


Maintaining Operational Readiness in the Army National Guard

by

Colonel Thomas G. Croymans
United States Army National Guard



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MAINTAINING OPERATIONAL READINESS IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

by

Colonel Thomas G. Croymans
United States Army National Guard

Colonel Carol Eggert
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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MAINTAINING OPERATIONAL READINESS IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Prior to operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the early 1990s, our national military strategy relied on the Reserve Component (RC), in particular the Army National Guard (ARNG), as a strategic, as opposed to an operational reserve. Since that time, a paradigm shift occurred. From that point forward we realized that operational employment of the ARNG in all significant military contingency operations was necessary, hence the need for an operationally ready ARNG. This paper examines what missions the Army could task to the ARNG that best ensure its ability to maintain operational readiness. The examination: (1) includes a brief historical background of the ARNG, (2) a review of the missions that maintain operational readiness, (3) conducts an analysis of those missions, and finally, (4) recommends a basic mission set for the ARNG. The ARNG, through enhanced training, equipment modernization, force structure balancing and multiple deployments, has developed and maintains an operational readiness that exceeds any previous level. Future readiness and effective employment of the ARNG requires a mission set and policy that ensures continuous engagement with viable missions that continue to develop and strengthen readiness and an already solid partnership with the Active Component (AC).

Since the time of its inception as a “federally recognized” force through the Militia Act of 1903, the Army National Guard has adapted and evolved over time, posturing itself to best serve the Nation in continually increased capacities. It was originally considered a separate but primary reserve force for U.S. Armed Forces. Later by reorganization via the National Defense Act of 1916, it would combine with the Regular Army in addition to the United States Army Reserve (USAR) to form the Army of the

United States in time of war. In both World Wars and the Korean conflict, mobilization and deployment of the ARNG into action, contributed to the defense effort in significant proportions. As a result, the Nation was able to effectively field a much larger and lethal force when needed and consequently able to scale back once hostilities ceased.

Reductions were accomplished by downsizing the Army and placing the ARNG back into its strategic reserve framework of the post conflict era. The Vietnam conflict was the first in modern history that did not, to any appreciable scale, employ the ARNG as part of its wartime strategy. President Johnson was against deployment of the Reserves in Vietnam. Certainly, the military establishment, to include General Creighton Abrams, supported and advocated for a reserve call up seeing the benefit not only from a military perspective, but from a political one as well.

The Abrams doctrine would forever change the way the Nation would approach strategy and integration, not only in force structure but in employment as well; sharing responsibilities and developing dependant relationships that require mobilization of forces from both components to address any contingency. The Total Force concept, born out of General Abrams's determination to link the engagement of U.S. Armed Forces and the American people elevated the RC to a position of equality, at least in concept, with the AC in times of war. It would take another twenty years for the Nation to benefit from the Total Force concept, finally manifesting itself with the planning and execution of Desert Shield, Desert Storm and fully implemented in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Today after nearly ten years of conflict, the ARNG routinely mobilizes and deploys everything from Brigade Combat Teams to Agricultural Development Teams

performing a vast array of missions supporting all major contingencies across the globe. Our military and our Nation depend on an operational ARNG to ensure its ability to defend against threats to the homeland on both a domestic and international stage. The ARNG is the largest element of the RC weighing in at 360,000 plus members as compared to a 570,000 strong active duty Army. As our military efforts already complete in Iraq, and the anticipated end of military operations in Afghanistan only slightly more than 24 months away, we are shifting our focus to a post conflict posture. A posture that includes reductions in budgets and ground forces, while protecting the investments made in creating an operational ARNG. Striking the right balance of employment between the ARNG and the AC that effectively meets the operational needs and at the same time efficiently maintains a capable and responsive Total Force is the challenge facing today's policy makers and senior military leaders.

When rebalancing the force to meet future national security challenges, the Guard and Reserve should be a "force of first choice" for those tasks for which they are particularly well suited, owing to their overall cost effectiveness and the skill sets that they can provide. Missions that follow a predictable, operational schedule fall clearly into this category.¹

Recently issued strategic guidance from the Pentagon states that the military will retain the ability to mobilize and generate forces as needed to meet any contingency that may arise. In order to meet the requirements of defeating future threats to the Nation's security, the ARNG must retain the capability to responsively complement the AC in an operational capacity while preserving the ability to provide a strategic reserve in the event of a large scale, long term contingency. Identification of the missions best suited for the ARNG that allow it to retain an operational readiness posture will ensure the Total Force is capable to meet the Nation's strategic security goals. The challenge lies in those missions being in balance with the needs of: the individual states,

homeland security, and the combatant commands effectively supporting both the state and Federal missions.

