Developing Ministerial Collaborative Planning Capacity
Abstract
In the aftermath of combat operations in Iraq, U.S. training and advisory teams initiated full-scale efforts to develop capacity within Iraq's police forces. From the outset, the United States went straight to the task of training indigenous police officers. Abandoned were advisory efforts to enhance and reform capabilities within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) at the national and operational command levels. The imperative of producing sufficient quantities of police officers to provide for Iraq's internal security took priority over developing the bureaucratic institution that would lead these forces. The result was a dysfunctional Ministry headquarters charged with sustaining a growing professionalized police force. In its June 2010 report to Congress, United States Forces-Iraq stated that its intended end-state for the MoI was a self-reliant ministry with sustainable and enduring systems that could enable the manning, training, and equipping of Iraqi police forces by the end of 2011. This paper examines whether the United States failed to achieve this objective by not fully investing in the development of a ministerial collaborative planning capacity capable of integrating ends, ways, and means. The conclusion provides a final assessment of U.S. ministerial planning capacity development efforts and a recommended change to the United States' overall Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 14, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA561348
Entities
People
- Francis L. Holinaty
Organizations
- United States Army War College