




**Objective 1.1: Non-compliant Actors and
other Irregular Adversaries:**

**Dealing with Actors and Compliance
in Intervention Operations
in a Non-permissive Hybrid Environment**



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Executive Summary

"Yet huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. Our new commander in Afghanistan -- General McChrystal -- has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: The status quo is not sustainable."¹

1. Basic Thoughts

*"The stakes in Afghanistan are high. ... The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. ... Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying hard or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. **The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.**"²*

Afghanistan has become a synonym for current missions, their challenges and their risks. It is the leading, yet not the only example of what missions and crisis management in the 21st century are all about. Not only that crisis management has become one of the key civil and military activities, operations of such quality have been transformed considerably in the past decade.

Missions may take on a rather broad spectrum stretching from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement and maintenance, nation building, and large-scale civil-military operations. The spectrum is very volatile and dynamic. The character of a mission may even change during the operation as such.

Moreover, the number of actors involved in such an operation has increased in numbers and in quality. The arc of actors ranges from governments to international organizations, private companies and non-governmental organizations. Finally, those actors show divergent mandates, missions, agendas, and different resources with even diametrically opposing targets. This complex environment is further compounded today by an increased quantity of actors involved in the conflict enabled by ever increasing improvements in international travel and communications.

¹ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan> (entry 2.12.2009).

² COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT, dated August 30, 2009. available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09, bold by the study's authors).

Missions/operations in the 21st century may take on a **variety of characters and shapes**, thereby **combining military and civilian elements** and, finally, **change its “face”** during a mission/operation as such several times.

Additionally, a mission/operation may **involve a heterogeneous spectrum of actors** who encounter an even more **dynamic spectrum of challenges**.

The picture described above may be dubbed as classical example of complexity in a very broad understanding. Complexity as a current and future phenomenon drives situations and enables the emergence of numerous other phenomena as delineated above.

Complexity is not a showstopper but it is **reality**. It requires delving into the matter of complexity and related issues (such as dynamics, non-linearity, backloops, time lags etc.) to understand what is **going on behind the curtains** of various scales of operations, of the spectrum of actors, and the emerging challenges.

For reason, it is of utmost importance to describe the methods, mechanisms, motivations, drivers (understood as processes which stretch over a longer period of time and may turn into non-compliance) and triggers (understood as final event or events which leads/lead to non-compliance) for compliance and non-compliance in order to better understand how to engage local populations in a manner which fosters the authority and legitimacy of the state.

Many missions take place in a **non-permissive hybrid environment**. The notion of a **non-permissive environment** refers to the fact that conditions to stabilize and reconstruct an order are not supportive and favorable enough to comply this aim. Usually, the local government is not willing and/or able to support respective Coalition's efforts effectively. In a non-permissive environment, actors, activities, triggers, methods and mechanisms of non-compliance receive an additional spin in development. It makes forecasts and handling of the situation even more complex than it is anyway in a permissive environment.

Hybridity refers to the fact that Actor 1 mixes activities with Actor 2 and vice versa (interaction). The result/outcome/output is a hybrid mixture of both. Apart from action as a result, new actors may also be an outcome of hybridity.

Orders are a generic category to grasp a cumulative phenomenon, such as an accumulation of actors. It is a meta-category of huge scope and has an “umbrella function” to cover many types of actors, such as different types of states and non-states. Additionally, it covers biological (e.g. the classical geographical and climatic environment) and technical categories (e.g. cyberspace). An order does not necessarily require an overarching synthesis such as a government. Common targets, an intersubjective consensus, or the societal practice form more often the basis for the emergence and the sustaining of an order. Additionally, orders are based on the existence of common, interests and values that refer to primary targets. Rules, law-like regulations, formal and informal agreements, moral, customs and established practice determine the patterns within the order.

Hybrid orders are orders embracing different types of actors, no matter whether they find themselves in the compliant and/or non-compliant spectrum of activities in a generic understanding plus the different environment[s] who intra-act and inter-act. In

hybrid orders actors, interactions and effects show a higher potential for and of complexity. Though it is highly advisable to apply a Comprehensive Approach it easily may reach its thresholds.

Three issues are of key importance for an Operational Commander:

1. Understanding **complexity** is the **pre-requisite** to **properly deal with non-permissive hybrid environment** actors, interactions and effects, and, finally, apply a comprehensive approach.
2. Modern stabilization and reconstruction based on a Comprehensive Approach doubtlessly **require a process of mutual adaptation between multitudes of diverse actors, who pursue their respective goals**. Finally, the various perspectives need to be harmonized to achieve a commonly agreed goal. This may be a highly contentious process.
3. **Intervening hybrid orders with classical tools such as “surgical interventions” and conventional warfare will hardly change hybrid orders**. The nature of such an order will remain unchanged. Even retaliation will achieve certain effects without a chance to assess the relative success of such an activity. Imposing an external type of order on hybrid orders will partially be possible but the hybrid order will be flexible and adaptable as much as necessary. If pressure from outside fades a hybrid order will turn back to its original state. Consequently, a Coalition's objectives must be adapted to the nature of a hybrid order and not vice versa. The point of departure is grasping the nature of a hybrid order and linking it into a Coalition's objectives. Finally, one has to slip into the role of a possible adversary and find out what objectives are reasonable and achievable.

2. Understanding the environment and the order(s)

Different types of orders do exist; they are usually the main target of intervention; their rules of living together may be considerably different as compared to the rules in post-modern states; a military-alone intervention is not enough to change those orders.

Political opportunism, election driven behavior and decision making, government periods, public opinion, rule of law, international law, Geneva Convention etc. **limit the room to maneuver** for troops since non-compliant actors and irregular adversaries drive and shape this room.

In a non-permissive environment the objective to achieve a safe and secure environment to a manageable extent is crucial to be able to establish a Comprehensive Approach. A Comprehensive Approach seems to be a far more adequate approach to engage such types of entities and bring them step by step over a longer period of time on the track of postmodern states. Finally, it requires to deal with all five levels of government (national, regional, provincial, municipal and local) - not solely the national center.

For establishing successful communication networks with respect to foreign cultures one needs a **well-differentiated intercultural competence**. To create good relationships factors such as *intercultural awareness* and interest in observing differences, *intercultural sensibility and respect* (e.g., being open minded and reflective), *intercultural understanding* (e.g., access to the other's world view, value systems, belief systems, religion) and *intercultural skills* (e.g., language skills,

knowledge of social rules, communication skills) are necessary but not sufficient conditions.

Additionally, for a productive information exchange and for effective interventions one has to gain a precise analysis of the other's knowledge structures (belief systems) and present state of knowledge, to look for feedback concerning adequate interpretation of information and to test the psychological conditions of readiness for information input.

The Operational Commander has to take three factors into account:

1. The **environment and the order are not the same**, but two different perspectives. Additionally, **numerous types of orders** do exist. **Achieving a safe and secure environment is crucial** if a Coalition acts within a non-permissive environment. The room to maneuver for troops is rather limited since non-compliant actors and irregular adversaries drive and shape this room.
2. A **Comprehensive Approach seems to be far more adequate** to engage such types of entities and bring them step by step over a longer period of time on the track of postmodern states.
3. A key factor to success is **profound knowledge on cultural issues**. This requires obtaining well-differentiated **intercultural competence**.

3. Understanding what an actor is all about

It is of utmost important to start with grasping the actor(s) and not to begin with the non-compliant slot. In all phases of a development, any actor must be aware of a changing environment with its specific features, since actors themselves (conscious and/or unintended) become part of the environment. Change is a "natural on-going" because of interaction between actors and the environment (Coalition forces included).

Actors who hide themselves in the hybrid environment are the most dangerous and at the same time difficult to handle; they use the environment in support of their own objectives and against the Coalition's objectives, because they are the much more familiar with it; for reason, they belong to the extreme part of the non-compliance spectrum up to the Irregular Adversary spectrum of actors.

Moreover, it is **impossible to separate actors in the extreme non-compliance spectrum from others**. They represent a hybrid order itself which can hardly be separated from others, since they are "**multi rolers & multi hatters**" (this means that somebody all the hats in parallel and plays the roles in parallel and not in sequences!).

Actors have their specific interests and intentions which probably cannot be changed in time. For reason, adequate operational planning to a complex non-permissive environment is crucial for success. This implies to **integrate the multidimensional viewing of actors**. Particularly for **transition phase** it is vital to identify the key actors. They can either be more or less supportive to Coalition efforts or not supportive. Their support may vary over the course of time.

During interaction, **specific phenomena may occur**. One of these phenomena is non-compliance of actors within a spectrum of deviation from the compliant status. It is highly required to step down from the black-and-white friend-and-foe-only perception. Additionally, it is of utmost importance for the sustainable success of the

Coalition force **not to pre-tag actors either as good or bad**. This would lead to not controllable vexed consequences for the overall undertaking and certainly would lead to a detrimental outcome.

Compliance and non-compliance are phenomena, i.e. they refer to any observable occurrence; phenomena may be perceived through a person's senses or with their mind. One could also call them appearances. It requires a specific scientific approach on the analytical level. **Operational commanders as well as actors**, who carry out the comprehensive strategy up to the strategic level, need to have a **scientific toolset** to be able to analyze the phenomenon and deal with it appropriately. This may be heavy work at the beginning, but it **finally will pay off**.

Fostering compliance and establishing active and passive resistance against non-compliance should be seen as counter-strategies to non-compliance. This supports the idea of creating and fostering a non-permissive environment for non-compliance and Irregular Adversaries. Additionally, one must understand the **interconnections**. **Trial and error is certainly not an advisable way** to deal the phenomenon since it causes numerous unintended effects which are usually detrimental to the Coalition's strategy.

If an activity is to **hinder or hamper the achievement** of the Coalition strategic vision or goals, one has to analyze the actor's **intent and interests behind this activity**. The hampering moment is the defining moment whether a phenomenon is compliant or non-compliant. The phenomenon refers to both, the actor AND the activity. Both objects together form the phenomenon of compliance/non-compliance.

