NATO *Inteqal* Board (JANIB) is responsible for approving Transition implementation plans and recommending areas to enter and exit the Transition process. The JANIB is chaired by Transition Coordination Committee chairman Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and co-chaired by COMISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR). It also includes the United Nations Special Representative for Afghanistan.

Careful evaluation of an area's security, governance, and development environment is conducted when considering eligibility for transition. After an area has been selected, the Afghan Government, NATO, and ISAF develop Transition implementation plans to be approved by the JANIB. Upon entry of an area into the Transition implementation process, NATO and ISAF support continues through four broad stages, progressing from local support to strategic support. The security of the Afghan people and the stability of the government are used to judge provincial readiness to move to each successive stage of transition implementation.

A critical component of the transition process is the gradual evolution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In recognition of Afghan concerns regarding parallel structures, and as part of the effort to promote Afghan capacity, PRTs are transitioning from service delivery to capacity building, and will either be disbanded or form part of individual countries ongoing commitments to Afghanistan.


To minimize risk in later tranches, ISAF and the Afghan Government have begun the transition process in some of the more difficult areas, including the South and East, to take advantage of the robust coalition presence. This plan assumes greater risk earlier in the process, but better ensures that the transition can be completed by the end of 2014 when the ANSF will have full responsibility for security.

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<sup>21</sup> "Transition"

### 3.2: CURRENT STATE OF TRANSITION

Figure 20: Transitioning Provinces and Districts (as of March 31, 2011)



#### ***TRANCHE ONE***

Announced by President Karzai on March 22, 2011, the implementation of transition began as scheduled in July 2011 for seven geographic areas: the provinces of Bamiyan, Panjshir, and Kabul (excluding Sarobi District), and the municipalities of Mazar-e Sharif (Balkh Province), Herat (Herat), Lashkar Gah (Helmand), and Mehtar Lam (Laghman). Tranche One included approximately 25 percent of the Afghan population. Although none of the Tranche One areas have completed the security Transition process, all have made adequate progress in security, governance, and development toward full Transition.

#### ***TRANCHE TWO***

On November 27, 2011, President Karzai announced the second tranche of areas to begin the Transition process. Tranche Two includes five provinces in their entirety and various districts and cities in 13 other provinces.

The provinces include Balkh, Takhar, Daykundi, Samangan, and Nimroz. The districts and cities include Sarobi District (Kabul Province); Jalalabad city and Behsood, Kooz Kunar, Kama, and Surkh Rod Districts (Nangarhar); Chagcharan city (Ghor); Sheberghan city (Jowzjan); Faizabad city and Shahr Buzurg, Yaftal Sufla, Arghanj, Baharak, Tashkan, Kishm, and Argo Districts (Badakhshan); Ghazni city (Ghazni); Qalai-e-Naw city and Aan Kamari District (Badghis); Maidan Shahr city and Hesa-e-Awal Beshood, Jalriz, and the center of Behsood Districts (Wardak); Nawa, Na'ad Ali, and Marja Districts (Helmand); all districts of Herat Province,

excluding Shindand, Obi, and Chisht Sharif; Qarghayee District (Laghman); all districts of Parwan Province, excluding Shinwary and Siagerd; and all districts of Sar-e-Pul Province, excluding Sayaad.

Tranche Two is much larger in scope than Tranche One, and also includes several areas with more challenging security environments. Different areas will proceed through the stages of transition on different timelines, based on security conditions and Afghan capabilities.

On December 1, 2011, Parwan Province became the first area from Tranche Two to formally enter the transition process, and all areas (with the exception of Sar-e-Pal and Takhar Provinces) had entered transition by March 31, 2012. In total, 138 districts across 20 provinces have entered transition, encompassing approximately 50 percent of the Afghan population.

Tranche Three districts are currently under consideration and evaluation, and are expected to begin Transition later in 2012.

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## SECTION 4 – SECURITY

### 4.1: THE INSURGENCY

The Afghan insurgency is composed of a syndicate of semi-autonomous groups, including the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin. The insurgency is also supported by various transnational terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as Pakistan-based militant groups such as Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan and the Commander Nazir Group. The primary actor within the insurgency is the Taliban, led by the Senior *Shura*<sup>22</sup> in Quetta, Pakistan, and the spiritual leader Mullah Omar. Overall, these groups maintain functional and symbolic relationships in pursuit of overlapping interests.

Amid major setbacks and the loss of several senior leaders in Pakistan resulting from aggressive U.S. counterterrorism efforts, al Qaeda's involvement in the Afghanistan insurgency has been constrained. As al Qaeda has been degraded, it has become reliant on a shrinking cadre of experienced leaders primarily inside a Haqqani-facilitated safe haven in North Waziristan. Al Qaeda continues to seek safe haven in Afghanistan, and has a small presence in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. The terrorist group continues to derive some benefits from its engagement in Afghanistan, including exploitation of incidents for propaganda, personnel recruitment, and tribal connections that it could use to re-establish future safe havens. Al Qaeda views continued involvement in Afghanistan as integral to its global image and relevance.

Although the specific area of operations for each group associated with the insurgency varies, the insurgency generally tends to operate along the border with Pakistan, primarily in the Pashtun-majority areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan, as well as in Pashtun communities in northern Afghanistan. The majority of insurgent commanders and fighters operate in or near their home districts, and low-level fighters are often well integrated into the local population. Out-of-area fighters comprise a relatively small portion of the insurgency.

Taliban senior leaders remain capable of providing strategic guidance to the broader insurgency and channeling resources to support operational priorities. Pakistan-based senior leaders exercise varying degrees of command and control over the generally decentralized and locally-based Afghan insurgency. Within Afghanistan, insurgent leadership structures vary by province. In general, a two-man team composed of a shadow governor and a military commander lead governance efforts and military operations at the provincial level, and also oversee district-level insurgent leadership and lower-level military commanders. Most shadow governors still reside in Pakistan.

To recruit, influence, and intimidate the Afghan populace, the insurgency uses a simple but effective messaging strategy. Capitalizing on the lack of basic services and government assistance at the village level, the insurgency encourages farmers to plant poppies as a means of closing the resource gap experienced by most rural Afghans. The insurgency also cultivates and exploits popular perceptions of the Afghan Government as corrupt, unresponsive, and uninterested in the plight of rural Afghans in order to recruit local Afghans to join the insurgency or to turn to shadow governments and courts to resolve issues.

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<sup>22</sup> "Council" (religious connotation)

The insurgency is funded from a variety of external sources, including Persian Gulf-based donors, state and non-state actors in Pakistan and Iran, and various transnational and criminal enterprises, but remains dependent on poppy cultivation and the narcotics trade as its primary source of revenue. Insurgents suspend operational efforts to provide labor for the poppy harvest, which typically begins in April and continues to June, as revenue from the poppy harvest is critical to insurgent operations throughout the year.

The insurgency also continues to receive critical support from neighboring Pakistan in the form of sanctuary, training infrastructure, and at times, financial and operational support. Pakistani sanctuaries bolster the efficacy of the insurgency – especially in areas where insurgents have access to direct or indirect Pakistani logistical and training support – and remain the most critical threat to the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan. The insurgency also receives materiel support from Iran, although to a lesser degree than from Pakistan.

#### **4.2: STATE OF THE INSURGENCY – FALL 2011 AND WINTER 2012**

The insurgency failed to achieve its objectives during the 2011 spring and summer al Badr campaign, resulting in diminished operations during the fall of 2011. Overall, enemy-initiated attacks<sup>23</sup> from October 2011 through March 2012 were down 16 percent relative to the same period in 2011. Specific insurgent goals, beyond escalating rates of assassinations and high-profile attacks, focused on maintaining and increasing violence levels in southern Afghanistan and conducting high profile attacks in Kandahar City and Kabul. As a result of Afghan and coalition Special Operations Forces targeting and conventional clear-hold-build operations, the insurgency failed to achieve these objectives, reflecting an ever-increasing gap between insurgent intent and capability.

During the reporting period, ANSF-ISAF operations maintained and expanded gains achieved during the spring and summer of 2011, and continued to degrade the cohesion and capability of the insurgency. The most significant progress was made in RC-S and RC-SW, the Taliban's primary area of effort, where ANSF-ISAF operations continue to deny insurgents' access to some safe havens, limit freedom of movement, and disrupt logistics, effectively separating insurgents from the Afghan population in key areas. Enemy-initiated attacks in RC-SW are down 29 percent, and attacks in RC-S are up by 13 percent, relative to the same period one year ago. Despite a decrease in attacks during the reporting period, the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar remain two of the most violent provinces in Afghanistan, due in part to insurgent sanctuaries and freedom of movement in Balochistan Province, Pakistan.

The overall declines in enemy-initiated attacks during the reporting period, however, does not signify that the insurgency has adopted a strategy of withdrawing and conserving resources until the coalition withdraws. To the contrary, insurgent leaders have worked throughout the fall and winter to motivate leaders and fighters, particularly in the south and southwest, to leave Pakistani sanctuaries and return to battle. The inability of Pakistan-based leadership to successfully enlist insurgent commanders and fighters to return to Afghanistan, as cited in previous reports, is a

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<sup>23</sup> *Enemy-Initiated Attacks*, as currently defined by ISAF, comprise enemy actions (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, and surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events to include executed attacks only (IED explosions/mine strikes). Potential or attempted IED attacks (i.e. IEDs and mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins) are not included.

steady trend and suggests fractures in insurgent command and control. This trend must not be overstated; however, as noted previously, the insurgency is local in nature and Afghanistan-based insurgents operate with a degree of autonomy, allowing them to tailor activities to local conditions.

The insurgency continues to exploit areas where the Afghan Government has failed to provide sufficient governance, rule of law, conflict resolution, and economic opportunities. Furthermore, security gains in RC-S, RC-SW, RC-E and Regional Command – Capital (RC-C) risk being undermined by support the insurgency receives from neighboring Pakistan. In particular, the impact of Pakistani support is manifested in violence levels and high profile attacks in RC-E and RC-C, where the insurgency leverages sanctuaries and support to plan and execute attacks. However, ANSF-ISAF interdiction operations and increasingly effective security in these areas have led to a decrease in enemy-initiated attacks in RC-E, which declined eight percent compared to the same period last year, while enemy-initiated attacks in RC-C remained statistically unchanged in the same time period. Conditions resulting from one of the harshest winters in Afghanistan during the last decade also likely contributed to the year-over-year decrease in security incidents<sup>24</sup> in both Kabul and RC-E.

Despite the undeniable progress of ANSF-ISAF operations, the insurgency is highly adaptable with a significant regenerative capacity, and retains the capability to emplace substantial numbers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and conduct high-profile attacks. Furthermore, insurgent operations are not limited to direct attacks on ANSF and ISAF personnel, and the security statistics cited above are not sufficient to measure the balance of insurgent versus Afghan Government influence. The insurgency continues to exert its influence in Afghanistan through alternate methods, including kidnappings, intimidation tactics, and robust assassination efforts, as well as messaging at mosques and leveraging the network of familial, tribal, and ideological sympathizers to exert their influence in areas controlled by the ANSF and ISAF. The insurgency will likely expand its soft power efforts as a result of its reduced operational capability and in order to conserve diminishing resources.


Near-term insurgent operations are expected to focus on regaining control of safe havens and expanding influence over population centers in Helmand and Kandahar. Southern Afghanistan remains vital to the insurgency for its historical significance to the Taliban movement and its importance to the insurgency's narcotics-related revenues. Kabul will remain a persistent target for high-profile attacks and assassinations in the Taliban's effort to undermine public support for the Afghan Government and security forces. Additionally, the insurgency will likely continue to target the ANSF and local defense initiatives, including the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. In the long term, despite initial overtures toward political cooperation with the Afghan Government and the international community, the Taliban retains its goal of overthrowing the elected Afghan Government following the withdrawal of international forces.

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<sup>24</sup> *Security Incidents* are currently defined by ISAF comprise enemy actions and explosive hazard events. Enemy actions include direct fire attacks, indirect fire attacks, surface-to-air fire. By explosive hazards, ISAF means executed IED attacks, namely IED explosions and mine strikes, as well as potential IED attacks. Potential IED attacks include those that were found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IEDs that were turned in to coalition by local nationals.

### 4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS – FALL 2011 AND WINTER 2012

Figure 21: Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts



The ISAF Campaign through 2012 will continue to see ISAF lead the expansion of security, governance, and development across Afghanistan. Military operations continue to focus on the provision of security within key population centers; controlling the approaches to Kabul and Kandahar; and denying al Qaeda safe havens inside Afghanistan. Concurrent to these actions, ISAF will provide support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) led Transition process to achieve the Lisbon objectives.

The ISAF Campaign continues to move the ANSF to the fore. In January 2012, the first ever Afghan written campaign plan, OP NAWEEED (Dari for “Good News”) was published. This plan is the ANSF expression of how the Army, Police and intelligence services will work together to protect the population and defeat the insurgency through 2012 and the first half of 2013. This plan, developed in collaboration with ISAF, sets the conditions for this style of planning to be replicated at the Army corps and police Zone level across the country through 2012. The adoption of an Afghan-led plan is critical to ensure security gains are maintained as the ANSF move into the lead.

ISAF will support Op NAWEEED through transitioning to a Security Force Assistance model. The adoption of this model will see ISAF transition through 2012 from a combat force with advisors, to an advisory force with combat capabilities. The deployment of specially selected

and trained Security Force Assistance teams will continue the progress already achieved with ANSF development in the field. The gradual improvement in the security situation and the growing capability of the ANSF will enable the United States to recover the final elements of the surge force, which will be complete by 30 September 2012. The growing capabilities of the Afghan Commandos, Special Police Units and the Afghan Local Police have been critical to the overall improvement in the security situation.

These effects through the summer of 2012 will set the conditions for ISAF to take a decreasing role in this expansion as we move towards 2014.

#### **4.4: ANSF-ISAF OPERATIONS**

##### ***REGIONAL COMMAND – EAST***

During this reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks in RC-E decreased by eight percent in the October 2011 through March 2012 time period compared to the same time period one year ago. Security incidents in RC-E accounted for 34 percent of all security incidents throughout Afghanistan, an increase of four percent from October 2010 – March 2011.

The eastern border districts of Dand-Patan in Paktiya Province; Jani Maidan, Gurbuz, Sperah, Bak, and Tani in Khost Province; and Bermal in Paktika Province are the current focus of insurgent attacks in RC-E, due to key border passes between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Continued joint operations by ANSF and ISAF during the reporting period in these key border districts, coupled with improved security at border check points, decreased insurgent ability to effectively refit or resupply themselves for the summer fighting season. Major operations include Operation MAURADER RAPIDS, which resulted in more than 70 enemy personnel killed and significantly disrupted insurgent movement, and Operation RUGGED SARAK, which disrupted the flow of lethal aid and fighters along insurgent lines of communication with the placement of new observation points and checkpoints along insurgent supply routes.

In the north of RC-E, Taliban, al Qaeda, and associated networks used the Kunar border to support their effort to project lethal aid into the Pech River Valley following coalition force realignment. Also, Taliban senior leaders in Nangarhar, Kunar, and Nuristan increased coordination through sub-commanders for attacks against ANSF-ISAF fixed sites and patrols. In Kunar, there have been limited but effective attacks along the border (Barge-e Matal District); however, insurgents have not had the capability to maintain any gains.

The most vulnerable area in RC-E is the corridor from Kurram Agency in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) through Azrah District (Logar Province) into both Logar and Wardak Provinces, which have been key staging areas for attacks against the capital. Operations during the reporting period focused on limiting insurgent freedom of movement along this infiltration route. The effects of Operation SHAMSHIR have disrupted the insurgency in Wardak and Logar and forced the Taliban to relocate command and control nodes, degrading their ability to facilitate high-profile attacks into Kabul.

By the end of the 2011 fighting season, there were clear indicators that insurgent manpower, weapons, and equipment was degraded. As Taliban leadership returns following the winter months, the major challenge for ANSF and ISAF will be to sustain momentum gained in security, governance, and development from the previous fighting season. Sustaining the momentum will be facilitated by a supportive population that is resistant to the insurgency and which fully embraces the ALP. Transition of provinces and key terrain districts continues, with an emphasis on population centers and areas where the ANSF and the Afghan Government demonstrate the most capacity to execute governance and development responsibilities, and to maintain security primacy. RC-E will continue to take advantage of opportunities to accelerate transition while current coalition combat power provides the ability to mitigate risks in more unstable transition areas.

### ***REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTH***

During this reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks in RC-S increased by 13 percent in the October 2011 through March 2012 time period compared to the same time period one year ago. Maiwand, Zharay, and Panjwa'i districts comprised 67 percent of RC-S enemy attacks over the reporting period. Security incidents in RC-S accounted for 21 percent of all security incidents throughout Afghanistan, an increase of three percent from October 2010 – March 2011. The increase in year-over-year EIAs in RC-S is relatively mild given that attack levels are lower over the winter period.

The security situation in RC-S improved during the reporting period, as evidenced by increased progress in the decisive terrain of Kandahar and the Arghandab River Valley west of Kandahar City. Afghan-led security in and around Kandahar City is expanding, and Daykundi Province transitioned successfully with Tranche Two. Governance, while continuing to lag behind ANSF development and security expansion, grew slowly but consistently as Afghan leaders worked to develop solutions that will endure after coalition forces depart.

The insurgency has failed to achieve its objectives for the 2011 fighting season in the RC-S area, and they have incurred significant losses to key leadership and terrain. The insurgency is expected to focus its efforts in the summer of 2012 on defending Maiwand as a strategic logistical, financial, and support zone. This district, along with Zharay and Panjwa'i, remains the insurgency's focus in their efforts to regain its influence with the population of Kandahar City. These three districts account for 67 percent of RC-S enemy attacks since October 2011. Unrelenting ISAF and ANSF operations in this area place insurgents in an increasingly disadvantaged position. If insurgents continue to lose influence in this area, they risk losing both the ability and credibility to influence the larger southern region.

ANSF and ISAF units conducted partnered operations throughout the winter, with the ANSF assuming the lead throughout the regional command. In December 2011, this lead was evidenced by Operation HOPE HERO, the first independently planned and executed ANSF operation in Kandahar Province, with ISAF providing only requested enablers and logistic support. Additionally, in January and February 2012, the ANA and the Kandahar Air Wing planned and executed the first two ANA-led air assaults. During the winter, the ANP established police garrisons in Kandahar City and the districts of Qalat, Dand, and Arghandab. In the spring, garrisons will also be established in Tarin Kot, Spin Boldak and Daman Districts. Collectively,

these police garrisons will position ANP in the security lead, with peripheral support from the ANA. Forces will then redeploy out of the cities in order to conduct offensive operations that expand and retain the security footprint. Also, the development of ALP in the key terrain districts as well as in locations along Highway 1 have increased village support, greatly enhancing the ANSF presence in RC-S.

