

THE TRANSITION OF STRATEGIC LEADER POSITIONS

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USAWC CLASS OF 2011

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 24-03-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Transition of Strategic Leader Positions				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mr. Allen G. Wynder Department of Army Civilian				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Stephen J. Gerras Department of Command, Leadership, and Management				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT During the summer of 2011, the U.S. will potentially have a new Secretary of Defense, a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a new U.S. Army Chief of Staff. These key positions are responsible for providing the strategic vision, direction and objectives to accomplish our nation's interest through military means of power. One should question the logic of how the nation and Department of Defense is best served in transitioning four of the top six key strategic positions nearly simultaneously in the summer of 2011. This paper will first examine DoD processes, programs, or policies for senior leader transitions and the integration with strategic leadership to understand the environment of leader transitions. By way of analogy, a look at the analysis of transitions of the President of the U.S., corporate chief executive officers, and presidents of universities is offered to gain perspectives in the best practices in conducting leader transitions. Next, a review of a previously conducted Army 4-star Command strategic leader transitions between two leaders is examined to develop a transition framework. Finally, recommendations are offered for conducting U.S. Army strategic leader transitions applying corporate best of industry practices.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Senior Strategic Leadership, Strategic Planning					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 26	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Mr. Allen G. Wynder
TITLE: The Transition of Strategic Leader Positions
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 24 March 2011 WORD COUNT: 4,995 PAGES: 26
KEY TERMS: Senior Strategic Leadership, Strategic Planning
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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THE TRANSITION OF STRATEGIC LEADER POSITIONS

During the summer of 2011, the United States (U.S.) will potentially have a new Secretary of Defense, a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a new U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and possibly a new U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff. Not a likely scenario, but one that could happen if the Chief of Naval Operations for the U.S. Navy and the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps were to also change, then all of the Department of Defense (DoD) strategic leader positions will changeover from one leader to another. These key positions are responsible for providing the strategic vision, direction and objectives to accomplish our nation's interest through military means of power. One should question the logic of how the nation and Department of Defense is best served in transitioning four of the top six key strategic positions nearly simultaneously in the summer of 2011.

This paper will first examine DoD processes, programs, or policies for senior leader transitions and the integration with strategic leadership to understand the environment of leader transitions. By way of analogy, a look at the analysis of transitions of the President of the U.S., corporate chief executive officers, and presidents of universities is offered to gain perspectives in the best practices in conducting leader transitions. Next, a review of a previously conducted Army 4-star Command strategic leader transition between two leaders is examined to develop a transition framework. Finally, recommendations are offered for conducting U.S. Army strategic leader transitions applying corporate best of industry practices.

Processes, Policies, and Programs for Transitions

DoD Directive 5105.76, *Transition of Administration Appointees and Other Officials*, establishes DoD policy for the transfer of authority from outgoing to incoming senior officials, whether incident to the transition between Presidential administrations or in the course of personnel action including reassignment, retirement, or resignation.¹ The policy further states DoD will “provide an efficient and thorough transition of its senior leadership, at those times when such transitions occur, in order to provide for continuity of the national security of the U.S., to avoid unnecessary turmoil in civilian leadership, and to sustain effective and efficient operations with the DoD.”² The policy is applicable to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff.

Although the DoD policy assigns responsibilities for the administration, management, and direction of transition activities, my contention is that current processes, programs, or policies are inadequate to transition strategic leadership positions (e.g. Chief of Staff Army, 4-star Army Command, Secretariat level Army position). Transitions are conducted in an ad-hoc manner with limited succession planning or onboarding.

A review of U.S. Army doctrine and regulations reveals a dearth of strategic level administration, management and direction for the transition of strategic leadership positions. In fact, one of the only publications, the *New Leader Transitions Handbook*³, focuses on the tactical and operational level of command serving to provide a step-by-step process for assuming a new leadership role. It covers from the time the leader is notified of the new leadership position to first day actions and considerations for the first 90 days. Even though the stated intent of the handbook is “to provide a ready reference

for all leaders: direct, organizational and strategic,”⁴ it is presented as a checklist and does not contain the appropriate considerations for strategic leaders.