The ARNG currently performs a wide range of missions that include both overseas and domestic mission support fulfilling state and Federal mission requirements. Overseas defense missions include supporting contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans and global engagement missions. Domestic mission support includes Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA), Civil Support (CS) and Homeland Security (HS). The Military's primary mission is to defend the United States from attack by foreign or domestic threats. The Armed Forces also have a responsibility to come to the assistance of U.S. civil authorities in the event of natural disasters, emergencies and other significant or catastrophic events.²

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is a critical dual mission assigned to both the active and ARNG units. The ARNG is routinely called to duty by order of its state governors, to support the state response in the wake of disasters and emergencies. Located in communities throughout the state, the likelihood of a nearby Guard unit is very high. Guard units are already prepared with contingency plans that include pre-determined personnel and equipment, minimizing response time and maximizing effectiveness. On the other hand, only the Secretary of Defense or the President can authorize the use of AC Forces to assist states in disaster relief or emergencies. The AC does perform duties under this mission set on occasion but only for events of major significance. Typically, these events are of the magnitude of

Hurricane Katrina, and other large scale disasters requiring a national response to both natural and manmade disasters and emergencies.

The Army National Guard is well equipped to support and perform the DSCA mission. The Army is using an effective equipping strategy based on major efforts designed to improve equipment readiness for both the AC and RC. First, it ensures units are equipped to designated levels according to their position in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. Another major effort focuses on building enduring readiness by targeting the institutional processes. This part of the strategy incorporates partnership between the AC, ARNG, and the USAR, to distribute resources to meet both the state and Federal missions.³ The AC is certainly living up to its commitment to modernize the ARNG. The ARNG is better equipped today than it has ever been. Major General Carpenter, acting Director of the Army National Guard recently testified to congress regarding the status of Critical Dual Use equipment issued to the Army National Guard since 2005.

Our Nation has invested over \$37 billion in equipment for the Army National Guard in the past six years. That investment was made in both Critical Dual Use (CDU) and other required equipment, used for both domestic homeland crisis response missions and overseas contingency operations. Overseas contingency operations have spurred improvements in the capacity of the ARNG to support the war effort, to respond to natural and man-made disasters, to provide critical assistance during state and national emergencies, and to be prepared to respond to potential terrorist attacks in defense of the homeland.⁴

DSCA operations are greatly enhanced when conducted by ARNG personnel who are well equipped and possess intimate knowledge of their geopolitical surroundings derived from being residents of the state they serve. National Guard senior leadership and personnel are thoroughly familiar with the surroundings of their respective states; they enjoy the benefit of long term participation in networks in both

the military structure and civilian public and private circles. The senior leadership of the Guard also enjoys a close, functional, and cooperative working relationship with its state emergency and safety management officials to form effective and responsive emergency management teams. Common to all states the adjutants general, state emergency management, safety and homeland security officials, are typically high profile members of state government and work closely with one another.⁵ Seamless integration of Guard support into the state disaster response framework adds efficiency and economy to DSCA operations. The National Guard is a reserve force therefore; it becomes attractive from an economical perspective. A ready National Guard costs only a fraction to maintain when compared to the same maintenance costs AC Forces.⁶

In addition to locally established networks and mature relationships associated with the conduct DSCA missions, the ARNG provides support to states across the country through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) concept: a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through EMAC, a disaster-affected state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues up front: liability and reimbursement. The EMAC concept was developed as a means for states to quickly and with very limited coordination, provide emergency assistance to each other through the National Guard. Pre-approved agreements based on existing shortages greatly enhance emergence response capabilities. National Guard units across the Nation are available to answer the call. Governors in responding to emergencies and disasters have come to rely extensively on EMAC when state resources are exhausted.⁷ The EMAC program is successful because it provides pre-

determined quick response forces and acts as a force multiplier in disaster relief operations.