The main counter-network operation in RC-S remains Operation MOUNTAIN LEOPARD II. RC-S and Special Operations units have conducted 285 air assaults and 67 ground assaults in conjunction with this operation since July 2011, successfully targeting and disrupting facilitators and leadership and degrading their ability to conduct operations. From July 25, 2011 through March 31, 2012, combined operations killed or captured 67 insurgent leaders, killed 250 other fighters, and detained another 651 associated military-aged men for follow-on questioning. These operations destroyed 12.2 tons of explosives, 61.6 tons of explosive pre-cursors, and over 159 tons of drugs and illegal substances.

By the end of the summer of 2012, RC-S will have two Stryker Brigade Combat Teams set with 47 Security Force Assistance Teams, a restructure designed to enable better operating and partnering with the ANSF. The 205<sup>th</sup> Corps and 404<sup>th</sup> ANP Zone have made excellent progress establishing areas where ANA and ANP operate both inside and outside large population areas. The greatest challenge lies in establishing the logistical and maintenance capacity to sustain the rapid growth in ANSF personnel, equipment, and tactical infrastructure.

### ***REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTHWEST***

During this reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks in RC-SW decreased by 29 percent from October 2011 through March 2012 compared to the same period one year ago. Security incidents in RC-SW accounted for 37 percent of all security incidents throughout Afghanistan, a decrease of five percent from October 2010 – March 2011.

ANSF and ISAF operations throughout RC-SW improved the overall security situation, especially in the critical terrain of the Central Helmand River Valley. Afghan-led security in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province's first district to transition with Tranche One areas, is progressing well. Three additional districts in Helmand Province (Nawah-ye Barakzai, Nad 'Ali, and Marjeh), as well as Nimroz Province, transitioned during Tranche Two.

In the Upper Helmand River Valley, ANSF and ISAF conducted a partnered operation to clear Route 611 through Kajaki District in order to provide security for the Kajaki Dam project. This operation was completed ahead of schedule, and additional operations to develop security in Now Zad and Musa Qal'ah began during the reporting period and are currently ongoing. In addition, RC-SW and RC-W continue to conduct joint planning and combined operations with two ANA Corps (215<sup>th</sup> and 207<sup>th</sup>). The objective of these operations is to improve the security situation in Farah and Gulistan and along Highway 1 between Helmand and Herat Provinces. Despite improvements, many districts in Helmand remain unstable, with Nahr-e Saraj being the most violent district in Afghanistan.

The ANSF are gradually assuming responsibility for security across Helmand Province. The operational performance of the ANSF continued to improve during the reporting period, not only

in the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, but also in the other key areas and population centers. ISAF no longer has maneuver forces in the provincial capital, and in the other transitioning districts, ISAF posture will continue to thin out commensurate with ANSF improvement and growth.

Governance continues to develop throughout RC-SW, albeit to various degrees. Representative government is established and active in all four of Helmand's transitioning districts. Among those districts awaiting transition, the south has evidenced more substantial progress, while the districts in northern Helmand present more risk, as ISAF and ANSF operations have pushed the insurgency to retrench to a few strongholds in the north. However, despite instability, security gains in the north have begun to result in tangible improvements in governance and development, all of which increases local support for the Afghan Government and the ANSF.

The biggest challenge for the remainder of 2012 will be the retrograde and redeployment of more than 60 percent of Marine Corps units (including four Infantry Battalions) as RC-SW force levels decrease from more than 18,000 Marines to fewer than 7,000 Marines by October 2012. The 215th ANA Corps is the youngest of the ANA Corps, and along with Afghan police units, will assume lead security responsibility throughout RC-SW. Coalition forces will focus efforts along the district centers and key populated areas of the Central Helmand River Valley and Upper Helmand River Valley. These coalition force efforts will be delivered through mentor teams, the support of key enablers (e.g. counter-IED and medical evacuation), and limited partnering for the ANSF.

### ***REGIONAL COMMAND – WEST***

During this reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks in RC-W increased by seven percent in the October 2011 through March 2012 time period compared to the same time period one year ago. Security incidents in Regional Command – West (RC-W) accounted for five percent of all security incidents throughout Afghanistan, an increase of one percent from October 2010 – March 2011.

Operations in RC-W predominantly included ANSF-ISAF patrols along Highway 1 through Farah and Badghis provinces in order to achieve freedom of movement and disrupt insurgents' freedom of action. Patrols and operations within these areas have been conducted within the seasonal winter-spring objectives and increased overall security in RC-W.

Partnered operations throughout the reporting period demonstrated positive ANSF performance on security and freedom of movement operations. Notably, ANA leadership and staff capability within the 207<sup>th</sup> Corps in RC-W continues to improve through close cooperation with advising and partnering units. Notably, the ANA 207<sup>th</sup> Corps within RC-W has planned and conducted cordon and search operations. One of these operations was the ANSF-planned and -led Operation COPPERHEAD in Farah Province, which focused on ensuring freedom of movement along route 515 (stretching from Farah District to Delaram District) and disrupting insurgent freedom of action. Overall, security improved in this area, a reflection of the ANSF's expanding capabilities and independence.

The ANA 207<sup>th</sup> Corps' increased planning and operational capability has accelerated and expanded their sense of ownership for operations and increased their interaction with coalition forces. Nevertheless, shortfalls remain concerning the planning of complex operations (cross-boundary operations) and lack of equipment.

The major challenge within RC-W for the near term will be to sustain the ANSF operational capability as coalition forces withdraw and remaining forces shift to an advisory role within the transition process.

### ***REGIONAL COMMAND – NORTH***

During this reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks in RC-N decreased by 60 percent in the October 2011 through March 2012 time period compared to the same time period one year ago. Security incidents in Regional Command – North (RC-N) accounted for two percent of all security incidents throughout Afghanistan, a decrease of two percent from October 2010 – March 2011.

During the past six months, operations in RC-N focused on maintaining Afghan Government control over key terrain in Kunduz, Faryab and Baghlan Provinces, and promoting freedom of movement along Highways 1, 3, and 6. In addition to these efforts, planning has begun on operations to provide security to enable the construction of Highway 1 from Qaisar District in Faryab Province to Almar District in Badghis Province in RC-W. Notably, the planning and eventual execution of this effort is ANSF-led, with ISAF providing partners, mentors, and enablers.

In October 2011, the ANSF, with ISAF support and partnering, started Operation EBTEKAR III, a six-month ANSF-led operation in the provinces of Balkh and Jowzjan intended to disrupt insurgents' activity and enable the ANSF to retain and expand security. The operation also set the conditions for the transition of these areas to Afghan Government control.

In February 2012, Operation CHAMTO started as a cross-provincial operation in Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces. This Afghan-planned and -led operation builds on the previous security gains and is expected to retain and improve the security situation in order to maintain freedom of movement on Highways 1, 3, and 5, a strategically important but fragile area.

With the ANSF in the lead, planning of future operations and force posture continues to focus on winter/spring operations and current and future transition planning. The 209<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps in RC-N continued to develop, and all units increased their capabilities for planning and execution of operations during the reporting period.

In January 2012, Tranche Two transition ceremonies took place in Badakhshan, Balkh, and Jowzjan Provinces, with security provided by coordinated operations between the ANP and ANA, and ISAF providing emergency support as needed. ANSF performance during the transition ceremonies demonstrated the improved capabilities for combined operations between the ANA and ANP.

The upcoming challenges for RC-N will be the reduction in coalition forces as well as the

continued transition process. Force reductions and the planned number of mentor teams will constrain the coalition's ability to mentor and advise a high percentage of ANSF units. Further, as an increasing number of districts and provinces transition to Afghan security lead, ISAF's access to information to support operations will be reduced.

### ***REGIONAL COMMAND – CAPITAL***

During this reporting period, security incidents in Regional Command – Capital were statistically insignificant (less than one percent) compared to all security incidents throughout Afghanistan, and thus represented no significant change compared to the same time period one year ago. RC-C is by far the smallest RC.

ANSF-ISAF operations in RC-C focused on joint clearing and patrolling operations in order to provide security for Kabul City as well as control Highway 7 and Highway 1 within Kabul Province boundaries. Operations during the reported period helped to neutralize insurgent support zones and reduce spectacular attacks in Kabul while gaining the trust of the Afghan population. In order to achieve these goals, five Capital Division ANSF *kandaks*, in coordination with ISAF, conducted clearing operations focused in Musahi, Paghman, Khake Jabbar, Qarah Bagh, Deh-e Sabz and Chahar Asiab Districts.

Kabul City had a relatively calm fall and winter. ISAF, partnered with the ANP, decreased the frequency of some patrols, such as rotary wing and rocket box patrols, due to the low level of enemy attacks during the last six months. Major security operations were conducted in support of critical ceremonies, including the *Loya Jirga* in November, the opening of Ghazi Stadium in December and the opening of the Afghan Parliament in January, with the overall objective of having the ANSF units in the lead, supported by ISAF assets.

Throughout the RC, ANSF units have assumed ownership of the security mission and maintained a positive working relationship with ISAF. The ANSF are increasingly capable of planning and synchronizing operations to support district and provincial security with increased levels of Afghan enablers and reduced dependence on ISAF.

With the winter fighting season, the insurgency started to increase their efforts to transport materiel and suicide bombers into Kabul City for future attacks into Kabul and the surrounding districts. The general threats and overall violence indicated that the increased security measures and success of ANSF and coalition forces in and around Kabul City forced the insurgency to conduct spectacular attacks with low logistical footprints but possible high payoffs. As the ANSF continues to develop and improve, however, insurgent attacks in the capital are expected to continue to decline.

### **4.5: LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES**

Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the Afghan Local Police are critical components of ISAF's COIN strategy. Together, VSO and ALP continue to make progress in protecting rural populations, preventing their exploitation by the insurgency and expanding the influence of the Afghan Government. Taken together, VSO and ALP reflect both "bottom-up" and "top-down" approaches to COIN – the former being reflected in security, governance, and development built up from the village and district levels, and the latter evidenced through connections to national

Afghan Government authorizations and implementing mechanisms. A key to this relationship is Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan’s (CFSOCC-A) Village Stability National Coordination Center (VSNCC) and its interagency affiliates. Through the VNSCC’s Provincial Augmentation Teams and District Augmentation Teams, direct support is facilitated from the national level to the village level, and local feedback is then returned to ISAF and the Afghan Government.

### ***VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS***

The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) initiated VSO in 2010. VSO are a bottom-up COIN initiative that establishes security areas around rural villages to promote local governance and development. VSO rely on embedded U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and ANASF to improve security, governance, and development in communities where the ANSF and ISAF have limited presence. VSO success has contributed to the significant growth of the program; VSO initially encompassed only eight districts, but have since expanded to include 5,200 CJSOTF-A personnel working in more than 100 communities in 58 districts throughout Afghanistan.

Overall security has improved in most villages as a result of VSO. Kinetic activity around the Village Stability Platform (VSP) generally increases immediately before a USSOF team embeds in the “shape” phase, and peaks during the “hold” phase, which is the month that the team embeds. From that point, the security situation generally improves and kinetic activity gradually drops below pre-shaping levels after approximately 15-18 months.


In VSP districts, governance activity is generally higher than throughout the rest of Afghanistan, both among local villages and between villages and district authorities. Villages near a VSP attended an average of 58 percent of bi-weekly Community Development Councils (CDCs) during the reporting period. This attendance figure represents a decline over the previous reporting period. Local villages and district authorities interacted an average of three times during every two-week period in the reporting period; visits by district representatives to villages supported by the VSO program accounted for nearly half of these interactions. This continued governance activity is noteworthy, given the broader struggles in local governance throughout Afghanistan.

### ***AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE***

As the principle component of the VSO initiative, the ALP are village-based security forces administered by the MoI. The program utilizes USSOF to train Afghans in rural areas to defend their communities against threats from insurgents and militant groups, in support of ISAF’s COIN strategy.

The MoI has approved 99 districts for ALP units; of these, 58 have been validated by their local *shura* and the MoI, a 21 percent increase from the previous reporting period. The total force of 12,660 ALP represents a 56 percent increase from the previous reporting period. The Afghan Government has authorized an end-strength of 30,000 ALP. However, ALP growth in the south and east – the main focus areas of the program – continues to be challenged by insurgent intimidation efforts and tribal infighting.

**Figure 22: ALP Disposition (as of March 31, 2012)**



The ALP program continues to expand and gain popular support. Tactical and technical proficiency of units gained during the 2011 fighting season has improved ALP capacity and performance. The sustainability of these gains, however, depends on coalition enabler support, MoI engagement, and continued USSOF mentoring.

Despite significant success, the ALP face multiple challenges. The program is heavily dependent on U.S. Government funding and USSOF training, mentorship, and oversight. Achieving the approved total force of 30,000 ALP guardians will challenge the capacity of CFSOCC-A forces, and may require additional support from USSOF and conventional force enablers. In part mitigating this concern, current plans call for transitioning some USSOF teams from directly training ALP to an “ISAF oversight” role for mature ALP units, which would increase CFSOCC-A’s ability to train, mentor, and oversee ALP with decreased force requirements.

Numerous ALP sites will transition to Afghan Government control but remain within ISAF “oversight.” ISAF oversight is an enduring operational and administrative affiliation between ISAF elements and VSO/ALP sites that have transitioned to ANSF primary partnering responsibility. ISAF oversight is designed to minimize risk, ensure consistent support, and enhance the success of Afghan security forces. This approach enables ISAF to reassign freed-up ISAF elements to generate additional ALP in other districts. In order for a VSO/ALP site to be considered for transition, the Afghan Government must be able to sustain security, development, and governance at the district level with minimal-to-no assistance from ISAF. ALP transitions

are determined by conditions on the ground and the ultimate authority to transition resides with the CFSOCC-A Commander.

ALP face many challenges, including ethnic and tribal tensions. For example, in Baghlan Province, ethnic tensions have resulted in clashes between Pashtun-dominated ALP and Tajik-dominated ANP. Although local *shuras* are largely effective in ensuring fair tribal and ethnic representation in ALP units, some *shuras* and ALP commanders actively resist recruiting certain ethnicities, which can create significant ethnic tension in multi-ethnic villages. To mitigate these risks, USSOF works closely with the *shuras* and District Chiefs of Police to promote a multi-ethnic approach, which is a key to stability.

The proliferation of independent, non-Afghan Government sanctioned militias, which operate outside the VSO/ALP framework, threatens to undermine the legitimacy and progress of the programs. Although limited in number, these unauthorized organizations threaten to damage the ALP “brand,” especially those that misuse the ALP name to further their own interests.

Finally, during the reporting period, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released its annual report on the protection of civilians, which discussed the ALP at length. UNAMA noted that ALP had improved security in and kept insurgents out of ALP areas, but maintained some criticisms from its 2010 report, which included references to isolated issues in recruitment, vetting, training, and discipline. To address these occurrences, CFSOCC-A created ALP Assessment Teams charged with investigating misconduct allegations and related issues affecting the ALP at the district level.

#### **4.6: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE (APPF)**

The Bridging Strategy for Presidential Decree 62 (August 16, 2010) stated that commercial, development fixed site, and convoy security services, including ISAF convoys, must transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) by March 20, 2012, with security services for ISAF bases and construction sites transitioning to APPF by March 20, 2013.

Six- and nine-month assessments were completed by MoI, ISAF, and U.S. Embassy personnel during September 2011 and January 2012. Results indicated the APPF was not on track to meet the requirements of the Bridging Strategy. The assessments concluded the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) was not developed and lacked sufficient leadership, training capacity, resources, and planning necessary for increased roles and responsibilities. The Afghan Government acknowledged the assessment and requested assistance from ISAF and the U.S. Embassy. As a result the APPF Advisory Group was established to partner with the Afghan Government and build adequate APPF capacity and capability.

Since that time, the APPF Advisory Group has worked closely with the MoI to advance APPF development, and, as a result, the APPF has made substantial positive progress on critical tasks necessary to begin the transition of security responsibilities and President Karzai approved the APPF transition plan. APPF has issued 15 permanent Risk Management Consultant licenses and an additional 31 interim RMCs. These interim RMCs will allow security providers to operate under the APPF even as they pursue permanent RMC licenses. In addition, 40 contracts with commercial and developmental partners are now complete, with six more in the advanced stages

of negotiation. The advisory group continues to work closely with the MoI to ensure the APPF matures and continues to support commercial and development efforts.

#### **4.7: POPULATION SECURITY<sup>25</sup>**

Afghan national perception in regard to security conditions have improved slightly since September 2011, based on the percentage of polled citizens who described security as either “fair” or “good” (85 percent in September 2011 versus nearly 90 percent in March 2012). Additionally, the percentage of Afghans who described their security environment as “bad” decreased from approximately 15 percent in September 2011 to close to 10 percent in March 2012.

Polls indicate that Afghans who believe the police can protect them outnumber their opposites by a 3-to-1 margin. Seventy-three percent of Afghans believe that “the police are capable of protecting their mantaqa,” a three percent increase from the previous quarter, while the percentage of Afghans who rated the police as “incapable” fell from 28 percent to 25 percent during the same timeframe. Two percent of respondents declined to answer or said they didn’t know.

Despite negative views of the security situation in some areas across the country, the majority of Afghans believe the government is leading security efforts – a sentiment that has prevailed for several years. Conversely, Afghans’ perception of Taliban and anti-government elements’ contribution to security remains low.

#### **4.8: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES**


During this reporting period, ISAF took extensive measures, including revising and re-issuing several Tactical Directives, to reduce ISAF-caused civilian casualties. These measures have generated positive results. Data indicates that 78 percent of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) occurring during the reporting period were caused by the insurgency. The total CIVCAS for the period of October 2011 – March 2012 decreased 32 percent from the same period last year. CIVCAS caused by ISAF decreased 49 percent over the same period.

Insurgents continue to rely on IEDs as the principal means to execute their campaign. More than 60 percent of CIVCAS caused by insurgents were from indiscriminate IED explosions. More than half of IEDs and mines were found safely cleared by security forces, which has helped to reduce CIVCAS.

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<sup>25</sup> Data in this sub-section was taken from the Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) Survey, Wave 15, March 2012.

