

Strategy Research Project International Fellow

A Roadmap for Future Security in the Western Balkans

by

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United States Army War College
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A ROADMAP FOR FUTURE SECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

by

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ABSTRACT

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Europe faces extremely complex issues in the Western Balkans Region, which began after Kosovo's Parliament declared independence. The fact is that Kosovo does not have full recognition in the world as a state, and Belgrade looks at this issue as an opening for democratic discussion and solution finding. This has resulted in a significant increase in tensions not only in Serbia but also in the entire region, and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the most vulnerable country among all six former Yugoslavian states.

There is a real potential danger that Kosovo could descend into chaos. A stable Western Balkan region (with all regional states in both NATO and the EU) is the basic precondition for resolving Kosovo's problem. Bosnia is behind other countries in the region regarding its path toward Euro-Atlantic integration.

Bearing this in mind, and taking a logical problem solving approach moving from the less complex (Bosnia) to more complex (Kosovo) issues, Bosnia becomes the top priority in terms of untying the Balkan knot. Time is crucial in this case.

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the issue of political stability in the Western Balkans and offer some new possible Courses of Action (COAs).

A ROADMAP FOR FUTURE SECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Currently, Europe faces extremely complex issues in the Western Balkans Region, which started after Kosovo's Parliament declared independence on February 17, 2008. Although it is not the only serious problem facing Europe, it deserves to be considered one of the most dangerous. The fact is that Kosovo does not have full recognition in the world as a state, and Belgrade looks at this issue as an opening for democratic discussion and solution finding. At the same time, this "de facto state" could easily become a "de jure state" in time. This has resulted in a significant increase in tensions not only in Serbia but also in the entire region, and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), which is the most vulnerable country among all six former Yugoslavian states, mainly because of its recent history and the bloody war during Yugoslavia's breakup.

Kosovo and Bosnia are the most sensitive in the Western Balkans, and Kosovo has a dangerous potential to descend into chaos. A stable region (with all states in NATO and EU) is the basic precondition for resolving Kosovo's problem. Bosnia is behind other countries in the region regarding its path toward Euro-Atlantic (E-A) integrations because of domestic political frictions which cause failures to fulfill the conditions that have been set from the international community. This country should not be considered as an isolated issue, but rather as the easier part of solving the Balkan region's problems. The main premise here is that a stronger Bosnia, ideally as a NATO and EU member together with its neighbors, brings a higher level of stability into the region, which is an important precondition for a final solution in Kosovo. There is no

doubt that the problem in Kosovo is the biggest and long-term one, while Bosnia's issue can be solved in a much shorter period of time, and Bosnia can finally become a successful part of the Balkan story.

Bearing this in mind, and taking a logical problem solving approach moving from the less complex to more complex issues, Bosnia becomes the top priority in terms of solving the Balkan knot. The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the issue of political stability in the Western Balkans and offer some new possible Courses of Action (COAs).

The first step (COA-1) would be the reassert of a strong and decisive American role in Europe, particularly in the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the U.S. assert its leadership in the International Community (IC), and uses strong and decisive diplomacy in order to maintain a stable Bosnia that fulfills its all political requirements for continuing toward NATO and EU membership. Once the Bosnian political impasse is removed, the second step (COA-2) in Bosnian problem solving would be its accelerated NATO membership. This country must become part of NATO together with other Western Balkan countries. Otherwise internal Bosnian tensions will grow and it could become an undesirable option bearing in mind the unsolved Kosovo issue, as well as the possibility of growing tensions in Sandzak¹, which lies partly in Serbia and partly in Montenegro and borders on Bosnia and Kosovo. In frame of this COA, NATO and the U.S. should relocate certain parts of their institutions into Bosnia in order to strengthen its overall position, as well as the position of the entire region. This would contribute to Bosnian and regional economic stability, which is essential in order to reach a more stable security situation. Consequently, this would set preconditions for future COAs toward Kosovo in order to cure this festering sore in Europe, which has a

dangerous potential to destabilize the entire Balkan region at the time when financial crisis is straining economies and causing tensions. Furthermore, having in mind the complex economic situation in Europe, an eventual higher level conflict would likely disrupt relationships inside EU and would further threaten the survival of the EU and its monetary system. This paper seeks to demonstrate that stability in Europe is an American national interest, and that U.S. must prevent EU dissolution in order to support a stable international order and economic prosperity by preventing instability in the Balkans and Europe.

The Balkans: A Short Overview

In geographic terms, “the core regions considered are mainland Greece, Serbia, Croatia, Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. Inasmuch as they occasionally impact on those areas, the peripheral territories of Slovenia, Hungary, Moldavia, Anatolia, Cyprus and the Greek Aegean and Ionian islands are also briefly discussed.”²



Figure 1

In demographic terms the Western Balkans is mostly made up of South Slavic peoples who speak closely related and mutually comprehensible languages. According to the analyst, “outside the region’s Slavic areas, Greeks, Turks, Romanians, and (perhaps to a lesser extent) Albanians have established state traditions”.³ The Balkans is commonly described as a point of intersection between the world’s major monotheistic religions – Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox branches of the Christian faith, Islam, and the remnants of what were once significant Jewish communities in urban centers such as Istanbul, Sarajevo and Thessalonica.⁴

From the perspective of political geography, “the Balkans may be defined as an integral part of greater Europe, but also as a relatively autonomous sub-region with a clear geographical outline, a distinct historical background, and a specific cultural ambience.”⁵ In its historical background, the Balkan region was full of lasting frictions and security dilemmas. Probably the most enduring associations concerning the Balkans are Balkan wars (of 1911 - 1913) as well as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo (1914), which triggered World War I. “For many decades, Westerners gazed of these lands as if on ill-charted zone separating Europe’s well-ordered civilization from the chaos of the Orient.”⁶

