

Effective Termination of Conflict: Perspectives From 1847 and 2003

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

EFFECTIVE TERMINATION OF CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES FROM 1847 AND 2003

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ABSTRACT

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This research project examines the war with Mexico in 1846-48 and the insurgency that arose and was quickly quelled. American commander Winfield Scott implemented a strategy that prevented the insurgency from exploding into a disaster, thus preserving the fruits of victory. This paper reviews what he did in order to seal the achievements of the conventional campaigns in Mexico by preventing a descent into the chaos of an insurgency. Based on this examination there are many parallels American planners could have considered that may have prevented the development of the insurgency in Iraq in 2003. Further, strategic leaders of the future could use these considerations to prevent insurgency from rising at the conclusion of a successful conventional campaign

EFFECTIVE TERMINATION OF CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES FROM 1847 AND 2003

The decision to write about Winfield Scott's campaign to Mexico City in 1847-48 arose from a term paper one of my young cadets at the United States Air Force Academy wrote for my Introduction to Military Theory and Strategy class. In the paper Cadet Michael Schertz presented a thorough overview of General Scott's brilliant conventional operation and he asked the question, how was Scott able to prevent a substantial insurgency from starting in Mexico? From this question grew a provocative thesis: had military planners in 2003 examined what Scott did to quell the nascent Mexican insurgency in 1847 then perhaps our forces might have duplicated the feat in Iraq. I was stunned by the premise of his well-written paper and wondered if there were some important considerations that could have saved our forces some grief in 2003. Further, I did not realize that the Mexican War had spawned an insurgency since the focus on historiography of the conflict hones in on the major battles and campaigns. However, as I began to research the subject I discovered that indeed there was a significant insurgency that threatened to spin out of control, thereby negating the earlier success of the United States Army and Navy in conventional operations.¹ This raised the question, what did General Scott do to successfully terminate the war while achieving the strategic ends of the United States?

The Mexican War was characterized by three distinct conventional operations. The first took place in what is today California, New Mexico, and Arizona. The others took place in northeastern and central Mexico. In two of the three operational zones a virulent insurgency germinated as United States troops passed through and occupied key areas of the country. The insurgency was both a spontaneous rising in local areas

and a sponsored insurgent campaign carried out as an auxiliary operation of the regular Mexican army. The American conventional campaigns were designed to extract territorial concessions from Mexico in order to fulfill America's 'Manifest Destiny' to become a continental nation. When the campaigns in northern Mexico failed to coerce the expected concessions from the Mexican government, it forced the administration of President James K. Polk to launch a third operation into central Mexico under General Scott directed at the political and cultural heart of the country, the capital of Mexico City. As the war extended in time and space the insurgency began to grow, placing the under-sized United States forces in a difficult situation.² Yet within months of accomplishing the major objectives the United States was able to conclude an agreement with the Mexican government that successfully terminated the war with all goals secured. How did the United States and General Scott succeed?

This paper will examine General Scott's campaign in central Mexico focusing on his counter-insurgency (COIN) operation. It will seek to determine the elements of his COIN strategy that enabled the United States Army to quell the Mexican insurgency to facilitate termination of the war in a manner favorable to the United States. In the process, it will discuss what concepts the strategic planner might have considered in Iraq, and finally, if those items have relevance for the future. Our review will begin with the strategic setting and then provide a survey of Scott's campaign. It will then analyze the Iraq campaign of 2003 before wrapping up with the important elements of a full spectrum strategy that could facilitate future strategic planning.

Why a War with Mexico?

The war with Mexico in 1846-48 had its roots in the dream of Manifest Destiny, which was articulated – though not expressly named – early in the 19th century by

various politicians. President Thomas Jefferson generated the American quest for expansion across the continent when he stated in his 1801 inaugural address that the United States should secure the lands to the west in order “to provide room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and ten thousandth generation.”³ Within two years Jefferson began to act upon the dream of expansion when he concluded the Louisiana Purchase, thus more than doubling the territory of the United States. His vision of a continental nation is clearly visible in his instructions to Captain Meriwether Lewis before his explorations with partner Captain William Clark in 1803. In his letter Jefferson tells Lewis that “the object of your mission is to explore the Missouri River . . . by its course and communication with the water of the Pacific Ocean [as] may offer the most direct and practicable water communication *across the continent*, for the purposes of commerce.”⁴ What Jefferson envisioned was a United States that spanned the continent from Atlantic to Pacific in order to propagate population growth and commercial expansion.

The restless population of the United States followed the lead of Jefferson over the course of the next several decades as Americans pushed westward. This seemingly unstoppable desire to spread across the continent and assume control of the land inevitably caused friction, first with the native Americans and later with the Mexicans, as unruly, uncouth Americans began to encroach on Mexican territory. Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821 and the country had a vast territory of its own extending from Central America in the south to what is today the American southwest – including Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, parts of Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and California. Much of that land lay empty and devoid of human improvement, a reality

that prompted the Mexican government to invite American settlers into some of its northern territories, especially Texas. Immigrants from the United States poured in during the second decade of the nineteenth century, searching for cheap land and economic prosperity. But the pressure exerted by the migration west alarmed Mexican authorities because Americans had different conceptions of enterprise, government, and culture.⁵

In 1835 President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna dissolved the old constitution, assumed dictatorial power, and immediately revoked the citizenship of the Texans of American descent. He ruled that no more Americans were welcome to immigrate to Mexico. Then, fearful following the sack of the unruly Mexican town of Zacatecas in May 1835 by Mexican troops, the Texans decided that resistance was the only way to protect their interests. The result was armed conflict between the American Texans and Santa Anna's forces and tension between Mexico and the United States. In 1835 American settlers in Texas rebelled against the Mexican government when it attempted to expel them by force. After a year and a half the plucky Americans in Texas captured Santa Anna in the culminating battle of San Jacinto and declared independence from Mexico. This did not end the controversy, however. Texas was now an independent "republic" controlled by former American citizens clamoring for admission to the Union. The United States was more than willing to consider admission of Texas as a state but had to think carefully about the diplomatic and domestic ramifications. Americans, especially in the South, would continue to cast a covetous eye toward the Texas Republic and beyond.⁶

By 1844 the United States and most European powers recognized Texas as an independent state. However, the Mexican government refused to accept a new nation to the north and when the United States sought to annex Texas with an offer to compensate, Mexico broke off diplomatic relations. Compounding the dispute was Texas' acceptance of the United States offer for statehood through annexation in 1845. Tensions hit a fever pitch when new President James K. Polk authorized a small army under Major General Zachary Taylor to advance to the Rio Grande River to establish that waterway as the boundary between Texas and Mexico. This action prompted a Mexican military response.⁷ Although these events precipitated the war they were not necessarily the underlying causes, which were more complicated.

The movement of Americans westward represented the physical manifestation of what was now becoming known as Manifest Destiny. James K. Polk came to the presidency as a Jacksonian Democrat and as such was steeped in the desire to expand United States territory westward. As he assumed office he began to articulate a policy to acquire Mexico's northwest territories. Polk stated in his inaugural address that "the world beholds the peaceful triumphs of the industry of our emigrants [those Americans moving west]. To us belongs the duty of protecting them adequately wherever they may be upon our soil." This kind of rhetoric emanating from the nation's leaders encouraged more Americans to migrate west and make the country contiguous from Atlantic and Pacific and from the Canadian border (along the 49th parallel) through California. In addition to this clear objective Polk went further in laying out a number of national security and economic goals, all designed to solidify any acquisitions. These included protection of the southwest frontier, the safety of the port of New Orleans, gaining

control of the ports on the California coast, opening trade with Asia, and facilitating cross-continental trade in goods not available between the east and west. To secure all of this without bringing on a war Polk attempted to offer a substantial monetary package “of fifteen or twenty millions, but . . . was ready to pay forty millions.”⁸ However, the arrogant manner in which the offer was made caused the insulted Mexican government to summarily reject it and hardened Mexican attitudes into a desire to reacquire Texas by force.⁹ With a substantial American force on the Rio Grande, in territory claimed by Mexico, the stage was set for an explosion that would result in war.

In mid-April 1846 matters came to a head when the commander of Mexican forces on the south side of the Rio Grande demanded that American forces on the other side withdraw to north of the Nueces River. General Taylor, who had positive orders to maintain his position, refused in no uncertain terms stating that “[I] wish it understood that I shall by no means avoid such an alternative” to fight.¹⁰ Taylor considered the ultimatum a virtual declaration of war and reported such to the President who in turn sought a congressional declaration acknowledging a state of war. Yet while Congress debated, the Mexican army took to the field on 1 May 1846, and within a week actual hostilities took place at Palo Alto making war with Mexico a fact. On 11 May 1846 Congress handed the President a declaration of war authorizing him to take action to win the conflict already underway in Mexico.

The Polk Administration originally envisioned a limited war with Mexico and through the Secretary of War William Marcy established several concise military objectives. Once the conflict commenced the Secretary initiated a two-pronged strategy designed to attain specific objectives and to limit the war to a certain magnitude in terms

of resource and financial expenditure. First, Marcy instructed Zachary Taylor with his small army of 4,000 men to launch an immediate offensive into northeast Mexico in order to secure a zone that would make all United States claims to Texas beyond doubt and discourage attempts at reacquisition. This secure zone could then be used as a bargaining chip in future conflict termination negotiations. Second, Marcy ordered Colonel Stephen A. Kearny to take the offensive with his tiny force of a little over 1,000 dragoons and Missouri volunteers to occupy the sparsely populated area of today's New Mexico, Arizona, and California. With an American force in control of this coveted area – and the small Mexican population – it was hoped that the Mexicans would relinquish it in the negotiating process. Further, the Polk Administration believed that once United States forces had defeated the Mexican army in the field in these regions the Mexican government would quickly lose the will to fight: “[A] peace must be conquered in the shortest space of time practicable.”¹¹ This would allow the Administration to limit military recruiting and the necessary financial outlays to support an army. Thus, Polk hoped to economize the venture before it could affect fickle American public opinion, especially in New England, where the conflict was largely viewed as a war concocted to expand slavery and southern interests. Even with such careful calculations, as in most wars, the will of the enemy dramatically changed the scope and nature of the conflict.




Figure 1. The Mexican theater of war in 1846-1848. Source: Mexican-American War Overview Map (<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlas/mexican%20war/mexican%20war%20index.htm>)

Within months of launching the two-pronged offensive the United States Army had secured all of the prescribed military objectives. Taylor defeated a Mexican army more than twice his size on multiple occasions enroute to Monterrey and Kearny had conducted an arduous campaign that did, in fact, secure the southwest. However, the twin operational successes did not provide the desired strategic effect within the Mexican government. On the contrary, Mexican resolve hardened in the desire to destroy the invader. As a result, the Mexican national authorities developed a program of guerrilla warfare to support their regular forces in the field, which one junior officer correctly noted was a way for the Mexicans to preserve their force while weakening the Americans.¹² The Mexicans were only successful in bringing this to fruition in northeast

Mexico against Taylor's little army, but it was enough to force the Polk Administration to widen the conflict and reconsider the strategic context. On the 19 September 1846 Polk realized that he had to reenergize the stalled war effort in order to win.¹³

Scott Enters the Scene

Major General Winfield Scott was the commanding general of the United States Army in 1847 and arguably its most prominent leader. Yet Scott came to the service in a rather unorthodox manner. Born in Virginia in 1786, Scott was from a middle class family that lived in the tidewater region. Scott's widowed mother bestowed in him and his three siblings a sense of strong will and determination to succeed. His mother died when Scott was only seventeen, but left him with enough means to attend college – first in Richmond and later at William and Mary – and gain a classical education. Scott chose to train as a lawyer, which he deemed the best “road to political advancement.”¹⁴ In addition to his education in the law, Scott also took a liking to philosophy, military history, and egalitarian political ideas. This is significant in that Scott would apply much of what he learned through his civilian education to planning and preparation of the campaign to Mexico City. Elements of his critical thinking emerge vividly in his general orders and the foundation was established at the College of William and Mary.