**Figure 23: Monthly Civilian Wounded or Killed by Insurgents and ISAF (October 2009 – March 2012)**



#### 4.9: GREEN-ON-BLUE INCIDENTS

A number of high-profile incidents occurred during this reporting period in which ANSF members knowingly attacked and/or helped facilitate an attack against coalition members with the intent to maim or kill coalition personnel (“Green-on-Blue” incidents). While statistically small in number, Green-on-Blue attacks have a significant negative operational and strategic impact on the coalition mission in Afghanistan. An attack on NATO mentors at the MoI on February 25, 2012 resulted in a brief suspension of MoI mentoring activities while security protocols were reviewed, and other attacks have caused similar problems.

These attacks have not yet caused a major diplomatic rift, nor have they significantly hurt relations between the ANSF and ISAF. The vast majority of coalition mentors have continued to train and fight alongside their Afghan partners with the same dedication and skill as they always have. Indeed, Afghan and ISAF soldiers continue to depend on each other for vital support on a daily basis on partnered operations throughout the country.


While they are often high-profile, Green-on-Blue incidents are rare, and have resulted in a relatively small number of casualties. From May 2007 to the end of March 2012, a total of 52 Green-on-Blue incidents occurred.<sup>26</sup> Of these 52 incidents, 43 resulted in the death or injury of coalition (military and civilian personnel), resulting in 86 dead and 115 wounded.

Investigations have determined that a large majority of Green-on-Blue attacks are not attributable to insurgent infiltration of the ANSF, but are due to isolated personal grievances against coalition personnel. There is no indication that these recent attacks are part of a deliberate effort by insurgents, nor were they coordinated with each other.

<sup>26</sup> The number of *Green on Blue* incidents is subject to change as newly-identified past cases emerge.

Together, coalition forces and the ANSF have been implementing several measures to prevent infiltration. ISAF has issued a Tactical Directive outlining the ways that ISAF is managing the Insider Threat through improving situational awareness and force protection. The ANSF has taken unprecedented action to counter the insider threat and to deny the insurgency the ability to infiltrate their units. They have implemented an eight step vetting process and have embedded counter-intelligence officers across the services to reduce the insider threat.

Figure 24: ANA Screening Process



## SECTION 5 – GOVERNANCE

### 5.1: ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

The Afghan Government is gradually developing the capacity to provide stable, effective, and responsive governance to the Afghan population. However, the government's long-term sustainability is jeopardized by multiple factors, including widespread corruption, dependence on international aid and mentoring support, and an imbalance of power that favors the executive branch over the legislative and judicial branches. Limited human capacity with appropriate formal training or civilian education within the civil service sector also impedes the development of stable and sustainable government across Afghanistan.

During the reporting period, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Afghan government demonstrated mixed progress in meeting their responsibilities and moving toward long-term sustainability. Both the executive and legislative branches began strategic preparations necessary for the July 2012 Tokyo Conference. The executive branch focused on administrating the transition process and securing long-term strategic agreements with the UK, France, Italy, and Turkmenistan. A similar agreement with the United States remains under negotiation. The judicial branch, with the assistance of the international community, made mixed progress in training and staffing sub-national judicial positions. Chronic absenteeism and constrained freedom of movement to urban centers, however, impeded the expansion of rule of law at the provincial and district levels. Further, the slow development of the judicial system contributed to the perception that insurgent shadow governments are more effective and accessible and that the Afghan Government is indifferent to rural Afghans.

In the legislative realm, the National Assembly made incremental progress in addressing the backlog of pending legislation created in the electoral disputes following the September 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* elections. Most notably, in October 2011, the Afghan Parliament approved the supplementary budget request to recapitalize the Afghan Central Bank for costs associated with the Kabul Bank bailout. However, in March 2012, the lower House of Parliament rejected the FY 1391 budget, which would have allocated funds for the \$80M annual payment required to recapitalize the Afghan Central Bank. Parliament is currently reviewing ministerial expenditures and budget reports, amending internal rules of procedure, and discussing efforts to create disincentives for hoarding and price gouging.

Nevertheless, parliamentary authority and independence remains subjugated to the executive and judiciary branches. This imbalance was evidenced by the National Assembly's approval of President Karzai's nine cabinet nominees in March 2012. According to the procedures of the Afghan National Assembly, resubmitting nominees for consideration is illegal; this, however, did not prevent President Karzai from resubmitting seven candidates whose appointments were previously rejected. After questioning only two and altering National Assembly procedures to allow the candidates to be resubmitted, the National Assembly approved all nine candidates. This incident exposed the weakness of the National Assembly in relation to the President, while also demonstrating the absence of a clear authority to interpret the Afghan Constitution and regulate Afghan law.

In November 2011, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new three-year, \$133.6M Extended Credit Facility program for Afghanistan, which is intended to support strengthened economic and financial governance. Following the collapse of Kabul Bank, the IMF required the Afghan Government to place Kabul Bank in receivership and take a series of steps to strengthen governance of the banking system prior to approval of a new program. In addition to the prior actions for approval of the program, the Afghan Government and IMF staff developed a 30-point banking sector action plan for the government to implement between spring 2011 and March 2013. Adherence to the conditions of the IMF program allows the Afghan Government to demonstrate commitment to economic and financial reforms and maintain the support of international donors, some of whom had withheld aid for the Afghan Government until a new IMF program was in place.

The Afghan Government continues to work with the international community to garner support for the 22 National Priority Programs (NPPs) agreed upon at the 2010 Kabul Conference. The NPPs outline strategic security, governance, development reform, and service delivery priorities over the next three years. The NPP process resumed after a 10-month delay stemming from the Kabul Bank crisis<sup>27</sup>

The international community had collectively determined that it only endorse NPPs that are feasible and that they were willing to fund, reflecting a renewed commitment to the NPPs and the Kabul Process. The current level of endorsement of 50 percent of NPPs is encouraging; however, the priority programs remain significantly behind schedule, as all NPPs were due to be endorsed by July 2011. The Afghan Government has committed to finalizing the remaining NPPs prior to the July 2012 Tokyo conference. At the July Conference, the international community will expect Afghanistan to present a prioritized and sequenced set of NPPs, given sufficient funds will not be available for all projects at the same time.

## **5.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE**

The institutional structure of sub-national governance in Afghanistan is provided by the Afghan Constitution, the extant Local Government Law, the Sub-National Governance Policy, Public Financial Management Laws and the organizational and administrative structure of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (which includes Provincial Governors' Offices, District Governors' Offices, and provincial municipalities as structures). The result is a highly centralized structure for sub-national governance in which budgeting is done by central Ministries and the Ministry of Finance. Provincial and district administrations, under the provincial and district governor, provide coordination, planning inputs, and monitoring of services delivered by Ministries. Implementation of services is primarily done by central ministries, which are expected, over time, to delegate more implementation responsibilities to the provincial level, increasing the scope for sub-national planning and accountability.

Sub-national bodies at provincial and district levels have established structures in most regions but remain unable to provide many basic government services. The Afghan Government

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<sup>27</sup>The Joint Coordination Monitoring Board is the body responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Afghan Compact, and is composed of Afghan Government officials, members of the international community, NATO/ISAF, and national representatives from the region.

remains highly centralized, with all decision-making and service delivery provided by Line Ministries in Kabul. As distance increases from provincial capitals and the Ring Road, the provision of government services, local preference for the Afghan Government, *tashkil* fills of critical positions, and effectiveness of the rule of law all decline.

Afghan support for the government varies by region and is related to the level of basic service delivery and security the government is able to provide. Corruption, patronage systems, and a lack of substantive representation dilute popular support for municipal, district, and provincial government initiatives. Furthermore, sub-national policies have limited impact on sub-national governance structures in the short term due to limited communication and coordination of planning between Kabul and regional and local levels. Communication and coordination between the provincial governments and Kabul constituted the area of least improvement during the reporting period.

The development of effective district governance made measured progress during the reporting period. Notably, the Afghan Government has agreed in principal to a roadmap leading to a single district-level representative body. This roadmap, likely to be endorsed as a plan by the summer of 2012, addresses the multiple district representative bodies established by donors – a critical requirement for the approval of the NPP on Local Governance. However, district governance remains limited by the centralized Line Ministry system, which depends on functioning provincial line ministries to move funds to the district level.

### ***SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS***

Despite the identified challenges, sub-national governance structures witnessed limited improvement in stability, effectiveness, and representation during the reporting period. Several programs have been developed to enhance sub-national governance capacity, including the Provincial Budget Pilot Program (PBPP), the Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program (ASGP II), the Performance-Based Governor's Fund (PBGF II), and the District Delivery Program (DDP). In general, these programs are dependent on international funding, and their successful implementation relies on a favorable security situation and adequate human resources. Sub-National Governance (SNG) policy has left many critical issues unresolved or blurred, particularly in relation to the competencies and roles of different critical actors at the sub-national level.

The PBPP, introduced recently by the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF), seeks to improve budgetary planning and communication between the provincial and national levels, build provincial capacity, and empower provincial authorities within the budget process. The pilot program, which encompasses four Line Ministries and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, has made sound progress since its implementation. Trainings and outreach have increased the communication between Kabul and the provinces. Of 170 total possible submissions, 168 of the provincial line directorates completed their project submissions for inclusion into the SY1391 budget. Several other ministries have requested to be included in the second year expansion of the pilot program. Periodic reassessments will help to determine how this initiative can be further developed to enhance sub-national and national governance initiatives.

ASGP-II is a multi-donor project that supports the Afghan Government in the area of sub-national governance and state building at the national, provincial, district, and municipal levels. The program is run by the UNDP with the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) as the Afghan implementing partner. The program was funded with \$83.6 million provided by the European Community, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK. ASGP II, however, has not been able to report any tangible results besides funding National Technical Assistance in the IDLG.

The second installment of the PBGF, a modification to the original contractual agreement with The Asia Foundation, was put into effect on October 25, 2011. The PBGF is an 18-month program funded at \$45.5M. The program is currently funded jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the United Kingdom is conducting a review to determine its involvement in PBGF after the end of the Afghan fiscal year (March 21, 2012). This program has provided each of the 34 Provincial Governors a budget of \$25,000 per month to cover operational expenditures as well as fund small-scale community outreach projects. The PBGF II was planned to be expanded with a Provincial Councils Fund and financial system pilot in coordination with the IDLG and MoF. However, due to limited funding, the second and third components have yet to be implemented.

The DDP is a governance and development program created to improve government presence and service-delivery capacity at the district level. The DPP covers 32 districts throughout Afghanistan. Partnering with both the IDLG and MoF, the program is funded by the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and France, with variations on how it is implemented. U.S. funding for the program was suspended in July pending accountability of expenditures and a request for IDLG and MoF to satisfy several additional agreed-upon conditions. Restoration of funding for the program is contingent on the outcomes of an ongoing technical assessment, an upcoming financial audit, and discussions leading toward a renewed commitment for sufficient program implementation from both the IDLG and MoF.

Overall, sub-national governance programs are a critical element to developing and improving the effective extension of governance from Kabul to the provincial, district, and village level throughout Afghanistan. The cumulative effect of these programs will improve the ability of the Afghan Government to respond to the needs of the local population, and increase support for and the credibility of the Afghan Government.

SNG programs continue to face challenges, however, including funding, procedures, and coordination of activities to enhance governance in the medium and long term through capacity building at the sub-national level. The practice of donors' geographically ear-marking funds remains prevalent, causing spending to be highly uneven across provinces. Years of limited discretionary funding at the central government level and plentiful donor funding at the provincial level has distorted the budget formulation process. The operational and management (O&M) budget is not proportional to the development budget, and this imbalance is amplified by off-budget infrastructure projects that do not account for future O&M.

### **5.3: RULE OF LAW**

The United States and coalition partners conduct a broad range of programs that promote the rule of law (RoL) in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DoD) rule of law efforts include: field support to civilian rule of law teams; training judges, prosecutors, and corrections officials; providing necessary infrastructure for courts and prisons; and training MoI police forces in many aspects of law enforcement, from investigations to community policing. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides broader governance and economic development support, and the Department of State (DoS) provides funding for modernizing court administration and developing transparency in the prosecutorial process. Other agencies like Justice, Treasury and Commerce provide subject matter experts to advise and train key members of Afghanistan's rule of law effort.

Overall, progress in rule of law continues to be mixed. The main challenges include a lack of access to the formal justice system, poor enforcement of the human rights protections guaranteed by the Afghan constitution, pervasive corruption, insufficient transparency, and unsatisfactory protection of justice facilities and personnel. The shortage of human capital and lack of political will on the part of the Afghan Government to continue to sustain programs and facilities which have been put in place to maintain security and stability as coalition forces draw down is also a key challenge going forward.

RoL breakdowns may be both a cause and consequence of conflict among Afghans. Taliban justice systems often fill – however brutally – community needs for swift adjudication to maintain order. In doing so, it establishes a shadow authority that not only challenges the legitimacy of the Afghan central government, but invites warlord and criminal competition for power and engenders further instability. However, because of the continued weakness of the Afghan Government, Taliban justice remains a marketable commodity, as segments of the Afghan populace view Taliban systems as better than no resolution at all. To fulfill the requirements of security and sustainability, security transition must include RoL, and transition from military to civilian support must end with the full ownership of all aspects of the justice sector—police, courts, and prisons—by local, provincial, and national Afghan stakeholders.

The rule of law mission is shared among several military and civilian rule of law actors – U.S. military (specifically the Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan (ROLFF-A) and the Regional Commands), NTM-A, IJC, Regional Commanders, the U.S. Government, coalition civilians working in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), UNAMA, a variety of NGOs, Afghan officials from relevant ministries, and other justice officials. While NATO policy authorizes UNAMA to take the lead on all civilian governance and rule of law issues, their capacity is extremely limited, even in those regional commands led by coalition partners, such as RC-W (Italy) and RC-N (Germany). In RCs under the control of the U.S. military, limited coordination with UNAMA occurs, and the lead on rule of law activities is jointly shared between the U.S. Government civilian agencies and the military actors referenced above.

In an attempt to provide greater unity of effort across all communities, NATO Defense Ministers endorsed the establishment of the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission – Afghanistan (NROLFSM-A) at the June 2011 Defense Ministerial. NROLFSM-A was intended first to complement and eventually to assume responsibility for much of the liaison and coordination

activities of the ROLFF-A in support of the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other rule of law actors as U.S. and coalition forces began to draw down.<sup>28</sup>

NROLFSM provides essential field capabilities, security to Afghan and international civilians who provide technical assistance and training in supporting the building of Afghan criminal justice capacity, and increased access to dispute resolution services, thereby helping to improve the efficacy of the Afghan government. The four main lines of effort of NROLFSM-A, through its U.S. operations under ROLFF-A, are: (1) Developing human capacity, (2) Building sustainable infrastructure, (3) Promoting awareness of the legal rights of citizens and access to state sanctioned justice actors and public trials, and (4) Facilitating justice sector security (especially for provincial level judges) to ensure that judges can make fair and transparent decisions based on the law without fear of violence or other reprisals. NROLFSM-A has been a key facilitator for all aspects of justice development both directly, and through its support to the many U.S. and international community civilian organizations assisting with rule of law.

ROLFF-A, when first established, had a specific mission to provide security and to assist in all aspects of coordination and liaison with civilian rule of law actors, ensuring that civilian agencies such as USAID and DoS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs were set up for success with respect to their long-term governance and rule of law projects. Presently, the ROLFF-A mission is focused on the Justice Center in Parwan<sup>29</sup> (JCIP), where it is developing the capacity of Afghan authorities to prosecute insurgents and terrorists for crimes under Afghan law, a key element of our combined efforts to ensure peace and security in Afghanistan. ROLFF-A is also developing the JCIP into a facility where less experienced judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys can "intern" with more experienced judges assigned to the court.

As ROLFF-A continues to shift its focus to the JCIP, the NROLFSM-A mission addresses issues in the districts and provinces. NROLFSM-A/ROLFF-A has submitted a detailed proposal to the U.S. Embassy Kabul Interagency Rule of Law Office outlining programs and projects to effectively employ the \$50M Congressional authorization for sustainable rule of law development in Afghanistan.

### ***THE JUSTICE SECTOR***

The DoD engages with nearly every level of the host nation government to enable development in Afghanistan's justice sector. While improvements in the Afghan legal system are often overshadowed by political and security issues that dominate public discussion, dozens of districts held their first public trials during the current reporting period, highlighting modest but significant progress in justice sector development. Additionally, there have been other positive signs of Afghan justice sector development. Recently the Afghan Supreme Court swore in 54 judges in mid-October. These judges were subsequently deployed for three-year tours, after which the judges will return to Kabul to attend the formal two-year Stage Academy. The Supreme Court plans to repeat this experiment with another 50 recruits in the near future. Such

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<sup>28</sup> The NATO mandate authorizing the establishment of NROLFSM-A describes five primary tasks for NROLFSM-A: security, coordination, movement support, engineering support and oversight of the contractual process.

<sup>29</sup> Presently the JCIP is used to transition those Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) detainees that can be prosecuted to the criminal justice process of Afghanistan.

initiatives represent a significant step towards filling critical justice sector gaps and improving the professionalism of those working as judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys. Improvements in infrastructure supporting the justice sector include a number of projects designed to enable sustainability through the building or refurbishing courtrooms, prisons and judicial offices across Afghanistan.

Progress toward a fully functional, transparent, and fair justice delivery system remains tenuous; nevertheless, the Afghan judicial sector is on a path to greater sustainability. Afghanistan still faces a host of challenges, including systemic corruption and inadequate coordination between the formal and customary justice systems. Afghan ownership of further development efforts is critical, as efforts aim to put in place the minimum conditions necessary to enable formal local authorities, institutions, and the wider public to sustain the rule of law. This is a gradual process, requiring continued international support to foster permanent changes in public perceptions of the legitimacy of Afghan justice institutions and turn independent success stories into irreversible trends.

### ***DETENTION OPERATIONS***

Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF 435) is responsible for U.S. Government detainee operations in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. CJIATF 435 conducts detainee operations in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A) by providing secure and humane care, custody, and control of the enemy to prevent their return to the battlefield. Ultimately, U.S. forces will no longer need to detain most enemy fighters when Afghanistan has demonstrated the capability to protect its citizens from national security threats. U.S. forces will retain sufficient detainee operations capability for those enemies that present an enduring threat to U.S. or partner interests and homelands.

On March 9, 2012, COMISAF and Minister of Defense Wardak signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to transfer the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) and Afghan detainees held in the DFIP to Afghan control. The MOU stipulates a not-later-than transition date of September 9, 2012, provided that certain conditions are met by both the U.S. and the Afghan Government. CJIATF 435 has conducted detailed planning to implement the transition of the 3,132 detainees held by the U.S. under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) at the DFIP as of the end of this reporting period.