Generally speaking, nowadays Balkan security challenges as a whole are: “instability resulting from the transition of market economies, exacerbated by the stagnation of the region in comparison to more developed countries; and the geostrategic position of the region, located on important routes between Europe and Asia (which are routes for the transport of oil and natural gas, but also for illegal traffic in weapons, narcotics, white slavery etc., and which could also be used for movement of

various terrorist groups and to facilitate terrorist activities). During the last decade of the twentieth century, this region was the scene of various conflicts that left economic, psychological, social and other consequences. There still attempts for secession, autonomy and independence by certain ethnic groups which, in conjunction with the relatively high concentration of military capacities, makes the overall situation more complex.”⁷

Considering today's Balkan security challenges in more specific terms, several main issues can be identified. Firstly, “the Greek – Turkish relationship is an integral part of the Balkan security dilemma”⁸ (Cyprus and strategic rivalry Aegean Sea as main unresolved issues). Secondly, Balkan political frictions exist between Macedonia and Bulgaria (Bulgaria “refused to acknowledge the existence of a distinct Macedonian identity or language”⁹), as well as between Macedonia and Greece (“Athens argues that the name Macedonia was part of the Hellenic heritage, and that the symbol on the Macedonian flag is associated with Alexander the Great”¹⁰). The third issue is the unresolved Albanian question, the biggest security threat in the Western Balkans for which a solution is not insight. Albanian people live not only in Albania (Albanian: 95%)¹¹, but also in Kosovo (Albanian: 92%)¹² and neighboring Macedonia (Albanian: 25,2%)¹³, as well as in Montenegro (Albanian: 5%)¹⁴. Geographically, Albania and Kosovo are contiguous, and they merge between Macedonia and Montenegro, which could be a “natural threat” to future security in the Balkans, and therefore in Europe. According to the principle of the domino effect, the Kosovo issue launched similar ideas in Bosnia and the Serbian part of Sandzak, which makes the overall security situation more complex. This domino effect has even broader influence; it struck Georgia, which

experienced war in 2008 in its northern region of South Ossetia which strove to achieve independence comparable to Kosovo's status. The Kosovo issue is extremely important not only because of its potential to slide the entire region into chaos and likely undermine the EU, but also as an indirect threat to inspire similar aspirations around the globe.

A good part of the Balkan story is that among ten considered Balkan countries, six are NATO members (Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Croatia,¹⁵), and three are EU members as well (Greece, Romania and Bulgaria). Also, a good fact is that the rest of the countries that are positioned in the Western Balkans contemplate becoming part of NATO and the EU; these are Bosnia and Serbia, as well as states that already have the status of candidate countries for the EU membership: Montenegro, Macedonia and Croatia¹⁶. Their roads toward the EU go through NATO membership first, which is a major unifying factor for the entire region, as well as for the countries themselves. In July 2001, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina formally expressed its readiness to accept its obligations and rights in the family of Euro-Atlantic nations, and to contribute actively to collective security.¹⁷

The Necessity for a Stronger and More Decisive American Role in Europe, Particularly in Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The following analysis gives the most important background information related to the topic, as well as an answer to the question why this European issue is an American national interest, and what America should do? This is followed by an analysis of the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the proposed options for U.S. actions, which leads toward a recommendation for the best option, and finally an evaluation of possible strategic consequences for the U.S.

Background Information. The end of war in Bosnia was created by the intervention of NATO forces and strong USA “Shuttle Diplomacy” led by Richard Holbrooke during 1990s. Negotiations lasted for three hard weeks in Dayton, Ohio, and resulted in an accord which was an agreement between three Presidents (Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia) on one side, and representatives from International Community on the other side (Contact Group: USA, Russia, UK, France and Germany). This historical peace accord, which was initialed on 21 November 2005 in Dayton and signed on 14 December 2005 in Paris, is also Bosnia’s Constitution. “Based on the Contact Group Plan that gave the Federation 51 percent of territory and the Republic Srpska 49 percent, Dayton brought the fighting to the end, in itself a considerable achievement. But, as a model for reconciliation and for rebuilding a shattered society, it was and remains severely limited.”¹⁸

Implementation of Dayton is ensured and guaranteed with military forces (in the beginning NATO, currently EUFOR¹⁹), as well as with the Office of the High Representative (OHR)²⁰ of the International Community and Europe Union. Immediately after Dayton the U.S. told its European allies that they would have to carry the burden for civilian reconstruction²¹, and since 1996 the peace process has been managed by six High Representatives from various European countries. Since 2011 the OHR is in charge just for Dayton Agreement implementation, but no longer for EU issues. For these issues another institution was established: the European Union Special Representative (EUSR)²².

Generally speaking, Bosnia and Herzegovina is in a worse political position than when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed sixteen years ago.²³ Currently Bosnia

faces serious challenges, especially regarding required democratic (political) reforms that are necessary for its Euro-Atlantic integration. Constitutional reforms are the biggest and hardest changes that have to be made as preconditions for EU membership. Besides these reforms Bosnia has to resolve one remaining issue concerning immovable defense property in the country, which has to be registered as state property for use by the country's defense ministry, as a precondition for achieving a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for a Bosnian way toward NATO.²⁴ In addition to this, as of December 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina still does not have a Council of Ministry because the results from the last elections, which were in October 2010, have not been implemented at all levels. In brief, there is no progress but only stagnation in the entire country and in the case of Bosnia stagnation does not mean staging in the place, but rather going backward.

The main creator of the Dayton Agreement, Richard Holbrooke, stated that "Dayton was a good agreement on paper; it ended the war and established a single multiethnic country. But countless peace agreements have survived only in history books as case studies in failed expectations. The results of the international efforts to implement Dayton would determine its true place in history."²⁵ Holbrooke was right; the final results strongly depend on the international interventionism, which follows as its obligation from the Dayton Peace Agreement. In this regard there is a huge historical liability in place within the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)²⁶ and its Steering Board (SB).