Our Army regulations provide for general officer (GO) inter-assignment training scheduled through the Army Senior Leader Development Office to further support their transition into new assignments.⁵ However, the training and guidance does not go far enough to reveal the expectations of strategic leadership and how transitions should occur with strategic leadership positions.

During the synopsis review of the recommended training courses by position and rank under the Army Strategic Leadership Development Program (ASLDP) in *the Senior Leaders Handbook for General Officers*, it shows that training is offered to GOs upon appointment to General and Lieutenant General tailored to the first assignment. For both the executive and senior courses of the ASLP, training dates are established upon confirmation to General and Lieutenant General. This infers the training is conducted after the assumption of duties and responsibilities of a top level strategic level position.

Only in the advanced course of ASLDP does the purpose support conducting transitions. The course states it is to continue the development and education of Army strategic leaders to lead the Army in mastering transitions through the next decade and beyond in order to realize the Army vision.⁶ However the advanced course of the ASLDP is targeted for Major General and not the Chief of Staff Army, 4-star Army Command, Secretariat level Army strategic leader positions.

Transitions Integration in Strategic Leadership

The U.S. Army War College provides a comprehensive definition for strategic leadership as “the process used by leaders to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources,

directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats.”⁷ Army strategic leaders represent a combination of high-level thinkers, accomplished warfighters, and geopolitical military experts with the responsibility to lead, develop, and achieve results for each organization under their stewardship.⁸

The transition of U.S. Army strategic leaders into key positions needs to have processes and practices to prepare the leader to fulfill the expectations of a defined strategic leadership definition. Even if one supports Warren Bennis’ simple definition for strategic leadership as “the capacity to translate vision into reality,”⁹ Linda Smircich declares we need processes where one or more individuals succeed in attempting to frame and define the reality of others.¹⁰ The responsibilities of strategic leaders naturally call for a reflection on the realities of leading, developing, and achieving results for an organization.

Bennis’ simple definition of strategic leadership and the Army War College definition both have the element of defining reality. Robert Miles contends leaders “must be able to confront all levels of the organization with reality.” Miles is correct to suggest leaders must be able to create and reallocate resources, raise and redirect standards of performance, model new behaviors, and must emphasize the appropriate mix of those levers given the challenges an organization faces as part of the reality.¹¹ Later in this paper, a process is described that aids in defining reality during the transition of strategic leaders.

Thomas Gilmore further states the term transitions means “all the stages from an organization’s perception of the need for new leadership through the arrival and successful joining of a new leader.”¹² “Many books have focused on leadership, but few have addressed in a concrete way how an organization assesses its strategic situation; translate this assessment into a profile of a desired candidate; actively recruits, screens, and hires the candidate; and manages the critical period when the new leader takes charge.”¹³

The realities of a leadership turnover offer a “powerful way for new values and behaviors to enter an organization, to revitalize working alliance, and rethinking of outdated assumptions.”¹⁴ “All involved in leadership transitions will need to become more skilled in successfully managing decisions that create the vacancy all the way through the process of the effective joining of a new leader with the existing staff.”¹⁵

Michael Watkins offers that transitions are important because during the first three months on the job the success or failure is predicated on how the leader and organization go through a change process and make the best of the opportunities to start anew and implement necessary changes.¹⁶ Watkins has five propositions about the challenges of transitions and what it takes to succeed in making them.

- The root causes of transitions failure always lie in a pernicious interaction between the situation, with its opportunities and pitfalls, and the individual, with his or her strengths.
- There are systematic methods that leaders can employ to both lessen the likelihood of failure and reach a breakeven point faster.

