


Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Towards Civilian Supremacy

by

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United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDONESIA: TOWARDS CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

by

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ABSTRACT

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Civil-military relations in Indonesia has been an up and down relationship. In the early days of independence and for the ensuing decades, the role of the military in Indonesia has been very prominent. Civil authority along with the military created Dwi Fungsi ABRI (dual function of Indonesian Armed Forces as defense force and political force), ensuring a strong military role in the political domain. In essence, civil-military relations are strongly influenced by the strong military positions in the government. The recent demonstration of the Indonesian peoples desire to adopt democratic values characterized by the successful transformation to democracy and military reform has affected the dynamic of civil-military relations in Indonesia. In light of these recent change in Indonesia how should civil-military relations be formulated? What should be improved and defined to create the civil-military relation most suitable to democratic values and national order? This paper will examine the ups and downs of civil-military relations in Indonesia at the leadership level by exploring six cases that occurred in Indonesia. Finally, this paper will define the form of civil-military relations in democracy and the norms to achieve it.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDONESIA: TOWARDS CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

Future problems in civil-military relations in new democracies are likely to come not from military but from the civilian side of the equation. They will come from the failures of democratic governments to promote economic development and maintain law and order. They will also stem from weak political institutions and ambitious political leaders who may enlist military as their accomplices in undermining or destroying democracy.¹

—Samuel P. Huntington

Civil-military relations play a pivotal role in the history of nations worldwide. All policies born in civil and military interactions will have a direct impact on the survival of the country and its people. It is almost certain that all countries have experienced the ups and downs of civil-military relations in accordance with the development of their era. Not infrequently, authorities are born and come to power because of the dynamic interaction of these two entities, and rulers often fall because of the interaction of both entities as well. In essence, civil-military relations are a never ending journey in line with the development of a state, and the interaction of these two entities is vital in determining the pulse of the government. Any friction between the two will automatically affect the safety and welfare of the state and its people. Therefore, it is important to examine the interaction of these two components in Indonesia. Various problems, in the context of civil-military relations, can be assessed as the reason the relationship between these two entities is still often not harmonious. Henceforth, this paper will research the historic ups and downs of civil-military relations in Indonesia, and move the relationship towards civilian supremacy. This paper focuses on the interaction of governmental leadership.

Civil-Military Relations Insight

As mentioned previously, the interaction of civil-military relations has resulted in ups and downs in many countries. Why do these two components have such a dominant interaction at the governmental leadership level? According to Bengt Abrahamsson,

Contemporary social science offers a variety of definition of power. In many or most of these definitions, the central feature is the overcoming of resistance. For example, Dahrendorf, following Weber, defines power as the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.²

Based on this statement, each person will seek to gain authority and power in order to achieve his/her objectives. In the context of civil-military relations, it becomes clear that if the relation is not based on the noble attitude of professionalism, then both parties will seek to take advantage of opportunities as much as possible to influence or even use others to obtain their goals. On the one hand, civil authorities can utilize the military as a means to maintain or obtain political interest, and on the other hand, the military can also create a favorable situation to achieve its own interest. In other words, the ruler, whether civilian or military, through authority, could easily create a partnership with the other for the sake of political interest.

At the highest level of governmental leadership, civil authorities and military elites often differ in their opinion. It usually starts during the policy formulation process and evolves into the operational level, with the most interesting area of military participation in the political institutions.³ It is, therefore, very important to examine their relationship in this arena. The second area of frequent fluctuation of civil-military relations is when civil authority interferes with military decision making. Every institution, including the military,

wants autonomy in internal affairs, particularly in terms of its own professionalism.

Furthermore, Marcus Mietzner stated that:

The determination of the military to manage their own affairs and resist civilian intervention is a major concern of militaries everywhere, and has been described by authors such as Nordlinger as a key motivation for military participation in politics.⁴

The problems that arise in civil-military relations are caused by both the intervention of civil authorities into military organizations and military intervention into the government. Marcus Mietzner stated that four kinds of military intervention to the government are: Praetorian rule (South Korea and Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s, and currently Burma), participant-ruler (Philippines under Marcos and Thailand for much of the 1980s), guardian rule (Turkey), and referee.⁵

In each case, the situation is caused by a power vacuum or one group becoming dominant over the other. Such conditions often occur in the early decades of independence as happened in Argentina in the period between 1930 and 1989, where Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson state that, “civilian control over military was, for much of this time, problematic because of weakness on the part of civilian and distrust by military that the needs of the country were being met.”⁶ In the early decades of independence, for most states, the military tends to have a stronger position than civilians, besides Argentina as mentioned above, it can also be seen in Mexico in the years immediately following independence from Spain in the 1820s.⁷ Danopoulos and Watson explained that when Mexico gained independence from Spain, there was a political vacuum in the government of Mexico, and some groups, including military groups that were privileged while Spain was in power wanted to keep their special

status.⁸ Likewise, in China, when the civil authorities were not able to meet the expectations of Mao Tse-Tung, he gave greater power to the military.⁹