In 2008 the International Community set so called 5 + 2 criteria, and this is defined by the PIC SB as a criterion for decision-making on OHR closure and transition.

These criteria include five objectives and two conditions, and “it remains crucial that Bosnia political leaders fully comply with the Dayton Peace Agreement avoiding any rhetoric or action that would threaten or violate the Peace Agreement”²⁷. So far Bosnia has fulfilled one condition: a Stabilization and Association Agreement was signed in June 2008, but the current political crisis in Bosnia has blocked all activities that are needed for other required reforms. Germany put itself in the leadership position at the end of 2010 when German Chancellor Angela Merkel participated in several divided talks with Bosnian politicians without any results. Her irresolute approach has left the political scene in Bosnia in an even worse position than it was before her soft initiative.²⁸ After Merkel withdrew, the situation in Bosnia has not been affected by any serious outside impact. In short, the October 2010 elections are still not implemented at all levels, and there are no signs of fulfillment of 5+2 criteria.

International Community (IC) influence is currently projected by the new head of EUSR office, Swedish Ambassador Peter Sorensen, who powerlessly tries to move the situation from impasse²⁹, while the OHR almost does nothing important in order to contribute to Bosnian knot solving³⁰. This IC pause is not result of its strategy or even part of the IC’s broader plan to give time to Bosnia for consolidation and implementation of democratic elections; it is doubtless a reflection of the IC’s weakness and lack of a clear and common strategy and common leadership.³¹ Time is essential for Bosnia, as well as for the entire region. Moreover, time is no less important for Europe and the internal problems the EU faces today. Losing time means losing momentum and dramatically decreasing chances for success.

European Issue as American National Interest. The European Union is based mainly on economic interests and it struggles with its political interests that are often very different among EU (national) state members. Its extremely complicated political structure, which has direct negative reflection on common foreign and security policy, makes the European Union vulnerable from outside as well as from inside, although the first sentence in the 2003 European Security Strategy is: "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free".³² Many authors try to explain this controversial European phenomenon. Christopher J. Fettweis suggests that Europe, unlike the U.S. ("America is at war"), has a different global threat assessment and is making rational response, with weaker military power, to a low-threat international security environment.³³ Contrary to this, Robert Kagan think that the European incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance, but also to denial, and that it is normal to try to put out of one's mind that which one can do nothing about.³⁴ Robert Kagan's thoughts apparently show Europe as an irresponsible Union. Besides these attitudes, perhaps the most important words came from Pope John Paul II, which he said in Sarajevo in 1997: "Europe took part in [the war] as a witness, but we must ask ourselves: was it always a fully responsible witness?"³⁵

This paper inclines to the conclusion that currently Europe is in the process of growing up as a Union, simultaneously facing the huge burden of numerous hot spots that threaten its economic and general security. In the Western Balkans these spots are currently: Greece as an economic crisis, Kosovo as a security crisis, and Bosnia with its internal political challenges. If Europe was irresponsible fifteen years ago during the Western Balkan War, today the problem seems to be weakness and powerlessness,

which has significant reflections on its actions. Apparently, “Europe’s inability, acting either as individual states or through the European Union, to deal effectively with the wars going on at its own front door, in the Balkans, and with other global challenges – together with the United States’ largely unchallenged preeminence from 1991 on – masked the fact that Washington needed to act in close cooperation with its allies to fulfill its global role. Europe needs U.S. support to pursue its interests and achieve its goals.”³⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski wisely summarizes the point: “Hence the essence of Europe’s gradually expanded security role can be encapsulated simply: complementarity with, but not autonomy from, America.”³⁷

Based on the U.S. role as the world’s leading power, and absent of leadership in IC and EU itself, which has a tremendously devastating impact on the policy toward the Balkans, U.S. must assume a leading position as first among equals, and help the EU to survive. America needs a stable Europe for its own good.

One of the numerous reasons the United States needs to help Europe is the fact that there are “no two economic regions that are so closely intertwined as these. The U.S. is by far the largest consumer of EU-produced goods, with 21.9 percent of the EU’s products going to the U.S. In terms of import goods, U.S. is in second place, behind China, at 12.7 percent (as of 2007). European exports constitute 18.4 percent of total American imports, and EU takes in 21.8 percent of America’s export. Both sides are thus intimately bound together through trade and overall economic development.”³⁸ Moreover, and more importantly, “economic integration served as the ‘glue’ that provided a stable basis for ongoing relations; economic lines of communication remained strong, even when political relations were disrupted”³⁹. At the same time,

among many countries in “new Europe”, Bosnia has been the most devoted and the most loyal one to the USA interests, as has been shown many times since 1995. During the war in Iraq, Bosnia sent its Armed Forces and directly supported operations in the theater, regardless of Europe’s attitude. Likewise, in 2003 Bosnia signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. about immunity, which gives Americans in Bosnia an exception from the International Criminal Tribunal, although it was contrary to EU policy which has very different orientation toward this issue. In both cases Bosnia showed that it considered the U.S. as an even closer ally than the EU.

How does all this relate to American national interest? There are four U.S. core national interests: physical security, promotion of values, stable international order and economic prosperity⁴⁰. According to this breakdown, the Bosnian issue most importantly relates to one national interest: promotion of values.