Scott's military career began when President Jefferson issued a call for militia and an expansion of the regular army as a result of British encroachment on American sovereignty during the Napoleonic Wars. Fired by patriotism and the opportunity to obtain a commission, Scott personally called on Jefferson. He was later commissioned a captain in the light artillery in May 1808 and thus began a career that reached a pinnacle in Mexico City forty years later.¹⁵

His formal education combined with a myriad of experiences between 1808 and the war with Mexico produced a leader of uncommon quality in Scott. His baptism by fire came during the War of 1812 when he demonstrated a talent for training and motivating troops. In the Niagara country in 1814 Scott's opponents were astounded by the precision and élan of his brigade under fire. One redcoat exclaimed that the British troops were not fighting militia, they were in fact up against "Regulars, by God!"¹⁶ This great compliment was a testament to Scott's skill as a commander and, more importantly, the ability to impose discipline. This key element of military excellence would prove essential to quelling the insurgency that would rise in Mexico City some decades in the future.

After the war Scott embarked on a regimen of self-study that would serve him well in Mexico. Military history titles were at the top of his list of books. He continued to study the subject throughout his life and had a special affinity for Frederick the Great, Marshal de Saxe, and Napoleon. In July 1815 Scott sailed for Europe as an official representative of the United States and was able to conduct some firsthand studies of famous European campaigns including some from the recently concluded Napoleonic Wars. As a result, he internalized much from his travels and self-study that he would use in developing a series of tactical manuals for the United States Army.¹⁷ This would become *de facto* doctrine for the army that would deploy to Mexico.

Significantly, Scott also paid close attention to the need for good civil-military policy by an occupying army. Specifically, hints of Napoleon's maxims 70 and 110 come through in his policy for the occupation of Mexico. They state that "justice and leniency in suppressing or preventing disturbances" is key to maintaining order in an

occupied country. Further, the occupying army should push to maintain “the responsibility of local governments and the method of organization and administration” for the purpose of seamless, continuous rule of law. Scott also owned a copy of the three volume *History of the Peninsular War* by Sir William Napier where he noted Napoleon’s unmitigated failure to quell the insurgency in Spain in contradiction of his own maxims.¹⁸ These texts helped inform Scott’s mind as he formulated strategy for Mexico and constituted the professional development of a soldier’s intellect.

Another key factor in the development of Scott’s thinking as a strategist was his background in the realm of politics. He had varied experiences across a wide spectrum of issues as a general. First, he served as an emissary representing President Andrew Jackson during the Nullification Crisis in South Carolina in 1832. Here he nimbly combined carrot and stick to both soothe passions and cajole malcontents simultaneously. His role in defusing the fiery dispute helped to delay the sectional crisis from reaching a fever pitch for many years. His participation in the antebellum Indian Wars infused Scott with an understanding of insurgency and his time in the mid-1830s directing the war against the Seminoles in Florida proved invaluable in developing his thinking about pacification. Although he made many mistakes, he came away with a firm basis for dealing with insurgency through disciplined and “courteous” troop employment and encouraging tribes to “oversee” their own affairs within U.S. law. Finally, in 1839 Scott was appointed by President Van Buren to serve as his soldier-diplomat in the Canadian border crisis in Michigan and the Niagara region. Here, Scott adeptly negotiated with the British government of Canada for the prosecution of a group of criminals who had terrorized Americans along the border while preventing those

affected by the incursions from taking revenge that could have sparked an all-out war. For this service he earned the sobriquet the “Great Pacificator”, but more importantly his storehouse of knowledge was building to a level that would serve him well later.¹⁹

With the war in Mexico stalled by the summer of 1846 Scott began to develop a plan that would break the stalemate and achieve the political ends laid out by the President. It aimed to “conquer a peace” by focusing on the political and military heart of the Mexican regime centered on Mexico City. In a series of letters to Secretary of War Marcy, Scott outlined a new strategy to win the war. First, Mexico City – representing the Mexican center of gravity – was the primary objective. To achieve this, Scott called for an amphibious landing at Veracruz almost 200 miles east of the capital followed by an overland march on the city. Second, this landing had to occur in the early months of 1847 before the yellow fever season arrived – called the *vomito* by the Mexicans – which would ravage an army moving through Mexico’s tropical zone. Third, a landing could only take place at Veracruz because it offered the best port for logistical support from the Navy and the most direct route to Mexico City, facilitating Scott’s imperative for speed. Fourth, the cooperation of the Navy was essential for the landing on the coast and procurement of special boats required for transport. Finally, Scott proposed to command this expedition personally with an army of 10,000 men with another 10,000 designated to reinforce the initial wave.²⁰ Here was a bold plan that would cut directly to the vital center of the Mexican government, but this was only half of Scott’s scheme.

Integral to Scott’s conventional strategy was his more obscure, but no less vital plan to quell an insurgency before it began. This plan was embodied in General Order

Number 20 dated 19 February 1847 along with several later addendums. Shortly before the amphibious landing, Scott personally drew up the order that would set the tone for conduct of the army moving through Mexico. In it he set strict standards for discipline of the army in order to prevent depredations against Mexican civilians and their property. Included in a list of protected places were “Churches, cemeteries . . . and religious buildings.” By noting the importance of religion and specifically the Catholic Church, Scott demonstrated a great understanding of the culture of Mexico. By paying respect to the Church, Scott was recognizing the enormous power it wielded in Mexican society. If he could leverage this institution it would go a long way toward maintaining the stability of the country, thus preventing widespread insurgency. Further, his initial order mandated that any offenses committed by soldiers or Mexican civilians would result in the composition of a military commission that would conduct a court to try offenders publicly. The purpose of the commissions was to demonstrate to the Mexican people that Americans had not come for the purpose of plunder. The United States Army was accountable to the rule of law and this would encourage the people to remain home rather than lashing out at unruly troops.²¹ After the landing at Veracruz, Scott would issue the order along with several appendices to reinforce the base plan. The orders covered a wide range of subjects to further diminish the possibility of an insurgency breaking out. These covered such topics as clearing garbage from the streets, soldiers making purchases on the local economy, and retaining local government officials and police in their positions. Combined together, these measures formed the basis for a proactive program to quell insurgency before it could get off the ground. These orders

represented prescient thinking about what could happen on the part of Scott. This would prove fortuitous in terminating the conflict favorably for the United States.

The Campaign to Mexico City

The thrust to take Mexico City began on 9 March 1847 with the first-ever United States Army amphibious landing at the coastal city of Veracruz. In consonance with Scott's plan of campaign the army executed a rapid advance inland after a short siege that witnessed the surrender of the Mexican garrison of the city. Key to success in the campaign was moving past the coastal lowlands before the *vomito* season, which would decimate the army. Veracruz fell on 27 March 1847 and within a week Scott's army was on the march down Mexico's National Highway. The Mexican army, twice the size of the American force, was soundly defeated at Cerro Gordo on 13 April 1847 and the next day Scott had the army pressing forward again. This successfully accomplished Scott's imperative to clear the lowlands by the onset of the disease season. By 15 May the army arrived at Puebla, which was less than sixty miles from Mexico City. Within sixty days Scott's little army of veteran regulars and enthusiastic volunteers had penetrated 120 miles into the Mexican heartland, fought and won two tough battles, and was poised to make the final stab on the capital.²² However, several problems arose at this point forcing the Americans to take an operational pause.

The reason for the halt at Puebla was three-fold. First, the distance from the coast began to stretch the tenuous American line of supply and communication to the breaking point. A 19th century army generally had to operate within about 100 miles of its supply base in order to maintain an acceptable logistical situation. The army by May had plunged well over 100 miles from Veracruz and the Navy, which was supporting Scott's force. Second, Mexican guerrillas – described by American leaders as

rancheros or *banditos*, literally “ranchers” and “bandits” – were beginning to raid Scott’s rickety supply line. These terms were used derisively to deny the Mexican guerrillas legitimate combatant status. If these persons were branded as bandits and murderers it would enable the US Army to place them outside the law in the eyes of the general Mexican population, which frowned on lawlessness.²³ In order to subsist for the remainder of the campaign and eliminate the opportunity for guerrillas to hit isolated targets, Scott made the decision to cut his tether with the coast and live off the land. In so doing, the army would pay for their food which would build credibility with the Mexican people; this would contrast favorably with the behavior of the *rancheros* who generally stole their subsistence. The abundant region around Puebla would therefore suffice to support his army for the final thrust to the capital and build a trust with the people.²⁴ Third, several volunteer regiments’ enlistments were about to expire and replacements were not yet close to arriving. This forced Scott to consider how to execute his next move in the campaign to Mexico City.²⁵ His sojourn in Puebla would drag on for almost three months as he awaited promised reinforcements, but during that time Scott was able to implement and enforce all the auspices of G.O. #20 while adding a couple of addendums as necessary to fit the situation.

The message of G.O. #20 was intended not just for the troops, but also the Mexican populace. Central in promulgating it was a demonstration that the United States Army was a disciplined force that did not intend to destroy or subjugate Mexican society. Scott used the order to make it known to all that Mexicans must manage Mexican affairs, and integral to this was the maintenance of law and order.²⁶ The ultimate purpose of the order was thus to prevent an insurgency by leveraging the

population on the side of the United States before it had a chance to gain any momentum. Indeed, an insurgency threatened to derail the campaign soon after the army departed Veracruz. Sergeant Thomas Barclay of the 2nd Pennsylvania Infantry reported in his journal that “Guerrillas were very troublesome, particularly at the National Bridge,” a key chokepoint on the route to Mexico City.²⁷ At each major town along the way to the capital Scott reissued the order to the Mexican population. By the time the army reached Puebla it had become standard operating procedure for the army commander to establish G.O. #20 as the manner by which US troops and the Mexican populace would interact. This simple three-page order served as the centerpiece of an insurgency prevention effort that precluded an all-out insurgency from coming to fruition. Thus the guerrillas were never able to do much more than harass the US Army.²⁸

The “Eight Steps”

In addition to G.O. #20 Scott adeptly implemented several other practical measures – that I deem the eight steps – designed to maintain order. First, Scott declared martial law to ensure that there was no breakdown of society. Second, Scott personally demonstrated respect for the Catholic Church by attending divine services at Veracruz soon after its fall, which was central to Mexican society and a source of power.²⁹ By paying deference to the Church, Scott was able to enlist a powerful ally in preventing and limiting an insurgency and eventually terminating the war, as the general Mexican population was strongly deferential to its religious leaders. Third, Scott facilitated an information operation whose main message was that the guerrilla activity represented lawlessness and therefore was a threat to all Mexicans. Painting the guerrillas in a negative light combined with the support of the Church served to place the *rancheros* outside the mainstream of society. Next, Scott retained most Mexican

government officials in their positions – as he did at Puebla – so there was not a vacuum created by the toppling of the recognized leaders of Mexican civil society. He even attended the funeral of a Mexican colonel who fell at Cerro Gordo “much to the satisfaction of the people.” Thus, Scott formed a partnership with the political leaders to allow the army to concentrate on the Mexican Army rather than worrying about controlling the populace.³⁰ Together these elements formed the civil aspects of the insurgency prevention strategy, but this was only part of what Scott implemented.

There is evidence that many in the ranks understood the criticality of Scott’s approach. Sergeant Thomas Barclay of Company E, 2nd Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry was a well-educated lawyer from western Pennsylvania who enlisted to fight in Mexico in the exciting days following the declaration of war. His journal is filled with incisive observations, including the importance of a conciliatory tone while operating in enemy country. Barclay wrote that “every man of common sense knows that we should conciliate as well as fight and prevent by every possible means arousing the Mexican nation.”³¹ While there were certainly those in the ranks who desired the army to come down hard on the Mexican population, soldiers like Barclay represented a dependable core that would carry out Scott’s intent admirably.