Hand in hand with the development of the political environment and societal values in a young democracy, civil-military relations will also be developed. Models of civil-military relations will vary due to so many factors that influence it. Morris Janowitz stated that:

For the purposes of analyzing military in the political development of new nations, five types of civil-military relations can be identified: (1) authoritarian-personal control, (2) authoritarian-mass party, (3) democratic competitive and semi-competitive system, (4) civil-military coalition, and (5) military oligarchy.¹⁰

Furthermore, Janowitz explained that among those five types of civil-military relations, democratic competitive and semi-competitive systems will put civilian supremacy over the military.¹¹

The experts also explained that in a democratic state, both civil and military groups have reached political maturity, so the issues that are raised tend to discuss substantive issue of duties and responsibilities.¹² In a healthy democratic state, civilian authority will determine policy and the military will execute it. The circumstances as mentioned above do not occur automatically, but develop over time in line with the development of societal values. For instance, when the states are in a stable situation, without major involvement by the central government in domestic affairs, civil-military relations will develop well, and it is expected to move into the modern concept of “civilian control of military”. However, if in the states there were rebellions or security threats, then most likely the military will have a more prominent role than the civilian side. In essence, the military, in a state of increasing security turmoil, may become the dominant group in the government as happened in Southern Latin America.¹³

Conditions of acute crisis, chronic crisis, and a power-vacuum may also result in an increased military role in government as happened in Germany from 1918-1924.¹⁴

In their interaction, especially to solve disputes, the military should be under government control as Michael C. Desch mentioned by stating that:

In my view, however, the best way to gauge civil-military relations is to examine how civilian and military leaders handle policy differences between them: the best civil-military relations are to be found in those countries where civilian authorities are able to prevail in policy disputes with military.¹⁵

Civilian control of the military should be based on the constitution and more importantly in terms of achieving national goals, instead of group or personal interests. In connection with the Desch statement, in democratic states, Huntington emphasized two types of civil-military relations:¹⁶ First, subjective civilian control where civil authority power should be maximized by minimizing military power. Secondly, objective civilian control where civil authority control the military in the objective sense by maximizing military professionalism.

In short, the ups and downs of civil-military relations in Indonesia can be described as follows: First, in the struggle for and the early years of independence, the President could not fully control the military. The military maintained a strong position in its interaction with civil authority. In some cases, the military could determine its own path in accordance with its decision and discretion. Second, in the 32 years *New Order era*, that President Suharto ruled Indonesia, the military became a major partner of civil authority, especially in politics. Third, in the reform era, after President Suharto transferred his power to the Vice President as per the constitution, the military started to withdraw from its

political role as General Wiranto developed a professional military reform program, that would eventually lead to the military no longer being a part of the political process.

In Indonesian history civil-military relations can best be studied through number of case studies that demonstrate the interaction between the President of Indonesia and his military.

Civil-Military Relations Cases in Indonesia

In the history of civil-military relations in Indonesia, the six most obvious things that are related to the interaction of these two entities are; First, the noncompliance of General Sudirman, the Indonesian Armed Forces Commander, to follow the President's decision to surrender to the Dutch in Yogyakarta, the Indonesian Capital, when attacked on December 19, 1948. General Sudirman, following his intuition, decided instead to lead a guerilla war.¹⁷ Similarly, when President Sukarno developed an ideology that included three components; nationalism, religious groups, and the communism called *NASAKOM (Nas-Nasional, A-Agama, Kom-Komunis)*,¹⁸ the military did not support the president. Second, during Soeharto's New Order, the military was a major element in support of the government.¹⁹ Under Soeharto civil authorities imposed a doctrine of Dwi Fungsi ABRI (dual function of Indonesian Armed Forces as defense force and political force) in 1982 as a legal aspect of military involvement in politics.²⁰ Third, still during the New Order, *Seskoad (Sekolah Staff dan Komando Angkatan Darat, Army Staff and Command College)* formulated an academic manuscript pertaining to military positions in the democratic order that is essentially tangent to the civil authorities.²¹ Fourth, during

the transition of power from President Soeharto to his successor Vice President B.J. Habibie, on May 21st 1998, General Wiranto, *Panglima ABRI (Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian Armed Forces Commander)* had an opportunity to take control of the country yet, decided to show how a professional military acts in a democracy by supporting the new President, instead of acting in his own interest.²² Fifth, during reformation, President Abdurrahman Wahid decided to implement a drastic military reform program, including a plan to re-structure the military and change leadership.²³ Sixth, current President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono continues the Indonesian military reform program by placing civilian's in control of the military both in the policy making process and implementation during his administration.