The ARNG also performs another dual responsibility mission closely related to and intertwined with the DSCA mission set called Civil Support (CS). Its relationship to DSCA is an encompassing one in the sense that CS overlaps and includes several missions similar to DSCA in addition to other forms of support. Aside from natural disasters, CS typically consists of military support that provides assistance to law enforcement agencies at all levels. In a number of instances, CS comes in the form of specialized equipment or capabilities that law enforcement agencies cannot fund or lack the resources, such as rotary winged assets and other surveillance assistance capabilities.

Civil Support

Civil Support is described in Joint Pub 3-26, Homeland Security, as support provided to civil authorities in the event of natural disasters, special events, manmade disasters. CS also includes activities such as Counterterrorism (CT) support, National Special Security Event (NSSE) support, Counterdrug (CD) operations support, maritime security, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), and finally loans of equipment, facilities, or personnel to law enforcement.⁸ ARNG responses to domestic disasters and emergencies as well as CT, CD, and NSSE security are well documented and too numerous to mention, other than to say that the capability is established and respected. The National Guard is responsible for and assigned both a state and Federal mission. In addition, its co-located within each state and under the control of the Governor. In the event a military response is determined necessary by local and state

officials, the National Guard is typically the first to get the call and provide military support civil authorities⁹

Today the ARNG is heavily involved in domestic mission support activities. Considered by all as the first to respond and the last to leave, the ARNG plays a critical and leading role in CS. Programs under the command and control of the ARNG provide the Nation with a comprehensive and responsive capability to address most any threat to homeland security. These programs include the Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART), based out of the eight ARNG division headquarters the DARTs provide the ten essential capabilities associated with disaster response operations. DARTs are organized and dispersed into regions that provide approximately 50,000 personnel east of the Mississippi River and 30,000 west of the river. A second program designed to provide lifesaving capabilities and quick response is the Homeland Response Force (HRF). Ten HRFs are on track to be established and located throughout the country. Key elements of the HRF include enhanced lifesaving capabilities, an initial response ability to bridge the gap between initial and follow on forces, and improved command and control. Third is the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) program that aligns itself with at least one in each Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region. CERFPs are available to the governors and provide a response capability to events associated with CBRNE threats. Fourth is the National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) designed to be a first response to counter-terrorism activities by providing 75 to 125 personnel within eight hours with locations in every state to respond to a Governor's or President's request. Finally, each state has a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil

Support Team (WMD-CST) to assist in the identification of CBRNE agents and advise local emergency managers in response measures.¹⁰

As previously mentioned, the ARNG is fully equipped to meet the challenges and requirements for DSCA and CS. state, county and city emergency responders routinely test communications equipment employed by the ARNG to ensure interoperability across the spectrum of entities involved in CS. Other types of equipment regularly utilized by the ARNG include ground transportation vehicles and rotary aircraft that have great utility in the disaster response, CD, and CT operations.

Given that the ARNG is the military first responder in nearly all cases, command and control of the military response is established early on. Problems arise when an AC military response is required. Command lines of authority can become confusing and the question of who is in charge often comes up. This issue is addressed through the recent establishment of the dual status command. In the event that army units and or personnel are called to assist in disaster or emergency relief efforts where the jurisdiction still remains with the state and not the Federal government, they will most likely be under the command of a dual status commander.

The advent of the dual status command was in direct response to inherent problems of providing Federal forces to assist in disaster/emergency response in areas that are under the control of the state. In several instances as noted during the response to Hurricane Katrina, the unity of effort was lacking between the ARNG and the AC due to the fact that they were working under two separate chains of command or commonly referred to as a parallel command. In parallel command the state and Federal commands work side by side and are intended to work together but this rarely

happens. Parallel command relationships are difficult to manage because the commands tend to act independently of one another. Coordination of effort and channels of communication typically suffer in the chaos that immediately follows a catastrophic event, thus resulting in a less than effective response.¹¹ Use of a dual status command combines authorities to command both Title 10 Active Duty Forces and National Guard Forces in either Title 32 or state active duty status.¹² A dual status command will alleviate this problem by ensuring unity of command by the appointment of a single commander that has command and control of all military resources. The ARNG is well versed in the execution of CS missions and is almost always the choice from the state/Governor perspective for command and control if the military response is within its border.