A full strategy also required an aggressive military pillar. The first element here – and fifth among the eight steps – was the development of an intelligence network. To make this work Scott turned to his trusted subordinate and friend Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allan Hitchcock. The venerable Hitchcock was the grandson of the Revolutionary War hero Ethan Allan, leader of the Green Mountain Boys. Hitchcock would prove a capable counter-insurgency operator in Mexico. Upon receipt of Scott’s directive

Hitchcock organized a “spy company” recruited largely from the very criminal elements – or “Rascals” as one young officer called them – that were harassing the lines of communication. The army had captured many *rancheros* over the course of the campaign and here was Hitchcock’s recruiting pool. To induce these men to work for the American army Hitchcock was authorized to pay \$20 a month to each man. This amount being over twice what an American private earned was all that was necessary to encourage them to join the company. The band not only provided a solid source of intelligence, but it also took many potential enemies off the street while providing an additional form of force protection for the army. This ingenious idea proved instrumental in keeping guerrilla bands off-balance while securing the ability of the army to operate relatively unfettered.³²

The next element of Scott’s military plan was the designation of a hard-hitting counter-guerrilla force. For this mission Scott turned to the commander of the 3rd United States Infantry Regiment, Colonel C. F. Childs. The purpose of this mobile unit was to harass *rancheros*, keep them from being able to attack at will, and destroy isolated enemy detachments. Further, Scott used a convoy escort system for movement of vulnerable wagon trains and even employed the Mexican spy company, the ‘Rascals’, as a command escort.³³ Although the enemy guerrillas were able to annoy the army from time to time, they were never effective enough to stop the advance toward Mexico City.

Finally, Scott developed a partnership with the Mexican police. A key to maintenance of civil order is competent indigenous police. Scott fully recognized this from his self-study and previous experience and therefore established as standard

procedure for the army to retain the local police of all municipalities. Further, “for the ease and safety of both [Mexicans and Americans] parties . . . the Mexican police shall be . . . duly harmonized with the military police.”³⁴ This policy further allowed the American army to concentrate its efforts on the Mexican army instead of worrying about the Mexican population nipping at them from the rear.

The cumulative effect of Scott’s prescient eight step counter-insurgency strategy was to maintain civil order, undermine Mexican military strategy, and enable the army to accomplish its operational objectives. Most important, the strategy facilitated conflict termination because the United States Army won the competition for support of the Mexican people – each element was designed to demonstrate American competence and goodwill. This drew a stark contrast with the ineptness of the Mexican senior leadership and haphazard guerrilla operations, which gave the Americans an insurmountable advantage over their adversaries.³⁵ The net result was winning the war.

After a nearly three month sojourn in Puebla, which allowed Scott to gather strength, his army began the final thrust to Mexico City. By mid-August the army was at the gates of the Mexican capital. In a series of hard-fought battles, including Contreras and Churubusco, Scott brilliantly outflanked the larger Mexican army by crossing the lava flow area known as the Pedregal. The Mexican army under Santa Anna believed the region was impassable and therefore arrayed its forces enmasse at other locations. When the Americans debouched southwest of Mexico City the Mexicans hastily shifted forces to meet the unexpected threat. However, disharmony and over-centralization of the Mexican command hierarchy resulted in sharp defeats, forcing Santa Anna back to the gates of the capital. Then on 13 September 1847 Scott launched the final assault

on the citadel of Chapultepec, which protected the southern approaches to Mexico City. Following a punishing engagement, the Americans entered the castle and a demoralized Mexican army melted away leaving Mexico City to the victorious Americans.³⁶

While the US Army had won a great victory over the conventional army of Mexico, the war was not yet won. In fact, this was the pivotal moment of the entire campaign. If the army mishandled the occupation of Mexico City then the war could still be lost. Scott was in the heart of a nation of seven million people with a mere 10,000 men. He quickly assessed that the potential for a slide into chaos was far too great to rest on the laurels of his recent victories. Therefore, on 17 September 1847 Scott published General Order No. 287, which was an updated version of G.O. #20 with “important additions.”³⁷ Scott’s ability to anticipate what could go wrong proved prophetic, but more important was his competence at implementing sound policies to tamp down any insurgency, thus sealing the conventional victory.

Shortly after occupying the city many Mexicans became unruly, goaded on by Santa Anna and his leading sympathizers – who had eluded capture. First, the lower classes began sacking unguarded locations around the city, including the presidential palace. Next, Santa Anna ordered all the prisons emptied so that all the criminals of Mexico City freely plied the streets in search of mischief. Third, the Mexican leader ordered his remaining loyal soldiers to conduct harassing raids around the city and against scattered American detachments as irregulars.³⁸ However promising these measures initially appeared, within a matter of days the efforts fell flat.

Scott was ready for Santa Anna's irregular tactics and by earlier issuing his G.O. #287 had fully anticipated the attempt to step up insurgent activity. To begin with, the army increased the number of patrols to maintain security in partnership with the Mexican police, which accomplished two objectives: it halted looting and helped to round up the released convicts. Second, irregular raiding was a complete failure as the scattered attempts to harass the city only irritated the people. The frustrated irregulars, unable to achieve success against the Americans, turned on the vulnerable among the people. This in turn angered the general population in and around Mexico City, who then looked for help from the American army and legitimate Mexican authorities, which Scott had left in place.³⁹

Scott also promulgated a plan to reconcile Mexican prisoners captured on the battlefield. In the 19th century it was traditional to parole prisoners because of the difficulty involved with supporting them logistically in addition to the burdens of keeping the army supplied. However, parolees frequently broke the terms by quickly rejoining the enemy army or irregular bands. To prevent this from occurring, Scott came up with an ingenious idea. He decided to capitalize on his understanding of the role of the Catholic clergy by inducing all Mexican parolees to promise "before God our Lord on this Holy Cross" that the captured soldier would not take up arms again.⁴⁰ In so doing, Scott leveraged the faith of average Mexicans to prevent the army and auxiliary bands from obtaining a ready source of manpower.

As the populace observed these efforts along with the American army working to restore order, they quickly threw their support behind the American occupiers. Ramon Alcaraz, an eyewitness to the occupation, noted in his history that the Mexican press,

which Scott allowed to publish freely, editorialized in support of American security operations. The Mexican newspaper *Eco del Comercio* openly espoused peace with the United States.⁴¹ With support of the people and the press solidly behind the American efforts, the army was able to implement a relatively orderly occupation that facilitated peace negotiations with the interim Mexican central government.

Stability Operations Around Mexico City

An uneasy calm settled over the country going into the fall of 1847. This atmosphere provided the backdrop for Mr. Nicholas Trist, the American diplomatic envoy, to begin peace talks with the Mexicans. Mr. Trist had arrived to take up his post as President Polk's peace negotiator when the army was in Jalapa. Unfortunately, Trist's arrival was not auspicious by any means. Scott initially viewed Trist with derision and anger as he believed that his presence with the army as the government's emissary represented a slight to his authority. He fired off a series of acerbic letters to Secretary Marcy defending his prerogatives as commanding general. Trist threatened to derail the entire campaign according to Scott. Only the near death of Trist by yellow fever repaired the relationship between the two men. In a commendable display of compassion Scott supervised the provision of medical care that saved Trist's life.⁴² From that point forward the two established a warm relationship that proved an essential element to terminating the conflict in a satisfactory manner. Establishing this partnership between the senior civilian and the military commander was fortuitous for the achievement of American strategic objectives.

Meanwhile, thousands of reinforcements doubling the army's strength began arriving in central Mexico, thereby allowing Scott to better secure the region. Because the general had established a satisfactory environment before Trist's negotiations,

nothing involving armed violence would derail the ongoing talks. However, what if an insurgency had taken hold following the fall of Mexico City? It is hard to imagine that the Americans could have accomplished their war aims in this theoretical scenario. With violence raging among an infuriated populace, without a police force, the Church unleveraged, and the government dissolved it is highly doubtful that a satisfactory outcome could have been possible. Therefore, Scott's preventative insurgency strategy proved instrumental in securing the strategic goals of the conventional campaign. Without a proactive approach to a potential insurgency, the hard-fought tactical victories along the road to Mexico City would have been forfeited. The commanding general's acumen in conventional and irregular warfare enabled him to achieve both a brilliant operational and strategic victory that achieved all stated war aims.

The resultant Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo sealed the military victories of the campaign. In the agreement the border between Mexico and Texas was established on the Rio Grande River. Mexico agreed to transfer its northwestern territories – including the current states of New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, and California – to the United States in exchange for a payment of fifteen million dollars. Further, the United States agreed to assume the war debt of Mexico incurred during the fighting. The treaty also established conventions of trade between the two countries, exchange of prisoners, rules of navigation, and delineated formal respect for the Church reminiscent of Scott's earlier policies.⁴³ Altogether the treaty as ratified represented a clear victory for the Polk Administration from a political standpoint. Using the instrument of war, the president succeeded in achieving the stated political goals of the United

States. Scott, as the commander of the army, served as the executive agent in carrying out the desires of the government.

Although Scott was able to achieve a great deal it must be noted that his political masters placed some heavy constraints on his ability to operate. First, shortly after the war broke out, Secretary of War Marcy instructed the army to prosecute the war vigorously and not waste time in niceties with the Mexicans. "The war is only carried on to obtain justice, and the sooner that can be obtained, and with the least expenditure of blood and money, the better," stated Marcy in a confidential memorandum to Zachary Taylor.⁴⁴ At one point Marcy went so far as to instruct General Taylor to hold Mexican towns that harbored guerrillas responsible through the levy of fines and confiscation of personal property. The Administration knew that it had a limited time to defeat Mexico before public support for the war would begin to wane.⁴⁵ Therefore, by executing a speedy campaign along the Rio Grande and in the northern provinces of Mexico the Administration hoped to wrap up the war with a minimum expenditure of both political and military resources. When this did not happen the Administration turned to Scott for an alternative strategy to reenergize the war and win it quickly through offensive action. Observing what was happening in northern Mexico, Scott drew on his previous experience and realized that preventing insurgency had to be an integral part of any campaign plan directed toward Mexico City. Thus, his plan encompassed a composite of conventional and preventative/counter-insurgency operations. This strategy would prevent the campaign from bogging down in order to meet Marcy's imperative to end the war sooner rather than later.

The second barrier erected by the Administration involved limits placed on manpower. Scott estimated in his initial proposal that to prosecute the campaign to Mexico City he would need a minimum of 20,000 troops along with heavy guns and associated transport. Marcy presented Scott's memorandum to the president on 17 November 1846 and Polk summarily rejected the need for a 20,000 man force. Scott embarked to Veracruz with a little over 10,000, just over half of what he assessed was the minimum requirement.⁴⁶ When the army arrived in Mexico City there were less than 8,000 men in the ranks due to attrition. Sergeant Barclay noted this fact in his journal on 14 September 1847 with an undertone of foreboding. Yet he was also justifiably proud of what the army had accomplished with such a small number.⁴⁷ The paucity of forces made a sound preventive and counter-insurgency strategy all the more critical to the success of the overall campaign. It also forced Scott to prioritize the key geographic points that he had to control during the occupation rather than attempting to hold ever square mile the army passed through. In the end, Scott chose his strongpoints very well and never lost momentum.