- The overriding goal in a transition is to build momentum by creating virtuous cycles that build credibility and by avoiding getting caught in vicious cycles that damage credibility.
- Transitions are a crucible for leader development and should be managed accordingly.
- Adoption of a standard framework for accelerating transitions can yield big returns for organizations.¹⁷

Watkins asserts the developing of strategies against five propositions will move the individual and the organization beyond a “sink or swim” approach to managing transitions. Success or failure rests on the individual and the organization’s ability to diagnose the situation, identify challenges and opportunities, and develop promising action plans. The accelerated transition plan is to create leader and organizational value sooner. The value breakeven point occurs 90 days after assuming the leadership position.¹⁸ Watkins states “leadership is ultimate leverage” and the goal of action plans and strategies are to help new leaders build momentum and increase their leverage.¹⁹

During transitions, it is inevitable that the change may cause a disruption to processes and perhaps even to the consistency of guidance. The quest during transitions is to balance the options of change and continuity. We should understand the hazards and vulnerabilities that occur with the leader and the organization during strategic leader transitions. Gilmore suggests that transitions are based on three premises; leadership does make a critical difference; leadership transitions are particularly significant moments in an organization’s history; and we often dramatically underinvest in these high-leverage opportunities, relying on luck rather than intelligent

strategies for success.²⁰ In many ways, these premises lead to hazards and vulnerabilities in conducting strategic leader transitions.

The transition of leadership can be difficult and occasionally disastrous in any type of organization— from company commander to 4-star Army Command and from one presidential administration to the next administration. The problems of tending to transitions— of determining the time, selecting a successor and actually transferring power has long been troublesome.²¹ We need to acknowledge the potential paralysis within the organization during the transferring of leadership from one leader to a successor. The continuity of guidance, knowledge, experience, and expertise may initially suffer in the leader and organization during the transition.

Presidential Transitions

Looking at Presidential transitions, they are not easy. Just consider how difficult it is to transition a President aligned with one political party to a President from a different party. It is instructive as an approach to review how Presidential transitions occur to gain insights into the transition of a strategic leadership position that has an impact on the national security of the U.S. In John Burke's look at four presidencies – Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, his thesis is that “it is the decisions that matter, and transitions, in turn, are critically important because they are in a time when the processes leading to policy decisions first beginning to take shape and are organized.”²² Transitions are important in that it offers the changing leader their first opportunity to assert control in an environment where their degrees of freedom are greatest. The transition of the presidency begins well before election and inauguration day.

The U.S. national interest requires that the transition of the office of President be accomplished as to assure continuity in the faithful execution of the laws and in the

conduct of the affairs of the Federal Government, both domestic and foreign.²³ The Presidential Transition Act of 1963, amended in 2000, establishes a transition team as a Federal entity to provide for the orderly transfer of power between administrations.²⁴ Any disruption caused by the transfer of executive power could produce results detrimental to the safety and well-being of the United States and its people. Accordingly, it is the intent of the Congress that appropriate actions be authorized and taken to avoid or minimize any disruption. In addition to the specific provisions contained in the act directed towards that purpose, it is the intent of the Congress that all officers of the Government conducting the affairs of the Government for which they exercise responsibility and authority are (1) to be mindful of problems occasioned by transitions in the office of President, (2) to take appropriate lawful steps to avoid or minimize disruptions that might be occasioned by the transfer of the executive power, and (3) otherwise to promote orderly transitions in the office of President.²⁵ The provisions of the act also provide for the training or orientation of individuals, during a Presidential transition, who the President intends to appoint to certain key positions.

Even with legislative requirements to assist in changing strategic leaders, transitions are difficult times and leaders are vulnerable. “Historians have argued that the Bay of Pigs fiasco was very much a function of the Kennedy administration’s newness and the underdeveloped relationships between the new leaders and the existing staff.”²⁶ A report on public-sector leadership reached the conclusion:

The capacity no longer exists—in the White House or in the Senate—to find and assess with care the qualifications of the large number of people needed to fill all appointed positions....Difficult thought it may be to comprehend, 79 percent of the presidential appointees we surveyed received no orientation of any kind at the time their appointments began. They went immediately into their jobs without systematic guidance on the

president's program, the relationship between their agencies and the White House, the operations of the major management processes of the federal government, or effective ways to deal with the Congress and the press. Many of them learned these things the hard way, through inefficient and often painful experience.²⁷

Let us consider the interchange between President Kennedy and Robert McNamara upon being offered the position of Secretary of Defense. "Mr. President, it's absurd, I'm not qualified." "Look, Bob," he said, "I don't think there's any school for Presidents either."²⁸ There really is not a school for Presidency, Secretary of Defense, CSA, 4-Star Command or any other of the national strategic leader positions. This means processes and procedures are needed to support the integration of the new strategic leader to the duties and responsibilities of the position.