The transition will include a physical separation between the U.S.-controlled Bagram Airfield and the DFIP, as well as U.S. efforts to partner with and mentor the emergent Afghan Detention Operations Command (DOC). The DOC, according to the MOU, will be commanded by an ANA 3-star general, and will include all components required under international law to provide secure and humane care, custody, and control of detainees transferred from U.S. to Afghan control.

Concurrently with transition planning and execution, the DFIP continues to see growth in detainees due to continued and increased U.S. and Afghan security force operations. The DFIP detainee population has increased 480 percent since its establishment in March 2010, including a 19 percent increase during the current reporting period. Currently, the transition of command and control and support areas continues through the conditions-based transfer of detention

facilities to full Afghan Government control and assistance in the implementation of Afghan LOAC policies.

CJIATF 435 maintains transparency of detainee operations through extensive cooperation with the Afghan Government, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), coalition governments, and U.S. authorities. Frequent site visits by senior representatives of the Afghan government and the ICRC help ensure transparency in the secure and humane care, custody, and control of detainees at both U.S. and Afghan facilities at the DFIP.

U.S. detainee operations are authorized under the LOAC and U.S. law and policy. The transition of U.S. detainee operations to Afghan authority will involve the transfer of many LOAC detainees to Afghan custody for criminal prosecution. These transfers, in turn, require continued development of the Afghan criminal justice system. Thus, Afghan rule of law efforts and U.S. detainee operations, while distinct, are related and mutually supporting.

ISAF and the Afghan Government are committed to ensuring the safety of all detainees and ensuring they are treated in a humane manner that meets ISAF and Afghan obligations. ISAF, in coordination with the international community and non-governmental agencies, is continuing its efforts to implement a six-phase remediation plan and inspections regimen to prevent transfer of detainees to any suspended or uncertified Afghan facility.

Within 60 days of transfer to the DFIP, and every six months thereafter, LOAC detainees are subject to a Detainee Review Board (DRB) which hears information related to the detainee's status and the threat posed by the detainee. After assessing the detainee's status and threat, the DRB makes a disposition recommendation. Based on the findings of the DRB, the detainee can be recommended for Continued Internment, release, reintegration, or transfer for prosecution at the JCIP and Afghan incarceration. As part of the transition planning, CJIATF 435 is engaging with Afghan leadership to establish an Afghan detainee review system similar to the U.S. system in order to comply with international law and the MOU.

The JCIP represents an integral part of the transition effort to help refine Afghanistan's legal capacity for criminal prosecution, in accordance with the Afghan Constitution, of individuals previously held by the United States at the DFIP. Consisting of courtrooms and ministerial office buildings, and adjacent to the DFIP and Afghanistan National Detention Facility at Parwan, judicial capacity at the JCIP has increased and is beginning to keep pace with the number of detainee cases found by a DRB to be suitable for Afghan prosecution. Compared to the previous reporting period, judicial capacity at the JCIP has improved significantly; since the first trial in June 2010 through March 2012, the Afghan Government has conducted 439 primary court trials (367 adult and 72 juvenile) and 233 appellate court trials (215 adult and 18 juvenile) at the JCIP with Afghan judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. Overall, the JCIP has completed a total of 672 trials (439 primary and 233 appellate court trials).

The number of detainees identified for transfer to Afghan custody and prosecution at the JCIP remains relatively low. LOAC detainees may be interned because they are part of an armed force engaged in hostilities, regardless of evidence of specific criminal activity. A detainee may have been involved in criminal activity, but capturing units cannot or do not develop

sufficient prosecutable evidence. Moreover, attempts to prosecute can be frustrated by the fact that a majority of detainees are detained based on classified information that cannot be shared with Afghan judicial actors, and therefore cannot form the basis of criminal prosecution. As evidence collection practices improve throughout the Combined Joint Operational Area – Afghanistan (CJOA-A), it is predicted that more cases will be recommended for criminal prosecution. Also, several training programs are being developed to increase Afghanistan’s forensic and evidence-collection capabilities, and increase coalition forces’ collection of prosecutable evidence for use within the Afghan criminal justice system. The JCIP and associated programs may also aid the Afghans in prosecuting detainees transferred to them from U.S. custody.

#### **5.4: COUNTER-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY**

Corruption undermines the effectiveness, cohesion, and legitimacy of the Afghan Government; it alienates elements of the population and generates popular discontent; it deters investment, encourages the diversion of international assistance, and impedes licit economic growth; it enables criminal networks to influence important state institutions and functions; and it facilitates the narcotics trade and other transnational threats emerging from Afghanistan. Counter-corruption efforts are essential to strengthening critical Afghan institutions, consolidating gains in the wake of improved security, and they will grow in importance as the process of transition continues.

The United States has implemented a number of initiatives to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to reduce corruption and organized crime, while working to ensure the U.S. contracting resources and development assistance are not subject to fraud and corruption. These initiatives include sustained engagement, capacity-building, and technical assistance in key Afghan ministries; expansion of interagency efforts to mature organized crime and corruption estimates in key sectors as a basis for action; creation of joint, Presidentially-sponsored forums to promote inter-ministerial coordination and develop concrete counter-corruption recommendations; and the development of investigative leads and other forms of support for vetted Afghan law enforcement, investigative, and oversight bodies. The United States has also expanded its vendor-vetting and contract actions, suspending or debaring contracting companies engaged in corruption and criminality. Additionally, ISAF and its interagency partners are increasingly examining the transnational dimensions of corruption and organized crime and identifying ways to combat it.

CJIATF-*Shafafiyat*<sup>30</sup> coordinates counter-corruption efforts within ISAF, fostering a common understanding of the corruption problem, planning and implementing ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrating ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of key Afghan and international partners, to address President Karzai’s goal of an “active and honest administration” in Afghanistan.

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<sup>30</sup> “Transparency”

## ***INTERAGENCY COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFORTS***

CJIATF-*Shafafiyat* has implemented numerous initiatives to support the Afghan government in its efforts to reduce corruption and organized crime, while working to ensure that international resources and development assistance are not subject to fraud and corruption.

A critical component of counter-corruption efforts is monitoring contract funds and property losses in order to deny power brokers, criminal networks, and insurgents the opportunity to benefit from stolen property or illicit revenue. To achieve these objectives, Task Force 2010 was established. Task Force 2010 coordinates with IJC, the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan, and USAID to vet vendors prior to contract award. Since its creation in August 2010, Task Force 2010 has vetted 1,231 companies, of which 93 were rejected for force protection or performance concerns. Task Force 2010 has also assessed 165 total vendors in support of the Regional Commands, identifying 13 of these vendors as “high risk” for force protection-related issues. Task Force 2010 continues contract oversight efforts, and as of the end of the reporting period, had reviewed nearly 1,200 high-value, high-risk contracts valued at approximately \$27B. Task Force 2010 vetting also resulted in the debarment of 81 U.S., international, and Afghan companies. In addition to Task Force 2010’s efforts, ISAF expanded vendor vetting efforts with the implementation of the International Vendor Vetting Office (IVVO) in December 2011. CJIATF-*Shafafiyat* provides strategic support to the IVVO by ensuring the scope of work as well as processes and procedures are sufficient to meet the requirements of ISAF’s counter-corruption objectives. While CJIATF-*Shafafiyat* is responsible for these objectives, IVVO is a means of supporting these efforts by reviewing all NATO and coalition partner contracts to ensure they are not diverted by criminal networks or insurgent organizations.

In addition to contract vetting and oversight, counter-corruption initiatives are also working to insulate the ANSF from criminal subversion and corruption; this activity is a critical component to maintaining the credibility of the ANA and ANP as legitimate security providers. Substantial progress was made this quarter in preventing criminal interference and subversion of institutions in the Afghan security sector. Nevertheless, corruption and organized crime remain a significant threat to the effectiveness and cohesion of the security ministries and the ANSF.

The implementation of the 54-point MoD joint anti-corruption action plan, developed in the course of the Office of National Security Council (ONSC) Transparency and Accountability Working Group (TAWG), is now in progress. These recommendations, formulated by MoD leaders working closely with ISAF officials, include significant reforms at the MoD in personnel, logistics, and acquisitions systems. Along with the TAWG recommendations, Minister of Defence Wardak has also committed to full investigations of crimes committed at the National Military Hospital (separate from but concurrent with the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC)-led effort, described below), as well as into ongoing illicit activity within the Afghan Air Force. Minister Mohammadi has signed a directive authorizing the ONSC TAWG’s launch within the MoI, and has designated a ministerial lead for the effort. Another noteworthy counter-corruption milestone in the last quarter is RC-East’s removal of a 50th negative actor from the security forces in the region in March 2012.

Corruption also extends beyond Afghanistan’s borders, and addressing this transnational element is equally critical as eliminating domestic corruption. The transnational dimensions of the flows

of money, narcotics, precursor chemicals, and weapons across Afghanistan's criminal networks have become increasingly apparent. Key figures within Afghan criminal networks are dependent on their links to the international financial system, their capacity to invest the proceeds of their illicit activities abroad, and their ability to travel freely outside of Afghanistan.

During the reporting period, however, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta endorsed COMISAF's September 2011 proposal requesting the creation of a Washington-based interagency body – the Illicit Activities Initiative for Afghanistan – designed to develop cases and direct the application of targeted sanctions and international law enforcement actions against criminal patronage networks. This remains a high priority for Commander, US Force Command-Afghanistan.

ISAF is increasingly tailoring its operations to address transnational threats posed by the nexus between the insurgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, and corruption, which are convergent and mutually reinforcing. The first quarter of 2012 saw the arrests of senior leaders within narcotics-trafficking networks in Nangarhar and Helmand Provinces, as well as the conviction of senior Nimruz trafficker Haji Eissa—demonstrating a steady rise in both sheer numbers and the seniority of traffickers arrested and prosecuted. The insulation of the Afghan Counternarcotics Judicial Center (CNJC) from chronic political interference and criminal coercion has been central to the success of these efforts. Additionally, as a result of ISAF's mobilization of Afghan-vetted law enforcement units against the nexus of the insurgency, narcotics trade, and criminal patronage networks, nearly half of the 29 sub-networks associated with the 'Top 10' narcotics trafficking organizations have been operationally degraded.

In other countries that have struggled to overcome the interconnected challenges of terrorism, insurgency, the narcotics trade, organized crime, and corruption, the ultimate reversal of these threats has depended on the mobilization of civil society in support of national unity and reform. Recognizing this, in coordination with the Afghan government, ISAF and its partners have set out to identify and connect elements of civil society, including independent media, religious figures, student organizations, and women's groups, as well as Afghan civic education, leadership development, and communications programs, in a long-term effort to generate positive social pressure for counter-corruption reform.

### ***AFGHAN COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFORTS***

Despite an expansive counter-corruption campaign led by CJATF-*Shafafiyat* and ISAF in close cooperation with the Afghan Government, counter-corruption efforts rely heavily on the capacity and political will of the Afghan Government. During the reporting period, Afghan leaders – including President Karzai – made limited progress in addressing corruption and instituting reforms in cooperation with the international community.

Afghanistan's principal anti-corruption institutions, the HOOAC and the Attorney General's Office (AGO), continue to have only minimal political support for enforcing transparency and accountability within the Afghan Government. In response to sustained ISAF and interagency engagement and influence, however, the Office of the Attorney General created a joint Afghan-international Special Cases Committee (SCC) designed to initiate and monitor the progress of long-stalled, high-profile cases of corruption and organized crime. A HOOAC-led inter-ministerial investigative team, overseen by the SCC, is now making progress in the case of the

criminal network that operated in the Dawood National Military Hospital and Office of the ANA Surgeon General from 2008 to 2010. The work of the SSC and its inter-ministerial partners represents a promising means of achieving progress on reversing the prevailing “culture of impunity,” but it remains a developing institution with only limited political support.

## **5.5: REINTEGRATION**

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, established by President Karzai in July 2010, continued to consolidate security gains by permanently removing insurgents from the battlefield. As of March 31, 2012, the APRP had formally enrolled 3,907 insurgents in the peace process (accelerating from 2,385 as of September 30, 2011 and 699 as of March 2011). Thus far, the recidivism rate is less than 1 percent.

Disengagement training will launch in the summer of 2012 and will allow reintegrees to formally “graduate” the program and fully reintegrate into Afghan society. APRP structures mediated the conclusion of several significant peace deals in the provinces of Herat, Ghor, Kunar, and Nangarhar; these mediations resolved long-standing, violent intra-tribal conflicts. The launch of the nearly final APRP grievance resolution strategy, which will be supported by ISAF, should accelerate similar effects across Afghanistan.

Despite an emphasis on RC-S, RC-SW, and RC-E, most reintegration has occurred in RC-N and RC-W. This disparity is due to a combination of mature APRP structures, ANSF performance, and improved security. More than one-third of all reintegrees are from just two provinces – Herat and Badghis – due primarily to a combination of proactive leadership by provincial governors and effective cooperation with Afghan National Directorate for Security (NDS) in those provinces. While the Herat and Badghis governors credit reintegration with eroding the insurgency, reintegration is inadequate on its own to eliminate criminal violence and fully stabilize communities. APRP is making modest progress in the south, southwest, and east, although these areas remain significantly behind other areas of the country in the number of formal reintegrees. However, the number of groups entering into discussions with the Afghan Government during the reporting period increased in the south and east.

A dual-track approach, including improved Afghan outreach and sustained military pressure on insurgent groups, will be used to draw insurgents into APRP. ISAF provides robust support to reintegration with an emphasis on RC-S, RC-SW, and RC-E. ISAF provides support to the Joint Secretariat through the Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC), and to provincial peace structures through logistical, financial, and capacity-building assistance. Reintegration has also been fully integrated into the transition process, and will be a prominent component in Tranche Three planning.

In the last six months, APRP made considerable strides in delivering community recovery programs. These programs follow formal demobilization and are designed to benefit communities that accept reintegrees, and help transition them from conflict to stability. The first Afghan Government community-recovery projects were launched in August 2011, and as of March 2012, there were more than 140 community recovery projects in 21 provinces across Afghanistan.

Key challenges to reintegration are the uneven capacity of APRP personnel at the provincial level and the difficulty in executing community recovery projects in unstable areas. To address uneven capacity at the provincial level, the Joint Secretariat conducted multiple training sessions and partnered with ISAF and the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) to create a comprehensive training and mentoring program for provincial APRP structures; this program will launch by the summer of 2012. The High Peace Council, Joint Secretariat and ISAF are engaging the Afghan Government by expanding the number of government entities that support APRP, such the ANA, NDS, Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs, and Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. Security for community recovery will remain a challenge, but can be facilitated by improved community outreach and grievance resolution efforts, and ANSF/ISAF synchronization of security operations with local political peace efforts.

## **5.6: RECONCILIATION**

In her February 18, 2011 speech at the Asia Society, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out three foundations for American policy in Afghanistan: a strong military effort to defeat al-Qaida and support Afghans as they secure their sovereignty; a civilian push to promote economic development and good governance; and a diplomatic surge to support an Afghan-led reconciliation process designed to end 30 years of war. As part of the diplomatic surge, the U.S. is leveraging a broad range of contacts at many levels across Afghanistan and the region, including preliminary outreach to members of the Taliban. The United States has focused special attention on the need for regional support for Afghanistan.

We are focused on fostering a credible Afghan political process to end the war. Our progress on the Lisbon transition strategy, buttressed by strong commitments to support the Afghans after 2014, is creating the conditions to potentially bring the insurgents to the negotiating table. The United States has also been using our broad contacts in Afghan society and the region to open the door for an Afghan-led peace process to reconcile those insurgents willing to agree to three necessary outcomes: breaking ties with al-Qaeda; renouncing violence; and accepting the Afghan constitution, including its protections for the rights of women and ethnic minorities.

In recent months, there have been several senior-level dialogues on reconciliation. Pakistani Foreign Minister Khar visited Kabul in February, followed by a visit by President Karzai the same month to Islamabad to attend a trilateral summit meeting with the leaders of Iran and Pakistan. The trilateral declaration expressed support for an “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned inclusive process of peace and reconciliation.” Following Karzai’s visit, Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani issued an “appeal to the Taliban leadership as well as to all other Afghan groups, including Hezb-e-Islami, to participate in an intra-Afghan process for national reconciliation and peace.” Finally, on March 25, delegations from the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan reconvened a Core Group meeting in Dushanbe. This meeting marked the resumption of the Core Group, which had not had met since August 2011.

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## **SECTION 6 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT**

### **6.1: GENERAL ASSESSMENT**

Since 2002, donor funding has helped create national health and education systems; built extensive transportation, power, water, communications, and border infrastructure; and strengthened economic governance. Significant long-term assistance will continue to be required, however, to create conditions for sustainable economic growth. Short-term development initiatives will focus on what is realistically achievable by the end of 2014 to stabilize the economy and ensure that the Afghan Government can deliver basic social and development services to the Afghan populace. Development during transition will be executed against a backdrop of declining donor funding, drawdown of coalition forces, a rapid decline in ISAF spending, growing unemployment, and likely economic recession.

According to the World Bank, Afghan GDP grew at the rate of 8 percent in 2010 and 7 percent in 2011. Future growth scenarios are highly contingent on security, governance, the performance of the agriculture sector, and changes in aid levels. The base scenario projects growth to slow to 4-6 percent through 2018, then converge to 3- 4 percent a year. Improved governance and fully operational mines would support a scenario of 6-7 percent average annual growth through 2025. However, should the key factors mentioned above rapidly deteriorate, Afghanistan could experience negative growth of minus 2 percent a year which would be difficult to recover from.

### **6.2: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

#### ***HEALTH***

Afghanistan has made significant achievements in the health sector over the last 10 years, supported by external assistance from the United States and other donors. The introduction of the Basic Package of Health Services<sup>31</sup> (BPHS) in 2004 and the Essential Package of Hospital Services<sup>32</sup> (EPHS) in 2005 are largely responsible for the improvement in the quality and accessibility of health care in Afghanistan.

During the current reporting period, 24 health facilities opened across Afghanistan, bringing the nationwide total to 2136, up from 498 in 2002. Currently, the United States supports approximately 540 health facilities in Afghanistan, including five provincial hospitals. Additionally, 104 mobile health teams have been launched and more than 12,000 health posts have been stood up, supplementing Afghanistan's health system in more remote areas. Internet and communications technology are also being used to a limited degree to enable access to health care through electronic health and telemedicine initiatives, including text-message reminders for vaccinations and remote diagnostics.

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<sup>31</sup> The BPHS is designed to provide a standardized package of basic services that forms the core of service delivery for all primary care facilities, and to promote the redistribution of health services by providing equitable access, especially in underserved areas.