If the U.S. fails to take a leadership position in the IC, and fails to undertake strong and timely diplomatic action in order to help to create a politically stable Bosnia, the Kosovo problem can easily descend into chaos, which would have the potential to spread into the entire region. The EU is already struggling with economic recession, which threatens to disintegrate the EU and Euro-zone; such a conflict would disrupt relationships inside the EU and further threaten the survival of the EU and its monetary system. Everything indicates that the EU will not be able to solve this problem alone. In this case the situation would relate to another core American national interest: economic prosperity, because of strong economic mutual dependent between the U.S. and Europe. Furthermore, Europe would need direct American military support, which would cost far more than current strong diplomatic involvement. This likely scenario would

create a direct endangerment to stable international order and would pose a threat to U.S. physical security. In a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) strategic environment the U.S. would have to cope with the fact that its strongest ally is preoccupied with its own escalating problems.

In sum, this overall issue fits into one U.S. core national interest directly: promotion of values; in the worst case scenario it would have potential to reach the remaining three national interests: economic prosperity and stable international order (directly), and physical security (indirectly).

On the scale of intensity of interests, currently it is neither survival nor vital, but rather important⁴¹. As stated above, if the objective is unfilled, this would likely result in damage that would affect one national interest. But, in case of the worst possible scenario (escalation of conflicts in Europe, dissolution of the EU and its monetary system) it would have immediate consequences for other national interests, which bring this issue up to the higher level on the scale of intensity: vital interest.

To conclude, it follows that this European issue can effect different American interests and also can vary on the scale of intensity of interests, depending on situational development. Currently it addresses national values as an important national interest.

What Should America Do (End, Means and Ways)? Having in mind that managing this issue is in the U.S. national interest, it follows that America should take some actions. Time is crucial in this case. Stagnation does not mean just a frozen Bosnian situation, but a dangerous retrograde process that has to be stopped. As it stated above, the International Community does not have a common approach toward

this important issue, and does not have a clear leader who is in the position to accelerate the entire process.⁴² So, if the current approach to Bosnia's issue is not effective thereby it must be changed. Moreover, this must be done as quickly as possible.

Objective (End). The U.S. should take a leadership in the IC, using strong and decisive diplomacy in order to maintain a stable Bosnia that fulfills all its political requirements for continuing toward NATO and EU membership. Fulfilling this main objective, which brings Bosnia to NATO's and EU's doors (less complex issue), opens a new window of opportunity to preserve the peace in Kosovo (more complex issue) and therefore in the whole Western Balkans region. In short; solving Bosnia's political issues is the starting point on the road toward future security in the Balkans, and therefore in Europe.

Options (Ways). Given that the problem in Bosnia should be considered in the light of indispensable political changes that are set by the IC as a precondition for its Euro-Atlantic integrations, diplomatic, informational and economic means of power are appropriate tools to reach policy objective. These non kinetic means of power and potential ways (options) to employ these means in pursuit of the end (objective) are listed as follows:

Option 1: Diplomatic means of power. This option implies a more intensive American role within existing institutions in Bosnia: the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and OSCE. Members of the PIC often do not have the same attitude toward their COAs, which is directly caused by lack of leadership. For this reason the U.S. has to assert itself as a leader in this important body and as a synonym for the united West.

Otherwise the PIC, as a main pillar for the mobilization of international support for the Agreement, will be useless. The PIC would be very successful under strong leadership with a clear strategy that could be implemented together with the OHR, the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and OSCE with a decisive and united approach. At the same time, OSCE already has a U.S. Ambassador as a head of mission, so it can be the main body that could either facilitate or mediate internal political discussions, depending on how the situation develops⁴³. Everything must be followed by strong diplomatic engagements in countries that are signatories to the Dayton Agreement in order to gain their support that would encourage Bosnia's politicians to bridge current problems; this could be done with existing U.S. Embassies.

Option 2: Broader diplomatic and informational means of power. This way implies the same diplomatic approach outlined in the previous option strengthened with one new diplomatic engagement that would be established: a U.S. Special Envoy for the Western Balkans⁴⁴ (USSEWB). The USSEWB would assert U.S. interests, be supported by diplomatic activities from the option 1, and be the coordinating body for whole U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region. Simultaneously, intensive and coordinated U.S. diplomatic activities would be necessary in NATO in order to ensure Bosnian membership once the Bosnian political impasse is removed. Everything would be supported by informational means, the main role of which would be to make this process transparent, to keep public informed, and to gain public support in pursuit of the objective as well as for these diplomatic activities at home and abroad.

Option 3: Broader diplomatic, informational, and economic means of power. This way implies the use of diplomatic and informational means as described in option 2. The

most important difference would be the greater use of economic means; use of economic means would allow additional tool for smart power, provide more COAs to be considered, and would strengthen the overall position of the negotiating team.

Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability Test (FAST) for Means. All three options are based on the use of diplomatic means of national power as a main non kinetic strategic approach. Reliance on diplomatic means is a feasible proposal; the U.S. has capacities for this engagement, whether it is according to option 1, or options 2 and 3. This basic proposal is legal, ethical, and worth the cost, in other words it is acceptable. Moreover it is desirable for several reasons: it would promote values in the region where the U.S. played a key political and humane role in view of Europe's inability to effectively intervene sixteen years ago. Furthermore it would represent the completion of the job the U.S. successfully initiated in the 1990s, and most importantly it would be the cheapest way to prevent possible bigger crises and avoid the need for an eventual future military involvement.

Regarding the suitability of diplomatic means, they are more suitable in options 2 and 3 than in the first one, because of their stronger approach that makes them more decisive and gives them better chances for success.

Informational means of power in options 2 and 3 are also feasible (the U.S. has such means), acceptable (legal, ethical, and worth the cost) and suitable (helps to achieve the objective), while economic means of power are acceptable and suitable, but perhaps not feasible (having in mind current economic constraints).

Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability Test for Options. According to FAST for means, the first and second options are feasible, acceptable, and suitable, while the third option is acceptable and suitable, but not feasible.