The organization and management of the transitions influence future decision making processes. Burke finds that there is a causal relationship in how Presidential transitions were organized and managed and presidential decisions that follows, in that how decision making took place and the policy choices that were made can be linked to in a variety of ways to what was done as well as what was not done during the transition in preparation for the task ahead.²⁹ There are various ways to organize and manage transitions but it is most important to understand the role of strategic leader in the decision making process and their role as a decision maker.

Chief Executive Officer/University President Transitions

The main difference between the transfer of power to a new president of the U.S. and a university president or a corporate chief executive officer (CEO) is that the U.S. government is many times larger, more complex, and more important. This does not mean looking at CEOs and university presidents transitions are of limited value to military leader transitions. The frequency of transitions and the failures that occur in the

corporate world provides informative awareness of the perspectives leaders may need to take.

According to a study by Booz Allen Hamilton in 2007, global CEO turnover runs at roughly 15 percent with another study stating 40 percent of new leaders failed within the first 18 months.³⁰ Other studies support the findings that what made a leader successful in one role in the organization did not continue to drive his or her success in the next role. In fact, senior leaders transitioning within their own organization must prepare themselves to expect significant obstacles to success.³¹

A CEO's success or failure rests on the individual and the organization's ability to diagnose the situation, identify challenges and opportunities, and develop promising action plans. Contrasting the situation and the results between Louis V. Gernter, Jr. as the CEO of IBM in 1993 and that of Carly Fiorina, CEO of Hewlett-Packard (HP) in 1999, and their transitions through their first 90-100 days saw different approaches to establishing a vision and strategy. Gernter was characterized as being dull while Fiorina was thought as being in a hurry to implement a vision and strategy. Gernter took his time taking three months to understand IBM's situation and thought it unlikely that after 30 days somebody could lay out a timetable for changing a company the size of IBM.³² Quite the opposite, Fiorina immediately launched into changes for HP that ultimately were not sustainable. Gernter's return of sales grew steadily throughout his tenure while Fiorina's initial success was overshadowed by years of declines in profit resulting in Fiorina's eventually firing in February 2005.³³ Gernter retired from IBM after being CEO for nine years and was thought of as the leader that saved IBM from demise. This is a case of two different CEOs assessing their situations during transitions into the strategic

leadership position that in the end led to success or failure to achieve sustainable performance results for their corporations.

Corporate organizations are increasingly using onboarding programs to help transitioning leaders. However, not all onboarding is done the same with the content and rigor of new leader assimilation and onboarding varying from organization to organization.³⁴ Onboarding should go beyond mere familiarizing transitioning leaders with policies, procedures, and paperwork. Rather onboarding programs should create mentoring relationships and informal networks with other executives who are perceived as the most effective programs for new senior external hires while internal hires need executive coaching and customized assimilation plans.³⁵

Army 4-Star Transitions

Given the strategic leaders of the Army will transition out of their positions optimally every four years for the CSA and 4-star Army Command positions and potentially more frequently for the Secretary of the Army, what framework should we use to make those strategic leader transitions? The transition of the strategic leader position at U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) of General William Wallace when he took command and when he turned over command provides an insightful approach on how to conduct strategic leader transitions.