Operational Commanders must be aware the following three issues:

1. He is confronted with "**multi rolers & multi hatters**" within a very diverse spectrum of actors. Non-compliant actors up to Irregular Adversaries play a particular role, since they may conduct a kind of effects-based operations based on a comprehensive understanding of their own environment.
2. **Local actors** in complex environments are very often in leading positions in the political, economic, ethnic, tribal, religion or military sense. These kinds of people have a comprehensive understanding of their own environment.
3. **As the Coalition becomes part of the environment it is of utmost necessity to understand the environment in a comprehensive manner**, too. This request transcends managing information.

4. Applying a Comprehensive Approach

Strategic conceptualizing is a permanent process, i.e. the conditions and pre-requisites are to be monitored continuously and, in case of significant deviation strategic concepts have to be adapted. This implies also **changes in the way of thinking** (as clearly indicated in the initial assessment by Gen McChrystal from August 20, 2009).

One of the key conclusions is that a Comprehensive Approach **must entail very robust interfaces**. The reason is that the actual application of a Comprehensive Approach very often is not in the direct interest of non-compliant actors. Future endeavors should focus on "robusting" the Comprehensive Approach.

Based on this premises and the request of permanent monitoring of the conditions, a Coalition intervening into hybrid orders in a particular environment, therefore, needs to

- **adopt a Comprehensive Approach** which finally starts up with a comprehensive strategy,
- be able to **follow the strategic vision in a flexible way** (alongside the “moving orders and environments” – adaptive – probably in a self-adaptive manner at least in certain issues),
- have **adaptive goals** to be able to use all opportunities the environment and the orders and actors offer,
- **understand compliance and non-compliance** as phenomena,
- **establish appropriate instruments and tools** to cope with phenomena on the operational level, especially on the interfaces between the strategic and the operational level as well as between the civil and military segment of the Comprehensive Approach, and,
- **avoid the approach of achieving a strategic end state since there is simply no such a state at all in a complex and highly volatile environment and in hybrid orders.** For reason, it is highly recommended not to include a strategic end state as an apodictic and stasis-like concept. **It is suggested to work with “flexible goaling”**, i.e. to adapt goals and make them part of the environment and the hybrid order and vice versa. This means that goals and environment/hybrid order are shoving and shaping each other permanently. The first reasonable step to bring this process into going is to make the hybrid order’s goals ones own goals and match them with the Coalition’s goals (particularly necessary under the given restraints in terms of time and resources).

Additionally, the following issues must be taken into account:

- As the environment and orders are complex and dynamic by nature, it is not useful to pursue a static strategy with static goals by static means and approaches. Although a **strategy** defines itself as a long-term compromise of a Coalition, it needs to be **comprehensive by nature** as well as support all kinds of opportunities for the Coalition.
- The **comprehensive Coalition strategy** needs to be carried out along a well-planned and well-conducted **change management**. The Coalition is one order interacting with others in a dynamic complex environment. The Coalition itself as well as other orders is also part of a permanently changing environment, though change within the environment may assume different qualities.
- The **Coalition itself is also changing** in terms of interest, intention and nature. This is a rather **normal process**, since it is an order in itself with a high degree of dynamic and complexity.

The following three requests transcend the level of an Operational Commander and shall be valid for all involved in a mission:

1. Applying a Comprehensive Approach seems a **road to success in non-permissive hybrid environments and hybrid orders**.
2. Successful application of a Comprehensive Approach **requires a flexible and adaptive strategy and vision**. For reason, permanent reflection on the strategy and vision and the Comprehensive Approach itself are indispensable pre-requisites. Additionally, open-mindedness for phenomena such as compliance/non-compliance is a must to be in a position to understanding the volatile ongoing in an environment and in an order.
3. It is a **permanent walk on a tight rope between determinateness and free-wheelingness in terms of flexibility and adaptiveness**. Certainly, **there is no “one-size-fits-all-solution”, but, in fact, every mission needs a tailor-made solution**. Yet, one finally may find some generic parameters. They should not tempt to walk in the direction of “one-size-fits-all”. At best, they may serve as guidelines.

Introduction

"The 21st Century world has become increasingly interdependent. International crises are frequently brought about by intra- or inter-state conflict, failed or failing states, transnational crime organizations and terrorism, and natural causes such as drought or famine.

Concurrently, crisis management operations have evolved from traditional peacekeeping to include peace enforcement and maintenance, "nation building", and large-scale civil-military operations. Additionally, the number of different crisis management actors has dramatically increased and includes governments, international organizations, private companies and non-governmental organizations representing a variety of different sectors (security, governance, economic development, humanitarian, etc.) frequently with divergent mandates, missions, agendas, and different resources.

This complex environment is further compounded today by an increased quantity of actors involved in the conflict enabled by ever increasing improvements in international travel and communications. All these factors pose challenges of daunting magnitude.³

The picture described above may be dubbed as classical example of complexity in a very broad understanding.⁴ Complexity is not only a current phenomenon but rather a key future issue. Complexity drives situations and enables the emergence of numerous other phenomena as delineated above. Global turbulences and perturbations are results which are required to be dealt with.⁵

³ Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5); Report of Synthesized Findings; Final MNE 5 Product, p. 10.

⁴ Because of complexity it is of utmost importance to come to grips with solid considerations regarding the key notions. Blurred key notions hamper any strategy, operational art and tactics. Lack of a common ground on notions – be they general such as 'security, strategy, policy etc.' or more specific such as 'irregular adversary, hybrid order etc.' – is the main stumbling block for a clear-cut discussion within Coalition forces and between Coalition forces and the actors within an hybrid environment and a hybrid order.

⁵ See particularly the path breaking work of James N. Rosenau who was one of the first scholars who theoretically and pragmatically reasoned about the changes in orders, in environments and derived possible consequences for decision making.

J. N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.): *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990*, Lexington, MA, and Toronto 1989.

J. N. Rosenau, N./Fagen, W. Michael: *A New Dynamism in World Politics: Increasingly Skilful Individuals?*, in: *International Studies Quarterly*, 1997 (41), pp. 655-686.

J. N. Rosenau: *Governance in the Twenty-first Century*, in: *Global Governance*, 1/1995, pp. 13-43.

J. N. Rosenau: *Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs*, in: D. S. Albert, / T. J. Czerwinski: *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*, NDU, Washington 1997, Chapter 4, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat'l%20Sec%20-%20Sept%2098/ch04.html> (entry 18.3.2004).

J. N. Rosenau: *Stability, Stasis, and Change: A Fragmegrating World*, in: R. L. Kugler/ E. L. Frost: *The Global Century*, pp. 127-153, www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2001 (entry 18.3.2.2004, 23.12.2004).

J. N. Rosenau: *The complexities and contradictions of globalization*, *Current History*, Nov. 1997, pp. 360-364.

Phenomena such as state failure have the potential to destabilize regions or feed broader global insecurity, the international community (or ad hoc Coalitions of member states) may choose to intervene. Such interventions would usually be at the invitation of the host government or under a specific United Nations mandate and the military contribution will often be a necessary but not sufficient element in the intervention. As a consequence, a huge variety of intervening actors are likely to deploy to the area of operation, some of which may have had a presence in theatre for years prior to the outbreak of conflict and the deployment of troops.

The mission and mandate for such operations may vary widely. In some circumstances intervening actors may be deployed to bolster the authority and capacity of the host government across a range of ministries. In other situations intervening actors may be deployed to counter the activities of insurgents, criminals, militia or other 'irregular' non-state actors. In yet others, intervening actors may be deployed to provide the conditions for effective peace processes between warring factions. In its most demand form, operations will involve a mix of all of the above elements within the context of state fragility and societal conflict.

Violent opposition to government authority usually takes the form of 'irregular activity' and may be motivated by those with specific grievances against the State (such as local insurgents, sectarian militia and/or jihadists) or opportunists keen to exploit the power vacuum (such as criminals, cartels and/or warlords). When a state lacks the will or capability to meet these challenges to its authority and is unable to provide adequate security for its population, people tend to turn to those individuals that can deliver their immediate needs. As such, the broader population may exhibit various degrees of compliance and non-compliance⁶ to the host government.

It is necessary to describe the methods, mechanisms, motivations, drivers (understood as processes over a longer period of time which may turn into non-compliance) and triggers (understood as final event which leads to non-compliance) for compliance and non-compliance in order to better understand how to engage local populations in a manner which fosters the authority and legitimacy of the state.⁷

J. N. Rosenau: The Dynamics of Globalization: Toward an Operational Formulation, in: Security Dialogue, 1996, vol 27 (3), pp. 251-260.

J. N. Rosenau: Turbulences in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton NJ, 1990.

⁶ Non-compliance: All types of activities and behavior detrimental to the achievement of the Coalition strategic vision/objectives and their implementation.

Non-compliant actor: An individual or group that performs activities or exhibits behaviors to counter the achievement of the Coalition strategic vision/objectives and their implementation. See Multinational Experiment Executive Steering Group Meeting Multinational Experiment 6, Granada, Spain, 26 Mar 09, Decision Sheet, 20090331.

⁷ This has clearly been indicated in the COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT, dated August 30, 2009. available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09).

General McChrystal bluntly indicated numerous times in his statement that the "entire culture - ... - must change profoundly". (p. 2-1 of the unclassified version of COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT). He referred to changes in the understanding of the environment, the definition of the fight, the interaction between the Afghan people and government. The outcome shall be a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy which is based on the following principles: improve understanding, build relationships, project confidence, decentralize, re-integration and reconciliation, economic support to counterinsurgency. See pp. 2-12 to 2-14 of the unclassified version of COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT, available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry

Ultimately, it is not enough to avoid triggers but a Coalition has to put its fingers already on the drivers if it wants to prevent non-compliance.⁸

When circumstances permit, host government entities and civilian agencies would deploy alongside Coalition or United Nations forces to help determine overarching priorities and deliver broader societal and institutional activities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction. This ambition proved predominant in Iraq and Afghanistan. It proved clear that resources are important, yet they are not necessarily the crux. Resources may include economic, social and infrastructure development programs, political reconciliation initiatives and host government capacity building activities. In such an environment, the development of co-operative, multinational and inter-agency planning and implementation mechanisms will be crucial to campaign success. Additionally, the combination of a clear commitment to the mission, intellectual energy, and visible progress ('success stories') are of utmost importance.⁹

When circumstances are less benign, local civil administration and existing market structures may be prevented from providing essential services and products (food, water, clothing, medicine) that are required by the civilian population. In these circumstances, multinational forces are required under the 4th Geneva Convention to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population or at least facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance by civil actors such as national and international relief agencies and NGOs. The relationship between the roles of military forces and civil actors will undoubtedly generate tensions which will need to be understood and resolved.¹⁰ In the context of modern stabilization and reconstruction based on a Comprehensive Approach facing irregular threats implies a process of mutual adaptation between multitudes of diverse actors, pursuing their respective goals and harmonizing the overall activities to achieve a commonly agreed goal.