Selection of the Best Option. Accordingly to the FAST, the second option is the most appropriate one; this option (way) currently the best support for fulfillment of the objective (end) with broader diplomatic and informational power (means).

Strategic Consequences for the U.S. Bearing in mind American national interests, it is possible to conclude that a failure to take the initiative will result in negative consequences, and vice versa, positive measures will result in positive strategic consequences.

Possible Negative Strategic Consequences – in case the U.S. does NOT take the proposed actions toward Bosnia. The EU already has tremendous internal economic problems which threaten to disassemble this community and its monetary system. In this position, with its complex political and security structure (and conglomerate of different national interests), the EU is not able to solve Balkan problems by itself. Europe was in a much better economic position during the 1990s, when Richard Holbrooke stated that “institutional structure makes it hard for Europe to use its full moral, political, and diplomatic authority in a coherent and consistent way.”⁴⁵ Although the EU has made a lot of organizational and structural changes and certain improvements since that time, the basic problem pointed by to Holbrooke remains the same.

Kosovo has huge potential to slide into chaos, which can spread through the entire region. Time is crucial and works against Bosnia and the Balkan region. Status

quo does not mean a frozen situation, but rather going backward. Losing time means losing momentum and dramatically decreasing the chances for success. In short, “doing nothing now risks a far greater and more costly involvement later”.⁴⁶

It follows that there is a huge risk for EU dissolution, which threatens to change the current international order and would have direct repercussions on U.S. economic prosperity. The strongest U.S. ally could become preoccupied by its own escalating problems and need U.S. military support. Then the U.S. would be required to stretch its efforts between Europe and other world-wide issues, which would be incomparably more costly than immediate diplomatic engagement.

Besides this, the absence of U.S. leadership in the International Community would provide an opportunity for other big players to try to insert themselves as leaders, or to have covert influence in the European region, solving problems but in a way that suits their own objectives.

Finally, bearing in mind that Bosnia and Kosovo are unfinished American jobs, and the fact that the majority populations in both areas are domestic European Muslims, lack of American action could have a negative impact upon relationships with Muslims countries. Inaction would harm these relationships that were carefully built by President Obama’s administration.

Possible Positive Strategic Consequences – in case the U.S. undertakes the proposed actions toward Bosnia. American diplomatic action, as a form of assistance to desperate Europe, would have several positive outcomes. Firstly, it would protect U.S. national interests and at the same time would reduce the need for American military intervention, which means prevention of greater cost that would be otherwise paid by

money and human lives. Secondly, it would give a greater chance to the EU to survive as a community of united European countries with a common currency. It would also help the U.S. and EU to maintain their relationship as strong military and economic allies, which are accountable and reliable to each other. Thirdly, America would demonstrate its diplomatic power and its consistency in policy, because this region is highly marked by American action during 1990s. Next, this action would keep the window open for U.S. influence in the entire region in the future, and distract and discourage other potential influencers on the region. And, finally, this action would lend huge credibility to the U.S. in its future relationships with the Muslim world, particularly sensitive issue areas such as Palestine or the Arab spring movement.

Possible Consequences In Case of U.S. Failure. Consequences in this variant would be the same negatives as in the case of a failure to take initiative. Although failure is almost not an option, in case of this situation the U.S. need not fear loss of credibility or reputation, because this issue is primarily European. But, on the other hand, it certainly does not mean that the U.S. would not receive laurels of success in case of accomplishment of the objective, which is a positive fact that certainly meets U.S. expectations.

Bosnian Accelerated NATO Membership and NATO & U.S. Physical Presence in Bosnia and the Balkans as Two Imperatives

The current Bosnian position regarding NATO is that it is invited to join the MAP, pending the resolution of a key issue concerning immovable defense property⁴⁷, so it is already close to the NATO door. Once the Bosnian political issues are removed, the country will be ready for its continuation toward NATO membership. But, this process must be accelerated because time running against entire region; even slow motion

forward means danger. As was already said, Bosnia must become part of NATO together with the other Western Balkan countries in its neighborhood. Otherwise the Bosnian economy will be damaged and internal overall tensions will grow, which would be an undesirable option bearing in mind the unsolved Kosovo issue, as well as (in this case scenario) likely growing tensions in Sandzak. Furthermore, regional security would be endangered, despite the fact that all other Western Balkan countries would be already in NATO except Bosnia. Leaving Bosnia behind others on the path toward Euro – Atlantic integration should be considered as a worst case scenario. This would be the case even if elimination of the Bosnian political impasse is removed as a precondition for further Euro – Atlantic integration. Although Bosnia in this case would still be a minor problem compared with Kosovo, both of them would be bigger issues than at present. Once again, the main cautionary fact is that losing time means losing momentum and dramatically decreasing chances for success. Hence, it follows that Bosnian accelerated NATO membership becomes as an important imperative.

Once Bosnia becomes a part of NATO together with other Western Balkan countries, their weak economies will get a chance to recover and stabilize, which will lead to a more stable security situation in the region. Equally important, new windows of opportunities will be opened in order to further strengthen not only Bosnia but also the entire region. This could include the relocation of certain parts of NATO institutions and part of the American EUCOM into Bosnia and the Western Balkan region.

This paper neither considers options nor gives suggestions as to which parts of these military institutions should be relocated, but it does offer a recommendation in the form of a general idea. The fact is that NATO and the U.S. are regionally based and

globally prepared. It follows that it does not really matter if HQs, units or educational centers are located in the Western or South-Eastern part of Europe from the point of view of effectiveness. But, it is extremely important where they are located if one looks at the issue from the Western Balkan perspective. Such a choice would demonstrate in practice European devotion toward its South-Eastern region, and American devotion to Europe, especially to so-called “new Europe” that is in fact more committed to the U.S. than “old European” countries.