Not all transitions occur under predictable circumstances. General Wallace assumed the duties of Commander, U.S. TRADOC, on October 13, 2005 after taking over a position previously held by General Brynes who was relieved on August 10, 2005 months short of the planned change of command in November 2005.³⁶

Before General Wallace became the TRADOC commander, a transition team was established and sought to answer a few basic questions: What does TRADOC do

well? What does TRADOC need to improve? How must we change? General Wallace states “the strength of the transition team was its organizational diversity: It included leaders from TRADOC as well as representatives from across the Army and the joint force; officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and civilians; and members of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units.”³⁷ The views of the transition team of TRADOC were not through a lens but a prism that projected many facets to view and assess the strategic environment of the command.³⁸ An iterative process was used to better understand how TRADOC needed to grow. The team interviewed hundreds of leaders, both active and retired, from across the DoD to gather many thoughts, ideas, and concerns. “The synthesis of ideas crystallized a vision for TRADOC, and five TRADOC areas of interests emerged—areas requiring change from an internal process viewpoint and from an enterprise perspective.”³⁹

The transition team developed transition framework for General Wallace occurred between April 2005 and October 2005. Each of the five TRADOC areas of interests was assigned to a two- or three-star commander from within TRADOC, who formed matrix teams to further analyze and develop solution strategies to create the required changes. A series of issue papers, initially staffed internally and then externally to a DoD audience, were one critical output of this effort. The papers focused on the truly challenging issues the Army needed addressing. General Wallace contends the passionate concerns of many great leaders truly shaped his thoughts and the feedback received was extremely informative, both from those who supported his work and from colleagues with different viewpoints.⁴⁰ The collaborative work of the transition team, the matrix team and the chain of command provided the foundation of objectives and

themes for a TRADOC Campaign Plan published in March 2006; approximately 150 days after General Wallace took command.⁴¹

Using a transition approach similar to General Wallace's transition, General Martin Dempsey assumed responsibilities as the TRADOC Commander from General Wallace on December 8, 2008. Unique to his selection as the TRADOC Commander, General Dempsey had no previous leadership assignments in TRADOC unlike General Wallace who was the Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, a TRADOC organization, prior to assuming command.

A transition team was established for General Dempsey to facilitate his integration into the command. Based on the fact that General Dempsey had limited knowledge of the core competencies and core functions of the command, the transition team took an approach that differed from General Wallace in preparing General Dempsey.⁴² In addition to the typical organization charts, the transition team had to develop the problem framing conditions to provide General Dempsey contextual information in order to facilitate his own development of initial guidance. The transition team consisting of a general officer as the team chief, select members across the TRADOC staff, and 13-14 School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Fellows based out of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas including a Federal Bureau of Investigations Agent, State Department foreign service officer, a German Army officer along with other joint services officers which enhanced the viewpoints of the strategic environment.

The transition team used Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD) as the process in defining reality during the transition of strategic leaders. CACD provides "a method for commanders to develop a shared understanding of

complex operational problems within their commands (commander's appreciation) and design a broad approach for problem resolution that links tactical actions to strategic aims (campaign design)."⁴³ The outcome of the transition team design work led to a problem statement, an operational design, a proposed mission statement, and proposed vision for General Dempsey's consideration that was completed and discussed prior to his assumption of command. Overall, design opened the aperture of viewpoints on the strategic problem and the strategic environment for General Dempsey.

The transition framework through design led General Dempsey to pose these basic questions to his subordinated commanders after his change of command: What is the one thing that must not change in TRADOC? What is the one thing that must change in TRADOC? Is TRADOC achieving the right balance of training, education, and doctrine to meet the needs of the Army in this era of persistent conflict? Is TRADOC organized correctly to achieve this balance? Are responsibilities and authorities correctly distributed? How can we generate passion for service within TRADOC? What decisions must I make within the first 90 Days?⁴⁴ General Dempsey may have arrived at the guidance questions on his own but it was likely the work of the transition team that aided in framing the situation.

The Dempsey transition team articulated the need for change by following John Kotter's, *Sense of Urgency*, codified in the eight steps to transformation.⁴⁵ The collaborative work of the transition team handed off a deductive reasoning process executed by the staff under the commander's direction that, in turn, produced executable plans and orders for implementation.⁴⁶ The TRADOC staff published a new TRADOC Campaign Plan (TCP) 2009 on January 23, 2009 providing a new vision,

mission, direction and objectives for General Dempsey. The sense of urgency was established when the plan was published a mere 45 days after General Dempsey assumed command.