Not only does the ARNG execute a lead role in homeland security, it is also plays a vital role in the international arena conducting security cooperation activities via its State Partnership Program (SPP).

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation program run by the National Guard. It also serves as a mechanism for training National Guard personnel. Since the program began in 1992, it has expanded to the point where nearly every state National Guard participates, as do the National Guard of Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.¹³

State Partnership Program

General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau refers to the National Guard's State Partnership Program as the crown jewel of the Guard's international engagement. Designed to build military to military partnerships and capacity with emerging nations throughout the world, the SPP continues to evolve, becoming increasingly important, as a key element of our National Security Strategy. That strategy

seeks to expand and enhance our security relationships with current allies around the world and develop new relationships with those nations that share similar views of freedom and democracy wherever geographically located around the world. The strategy also implies that we conduct security cooperation activities that project a positive image and portray the United States as a security partner of choice. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.¹⁴

One overall effect of the SPP is the enhancement and maintenance of operational readiness for participating ARNG units. The opportunity to engage with foreign peoples, learn their languages, landscapes and cultures serve to increase Soldier awareness and perspectives. Soldiers gain from the experience of working with foreign military counterparts, sharing expertise and building enduring relationships. The Active Component counterpart on the other hand, typically rotates to a new duty assignment every two to three years therefore never getting the opportunity to develop the long term relationships that ARNG members often do. ARNG Soldiers usually spend their entire careers in the same unit. This consistency provides for repeated engagements with state partners over long periods of time resulting in the development of strong and lasting relationships.¹⁵ Guard members bring a vast array of civilian skills to the partnerships where they advantageously employ them wherever they can to augment the mission and ensure success.

The SPP lends itself to the possibility of being coordinated with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC)/ARNG Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities in

order to maximize its effectiveness. Secretary of Defense Panetta's January 2012 strategic guidance identifies the National Guard SPP as a key partnership development effort.¹⁶ Building partnerships and capacity with emerging nations around the world, is a critical element of our National Security Strategy. The ARNG having nearly two decades of experience in this area is the logical force of choice to remain actively engaged and perhaps poised to take on a larger role in the international arena.

The real challenge to both the Army and the ARNG going forward, is how it will maintain the operational readiness of its largest and most vital entities, those being its 28 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)? Certainly funding is a significant factor along with other considerations such as availability and relevant mission assignment that satisfies commander intent. These concerns, all of which are central to achieving the goal of maintained operational readiness, deserve primary consideration in the process of mission allocation and assignment. Once operations in Afghanistan draw down, employment of forces becomes an issue. How will the AC and the ARNG determine mission assignment? Will there be enough viable missions for all of the AC force structure of 45 BCTs, 38 Multi-Functional Support BDEs, and 44 Functional Support BDEs in addition to the ARNGs force structure of 28 BCTs, 48 Multi-Functional Support BDEs, and 40 Functional Support BDEs to go around? In the event that a shortage of mission requirements develops, it is logical to assume that the AC would have priority in mission assignment. Should this occur, ARNG units are left without viable peacetime deployments and risk losing the operational readiness the Nation and the AC has come to depend on.

Regionally Aligned Brigades

The concept of the Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) is an area that has great potential as a relevant and easily adaptable mission for the ARNG to assume. It provides the framework for the ARNG to build upon while enhancing its relationship with the GCCs. As currently envisioned, the AC and ARNG, would supply RABs for employment by the GCCs. The RAB is the primary mechanism for delivering General Purpose Forces (GPF) for Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities in support of the Combatant Commander's (CCDR) theater campaign plan.¹⁷ The RAB provides a conduit for ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to deploy on a predictable cycle to provide direct support of the GCC in the execution of his or her theater campaign plan. The RAB is a unit that is capable of performing full spectrum operations tailored to specific missions and task organized as a modular brigade headquarters. Subordinate units are also task organized to specific missions under the modularity concept. RABs are resourced and deployed through the ARFORGEN process. The primary function of RABs is to perform TSC activities and operations.¹⁸

Security Force Assistance (SFA) is the fundamental center of military missions and objectives abroad for the near term future. Of the four primary objectives laid out in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review "prevent and deter conflict," and "prepare to defeat adversaries in a wide range of contingencies" point directly to SFA and Security Assistance (SA) operations. The construct of the RAB was developed within the context of SFA. The ARNG is well suited for this type of mission from having developed expertise in security cooperation capabilities through its highly successful SPP.