<sup>32</sup> The EPHS is designed to identify a standardized package of clinical, diagnostic, and administrative services for provincial, regional, and national hospitals; to provide guidance on how the hospital sector should be staffed, equipped, and provided with drugs for a defined set of services at each level; and to promote a health referral system which integrates the BPHS with hospitals.

Improvements in facilities have led to improvements in accessibility. In 2002, only 9 percent of the population had access to basic health services within the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) benchmark of two hour walking distance. Today, 68 percent of the population can reach a healthcare facility (either public or private) within one hour by foot or animal. In urban areas, healthcare is much more readily accessible (97 percent); however, access declines for Afghans in rural areas (63 percent) and among nomad populations (46 percent). Overall, 85 percent can reach a healthcare facility (public or private) within one hour by any type of transportation (100 percent urban population, 81 percent rural, and 81 percent nomad).

The impact of the increased availability to basic health services has resulted in a dramatic improvement in health indicators between 2002 and 2010, according to an Afghan Mortality Survey conducted by the MoPH in 2011. The under-5 mortality rate reduced from 257 to 97 deaths per 1,000 live births and the infant mortality rate fell from 172 to 77 per 1,000 live births. Family planning acceptance rose as the contraceptive prevalence rate increased from 10 to 20 percent, and total fertility rates declined from 6.3 to 5.1. The maternal mortality ratio declined dramatically from 1,600 to 327 per 100,000 births. Maternal health indications improved as antenatal care coverage increased from 16 to 60 percent, and skilled birth attendance also increased, from 14 to 34 percent. Although these statistics are based on imperfect reporting mechanisms and have yet to fully mature, they nevertheless point to promising trends in the availability and quality of Afghan health care, as well as the quality of life for the Afghan population.

Despite improvements noted above, significant challenges remain. For example, Afghanistan continues to have some of the poorest health indicators in the world. The health situation for women and children remains grim, particularly among nomadic and rural populations and those in insecure areas. Two in three women give birth at home without skilled birth attendants and in unsafe conditions, one in 10 Afghan children die before the age of 5, one Afghan woman dies every two hours from pregnancy-related causes, and only 56 percent of the population has access to clean drinking water.

Additionally, Afghanistan remains one of only three countries with endemic polio; the other two are Pakistan and Nigeria. After years of declining numbers, Afghanistan experienced a major outbreak of polio in 2011 with 80 confirmed cases, compared to 25 confirmed cases in 2010. A parallel rise in cases was seen in Pakistan in 2011. To address this problem, an Emergency Polio Action Plan is being developed by the MoPH in coordination with international partners (including the World Health Organization, USAID, United Nations Children's Fund, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control), with the goal of ending polio transmission by the end of 2013.

Developing sustainable health financing options will be important to the health sector's long-term viability.

## ***EDUCATION***

Since 2002, the Afghan populace has experienced a dramatic increase in access to basic education and the educational system has matured to support the enrollment of 8 million students – more than 10 times the number of children enrolled in early 2002. During the 2011 (SY1390) school year, primary education enrollment was greater than 70 percent, including more than 37 percent of girls. More than 13,000 schools are open nationwide. These schools are staffed by more than 170,014 teachers, trained to Afghan Government standards with the support of USAID.

While the quality of instruction and facilities remains uneven, the education of girls and women in the southern and eastern segments of the country has increased. The education system has expanded to provide vocational training to young adults and literacy training to Afghans of all ages. More than 38,190 students are matriculating at 142 Technical and Vocational Education and Training schools, which is an increase of approximately 13,000 students and 45 schools from the prior school year.

According to current projections, Afghanistan will provide access to basic education to more than 77 percent of its school-age population by 2015, a significant factor in reducing the number of children exposed to radicalization, improving opportunities for females, and providing young Afghans with increased occupational choices.

Education assistance for FY2012 will support the strategic goal of expanding access to education services, particularly for women and in rural and non-secure areas. USAID's proposed on-budget assistance programs with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education will be targeted to improve access to basic and higher education, increase literacy, and provide individuals with knowledge and skills that enhance their ability to contribute to sustainable economic growth.

## **6.3: ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE**

Donor-funded development efforts continue to improve Afghan infrastructure, including roads, rail, power, and border controls. However, the regulatory authorities and operations and maintenance mechanisms necessary for the long-term sustainability of this infrastructure are immature or have yet to be developed.

### ***ROADS***

The road network in Afghanistan continues to expand. The construction contract for the last 233 km of the Ring Road Northwest (Highway 1) was signed in December 2011 and construction is expected to begin by Summer 2012. In the East-West corridor, Italy will fund part of the road in Herat Province from Herat City to Chest-e Sharif (155 km), and also from Maiden Shar (Wardak Province) to Bamyan (Bamyan Province). The Asian Development Bank and Japan have nearly completed the road from Bamyan City to Yakawlang in Bamyan Province. The remaining sections of the East-West corridor are unfunded.

Along the North-South corridor, the road from Mazar-e Sharif to Pul-e Baraq (76 km) in Balkh Province was completed by the Asian Development Bank and the second section from Pul-e

Baraq to Darisuf in Samangan Province is expected to be complete by summer of 2012. The road from Tarin Kot to Chora (40 km) in Uruzgan, sponsored by the Netherlands, was completed by GIZ, the German Agency for International Cooperation owned by the German Federal Government. The United Arab Emirates is considering financing the last segment of Route 611 in Helmand Province, estimated at \$39M.

## ***RAIL***

In addition to the road network, Afghanistan's future rail system will be critical to economic expansion, particularly in the mineral extraction sector. An operations and maintenance contract with Sogdiana Trans (Uzbekistan National Railroad) has been signed, and limited operations began in February 2012 on the newly built 75km rail line from Hairaton border crossing to Nabe'bed (outside Mazar-e-Sharif). The Afghanistan parastatal ASTRAS has taken over loading and unloading operations, but is without a contract and lacking the capacity to provide a long-term solution.

In October 2011, USCENTCOM's Railway Assistance Team drafted a proposal for a much-needed Afghan Railway Authority that is currently awaiting cabinet approval. The proposed authority will regulate future railway construction and operations. The USCENTCOM team, in coordination with United States Transportation Command and the Afghan Ministry of Mines, is developing an Afghan National Rail Plan, which will take into account developments in mineral and hydrocarbon extraction.

## ***POWER***

Southeastern Power System's Kandahar-Helmand Power Plant program, partially delayed due to the Route 611 security environment, resumed delivery of supplies for the rehabilitation of the Kajaki Dam and Power Plant at the end of December 2011. However, closure of the Pakistan GLOCs has created a significant backlog of electrical materials required for this project. Unless the border re-opens or alternate routes and/or other shipping are used (which will increase the cost of the contract), we could realistically see a potentially one-year delay in getting Kandahar distribution upgrade materials in country. This condition will translate to a one-year delay in some of the Kandahar work, in addition to a 6-8 month delay in getting the Breshna Kot and Durai Junction substations into service. The contract for replacing and updating the 110 kV line from Musa Qala through Kajaki substation to Lashkar Gah is being rescoped and rebid after November 2011 bids were too high. The 110 kV line from Durai Junction to Kandahar is funded for FY2012. The Salma Dam has also overcome persistent security and contractual issues and work is proceeding. The dam, a 42 megawatt (MW) power plant, and transmission line to Herat are significantly behind schedule, due in part to security issues. The project is not likely to be completed until the summer of 2013.

## ***OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE CAPACITY***

GIRoA continues to develop the capability and capacity to build and maintain transportation networks and power infrastructure. The 2012 Afghanistan Infrastructure Program planned transportation projects include road infrastructure and maintenance capacity building. Future infrastructure sustainment is linked to efforts to improve capacity and capability of the Ministry of Public Works for planning and sustaining roads, bridges and tunnels. The long-term

sustainability for power includes capacity building and commercialization efforts to increase DABS (Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat) revenue through increased sales, enabling DABS to fully fund sustainment and capital improvements.

Currently, the ministries' mechanisms and institutional capacity to appropriately budget for O&M costs on a unit cost basis are limited and the approval and management of the budget at the major heads of expenditure level is the domain of the MoF, with provincial level requirements still often struggling to be recognized. The rigidity of this system, while necessary due to the institutional environment, results in significant inefficiencies.

The ministries responsible for critical assets possess limited ability to adequately execute an O&M plan on the scale required in Afghanistan, with the power and water sectors having the most capability. The limitations in internal technical capacity, as well as contracting and procurement to seek outside assistance exhibited by the ministries, would inhibit the effectiveness of any increase in O&M budget disbursed through the Afghan Government. Currently, the systems and internal controls needed to both determine appropriate O&M spending levels and ensure that the amounts budgeted for O&M are deployed and disbursed for the appropriate activities, are uniformly deficient throughout the ministries.

The Afghan Government must continue to develop internal capacity in order to sustain existing infrastructure. Improvements in capacity will support both the budgeting process for O&M costs, as well as the disbursement of the O&M budget throughout the year, thereby increasing the likelihood of sustainability for assets and service delivery.

#### **6.4: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT**

Afghanistan continues to experience steady economic growth, averaging 8.5 percent annually. However, this growth is primarily driven by donor and ISAF spending and must transition to investment-driven demand to lay the foundation for sustainable economic development. Such development is critical to long-term stability, but remains a significant challenge due to current fiscal gaps, the immaturity of most Afghan economic sectors, widespread corruption, and underdeveloped infrastructure.

A recent World Bank study on transition economics, assuming near-term growth in the mining sector, estimated that during the process of security transition, economic growth is expected to slow to 6 percent annually and eventually level off at approximately 4 to 5 percent as transition concludes post-2014. However, two factors can mitigate the possible effects of an economic recession: assuring that the reduction in external spending is more gradual than precipitous; and channeling donor funding through the MoF budget process that flows directly into the Afghan economy.

Major challenges for achieving economic stabilization are fiscal sustainability and transitioning from a statist, command economy to market-driven economic growth. The extent of progress will depend on tangible outcomes in creating and implementing the legal and regulatory framework necessary to stimulate private investment; completing major infrastructure projects in power, roads, rail, and air; financial sector reform; and increasing credit availability, agriculture and agribusiness value chains, extractive industries and Small to Medium Enterprise

development in key sectors that have the potential for promoting job creation, trade, and commerce. Promising sectors include carpet manufacturing, dried fruits and nuts, jewelry, cashmere, construction, and services.

Trade and regional economic integration are also key factors in sustainable economic growth. However, implementation of the bilateral Afghan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) has not yet been realized. Although Afghanistan became a full member of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in August 2011, political tensions between India and Pakistan have delayed implementation of the membership agreement. Discussions took place in January 2012 between India and Pakistan on tariff reductions on non-sensitive goods, followed by a meeting in Pakistan by SAFTA members to develop an action plan for SAFTA implementation. A follow-on meeting is scheduled to take place in April or May to continue these discussions.

At the U.S.-Afghan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement meetings that took place in Kabul in December 2011, U.S. Trade Representative policy discussions with the Afghan Government advanced bilateral trade issues. USAID continues to provide technical assistance to the Afghan Government related to capacity building for trade agreement implementation. This support is expected to result in positive developments in World Trade Organization accession in the medium term.

Although ISAF and the international community have provided Afghanistan with most of the critical infrastructure necessary for sustainable economic development, the lack of power remains a major constraint; in-country electric power production is far below the necessary threshold for strong economic growth, and the distribution network is significantly underdeveloped. Further, the development of infrastructure over the last decade requires additional funding to meet O&M requirements. Regulatory authorities have been established for some infrastructure industries, such as power and telecommunications; however, the sustainability of strategic infrastructure, essential to economic growth, is at risk without further improvements in establishing regulatory authorities for civil aviation, roads, and rail.

### ***REVENUE GENERATION AND BUDGET EXECUTION***

Although the Afghan Government continued to make progress in revenue generation from customs, border management, and the growing mining industry, the rate of expenditure will continue to far exceed government revenue in the near- to medium-term. The World Bank estimates that in 2021-22, the financing gap between government expenditures and domestic revenues will be approximately 25 percent of GDP, or \$7.2B in 2011 dollars. This gap may diminish somewhat as the size and cost of the ANSF is finalized; however, a significant fiscal gap is expected to remain. As Afghanistan gradually develops its natural resources, royalties and taxes on the export of materials, along with taxation on wealth generated as a result of these industries, may help close the budgetary gap.

Domestic revenues reached 74.6 percent of the goal for SY1390 and covered 71.6 percent of total operating expenditures in the first nine months of the solar year (March – December 2011), including a 10 percent share for security forces in the first six months of the year, but are expected to only cover 65 percent of the total operating expenditures by the end of the Solar Year (March 2012). Continued improvements in customs revenue, the introduction of a value

added tax, and the development of agricultural and mineral sectors are expected to increase government revenues. However, Afghanistan demonstrates an overreliance on customs, mining, and overflight for revenue generation, and needs to diversify. Additional taxation could provide the government with much-needed revenue. Over the reporting period, the Large Taxpayer Office saw progress with a pilot project in three provinces; however, corporate tax collection is almost exclusively confined to Kabul.

Budget execution continues to be a serious obstacle for the Afghan Government, which remains incapable of effectively executing the budgets of large-scale donor development projects. In the last three years, the Afghan government has been able to execute only 40 percent of its total development budget each year. For the first six months of SY1389 (March – September 2010), the Afghan government had spent 25.3 percent of its development budget. For the same period this year, development budget execution increased to 31.5 percent. These incremental gains, aided by technical assistance from USAID, the World Bank, and the Department for International Development, are positive steps. However, poor budget execution is endemic and will require generational change.

The Afghan Government's success in executing its operating budget is more mature. The execution rate of the operating budget in the first nine months of this year was 64.7 percent, an increase compared to the execution rate of the first nine months of last year (60.4 percent).

## ***AGRICULTURE***

More than 80 percent of Afghanistan's economy is agriculture-based, making the sector an important area for U.S. and international assistance.

Afghanistan's agriculture sector is not progressing as quickly as other areas of socioeconomic development. Food insecurity remains a significant concern, and was magnified by a reduction in wheat crop production in the 2010-2011 season as compared to the previous two years. Although the country's final wheat production was statistically close to average, the drop in production was interpreted as significant, prompting an outpouring of donor aid from several countries and international agencies. Although the net precipitation received during the growing season prevents the situation from being classified as drought, dry spells experienced during critical maturation periods of wheat seed did negatively impact final harvest numbers.

The U.S. Agricultural Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan has dual goals: increase the capacity of Afghanistan's Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) to deliver services; and increase agricultural sector jobs and incomes through enhancing agricultural productivity, regenerating agribusiness, rehabilitating watersheds, and improving irrigation infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is taking numerous steps to assist MAIL in becoming a more efficient organization that is able to address the nation's agricultural needs. Planned USAID programming will work directly with MAIL to increase its technical capacity to manage programs which deliver important services to citizens in the areas of research, extension, and irrigation.

USDA continues to implement a multi-year capacity building and change management program to strengthen MAIL's organizational capacity to support sustainable agriculture sector

development. The program employs management mentors throughout the ministry to improve the technical and administrative knowledge of MAIL civil servants, and in turn, improve the ministry's delivery of services to the Afghan people. Notably, the program has improved MAIL's ability to receive and manage on-budget assistance from international donors, although the extensive donor use of stand-alone management units leaves the systems largely untested.

USDA has also begun implementation of a project to strengthen MAIL's ability to deliver more effective, demand-driven extension services to producers and other rural clientele in targeted provinces, including Kabul, Herat, Balkh, and Nangarhar. The project focuses on professional development and training for MAIL's extension staff (primarily at the province and district level) in order to demonstrate MAIL's ability to support farmers and promote water and natural resource management, ultimately building public confidence in MAIL's capacity to provide critical services. These efforts will be complemented by a USAID program that will work with MAIL's extension and research staff to develop the linkage between applied research and extension in order to effectively introduce and sustain improved technologies to increase productivity for Afghan farms.

USAID continues to support projects designed to boost farm production and productivity as well as enhance farm-to-market linkages required to ensure the agriculture sector contributes to sustained economic growth. USAID's Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West program is contributing to both agricultural development and alternative livelihood objectives by strengthening farm-to-market linkages for licit crops. This program has supplemented USDA capacity-building efforts with various programs aimed at increasing long-term agricultural development and employment, as well as improving the incomes of farm families. The program generated approximately \$4M in off-farm sales in FY2011, supported bringing more than 23,000 hectares of land under improved irrigation since 2010, and created approximately 42,000 employment opportunities in farm communities since 2010.

In southern Afghanistan, the one-year, \$65M Southern Regional Agricultural Development program, funded by USAID, has instituted several programs to support growth in the agricultural sector in Helmand and Kandahar Province during the reporting period, including: 1) distributed grants of farm machinery to Afghan Government-approved agricultural cooperatives; 2) training and employment of approximately 4,000 laborers to plant more than 1 million fruit tree saplings; and 3) distribution of vegetable seed and fertilizer conditional asset transfers to approximately 1,000 Kandahari farmers. This program will be replaced by a five-year agricultural development program in 2012.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)/Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) are key enablers for growth in governance and economic development, and cementing gains in security. ADTs assist private farmers and local government officials at the district/provincial level and are a useful tool in capacity-building efforts. Currently there are 10 ADTs supporting 14 provinces in Afghanistan; seven teams are located throughout RC-E and three teams are in RC-S. ADTs are sourced by National Guard personnel, leveraging civilian skills and expertise across a range of agriculture sciences. ADTs at the local and national levels have instituted hundreds of sustainable projects addressing the basic income and subsistence needs. USDA offers Agricultural Development for Afghanistan Pre-deployment Training (ADAPT), designed to meet

the needs of U.S. Government and NGO personnel, including ADTs. Through a combination of classroom curriculum and hands-on exercises, ADAPT trainees receive an extensive overview of the Afghan agricultural environment in such technical subject areas as U.S. Government policy and strategy, animal husbandry, rangeland management, crop and horticulture production, orchard and vineyard management, post-harvest practices, water management, and soils.

Continued USDA capacity-building efforts, along with USAID and ADT grassroot agricultural development programs, will be critical to the continued stabilization and growth of Afghanistan's agriculture sector.

### ***EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES***

The mining, oil, and gas sectors made significant progress during the reporting period, particularly toward ongoing and future tenders.