Watkins' take on the first 90 days challenges are the road map for accelerating transitions. In many ways, Watkins' ideas on the first 90 days parallel the action requirements that Kotter's eight transformation steps suggest for successful change.

Watkins postulates the following keys:

- Promote yourself.
- Accelerate your learning.
- Match strategy to situation.
- Secure early wins.
- Negotiate success.
- Achieve alignment.
- Build your team.
- Create coalitions.
- Keep your balance.
- Expedite everyone.⁴⁷

Consider how General Dempsey is going to transition into the position as the Army Chief of the Staff when he takes over from General George Casey in the summer of 2011. Should General Dempsey base his transition to CSA from his experience as the TRADOC commander or from his experience serving as the acting commander of U.S. Central Command after the surprise resignation of Admiral William J. Fallon?⁴⁸

There are many leaders that have been successfully transitioning into new leadership

positions. But sadly, how the leader and the organization execute such an action is not captured as a process, practice or policy that is passed on to the next leader or other leaders in other organizations. When asked, a senior U.S. Army official who knew he had the responsibility to transition a new CSA in the summer of 2011, he could not offer a concrete plan how he would do it.⁴⁹

The approach for transitioning the CSA starts with a shared framework of how to integrate the old ways with the new ways with the quickening of his transition becoming an organizational asset that mutually benefits the individual and the organization.⁵⁰ Good strategies for transitions start with massive amounts of quantitative analysis—hard, difficult analysis that is blended with wisdom, insight, and risk taking.⁵¹ The CSA cannot do this analysis on his own in a position with a wide range of responsibilities and authorities. Just as the President of the U.S. has a transition team that formulates initial policy, the CSA should have a transition team that synthesizes the massive amounts of information in the strategic environment and potentially using Design as the approach to identify the essence of what the leader may need to do in the future. How slow or how fast the CSA begins to implement changes is based on his assessment of the situation. Hopefully, the new CSA does not feel how General Dwight D. Eisenhower felt as the Army Chief of Staff from December 1945 to February 1948;

Eisenhower entered political-military conflicts as the military head of one of the services, an interested party who, despite being *primus inter pares* in prestige, was only one among equals in power. After SHAEF, it was a time of frustration for Eisenhower. Shortly after assuming his new duties, he wrote his son that the position of Army Chief “was a sorry place to light after having commanded a theater of war.” And more than halfway through his tenure, he confided that “since my own method worked well for me when I was a little ‘Czar’ in my own sector, I find it difficult to readjust to the demands of this city.”⁵²

Recommendations

Based on the review of corporate best of industry practices and a review of 4-Star Army Command transitions, the following recommendations are offered for conducting U.S. Army strategic leader transitions:

- Incorporate and integrate strategic leader transition instructions at the Senior Service Colleges during dialog on strategic leadership and systems thinking fundamentals.
- Establish policies and procedural guidance for strategic leader transitions and publish it in Army regulations or doctrine to permit organizational leaders to begin to understand the requirements and processes for transitioning strategic leaders.
- Adopt a transition framework to allow the acceleration of leader and organizational change.
- Incorporate the use of transition teams composed of diverse viewpoints to prevent the anchoring of ideas.
- Facilitate the use of Campaign Design during transitions to understand the framing of the problem and strategic environment.
- Conduct targeted onboarding and succession planning.

Conclusion

To meet the challenges of leadership transitions, it is necessary for the U.S. Army to stop conducting strategic leader transitions in an ad-hoc manner. It is time to develop processes, programs, or policies to adequately transition strategic leadership positions (e.g. Chief of Staff Army, 4-star Army Command, Secretariat level Army

position). Since the nation does not have schools to produce the CSA or the Army 4-star Command commander, the senior service colleges need to integrate strategic leader transitions into their curriculums in order to educate and train a body of strategic leaders that may in the future participate in, provide support to or lead a strategic leader transition.