In addition to this, one of the main purposes of NATO and the U.S. presence in Western Europe was to deter an external threat. Since European security today is endangered from inside rather than outside, it seems logical to relocate some parts of this military potential from the European West toward South-Eastern Europe. This would set preconditions for Western Balkan countries to continue on their political course toward EU membership.

Relocations would be mutually beneficial. It would not only bring security and economic benefits to the region, but also financial benefits to the U.S. and NATO. The entire region will be open to this idea, and will be able to offer military facilities, since the all militaries have been downsized in the last few decades and left behind numerous military locations. Furthermore, it is expected that these locations would be offered for minimal cost or even for free, depending on the requirements for their reconstruction and adaptation for new purposes. The initial cost would not be small, but bearing in mind that the labor and cost of living in Bosnia and the whole region are far cheaper than those in Western Europe, this undoubtedly would become cost effective over a longer period of time.

The American public's reaction will strongly depend on the way that it is informed about relocation, which will save money and maintain a U.S. presence in Europe with a more appropriate distribution of power and resources.

Expected Western European reaction should be "abstaining positive", heaving in mind simultaneously two opposite events: lost some jobs of civilians and private sector mainly in Germany and Belgium (Brussels) simultaneously with strengthen European South-East region in order to get more stable Europe itself.

Though these measures will draw the attention of Russia as the biggest NATO opponent, Moscow should not have serious objection or launch any severe counter reaction. The Russian reactions will occur during the process of admission of these countries into NATO, and must be alleviated by strong diplomacy. Once the entire Western Balkan region becomes part of a collective security system, the geographical gap between Western and Eastern NATO countries will be filled, and regrouping of headquarters and/or units as well as educational centers would be part a normal adaptation to the completely new situation in Europe.

In short, completion of this COA, which has for its objective to accelerate Bosnian NATO membership in order to set conditions for the simultaneous admission of all regional countries into NATO, and further strengthening Western Balkan area with a NATO and U.S. presence, would finally create preconditions for a long term solution to the Kosovo problem.

Final Considerations, Conclusion and Proposal

Before 1999, the great powers had intervened three times in the Balkans. ...These three interventions were so destructive that they that guaranteed the Balkans' relative economic backwardness, compared to the rest of Europe. And the violence that these interventions encouraged, often conflicted by one Balkan people on another, ensured the continuation of

profound civil and nationalist strife. In the West, however, these events are rarely regarded as the result of the external intervention. On the contrary, the Balkans countries are seen as culprits who force the reluctant outside powers into their unfathomable conflicts. This imagined Balkans – a world where people are motivated not by rational considerations but by mysterious congenital bloodthirstiness – is always invoked when great power seek to deny their responsibility for the economic and political difficulties that the region has suffered as a consequence of the external interference.⁴⁸

Today's political, economic and security conditions in the Western Balkans are the after effects created by the international interventions in recent history. This paper does not intent to argue over whom to blame for the Balkans overall position, or to discuss what would have happened if there was no IC intervention, but rather to state clearly that the international community has an obligation to help out in this region.

The unquestionable fact is that today the positions of Kosovo and Bosnia are shaped and created by the International Community's military, diplomatic, economic and informational means, and this is unfinished process which cannot be ended properly without outside help. Unfortunately, the IC is not capable of helping despite the fact that it has mechanisms to do so. More precisely, the IC does not have unity which leads to a lack of common strategy and common leadership, without strong and decisive approach and clear course of action.

America has left a strong foot print in this region, particularly in Bosnia and also in Kosovo, while turning over responsibilities to Europe which should carry the burden for civilian reconstruction. In the meantime Kosovo declared independence, which has led to a rise of tensions in the entire region, especially in Bosnia where coincidently all progress has been slowed down or stopped. Given that this European issue can affect different American national interests and also can vary on the scale of intensity of

interests depending on the situation, the U.S. must not look at it like at someone else's problem. It has to take some actions for moral and pragmatic reasons toward the Western Balkan crisis in order to prevent the worst case scenario: escalating conflicts in Europe, and the dissolution of the EU and its monetary system.

This paper proposes that the U.S. should take a leadership role in the IC, and use strong and decisive diplomacy in order to maintain a stable Bosnia that fulfills all political requirements for continuing toward NATO and EU membership together with other regional countries. Fulfilling this main objective, which brings Bosnia to NATO's and EU's doors (less complex issue), opens new window of opportunity to preserve the peace in Kosovo (more complex issue) and therefore in the whole Western Balkan region. Since time runs against Bosnia and the entire region, all regional countries have to become NATO members as soon as possible – their accelerated NATO membership become an important imperative. This would bring the Western Balkan new opportunities to create more secure and stable region. In order to further strengthen not only Bosnia but also the entire region the U.S. and NATO should relocate certain parts of NATO institutions and part of U.S. EUCOM into Bosnia and the Western Balkans. It would be financially cost effective and militarily desirable with tremendous positive effect on the Balkan region as a whole. Furthermore, it would be a message and demonstration in practice of European devotion toward its South-Eastern area, and American devotion to Europe, especially to "new Europe". More importantly, this will set preconditions for solving the Kosovo problem and helping Western Balkan countries on their political course toward EU membership.

Everything stated above is necessary, although not sufficient, for true stability and long-term economic recovery and its re-growth in the Balkans and in Europe as whole. In other words, it would be “a regional framework capable of promoting development, encouraging reconciliation, and sustaining peace”.⁴⁹

“Yet, if the great powers fail to seize the present opportunity by investing heavily in the region”, writes Misha Glenny, “the suffering of the Balkans will surely continue...”⁵⁰, but this time Balkans would not suffer in isolation as it did during 1990s – this time its suffering would be shared with and returned to the disunited and deeply divided creators of its current political landscape.