The RAB model under consideration by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) promotes employing one RAB for each of the GCCs on an annual basis. This generates a predictable and steady requirement of six RABs per year, including a standard CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) mission assigned and dedicated to United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The ARNG already has 17 CERFP teams who conduct basically the same mission.

Today, the Army's goal for its ARFORGEN model is configured to provide a total of 20 BCTs in the available pool every year; 15 from the AC and 5 from the ARNG. The ARNG has 28 BCTs, 48 Multi-Functional Support Brigades, and 40 Functional Support Brigades. At that rate, it would take 23 ARFORGEN cycles to employ each brigade once, without considering the other 59 Multi-Functional and Functional Brigades in the USAR. While not all brigade level commands within the ARNG are suitable for this type mission, employment at a level which sustains operational readiness for ARNG units may be an issue.

The Nation's increased commitment to expanding relationships with its African partners presents a great opportunity for involvement of the ARNG through participation in the U.S. African Command (USAFRICOM) Commanders Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plan. U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) is the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) designated for AFRICOM. The problem for USARAF is that it has no force structure underneath it; all it has is a headquarters. From its inception, USARAF has been dependent on other organizations and the global force management process to accomplish its mission. In actuality, USARAF—indeed all ASCCs—require assigned forces to conduct SFA in their theater of operations.¹⁹

Theater Security Cooperation

Security cooperation encompass a wide variety of activities and agencies both within and external to the DOD. Interagency cooperation and interactions with foreign defense and security establishments are critical to developing solid relationships with our foreign partners. From the military perspective, establishment of quality relationships with foreign militaries serves as the primary mechanism to develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities.²⁰ Combatant Commanders employ TSC activities to build defense and security relationships that promote U.S. security interests, while increasing the capacity of Host Nation governments and military organizations. This effort is directly in line with the 2010 QDR guidance to build the security capacity of partner states. While RABs are a significant component of TSC plans which support the national strategy, other supporting missions that “enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability”²¹ are equally important and readily executable by ARNG units. TSC missions provide the predictability and the variance in scope to accommodate the ARNG units that would not be participating in RAB operations.

Herein lies an opportunity for the multi-functional and functional brigades as well as smaller more specialized units in the ARNG force structure to participate in partnership and capacity building missions on a rotational basis. ARNG personnel are particularly well suited for these types of missions. Reserve Component personnel are also more likely to bring many of the critical skills required during building partner capacity or TSC activities, including expertise in agriculture, business, finance, governance, and rule of law.

Reserve Component personnel may also provide a useful source for foreign language skills and knowledge of foreign cultures. Because many

reservists remain in the same unit for their entire career, the Reserve Component is well suited to establish desirable long-term relationships with Host Nation units and service members and sustain the language and cultural awareness that can only be gained over time.²²

The “Priorities for 21st Century Defense” identified “Provide a Stabilizing Presence” as one of its primary missions. It goes on to identify that mission to say that: U.S. Forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises.²³ It concludes with the caveat, a reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity.²⁴ Consistent and predictable support of TSC and capacity building activities conducted in an efficient and cost effective manner are key to achieving the Nation’s strategic security goals. Enhancement of our partner nations’ own security capabilities strengthens U.S. and partner security capabilities. Employment of the ARNG in support of this primary mission can provide predictability and operational readiness for the ARNG and mission accomplishment through assured access of resources for the Army.

Analysis

The goal for the Nation, the Army and the ARNG is to preserve and continue the investment made over the past ten years in the ARNG in terms of operational capabilities. As stated in the 2011 Army Posture Statement:

One thing is certain across every echelon of this army; we cannot relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic reserve. The security of the nation can ill afford a reserve force that is undermanned, under-equipped or at insufficient levels of training and readiness.²⁵

A key element of the National Security Strategy is to “provide a stabilizing presence”²⁶ to that end, SFA and building partner capacity are paramount. The way to

achieve these end states is through regular and predictable integration of ARNG units into army operations, contingencies, and exercises.