Finally, Scott did not enjoy a good personal relationship with the chief executive. This was partly due to the fact that Scott was a known Whig by political affiliation. If Scott achieved any success in the war he could challenge Polk, a Democrat, in the next presidential election. This factor caused a great deal of friction between the general and his political master. At one point Polk recorded in his diary that "[T]hese officers (including Scott) are all Whigs and violent partisans, and not having the success of my administration at heart."⁴⁸ The second factor that strained the relationship was Polk's perception that Scott was not suited for command. Polk was piqued by the general's

refusal in early 1846 to assume command of Zachary Taylor's army – at that point in the war the only force in the field.⁴⁹ Scott appears to have refused to move his headquarters to Mexico at that time to avoid embarrassing his friend, Taylor. Further, as the overall commanding general Scott needed to complete a great deal of administrative work in the United States to expand the army and make it ready for combat. Yet in the end Polk threw his support behind Scott as he prepared for action in the campaign to Mexico City. Why did Polk do this? From Polk's diary it is clear that the cabinet convinced the president to allow Scott to command the campaign since "as he [Scott] was the highest officer in the army, he should be entrusted with the conduct of this important expedition."⁵⁰ It is to Polk's credit that in spite of his personal reservations about Scott he recognized that he was the premier officer of the army. Regardless, Polk would keep a close eye on Scott throughout the campaign, putting pressure on the general to produce a victory, and quickly.

With these formidable constraints Scott was forced to execute the campaign. Possessing a bare minimum of personnel and knowing the need for speed, demand for offensive action, and political and personal agendas on the part of the Administration, how did Scott respond? He ingratiated the Administration with a bold and successful operation to Mexico City while providing "a cordial reciprocation of my personal . . . regard" in his correspondence.⁵¹ Thus, he executed a compound strategy of conventional operations and preventive/counter-insurgency operations out of immediate reach of the Administration. He was able to do this partly because of the time required for messages to travel back and forth to Washington – about a month – which gave Scott the breathing space he needed to fully implement his strategy free from immediate

political intervention. The entire campaign took about six months to execute, and Scott was well on his way to accomplishing his objectives before anyone could redirect his effort. In the end, however, the credit for Scott's successful prosecution and conclusion of the Mexican War must rest not with time or luck or Mexican inaction, but with the general himself.

Winfield Scott brilliantly fulfilled his mission and facilitated achieving the strategic ends of the United States. He led a small army over 150 miles deep into the territory of a hostile country opposed by its regular army and a burgeoning insurgency. Yet through a strategy of competent conventional operations married to a well-thought out preventive and counter-insurgency campaign, he was able to defeat both threats in about six months. This allowed the formal peace negotiations to proceed unfettered and brought about a termination of the conflict on the most favorable strategic terms for the United States. Approximately 160 years later a similar conventional campaign was undertaken by another American army but with different strategic results.

Iraq 2003, Winning a War, Losing a Peace?⁵²

The results of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), which began in March 2003, stands in stark contrast to the campaign to take Mexico City in spite of a startling number of parallels between the two conflicts. The campaign that toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein was a headlong march to the Iraqi capital, the political, social, and economic heart of the country. Like Winfield Scott's march to Mexico City, the United States forces that invaded Iraq were relatively undersized for the mission. Yet just like their predecessors in Mexico, these forces executed a brilliant conventional campaign. However, shortly after expelling Saddam and his Ba'ath Party from power chaos ensued and a nasty insurgency took root. How did this happen? The second half of this paper

focuses in broad terms on answering this question. It will examine the planning, preparation, and execution of OIF and the lack of interagency cooperation that led to the descent into chaos, while offering examples from Scott's campaign, that if carefully studied and adapted, might have prevented some of the problems of 2003-2011. The paper will conclude with salient concepts that Scott considered which could help us avoid a strategic debacle, like OIF, in the future.

Planning and Preparation for OIF

Shortly after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan the United States shifted its sights toward Iraq. Planning for OIF began when the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, issued an order on 27 November 2001 to the Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), General Tommy Franks. Rumsfeld instructed Franks to begin development of courses of action for an invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The stated purpose of an attack was two-fold. First, the United States wanted President Saddam Hussein removed from power in Iraq, along with the Ba'ath Party. Second, the United States believed that Hussein was attempting to revitalize his nuclear program and the US wanted to prevent this from coming to pass. Hussein had a long history of antagonism with the United States dating back to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990. A large coalition led by the United States operating under United Nation resolutions expelled Iraq from Kuwait in the First Gulf War. This confrontation destroyed much of the Iraqi army, but left Hussein in charge of Iraq, albeit under heavy restrictions. Throughout the rest of the 1990s Hussein continued to agitate his neighbors, while severely oppressing ethnic and religious groups within his country. Further, he was suspected of having rejuvenated his weapons of mass destruction

programs. By 2001 it was assessed by some experts that the only course of action left to the United States to bring stability to the Gulf region was regime change.⁵³

As the Bush Administration took the reins of government it immediately faced the challenge of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Within a month the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and with the indigenous Northern Alliance and special operations forces drove the Taliban from power in a neat and relatively low cost campaign. Even before Taliban was being swept away leaders within the administration were already looking west toward Iraq as the next logical step in what was dubbed the Global War on Terror (GWOT). When Secretary Rumsfeld gave the order to begin planning, CENTCOM already had an operation plan (OPLAN) on the shelf. OPLAN 1003 was developed in 1998 as a contingency for an offensive into Iraq.⁵⁴ General Franks immediately reviewed the plan with his staff and assessed it as obsolete, mainly because it did not take into account current force dispositions and advances in precision weapon technology. Within a couple of weeks his staff would refine the standing plan and present it to the national command authority for consideration.⁵⁵

Planning began in earnest as soon as Franks briefed his staff. By 28 December 2001 Franks was ready to brief his commander's concept to President Bush at his Texas ranch.⁵⁶ Franks had commanded CENTCOM for about eighteen months when he was summoned to Crawford, Texas for this briefing. In 36 years of service he had fought in combat in Vietnam and commanded field artillery units at every level before promotion to flag rank and service in the First Gulf War. Most recently, forces under his command launched OEF in Afghanistan, toppling the Taliban in a spectacular campaign

in the fall of 2001. On this day in late December, the experienced and battle-hardened Franks would lay out the basic concept that would plunge the United States into combat in a second theater while operations in Afghanistan were still on-going.

At the 28 December meeting General Franks laid out his ‘commander’s concept.’ The updated plan – now dubbed OPLAN 1003V – contained four major phases for an operation into Iraq to change the regime and remove weapons of mass destruction. The phases included: Phase I Preparation; Phase II Shaping the Battlespace; Phase III Decisive Operations; and Phase IV Post-Hostility Operations. Phase I was designed to garner support from the international community while simultaneously building what Franks called an “air bridge” to transport and support forces in the proposed theater. Phase II’s purpose was to “shape” the battlespace by placing the enemy at a disadvantage before launch of the next phase. In Phase III the coalition would decisively defeat the Iraqi army while simultaneously removing the ruling regime from power. Specifically, this meant that the Hussein “regime leaders [were] dead, apprehended, or marginalized” paving the way for a new government. Finally, Phase IV was intended to establish a new, representative government without weapons of mass destruction and capable of defending itself. This phase also encompassed a reconstruction effort designed to quickly back the new government with a functioning economy.⁵⁷ Franks states in his memoirs that he believed that this final phase would last an unknown length of time and could “prove more challenging than major combat operations.”⁵⁸ Herein lay the major controversy after the insurgency began in late 2003 following the end of major combat.

Shortly after operations went awry in late summer-early fall 2003, recriminations began to surface that the reason that a nasty insurgency was germinating in Iraq was due to a failure to anticipate and plan for such an eventuality. One author – among several – asserts that the plan’s “incompleteness helped create the conditions for the difficult occupation that followed.”⁵⁹ This assertion is patently false. In fact, a great deal of thought and planning was undertaken to anticipate and quell an insurgency.⁶⁰ Since this is the case, we must then ask the question, why did the US fail to prevent or quell the insurgency in Iraq in its early stages? We can find the answer by examining what the agencies of government – the Department of Defense (DoD), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Department of State (DoS) – believed was the realm of their responsibilities and follow-up actions after the conclusion of Phase III Decisive Operations.

The individual agencies planning for OIF appear to have done an admirable job capturing the details and possibilities inherent in a campaign to liberate Iraq. For example, CENTCOM fully anticipated the requirement to maintain civil order, reconstruct infrastructure, and rebuild Iraq’s government capacity. Further, General Franks clearly understood that force levels would necessarily have to rise to perform stability operations.⁶¹ In fact, the future planning staff of CENTCOM drew up an OPLAN called IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION. In many ways this plan is reminiscent of Winfield Scott’s G.O. #20. It anticipated seven critical tasks to achieve a successful outcome to the war. The tasks included: maintenance of the rule of law, security, support to civil administration, assisting the Iraqi government, enlarging the coalition, emergency humanitarian assistance, and ensuring the operability of critical infrastructure.⁶²

Subordinate elements of CENTCOM also lay the foundation for Phase IV in completing thorough plans. The Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) headquarters constituted by Third Army started planning in October 2002. The CFLCC attempted to identify flaws in the Phase IV outline through a series of wargames and did develop several possible eventualities that the force would have to deal with. For example, the intelligence section cautioned that a rapid regime change could lead to the “risk of an influx of terrorists to Iraq, the rise of criminal activity, [and] actions of former regime members” to upset attempts to stabilize the country. Based on these potential risks CFLCC determined that the ground forces available for Phase IV were probably insufficient to maintain civil order.⁶³

In October of 2002 the Department of the Army instituted a study of the challenges of a post-conflict Iraq through the Strategic Studies Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The resulting report presciently anticipated every major factor that the military had to consider in order to realize strategic success. The conclusions included structuring the force appropriately; religious, ethnic, and tribal differences; the difficulty of stabilizing the fragmented Iraqi society politically; and the critical requirement for security to enable civil institutions to function. The survey examined historical cases in occupations by US military forces in past conflicts and then offered a series of relevant considerations for the transition to stability operations. Prominent among these was the role of interagency planning, the roles of each agency, and how/when to handover civil responsibilities from US agencies to Iraqi institutions.⁶⁴ The monograph was very relevant in light of what occurred. However, its late publication date –

February 2003 – made it less than timely since the elements identified came to fruition within 60 days.

The National Security Council (NSC) conducted its own effort to anticipate what could go wrong in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld presented what he dubbed a “parade of horrors” to President Bush in October 2002. It is striking that memorandum fully anticipated what actually did go wrong in Iraq. For instance, item #19 states that “[R]ather than having the post-Saddam effort require two to four years, it could take eight to ten years, thereby absorbing US leadership, military, and financial resources.”⁶⁵ The Department of State also engaged in its own planning project termed “The Future of Iraq.” Secretary of State Colin Powell commissioned a series of working groups to identify and plan for the challenges that could arise in the post-Saddam era. The resultant 2,000 page collection of documents included information on the development of a new Iraqi government and reconstruction efforts. Assessments of the DoS effort deemed it as a comprehensive, insightful look at the problem of a post-Saddam Iraq.⁶⁶ Yet in spite of the planning efforts of the DoD, NCS, and DoS the stabilization phase of OIF was an abysmal failure resulting in an eight year slog to “success” – as predicted in Rumsfeld’s ‘Parade of Horribles’. If the various agencies did such an admirable job of anticipating and planning the operation, then what went wrong in execution?

The problem with the planning effort is found in the stovepiping of the agencies involved and adopting the most optimistic estimates of success rather than accepting the negatives, such as Rumsfeld’s ‘Parade’. Within military circles there was a great deal of “collaborative, iterative, and continuous planning . . . at all levels of command.” However, the major military organizations, such as CENTCOM and CFLCC, never

engaged the civilian agencies that would prove critical to success in the transition to and execution of Phase IV Stabilization. “The planning was shoddy,” notes one author and further, “there was no one really in charge of it, and there was little coordination between the various groups.”⁶⁷ Therefore, it appears that the several departments of the government developed their own individual plans in a vacuum.