Strategic leader transitions are a critical time for both the individual leader and the organization. Congress has legislature that provides the ability to smoothly transition the Presidency of the U.S. appropriately, DoD has processes to aid presidential transition teams and even establishes a supporting transition team allowing the transfer of power during a critical period. Despite recognizing the need to support a higher strategic leader's transition, the U.S. Army does not have known processes and practices to transition its own strategic leaders that have responsibilities for providing the strategic vision, direction and objectives to accomplish our nation's interest through military means of power.

An existing document for leader transitions, the *New Leader Transitions Handbook*, needs augmentation with appropriate level strategic level transition guidance to inform organizational leaders of the insights of conducting those types of transitions. Similar to incorporating strategic leader transition dialog into the Senior Service College curriculums, the various courses for Army Strategic Leadership Development Program (ASLDP) also need dialog on strategic leader transitions.

It is a best practice to use a transition team to synthesize the strategic environment and other information for the senior strategic leader. The team should use

a process like Campaign Design to allow the strategic leader and the transition team to begin the first look at uncertainty.

The importance of the first 90 days and propositions about the challenges of transitions provide insights to what it takes to succeed. Overall, transitions are based on three premises; leadership making a critical difference; leadership transitions being a significant moments in an organization's history; and the need to invest in these high-leverage opportunities. The U.S. Army can start by conducting strategic leader transitions in a planned manner.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5105.76, *Transition of Administration Appointees and Other Officials*, August 8, 2008, 1. The policy also applies to the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the DoD, and other DoD Components. The policy is for the departure and arrival of administration appointees, including Presidentially-Appointed, Senate-confirmed (PAS) officials, Non-career Senior Executive Service (SES) members, Schedule C appointees and other officials that are appointed as consultants pursuant to elements of U.S. Code.

² Ibid., 2.

³ U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, *New Leader Transition Handbook*, November 21, 2008, 2. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal/repository/LeadershipTransition.pdf> (Accessed October 25, 2010)

⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Training and Leader Development*, Regulation 350-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 18, 2009), 55.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, General Officer Management Office, *Senior Leaders Handbook for General Officers*, August 2009), 11. http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/jccoe/Special_Programs_Directorate/Enlisted_Aide_web_documents/Senior%20Leader%20GO%20Handbook%202009.pdf (Accessed January 28, 2011)

⁷ Stephen J. Gerras, ed. *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3d ed. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 2.

⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Field Manual 6-22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 12, 2006), 12-1.

⁹ The quote is attributed to Warren Bennis. U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Corps War College, *U.S. Marine Corps War College Strategic Plan for 2009-2014*, November 15, 2008, 24. <http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/War%20College%20Documents/MCWAR%20Strategic%20PlanVer2-2.pdf> (Accessed October 20, 2010)

¹⁰ Linda Smircich, "Leadership: The Management of Meaning," in *Leaders & The Leadership Process*, 2d ed., Jon Pierce and John Newstrom (Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, 2000), 17.

¹¹ Robert H. Miles, "Leading Corporate Transformation," in *The Leader's Change, Handbook* ed. Jay A. Conger et al (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999), 221.

¹² Thomas N. Gilmore, *Making a Leadership Change – How Organizations and Leaders Can Handle Leadership Transitions Successfully* (New York: Authors Choice Press, 2003), xi.

¹³ *Ibid.*, xi.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁶ Michael Watkins, *The First 90 days Critical Success Strategies for New Leaders at All Levels* (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2003), 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 21.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 239.

²⁰ Gilmore, *Making a Leadership Change – How Organizations and Leaders Can Handle Leadership Transitions Successfully*, 8.

²¹ Frederick C. Mosher, W. David Clinton, and Daniel G. Lang, *Presidential Transitions and Foreign Affairs* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 11.

²² John P. Burke, *Presidential Transitions From Politics to Practice* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 5.

²³ Transition to a New Presidential Administration, <http://www.opm.gov/transition/trans20rch1.htm> (Accessed November 2, 2010)

²⁴ Transition to a New Presidential Administration, <http://www.opm.gov/transition/trans20rch1.htm> (Accessed November 2, 2010).

²⁵ Presidential Transition Act of 1963, Public Law 88-277, <http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/103158> (Accessed March 4, 2011).