In the mission areas of DSCA and CS the ARNG deserves serious consideration as the force of first choice. In fact, there are very few scenarios where the ARNG would not be the first military responder. The ARNG already plays a large role in domestic response and mission support activities. Leveraging the advantages the ARNG already enjoys such as: high level networks with civilian emergency responders, broad understanding of the political, geographical and industrial landscape, stand to enhance the Army's HLS/HLD capabilities. The establishment of the dual status command authority for disaster and emergency response addresses the issue of state vs. Federal control in DSCA / CS operations and ensures that state governors retain command and control. The dual status command concept enhances and facilitates cooperation between AC Forces in Title 10 status and ARNG Forces in State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status ensuring military unity of effort and unity of command. Given the distributed nature of stationing across the country and its dual status capabilities, the ARNG is logically the primary force of choice in a military context.²⁷

Given the fact that the Army, faced with the challenge to make real cuts in manpower, programs and supported missions, CS / DSCA is one that can be shifted to the ARNG. The ARNG is in a strong position to assume a lead role. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) can assume a larger coordination role between the states, and Federal departments to include DOD, ensuring continuity. Modest adjustments to NGBs manning and structure aimed at increasing current capabilities can assist the ARNG in fulfilling a larger and more comprehensive role in its domestic support mission.

The ARNG also plays a significant role on the international scene through its overseas defense mission. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State as well other senior civilian and military officials recognize the National Guard SPP a high benefit low cost program. The SPP is an integral component of the Defense Department's security cooperation strategy, the GCC theater engagement programs, and the U.S. Ambassador's Mission Strategic Resource Plans.²⁸ Currently the SPP has state partners within every one of the GCCs around the world.

The expertise that National Guard units have acquired in conducting these types of operations are often in demand among foreign militaries, which frequently play a major role in their nation's disaster response plans, and which may play significant roles in their nation's border security, civil disorder, or counterdrug operations.²⁹

Expansion of the ARNG expertise in partnership and capacity building gained through the SPP into the roles of RABs and assignment of TSC missions is a logical progression that fits the mold of predictable and consistent missions best suited for the ARNG. Increasing the opportunity for overseas deployment of ARNG units to engage security partners serves to build enduring relations and increase security relationships with nations around the world.

The challenges to assigning these increased roles and missions to the ARNG are significant and have an impact on all aspects of readiness to both the AC and the ARNG. First, in the light of decreasing budgets that includes decreases in manning, equipping and training, reaching a reasonable balance between AC and ARNG readiness will be difficult. Second, assuming that the current drawdown in Afghanistan continues as scheduled and no other significant contingency develops in the near future, the availability of viable missions becomes a question. Finally, what are the

In the “Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component,” report, it examined rotational costs of AC and RC units. The costing model looked at several scenarios. First, the model estimated costs using only AC Forces, second, a combination of AC and RC Forces and finally an all RC approach in an attempt to find the most economical rotational costs. In each case, the methodology considered a 12 month deployment period for the RC unit but varied the number of months for pre and post mobilization activities and actual time spent with boots on the ground. What the report did not consider was a shorter total deployment time of nine months. In its findings, the table below identifies the most cost effective rotational configuration. The notional cost as depicted in Figure 1 below is \$3,150 which employs two AC units and three RC units that provide forces for an operation over a six year period.³⁰

Figure 1. Application of Rotational Costing Model of Mixed Active and Reserve Component Units

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the RAB concept requires a total of six RABs annually to support the entire mission. In this model three RC/ARNG units assigned to one of six RAB requirements engages 18 of the 28 ARNG BCTs in one complete ARFORGEN cycle or approximately 65% of the BCTs within the ARNG. However, reducing the total deployment time by three months from 12 to 9, the same model produces readiness results that are more favorable.




Figure 2. Application of Rotational Costing Model of Mixed Active and Additional Reserve Component Units.