Furthermore, this paper will examine in detail the cases mentioned above from the perspective of civil-military relations, particularly from the aspect of interaction of its leaders. Finally, this paper will discuss each case to define Indonesian civil-military relations in its democracy and the methods to achieve it.

Analyzing Indonesian Cases

In the first case, in the midst of Indonesia's raging struggle for independence, the Dutch attacked *Yogyakarta* on December 19th 1948 where President Sukarno along with his cabinet members allowed themselves to be captured, while Sudirman disagreeing with Sukarno's decision to surrender decided to continue the struggle by conducting guerilla war. The aim of surrendering was to gain international community support against the Dutch.²⁴ This strategy was intended to win the struggle diplomatically,²⁵ unfortunately it did not succeed. Civil authorities assumed that

diplomacy was the best solution, while General Sudirman considered that continuing guerilla warfare was the best solution. General Sudirman's consideration based on the experience that the Dutch, in practice, always defied diplomatic agreements. Although both parties were bound by the agreement, the Dutch continued to attack Indonesian positions.²⁶ In this case, there are at least two interrelated problems: First, how compliance or noncompliance should be realized within the framework of the ruling authorities to a subordinate. Secondly, to what extent both civil authority and the military must defend their decisions based on the considerations underlying the decisions and in particular the objectives to be achieved. For instance, General Sudirman chose a path that did not comply with a decision of the civil authority because he believed the continuation of struggle was more important than just compliance to the leader. The lesson can be taken within the framework of civil-military relations that the military leader is not only concerned with harmony in the context of compliance, but more importantly must weigh the substance of the problem to be solved. The noncompliance of General Sudirman had a significant impact on the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia. Especially in determining the position of the military as an important part of the state components, which should be directly involved in politics in terms of setting state policy, especially in security matters, rather than the involvement in day-to-day politics.

In Sukarno's *Nasakom* concept in which the military did not support as it believed it would provide wider opportunity for the communists to occupy positions in government. Before *Nasakom* was declared, the military categorized communists as a threat to the state.²⁷ In this case, the military indicated that the security and safety of the

state is more important than just supporting the policy of the civil authorities. It can be said that, on the one hand, the military must support the government, and on the other hand, the military must provide input to the government in order to avoid deviations from the national constitution. Because the military in Indonesia is entrusted by law to ensure the security and safety of the state, the military will prioritize its matter in performing this important duty. The issue of civil-military relations should always be defined in terms of achieving national goals, not just used to seek status and power. In democracy, the military must be obedient to the civil authority except in certain cases where civilian authority uses power unconstitutionally.

An important note to be realized is during the struggle for independence, the appointment of Indonesian armed forces commander was not based on a presidential decision. General Sudirman became commander of the Indonesian armed forces based on military internal decisions by the officers corps on November 12, 1945.²⁸ This demonstrates that structuring a military organization, including the appointment of the Indonesian armed forces commander should be formulated under civil authority control.

In the second case, President Soeharto utilized the military to ensure the safety of the state on one hand, and ensure the safety of the ruling government power on the other hand. It is recognized that this was an unpopular policy within the framework of democratic states. Actually, civil authority had begun the management of government by adopting democratic values, but it was an ambivalent democracy. The election of the president along with vice president and most of the members of parliament were based on the mechanism of democratic process, but at the same time government actions were also inconsistent with democratic values. For example, the military supported

Golkar political party and maintained power through Dwi Fungsi. The appointment of active duty military officers as members of the legislative institutions both at the central and regional levels and many other posts was not consistent with democratic values as J. Kristiadi stated that:

As a result, military officers hold positions as ministers, director general of important departments, general secretaries, ambassadors, governors, mayors, sub-district and village heads, as well as senior positions in public firm, state enterprises and private companies.²⁹

In fact, during President Soeharto's administration, the military became the primary supporting element of the Golkar party³⁰ and had 100 seats in parliament reserved for military officers giving them enormous political power. During the 32 years of President Soeharto rule of Indonesia, the military enjoyed unprecedented power and there was no significant control from another component, including the media due to President Soeharto's administration decisions that limited the role of the media.³¹ The question is how should the military deal with this dilemma? In the context of civil-military relations there are two options to comply or non-comply with the leader. This means that the military could act as they did in the first and second cases as previously described (General Sudirman's cases), where the military posited itself and did not heed the policy of civil authorities. Another option is that the military can also support the policy of civil authorities with various consequences. In Soeharto's case, the military became a primary partner of civil authority. During the New Order era, civil authority was dominant in regulating the military. Why was civil authority so powerful? It can be deduced that: First, due to the threat of communists immediately following the President Sukarno era, the state was unstable during