²⁶ R.E. Neustadt and E.R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1986) quoted in Thomas N. Gilmore, *Making a Leadership Change –*

How Organizations and Leaders Can Handle Leadership Transitions Successfully (New York: Authors Choice Press, 2003), 12.

²⁷ National Academy of Public Administration, *Leadership in Jeopardy: The Fraying of the Presidential Appointment System* (Washington: National Academy of Public Administration, November 1985), 20, quoted in Thomas N. Gilmore, *Making a Leadership Change – How Organizations and Leaders Can Handle Leadership Transitions Successfully* (New York: Authors Choice Press, 2003), 13.

²⁸ Errol Morris, dir., *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara*, DVD (Sony Pictures Classics, December 2003).

²⁹ Burke, *Presidential Transitions From Politics to Practice*, 377.

³⁰ Patricia Wheeler, "Making Successful Transitions: The Leader's Perspective," in Marshall Goldsmith, John Baldoni and Sarah McArthur, *The AMA Handbook of Leadership* (New York: American Management Association, 2010), 187.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 189.

³² Jim Collins, *The Mighty Have Fallen and Why Some Companies Never Give In* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 87.

³³ *Ibid.*, 89.

³⁴ Wheeler, *Making Successful Transitions: The Leader's Perspective*, 190.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 192.

³⁶ Mark Mazzetti, "THE NATION; General Is Relieved of Command Over 'Personal Conduct'" *Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles, Calif.: Aug 10, 2005. A.10, in Proquest (Accessed March 9, 2011).

³⁷ General William S. Wallace, Victory Starts Here! Changing TRADOC to Meet the Needs of the Army, *Military Review*. (May/Jun 2006). Vol. 86, no. 3: 59, in Proquest (Accessed March 4, 2011). The author of this SRP participated in the transition process of General Wallace and led management processes for integrating the matrix team work into the TRADOC Campaign Plan, 2006.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 59.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁴² The author was the lead planning chief for General Dempsey's transition. He was assigned to lead the transition team along with Colonel Joe Gallagher, U.S. Army from October 2008 to Dec 2008. Following his detail on the Transition Team, the author led the TRADOC

through the campaign planning process and wrote the TRADOC Campaign Plan (TCP) 2009 published on January 23, 2009 and TCP 2010-11 published in June 2009.

⁴³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. TRADOC), i.

⁴⁴ General Martin Dempsey, "Initial Guidance," briefing slides, Fort Monroe, VA, TRADOC, December 9, 2008.

⁴⁵ John P. Kotter, "Leading Change," in *The Leader's Change, Handbook* ed. Jay A. Conger et al (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999), 99. Each step had an associated TRADOC task or objective. For example, step 3 - Developing a Vision and Strategy was followed through the Campaign Design with a suspense of November 25, 2008 in Major General John Martz, "TRADOC Transition Team," briefing slides, Fort Monroe, VA, TRADOC, December 9, 2008.

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design*, i.

⁴⁷ Watkins, *The First 90 days Critical Success Strategies for New Leaders at All Levels*, 13-14.

⁴⁸ Thom Shank, *New York Times*, "Petraeus Steps Into New Role as Head of Central Command," October 31, 2008.

⁴⁹ Question was asked of a senior Army official during Army Senior Leader Day, at U.S. Army War College, October 14, 2010. A follow-up email was sent on December 15, 2010 inquiring about his views on Senior Leader transitions but no response was offered. A different senior Army official did respond to the same question posed and offered that there is an orderly and precise process for CSA transitions. The author reviewed regulations and doctrine but did not find any evidence of a process.

⁵⁰ Watkins, *The First 90 days Critical Success Strategies for New Leaders at All Levels*, 9.

⁵¹ Louis V. Gertner, Jr., *Who Says Elephants Can't Dance? Inside IBM's Historic Turnaround* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 223.

⁵² David Jablonsky, *Ike and the Birth of the CINCS: The Continuity of Unity of Command* in Douglas T. Stuart, ed, *Organizing for National Security*, November 2000, 90, in Proquest (Accessed Mar 4, 2011). General Dwight D. Eisenhower was Commander, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.