In case of non-permissive hybrid environment actors, interactions and effects show a higher potential for and of complexity. For reason, two issues are of highest importance: first, an improved level of understanding of the environment as such; and, secondly, the application of and cooperation within the framework of a Comprehensive Approach becomes much more challenging. Though it is highly advisable to apply a Comprehensive Approach it easily may reach its thresholds. This is particularly valid for reaching common goals towards Irregular Adversaries and problematic governments.

Non-permissive environment: In the underlying study, the notion of non-permissive environment refers to the fact that conditions to stabilize and reconstruct an order are not supportive and favorable enough to comply this aim; usually, the local government is not willing and/or able to support respective Coalition's efforts effectively. In a non-permissive environment, actors, activities, triggers, methods and

21.09.09).

⁸ See COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT, available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09). which is centered around comprehensive population oriented approach, ie. apart from better understanding and executing COIN basics, the key of ISAF is to protect the people, understand their environment and build relationships with them (p. 2-1 of the unclassified version of COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT).

⁹ See p. 2-1 of the unclassified version of COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT).

¹⁰ The authors like to thank COL Bryan A Groves for his valuable comment. See his email dated 28 July 2009.

mechanisms of non-compliance receive an additional spin in development. It makes forecasts and handling of the situation even more complex than it is anyway in a permissive environment.

Non-permissive hybrid environment: In the underlying study and with regard to non-permissive hybrid environment features of hybrid environments matter even more: Complexity, non-linearity, etc. play an even greater role. Spiral effects attend, leverages of mechanisms become rather important. A non-permissive hybrid environment provides lots of opportunities to actors in the non-compliant spectrum up to the Irregular Adversaries level. Their greatest advantage is the knowledge of actors with their respective interests and intentions, mechanisms in the environment and achievable effects to support their objectives. In a non-permissive environment the objective to achieve a safe and secure environment to a manageable extent is crucial to be able to establish a Comprehensive Approach. Moreover, it is impossible to separate actors in the extreme non-compliance spectrum from others. They represent a hybrid order itself which can hardly be separated from others, since they are “multi rolers & multi hatters”. This means that somebody all the hats in parallel and plays the roles in parallel and not in sequences! i.e. one actors plays several role at a time.

Such an environment is often found in entities of pre-modern nature and quality. Pre-modern entities refer e.g. to former colonies which were drawn into chaos; they can be states, regions or generally speaking entities. They often are in the status of a failure. Power and legitimization to apply power and violence usually has waned away. They are unable to secure its territory, thereby opening up room for parallel actors. Usually they fill this power gap and try to squeeze opportunities for themselves. Sometimes, they are labeled as sanctuaries for terrorists and general unrest. Such entities can be found in Africa, Central Asia, and Caucasus etc. A particular danger is posed by entities which bridge such pre-modern constructs (Pakistan may serve as an example).

Based on the Multinational Experiment 6 Problem statement which reads follows:¹¹

To establish and ensure a safe and secure environment, coalition forces require the ability to share information, gain situational understanding, synchronize efforts and assess progress in concert with interagency partners, international organizations, and other stakeholders when countering activities of irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors ...

... the study follows a question based approach with a general research question in the centre of interest:¹²

Which dimensions (like methods, mechanisms, motivations and triggers¹³) of non-compliance have to be considered in Coalition operational environments to develop

¹¹ See Multinational Experiment 6, Baseline Assessment. It is highly recommended to permanently review the problem statement, thereby keeping up with the ever-changing so-called reality.

¹² D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Workshop Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Potsdam, 2009.

¹³ See Task, Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6.

comprehensive recommendations to achieve compliance in order to contribute to a safe and secure environment?

The following **research areas** are to be read before the backdrop of a non-permissive hybrid environment. They were established to **specify the general research question** more detailed:¹⁴

1. What are the current and foreseeable framework's conditions (i.e. particularly orders, environment, norms and rules) Coalition forces are engaged in?
2. How can the generic scenario and framework for reference of the underlying study be described (i.e. how can asymmetry be delineated in the underlying context)?
3. What is the impact of non-compliance for achieving the Coalition goals?
4. What are dimensions of non-compliance, such as scopes, fields, objects and modes? Are there links between Irregular Adversaries and non-compliance? If yes, which one and how do they impact a Coalition?
5. Which are the types of non-compliance Coalition forces could be confronted in such a scenario? How would a typology look like? What are possible causes for non-compliance? How can they be assessed?
6. Which recommendations for the development of guidelines within a Comprehensive Approach shall be given to improve compliance and hinder transition into the Irregular Adversary spectrum? What kinds of strategies are applicable in order to prevent a mitigation of actors to the Irregular Adversary spectrum?

The following study report is designed in a **comprehensive manner**, i.e. the chapters cover also conclusions and recommendations. **It is framed within a question-based approach** and

- describes the **background for non-compliance** with regard to a non-permissive hybrid environment, since this is the most challenging type of environment; additionally, this type of environment will be the main to be encountered in future operations; in particular delineations on the environment and on orders are provided;
- furthermore, offers an **analyses of different types of actors and paradigms of non-compliance** (including motivations, triggers, methods and mechanisms of actors on their path to non-compliance);
- shows **ways to cope with non-compliance**, thereby particularly emphasizing the Comprehensive Approach (delineating the Coalition's Comprehensive Strategy, operational/in-country level of planning and the organization for flexibility in planning) as the currently most appropriate approach;
- delineates **approaches for various types of actors**,
- provides a **point of departure** concerning terms and definitions, and,

¹⁴ D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Workshop Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Potsdam, 2009.

- finally, proposes **recommendations for the operational commander**, dealing with non-compliance and other Irregular Adversaries as a particular phenomenon.

1 Background for Non-compliance

1.1 Generic Deliberations: Environment and Orders¹⁵

“The conflict in Afghanistan can be viewed as a set of related insurgencies, each of which is a complex system with multiple actors and a vast set of interconnecting relationships among those actors. The most important implication of this view is that no element of the conflict can be viewed in isolation – a change anywhere will affect everything else. This view implies that the system must be understood holistically, and while such understanding is not predictive, it will help to recognize general causal relationships.”¹⁶

What General McChrystal found out for Afghanistan seems to be of a more generic quality. For reason, an in-depth analysis of generic parameters which supports a better understanding of what the environment and possible orders are all about is an indispensable step within the framework of comprehensive approach.

The following deliberations form the basis to arrive at a more or less concrete imagination on the environment and of orders a Coalition is confronted with in case of an intervention.

In the underlying work environment refers to the area of intervention, including all actors and orders between those actors and can be characterized by general features.

The environment covers enduring and variable parameters (i.e. parameter which remain relatively unaltered over a longer period of time and within space; and parameters which change more or less over a longer period of time and within space). Change is a permanent phenomenon, yet it is continuous and discontinuous. Fast changes with parallel deaths of actors, i.e. actors may change their behavior, attitudes, interests, needs and finally, their way and course of action; they may be friend and foe within a relatively brief period of time. We see an increased appearance of new actors particularly of non-sovereign actors (they may be compliant and/or non-compliant).

Networking effects and intertwining of events and processes are key standard within the environment. Perceptions of time, space, legitimacy, sovereignty and power have changed considerably as compared to similar environments some years ago. So processes often do not have a clear beginning and a clear ending; additionally systemic ripple effects may appear which means that small causes may lead to far reaching effects.

Coalition actors must be aware that they are part of the environment and cause specific intended and unintended effects and changes. Both float into one each

¹⁵ Part 1.1 is based on A. K. Riemer: The International Order at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt/Main 2007, part. Part A: Order Analysis, pp. 29-69.

¹⁶ p. 2-3 of the unclassified version of COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT, available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09).

other, impact and create each other. Any strategy becomes part of the environment and vice versa, meaning that a strategy molds and shapes the environment and vice versa. For reason, strategies need to be adapted on a regular basis to be in a position fulfilling the “shaping part” and not lag too much behind the development of the environment. A strategy is not a “top-down only process” but must take both into consideration, top-down and bottom-up. This is particularly valid for a non-permissive hybrid environment. Strategies successful in such an environment must comprise a more improvised element than in other environments. Finally, improvisation must reach a “cultivated level” to achieve success and to drive again the environment according to a Coalition’s interests and objectives (i.e. the application of *Auftragstaktik* [mission-type tactics] as opposed to *Befehlstaktik* [order-type tactics] is suggested to be consideration for certain activities). This would allow more room for adaptation.

An environment as factual and ideational framework consists of numerous orders. An order is an ideational framework consisting of actors, their actions and interactions and shows three levels of interaction:

1. Ideational or intersubjective (How is the world socially constructed? What does/do the single individual and/or groups of individuals perceive?)
2. Behavioral (What does/do the individual or/and groups of individuals do on a regular basis to keep global arrangements alive? How is the world perceived by opinion leaders?)
3. Institutional (This level refers to institutions and regimes within a state or between states and/or non-sovereign actors)

Orders are a generic category to grasp a cumulative phenomenon, such as an accumulation of actors. It is a meta-category of huge scope and has an “umbrella function” to cover many types of actors, such as different types of states and non-states. Additionally, it covers biological (e.g. the classical geographical and climatic environment) and technical categories (e.g. cyberspace).

