Defeating the Narco-Insurgency within the United States
Abstract
The high consumption of illicit drugs in the United States has resulted in a cooperative relationship between transnational gangs and powerful Latin American drug cartels. Should the U.S. government continue its war on drugs despite its ineffectiveness and high costs? If so, how can the United States become more effective in its efforts to defeat this threat? This monograph asserts that the stability of the United States is threatened by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) who are trafficking in illicit drugs. The U.S. government's approach to the narcotics problem is to attack the supply side of the problem, but this approach is failing. The U.S. effort to defeat TCOs has been unsuccessful because the United States has not identified the problem of transnational crime as the low-level insurgency that it is. The monograph describes the structure and complexity of TCOs and analyzes the supply side strategy currently in use in the United States, identifying the strategy's shortcomings. The monograph then identifies a center of gravity (COG) for both the threat and the U.S. government using Joint Publication 5-0 and Dale Eikmeier's method for identifying COGs. The first task in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity and, if possible, tracing them back to a single one. The center of gravity analysis conducted in this monograph concurs with U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24. To defeat this TCO threat, the population must become the point where the U.S. government places its primary focus.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA561067
Entities
People
- Ivan Udell
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College