Contributing to the problem of collaboration and integration in the planning process was the issue of inter-agency rivalry “below the level of the principals.” In a recent interview, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers stated that parochialism played a large role in the failure of planning. Specifically, the DoS – DoD relationship was anything but cooperative. “[A]nything coming out of Defense, we don’t want to hear about” he intoned about the State Department, while the same attitude reigned at the DoD with reference to DoS. Thus, General Myers concluded that “we couldn’t harness these [elements of national power] in a way to focus more effectively in Iraq.”⁶⁸ With two powerful agencies of government failing to communicate and coordinate effectively regarding the same strategic problem the inevitable result was the paralysis of the effort to stabilize Iraq in Phase IV. The reader will remember that Winfield Scott initially had issues with Nicholas Trist as they came to grips with ending the Mexican War. However, for the greater good they managed to put their differences behind them in order to resolve the issue at hand, which was terminating the war in a manner that would facilitate securing the strategic ends. While times were much simpler in the 19th century and the complexity of working within and through bureaucracies was far less daunting, today’s leaders should still note that the

spirit of cooperation and coordination are critical components of successful planning in the modern age as they were in Scott's time.

In light of this it is easy to see why confusion set in during Phase IV of OIF. With the various agencies effectively working in a vacuum there was no way to properly coordinate who would do what in the inevitable transition to Phase IV. When decisive operations ended the forces on the ground – which were too small – could not secure the country because they were inappropriate to the changing mission. Small numbers of armor and mechanized forces are certainly appropriate for operations against a conventional army; however, as an army transitions from major combat to stability operations larger number of light forces are necessary for security, as noted by several military professionals during the planning phase. Yet others in the government did not accept their assessment.⁶⁹ This is because officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense along with the Secretary himself believed the rosy assumption that our arrival on the scene would be hailed by the Iraqis, thus obviating the need for a large number of troops. This was contrary to the view developed by the military planners. Additionally, the chaos unleashed with the collapse of the Saddam regime pushed the military forces to the breaking point; they were incapable of providing governance and implementing reconstruction tasks and the lack of collaboration between agencies guaranteed that no one was ready to take full responsibility. With the dissolution of the Saddam regime and implementation of the de-Ba'athification policy, there was no civil government ready or capable of assuming responsibility for governing at the end of major combat operations. Various United States government agencies that the military expected to fill the resultant civil vacuum and perform reconstruction were not readily

available to execute these tasks.⁷⁰ This stability gap created the opportunity for an insurgency to take root. By contrast, Winfield Scott issued G.O. #20 with its provisions for the rule of law and retention of certain government officials to prevent such a gap from forming in Mexico, thereby quelling the burgeoning insurgency before it could take hold.

Another factor in the failure to integrate agency planning was the disconnect between the agencies regarding which department was responsible for what. General Franks noted in a planning update at the White House in August 2002 that the possibility of a rapid collapse of the Saddam regime would require an equally rapid American response to ensure that stability among the populace could be guaranteed. Franks further stated that “well-designed and well-funded reconstruction projects . . . will be the keys to our success.” But he appears to have believed that the responsibility for implementing stabilizing measures rested with the civilian agencies rather than the military.⁷¹ Consequently, when the regime did collapse, as Franks suspected it might, the military stood by expecting the civilians to quickly fill the vacuum. As a result, it was not a failure to plan but “the ineffectiveness of the planning process” that led to the conditions whereby the insurgency arose.⁷²

A critical decision that contributed to the ultimate failure to transition smoothly to Phase IV was the paucity of forces available to secure the country. Also, the forces that were available consisted mostly of armor and mechanized troops ill-suited to constabulary duties critical to stabilization. The heavily armored and mechanized troops that invaded Iraq were well-trained in combat tasks involving battle on the open plain utilizing tanks and armored personnel carriers. However, such troops lacked training in

counter-insurgency tasks, making them ill-suited to what would happen upon transition to Phase IV. Every plan developed by the military called for at least 250,000 soldiers as the minimum adequate force required to secure the gains.⁷³ Some estimates of the forces required for transition to stabilization were on the order of 500,000.⁷⁴ In testimony before the Congress on 17 February 2003 General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, asserted that at least 400,000 troops would be needed to secure Iraq and enable capacity building to start and progress.⁷⁵ Yet, at no time in Iraq did force levels ever approach the lower 250,000 number. In fact, when decisive operations came to a close in Iraq there were less than 170,000 troops in Iraq and the deployment order for the desperately needed 1st Cavalry Division was cancelled. This decision nullified the planning that had taken place in CENTCOM and ensured that the conditions were set for an ugly insurgency to rise unabated. A CFLCC planner believed “that the decision not to send additional troops was the tipping point that led to the subsequent insurgency.”⁷⁶ In contrast to the failures in Iraq, General Scott – also operating under tight force restrictions – took actions to maximize the utility of his inferior numbers to prevent and effectively squelch a burgeoning insurgency in Mexico in 1847-48. The differences between how he planned for the unconventional aspects of his campaign and how the American leadership planned for Phase IV in Iraq are startling. Yet in a conventional sense his march on Mexico City was eerily similar to OIF in 2003.

The OIF Campaign

OIF in 2003 was much like Scott’s campaign in 1847. Both campaigns consisted of a thrust toward the capital city of the enemy, known to encompass the political heart and soul of the respective nations. Taking these cities, it was believed, would result in a decisive military victory and achieve the ends set forth by the presidential

administrations. To reach their respective objectives each army had to pass through hundreds of miles of hostile country. In both cases the force structure was far too small to secure the area overrun by the advancing army and the American commanders anticipated the possibility of insurgency. In both campaigns ethnic and religious considerations affected the conduct and course of the operations. Both American commanders also anticipated that stabilizing the invaded countries would be a difficult task. Finally, there was an expectation by their political masters that the commanders would conduct the campaigns in a rapid manner to bring the wars to a speedy and politically palatable conclusion. The purpose in both cases was to maintain popular support that would wane should the wars become too bloody and protracted. These nine parallels were shared by both American armies and yet the strategic outcome of the conflicts was drastically different. The primary reason for this is not rooted in contextual or technological discrepancies between 1847 and 2003; admittedly, Scott had more freedom to plan, execute, and adapt his preventive/counterinsurgent strategy than Tommy Franks did. Additionally, the bureaucratic changes between the mid-nineteenth and the early twenty-first century were also profound and mitigated against Franks' ability to effectively plan his strategy and adapt it. Instead, the major difference was this: Winfield Scott and his cohort actually implemented a plan encompassing conventional operations and insurgency preventing measures that would arrest the spiral into chaos before it could start. The generation of American leaders 156 years later did not actually implement a plan that accounted for a blossoming insurgency even though the possibility was fully anticipated by all players.

OIF began on 19 March 2003 as elements of the 3rd Infantry Division led the assault into Iraq. Preceding the ground forces was an aerial assault of missiles and aircraft striking targets deep inside Iraq. The purpose of the air campaign was to paralyze Iraqi command and control, prevent effective response to the assault by Iraqi forces, and strike Iraqi forces directly to weaken morale. Over the course of the next three weeks the combined forces of the United States and coalition partners rapidly overcame all resistance. The British secured Basra – Iraq's only port – within seven days and the spearhead of the US force moved inexorably up Highway 8, the main artery to Baghdad.⁷⁷ It was during this rapid advance that the first of the planning assumptions proved false.




Figure 2. The theater of war for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Source: US Army War College, Department of Military Strategy and Operational Planning.

All operational plans expected that the Iraqi army would suffer a rapid defeat and subsequently surrender in large numbers, much as they had during the First Gulf War in 1991. This, however, did not happen. Instead, Iraqi forces – including the Republican Guard – “simply melted away” for two reasons. First, their will was broken by incessant bombing from coalition airpower and second, many were under orders to operate as irregulars to slow the advance of the coalition on Baghdad. Many of these individuals would later become recruiting fodder for insurgent leaders who gained strength as civil order broke down.⁷⁸ Also, as the vanguard rolled up to Baghdad, the Iraqi high command unleashed the *Saddam Fedayeen* militia to conduct irregular warfare against the Americans. The *Fedayeen* was strikingly similar to the Mexican *rancheros* that Scott’s men encountered in Mexico. These fanatical regime loyalists began to effectively harass the long lines of communication back to Kuwait, portending troubles to come.⁷⁹

On 9 April 2003 US forces were on the outskirts of Baghdad. The mechanized forces had moved nearly 300 miles in three weeks, pausing only during blinding sandstorms that periodically swept across the desert. They had defeated Saddam Hussein’s army in every engagement and as the 3rd Infantry Division rolled up on the capital organized resistance collapsed. As the Americans approached, the Iraqi army simply walked away, leaving their guns and heavy equipment behind, but these forces were not the only ones to walk off the job. The police and government officials at all levels followed suit. They apparently left their jobs because they were “fearful of citizens’ vengeance” and possible arrest by the coalition for suspicion of being members of the Ba’ath Party.⁸⁰ Thus, as the US military stood poised on the doorstep of Baghdad

the civil government was in a state of collapse and the stage was set for lawlessness to ensue. The paucity of American numbers, the mismatch of forces readily available versus those trained specifically for stability operations and counterinsurgency, and the confusion over which US entity would take the lead in Phase IV exacerbated this sorry state of affairs.⁸¹ In spite of a brilliantly executed conventional campaign, American military and interagency unpreparedness opened the door to disaster.

This reality stands in great contrast to the three important successes achieved in Phase III of the war, Decisive Operations. First, the conventional operation to destroy and disarm the Iraqi regular army was executed in a brilliant manner. Second, United States forces did an outstanding job protecting Iraqi infrastructure. The oil industry remained fully operational, which was critical for revenue generation for both the government and the people, and the power grid was mainly intact facilitating the delivery of most basic services to the people. Finally, the Ranger Regiment conducted a parachute assault to secure the Haditha Dam and in so doing protected the water supply from contamination.⁸² With most public services operational it was fully possible to jump start Phase IV stabilization tasks, but the prerequisite of establishing security was necessary first to allow a return to normalcy. That prerequisite was never achieved.

By 10 April 2003 every major city in Iraq had already witnessed a serious outbreak of lawlessness. "Mobs attacked government buildings across the country, carting off not just valuables but everything that could be pried off walls and floors."⁸³ Worse than this, looters also began to destroy the very infrastructure that the US military had worked so hard to protect. The reason for this was two-fold. First, the

absence of native police provided a permissive environment for crime when they left their jobs as American forces approached. Second, the plethora of critical nodes requiring protection and the inability of overstretched US forces to backfill the absent Iraqi police meant that these locations immediately became targets for opportunistic Iraqis.⁸⁴ The commanders on the ground quickly realized what was happening and clamored for the needed – and inbound – forces to stem the tide of chaos. But, their calls were obstinately resisted by the civilian masters through a “fundamental misunderstanding” of what the looting meant.⁸⁵ One officer reported that “[A] finite supply of goodwill toward the Americans evaporated with the passing of each anarchic day.”⁸⁶ Thus, the initial strategic decision to hold down troop levels later forfeited the tenuous support of the Iraqi people as chaos closed in around them, portending protraction of the conflict – exactly what American planners feared and fulfilling the worst estimates of those who had been ignored earlier.

In an attempt to reintroduce civil authority, the US brought in an interim government consisting of an obscure collection of retired officers and exiled Iraqis to help calm the populace. During the planning process before the war the DoD stood up the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). The purpose of the organization was to provide post-war administration – under the auspices of the DoD – as a part of Phase IV. The office was headed by personnel from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that would populate the departments of the interim government. Subordinate to the department heads were officials from other government agencies – especially the State Department – who were the true experts in the respective branches, such as civil administration and management of basic

services. This hierarchical arrangement caused a great deal of needless friction between DoS and DoD.⁸⁷ The obvious issue with the organization was that while the DoD expected the DoS to step up in Phase IV Stability operations, it still wanted to retain control. Yet the military, as previously noted, had done little to integrate its planning with the other Federal agencies prior to the invasion, thereby leading to a divergent perception among them regarding how to execute the transition to Phase IV.