The rights to the Amu Darya oil basin were awarded to the China National Petroleum Corporation and the Afghan-Tajik hydrocarbon basin seismic survey is ongoing. The tender for the West Garmak Coal site closed in late November, and the outcome of bid evaluations is expected in mid 2012. Two gold mines, two copper mines, and one lithium mine were opened for tender in early December 2011. The gold deposit in Badakhshan Province, the Zarkashan gold and copper deposits in Ghazni Province, the Namak-Sar lithium deposit in Herat Province, the Shaيدا copper deposit in Herat Province, and the Balkhab copper deposit in Sar-e-Pul Province were the first of a long list of small- to medium-scale mineral and "rare earth" deposits to go to market during the reporting period.

Three of the four blocks of the Hajigak iron deposit were awarded to a consortium of six Indian companies; the fourth was awarded to the Canadian company Kilo Gold. The contract is expected to be signed in Spring 2012. Although production is not expected before 2016, the exploration phase will induce large-scale investments in strategic infrastructure, specifically in energy, rail, and road networks. The resource base of the Hajigak deposit is estimated at 1.6 billion tons at 62 percent iron ore, and is expected to provide the Afghan Government with up to \$200M in royalty payments per year.

### **6.5: WOMEN'S ISSUES**

Women are making progress in Afghanistan, playing an ever-increasing role at all levels of Afghan society, particularly in the public and political arenas. Women hold 27 percent of the seats in the National Assembly and 25 percent of the seats in the Provincial Councils. In the 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* election, 406 of 2,556 candidates were women, a 24 percent increase from the 2005 election. Increased participation was met by increased electoral success: there were two female winners in Nimruz Province who won both provincial seats; 69 women filled elected seats, one seat above the reserved number of 68; and 11 women had enough votes to enter the Parliament independent of the reserved seats. Women have also increased their presence and visibility through the National Solidarity Program and constitute 24 percent of participants in the local Community Development Councils.

Women are also assuming greater responsibility in the socio-economic realm. In the health arena, 30 – 40 percent of the medical professionals are women. In the economic sector, the

number of registered women-owned businesses increased nearly 100 percent in 2010 to total 281.

While DoS and USAID administer the majority of women's initiatives, DoD also oversees several programs focusing on women. These programs include assistance to the Department of Women's Affairs in Kandahar and the District Development Assembly for Women's Affairs in Parwan District.

Some military units also incorporate Female Engagement Teams (FETs,) which were first established by the U.S. Marine Corps. FETs use female service personnel or civilians to accompany military patrols in order to engage local Afghan women and communities in open communication, thus facilitating civil-military interactions and building trust, cooperation, and security. The Ktah Khas Afghan (Afghan Special Unit) has recently selected the first 11 women to form Cultural Support Teams (CST) in support of their Strike Forces. The Afghan CST will further the "Afghanization" of night operations as they interact with the population and help care for women and children encountered on special operations.

Recently, the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program assigned two senior gender integration mentors to NTM-A. These mentors are responsible for mentoring the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on gender integration and human rights. The mentors provide oversight for the development of long-range strategic plans to improve gender integration, human rights/dignity, and equality-related matters within the ANSF.

To reduce discrimination and violence against women, the Afghan Government has enacted a law prohibiting violence against women and adopted the convention on the elimination of discrimination against women. However, implementation of these agreements remain slow, and violence against women and girls remains prevalent. In March, a statement by the Ulema Council, endorsed by President Karzai, outlined standards of behavior for women that were stricter than those in the Afghan constitution. President Karzai's intent is unclear, and the statement by the Ulema Council raises concerns about its negative implications for the advance of Afghan women's rights. Despite advances, the troubles of poverty, illiteracy, and poor health care continue to affect women disproportionately, and solutions will require a long-term sustained effort.

## **SECTION 7 – COUNTERNARCOTICS**

### **7.1: STRATEGY AND PRIORITIES**

The Afghan Government is the lead for all counternarcotics (CN) operations. The Afghan Government regularly partners with the U.S. and international organizations to target narcotics traffickers and facilities. As part of the COIN strategy, DoD coordinates with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and other U.S. Government departments and agencies to support the overall CN strategy for Afghanistan. The main goal of this strategy is to reduce the ability of the insurgency to draw support from the narcotics industry. RC-S and RC-SW remained priority areas for military and law enforcement CN efforts during the reporting period. These regions constitute principal areas for Afghan poppy cultivation, and as such, are critical sources of revenue for the Taliban-led insurgency. DoD's role in support of CN operations includes building the capacity of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), improving border security, promoting information sharing, and fostering regional and international cooperation.


The United States has been revising its CN strategy for Afghanistan since the beginning of this reporting period. This revision will prioritize CN assistance during the security transition and drawdown of U.S. and coalition combat forces. Additionally, at the operational level, a new CN Campaign Strategy was signed by COMISAF during the reporting period. This campaign strategy further reiterates the importance of continuing to degrade the insurgent-narcotics nexus. Simultaneously, ISAF will assist the Afghan Government in developing its counternarcotics capacity and capability for the eventual transition to greater Afghan responsibility.

### **7.2: COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS**

Increased ISAF presence and expanded operations in southern Afghanistan, enabled by the surge in forces through 2010, have helped to decrease poppy cultivation in an area of the country where CN progress was previously unattainable. Areas with ISAF and ANSF presence have seen a steady decline in cultivation, most notably in Helmand, Afghanistan's largest poppy-growing province, where cultivation has declined for three consecutive years.

This reporting period saw a 49 percent decrease in seized opium, a 54 percent decrease in seized morphine, a 93 percent decrease in seized heroin, a 70 percent increase in marijuana and hashish seizures, a 56 percent decrease in seized liquid pre-cursor chemicals, a 33 percent increase in seizure of solid pre-cursor chemicals, and a 50 percent decrease (a total of 256 individuals) in the total number of suspects arrested.

**Figure 25: Quarterly Comparison of Narcotics Seizures**



Poppy and its related opium production will modestly increase in 2012. This estimate is based solely on historical growth information collected by the UNODC between 2002 and 2011 indicating an average of 128,100 hectares per year. Judging by the average increase and decrease amounts over this ten year period, an increase of no more than 30,000 hectares or 23 percent could occur but is highly unlikely. There has been no significant change in growing methods, available land, fertilizers, poppy varieties, or water supplies. Sustained presence of coalition and GIRoA security forces will also maintain the status quo of potential growing output. Information indicating changes in potential growing areas in remote locations beyond previous years does not indicate any major change to potential cultivation amounts. The above average snow fall this winter and its snow melt should have little impact on poppy growing but could provide more mountain streams for morphine and heroin processing at clandestine laboratories in remote mountain locations.

During this reporting period, the CNPA planned and led an initiative called Operation EAGLE to conduct coordinated counternarcotics operations in Herat, Nimroz and Farah Provinces. The operation's objective was to build capacity within the CNPA through combined operations between CNPA units (provincial and specialized) and other Afghan police. Operations began on September 21, 2011 with limited checkpoint operations designed to demonstrate a police presence and develop intelligence for future operations. Subsequent operations became more complex and involved combined activities between provincial and specialized CN police. The final operations were complex ground and air narcotics interdiction missions between CNPA units, ABP, ANP, and others. Mission reviews and assessments were completed by mid-

December 2011. Operation EAGLE was the first time the CNPA had effectively integrated specialized and provincial units with the operations of other MoI police elements.

Meanwhile DEA, the CNPA National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and ISAF maintained high CN operational tempos throughout the reporting period, conducting several major CN operations in Helmand Province in October and November 2011; these operations resulted in the destruction of several drug processing labs. The destruction of these labs has denied the insurgency millions of dollars in potential revenue.

In October 2011, DEA, the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), the Provincial Reaction Company Kandahar, and U.S. military forces conducted a joint CN operation in Kandahar City which resulted in the seizure of 21,150 kilograms of pre-cursor chemicals. There was also an increase in hashish seizures in Kandahar Province during the reporting period. On December 24, 2011, DEA, the SIU, and the U.S. military executed two Afghan search warrants, which resulted in the seizure of 10 metric tons of hashish. On January 23, 2012, an operation was conducted in which 16 metric tons of hashish and one hashish processing center was seized. On January 30, 2012, another operation resulted in the seizure of 35.3 metric tons of hashish. These seizures resulted in millions of dollars of potential revenue being denied to the insurgency.

In June 2011, the DEA, SIU, and the CNPA Technical Investigative Unit (TIU) began an investigation of an international drug trafficking organization (DTO) operating in Helmand and Herat Provinces. This DTO was responsible for the distribution of hundreds of kilograms of heroin and opium, along with the importation of Acetic Anhydride from Iran. Through judicially authorized intercepts, the DEA and SIU were able to identify the DTO leader and his associates. On December 16, 2011, one of the sons of a DTO leader was arrested in the city of Herat by the NIU and SIU with 23 kilograms of heroin. On December 29, 2011, DEA and the SIU learned through judicial telephone intercepts that the DTO leader was in Kabul to meet with the MOI Deputy Minister of Intelligence regarding the arrest of his son. SIU investigators were mobilized to the MOI and arrested him without incident. On February 9, 2012, another son was arrested by the CNPA in Herat Province on an outstanding arrest warrant. The arrest of these three individuals has dismantled the DTO. On February 6, 2012, the DTO leader and his son who was arrested on December 16, 2011 were each sentenced by Afghan authorities to 20 years of imprisonment for drug trafficking violations.

On February 18, 2012, DEA and the NIU orchestrated the arrest of an individual at the Lashkar Gah airport in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, upon his return from India. This individual had been sought by the Counter Narcotics Justice Center since September 17, 2011, after a CN operation conducted by the NIU, the DEA Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team and ISAF Special Operation Forces in Margha Village in Helmand revealed an exceptionally large drug lab stocked with laboratory equipment and precursor chemicals. Approximately 21.5 metric tons of drugs and precursor chemicals were seized.

Other notable CN operations during the reporting period include the continued progress of the DEA-mentored Judicial Wire Intercept Program (JWIP). The JWIP provides Afghan law enforcement with lawful intercepts that can be used in an Afghan court of law. Since its inception in 2008, the JWIP has intercepted millions of calls. Since the beginning of FY12,

information obtained through the JWIP has resulted in the arrest of 24 individuals and the seizure of 55 kilograms of heroin and 18 kilograms of opium.

On March 14, 2012, Haji Bagcho, a significant Nangarhar-based heroin trafficker with ties to the Taliban, was convicted of violating two counts of Title 21 U.S.C. § 959; conspiracy to distribute and the distribution of heroin, knowing or intending that it would be imported into the United States, and one count Title 21 U.S.C. § 960; engaging in drug trafficking knowing or intending to provide something of monetary value to a terrorist or terrorist organization. During the course of this DEA investigation, ledgers that belonged to Bagcho reflect heroin transactions in 2006 in excess of 123,000 kilograms, estimated to be worth more than \$250 million. Bagcho used a portion of his drug proceeds to provide cash, weapons, and other supplies to the Taliban. He faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum of life in prison. Bagcho's sentencing hearing is tentatively scheduled for June 2012.

### **7.3: COUNTERNARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS**

#### ***COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN***

CNPA is the ANP component responsible for CN operations throughout Afghanistan. CNPA headquarters are located in Kabul, and CNPA has officers stationed in all 34 provinces and four forward operation bases located throughout Afghanistan. DoD continues to support CNPA through capacity building in order to establish a capable Afghan institution that can counter the narcotics trade and resist corruption. The current CNPA *tashkil* is authorized at 2,570 positions, to include CNPA headquarters elements, specialized units, and provincial units.

DoD, in partnership with the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, is funding the CNPA Development Unit (CDU). The CDU is working toward the goal of transitioning CN responsibility to the Afghan Government. In support of this, the CDU, with the NTMA Senior Police Advisor for Counternarcotics, aided the CNPA in completing their Ministerial Development Plan, a roadmap for CNPA development and the transition of greater security responsibility to CNPA at the 2014 transition.

In order to further support the CNPA, the Afghan Government established a Tactical Operations Center (TOC), which conducts training, develops procedures to fulfill mission requirements, and produces materials to support CN operations. One of the TOC's most valuable products is the Daily Report, which not only includes CNPA statistical data, but also threat information, coalition force military activity and seizures, weather, personnel strength data, and highlights of important CN events. The TOC significantly improved data reporting and is responsible for more than 50 percent of seizures reported by CNPA. Other activities at the TOC include extensive support for the development and planning of CNPA-derived and -directed interdiction missions integrated with CNPA specialized units.

#### ***COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN SPECIALIZED UNITS***

The CNPA and the TOC are supplemented by a number of specialized and highly-trained Afghan CN units, including the NIU, the SIU, the TIU, and the Air Interdiction Unit, all of which fall under the CNPA.

The NIU is a 470-person DEA-mentored specialized tactical element of the CNPA. The NIU is capable of conducting interdiction operations and seizures and serving arrest and search warrants in a high-threat environment, and supports CN operations with full range of capabilities, from providing security for undercover officers meeting with drug traffickers, to air and vehicle mobile operations targeting clandestine drug labs and storage sites. In 2012, DEA anticipates the NIU to be at the full authorized strength of 538 officers.

The NIU continues to assume greater responsibility for CN operations in Afghanistan. For example, on December 24, 2011, the NIU seized 4 kilograms of heroin and arrested one Afghan national. In addition, on February 2, 2012, the NIU seized 8 kilograms of heroin and arrested one Afghan national. These operations were Afghan led and demonstrate the NIU's effectiveness of independently conducting its own operations. Further, partnering between Afghan CN elements and ISAF remains strong. Since September 2011, the DEA has been supporting and managing the integration of the NIU with the U.S. Marine Corps in RC-SW. Since that time, the NIU has maintained a permanent presence in RC-SW and has accompanied the USMC on numerous counter-drug operations.

In addition to its presence in RC-SW, the NIU established a permanent presence in Kandahar Province in October 2011, which represents the initial deployment of a full-time NIU presence in RC-S. Previously, the NIU has had a full-time presence in RC-N (2009), RC-W (April 2011), RC-SW (September 2011), and RC-S (Uruzgan Province – June 2011).

Other specialized units of the CNPA include the SIU and the TIU. The SIU is a specially vetted and trained 77-person Afghan law enforcement unit. The SIU has evolved into a self-driven unit with superior investigative skills, and has conducted operations which have resulted in significant seizures and the arrest of numerous narcotics traffickers. The SIU carries out complex CN investigations using intelligence developed by the TIU. The TIU is comprised of nine specially vetted officers and 200 contract linguists and translators who perform court-authorized judicial wire intercepts. In addition, members of the SIU also serve as part of a Financial Investigative Team (FIT) at the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell.

Operational coordination among the various specialized units in the CNPA continued to improve during the reporting period, as reflected in a number of joint operations. For example, in July 2011, the SIU, NIU, and TIU, with DEA support, initiated an investigation into an international DTO transporting heroin from the Kabul International Airport to the broader region. On October 18-19, 2011, SIU investigators received information from the TIU identifying the location of the head of the DTO, who was subsequently arrested by SIU and NIU in Kabul City without incident. The following day, using information received by the TIU, the SIU arrested another individual working for the trafficking organization at the Kabul International Airport. This complex, long-term operation involving multiple elements of the CNPA demonstrates the growing capability of the CNPA.

In addition to the NIU, SIU, and TIU, the CNPA's AIU plays a strategic role by enabling elite Afghan CN law enforcement personnel and their DEA partners to conduct missions in dangerous areas and remote terrain. The United Kingdom contributes one training team member, supplements aircrew salaries, and provides five Mi-17 helicopters. DoD trains Afghan pilots and

crew members to fly and maintain Mi-17 helicopters to international standards. DoD has also assigned an embedded training team to train and mentor the unit's key leadership and personnel to acquire and sustain quality standards in aviation operations and maintenance so the unit is prepared to provide adequate tactical support to law enforcement missions.

From October 1 to March 30, 2012, the AIU supported 22 CN missions, which resulted in the destruction and seizure of 24 kg heroin, 2,030 kg of poppy seed, 21 enemies killed in action (KIA), 1 enemy wounded in action (WIA), one detainee, and the destruction of two drug labs. Notably, 21 of the 22 CN missions were flown with Afghan crewmembers, a major milestone in the development of the AIU. However, the AIU will require significant coalition assistance for several more years, particularly in the area of aviation maintenance.

The AIU is in a process of transition. Currently, the AIU is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and has the primary mission to provide aviation support to Coalition and Afghan law enforcement organizations conducting CN missions. The AIU provides general aviation support to the MoI as a secondary mission. The AIU operates 20 Mi-17 helicopters. Plans are underway to use the personnel and aircraft of the AIU as the basis of forming a new aviation unit, the Special Mission Wing (SMW), with a dual mission. The SMW will retain the mission to support CN operations and add a new mission to provide aviation support to Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions.

The concept is to detail the AIU into a joint MoI-MoD unit capable of providing aviation support for CN operations as well as SOF support missions. The aircraft and personnel of the AIU will form the initial foundation of the SMW. DoD will provide the unit with additional Mi-17s and also add fixed wing aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. Additional Afghan personnel required to expand the unit will be drawn from the MoD Afghan Air Force (AAF). These additional personnel and aircraft will be available for both CN and SOF support missions. The SMW will be subordinate to the MoD Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC). Plans are to establish the SMW in May 2012.

### ***TRAINING***

Specialized training is the key element in building the capacity of Afghan CN units. To this end, the Counternarcotics Training Academy (CNTA) continues to provide basic investigative courses of instruction for all CNPA officers. Following graduation from Basic Police Academy run by NTM-A, all candidate CNPA officers, must attend the five-week CN training course prior to being certified as a CN officer. The course is designed to provide fundamental training required to effectively investigate and prosecute narcotics crimes. The CNTA was established in 2007 and has since graduated 2,180 students, completed 41 classes, and has 42 classes ongoing. In addition to progress in training, efforts to grow and maintain the CNPA continue to yield progress; notably, more predictable pay and above-average working and living conditions have greatly diminished the CNPA's recruitment and attrition challenges over the last year.

CNTA also continued to develop an Afghan training capacity through a "Train-the-Trainer" program. The 12-week program was created to build the capacity of an Afghan-owned, independent training center. This initiative complements the Afghan Government's development strategy, and is considered critical for Afghanistan's long-term capability to address narcotics

trafficking and organized crime. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) created Mobile Training Teams (MTT), which provided “Afghan to Afghan” training in drug and precursor identification as well as basic intelligence training. During the year, MTT courses trained 366 officers in 9 provinces.