transition. President Soeharto came to power after the failure of the communist's coup in 1965.³² Hence, his first priority was overcoming the communists. The military, in accordance with its responsibility, maintained the same priority; to eliminate the communist threats. The same concern between civil authority and military resulted in creating a strong partnership among them. Second, during Suharto's administration, the appointment of the Indonesian armed forces commander was the president's authority alone without the authorization of the legislature institution. Consequently, civil authority power became very dominant over military. Third, civilians, especially in the early years of independence, were still too weak to lead the government, particularly under the communist threats. The lack of civilian ability to perform at every level of government also contributed to the birth of the government's policy to place an active military officer into civilian positions. When looking at the struggle to break away from colonial rule, it can be seen that the military was the main pedestal to motivate the formation of other organizations in an effort to achieve the goal of independence. The dominance of the military over civilian continuously existed decades later.

In the third case, *Seskoed* as the highest educational institution of the army had produced a strategic paper through a conference, in mid-1977, shortly after the general election was held. The product provided a military perspective that tends to correct the policy of civil authorities, which had not been assessed in accordance with democratic values.³³ *Seskoed*, through the product called *Seskoed Paper*, argued that the military should not be part of or support one party (*Golkar* party).³⁴ In this case the military had

shown its quality as a state institution which was responsible for promoting democratic values. Shortly after the *Seskoad Paper* was launched, it was supported by the officer retirement group.³⁵ Responding to this issue, civil authorities, later in 1982, produced the doctrine of dual functions of ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, the Indonesian armed forces) to legitimize the military involvement in political arenas.³⁶ At that point the military faced civilian authority which was the dominant power. *Seskoad's* seminar-product was the only academic product which needed support of the military elites. Therefore the military, although academically, had produced a strategic product in the context of democracy, but had not been able to provide significant impact in the establishment of good civil-military relations.

In the fourth case, General Wiranto, on May 21st 1998 shortly after handover of power from President Soeharto to Vice President B.J. Habibie, delivered a speech which stated that the military and all its units would support the new government. In his speech, General Wiranto also said that it would maintain the safety and honor of former presidents, including President Soeharto and his family.³⁷ General Wiranto's statement dispelled many observer predictions that were based on past experience, once the state was in security chaos, then the military would take power.³⁸ Later Adi Sasono, Minister for Cooperative and Small Enterprises of Habibie's administration, suggested that President Habibie replace General Wiranto because of his fear that the military could pose a threat to the new government.³⁹ In spite of the fact that General Wiranto had laid the foundation of a professional military role in democracy by supporting the vulnerable civilian government during the transition. The military role under General Wiranto, in the 1998 crisis, had a great impact in preparing a smooth resignation of President Soeharto

by collaborating with the non-military component of society. As mentioned by Nurcholis Majid, a prominent Indonesian Moslem intellectual, that the armed forces were the key to solving the stalemate. Stressing his point, he stated that:

Just look at Thailand, Philippines, and South Korea. There the cooperation of military was crucial in initiating democratic change. So we had to win ABRI's support for reform. If they remained obstructive, no change would have been possible.⁴⁰

General Wiranto had delivered a message to Indonesian society concerning the progress of civil-military relations in Indonesia. After General Wiranto's decision was announced, many observers re-evaluated their opinions of General Wiranto's personal long-term political interest for the upcoming election.⁴¹ In this case, it is clear that the societies' opinion indirectly contributed to the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia. Conversely, General Wiranto's statement was a reflection of military responsibilities as mandated by the Indonesian constitution to support the legitimate government.

Indonesian history had shown that if the state was unsafe or unstable, then the Indonesian military would provide a firm stance in order to maintain security and stability for the benefit of the society at large. Why did General Wiranto set the policy to support the new government? There are several factors behind this decision. First, the new government was the legitimate government. Second, the transition from Soeharto to B.J. Habibie was a very vulnerable period in the security of Indonesia. Third, political development and demand to uphold democratic values had become very prominent. Therefore, the military, in accordance with its responsibility, prioritized the interests of state security, instead of being utilized by the state to conduct a military coup. The military as an institution of the state has a moral responsibility to support the democratic