Endnotes

¹ Sandžak is a multi-ethnic region, bordering Kosovo to the south-east and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the west, which contains the single largest Bosniak community in the Balkans outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. In light of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Sandžak remains vulnerable to both inter- and intra-ethnic disputes, though the latter remains more problematic at present. <http://www.transconflict.com/about/where-we-work/sandzak/> (accessed December 6, 2011).

² Misha Glenny, *The Balkans*, (New York, Penguin Group, 1999), xxii.

³ Craig Nation, *War In The Balkans, 1991-2002*, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 6.

⁴ Ibid., 5.

⁵ Ibid., 6.

⁶ Glenny, *The Balkans*, xxi.

⁷ Defense White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available from <http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/defense/engwhitebook.pdf>, Internet. Accessed 3 Dec 2011.

⁸ Nation, *War In The Balkans, 1991-2002*, 317.

⁹ Ibid., 333.

¹⁰ Ibid., 334.

¹¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html> (accessed November 27, 2011).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ NATO Home Page, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm (accessed December 4, 2011).

¹⁶ EU Home Page, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (accessed December 4, 2011).

¹⁷ Defense White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available from <http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/defense/engwhitebook.pdf>, Internet. Accessed 3 Dec 2011.

¹⁸ Glenny, *The Balkans*, 651.

¹⁹ On 2 Dec 2004 the European Union launched an EU-led military operation in Bosnia (Operation "Althea"). The mission was to provide military presence in order to contribute to a safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, manage any residual aspects of the Dayton Agreement, and support the Armed Forces of Bosnia in the areas of capacity building and training. The EU currently has around 1,600 troops in the theatre that can be reinforced by troops from the NATO Mission in Kosovo (KFOR). Parallel with this, NATO HQ remains in Sarajevo, and has responsibility for the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement, and to assist Defense Reform in Bosnia and its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as to provide support to the International Criminal Tribunal. *EUFOR Home Page*, http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134 (accessed December 7, 2011).

²⁰ The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is the chief civilian peace implementation agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement designated the High Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement on behalf of the international community. He is also tasked with co-ordinating the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies operating in the Bosnia and Herzegovina. *The OHR Home Page*, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=41352 (accessed December 7, 2011).

²¹ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, (New York, Random House, 1998), 360.

²² The EU Special Representative is the lynchpin in the European Union's presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina ensuring a coordinated and coherent EU approach to building self-sustaining peace and stability by assisting the country's move beyond peace implementation towards European integration. Peter Ingemann Moesgaard Sorensen was appointed by the Council of the European Union on 18 July 2011 as EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by High Representative Catherine Ashton as Head of the Delegation of the

European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU Special Representative reports to the Council of the European Union, the inter-governmental body representing the 27 EU member states, through the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council. *Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina Home Page*, <http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/?akcija=clanak&CID=9&jezik=2&LID=24> (accessed December 7, 2011).

²³ Former U.S. Ambassador in BiH Clifford Bond stated at the Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe briefing (U.S. Helsinki Commission, July 26, 2011): “The political situation in Bosnia has been deteriorating for a number of years, but I think it’s the worst that I’ve seen it since I became involved in the country in 2001 – 2004”. *Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission Briefing Records*, http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewTranscript&ContentRecord_id=505&ContentType=B&ContentRecordType=B&CFID=71186771&CFTOKEN=33927299 (accessed December 3, 2011).

²⁴ *NATO Home Page*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49127.htm (accessed December 7, 2011).

²⁵ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 335.

²⁶ The International Community in the Bosnian case is a synonym for the Peace International Council (PIC), which was established at a Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) (following the successful negotiation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, held in London, December 1995), to mobilize international support for the Agreement. The PIC comprises 55 countries, and its most important part is The Steering Board with its members: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which is represented by Turkey.

²⁷ Five objectives that will need to be delivered by the Bosnia authorities prior to transition are: 1. Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of the Issue of Apportionment of Property between State and other levels of government; 2. Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of Defence Property; 3. Completion of the Brcko Final Award; 4. Fiscal Sustainability (promoted through an Agreement on a Permanent ITA Co-efficient methodology and establishment of a National Fiscal Council); 5. Entrenchment of the Rule of Law (demonstrated through Adoption of National War Crimes Strategy, passage of Law on Aliens and Asylum, and adoption of National Justice Sector Reform Strategy). In addition to the objectives listed above, the PIC Steering Board agrees that two conditions need to be fulfilled prior to transition: a) Signing of the SAA (Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU), and b) a positive assessment of the situation in Bosnia by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. *The OHR Home Page*, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=41352 (accessed November 10, 2011).

²⁸ “During the government formation crisis in Bosnia at the end of 2010, the office of German Chancellor Angela Merkel launched a round of talks of the constitutional reforms with the country’s political leaders, in Berlin. In light of what has since become known as a Merkel initiative, political commentators in Bosnia and beyond started to talk about the “return of Germany in Bosnia. Yet, in two separate rounds of talks completed at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 these hopes have been dashed. Not only were the negotiations fruitless, but

the performance of the Chancellor's office also produced quite a bit irritation in both Bosnia and EU. Instead of facilitating solutions, Merkel's initiative actually exacerbated the government formation crisis after the October 2010 elections." For more information see Bodo Weber, *Germany Shift of Bosnia Policy*, Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe Online 2 (July 2011), 132.,

http://www.atlanticinitiative.org/images/stories/ai/pdf/Democracy_and_Security_Vol_II_no_6-7.pdf (accessed December 7, 2011).

²⁹ More about EUSR activities is available at the *EUSR Home Page*, <http://www.eusrbih.org/> (accessed December 7, 2011).

³⁰ *The OHR Home Page*, <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp> (accessed December 7, 2011).