Training efforts extend beyond the CNTA for the specialized CN units. In order to provide basic, advanced, and sustainment training to the NIU and SIU, DEA established an Afghan Regional Training Team (RTT). During the period of October 1, 2011 through March 31, 2012, approximately 3,292 law enforcement officials participated in the RTT Program. Training seminars include firearms instruction, basic and advanced drug investigation techniques, and map-reading techniques. The RTT continues to mentor and train a cadre of Afghan instructors in order to provide them with increased responsibility over their training programs. Currently, the NIU has 12 officers devoted to the training cadre and the SIU has eight officers committed to the same. On February 25, 2012, a NIU Basic Class began for approximately 35 participants. This is the first 100 percent Afghan instructed class with only limited DEA/RTT oversight.

As a result of the RTTs success and established training credentials, the Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter Narcotics sought the assistance of the RTT to provide training for personnel assigned to the CNP-A Personal Security Detail. In October 211, the RTT conducted the first eight-week Personal Security Detail (PSD) training course. Approximately 42 students completed this course. A second PSD course concluded at the end of February 2012, with 38 students completing this course.

#### **7.4: INTERAGENCY COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS**

Several interagency and international organizations support CN operations in Afghanistan, including the Interagency Operations and Coordination Center (IOCC), CJATF-Nexus, and the Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC).

The IOCC provides intelligence and operational support to law enforcement CN operations in Afghanistan. The IOCC, led by the DEA and United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), is the central CN cell for developing an understanding of how the Afghan and regional narcotics trade supports the insurgency and drives corruption. As the military drawdown continues, the ability to conduct evidence-based operations and combined Afghan and international civil-military collection and analysis efforts will become increasingly essential in sustaining CN efforts. The IOCC partners with ISAF, CJATF-*Shafafiyat* and CJATF-Nexus to conduct law enforcement CN operations in non-secure, predominately military environments while bringing together the necessary resources to conduct an effective civil-military campaign to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus.

CJATF-Nexus, an ISAF organization with representatives from the international law enforcement community, also supports interdiction operations to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus. CJATF-Nexus specifically targets network functions (e.g., safe havens, movement, communications, and finance), rather than individual narco-traffickers, to disrupt network resiliency. CJATF-Nexus improved and expanded its narcotics targeting support during the reporting period, providing critical support for law enforcement investigations

and military operations by analyzing key trafficking networks and improving visibility on powerbroker corruption in RC-S, RC-SW, RC-W, and RC-E.

The U.S. and UK Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC) continued to perform strategic-level analysis and provide operational reach-back support for organizations in Afghanistan and improved collaboration across a wide spectrum of CN partnerships. JNAC's mission is to formulate strategic counternarcotics policy and provide operational decision-makers with independent, accurate all-source intelligence on the Afghan and wider regional opiate trade. JNAC also evaluates the potential and actual effectiveness of counternarcotics strategies and operations. From October 1, 2011 through March 31, 2012, JNAC provided UK and U.S. policymakers, U.S. Combatant Commands, ISAF, and key coalition partners with more than 25 written releasable products on key Afghan and regional drug issues, major Afghan drug networks, and evaluations of the impact of counternarcotics strategies and operations in Afghanistan. JNAC remains an effective model of interagency and international collaboration and partnership.

### **7.5: AFGHANISTAN THREAT FINANCE CELL (ATFC)**

The ATFC is a U.S. National Security Council-mandated organization that identifies and disrupts sources of insurgent and terrorist funding in Afghanistan. Led by the DEA, with deputies from DoD and the Treasury Department, the cell consists of DoD service and combat support agency personnel, Treasury Department analysts, law enforcement agents (DEA and Homeland Security), and coalition partners. DoD provides funding support through the DoD CN central account.

The ATFC works through both Afghan law enforcement and coalition forces to identify and disrupt insurgent and terrorist financial activities. For law enforcement support, the ATFC works closely with vetted personnel from the DEA-mentored NIU and SIU, the Afghan Public Prosecutors' Office, and vetted judges; this cooperation is critical to the development of an independent and sustainable Afghan financial investigative capability. ATFC investigations and operations are focused on prosecuting narco-traffickers and providing military forces with leads on individuals who provide financial support to insurgents and are affiliated with Afghanistan's narcotics industry.

ATFC analysts and liaison officers operate in close coordination with ISAF regional commands, the IJC, task forces, and SOF to ensure counter-threat finance efforts are integrated with military planning cycles and operations to disrupt insurgent funding. Specifically, the ATFC provides operational-level recommendations to planners and tactical targeting support. During the reporting period, ATFC identified and disrupted sources of insurgent funding throughout Afghanistan and integrated targets into command-level operational planning. Following successful operations, ATFC also provided debriefing support at DFIP.

### **7.6: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL COORDINATION**

Several international engagements took place during the reporting period that further strengthened counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan.

In late January 2012, the Department of State's (DoS) Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs hosted Afghan Minister of Counter Narcotics Zarar Moqbel Osmani in Washington, D.C., for meetings with representatives from DoS, DoD, DEA, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and USAID, as well as several Senators. Minister Osmani visited the Second Genesis Rehabilitation Center and the DEA Training Center at Quantico. He also participated in the opening session of the U.S.-UK bilateral meeting on Afghan CN on January 26. During the visit, Osmani requested U.S. support for CN-oriented alternative livelihoods efforts, previewed the objectives in the updated Afghan National Drug Control Strategy, and emphasized the need for drug demand reduction activities and the independence of the CNPA. The visit was Minister Osmani's first official trip to Washington, D.C., in his current capacity.

In February 2012, the UN convened a meeting of principals from the Paris Pact, a UNODC-sponsored partnership of more than 50 member nations and organizations focused on decreasing availability of, demand for, and trafficking in Afghan opiates. At the meeting, government ministers stressed the need to reduce drug trafficking, opium poppy cultivation, and narcotics production in Afghanistan. On the margins of the Paris Pact meeting, DoS representatives held consultations with Central Asian partners to discuss the United States' Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI), which builds on established efforts to prosecute drug traffickers and disrupt their networks in Afghanistan. Through CACI, the DEA will work with interested partners in Central Asia to establish investigative units that can develop targets using sensitive intelligence, share information with counterpart units in Afghanistan, and attack transnational drug networks through the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center.

On a bilateral basis, the U.S. Government continued its work with the Russian Federation on counternarcotics issues via the U.S.-Russia Counternarcotics Working Group (CNWG) (formed as part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission in July 2009). In November 2011, the co-chairs of the CNWG (ONDCP Director Gil Kerlikowske and Russian Federal Drug Control Service Director Viktor Ivanov) met in Chicago to discuss a continued partnership to address the Afghan drug trade. Since 2009, the CNWG has greatly improved law enforcement information sharing and collaboration between the U.S. and Russia on Afghanistan drug issues. At the meeting, the CNWG agreed to continue their efforts through 2012 by cooperating on law enforcement investigations and countering the drug trade's illicit financial flows emanating from Afghanistan.

At the regional level, the Northern Route Working Group (NRWG) is a multilateral initiative designed to increase general drug law enforcement cooperation and information sharing among its members in order to target transnational drug trafficking organizations responsible for the flow of illicit narcotics throughout the Central Asia region. The NRWG is comprised of DEA representatives serving in Almaty, Dushanbe, Kabul, Moscow, and Tashkent, as well as members of the CNPA, the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, the State Drug Control Service of Kyrgyzstan, and the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency. The most recent meeting was held March 29-30, 2012 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

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## **SECTION 8 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT**

### **8.1: PAKISTAN**

Pakistan is a state of central importance in South Asia, highlighted by a shared border with Afghanistan, its status as a nuclear power, and its role in the fight against al Qaeda and the Afghan insurgency.

The United States continues to seek a relationship with Pakistan that is constructive and mutually beneficial, and that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests. Pakistan has publicly committed to playing a positive role in a genuine national reconciliation that is Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. However, Pakistan's selective counterinsurgency operations, passive acceptance - and in some cases, provision - of insurgent safe havens, and unwillingness to interdict material such as IED components, continue to undermine security in Afghanistan and threaten ISAF's campaign.

Relations became severely strained by several events in 2011 culminating with the November 26, 2011 cross-border incident that resulted in the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers, ultimately these incidents reduced bilateral cooperation. Following the incident, Pakistan canceled its participation in the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, Germany. The Government of Pakistan also decided to undertake a comprehensive review of its relationship with the United States, and issued its finding in April 2012 following a debate in Parliament. Pakistan has indicated that it seeks to negotiate new terms for its relationship with the United States by defining Pakistani red lines on sovereignty and seeking written agreements to define bilateral cooperation in a number of critical areas, including counterterrorism cooperation and costs associated with future use of the ground lines of communication.

Recent meetings between senior Pakistani and Afghan officials have resulted in improved cooperation between the two countries, specifically on aspects of a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. A February 1, 2012 visit to Afghanistan by Pakistani Foreign Minister Khar was followed by a visit by President Karzai to Pakistan later that same month, indicating progress in Afghan efforts to elicit Pakistan's support for peace efforts with the Taliban. Following President Karzai's visit, Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani issued a public statement encouraging Taliban and other Afghan insurgent leaders to participate in an Afghan-led reconciliation process, representing a significant improvement from Pakistan's previous reluctance to support this process. Additionally, a tripartite U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan border meeting on February 8, 2012 set initial conditions for progress on cross-border cooperation. Several military border working groups designed to increase cross-border cooperation and mitigate the threat of future attacks have met since then.

In spite of these engagements, pervasive mistrust, long-standing tensions, and divergent strategic interests continue to make genuine cooperation difficult. Insurgent efforts - including assassinations of Afghan officials and attacks on Afghan and coalition forces emanating from the safe havens in Pakistan (particularly those sheltering the Haqqani Network and other Taliban affiliates), continue to threaten the emergence of a durable and stable political solution in Afghanistan.

Pakistan continues to seek a stable, secure Afghanistan, an Afghan government with primacy for Pashtuns, and limited Indian influence. To this end, Pakistan has allowed an insurgent sanctuary in its border areas to persist, offering a safe haven to Afghan Taliban and associated militant groups including the Haqqani Taliban Network in North Waziristan Agency. Pakistani leaders have tolerated this due to their concerns that Pakistan will be left alone to confront an unstable, an unfriendly, or an Indian-influenced Afghanistan on its borders. Accordingly, Pakistan seeks to play a key role in the peace and reconciliation process to advance a political settlement that considers Pakistani interests.

## **8.2: INDIA**

In October 2011, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Karzai signed a strategic partnership declaration, which formalized cooperation on governance, economics, commerce, education, public administration, and security/law enforcement. Subsequent engagements at multilateral venues, including the Istanbul Conference in early November 2011, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit in the Maldives in mid November and the Bonn Conference in December 2011, reinforced the positive relationship between Afghanistan and India.

Indian assistance has previously focused on major infrastructure projects such as electricity generation and transmission and road construction. In a broadening of focus from development to investment, India's SAIL Consortium was awarded 75 percent of the rights at Bamyan Province's Hajigak iron ore mine in November 2011. India has also expressed interest in bidding on future tenders throughout Afghanistan.

India also supports a variety of high-visibility projects and initiatives. For example, India and Afghanistan recently finalized plans for construction of the Indian-funded Afghan Parliament building. Indian funding also continues to support the construction of the Salma hydroelectric dam in Herat Province. Construction at Salma, however, is currently behind schedule, with a tentative completion date of late 2012. Beyond construction, India continues to support the development of Afghan human capital through scholarship programs at Indian universities (more than 1,000 scholarships per year), agricultural training programs, and other vocational training activities. Public opinion surveys continue to show that Afghans have a favorable view of Indian involvement in their country.

India continues to show interest in Afghan security assistance through strengthening ANSF capabilities, although activities in this area have been limited to date. India currently provides scholarships for ANSF personnel to study in India, and the Indian Government also is exploring options to train female Afghan police in India.

## **8.3: CENTRAL ASIAN STATES<sup>33</sup>**

The Central Asian States host the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which provides multiple ground and air transportation routes into and out of Afghanistan for commercial carriers and U.S. military aircraft. NDN GLOCs and air lines of communication (ALOC), which already

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<sup>33</sup> Central Asian states are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

functioned as the primary sustainment routes into Afghanistan, increased in importance following the November 2011 closure of the Pakistani GLOC to ISAF cargo. Maintaining the NDN LOCs remains critical to ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Efforts are underway to diversify the NDN, with new over-flight permissions and expanded ground transit agreements including “reverse” transit and transits of wheeled armored vehicles.

The Kyrgyz Republic hosts the Transit Center at Manas International Airport (TCM), the primary transit point for U.S. personnel movement to and from Afghanistan. The agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and the United States to allow the TCM to operate will expire in July 2014. Access to the TCM beyond the current agreement remains an ongoing political issue. Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, elected in October 2011, continues to affirm his support for the Transit Center through 2014.

Beyond the NDN and logistics support, the Central Asian States contribute infrastructure and economic development to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan completed a 75 km railway line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2010; limited railway operations have begun and may reach full capability later this year. As Afghan infrastructure continues to develop, expanded road, rail, and air networks will facilitate additional commercial activity between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors. Uzbekistan also provides electricity to Afghanistan.

Central Asian States’ concerns in Afghanistan include both the spread of violent extremism in the region and threats stemming from narcotics trafficking and related criminal activities. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Tajikistan remains the primary route for Afghan-produced narcotics to Russian markets, with conduits through other Central Asian States. Border security will also remain a top concern for the Central Asian States, which are closely attuned to the implications for their own countries stemming from events in Afghanistan and developments in narcotics trafficking.

#### **8.4: IRAN**

Iran aims to play a dominant, long-term role in Afghanistan and the broader region, and seeks the permanent withdrawal of foreign forces from regional nation-states. Iran’s attempts to influence events in Afghanistan include overt support for the Afghan Government; economic and cultural outreach to the Afghan population, particularly to the Shi’a minority populations; and covert support, including the provision of weapons and training, for various insurgent and political opposition groups.

At the highest political levels, Iran seeks to maintain positive relations with the Afghan government. In addition to maintaining a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, Tehran often uses high-level visits and key leadership engagements to publicly criticize the presence of international forces in Afghanistan and to call for the withdrawal of ISAF. Of note during the reporting period, Iranian and Afghan Defense Ministry officials held their first Joint Defense Commission meeting in Tehran in December 2011. The officials signed an agreement for Iran to increase Iranian fuel exports (e.g., gasoil, gasoline, jet fuel) to Afghanistan beginning in 2012. Iran’s Defense Ministry also agreed to provide the Afghan Army with food items, medical equipment, supplies for mosques, and scholarships in areas such as medicine and civil engineering.

Further, on February 17, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and President Karzai held their third trilateral summit in Islamabad with Pakistani President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani, issuing a relatively general statement on cooperation issues including counternarcotics and refugees. Various Afghan officials continue to welcome and seek further Iranian support despite allegations of Tehran's covert support to insurgents.

Since 2001, Iran has pledged more than \$1B in aid to Afghanistan and given more than \$500M. Iran's reconstruction and development efforts have been largely concentrated in western Afghanistan. Iran's aim is to increase its influence with the local population in order to foster pro-Iranian attitudes. Iran also wants to expand its sphere of influence beyond border regions into other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran currently maintains consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, and is considering opening additional consulates in Bamiyan and Nimroz Provinces.

Iran also continues to provide lethal assistance, including weapons and training, to elements of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Since 2007, coalition and Afghan forces have interdicted several shipments of Iranian weapons. Tehran's relationship with the insurgency, though not ideologically based, is consistent with Iran's short- to mid-term goal of undermining coalition efforts and an international military presence in Afghanistan.

Beyond economic and security issues, the protracted Afghan refugee situation continues to be a contentious issue between Iran and Afghanistan. Approximately one million registered Afghan refugees and about 1.4 million undocumented Afghan migrants (non-refugees) currently reside in Iran. In 2011, about 19,000 registered Afghan refugees voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan from Iran, a 55 percent increase compared to the 8,400 Afghans who returned in 2010. UNHCR attributes the upsurge to economic pressures and the Iranian government's discontinuation of subsidies on basic goods and services. Iran did not forcibly expel or return any registered refugees. Over 211,000 undocumented Afghans (non-refugees) were deported from Iran in 2011, a 26 percent decrease from the year before. In addition, over 282,000 undocumented Afghans spontaneously returned to Afghanistan, a 20 percent decrease from 2010 figures.

## **8.5: CHINA**

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has two primary interests in Afghanistan: security and trade. It continues to seek improved relations with, and stability for, Afghanistan, while it devotes diplomatic effort to develop an economic relationship focused primarily on future raw material access and extraction. Beijing has given no indication of it plans to commit security personnel to Afghanistan.

Since 2002, China has committed more than \$180M in aid to the Afghan government, and in 2009, China announced it would provide an additional \$75M over the next five years. Further, PRC companies will likely continue to invest in Afghanistan, most notably in the development of Afghanistan's mines and infrastructure. The China National Petroleum Corporation was awarded the rights to a section of the Amu Darya oil basin during the reporting period, and China is currently conducting a feasibility study for a rail system to support extraction efforts at the Aynak copper mine. However, China continues to have security concerns including issues such as external support to Uighur separatists, the safety of PRC workers in Afghanistan, and

narcotics trafficking into western China which can inhibit progress on projects such as the Aynak copper mine while impeding other investments. China and Afghanistan exchange regular political visits and seek cooperative bilateral efforts on counterterrorism and counternarcotics issues Beijing has also voiced its support for reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Although China maintains a strict policy of non-involvement with ISAF security operations, it has provided ANSF personnel a variety of non-lethal, China-based training to bolster Afghanistan's security and stability since 2006. Training for the ANP conducted at People's Armed Police municipal training facilities has covered policing skills, crowd and riot control, criminal investigations, and internal security duties. China has also offered basic, advanced, and senior military courses for ANSF officers at PRC People's Liberation Army military training colleges and universities.

Beijing continues to support regional diplomacy, most notably by including President Karzai in annual Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits and forming an SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. Afghanistan is currently under consideration for observer status at the SCO. China attended the Istanbul Conference on regional support for Afghanistan in November 2011, and is an active participant to the ongoing Istanbul process, which is planning another regional ministerial conference in June 2012.

## **8.6: RUSSIA**

Russia seeks a stable Afghanistan to minimize the threat of terrorism and stem the flow of narcotics into Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus, and supports Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts. Also, based on a commitment made at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Russia continues to expand the types of cargo shipped by rail and air via the NDN and also permits the reverse transit of goods back through the NDN.

Russia recognizes terrorism as being closely intertwined with narcotics trafficking. Russia's interest in expanding counternarcotics cooperation has continued with its participation in multilateral meetings, UNODC programs, and calls for greater international support to counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Council will also expand its Central Asian counternarcotics program, which trains counternarcotics personnel from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan, in Russia, Turkey, and via mobile training teams.