progress. Therefore, it can be concluded that civil-military relations are affected by provisions stipulated in the constitution, also influenced by security and the development of democratic values today. The unstable state situation on May 1998, was considered by many, an opportunity for General Wiranto to become the leader of the strongest institution in Indonesia,⁴² but General Wiranto decided not to take advantage of the situation. His decision impacted the future role of the military profession in the order of modern civil-military relations in Indonesia. Furthermore, during the reform era, the Indonesian military conducted military reform initiated by General Wiranto. The program encompassed three stages:⁴³ First, a new paradigm of ABRI's political role, known as the fourth new paradigm outlined ABRI's political role. Second, redefinition, reposition, and re-actualization of the role of TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, the Indonesian Armed forces). Third, the implementation of TNI's new paradigm. Part of the Indonesian military reform program, in practice includes: First, the military abolished dual functions of TNI on April 2000.⁴⁴ Second, the government, in 2004, also created Indonesian law number 34/2004 of TNI where the government regulated TNI's role as part of correction of TNI's role in new order era.⁴⁵ Third, in 2004 the military under General Endriartono Sutarto, Commander of Indonesian armed forces, decided to withdraw active military from the legislature earlier than the 2000-decision that had been asked by politicians which would have ended in 2009.⁴⁶ Fourth, the military cut their formal ties with *Golkar* party and separated the police from the military which had been united since 1962.⁴⁷ As the continuation of the reform program, civil authority through People's Consultative Assembly Decree number: VII/MPR/2000 had regulated the appointment of TNI's commander should be authorized by the House

of Representatives. In addition to the above reforms, the military reform program was also conducted in many other sectors.

In the fifth case, President Wahid utilized his power to interfere with the military role on internal affairs. Shortly after he gained power, he drastically reformed the armed forces through a major change in military leadership including the planning to re-structure some of the military organization.⁴⁸ Validation of the organizational structure, including the military organization, actually had to go through an in-depth review. It is arguable that civil authority intervention deeply into the military organization can cause a negative response from military leadership, and can also lead to the dissention within the military organization. Henceforth, it is very dangerous for both military and civil authority, if civil authority interferes deeply into internal military organization affairs. Thus, the concept of civil-military relations should be directed to the mechanism that civil authority establishes strategic guidance for the military and then allows flexibility for the military to act upon them as discussed by Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan that:

In this model, it is the duty of the statesman to formulate a clear, concise and unambiguous declaration of national policy to guide military. Once this declaration is provided, the politician should simply get out of the way and let military get on with his job.⁴⁹

In President Wahid's case, he interfered with the military internal affairs by influencing the appointment of certain officers. It can be concluded that the intervention of civil authority into military internal affairs will cause resistance among military elites.

In the sixth case, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono implemented professional military role in democracy by appropriately putting the military under civilian control. During his administration, civil authority formulates the policy to be executed by the military. The President appointed civilian experts to his cabinet, including the

appointment of a civilian as ministry of defense. Obviously, the President maintained the continuation of the professional military role in the context of civil-military relations in a democratic state. Since the Indonesian military reform program was undertaken by the Indonesian armed forces headquarter (Yudhoyono was part of the senior military thinkers who formulated its reform program). Civil authority continues to oversee military reform in all sectors. The on going process of military reform under Yudhoyono will develop well due to the strong efforts of civil authority to create a professional military under civilian control. Based on past experience, people desire to increase democratic values and society control, the military no longer has opportunity in politics, particularly in day to day politics. An important part of creating a professional military in democracy is to provide an opportunity for the military personnel to participate in elections. In democracy, the right to vote is the most important right for all people no matter what their profession. Therefore, it is very important to formulate a policy to allow military personnel to use their voting right. Under Yudhoyono's administration, this issue is still under discussion between military elites and civil authority, including legislative members. The main point is how to organize in order to avoid military involvement in politics institutionally.

Indonesian Cases: Noncompliance, Partnership, and Civil Authority intervention

Noncompliance: General Sudirman and Seskoad's cases

The military as a component of the nation, in carrying out its duty, is sometimes faced with difficult options of either compliance or noncompliance with civilian policies. General Sudirman decisively chose to not comply with the leader of the state because

he believed that the military struggle was vital to achieve Indonesian independence. Bengt Abrahamsson stated that, "The overriding concern of the military profession is centered around the security of the state."⁵⁰ In General Sudirman's case, the main military concern is to winning the struggle for independence. It must be the first priority. So, General Sudirman remained focused on defeating the Dutch as the top priority of Indonesian national goals. Likewise, General Sudirman, when faced with the concept of *Nasakom* of President Sukarno, decided not to comply because he considered the communists a serious threat to the state. So, it can be concluded that the military tends to firmly stand or non-complies when the problem faced are related to the security of the state.