An order does not necessarily require an overarching synthesis such as a government. Common targets, an intersubjective consensus, or the societal practice form more often the basis for the emergence and the sustaining of an order. Additionally, orders are based on the existence of common, interests and values that refer to primary targets. Rules (verbal and non-verbal ones; communicated and non-communicated ones), law-like regulations, formal and informal agreements, moral, customs and established practice determine the patterns within the order.

Their relationships are distinctively stronger in terms of quality and quantities compared to other parts/elements/actors and constitute systemic borders, which separates such a system from its environment. It makes the system ‘visible’, distinctive and, finally, viable. Borders are ‘assumed or artificial borders’ and not necessarily real and measurable borders. They are qualitative criteria to distinguish the ‘one from the other’. Borders serve as orientation line and support clearer structures in the overall system. Moreover, those borders may vary in the course of time and from perspective to perspective.

Orders consist of many interacting individuals and/or groups of individuals. They exhibit properties such as self-organization, evolution, and constant novelty. They

exist in all the areas of the world of physical orders, biological orders, and human social orders. It is very difficult to comprehend them by the standard reductionist analytic approach of modern science. For reason, a Comprehensive Approach understood as multidisciplinary and multimethodologically will support grasping the order under consideration much better in the sense that it serves a Coalition's effort to shove and shape orders as such.

The following features of orders¹⁷ are of supportive quality and must be taken into account at all stages of an intervention and to understand why actors may be involved in non-compliance. Those features form a parenthesis to describe the underlying study's perception of a hybrid order. Numerous hybrid orders will be labeled as hybrid environment.

It is also possible, that an actor, whose activities were for long time non-compliant changes activities to the compliant spectrum. This means that actors may oscillate within the spectrum. For reason, a one-time labeling is neither reasonable nor justified.

Numerous encounters of more or less high **dynamics** happen on all levels of orders, particularly in communicating between actors.

Complexity is caused by interaction between a considerable number of different and, more or less, independent variables (i.e. levels, types and actors). This development is overlaid and, additionally, influenced by intra-action. Sometimes relationships between the elements of orders are not clear but blurred ('fuzziness'). Causes, effects, intra- and inter-actions per se are often no longer distinguishable. The 'fate' of the actors, types and levels in the order and their relationships are influenced by their intra-action, the current interaction, past experience and future expectations. Accountability receives a particular connotation, i.e. full accountability is not reachable – on a mutual basis.

¹⁷ Classical systems theory: See L. von Bertalanffy: General Systems Theory, 6th rev. ed., New York 1979. N. Wiener: Kybernetik: Regelung und Nachrichtenübertragung im Lebewesen und in der Maschine, Düsseldorf, Wien, New York, Moskau 1992.

Theory of social systems: See N. Luhmann: Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie, 4. ed., Stuttgart 1993. Helmut Willke, Systemtheorie: Eine Einführung in die Grundprobleme der Theorie sozialer Systeme, 3. Aufl., New York 1991. J. A. Tainter: Sustainability of complex societies, Futures, Vol 27, No 4, pp. 397-407, 1995.

System-theoretical approaches in the field of political sciences and international relations: See W. L. Bühl: "Revolution und Systemtransformation", Politische Vierteljahrschrift, 28. Jg., (1987), Heft 2, pp. 162-196. W. L. Bühl: Sozialer Wandel im Ungleichgewicht: Zyklen, Fluktuationen, Katastrophen, Stuttgart 1990. Jay Forrester: World Dynamics, Cambridge, Mass. 1971). Ilya Prigogine: Science, Civilization and Democracy: Values, systems, structures and affinities, Futures August 1986, pp. 493-507. R. Jervis: System Effects. Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton, NJ 1997.

Chaos and catastrophe theory See J. Briggs and F. Peat David: Die Entdeckung des Chaos: Eine Reise durch die Chaos-Theorie, München, Wien 1990. J. Gleick: Chaos - die Ordnung des Universums: Vorstoss in Grenzbereiche der modernen Physik, München 1988.

theory of self-referential systems and interdisciplinary approaches: See H. Haken, / A. Mikhailov, (eds.): Interdisciplinary Approaches to Nonlinear Complex Systems, Heidelberg 1993. F. Malik: Strategie des Managements komplexer Systeme, 3. Aufl., Bern, Stuttgart 1989. C. Marchetti: Society as a Learning System: Discovery, Invention, and Innovation Cycles Revisited, Technological Forecasting and Societal Change 18, pp. 267-282 (1980). F. Vester: Unsere Welt - ein vernetztes System, 8. Aufl., München, 1993. J. H. Holland: Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity, Reading, MA 1995. S. Kauffman: At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity, New York 1995.

For reason, social development is neither pre-ordained nor unilinear. This implies that actors who act in the non-compliance spectrum are to be engaged by applying a more comprehensive and not a “military-only”-approach. Additionally, ‘multi roling and multi hatting’ must be comprehended thoroughly. Actors which serve as an interface between various orders deserve particular attention. Additionally, it is indispensable to figure out ‘key orders’ (as a tool to reduce complexity and to target resources!) which are of relevance to accomplish ones own targets.

All dynamic orders show **self-organizing skills**. Within a certain threshold of development, no ‘push and/or kick’ from outside is necessary to bring the order back into balance. It is able to adapt itself to the prevailing environment. It is flexible and robust against perturbations from outside. One can therefore assume, as long as vital interests of local actors are not affected too heavily, orders in the environment adapt themselves to changes to a certain extent. Making use of this fact can be a fact of success for a Coalition’s strategy.

Actors will adapt to imply or explicitly give rules and norms as long as their vital interests are not touched in their core. If vital interests are touched in their core additionally support needs to be fed in to keep actors within “natural borders” which make an order living smoothly and peacefully.

Finally, orders and actors adapt and impact themselves. Understanding a Coalition’s impact on the order opens up a way to understand how actors might change themselves in their behavior and their application of means (e.g. they may develop into the non-compliant spectrum).

The basis for the ‘life’ of an order is communication (interaction). This feature is in close relationship with ‘dynamics’. **Openness and closeness** exist at the same time. This is not a contradiction per se, but a specific feature of complex, social and autopoietic orders. Orders display a certain state of exclusivity.

For reason, impacting actors is of vital importance for “out-side actors” to keep actors within “natural borders” which make an order living smoothly and peacefully. Additionally, “natural borders” need to be predefined, because they shove and shape the fact whether actors within an order tend to act in the non-compliant spectrum or stay within the range of compliance. Closeness is an aspect which requires as much respect as possible, since it is a “natural shelter” for an order’s peaceful existence. Intruding into closeness bares a high level of uncertainty and of unintended and unpredictable effects.¹⁸

Generally speaking, there is always the possibility to establish access to actors in an environment and make them part of the solution. Exceptions are non-compliant actors per se¹⁹, who are the reason for an intervention. But this does not necessary mean that there is no way at all of getting them in line with Coalition objectives. It is a matter of time, patience, power of conviction and resources.²⁰

¹⁸ D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Workshops Objective 1.1, Potsdam, Vienna, 2009.

¹⁹ Working definition: In the underlying study *non-compliant actor per se* is an actor that stays with activities in the spectrum of non-compliance although comprehensive efforts were taken to bring him/her/them into the compliance spectrum of activities. This behavior does not necessarily mean that a non-compliant actor per se cannot be brought to the compliant spectrum of behavior and/or activities. Their activities are also in the Irregular Adversary spectrum. In many cases non-compliant actors per se are the reason for an intervention.

²⁰ D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Workshops Objective 1.1, Potsdam, Vienna, 2009.

Non-linearity means that causes and effects within an order cannot be assessed in terms of classical, deterministic mathematical equations. Similar causes produce 'un-similar' effects. Analogies can only be applied with care. Non-linearity poses considerable measurement and methodological problems. The *ceteris-paribus* clause (i.e. one variable is changed and the rest is held constant) is not applicable. In many cases, 'only' an approximation is possible.

For reason, any action undertaken has to be considered carefully in advance in a comprehensive manner since it may lead to unintended consequences. Moreover, costs of an action may overtake the benefits by far, i. e. it takes much more efforts and resources to re-establish a situation when non-linearity is neglected. Particularly in non-conventional conflict situations non-linearity is a hard-fact and requires a mental and ideational change of thought, since the phenomenon of accident is a vital part of the game.²¹

Back loops, feedbacks and timelags mean that a change in one element or relationship within the order often alters others, which in turn affect the original one. The results are cycles in which causality is mutual or circular rather than a one-way process, as it is in most applied theories. Feedbacks may take place between at least two different actors, but may also occur within an acting individual. Moreover, the different types of feedbacks might occur at the same time. Finally, it might become a matter of perspective in judging what kinds of feedbacks are perceived. Back-loops usually take place according to a 'stimulus-response pattern'. Stimulus and response do not take place at the same time, but with a time lag.

The following categories of back-loops must be distinguished:

Positive (enforcing, self-amplifying and therefore destabilizing) backloops: Positive back-loops stand for growth and change. Both may lead forces to continue or even magnify growth and change. Relationships will display a non-linear behavior. The magnitude between cause and effect will be disproportionate and will depend on the overall state of the system. Armaments race and the price-spiral are well-serving examples of positive feedbacks. Positive feedbacks are usually triggered by the interplay of *information*, *expectations*, *experience* (for example the case of a self-fulfilling prophecies); *tipping* (when several actors participate in the game of decision-making, a small cause may lead to a large effect, although beliefs, preferences, ideas, choices etc. remain constant); *consensus* (in this case actors imitate other actors or at least try to please them or take a position that is more extreme than the position of others); *competition* (one actors tries to overtake others), and *power* (an actor uses threats to maintain his/her position). Positive backlooping may serve as a tool to support complying actors in keeping on their behavior. On the other hand, positive backloops may serve as an explanation why actors may become at least temporarily non-compliant.