Figure 2 illustrates a similar force mix as in Figure 1 but differs in the total deployment time for the RC/ARNG units. In this example AC units rotate on a 1:3 deployment to dwell time ratio and RC/ARNG units rotate on a 0.75:5.25 ratio. This ratio accounts for the reduced deployment time from 12 to 9 months. The nine month deployment time produces a period of six months boots on the ground, two months pre-deployment and one month post-deployment. The nine month rotation creates a requirement for an additional RC/ARNG unit to fill the gap created by the shortened deployment time. By increasing the number of RC/ARNG units in the model by one, (from three to four) and then applying the model to the RAB mission, six more RC/ARNG units (one per GCC) are required to meet the demand. The new requirement

increases from 18 to 24 ARNG BCTs employing 85% of ARNG available units for this particular mission. The shorter deployment time slightly increases the total cost (approximately 7%) but yields increased utilization rates, resulting in increased readiness. Implementation of this model provides a predictable deployment schedule the ARNG depends on for planning and execution. It also provides the needed depth the Army is looking for at a reduced cost which in turn affords the reversibility the Army is planning on to generate operationally ready forces in a short period of time. This model is applicable to the RAB mission and any number of reoccurring mission requirements to include TSC missions.

Competition for assignment of RAB and TSC missions between AC and ARNG units must be managed if operational readiness of the ARNG is the goal. A careful analysis and identification of which units within the ARNG will be operational and which are going to be strategic is necessary. Those deemed operational will receive mission assignments and deploy in their available year of the ARFORGEN. Inclusion of ARNG units designated as operational, in the global force management process, will ensure they are employed at a rate that maintains readiness at acceptable levels. Detailed and extensive planning is necessary to ensure AC units in their available year are employed avoiding a situation where an ARNG unit is deployed while an AC unit in its available year is not.

In addition to equitable employment of the Total Force, perhaps the largest obstacle in maintaining an operational ARNG lies within the public sector, that of employers of ARNG Soldiers. While employers are overwhelmingly supportive of reservist-employees absences for conflicts involving national security and defense of

other countries, a much smaller number supported absences for additional duty, training, or professional development. An effective approach to mitigating the issue of deploying reservist-employees for “training” is to offer employer incentives in the areas of health care and tax incentives. Health care and taxes are direct costs that impact an employer’s bottom line. Alleviation of these requirements in some measure for employers of reservists can have a positive effect. Additionally, the cost model depicted in Figure 2 advocates shorter deployment time taking some of the pressure off employers enabling them to better support non conflict deployments. With the eventual drawdown in Afghanistan and already being out of Iraq, employers understanding and cooperation may wane if a reservist-employee deploys for training purposes only and not in direct support of a contingency. Shorter deployment times and direct benefits can assist in garnering continued employer support.

Although there are a number of challenges associated with the proposals concerning missions, employment cycles and employer relations, solutions are attainable, affordable and realistic. Providing increased operational readiness by ensuring ARNG units not only train and prepare based on the predictability of the ARFORGEN cycle but that they are actually deployed in support of a viable mission comes at a cost. Operational depth achieved through gainful employment of ARNG units in real world missions where they maintain expertise and develop relationships with their AC counterparts.

Recommendations

The Army National Guard rests on a solid foundation from which a well trained, equipped, disciplined and dedicated force can continue to maintain and increase its capability and depth. The success it enjoys today is the product of more than ten years of mobilizations and deployments. As the operational requirement diminishes over the not so distant future, competition for employment opportunities for both the AC and the ARNG are likely to occur. The Army will offset much of its need through the planned reduction of nearly 90,000 Soldiers over the next three to five years. For the Army National Guard to maintain its operational readiness it requires a sustainment program that includes the recommendations listed below.

Tasking the Army National Guard with the primary role for the military response to homeland security to include CS and DSCA missions can enhance overall military responsiveness. Army National Guard units are stationed throughout the entire United States, three territories, and the District of Columbia. In each case, senior Army National Guard leaders are closely networked with the governors, and other political leaders, along with local, state, and Federal emergency management officials.

Institutionalization of the dual status command provides a solution to the problem of unity of effort, placing both state and Federal units under a single chain of command.

The Secretary of Defense has the authorization and can assign primary responsibility for the military component of homeland security to the Army National Guard.

Justification is based on the Guard's strong relationships, institutional knowledge, stationing, and quick response capability. The Army National Guard is well versed and ready to assume the lead role as the force of first choice for homeland security

missions. The Army National Guard has the depth and capacity to take responsibility of this vast mission; to be the initial and enduring military response force to homeland security with the AC in a support role.