In *Seskoed*'s case, the military institution has responsibilities for reviewing, analyzing and promoting the values of military profession at the strategic level. It had been proven through the 1977 seminar product which contested civil authority policy in involving military in political arenas. In the context of civil-military relations, power of educational institution, including its product, has no power to influence politics. Therefore, strategic products of educational institutions need to be supported by military elites and civilian authority as well. The lesson learned is: First, if political power of civil authority is too dominant where military and other national components have no bargaining power, hence it will eliminate their role and control on civil authority. Second, when civil authority uses its authority for defending its power, certain military elites will show its non-compliance to civil authority.

Partnership: President Suharto and General Wiranto's cases

One of the legacies of President Sukarno was the existence of a communist threat in Indonesia due to the impact of his *Nasakom* program. Therefore, a priority for President Soeharto was to narrow down, suppress and even eliminate the opportunity for communism to grow in Indonesia. Once again, what was seen in this policy is that civil authority will always try to eliminate obstacles that could threaten the state, and the military will become the primary tool to strengthen his/her power. It can be deduced that when there is a threat to the state, then civil authority will utilize the military as the main tool to overcome the threat. In other words, the military will play an important role as a partner of civil authority when it is needed. In Soeharto's case, deviation lies in the civil authority policy of military dual function. This policy eventually led to problems in civil-military relations due to the military not only being a tool of the state, but also being a tool of civil authority for political interests. In the context of civil-military relations, the military became a partner of civil authority in a negative sense. Conversely, General Wiranto had laid a strong foundation and provided a positive example for the development of civil-military relations for Indonesia's future. He had proven and realized one of the concepts of military reform. Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster have called General Wiranto's reform initiative the first generation of civil-military reforms in Indonesia.⁵¹ General Wiranto had put the interest of the safety and the security of the state as a top priority that must be fully supported by the military. Learning from the past, General Wiranto decided to show how the military can forge a positive partnership with civil authority, instead of playing a negative partnership role.

Civil Authority intervention: President Wahid's case

Civil authority intervention in military organizations especially on technical issues eventually led to resistance from the military. In this case, the military positioned itself as a professional military institution which is focused only on substantive issues of civil-military relations. Although it disagreed with the political moves of the civil authority in forcing drastic changes to TNI, the military tended not to indulge in technical matters rather the military focused its attention on national issues. Even though the military did not fully agree with President Wahid's program, the military elite did not radically show non-compliance because the issue was not related to the security and safety of the state, which was the primary concern of the military. However the military did, indeed, show resistance to the civil authority's policy which intervened deeply into military organization.

Civil-Military Relations in Indonesian Democracy

In actualizing civil-military relations in a democracy, relations must be organized based on the factors that influence it. Both sides must mutually put themselves in a position corresponding to democratic values in which they must carry out their role in a professional and proportional manner. Civil authority should partner with the military in a positive sense to achieve national goals, instead of creating a partnership that maintains and secures his power. Similarly, the military should maintain its position as a professional partner of civil authority. Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the future Indonesian civil-military relations will definitely continue its trend towards civilian supremacy and it will be influenced by at least four issues: First, how does civil authority define the primary military mission in the national order? Second, how do third parties,

including legislative, society, and the media, influence the interaction between civilians and the military? Third, how does the military implement the noble values of its profession? Fourth, how does the civilian authority implement its control of the military?

The above analysis demonstrated that in the future, civil authority is the key player to determine military's role. In this case, civil authority should comprehensively consider all aspects in determining the role of military according to constitutional mandate. Therefore, civil authority should regulate role of military in defense and security of the state properly and professionally and not ask to involve out of its role, particularly in day to day politics.

Based on past experiences, civil-military relations that adopt democratic values should also involve third parties such as legislative, society and the media. The impact of the advancement of democratic values, civil authority's role will automatically increase on the one hand and decrease military's role on the other hand. Therefore, it will create a strong power of civilian over military. It was true what was said by Huntington that civil authority, in the era of democracy, will have more opportunities to use military in order to obtain its interests.⁵² In this case, third parties' role is needed. Through third parties' control, it is expected that two sides both civilian and military will consistently maintain their respective roles and will not be able to utilize their power to undermine or destroy democracy. In fact, since 1998, the on going progress of Indonesian civil-military relations are always under parliament, the media and society's observation. Due to a strong control of third parties, civil authority and the military will no longer have the opportunity to act out of democratic values. This control contributes to the advancement of civil-military relations in Indonesia.

As described earlier that dynamic of civil-military relations with its various implications will never be solved, but will always evolve in an evermore complex environment. As well as the military profession's role will always evolve as the environment evolves. As mentioned by Congressman Jim Marshal and General USA (Ret) Frederick M. Franks that:

The military profession's role has expanded over the course of the last century, widening from the management of violence early in the century to encompass the management of defense following the Second World War and the management of peace after the Cold War.⁵³

Responding to the evolution of the environment, the military will be put in a difficult position when civil authority selects a policy that is contrary to the good of the nation, particularly policies that involve the military. Hence, the military must uphold the noble values of its profession. So, anyone who in power cannot easily take advantage of the military institution for the benefit of his/her power. If the military succeeds in implementing the noble values of its profession, it is believed that it will be able to maintain its professional role as well (General Sudirman's cases). Conversely, negative things tend to occur when the military does not uphold its professional values. Civilian authority will take advantage of the strong support of the military leading to opportunities to maintain power (New order era's case).