Negative (breaking, dampening and therefore stabilizing) backloops: This kind of back-loops have a regulative function. One example is the case of an armistice and of peace accords. Those agreements have a 'breaking effect'. They may delay and/or prevent an order's collapse, which is usually caused by a series of positive back-loops. Without negative back-loops, patterns would have not enough time to permit a society a minimum of organization and, consequently, stability. Negative backloops may also serve as a tool to turn a non-compliant actor into a compliant

²¹ D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Workshops Objective 1.1, Potsdam, Vienna, 2009.

one, particularly if an intervening Coalition sees through the patterns of behavior and comes into a position to break a non-compliant behavior.

Sometimes, positive and negative feedbacks operate at the same time, depending on the perspective from a particular situation, which is assessed. A well-known example of this is 'policy creates politics'. This refers to the phenomenon that policies affect institutions and instruments at their disposal. If the political environment changes new groups will emerge as a response to such change.

For reason, backlooping may be used to control a situation, either by consciously heating it up and/or be consciously breaking it and calming it down. Again, the feature must not be seen separately from other features, but must be viewed in a comprehensive manner as such.²²

Enhancing the above generically described concept of order the notion of "hybrid/hybridity" will be inserted. It will supplement the considerations. In the underlying context "**hybrid**" generically refers to the combination of two or more different things, aimed at achieving a particular objective or goal. It is the occurrence of offsprings of orders of different varieties, be they physical, biological, and human social by nature.

The term **hybridity** is believed to be derived from the Latin word *hybrida*, *hibrida* or *ibrida*, translated to *insult or outrage*. It refers in its most basic sense to mixture. The term originates from biology and was subsequently employed in linguistics and in racial theory in the nineteenth century. Its contemporary uses are scattered across numerous academic disciplines. In the underlying context, hybridity refers to the fact that Actor 1 mixes activities with Actor 2 and vice versa (interaction). The result/outcome/output is a hybrid mixture of both. Apart from action as a result, new actors may also be an outcome of hybridity.

Inserted into the concept complex orders, hybridity in terms of "hybrid activities" is the order of the day, i.e. it is a normal procedure.

Since "activity" is a neutral term, it could also be labelled as "challenge". For reason, hybrid challenge (also perceived as neutral) may emerge. They can either be an opportunity and/or a threat (hybrid opportunity/hybrid threat). The assessment depends on the individual standpoint and the experience-expectation horizon²³ of the observer (actor). Hybridity itself is a fact and not necessarily a danger. Again, it depends on the above mentioned.

Hybrid orders are orders embracing different types of observables (i.e. actors, no matter whether they find themselves in the compliant and/or non-compliant spectrum of activities in a generic understanding plus the different environment[s]) who intra-act and inter-act. For reason, the above described order will be tagged "hybrid order" in the underlying understanding.

Action as generic category within hybrid orders may either be intra-action and/or interaction. Generally, a hybrid order is determined in its behavior by the performance of the actors of the system (=interaction between and intra-action within

²² D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Workshops Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Potsdam, Vienna, 2009.

²³ See R. Koselleck: Kritik und Krise. Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt, Freiburg 1959: Koselleck refers to the notion of „experience-expectation“ (German: *Erfahrungs-Erwartung*) thereby trying to bridge the past and the future an individual brings into the assessment of a situation.

groups of actors, governments on various levels, non-governmental organizations, enterprises, institutions etc.).²⁴ Intra-action is often neglected, but is not less important than interaction. It serves as a supplemental phenomenon to interaction. Simply speaking, 'interaction' means that at least two units are communicating. Communication may take place on different levels. Moreover, different types of interaction can be figured out. Those levels and types of interaction will interplay permanently.²⁵

Interaction in hybrid orders is different to interaction in simple orders. It is not an additive approach based on clear-cut 'what-if questions'.²⁶ *"We cannot understand systems by summing up the characteristics of the parts or the bilateral relations between pairs of them. This is not to say that such operations are never legitimate, but only that when they are we are not dealing with a system. More precisely, actions often interact to produce results that cannot be comprehended by linear models."*²⁷

This working definition does not capture the nature of hybridity in the sense that at least two objects form a new third object in complex and dynamic orders. Mixed situations and non-conventional situations are not necessarily hybrid in the underlying understanding of the study. The same is valid for irregularity and asymmetry. Both can lead to hybridity but there is not a must-outcome. The above mentioned definition has to be seen as a first step towards a definition on hybrid threats but should not be something like an "end-state definition". We see it as a phenomenological account which definitely needs to be refined and developed further.

Summing up:

- It is of utmost importance to understand the environment and the different orders and their patterns as a basis to coin the right strategy. This first generic step serves as key basis to tailor the cultural mindset, particularly the operation culture.²⁸
- Intra-actions within a specific level and inter-actions between levels must be distinguished.
- Actions determine results and vice versa, because actions depend mainly on the state of other actions. One strategy depends on the strategies of others and affects such strategies as well. In both cases expectations and experiences of

²⁴ Complexity is the unavoidable result of intra-action within and interaction between the different actors. See F. Malik: Strategie des Managements komplexer Systeme, 3. Aufl., Bern, Stuttgart 1989, p. 45. H. Willke: Systemtheorie: Eine Einführung in die Grundprobleme der Theorie sozialer Systeme, 3. Aufl., Stuttgart, New York 1991, pp. 51-60. N. Luhmann: Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie, 4. Aufl., Frankfurt/M 1993, pp. 16-18. J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff: Contending Theories of International Relations. A Comprehensive Survey, 3rd ed., New York 1990, p.138.

²⁵ See R. Jervis: Complexity and the Analysis of Political and Social Life, Political Science Quarterly, (1997/98) 11, no 4, pp. 73-78.

²⁶ If interaction in complex social systems is dealt in the same way as interaction in simplex systems, decision-making will be inadequate. See R. Jervis: System Effects. Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton, NJ 1997, p. 29.

²⁷ R. Jervis: System Effects. Complexity in Political and Social, Princeton, NJ 1997, p. 34.

²⁸ See p. 2-11 of the unclassified version of COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT, available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09).

actors within, and even on different levels, influence the path of a development. Finally, the overall environment influences the behavior.

- Indirect and/or delayed effects of actions are to be considered. Indirect effects are often a by-product of other goals and activities. They may take place on the intra- and on the inter-level. In many cases, they are more important than direct effects. In addition, indirect effects may be intended or non-intended. Some actors understand the system well and 'play' in the policy setting with indirect effects, while others do not.
- Intra- and interaction are not always a two-ways phenomenon, which is isolated from the 'rest of the environment'. In many cases, they are 'cross-influenced' and 'counter-determined' by other issues and actions, which do not have any first-sight connection to the case in the narrow understanding.
- Developments not only may lead to unexpected outcomes, but they are in many cases neither smooth nor gradual. Jumps and unexpected results, which were originally not on the 'menu of expectations', characterize the life of complex social systems. In addition, it may happen that no change is perceived on the surface for a longer period. Suddenly – usually at an unexpected moment – a collapse or a transformation takes place. Sticking to linearity requires the assumption of proportionality between action and re-action (stimulus and response; input and output). However, in complex social systems this is hardly the case.
- Finally, multiplication (or aggregation) is also an inappropriate approach. It is not possible to predict results separated from the action. In international politics, two policy settings may lead to very different outcomes. Once a certain policy is launched, decision-makers are very often confronted with irreversibility of processes.
- In a non-permissive environment, actors, activities, triggers, methods and mechanisms of non-compliance receive an additional spin in development. It makes forecasts and handling of the situation even more complex than it is anyway in a permissive environment.
- In case of non-permissiveness features of hybrid environments matter even more: Complexity, non-linearity, etc. play an even greater role. Spiral effects attend, leverages of mechanisms become rather important.
- A non-permissive hybrid environment provides lots of opportunities to actors in the non-compliant spectrum up to the Irregular Adversaries level. Their greatest advantage is the knowledge of actors with their respective interests and intentions, mechanisms in the environment and achievable effects to support their objectives.
- In a non-permissive environment the objective to achieve a safe and secure environment to a manageable extent is crucial to be able to establish a Comprehensive Approach.
- Moreover, it is impossible to separate actors in the extreme non-compliance spectrum from others. They represent a hybrid order itself which can hardly be separated from others, since they are "multi-rolers & multi-hatters".
- Connecting hybrid orders and a non-permissive environment implies that the strategic, the operational and the tactical level are more interlocked than in

other types of orders and environments. This implies the strong need for a solid combination of a well-synchronized interactive top-down and bottom-up approach. Otherwise, events happening on the tactical level lead to a decoupling from the operational and the strategic level, thereby hampering any success on different levels.

- Since time has been “squeezed” in a hybrid, non-permissive environment, reaction sequences must be adapted adequately (*criticality of time*). This implies automatically shorter sequences and a faster rhythm. Trying harder and doubling down is not the solution. It requires to change in strategy, the way of thinking and the way of operating.²⁹
- Short-term sequences are overlaid by long term rhythms such as winning the support of the population (eg. confidence building and nation building; winning hearts and minds).³⁰ Both levels are deeply interlocked and must never be separated in considerations in a hybrid, non-permissive environment (phenomenon “parallel of the unparallel”). Repercussions on the application of different types of tactics are inevitable.
- In a hybrid, non-permissive environment it does not matter whether one applies an effect-based approach to operation or a capability-based approach to operation (to name the two most popular ones). It is much more important to focus on the key of operational art, i.e. any operation must deliver results which support the achievement of strategic political objectives.
- It is indispensable to target at a non-compliant actor’s strategy and NOT at the actor as such and at the effects he/she achieves with certain actions. This presupposes an in-depth identification of a non-compliant actor’s strategy. It will enable Coalition forces to establish a non-permissive environment for non-compliant actors and to turn the tables.

1.2 Change as a Source and Driver for Non-compliance

A Coalition intervention aims to support the international will to change a situation. Reasons for an intervention are non-compliant actors per se, who remain non-compliant against the will of the international community and the Coalition. Non-compliant actor may consist also of armed wings which can be defined as Irregular Adversaries.³¹ Their activities are very often the final trigger for launching an intervention.

²⁹ See p. 1-1 of the unclassified version of COMISAF’s INITIAL STATEMENT, available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09). This includes also rethinking what an operation is all about.