Further exacerbating the problems with ORHA was the fact that CENTCOM and CFLCC did not know what to do with the organization once it was created. The OSD organized the office separate from the combatant command and it was supposed to report to General Franks. However, the OSD retained a direct line of authority to ORHA. This fact alienated the ORHA from CENTCOM and CFLCC, both of whom “had very little to do” with ORHA and its director Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay Garner.⁸⁸ The ORHA began serious planning for OIF in January 2003, long after the military organizations had begun their effort. This lack of synchronization made later execution of stability operations disjointed and ineffectual. For example, during ORHA’s planning phase it held a wargame in February at the National Defense University. This wargame revealed “tons of problems” within the civilian-military interagency effort, particularly regarding the timing of the transition to stability operations and who was in charge at each stage.⁸⁹ As predicted, this became a major issue in April 2003 as coalition forces took control of the country with few ways to tackle the myriad of problems they faced.

Another factor that made the transition to civil authority difficult was the decision to populate the Iraqi ministries with exiles. Official US policy for the government was to ‘de-Ba’athify’ the ministries of Saddam loyalists. The process of de-Ba’athification was

not supposed to remove every civil servant in Iraq in order that the ministries could retain some competence and continuity. However, the process placed “the burden of proof . . . on the individual to demonstrate why he should retain his position.” This policy effectively eliminated the government as a viable entity until the coalition could properly screen all employees.⁹⁰ To temporarily replace them and fill the permanent vacancies the ORHA sought to install many Iraqis from the diaspora in the United States. This plan failed because many of those recruited for the positions did not have appropriate qualifications or lacked credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi people.⁹¹ The resultant Iraq Governing Council was “widely condemned as unrepresentative” and viewed as a “stooge of the occupying powers.”⁹² Thus, even when the interim government was finally stood up it was mainly ineffective, further weakening the United States’ ability to terminate the conflict.

An avenue that may have helped to facilitate the maintenance of order received only a cursory effort by the coalition. This was leveraging the cooperation of the religious authorities in Iraq. There were two reasons for this lack of contact between the US and Iraqi religious leaders. First, the US used the United Nations as a “bridge” for messaging rather than direct contact. Second, the most important Iraqi Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, likewise would not meet in direct talks with the Americans.⁹³ Thus, both parties were wary of making contact with each other, creating yet another factor in the deterioration of civil stability. The failure by either side to establish a dialogue worked to the detriment of Iraq. This factor is a great contrast to what Winfield Scott was able to achieve with the Catholic Church in Mexico. In this case, both Scott and the Church willingly met and dialogued in order to prevent

problems that would have aided an insurgency in 1847. It is important to note here that both sides were willing to sit down together, unlike the situation in Iraq.

As conditions deteriorated and civil stability in Phase IV appeared unobtainable, US military forces began to assume a heavy-handed and culturally insensitive attitude. The 4th Infantry Division arrived in Tikrit on 19 April 2003 and purportedly assumed a “very aggressive posture” in Saddam’s hometown. Apparently, soldiers from the division pointed their weapons at civilians, humiliated males and females alike during surprise home searches, and did not foster good relationships with local tribal elders. The media began to report these excesses with scrutiny, painting an unflattering picture of the proverbial ‘ugly American.’⁹⁴ This had the effect of convincing the local people to close up their shops and to avoid cooperating with the division leadership in providing needed intelligence. In other units across the country, night raids and home searches became common, further alienating the people from the Americans. The US military was beginning to be perceived as occupiers rather than liberators. A poignant example of this perception coming to fruition is the mishandling of a patrol in Baghdad due to cultural ignorance. In this instance a platoon was sent to visit the Rami Institute for Autistic and Slow Learners. As the platoon left the Institute the local people attacked the American unit because they believed that the soldiers were there to have sex with the female staff. The all-male unit was insensitive to the Arab cultural norm that strange men do not visit unattended women. This lit another powder keg in the capital that fueled the insurgency.⁹⁵

In a similarly much publicized case in Fallujah in April 2003, US troops were provoked to fire upon the crowd by a few insurgents who blended into a demonstration.

This incident, along with a series of other miscues, drove the citizens into “outright rebellion.”⁹⁶ The lack of light – or dismounted – infantry exacerbated the problem of security. The mechanized forces prevalent in Iraq at that time conducted mounted – vehicular – patrols that sped, sometimes recklessly, through the towns and villages. This angered the populace and without light infantry units walking the streets the Americans could not get to know the people and build bonds of trust needed to prevent/counter an insurgency. “The lack of Army dismounts is creating a void in personal contact and public perception,” noted Marine Major General James Mattis.⁹⁷

A final factor that contributed to the deterioration of security is that United States forces went into Iraq with a deficit of human intelligence that hampered the effort to secure the capital, lines of communication, and outlying areas. Accepting the assessments of Iraqi exiles led our civilian and military leaders to believe that Iraq would welcome US forces and quickly embrace a democratic form of government. Also, it was assumed, based on intelligence estimates, that the former Iraqi army, police, and government would transform into a force for reform. All of these assumptions proved bogus. Further, after US forces had defeated Iraqi forces and occupied the country, a lack of human intelligence, due to an inability to build and exploit relationships with the locals, handicapped forces attempting to establish security.⁹⁸ All of this cumulatively led to poor decision-making regarding strategic objectives and an inability to effectively utilize the means available in a strategy designed to best achieve strategic ends. Thus, a war projected to last several months dragged on for over eight years.

In sum, a combination of factors were responsible for the poor transition to Phase IV: disjointed and shortsighted planning among the DoD and other Federal agencies;

failure to retain key Iraqi officials; lack of cooperation between the coalition and Iraqi religious authorities; absence of civil authority and American light infantry; a lack of human intelligence networks; and heavy-handed tactics by occupying troops in certain districts. The loss of trust between the American military and the Iraqi people – the key issue that pushed thousands of Iraqis into the orbit of the budding insurgency – was not foreordained. Ultimately, the failure of Phase IV represents the inability of strategic planners to factor in all of the conditions that existed in Iraq – such as Sunni-Shia antagonism – before the war started. None of the leaders were then able to build the plan to mitigate what would happen when the tensions of three decades of rule under Saddam were released. While the separate agency planners did anticipate what could go wrong, factors such as parochialism, stovepiping, and muddled authorities prevented integration of the individual agency plans that could deal with the possibilities. The war then spiraled into an intractable insurgency and with it the support of the American people plunged as the war protracted.

All of these factors are diametrically opposed to the judicious steps that Winfield Scott took to stabilize Mexico City following his conventional campaign. Whereas United States forces in 1847 looked realistically at potential challenges and implemented a series of measures to incorporate the existing government and build trust with the people in stride with the conventional operation, Americans in 2003 seemed to accept the most optimistic assumptions about the campaign and thus deluded themselves as to the true possibility that an insurgency could take hold. This optimism facilitated ignorance regarding the need to implement policies that would prevent an insurgency. Scott never provided the Mexican insurgents with the

opportunity to gel as a movement in 1847 because of the proactive steps he took while the campaign was in progress. In 2003 no measures to prevent insurgency were taken during the course of decisive operations and this allowed a gap to open between Phase III Decisive Operations and Phase IV Stabilization. Iraqi opportunists quickly filled the security and power vacuum and within a short six weeks a stubborn insurgency blossomed that would take another eight years to quell. If the Americans in Iraq had, like Scott, adopted an “in stride” approach to preventing insurgency in a compound conventional/counter-insurgency campaign plan, it might have facilitated a favorable termination of the Iraq conflict years earlier. The United States in the future cannot and will not accept another Iraq-type war. What might today’s strategic planner learn from the combined examples of Scott in Mexico and the US occupation of Iraq?

Salient Points to Consider in Future Conflict

Based on the experience of the US military in 1847 and 2003 there are a number of factors that political leaders, commanders, and strategic planners – both civilian and military – should consider in deliberations over future conflicts. This spectrum ranges from the need to develop relationships across the inter-agency landscape to ensuring unity of effort among the departments, to keeping in mind cultural sensitivities and host nation politics. While we cannot use history as a template for future planning, we must certainly build vicarious experience from history and utilize its lessons when developing plans for future conflicts. Thus, through the “reading of history . . . as a mode of inquiry, a framework for thinking about problems” of the future emerges that can assist us in navigating difficult waters.⁹⁹

In 1847 Winfield Scott implemented plans delineated in G.O. #s 20, 87, and 287 that proactively contended with the anticipated worst case scenarios to set the

conditions for a favorable termination of the Mexican War. Further, following some initial difficulties with parochialism and collaboration, Winfield Scott and Nicholas Trist developed a mutually beneficial working relationship to achieve an outstanding resolution in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Although the situation in 2003 was certainly more complex than that of 1847 from a planning and bureaucratic standpoint, the future strategic planner must realize that thinking about contingencies and good inter-agency relationships are essential to managing the complex problem of insurgency and conflict termination. Planning against the worst case scenario and managing relationships can go a long way toward facilitating unity of effort and ending a war without sliding into an unwanted complication of insurgency.

The next salient consideration is the critical need to maintain security of the occupied civil society. It is unlikely in any future conflict that we will encounter a situation wherein civilians are not a major factor in the conflict. In 2003, in spite of doctrine that made civilian considerations central to any plan, the problem of how to secure Iraq after regime collapse was assumed away. Too few troops – and troops of the incorrect type – were available to provide security after the police melted away. As a result, Iraq quickly slid into chaos and insurgency while tentative popular support for United States forces vanished. Thus, contrary to assumptions at the time, favorable conditions for conflict termination flow directly from the civil society's perception of their physical security.¹⁰⁰

In Mexico, despite a paucity of troops, Winfield Scott implemented a plan to prevent such a slide into the abyss of insurgency. Elements of his plan included; retention of middling government officials and police, open support of the Catholic

Church, local police partnering with his troops, and intelligence networking. These proactive policies suppressed the *rancheros* and criminals and enabled Scott to stabilize the capital and surrounding countryside. Again, while the problems of 2003 are certainly more complex, the essence of the issue is the same. The safety of the civil populace directly correlates to the possibility of the development of an insurgency. If an army can secure the civil society, it has a much greater chance of stabilizing the situation to bring about a favorable set of conditions to facilitate conflict termination in accordance with stated ends.

Related to the concept of providing strong and immediate security is the underlying assumption that the armed forces on the scene understand the occupied society from a cultural standpoint. Cultural sensitivity is critical to the implementation of security measures. The population of an occupied country that views the occupier as insensitive to their societal values will quickly gravitate into the orbit of the opposition. The opposition, as in the case of Saddam's *Fedayeen* and Islamist militias, will then galvanize this discontent into armed resistance. The resultant violence feeds upon itself, like a vicious circle, to make the security situation uncontrollable. This is what happened in Iraq in 2003. The combination of a lack of physical security with cultural insensitivity or ignorance – as the cases with crowd control in Fallujah and the Baghdad Rami Institute poignantly illustrate – drove the populace into the arms of the insurgency.

In contrast, Winfield Scott realized that troop discipline and sensitivity to local culture was vital to his ability to stabilize the country. His orders reflected this as he imposed heavy penalties on those in his command who violated Mexican cultural norms. Most importantly, Scott personally demonstrated his grasp of the significance of

cultural issues when he publically paid deference to the prerogatives of the Catholic Church. He set the example for the army at large by attending services and meeting with Church officials to build consensus for his policies. As a direct result, Scott was able to develop an informal alliance with the Church to maintain security so that he could stabilize Mexico for peace talks to proceed. Cultural sensitivity is another element that planners at the strategic level must seriously consider before entering into conflict on foreign soil. The current programs to train soldiers at our training centers and educate leaders about cultural considerations through professional military education are excellent steps in the right direction and we must sustain these in the future even in an environment of constrained resources.