As argued by Huntington, the role of civil authority will be more dominant in the formation of civil-military relations in a democracy.⁵⁴ Therefore, the effort to create a strong civil authority while adopting democratic values must be continuously developed. Improving management capabilities of government, including political maturity, is very important in developing a strong political character. Based on the analysis above, often military involvement in politics is not by the will of military, but because of a situation

where civilians have not demonstrated their ability or maturity yet. Civilian authority still invites the military (New order era's case) to engage in politics. The negative relationship among political parties can also drag the military into the political sphere. During the struggle for independence and several decades later, the strong military position on the one hand and the weakness of civilian politician on the other hand resulted in the tendency that certain civilian groups invited the military into politics. Civil parties should attempt to apply political dignity and put the interests of the state over the interests of political groups, and conduct political behavior that can be an example to the society at large. Public distrust of politicians may trigger the military return to politics. It is, therefore, very important to conduct a comprehensive effort to improve the competency and quality of the civilian politician. In modern civil-military relations, civil authority should regulate the military based on the constitution, democratic values and national order. Civil authority must maintain and increase the achievement of on going military reform program. Therefore, parliament, the media, and society must continuously take part in controlling how civil authority and military interact in the context of national order. The values that has been injected to the on going military reform program should be continually observed and maintained. This, in turn, is expected to be a control tool and a reference in civil-military relations in running the government. The role of military should determine by civil authority based on national order. The military thereby accepts subordinate roles in the political system. Civilian control, as defined by Huntington, is thus "governmental control of military."⁵⁵ Therefore, the Indonesian military should be under governmental control. In essence, the military will only act by

the state's political decisions. In this case, political decisions must be based on the constitution, democratic values, and national interests.

Conclusion

As explained in this paper, there are significant factors in the dynamics of civil-military relations, including factors that lead to disharmony as well as areas where frequent conflicts of interest occur. Therefore, it is important to fix these factors. Civil-military relation disharmony can lead to clashes in the society. In the context of national order, the effort of each generation to revive the values of democracy is always hampered by the disharmony of civil-military relations. Both entities, civil and military participate in creating uncertainty in civil-military relations. In Indonesia's future, the role of civil authorities will be getting stronger. If there is no control by third parties, the strong political position of civil authority can invite the military to role play out of its area of responsibility (New order era's case) as we were reminded by Huntington at the beginning of this paper. Conversely, when civil authority disregards the primary concern of military and uses his/her authority for defending his/her power, the military will tend to non-comply with civil authority (General Sudirman and Seskoad's cases). Sudirman case when he non-complied to civil authority shows a different thing than what Michael C. Desch mentioned above. As well as when civil authority interferes deeply into military internal affairs, the military elites will show its resistance (President Wahid's case).

Based on the ups and downs of civil-military relations in Indonesia, it is, therefore, very important to formulate policies of future civil-military relations. The power should be synergized as the challenges that will be faced will surely become more

complex, especially in democracy. The military reform program initiated by Wiranto which adopts democratic values and civilian control of the military is now the model for civil-military relations in Indonesian democracy. The implementation of the 1998 military reform program has shown excellent progress in many sectors. Both entities civil authority and the military realize how should they interact in modern civil-military relations. Henceforth, the steps must be taken to maintain civil-military relations progress in Indonesian democracy that include: First, establishes a civil-military relations policy in which is defined all groups' roles and responsibilities, including legislative branch, society, and media. Second, strengthening control by third parties, including; legislative, society and media. Third, creating a professional military that upholds the noble values of its profession. Fourth, implementing the concept of civilian control of the military based on the national order and democratic values. *Finally*, this paper concludes that these four steps should continuously and comprehensively be implemented in order to allow civil-military relations in Indonesia moves toward civilian supremacy.

Endnotes

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, Reforming Civil-Military Relations, in book Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, p. 11

² Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power, Chapter Twelve; The Military Profession and Political Power: Resources and Their Mobilization, p. 140

³ Ibid p. 8

⁴ Ibid p. 40

⁵ Ibid, p. 8,9,10 and 12-13. Four kinds of military intervention to the government as proposed by Marcus Mietzner as follows: *First*, Praetorian rule, where the military is the main component of the regime (South Korea and Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s, and Burma

still praetorian rule until today). *Second*, participant-ruler, where the military participates directly, but does not control the government (Philippines under Marcos and Thailand for much of 1980s). Third, guardian rule, where the military does not necessarily participate in or dominate the government (Turkey). *Fourth*, referee, where the military acts as king makers.