Ensuring regular deployments, from 60% to 70% of all the Army National Guard units in their available year of the ARFORGEN greatly facilitates the ability to maintain readiness goals. Deployments at this rate are less but closely resemble those encountered over the past ten years thus ensuring operational readiness. Predictable deployments also serve to improve skills and further develop expertise through training opportunities with the AC ensuring proficiency on the most current equipment, techniques, tactics and procedures. Deployment rotations are based on a six year ARFORGEN cycle, but the mobilization to dwell time ratio would actually be 0.75:5.25 (nine months total with six months boots on the ground) allowing a greater number of units to deploy thus attaining previously mentioned deployment goals.

Enhancement of the State Partnership Program by allowing Army National Guard units to conduct expanded activities with state partners through regular ARFORGEN based deployments also maintains operational readiness. Adjusting deployment times for Army National Guard units to six months (boots on the ground) in support of their partner countries serves two purposes. First, it provides for the opportunity to build stronger and broader relationships that build greater capacity for partnering militaries. Secondly, it provides a platform for other than BCT sized Army National Guard units to mobilize and deploy to maintain operational readiness. Typically, a company sized unit but rarely that of a battalion, participates in the program. Expansion of the program by

integrating battalion sized elements would allow for larger projects and broader efforts over longer periods of time.

Full participation of the Army National Guard's BCT structure in the Regionally Aligned Brigade program guarantees reliable support to all six GCCs while providing a platform for realistic training opportunities for a critical segment of the Army National force structure. This program offers the highest payoff in training and operational opportunities for the 28 BCTs in the Army National Guard. Full participation ensures the GCCs and Army National Guard units will establish long term and enduring relationships that support their TSC plans. Given the learned ability of Army National Guard units to provide assistance and engage in capacity building activities the Army should consider the Army National Guard for a large role in supporting the GCCs through providing forces for Regionally Aligned Brigade and Theater Security Cooperation missions. Since these missions and activities are predictable, relatively consistent over time, and can be substantially enhanced by long-term personal and geographic relationships, the Army National Guard is a logical, cost effective and viable choice for such missions.

Finally, continue to execute and fund the Army Equipping Strategy currently underway. Equipment modernization is critical to maintaining operational readiness. Critical Dual Use equipment fielding over the past few years is paying big dividends in the Army National Guard's ability to better respond to emergencies and disasters and for employment in contingency operations. Units not trained or familiar with the equipment being used by the AC today are not in a position to maintain readiness levels required in an era of persistent conflict.

Conclusion

President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta unveiled a new strategy and issued pointed guidance to the military when they announced the Priorities for 21st Century Defense. The question is not if, but how will the Department of Defense and the Army employ the Army National Guard to ensure operational readiness is maintained for the long term?

The Army National Guard is in a position to readily assist and augment the Army and in some missions take the lead at providing security for our Nation as we look to future and beyond. Over the past ten years of war, the Army National Guard has established itself as a capable and reliable force significantly contributing to the Nation's security. The new strategy clearly relies on an operational reserve by its stating the challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require that we continue to employ National Guard and Reserve Forces.³¹ The Army National Guard is well suited for several missions in both structure and expertise to accomplish: combat operations, homeland defense/homeland security, theater security cooperation, state partnerships and capacity building. For the Army National Guard to stay proficient at and meet the demands of these vital security missions, manning and equipping are key but the absolute imperative is gainful employment. Incorporation of the Army National Guard in major contingency operations, Theater security cooperation operations, major exercises and other operations requiring deployments of six months or longer ensure desired outcomes. Utilization rates of the Army National Guard must remain at high levels for it to maintain and hone the war fighting edge its gained over the past ten

years. Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta sums up the issue of Army National Guard readiness in no uncertain terms:

A decade at war has honed the Guard into an effective, lethal fighting force, and it would be a tremendous mistake, in my view, to put that capability back on the shelf. I can tell you on my watch, it's not going to happen.³²

Endnotes

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⁸ Civil Support (CS) covers a wide range of activities that the military can provide to assist local authorities in any number of natural and or manmade Joint Pub 3-26, Homeland Security describes CS as support provided to civil authorities in the event of Natural Disasters, Special Events, and Manmade Disasters. CS also includes activities such as Counterterrorism (CT) Support, National Special Security Event Support, Counterdrug Operations Support, Maritime Security, and Loans of equipment, Facilities, or Personnel to Law Enforcement, and finally Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

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¹⁴ Leon E. Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 3.

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