³⁰ See p. 1-1 of the unclassified version of COMISAF’s INITIAL STATEMENT, available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09).

³¹ “Adversary - A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.” NATO AAP-6.

The following characteristics associated with an “**Irregular Adversary**” are proposed to allow sufficient flexibility for experiment design and scenario development to ensure adequate evaluation of experiment objectives and outcomes and may include but are not limited to:

1. Not constrained by generally accepted conventions of international behavior, such as the Geneva Conventions with respect to agreed international standards covering the conduct of

Change is a challenging phenomenon in science. Rarely all parameters in a complex, social order change at the same time. Usually, more parameters remain rather stable within a certain threshold.

Change concerning the order is a neutral term, which does not indicate anything positive or negative about the source(s) for change and about consequences. It is a permanent phenomenon, which is rooted in intra- and interaction within the international order. Thereby, it is a constitutive part of the order, and a vital premise for their survival. It refers to the threshold (i.e. borders and boundaries) between present and past, between being and becoming, and is an expression of time and of indeterminism, going beyond clear mathematical-mechanic equations and laws of nature. Change is a process-phenomenon. In many cases, the first source for change cannot be identified. Usually, a key event supports the surfacing of a certain development, which differs from the earlier situation. Change may be continuous or discontinuous. Continuous change is perceived as a status of floating balance. Within certain borders and boundaries ('thresholds'), variables fluctuate and 'move'. Discontinuity, on the other hand, is a significant deviation from a certain floating balance.

It can be categorized as follows, change that affects

1. parameters as such (boundaries' oriented change);
2. structural parameters (power distribution within the international order);
3. relational parameters (longstanding relationships that support a smooth development of the processes within the international order); and
4. orientational parameters (i.e. the skills of individuals, citizens of a state or NGO-members).

Whether the order develops continuously or not is a matter of the assumed time-space framework. Continuity and discontinuity are subjective and relative

warfare. Often violate status as a regular combatant, feign civilian or non-combatant status or commit hostile acts in disobedience of the laws of war. Normally not a member of the regular armed forces, police or other internal security forces and lack the political discipline imposed by national sovereignty and accountability. May operate independently or outside the framework of a political state and often feel no allegiance to a nation or accepted political ideology.

1. Have a long term focus and use protracted efforts "below the threshold of war" to disrupt the ability of the government, the civilian security forces and the armed forces to carry out their tasks and to prevent the economy and political and public life from functioning normally. Employ a general strategy of avoidance and are often indistinguishable from the civil population. A key tenant may be focused on population control/popular support. Combat forces are only partially and occasionally visible and when directly confronted with a stronger military opponent, they transform, reorganize, and weave into various physical environments and human activities.
2. Exploit increasingly inexpensive but lethal weapons in an erosion strategy aimed at weakening political resolve by inflicting mounting casualties over time, often with external support from sovereign governments, transnational organizations or building of alternate or 'shadow' governments, as alternatives to standing sovereign governments, to demonstrate strength while delegitimizing the standing government. They are frequently characterized by particularly extreme violence with a degree of brutality, which ensures maximum media coverage, against both military and civilian targets. At the same time, they are adept at presenting their own suffering and commitment in the media to influence the international community. Note: Transnational is defined as extending or going beyond national boundaries.

See Multinational Experiment Executive Steering Group Meeting Multinational Experiment 6, Granada, Spain, 26 Mar 09, Decision Sheet, 20090331.

phenomena. The perception of change is depending on the experiences and expectations of the actor. What is perceived as change by actor A not necessarily is change for actor B, actor C,... actor X. This assumption makes change a 'category' with a considerable degree of relativity. Moreover, order hardly is subject to so-called 'total changes', i.e. that all parameters within the research object change.

This leads to the following conclusions:³²

- With releasing an intervention the Coalition causes somehow numerous changes in the respective environment. Such changes will have quite different consequences and must be taken into account in all phases of an intervention. Finally, change hugely impacts strategic and operational considerations.
- Changing a non-permissive hybrid environment means that the coalition encounters hybrid orders thereby interacting with them. Results might be perceived as rather chaotic and become uncontrollable by usual means.³³
- If an order has already experienced the state intended by a Coalition it is easier to achieve a Coalition's objective. For reason, it is important to identify nuclei of orders and stabilize and foster them.
- If an entity has not experienced the state intended by a Coalition the likelihood to fall back into pre-orders is rather high, i.e. if one tries to implement a quality of order one has to take at least 2-3 generations into account.
- On the other hand it is obvious that the timeframe to set the stage is not more than 4-5 years. This is due to pressure from home countries and from the intervened entity.
- Change should open up opportunities for all kinds of non-compliant actors to get back into the spectrum of compliance.
- The level of ambition for changes should not be too high (*"Avoid overambitious- multi-tiered capital intensive approach - Avoid the Supersize approach"*³⁴).
- A Coalition will not be able to change the hybridity of an environment. It must rather engage the non-permissiveness of the environment. Actors must be influenced or engaged
- A Coalition must be aware that changes are processes. So e.g. democracy must be understood as a process. Achieving a defined end-state concerning processes is sometimes not helpful in terms of achieving strategic objectives. It is more appropriate to define milestones and make local actors part of the solution. Additionally, time may take different qualities. What is "long" in the

³² D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Workshops Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Potsdam, Vienna, 2009.

³³ Understood as non-deterministic, which means the development cannot be depicted by classical mathematical equations. Pragmatically interpreted, if this fact is disregarded in a campaign and an operation planning effects which are highly detrimental to the long run of such a campaign/operation might emerge already at the very beginning and the track of overall development can hardly be changed.

³⁴ M. Susan: Transition. A multidimensional problem. What's Good Enough? US Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Presentation at the Workshop Multinational Experiment 6 in Motta di Livenza, ITA, June 2009.

traditional western understanding could be short or even shorter in other perceptions.

- An assessment of changes must take into account all intended, unintended and possible effects and what should better not be touched.

1.3 Post-modern States in Interaction with Pre-modern or Modern States

In the past twenty years, the concept of state was frequently questioned.³⁵ In the modern understanding, the state stands as a synonym for the prime actor and for organizational principles and a multivariate understanding of sovereignty. The Westphalian System with its state centrism and the primacy of *domestic sovereignty* were non-debated pillars until some twenty years ago.³⁶

³⁵ See e.g. J. M. Hobson: *The State and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. J. A. Caporaso: *Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty*, in: *International Studies Review*, Special Issue on Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order, 2000 International Studies Association, pp. 1-25. R. A. Denemark: *World System History: From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations*, in: *International Studies Review*, Special Issue 1999: *Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures about the Next Millennium*, pp. 43-75, part. p. 45: *"There is no reason to assume that states are always to be as central to global social processes as they have been recently, ..."*. Y. H. Ferguson/R. W. Mansbach: *Global Politics at the Turn of the Millennium: Changing Bases of „Us“ and „Them“*, in: *International Studies Review*, Special Issue 1999: *Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures about the Next Millennium*, 77-107, part. 83: *„The end of the Cold War provided a renewed impetus to move theory away from its long-standing state-centric bias.“* Y. H. Ferguson/R. W. Mansbach: *Technology and the Transformation of Global Politics*, Paper presented at Annual ISA Convention, Los Angeles, CA, March 15-18, 2000. *"The most salient feature of the postinternational world is that it is no longer so predominantly a system of sovereign states, each supposedly enjoying exclusive control over a defined territory and with no authority above them."* (6): *"The erosion of state authority is accompanied by the emergence of new authority structures and networks and the growing importance of forms of 'governance' other than that of 'sovereignty-bound' actors as distinct from 'sovereignty-free actors.'"*

³⁶ The Peace of Westphalia (the treaties were in 1648 in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück; today located in GER) marked a watershed in the development of the modern sovereign state system. It ended a decades-lasting struggle between different religions (Catholics and Protestants) and introduced equality between the players/actors by promoting a different organising concept other than religion. This change had enormous impact in the structure of the 'network of relationships'. The 'Westphalian state' with all its attributes became the leading form of polity in Europe and had a strong shoving and shaping impact on the 'overall/global network of actors'. The key emphasis of the new form of the system was on the *changed quality of relationships between the actors*. The makers of the Westphalian settlement recognized the need for international order. The new aspect in the development was the establishment of a system of states which was based on equality, no matter whether they were Catholic or Protestant, republican or monarchical.

See e.g.: J. A. Caporaso: *Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty*, in: *International Studies Review*, Special Issue on Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order, 2000 International Studies Association, 1-25.

Sovereignty experienced restrictions within the past few years, some of them happened unnoticed and hardly debated among the broad public. Within EU and within the human interventionist concept sovereignty has been curtailed considerably. In case of violation, sovereignty may be abused (see *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping* by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992 or all measures to fight terrorism). Lack of debate led to lack of strategic vision and of gaps in assessing what an intervention could mean and where it could lead to. All in all, the multivariate concept of sovereignty has suffered considerable damages and cuts – many of them were not in favor of the overall order.

The state of today is not a homogenous construct and not a single unitary actor anymore. The erosion of saturated states, the parallel emergence and re-emergence of states has shaken up the international considerably. Since states run through phases of developments not all of them show an equal inner cohesion. Even in saturated, matured states inner cohesion may vary of the course of time.

The concept of weak/strong states and weak/strong powers may help to shed some light on the issue. The main focus refers to the socio-political cohesion of a state in terms of society.³⁷

Weak/strong powers refer to distinctions between states and their military and economic capabilities. The socio-political cohesion of a state displays rather no connection with the state as a power.³⁸ Theory shows a considerable deficit in adequate indicators to define of weak states/powers. Nevertheless, the idea per se is a reasonable tool for analysis.

In many cases existing governments are more part of the problem, than part of the solution. Therefore it is challenging to follow a governmental approach. In many cases the coalition is lumped together with the problematic government, and, thereby, loosing legitimacy because it is considered as being part of bad governance as such.