Essential to maintaining security and ensuring good cross-cultural relations is the retention of certain departments of local civil government and the police. In Iraq, all semblance of governance, including the police force, vanished. During planning for OIF the US planners identified the possibility that “catastrophic success” could create a situation in which local government and its accompanying security apparatus’ would collapse. This, some lone voices reasoned, could allow a vacuum to develop in which criminality would flourish and open the door to an insurgency. Yet even after this possibility was identified the more optimistic assumptions were accepted and nothing was done to plan against it. No effort appears to have been mounted to convince middling Iraqi officials and police to remain on the job until it was too late because of the optimistic assumption that these leaders would simply begin working under a new regime when it arrived.¹⁰¹ When this did not happen reliance was placed on the ORHAs mix of exiles and military retirees, which comprised the coalition provisional authority, to

reestablish civil control. Instead, the remaining security apparatus and civilian officials melted away, beginning the slide into chaos. The late arrival of the ORHA along with the use of exiles with no credibility among common Iraqis, failed to bridge the gap in civil order that resulted. In another stark contrast, Winfield Scott's orders specifically addressed the retention of local authorities and police. The steps taken were designed to maintain security and stabilize the civil society at the earliest possible point. With these conditions in place, Mr. Trist was able to move forward with peace negotiations unfettered and the US achieved its strategic ends in a timely manner.

There was no single American culprit behind the string of failures in 2003. In fact, the entire inter-agency is open to blame. As noted, none of the agencies – in particular DoS and DoD – collaborated or integrated their planning effectively. Worse, there was confusion between the agencies as to who was responsible for what and at what time. Too many people at DoD and DoS assumed that the other agency was responsible for certain tasks.¹⁰² This was a direct result of the lack of collaboration and integration and the spirit of parochialism of the various departmental planners. Planning processes in the 19th century were obviously less complex and sometimes haphazard. Therefore, we cannot reasonably compare what happened in 1847 to 2003 in terms of bureaucratic processes. Nevertheless, Winfield Scott's actions should give today's strategist pause. Scott assumed nothing away and established his leadership and that of the army across the spectrum of civil-military problems. And where there was a question of authorities, he consulted with Mr. Marcy and Mr. Trist to ensure unity of effort.¹⁰³ What today's strategic planners must incorporate into modern processes is early collaborative planning, relationship-building across the inter-agency, and

establishing clear roles, responsibilities, and tasks among the key stakeholders long before the first troops engage in decisive operations. To do anything less than this opens the door to disunity of effort in execution of operations, which can lead to strategic and operational failure.

Another point to consider for the future involves intelligence. The United States invaded Iraq without a human intelligence network and faulty intelligence-gathering before the war led to the belief that Iraq was hiding an extensive WMD program. American leaders uncritically accepted information from Iraqi exiles that the people would welcome US forces and quickly embrace a democratic form of government. Perhaps the worst and fatal assumption was the belief that the former Iraqi army, police, and government would quickly become a force for reform. All of this intelligence proved incorrect. Then, after US forces had defeated Iraqi forces and were transitioning to Phase IV Stabilization there was no means to build a network quickly. Exacerbating these problems was the fact that American forces did not build and exploit relationships with the locals, handicapping them as they attempted to establish security.¹⁰⁴ Thus, poor intelligence and lack of human networks to gather needed information led to poor planning before the war and inept decisions after it started. This prevented the securing of strategic objectives rapidly with no means to recover once in place.

Faulty intelligence combined with cultural ignorance by the Polk Administration also led to protraction in 1846. Polk and Secretary Marcy had expected the Mexicans to capitulate once the territory desired for annexation was occupied by US forces. The Administration was taken aback when the Mexicans continued to resist. To break the stalemate President Polk unleashed General Scott in a dagger thrust at the Mexican

capital. This proved decisive, but only because Scott was able to gain civil control during and following the conventional campaign. He was aided enormously by his intelligence network established and supervised by Ethan Allan Hitchcock.¹⁰⁵ The point for today's planner is that intelligence estimates and assumptions should be comprehensively wargamed with some entity playing the 'devil's advocate' just as our doctrine states. The purpose is to prevent stumbling into a war based on a rosy intelligence estimate of the situation, which occurred both in 1846 and 2003. Also, the strategist must place great value in human intelligence to temper information gathered from other sources, such as signals and other electronic means.¹⁰⁶ Both campaigns were initially flawed by faulty estimates, but the difference was that Scott resuscitated American fortunes in 1847 by fully anticipating the possibility of an insurgency and then establishing a credible human intelligence network that helped quell the insurgency before it could gain traction.

A further parallel between 1846 and 2003 is that Administration officials disregarded key elements of military advice offered by their senior military advisors. In late 1846 as Scott prepared for operations in Mexico he recommended a troop strength of 20,000 for the thrust to the capital. The Polk Administration rejected this number, fearing the American public would turn against the war and that maintaining that size of a force was too costly. This reality forced Scott to adopt creative measures to ensure security.¹⁰⁷ In the end, the Polk Administration delivered with 10,000 reinforcements shortly after Scott occupied Mexico City, making Scott's job of securing the capital easier as peace negotiations proceeded. The situation in Iraq unfolded in an eerily similar manner. In 2002 General Eric Shinseki forthrightly testified before Congress that

several hundred thousand troops were required to stabilize Iraq during and immediately following conventional operations aimed at Baghdad, the capital. General Franks and Lieutenant General Dave McKiernan echoed this in their estimates of force structure required for the campaign.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense and his deputy rejected these suggestions out of hand because they believed the rosy assumptions that the Iraqis would welcome the American forces and that the army and police would remain relatively intact to assist with stabilization in Phase IV. Thus, the force that deployed was nearly 100,000 troops below the lowest estimate provided by military planners.

In the future, civilian leaders should engage in a serious dialogue with their military experts rather than rejecting advice out of obstinacy. Also, strategic military leaders have to communicate effectively and convincingly when airing their views. Failure on either account can multiply the cost of a campaign in both blood and treasure while protracting a war, jeopardizing the outcome.

Finally, strategic leaders, civilian and military, should invest in educating the inter-agency in civil-military relations, strategic and operational art, and employment of the military element of national power. Winfield Scott was a leader of rare talent, having a combination of tactical, operational, and strategic brilliance in the same person. He attained this high level of competence by long experience, training, and a program of self-study. There was no formal institutional methodology to prepare an officer for the range of possibilities in warfare in the 19th century. Yet Scott demonstrated an intellectual cognition without peer in the American military at that time. Today we have many institutions that provide a formal education for future leaders across the spectrum

of war, from the tactical to strategic levels. Scott had many broadening experiences as an officer, becoming involved in political-military relations during the Nullification Crisis and the border disputes along the Niagara and Maine frontiers. We must likewise offer today's leaders a wide range of broadening opportunities beyond tactical experience – to include joint and inter-agency assignments – to ensure they are ready for a future with seemingly volatile, ambiguous, and intractable challenges. While we had an outstanding corps of leaders in 2003, many had a decidedly one-dimensional experience as they embarked on OIF.¹⁰⁹ Future budget cuts will mitigate against making the necessary educational and experiential investment in leaders, civil and military. Our senior leaders must resist this impulse in order to develop the critical thinkers we will need to solve the complex operational and strategic problems of the future, which will yield savings over the long-run in blood and treasure.

Conclusion

History cannot be used as a template for the planning of future conflicts. To use history in such a manner ignores context and opens up the possibility of failure through clinging to dogma rather than critical thought. One must consider history in breadth, depth, and context in order to inform thought in future situations. History provides us with vicarious experience that can help strategic leaders work through complex problems because they understand the nuances of the environment of war. Considering history in this manner, it is clear that our civilian and military leaders could have gleaned much from the Mexican War when developing the plan for OIF. This could have saved the United States much in time, lost lives, and untold billions of dollars.

General Scott developed a comprehensive plan that accounted for conventional and unconventional aspects of war while providing the mechanism to terminate the war on favorable terms to the United States. In developing a plan for compound warfare he fully anticipated what could happen and proactively implemented measures that prevented a full-blown insurgency, thereby allowing peace negotiations to proceed. Had Scott thought of the campaign in a single dimension of conventional operations only, he would have left the door open for a wide-ranging insurgency that could have bogged down the momentum of the operation. General Scott – through his experience, education, and training – developed a plan that covered an array of considerations beyond conventional operations. These included Mexican culture, religion, security of the populace, information operations, building intelligence networks, and civil-military relationships. Thinking critically about these issues facilitated the stabilization of Mexican civil society following the conventional defeat of the Mexican Army. This allowed peace negotiations to advance apace in a manner that terminated the conflict favorably for the United States while achieving the stated strategic ends.

In summary, comparing the campaign to Mexico City in 1847 with OIF in 2003 offers many illuminating considerations for today's strategic leader. The campaign in 1847 was not a clean conventional operation as we have come to believe. In many ways it was a distant mirror that gives us a glimpse of the future operating environment. This environment will challenge us conventionally and unconventionally simultaneously. When we examine 1847 against the experience of OIF in 2003 there is much to inform the leaders of the future who will have to plan and operate in this hybrid environment. Military campaigns must seek to achieve operational and strategic ends by setting

conditions to terminate the conflict favorably. The Mexico City campaign illustrates how Scott did this by anticipating almost every possibility and planning operations across the spectrum of war. This prevented the insurgency following successful conventional operations from gaining any traction and allowed for a decisive peace settlement. The United States achieved its strategic ends as a result. Unfortunately, our leaders failed to plan in this fashion for OIF, resulting in a protracted war. It will behoove future strategic leaders to examine our rich history – and these campaigns – so that they can build vicarious experience to inform their thinking when considering tomorrow's problems.

Endnotes

¹ There is a great deal of available literature that a historian can review in studying the events of the Mexican War. Among the most popular secondary sources are John S.D. Eisenhower's fine narrative *So Far From God* and biography of Winfield Scott titled *Agent of Destiny*. In addition to these there is a number of other excellent narratives of the war that I utilized including: Timothy D. Johnson's, *A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign*; and *The Mexican War, 1846-1848* by K. Jack Bauer and Robert W. Johannsen. There is also an abundant waft of primary sources including some recently published journals. The main primary source that I used – and it is absolutely indispensable – is the US Congress' *Executive Document Nos. 59 and 60*, which can be found online. The executive documents contain the orders and official correspondence of both the army and government in the Mexican War. President Polk's *Diary* edited by Allan Nevins is also critical to gaining an understanding of the political machinations at work in the decision to go to war in Mexico. The journals of Ralph Kirkham, Richard Coulter, and Thomas Barclay provided an understanding of the views of the common soldier in the Mexican War. These journals are of recent publication and easily accessible to even the most casual researcher. A significant primary source from the Mexican point of view was found in Ramon Alcaraz's *The Other Side: Notes for the History of the War Between Mexico and the United States*. This work, translated by Albert C. Ramsey in 1850, was found online and provided a great perspective of popular sentiment as it pertained to the American occupation force.

For the research of the 2003 Iraq War I utilized a series of recent studies supplemented by some histories by popular authors. The primary study is the well-written and pertinent Rand study titled *After Saddam*. I found this 2008 study indispensable in understanding the nature of the planning and preparation for the war. Former Minister of Defense Ali Al Allawi's *The Occupation of Iraq* provided a fine perspective of the Iraqi viewpoint of the war. Popular recent histories, such as Thomas Ricks' *Fiasco* and Michael R. Gordon's *Cobra II* provided a critique of operations conducted by the coalition focusing on US policy. However, the historian must

examine these with objectivity since each is tinged with emotional and biased perspectives. The viewpoint of the commander, Tommy Franks, was critical to the analysis of the campaign and his readable, but notably one-sided, account in *American Soldier* proved invaluable. The future will bring a great deal more writing about the war in Iraq and most certainly there will be a wide disparity of opinions. I suspect that the further in time we move away from the event, the more likely we will find dispassionate, objective assessments of the events of 2003.

² Stephen A. Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico: May 1846 – July 1848* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), 7-9, 14-15, and 25. The strength of the United States Army in Mexico never exceeded 30,000 troops.

³ Thomas Jefferson, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 33 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) 148-152. Online book from Princeton University, <http://www.princeton.edu/~tipapers/inaugural/infinal.html> (Accessed on 18 September 2001).