The High Representative does almost nothing important, although the office was granted the so called "Bonn Power" by the PIC in December 2007 in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the following issues: (1) timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common institutions; (2) interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned; (3) other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions. Such measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation.

OHR main decisions available at *The OHR Home Page*, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182#11 (accessed December 7, 2011).

³¹ Former U.S. Ambassador in BiH Clifford Bond arguing at the Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe briefing (U.S. Helsinki Commission, July 26, 2011): "There was speculation earlier this year [2011] that the EU was developing a package of sanctions to be used in response to anti-Dayton actions or efforts to block or slow Bosnia's integration into Europe. It was always unclear if an EU member-state consensus existed for such tougher measures, and apparently it does not. The U.S. must, therefore, remain actively involved in Bosnia in full partnership with the EU and its member states". http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewTranscript&ContentRecord_id=505&ContentType=B&ContentRecordType=B&CFID=71186771&CFTOKEN=33927299 (accessed December 3, 2011).

³² European Union, *A secure Europe in a better way*, December 12, 2003, 1. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2011).

³³ Christopher J. Fettweis, "Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy," Taylor and Francis Online, (September-October 2011): 319.

Fettweis, Christopher J. "Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy." *Comparative Strategy* 30, no. 4 (September-October 2011): 316-332. <http://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.usawcpubs.org/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2011.605020> (accessed December 3, 2011).

³⁴ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, (New York: Knopf, 2003), 32.

Christopher J. Fettweis also takes this Kaplan's thoughts in his article (see note 33) to show opposite attitudes between he and Kagan.

³⁵ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 21.

³⁶ Beate, "Asymmetric Interdependence", 49.

³⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, (New York, Basic Books, 2004), 106.

³⁸ Beate Neuss, "Asymmetric Interdependence: Do America and Europe Need Each Other?" *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2009, 51.

³⁹ Ibid., 53.

⁴⁰ United States Army War College, *National Security Policy and Strategy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2011, 112.

⁴¹ Ibid., 114.

⁴² "The involvement of the European Union in the Bosnian crisis has been limited by the complex process of the harmonization of common foreign policy positions within the Union, but also by the particular interests of some of its members and indifference on the part of others. The announcement of European sanctions for leaders "whose activities undermine sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, and the international character of Bosnia and Herzegovina or threaten the Dayton Peace Agreement" is encouraging, but without a common EU strategy in Bosnia it is clear that existing limitations relativize their usability. It seems that the political challenges generated within the little over 50,000 square kilometers, among less than four million inhabitants, determine the extent of desired but yet unreachable foreign policy cohesion in Europe."

Vlado Azinovic, *The Allure of Analogy, Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe* Online 2 (July 2011): 6, http://www.atlanticinitiative.org/images/stories/ai/pdf/Democracy_and_Security_Vol_II_no_6-7.pdf (accessed December 8, 2011).

"The West will succeed together or fail together in Bosnia. No single actor, even a theoretically united EU, can succeed alone. Only the united West – the EU, U.S., Turkey, Japan and Canada – can restore the necessary stability to allow for progression toward a functioning Bosnia, and the U.S. is what bonds the United West. Time is of the essence."

Kurt Baasuener, *Only U.S. Engagement Can Pull Bosnia Back From the Brink*, *Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe* Online 2 (July 2011): 10, http://www.atlanticinitiative.org/images/stories/ai/pdf/Democracy_and_Security_Vol_II_no_6-7.pdf (accessed December 8, 2011).

⁴³ The OSCE is the institution in Bosnia that naturally imposes itself in terms of its engagement in order to stabilize the situation in Bosnia. Among many proposals about the OSCE and what it should do, see Edward P. Joseph arguing about the OSCE mission and its coordinating role in the process of accelerated Bosnian NATO membership in his article: "What to Do About Bosnia and Herzegovina?: The Case for Accelerated NATO Membership and

OSCE Coordination of Constitutional Reform”, U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina.pdf> (accessed November 10, 2011). He sees OSCE role on the way that U.S. diplomats and experts and their European Counterparts conduct quiet, direct diplomacy with the parties in Bosnia, outside the public (pg 18), which is one possible way that this paper does not support.

⁴⁴ Former U.S. Ambassador in BiH Clifford Bond explained exactly the same idea at the Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe briefing (U.S. Helsinki Commission, July 26, 2011): “For the part of the United States, I recommend that it reconsider an idea that originated here on Capitol Hill just a few years ago. This is the appointment of a special representative or envoy for the Western Balkans. The U.S. team working on Bosnia is extraordinarily dedicated and competent. But a solution of Bosnia’s complex political problems will require better coordination not just between Washington and Brussels but between Washington and the many EU member-state capitals, as well as regional actors like Turkey and Russia. If possible, such an envoy should work in tandem with a European counterpart to develop a more proactive approach in Bosnia. Such a position would be a full-time job, and it cannot be done by someone with broader responsibilities sitting in Washington. I know, personally, that there is very strong support for this idea among old Bosnia-hands, both in the United States and in Europe.” http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewTranscript&ContentRecord_id=505&ContentType=B&ContentRecordType=B&CFID=71186771&CFTOKEN=33927299 (accessed December 3, 2011).

Kurt Bassuener also discusses about the need for an American role in Bosnia and proposes an American special envoy for the Western Balkans who would be a complement to EUSR and OHR, in his article “Unfinished Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What Is To Be Done?”, U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing, pg 14. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/Unfinished%20Business%20in%20Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina.pdf> (accessed November 10, 2011).

⁴⁵ Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 332.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 42.

⁴⁷ NATO Home Page, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49127.htm (accessed December 6, 2011).

⁴⁸ Glenny, *The Balkans*, 662.

⁴⁹ Nation, War In The Balkans, 366.

⁵⁰ Glenny, *The Balkans*, 662.