Groves points in his comment to the following option: *“During counter insurgency and stability operations, supporting multinational forces and allied civilian governments must reinforce the civilian host nation (HN) government under attack by non-compliant actors and irregular adversaries. Allied civilian governments provide support to the HN government by providing support to civil assistance, to include assistance in government reform that leads to increased HN government effectiveness and efficiency and a greater perception of HN government legitimacy by the HN population. Multinational forces conduct lethal and non-lethal maneuver and information operations in a way that reinforces perceptions of HN legitimacy while making the environment non-permissive for non-compliant actors and irregular adversaries.”*³⁹

States may perform different layers of social and societal cohesion. Loosing social and societal cohesion may drive a state into a phase of de-legitimization. Weak states, failing and, finally, failed states present one end of a “state continuum”.

Yannis Stivachtis names six features to describe states with **fading social and societal cohesion**.⁴⁰

1. Experience of a high level of political violence.
2. Significant degree of internal control of the citizens.
3. Major political conflicts over what ideology should be the founding principle of the particular statehood.

³⁷ See B. Buzan: People, States and Fear, 2nd ed., London 1991, 97.

³⁸ Y. A. Stivachtis: Weak States and National Security, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 5/1999, 556.

³⁹ Comment by Groves: *“The Government of Afghanistan (GOA) has been an easy target for criticism in western media, but it is essentially a creation of the west in the wake of the departure of the Taliban.”* The authors like to thank COL Bryan A Groves for his valuable comment. See his email dated 28 July 2009.

⁴⁰ See Y. A. Stivachtis: Weak States and National Security, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 5/1999, 556.

4. Lack of coherent national identity or the presence of contending national identities within their territories.
5. Lack of clear and accepted hierarchy of political order.
6. High degree of states control over the media.

Another approach has been provided by *Kalevi J. Holsti*.⁴¹ *Holsti* claims that weak states show common structural deficits. These deficits are created by larger forces, including colonial legacies and world economy aspects. He indicates the following **features**:

1. Low level or even absence of vertical legitimacy (i.e. massive lack in loyalty of the population towards its leaders).
2. Strength in the field of despotic power, but quite weak in infra-structural powers.
3. Personalizations of the state, i.e. rulers perceive themselves as the states.
4. Lack in horizontal legitimacy, i.e. there is non homogeneity within the certain communities of the state; moreover, agreements between these communities are lacking.

In fact, weak states contain numerous communities, which display a high potential for hostile relationships. Those features are usually key issues in weak states. They vary from period to period in intensity within one research object/state. Moreover, they vary from research object/state to research object/state in their intensities, too.

Taking social and societal coherence as key dimensions, a state grid reads as follows:

- **Strong states** show a functioning social and societal cohesion; legitimized authorities exercise power; rules and norms are executed in a manner without applying violence.
- **Weak states** perform a decreasing social and societal cohesion; authorities erode; rules and norms are less and less followed and executable.
- **Failing states** have a hardly perceivable social and societal cohesion; anarchy in term of a state without rules grows more and more; a vacuum of rules and norms emerges; legitimized authorities decrease and/or lose their power to execute rules and norms.
- **Failed states** perform almost no social and societal cohesion and show a comprehensive vacuum of rules and norms; no legitimized authority is available; anarchy and rulelessness dominate.

Based on the erosion of the Westphalian understanding of states the following grid emerges:

- **Postmodern states** (or post imperial states) diverge from classical sovereignty and balance; there is no separation in domestic and abroad issues. Domestic sovereignty erodes, because interference in former domestic issues on a mutual basis is the rule. Borders become less and less important; they are transcended; their security is based on mutual openness, transparency, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.

⁴¹ K. J. Holsti: *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge 1996, 104-108.

- **Modern states** follow the traditional path of *raison d'état*, certain interests and the concept of power in terms of military and political power.
- **Premodern states** often refer to former colonies which were drawn into chaos; they are of in the status of a failed state. Power and legitimization to apply power and violence usually has waned away. They are unable to secure its territory, thereby opening up room for parallel actors. Usually they fill this power gap and try to squeeze opportunities for themselves. Sometimes, they are labelled as sanctuaries for terrorists and general unrest.
- Additionally, the concept of **state** was combined with the concept **power** to emphasis the individual state's meaning within the order. Power definitions of today go beyond *Max Weber's* definition. Power refers to factors and capabilities of an actor to manipulate the behavior of other actors against his/her will, to bring through one's own interest.⁴² The diversification of power and the osmotic and dynamic behavior of the single layers lead to different dimensions and different centers of power.⁴³ The erosion of the Westphalian System paralleled this development. It does not mean that the nation-state has vanished, but there has been a shift in terms of tasks and core competencies. They currently comprise keeping up order, legitimization, and the guarantee of security.⁴⁴

1.4 General Considerations for the Operational Commanders

In intervention operations Operational Commanders are often confronted with hybrid orders in a specific type of environment as described in the following chapter. It is therefore appropriate to call this type of environment a hybrid environment⁴⁵. It consists of hybrid orders.

Intervening hybrid orders with classical tools such as "surgical interventions" and conventional warfare will hardly change hybrid orders. The nature of such an order will remain unchanged. Even retaliation will achieve certain effects without a chance to assess the relative success of such an activity. Imposing an external type of order

⁴² See C. Kegley/E. Wittkopf: *World Politics*, Boston, New York 2001, 32.

See additionally the rather diversifying definition of Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. J. Nye/R. Keohane: *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed., Glenview, Ill., Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown 1989. R. Keohane/J. S. Nye: *Power and Interdependence in the Information Age*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1998, pp. 81-94. J. S. Nye/W. A. Owens: *America's Information Edge*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1996, pp. 20-36. Nye, Joseph: *America's Power - By Invitation*, *The Economist*, Mar. 21, 2002 (military-economic-cultural delineated in a chessboard style manner).

Additionally, a current interpretation of power refers to a combination of hard and soft power to *smart power* (a notion first mentioned by Sen John Edwards and Zalmay Mamozy Khalilzad, then Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, New York. See Edwards, John: *Reengaging With the World: A Return to Moral Leadership*, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62826/john-edwards/reengaging-with-the-world> (entry 02.07.09). Z. M. Khalilzad: *Hard Power vs. Soft Power*, Lecture at the Albach 2007 Meeting, August 2007.

⁴³ See H. C. Bartlett/G. P. Holman: *Grand Strategy and the Structure of U.S. Military Forces*, *Strategic Review*, Spring 1992, 39-51.

⁴⁴ See A. K. Riemer: *Information Society und/oder Nationalstaat: Was nun im neuen Millennium?* in: *Österr. Militär. Zeitschrift*, Heft 1/2000, 13-24.

⁴⁵ The notion Hybrid Order is proposed to become a working definition for Multinational Experiment 6: *Numerous hybrid orders will be labeled as hybrid environment*.

on hybrid orders will partially be possible but the hybrid order will be flexible and adaptable as much as necessary. If pressure from outside fades a hybrid order will turn back to its original state. Consequently, a Coalition's objectives must be adapted to the nature of a hybrid order and not vice versa. The point of departure is grasping the nature of a hybrid order and linking it into a Coalition's objectives. Finally, one has to slip into the role of a possible adversary and find out what objectives are reasonable and achievable.

Following this trace NATO has aligned in this topic by applying the notion of **hybrid threats**. It suggests the following working definition: *"Enemies will attack in ways NATO might consider irregular or asymmetric, but are anything but asymmetric to them. The environment will include conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal elements in mixed modes of operations to achieve political or military goals or purely personal gains. Adversaries show no respect for distinctions between civil and military operations, and exploit them to threaten Alliance territories, populations, critical infrastructures and forces."*⁴⁶

In the best case, the Operational Commander considers the following issues:⁴⁷

1. Regarding the environment

- In all phases of an operation, Commanders must be aware of a changing environment with its specific features, since Operational Commanders and Coalition forces become part of the environment. This is a "natural process" because of interaction between forces and the environment.
- Additionally, the Operational Commander has to identify, whether he operates in a permissive or non-permissive environment. He has to be able to figure roots for a non-permissive environment, i.e. he has to identify the actors who create and shape an environment to become and stay non-permissive. Additionally, he has to take into account that those actors are "multirolers&multihatters". They usually do not envisage primarily military goals, but do pursue mainly political objectives. For reason, the Operational Commander has to be able to think in political terms⁴⁸ and ideas, too.
- It is not appropriate to use conclusions of one environment and apply it as a static blueprint for another environment.
- Operations in a non-permissive environment with actors up to the Irregular Adversary spectrum are very different to operations in a permissive environment. The danger of Irregular Adversaries to local population, international civilian actors as well as Coalition troops affects all actors and orders in the environment and must be taken into account in all phases of the operation.
- Operational Commanders should try to establish a non-permissive environment for non-compliance and Irregular Adversaries. Working with partners is

⁴⁶ Based on the Multiple Future Project Final Report and on the Phase 1 Countering Hybrid Threat (CHT) ITP Report, 16 JUNE 2009.

⁴⁷ D. Muhr: Deliberations after Multinational Workshop Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Vienna, 2009.

⁴⁸ Political terms open up a far broader spectrum than the military-context-only-thinking offers.

necessary to achieve this state. A Comprehensive Approach best serves this endeavor, despite the approaches inherent limits.⁴⁹

- The ability to see the environment through the eyes of other actors is one key to understand the others' point of view and to derive one's own reactions and counter strategies. The best 'door and eye openers' are language skills and cultural understanding.

2. Actors

- Actors have their specific interests and intentions which probably cannot be changed in time.
- Actors with their respective activities must be assessed whether and to which extent they contribute to a non-permissive environment.
- Operational Commanders should focus their efforts on changing activities rather than changing actors.

3. Operational planning

- Paradigms of a hybrid non-permissive environment must be figured out and included in the first considerations, and, finally, taken into account for adequate operational planning.
- The transition phase must be in the focus of all efforts.
- In operational planning Operational Commanders must take into account that certain actors are very necessary in the stabilization and transition phase although they maybe foes in pre-phases.