⁴ Anthony Brandt, ed., *The Journals of Lewis and Clark*, (Washington, DC: National Geographic Adventure Classics, 2002) xxviii. Thomas Jefferson's letter to Lewis dated January 1803. Emphasis added.

⁵ Stephen L. Hardin, *Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution*, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1994) 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-7.

⁷ United States Congress, *Executive Document No. 60*, (30th Congress, 1st Session, 1848) 79-81. GoogleBook (accessed and downloaded 30 September 2011) Letter from Mr. Castillo y Lanzas to Mr. John Slidell dated 21 March 1846 and correspondence from Secretary of War William L. Marcy to Major General Zachary Taylor; Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, xix-xx, 23-26, and 30.

⁸ James K. Polk, "Inaugural Address" delivered 4 March 1845. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/James_K._Polk%27s_Inaugural_Address (accessed 28 September 2011) and Allan Nevins, ed., *Polk: Diary of a President 1845-1849*, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1968) 9-10 and 106.

⁹ US Congress, *Executive Document No. 60*, 79. A series of letters between the US plenipotentiary John Slidell and Mexican government representative Mr. Lanzas culminating with this one, which illustrates the crude manner in which the United States attempted to acquire the Mexican territory. Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico*, 8-9 and Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 45-46.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹¹ Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico*, 9 and US Congress, *Executive Document No. 60*, 90-91, 153-154 and 323-325. Marcy to Taylor dated 13 January 1846; Marcy to Kearny dated 3 June 1846; and Marcy to Taylor dated 8 June 1846.

¹² Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico*, 25-26 and Robert Ryal Miller, ed., *The Mexican War Journal & Letters of Ralph W. Kirkham*, (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 1991) 13.

¹³ Nevins, *Polk Diary*, 149.

¹⁴ Winfield Scott, *Memoirs*, Vol. I (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970) 24-25.

¹⁵ John S. D. Eisenhower, *Agent of Destiny: The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott*, (New York: The Free Press, 1997) 3-10.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 76-78 and 84.

¹⁷ Gerald A. Dolinish, *General Winfield Scott: His Development and Application of Political/Civil-Military Concepts During the Mexican War*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 15, 2002) 2-4 and Scott, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, 156-159 and 205-206.

¹⁸ Dolinish, *General Winfield Scott*, 4; T.R. Phillips, ed., "Military Maxims of Napoleon" in *Roots of Strategy*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985) 428-429 and 438; and Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico*, 27.

¹⁹ Dolinish, *General Winfield Scott*, 5 and Eisenhower, *Agent of Destiny*, 183.

²⁰ US Congress, *House of Representatives Executive Document No. 59*, (Washington, DC: 30th Congress, 1st Session, 1848) Rice University online collection at <http://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/22126/1/9900253.tei.html> Winfield Scott to Secretary of War William L. Marcy dated 27 October 1846 and 12 November 1846 (accessed on 29 September 2001) and Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 253-254 and 266.

²¹ Winfield Scott, "General Order No. 20," Rice University Online Collection, <http://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/27562/3/aa00208tr.tei.html> Written at Tampico, Mexico and issued shortly after landing at Veracruz (accessed 26 September 2011) and Scott, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, 580.

²² Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 297.

²³ Scott, *Memoirs*, Vol. II., 580.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 460; Nevis, *Polk Diary*, 249; and Timothy D. Johnson, *A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign*, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2007) 139-140.

²⁵ Scott, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, 452-453 and Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 298 and 302-303.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 266-267.

²⁷ Allan Peskin, ed., *Volunteers: The Mexican War Journals of Private Richard Coulter and Sergeant Thomas Barclay, Company E, Second Pennsylvania Infantry*, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1991) 107.

²⁸ I purposely do not use the term counter-insurgency because this term denotes that an insurgency is already on-going. Scott's purpose in issuing G.O. #20 and subsequent orders was to prevent the onset of insurgency. Therefore, this implies that an insurgency had not already started.

²⁹ Scott, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, 545. G.O. #287, Clause 15, Scott to the Army. Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 267.

³⁰ Peskin, *Volunteers*, 95; Scott, *Memoirs*, 296-297 and 302-303; and US Congress, *Executive Document #60*, 914. G.O. #87, Scott to the Army.

³¹ Peskin, *Volunteers*, 110.

³² Ethan Allan Hitchcock, *Fifty Years in Camp and Field*, edited by W. A. Croffut, (New York: G.P. Putnam's & Sons, 1909) 259-265. GoogleBooks online <http://books.google.com> (accessed on 10 October 2011); and Miller, *Kirkham Journal*, 39.

³³ Scott, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, 453; Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 296; and Miller, *Kirkham Journal*, 39.

³⁴ Scott, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, 545. G.O. 287, Clause #14.

³⁵ Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 347-348. John Eisenhower noted that the Mexican guerrillas turned on the people when they discovered that American patrols limited their ability to strike easy targets. Turning on the people though, played into American hands by demonstrating that their efforts delivered security, undermining Mexican attempts to win by introducing a widespread insurgency.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 318-322 and 342.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 540-546.

³⁸ Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 345-347. It is interesting to note that Saddam Hussein, like Santa Anna, did these same things in 2003.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ US Congress, *Executive Doc. #60*, 1054-1057.

⁴¹ Ramon Alcaraz, *The Other Side: Notes for the History of the War Between Mexico and the United States*. Trans. Albert C. Ramsey (New York: John Wiley, Publisher, 1850) 422-423. GoogleBooks Online, http://books.google.com/books/about/The_other_side_or_Notes_for_the_history.html?id=HUUJAAAAQAAJ (accessed 1 October 2011).

⁴² Scott, *Memoirs*, 575-580.

⁴³ Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, University of Dayton online archive, <http://academic.udayton.edu/race/02rights/guadalu.htm> (accessed on 14 September 2011).

⁴⁴ US Congress, *Executive Doc. #60*, 333.

⁴⁵ Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico*, 23-25.

⁴⁶ Nevins, *Polk Diary*, 168-169 and US Congress, *Executive Document No. 59*, in Rice University online collection <http://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/22126/1/9900253.tei.html> Scott to Marcy, 12 November 1846. Polk's diary mentions 14,000 as the number discussed in

the meeting. The figure of 14,000 is also found in Scott's memo in a table at the end of the document. The higher number of 20,000 is mentioned in the text where Scott notes that "[T]o reach that point [Mexico City] . . . an army of more than 20,000 men may be needed." Polk, however seized on the lower figure.

⁴⁷ Peskin, *Volunteers*, 180.

⁴⁸ Nevins, *Polk Diary*, 100 and Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 90 and 160-165. Winfield Scott's name had been floated by such Whig leaders as John J. Crittenden as a potential opponent in the 1844 election that saw Polk rise to the office. Any success that Scott enjoyed on the battlefield could have made him a formidable candidate for the presidency in 1848 and the Democrats wanted to avoid such an eventuality.

⁴⁹ Nevins, *Polk Diary*, 101-102 and Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 92-93.

⁵⁰ Nevins, *Polk Diary*, 169.

⁵¹ Scott, *Memoirs*, II, 399-400.

⁵² From the title of Ali A. Allawi's book used as a reference in the coming section of this Strategy Research Paper. Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2007).

⁵³ Kenneth Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad," *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 2002), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57805/kenneth-m-pollack/next-stop-baghdad. (Accessed 5 November 2011).

⁵⁴ Nora Bensahel, et al., *After Saddam: Pre-war Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2008) 6.

⁵⁵ Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York: Regan Books, 2004) 315.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 345-346.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 349-352.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 352.

⁵⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006) 115.

⁶⁰ Bensahel, *After Saddam*, xvii-xviii.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 7-8 and Franks, *American Soldier*, 351-352 and 366.

⁶² Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 9.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁶⁴ Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003) iii, 17-18, and 42-54.

⁶⁵ Keeper File, "Rumsfeld's 'Parade of Horribles'," *Air Force Magazine* (April 2011), 71.

⁶⁶ Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 30-37.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 15 and Ricks, *Fiasco*, 78-81.

⁶⁸ Richard B. Myers, "An Interview with Richard B. Myers," *Prism* (Volume 2, Number 4, September 2011) 152.

⁶⁹ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 79 and 96-97; Franks, *American Soldier*, 366; and Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 17.

⁷⁰ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 78-81; Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 36; and Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2007), 98.

⁷¹ Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 17 and 28-30 and Franks, *American Soldier*, 392-393.

⁷² Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 16.

⁷³ Franks, *American Soldier*, 366. Franks briefed this figure to Secretary Rumsfeld on 1 February 2003.

⁷⁴ Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 17.

⁷⁵ Eric Schmitt, "Threats and Responses: Military Spending; Pentagon Contradicts General on Occupation Forces' Size," *New York Times* 27 February 2003.
<http://nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-threatsandresponses.html> (accessed 13 November 2011) and John Althouse, "Force to Occupy Iraq Massive," *USA Today* 25 February 2003.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-02-25-iraq-us_x.htm (accessed 13 November 2011).

⁷⁶ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 122. Quote from the CFLCC Chief of Plans.

⁷⁷ Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 89.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* and Ricks, *Fiasco*, 119 and 125.

⁷⁹ Franks, *American Soldier*, 486.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 525.

⁸¹ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 116-118; Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 82-84; Jonathan Weisman, "Iraq Chaos No Surprise, but Too Few Troops to Quell It," *Washington Post* 13 April 2003.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A19587-2003-Apr-13?language=printer> (accessed 13 November 2011).

⁸² Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 83-84.

⁸³ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 135.

⁸⁴ Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 169 and Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 88-89.

⁸⁵ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 136.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Quote of Lieutenant Nathaniel Fick, United States Marine Corps.

⁸⁷ Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 54-55; Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 98; and Kenneth Katzman, *Iraq: United States Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2004) 19-21.

⁸⁸ Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 98.

⁸⁹ Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 59-60.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁹¹ Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 100.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 165.

⁹³ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 216.

⁹⁴ Major Douglas A. Pryer, "Controlling the Beast Within: The Key to Success on the 21st Century Battlefield," *Military Review* (Special Edition, September 2011) 82-83.

⁹⁵ Ricks, *Fiasco*, 178.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 169 and Ricks, *Fiasco*, 138-139.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 144 and Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 169.

⁹⁸ Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 7-8 and 80-81.

⁹⁹ Eliot A. Cohen, "The Historical Mind and Military Strategy," *ORBIS: A Journal of World Affairs* (Fall, 2005), 575.

¹⁰⁰ Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 9 and Franks, *American Soldier*, 422. General Franks in his book states that "security would not be possible in Iraq without immediate reconstruction and civic action." In my opinion, this is reverse of what is true. 'Reconstruction and civic action' can only occur in a secure environment. Therefore, an army must establish security first and everything else flows from this essential condition. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-5. This was the current doctrinal manual in use at the start of OIF.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 110; Franks, *American Soldier*, 392-393; and Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 8-9 and 26-28.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 16-17 and Ricks, *Fiasco*, 111.

¹⁰³ Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 304-306.

¹⁰⁴ Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq*, 7-8 and 80-81.

¹⁰⁵ Eisenhower, *So Far From God*, 303.

¹⁰⁶ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 11 August 2011) IV-33 – IV-34.

¹⁰⁷ US Congress, *Executive Doc. #59*, Scott to Marcy on 12 November 1846. Rice University Online Archive.

¹⁰⁸ Eric Schmitt, "Threats and Responses: Military Spending; Pentagon Contradicts General on Occupation Forces' Size," *New York Times* 27 February 2003. <http://nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-threatsandresponses.html> (accessed 13 November 2011) and Bensahel, *After Saddam*, 17.

¹⁰⁹ Henry A. Leonard, *Something Old, Something New: Army Leader Development in a Dynamic Environment* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2006) 99-100; Lieutenant General Michael A. Vane, "New Norms for the 21st Century Soldier," *Military Review* (July-August 2011), 16-17; and Ellen Van Velsor, et al., *Key Development Events and Lessons from Senior Officers*, (Greensboro, North Carolina: Center for Creative Leadership, 2011) 4.