⁶ Danapoulos and Watson, *The Political Role of Military-An International Handbook*, p. 1

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid, p. 271

⁹ Charles L. Cochran, *Civil-Military Relations*, p. 284

¹⁰ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations; An Essay in Comparative Analysis*, p. 5

¹¹ Ibid p. 6

¹² Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia* p. 8. In countries where democratic control of the military, the military will only involve in politics if it was asked by civilian authorities for such advice. After decision taken, the military will implement the policy militarily.

¹³ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of military - the Changing Security Environment*, Chapter 6-Twilight of the General? Domestic Security and Civil-Military Relations in Southern Latin America, p. 97

¹⁴ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback-the role of military in politics*, p. 75

¹⁵ Desch, *Threat Environment and Military Missions*, in book *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, p. 13

¹⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 80-83

¹⁷ Constantine P. Danapoulos and Cynthia Watson, *The Political Role of Military-An International Handbook*, p. 191

¹⁸ Tarzie Vittachi, *The Fall of Sukarno*, Chapter I, p. 13

¹⁹ Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship*, p. 173

²⁰ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto; Order, development and pressure for Change*, p. 71

²¹ David Jenkins, *Soeharto and his Generals: Military Politics, 1975-1983*, p. preface x

²² Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *Military and Democracy in Indonesia – Challenges, Politics and Power*, p. 38

²³ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, Institute of Southeast Asian Study, Singapore-2009, p. 212-213

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300*, second edition, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California-1993, p. 230

²⁶ Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*. Ibid, p. 40

²⁷ Ibid, p. 50; See also Salim Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 178

²⁸ Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 34-35

²⁹ J. Kristiadi, *The Armed Forces in the book Indonesia; The Challenge of Change* edited by Richard W. Baker, M. Hadi Soesastro, J. Kristiadi, and Douglas E. Ramage, publish by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies p. 107

³⁰ On March 1980 President Soeharto, at ABRI Commader Call in Pekanbaru Province, conveyed that ABRI would support Golkar Party, see Salim Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 62

³¹ Hanif Hoesin, *Selintas Sejarah Kebebasan Pers di Indonesia (At a Glance the History of freedom of Press in Indonesia)*, p. 9 <http://www.scribd.com/doc/48410990/KEBEBASAN-PERS-DI-INDONESIA-Hanif-H>

³² Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 56

³³ Jenkins, *Soeharto and his Generals: Military Politics, 1975-1983*, p. preface x

³⁴ Ibid, See also Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 60-61

³⁵ Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 61

³⁶ Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto; The Rise and Fall of The New Order*, Third Edition, p. 71

³⁷ Meitzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*, p. 134

³⁸ Ibid, p. 199; See also Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 271; See also Yong Cheol Kim, R. William Liddle, and Salim Said, *Political Leadership and Civilian Supremacy in Third Wave Democracies: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia*. *Pacific Affair*; Summer 2006; 79, 2; ProQuest Research Library, p. 258

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 126

⁴¹ Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 338

⁴² Ibid p. 271

⁴³ Insitute for Defense Security and Peace Studies, Reformasi TNI published May 2008, p. 3 Website:idsps.org/option,com_docman/task.../Itemid,15/ See Also ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI (The Indonesian Armed Forces in the 21st Century: Redefinition, Reposition, and Reactualization of the Role the Indonesian Armed Forces) Jakarta: Mabes ABRI (Headquarters of the Indonesian Armed Forces), 1998; See also Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 268

⁴⁴ Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 300-301

⁴⁵ Insitute for Defense Security and Peace Studies, *Reformasi TNI* published May 2008, p. 4

⁴⁶ Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 315-317

⁴⁷ Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*, p. 202

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 211-213; See also Kim, Liddle, and Said, *Political Leadership and Civilian Supremacy in Third Wave Democracies*, p. 263; See also Said, *Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak*, p. 360-361

⁴⁹ Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan, *The Leaven Worth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art*, US Army War College Selected Reading Academic Year 2012, 29 November 201—27 January 2012, p. 114

⁵⁰ Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, Chapter Five, p. 80

⁵¹ Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*, p. 202

⁵² Huntington, *Reforming Civil-Military Relations*, in the book *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, p. 11

⁵³ Congressman Jim Marshal and General USA (Ret) Frederick M. Franks, *The Future of the Army Profession*; Revised and Expanded. Second Edition, p. 40

⁵⁴ Huntington, *Reforming Civil-Military Relations*, Ibid, p. 11

⁵⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 80-81