At the December 5, 2011 Bonn Conference, Russia asserted that the SCO should stand as the priority venue to coordinate regional contributions to Afghanistan. Russia has supported Afghanistan's bid for observer status within the SCO, which remains under consideration by the SCO. This has highlighted the increasingly important role that Russia has placed on regional cooperation mechanisms for economic, development, and security in Afghanistan as ISAF draws down.

## **8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES<sup>34</sup>**

The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to provide support to Operation Enduring Freedom, and have worked to provide financial support in the interest of a stable Afghanistan. The Gulf, however, is unfortunately also a source of considerable funding for the Taliban and other terrorist groups that operate in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

GCC states provide the United States key basing facilities and access in support of the mission. Many of the GCC countries provide important air bases and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan and logistical support of these operations. GCC countries host USCENTCOM's forward headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters, and U.S. Army Central Command Headquarters (Third Army). Other GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, ISR, and logistics operations in support of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. GCC nations are key partners in efforts to block terrorist financing, including the seizure of assets associated with al Qaeda's financial network.

Further, GCC nations have supported humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, including the establishment of refugee camps in Pakistan, financial assistance, and aid for Afghan refugees. GCC countries are likely to continue support to Afghanistan after U.S. and coalition combat operations end.

Gulf countries and their ongoing large-scale construction projects provide opportunities for migrant labor. Afghan participation in this labor force has been large and could continue to be a major source of remittances, further contributing to the economic development of Afghanistan. A number of wealthy Afghan expatriates choose to live in the GCC states, deepening the economic, political, and familial ties between the countries.

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<sup>34</sup> GCC members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

## **ANNEX A: SECURITY METRICS<sup>35</sup>**

### **A.1: TOTAL SECURITY INCIDENTS**

The security indicators (metrics) routinely used by ISAF to assess the strength and capability of the insurgency are as follows:

- Security Incidents
- Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIAs)
- IED Activity
- Complex / Coordinated Attacks
- Civilian Casualties
- Caches Found
- Green-on-Blue Incidents<sup>36</sup>


It is important to note that these indicators represent a subset of all available security-related metrics, and that qualitative information is also used to support ISAF assessments of the security situation. New metrics continue to be developed in order to provide the most holistic assessment of the dynamic security environment in Afghanistan.

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<sup>35</sup> All data contained in Annex A reflects data from the Afghanistan Mission Network CIDNE as of 31 March 2012


<sup>36</sup> New indicator emerging in importance due to recent events; definition and category details are explained further in the report.

Figure 26: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Nationwide Year-Over-Year Change



Security incidents from October 2011 through March 2012 decreased by 15 percent compared to the corresponding period last year. Notably, data reflects nine straight months (since July 2011) of year-over-year (YoY) decreases in security incidents.


**Figure 27: Monthly Security Incidents (October 2009 – March 2012)**



## A.2: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS

EIAs – which, unlike security incidents, do not include potential or attempted IED attacks – were also down 16 percent from October 2011 through March 2012 in comparison to the corresponding period last year. Since May 2011, each month has seen fewer enemy EIAs than the corresponding month from the previous year.

**Figure 28: Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (October 2009 – March 2012)**




### A.3: ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY REGIONAL COMMAND

#### *RC-CAPITAL*

RC-Capital is the smallest RC, by far, and has had low violence levels for several years. As previously noted, security incidents in RC-C were statistically insignificant during the reporting period; the change in EIAs in RC-C over this period was likewise statistically insignificant, with an increase of only two attacks over the corresponding period from last year.


**Figure 29: YoY Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Capital (October 2009 – March 2012)**



## RC-WEST

From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs in RC-W increased 7 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. RC-W accounted for 5 percent of all EIAs from October 2011 – March 2012, a statistically insignificant change (increase of 1 percent) compared to the corresponding period last year.


Figure 30: YoY Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-West (October 2009 – March 2012)



***RC-EAST***

From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs in RC-E were down eight percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. RC-E accounted for 34 percent of all EIAs from October 2011 – March 2012, an increase of three percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.


**Figure 31: YoY Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-East (October 2009 – March 2012)**



## RC-NORTH

From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs in RC-N decreased 60 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. RC-N accounted for two percent of all EIAs from October 2011 – March 2012, a decrease of two percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.


Figure 32: YoY Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-North (October 2009 – March 2012)



## RC-SOUTHWEST

From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs in RC-SW decreased by 29 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. RC-SW accounted for 37 percent of all EIAs from October 2011 – March 2012, a decrease of seven percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.


Figure 33: YoY Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Southwest (October 2009 – March 2012)



## RC-SOUTH

From October 2011 – March 2012, EIAs in RC-S increased 13 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. RC-S contributed 21 percent of all EIAs from October 2011 - March 2012, an increase of five percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.


Figure 34: YoY Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-South (October 2009 – March 2012)



#### A.4: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ACTIVITY

The reporting period evidenced an 11 percent year-over-year decrease in IED and mine explosions, while IED and mine activity (which includes executed and potential IED attacks) decreased 13 percent. Potential IED attacks include those that were found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and those turned in to the coalition by local nationals. IED turn-ins doubled during this period compared to one year ago.


Figure 35: Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (October 2009 – March 2012)



## A.5: COMPLEX AND COORDINATED ATTACKS<sup>37</sup>

Complex and coordinated attacks from October 2011 – March 2012 decreased 30 percent from the corresponding period last year. The latter two months in the reporting period evidenced gradual increases in these attacks, consistent with historical patterns associated with the start of the fighting season.

**Figure 36: Monthly Complex and Coordinated Attacks (October 2009 – March 2012)**




<sup>37</sup> A complex and coordinated attack is an attack which is conducted by multiple hostile elements employing at least two distinct classes of weapon systems from multiple locations, which indicates a higher level of planning.

## A.6: CACHES FOUND

This reporting period saw a decrease in total caches found from one year ago and from the previous reporting period's total. Analysis was unable to discern whether the decrease was attributable to a diminishment of insurgent supplies resulting from persistent ANSF/ISAF operations, but this conclusion is reasonable, given the broad and sustained campaign against the insurgency.

Figure 37: Caches Found (as of 31 March 2012)



## **Annex B: Congressional Legislation**

### **FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1230**

#### **REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.**

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2010, the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan.

(b) **COORDINATION.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head of any other department or agency of the Government of the United States involved with activities relating to security and stability in Afghanistan.

(c) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES RELATING TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.**— The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of a comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. The description of such strategy shall consist of a general overview and a separate detailed section for each of the following:

(1) **NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE.**—A description of the following:

(A) Efforts of the United States to work with countries participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (hereafter in this section referred to as ‘‘NATO ISAF countries’’).

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals relating to strengthening the NATO ISAF, and the results of such actions:

(i) Encourage NATO ISAF countries to fulfill commitments to the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and ensure adequate contributions to efforts to build the capacity of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), counter-narcotics efforts, and reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan.

(ii) Remove national caveats on the use of forces deployed as part of the NATO ISAF.

(iii) Reduce the number of civilian casualties resulting from military operations of NATO ISAF countries and mitigate the impact of such casualties on the Afghan people.

(2) AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for activities relating to strengthening the resources, capabilities, and effectiveness of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) of the ANSF, with the goal of ensuring that a strong and fully-capable ANSF is able to independently and effectively conduct operations and maintain security and stability in Afghanistan.

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals relating to building the capacity of the ANSF, and the results of such actions:

(i) Improve coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners.

(ii) Improve ANSF recruitment and retention, including through improved vetting and salaries for the ANSF.

(iii) Increase and improve ANSF training and mentoring.

(iv) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the United States and the Government of Afghanistan.

(3) PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AND OTHER RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, including a long-term strategy with a mission and objectives for each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals with respect to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, and the results of such actions:

(i) Improve coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners.

(ii) Clarify the chain of command, and operations plans for United States-led PRTs that are appropriate to meet the needs of the relevant local communities.

(iii) Promote coordination among PRTs.

(iv) Ensure that each PRT is adequately staffed, particularly with civilian specialists, and that such staff receive appropriate training.

(v) Expand the ability of the Afghan people to assume greater responsibility for their own reconstruction and development projects.

(vi) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the United States and the Government of Afghanistan.

(vii) Ensure proper reconstruction and development oversight activities, including implementation, where appropriate, of recommendations of any United States inspectors general, including the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction appointed pursuant to section 1229.

(4) COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for the activities of the Department of Defense relating to counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, including—

(i) roles and missions of the Department of Defense within the overall counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan of the Government of the United States, including a statement of priorities;

(ii) a detailed, comprehensive, and effective strategy with defined one-year, three-year, and five-year objectives and a description of the accompanying allocation of resources of the Department of Defense to accomplish such objectives;

(iii) in furtherance of the strategy described in clause (i), actions that the Department of Defense is taking and has planned to take to—

(I) improve coordination within the Department of Defense and with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States;

(II) strengthen significantly the Afghanistan National Counter-narcotics Police;

(III) build the capacity of local and provincial governments of Afghanistan and the national Government of Afghanistan to assume greater responsibility for counter-narcotics-related activities, including interdiction; and

(IV) improve counter-narcotics-related intelligence capabilities and tactical use of such capabilities by the Department of Defense and other appropriate departments and agencies of the Government of the United States; and

(iv) the impact, if any, including the disadvantages and advantages, if any, on the primary counter-terrorism mission of the United States military of providing enhanced logistical support to departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and counter-narcotics partners of the United States in their interdiction efforts, including apprehending or eliminating major drug traffickers in Afghanistan.

(B) The counter-narcotics roles and missions assumed by the local and provincial governments of Afghanistan and the national Government of Afghanistan, appropriate departments and agencies of the Government of the United States (other than the Department of Defense), the NATO ISAF, and the governments of other countries.

(C) The plan and efforts to coordinate the counternarcotics strategy and activities of the Department of Defense with the counter-narcotics strategy and activities of the Government of Afghanistan, the NATO-led interdiction and security forces, other appropriate countries, and other counter-narcotics partners of the United States, and the results of such efforts.

(D) The progress made by the governments, organizations, and entities specified in subparagraph (B) in executing designated roles and missions, and in coordinating and implementing counternarcotics plans and activities, and based on the results of this progress whether, and to what extent, roles and missions for the Department of Defense should be altered in the future, or should remain unaltered.

(5) **PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND RULE OF LAW.**—A description of any actions, and the results of such actions, to help the Government of Afghanistan fight public corruption and strengthen governance and the rule of law at the local, provincial, and national levels.

(6) **REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.**—A description of any actions and the results of such actions to increase cooperation with countries geographically located around Afghanistan's border, with a particular focus on improving security and stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.

**(d) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS TOWARD SUSTAINABLE LONG TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.—**

(1) **IN GENERAL.—** The report required under subsection (a) shall set forth a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward sustainable long-term security and stability in Afghanistan, as specified in paragraph (2), and shall include performance standards and progress goals, together with a notional timetable for achieving such goals.

(2) **PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS SPECIFIED.—** The performance indicators and measures of progress specified in this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(A) With respect to the NATO ISAF, an assessment of unfulfilled NATO ISAF mission requirements and contributions from individual NATO ISAF countries, including levels of troops and equipment, the effect of contributions on operations, and unfulfilled commitments.

(B) An assessment of military operations of the NATO ISAF, including of NATO ISAF countries, and an assessment of separate military operations by United States forces. Such assessments shall include—

(i) indicators of a stable security environment in Afghanistan, such as number of engagements per day, and trends relating to the numbers and types of hostile encounters; and

(ii) the effects of national caveats that limit operations, geographic location of operations, and estimated number of civilian casualties.

(C) For the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), and separately for the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) an assessment of the following:

(i) Recruitment and retention numbers, rates of absenteeism, vetting procedures, and salary scale.

(ii) Numbers trained, numbers receiving mentoring, the type of training and mentoring, and number of trainers, mentors, and advisers needed to support the ANA and ANP and associated ministries.

(iii) Type of equipment used.

(iv) Operational readiness status of ANSF units, including the type, number, size, and organizational structure of ANA and ANP units that are—

(I) capable of conducting operations independently;

(II) capable of conducting operations with the support of the United States, NATO ISAF forces, or other coalition forces; or

(III) not ready to conduct operations.

(v) Effectiveness of ANA and ANP officers and the ANA and ANP chain of command.

(vi) Extent to which insurgents have infiltrated the ANA and ANP.

(vii) Estimated number and capability level of the ANA and ANP needed to perform duties now undertaken by NATO ISAF countries, separate United States forces and other coalition forces, including defending the borders of Afghanistan and providing adequate levels of law and order throughout Afghanistan.

(D) An assessment of the estimated strength of the insurgency in Afghanistan and the extent to which it is composed of non-Afghan fighters and utilizing weapons or weapons-related materials from countries other than Afghanistan.

(E) A description of all terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, including the number, size, equipment strength, military effectiveness, sources of support, legal status, and any efforts to disarm or reintegrate each such group.

(F) An assessment of security and stability, including terrorist and insurgent activity, in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

(G) An assessment of United States military requirements, including planned force rotations, for the twelve-month period following the date of the report required under subsection (a).

(H) For reconstruction and development, an assessment of the following:

(i) The location, funding (including the sources of funding), staffing requirements, current staffing levels, and activities of each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team.

(ii) Key indicators of economic activity that should be considered the most important for determining the prospects of stability in Afghanistan, including—

(I) the indicators set forth in the Afghanistan Compact, which consist of roads, education, health, agriculture, and electricity; and

(II) unemployment and poverty levels.

(I) For counter-narcotics efforts, an assessment of the activities of the Department of Defense in Afghanistan, as described in subsection (c)(4), and the effectiveness of such activities.

(J) Key measures of political stability relating to both central and local Afghan governance.

(K) For public corruption and rule of law, an assessment of anti-corruption and law enforcement activities at the local, provincial, and national levels and the effectiveness of such activities.

(e) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(f) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary of Defense shall supplement the report required under subsection (a) with regular briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on the subject matter of the report.

(g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

## Annex C: Glossary

1UC	1 Uniform Course: a direct-entry training course for qualified candidates who enter the force as NCOs
AAF	Afghan Air Force
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ADAPT	Agricultural Development for Afghanistan Pre-deployment Training
ADTs	Agribusiness Development Teams
AGO	Attorney General's Office
AKVTC	Afghan Vocational Technical Trade Center
ALOC	Air Lines of Communication
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANACDO	ANA Commandos
ANAOA	Afghan National Army Officers Academy
ANASF	Afghan National Army Special Forces
ANASOC	ANA Special Operations Command
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDU	Afghan National Defense University
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANPTGC	Afghan National Police Training General Command
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
APRP	Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program
ASC	Army Support Command
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ASGP II	Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program
ATFC	Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell
AUP	Afghan Uniform Police
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
CACI	Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative
CDCs	Community Development Councils
CDU	CNPA Development Unit
CF	Commando Force
CFSOCC-A	Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan
CI	Continued Internment
CIVCAS	Civilian Casualties
CJIATF 435	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435
CJOA-A	Combined Joint Operational Area – Afghanistan
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CJSOTF-A	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan
CM	Capability Milestone
CN	Counternarcotics

CNJC	Afghan Counternarcotics Judicial Center
CNPA	Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan
CNTA	Counternarcotics Training Academy
CNWG	U.S.-Russia Counternarcotics Working Group
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
COMISAF	Commander ISAF
CPMD	Construction and Property Management Department
CPNs	Criminal Patronage Networks
CPS	Computerized Pay System
CST	Cultural Support Teams
CUAT	Commanders Unit Assessment Tool
DABS	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
DDP	District Delivery Program
DEA	U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
DFIP	Detention Facility in Parwan
DOC	Afghan Detention Operations Command
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DRB	Detainee Review Board
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
EIAs	Enemy-Initiated Attacks
EPHS	Essential Package of Hospital Services
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
FATA	Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FETs	Female Engagement Teams
FRIC	Force Reintegration Cell
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GLOCs	Ground Lines of Communication
HOOAC	High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOCC	Interagency Operations and Coordination Center
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ITAG	Infrastructure Training Advisory Group
IVVO	International Vendor Vetting Office
JCIP	Justice Center in Parwan
JNAC	Joint Narcotics Analysis Center
JNAC	UK Joint Narcotics Analysis Center
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JWIP	Judicial Wire Intercept Program
<i>Kandak</i>	Battalion

KIA	Killed in Action
KMTC	Kabul Military Training Center
KTD	Key Terrain Districts
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock
MDBs	Ministerial Development Boards
MDP	Ministerial Development Plan
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoDA	Ministry of Defense Advisors
MoF	Afghan Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTT	Mobile Training Teams
MTTs	Mobile Training Teams
NATC-A	NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDN	Northern Distribution Network
NDN	Northern Distribution Network
NIU	National Interdiction Unit
NMAA	National Military Academy of Afghanistan
NPPs	National Priority Programs
NPTC	National Police Training Center
NROLFSM-A	NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission – Afghanistan
NRWG	Northern Route Working Group
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
NVDs	Night vision devices
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OCC-P	Operational Coordination Center – Provincial
OCC-R	Operational Coordination Center – Regional and
OCCs	Operational Coordination Centers
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
ONSC	Office of National Security Council
ONSC	National Security Council
OPLAN	Operations Plan
PATs	Provincial Augmentation Teams
PBGF II	Performance-Based Governor’s Fund
PBPP	Provincial Budget Pilot Program
PRC	People’s Republic of China
PRCs	Provincial Response Companies
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
RC-C	Regional Command Capital

RC-N	Regional Command North
RC-S	Regional Command – South
RC-SW	Regional Command – Southwest
RC-W	Regional Command West
RLCs	Regional Logistics Centers
RLSCs	Regional Logistics Support Commands
RoL	Rule of Law
ROLFF-A	Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan
RTT	Regional Training Team
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Agreement
SAIL	Steel Authority of India Limited
SCC	Special Cases Committee
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SIU	Sensitive Investigative Unit
SMW	Special Mission Wing
SNG	Sub-National Governance
SOCA	United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime Agency
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPTC	Special Police Training Centre
SY	Solar Year
<i>Tashkil</i>	The manning document which determines a unit’s or ministry’s authorizations.
TAWG	Transparency and Accountability Working Group
TCM	Transit Center at Manas International Airport
TIU	Technical Investigative Unit
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Project
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USMC	US Marine Corps
USSOF	U.S. Special Operations Forces
VSNCC	Village Stability National Coordination Center
VSO	Village Stability Operations
VSP	Village Stability Platform
WHO	World Health Organization
WIA	Wounded in Action
<i>Wolesi Jirga</i>	Lower House of the Afghan Parliament
YoY	Year-Over-Year

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