4. Comprehensive Approach

- Within the operational art, the Operational Commander has to balance the application of the Comprehensive Approach oscillating between counterinsurgency and stability operations.
- Operational Commanders support therefore a Comprehensive Approach taking into account that a Comprehensive Approach in a non-permissive environment is hard to conduct due to security reasons especially for civilian actors.
- From a military perspective more abilities need to be included. It is not sufficient to rely only on capabilities. The solution is a match between those two sides.
- Since Operational Commanders are often confronted with dilemmas (it refers a problem offering at least two solutions or possibilities, of which none are practically acceptable and reasonable) he has to be aware that violence increases the dilemma situation. Negative backlooping might support a change of the dilemma. A dilemma can not be solved in a traditional choice-manner, but has to be overcome; i. e. a "third solution" has to be created.

5. Strategy Development

- Operational Commanders must participate in the development of the Coalition's strategy in order to understand the political embedding of a situation.

⁴⁹ The authors like to thank COL Bryan A Groves for his valuable comment regarding possible limits of CA. See his email dated 28 July 2009.

- Operational Commanders has to request the validation of the strategy along the 15 premises mentioned above.

6. General Requirements

- Operational Commanders must be able to think in political categories to better understand political interests, processes and activities.
- Any Commander must be a “homo politicus” to certain extend.
- The feeling and knowledge of political basics must be paired with the ability to think in categories of other actors and orders even in a non-permissive environment characterized with a fundamental different culture.

1.5 Conclusions

For reason, the following issues have to be taken into consideration:

1. Different types of orders exist; they are usually the main target of intervention; their rules of living together may be considerably different as compared to the rules in post-modern states; a military-alone intervention is not enough to change those orders.
2. Political opportunism, election driven behavior and decision making, government periods, public opinion, rule of law, international law, Geneva Convention⁵⁰ etc. limit the room to maneuver for troops since non-compliant actors and irregular adversaries drive and shape this room.
3. In a non-permissive environment the objective to achieve a safe and secure environment to a manageable extent is crucial to be able to establish a Comprehensive Approach.
4. A Comprehensive Approach seems to be a far better approach to engage such types of entities and bring them step by step over a longer period of time on the track of postmodern states;
5. finally, it requires *“Deal with all five levels of government (national, regional, provincial, municipal and local) - not solely the national center; Western state models and institutions may not be appropriate for interim or long-term government structure in highly decentralized or historically fragmented societies (Afghanistan, Somalia); Historical and existing state structure, including institutions, processes, power elites, cultural legacy and the relative*

⁵⁰ See Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6; Non-Compliant Actors (NONCAS), Swiss contribution to Workshop 2, (26-28 May 2009, Vienna): The Framework of the Geneva Conventions. The following paragraph is taken from the summary: *“The Geneva Conventions together with their two additional Protocols of 1977 are the major codification of the law of armed conflicts today.*

That law addresses mainly two questions: what means and methods of warfare are prohibited (or a contrario allowed)? What persons are entitled to protection against belligerent violence? The Geneva Conventions apply quite broadly to hostile situations confronting the armed branches of two or more than two States: some provisions apply already in peacetime; the bulk of provisions apply in case of armed conflict, declared war or occupation of territory even if no resistance is offered.

The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols are based on the sole distinction between combatants and civilians. Overall, that simple distinction has proved workable.”

*weights to give national, regional and local governments must be assessed in determining state model.*⁵¹

6. For establishing successful communication networks with respect to foreign cultures one needs a well-differentiated intercultural competence.⁵² To create good relationships factors such as *intercultural awareness* and interest in observing differences, *intercultural sensibility and respect* (e.g., being open minded and reflective), *intercultural understanding* (e.g., access to the other's world view, value systems, belief systems, religion) and *intercultural skills* (e.g., language skills, knowledge of social rules, communication skills) are necessary but not sufficient conditions. Additionally for a productive information exchange and for effective interventions one has to gain an exact analysis of the other's knowledge structures (belief systems) and present state of knowledge, to look for feedback concerning adequate interpretation of information and to test the psychological conditions of readiness for information input.⁵³

2 Actors in a Hybrid Environment: Towards a Multi-dimensional Viewing⁵⁴

Actors deserve particular scrutiny in the underlying analysis, starting with "who are actors?" and offer strands and options to classify them.⁵⁵ A classification has to square the circle of strictness in the sense that it offers clear-cut categories; additionally, it has to be osmotic since actors change their face and with several labels at the same time which make any action for and/or against them rather difficult. Yet, multiroling or multihatting are to be found rather often in operations.

Actors form the environment as well as are products of the environment. For reason, both shove and shape each other in an everlasting and permanently ongoing

⁵¹ S. Merrill: Transition. A multidimensional problem. What's Good Enough? US Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Presentation at the Workshop Outcome 1 Multinational Experiment 6 in Motta di Livenza, ITA, June 2009.

It has to be noticed that a society and a state as a legal construct may be coherent, but this is not a must. Additionally, both concepts should not be confused. The authors like to thank COL Bryan A Groves for his valuable comment. See his email dated 28 July 2009.

⁵² G. Fleck: Deliberations for Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Potsdam, 2009.

⁵³ See additionally M. Martin: Engaging Local Actors, Experiences as a Cultural Understanding Officer, District Nad-e-Ali, Helmond, Presentation at the Workshop Outcome 1 Multinational Experiment 6 in Motta di Livenza, ITA, June 2009. He ideationally aligned in his presentation with the above mentioned. His experiences presented were in line with the above mentioned.

⁵⁴ See eg. A. K. Riemer: Actors within the International Order: Analyzing the other Side of the Fence, AARMS, Vol 6, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 531-558.

A. K. Riemer: The International Order at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt/Main 2007, pp. 71-88.

⁵⁵ It is highly recommended to not to stay too general in naming actors, such as "the people", "the population". This seems far too coarse in terms of granulation. Neither "the people" nor "the population" are homogeneous in their structure. In fact, the pose an ever-changing network of different multi rolers and multi hatters. Figuring out the various groups, roles, identities and hat is indispensable for a reasonable and success-promising strategy.

As McChrystal rightly points out in his Initial Statement: "Each individual group, however, has a specific strategy, develops annual plans, and allocates resources accordingly. Each group has its own methods of developing and executing these plans an each has adapted over time." p. 2-6 of the unclassified version of COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT, available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09).

process. Environment and actors “float” into each other and compete each other. Additionally, actors are floating in and out. There is hardly a vacuum but a short-term vacuum is filled up rather instantly, particularly in the case of resource floating.

Since it is hardly possible to change environment as well as the orders within an acceptable amount of time the Coalition should not try to change actors. It seems more appropriate to try changing behavior and activities into the compliant spectrum. This should be taken into account additionally – particularly in a non-permissive hybrid environment. This will serve the above mentioned features of openness and closeness and self-adaptation of orders.

The underlying chapter offers different approaches on how to define actors. Those approaches are to be seen as complementary and not as mutually exclusive. Additionally, the following deliberations are of generic nature and lead to considerations regarding actors.

2.1 Basic Remarks: Scoping the Actor and its Behavior

The question regarding ‘**who are actors?**’ is not that easily be answered, as it may seem at the very first glance.

Generically, actors are the key observation unit within the research object as such. They create structures, represent a system and, at the same time, are part of the society.

Actors are neither coherent in their behavior within one category nor do they have the one and only attitude towards a specific issue. Actors shape the order, and, finally, the environment; they resist and drive change at the same moment. Actors may vary their appearance over the course of time. They may real and/or virtual.

Many features an actor may display are directly observable. Some analytical aspects such as knowledge, attitudes, orientations, experiences and expectations are hardly directly observable, but these are derivable from empirical observation.

Moreover, not all actors have the same **impact** on a situation and its development. Some have more impact, others less, and some do not have any impact at all. Some are visible. Many are not. Many decisions are prepared in working groups, councils or in expert groups, in backchannel activities and even clandestine. Such actors mostly work behind closed doors. Decision-making processes are usually not observable. At least the moment of decisions cannot be observed.

One of the key assumptions is that human behavior is characterized by **rationality**, however bounded by the limits of human attention and information processing capability. Furthermore, humans may pursue different kinds of rationality according to the logic of their social context. Although the social context may give a hint of what would be considered a typical behavior of a representative of a certain social group, individuals also always have a potential for rational reflection and are potentially able to act differently.

Additionally, everyday human behavior is **polymotivated** and driven by **multifaceted** considerations as well as of mere habit, thoughtlessness and hazard. Not least, how an individual perceives a situation and what sense he or she is able to make of it determines the response to a situation. Such sense making is founded on an ongoing construction of identity, triggered by the question of whether it is possible to take things for granted, driven by the need for identity and meaning, and leading to an answer in terms of “- Who am I?” in such a situation and what is appropriate to do

accordingly. Understanding interests implies also understanding identities. In other words, human interests and motivation should be seen as a complex composite of different dimension of rationality, social and psychological needs which can never fully be explained and reduced to scientific laws. Hence, human action must be understood “from within” the actor’s perspective and cannot fully be determined by his or her belonging to a certain category.

Nevertheless, the **belonging to a social group** is one of the most fundamental human needs making the social dimension crucial to understand everyday behavior. To any social group, its social distinction from other groups is at heart of its function. A social field is a social room with its own unwritten rules, which set the norm for behavior and what is seen as valued (*within that field*). The actors’ schemes of perception, thought and action within a field forms a composite (*habitus*) of dimensions central to the way of living formed by the dominant group in the field.⁵⁶

What is valued within the field may be expressed as different forms of capital (social, symbolic, cultural and economic) of the field and is a source of power. *Economic capital* is money, property and other physical assets, *cultural and symbolic capital* (e.g., prestige, honor, attention) are often merged concerns education, skills and other valued advantages, while *social capital* includes personal contacts, connections and social networks etc.⁵⁷ Symbolic capital can be view as a crucial source of power. When a holder of symbolic capital uses the power this confers against an agent who holds less, and seeks thereby to alter their actions, they exercise *symbolic violence*.

Actors draw actively and skillfully on these different forms of capital as sources of power for advancement of both individuals and groups within the field.

Clearly, actors will have to be defined **by virtue of their actions**. However, classifying action is a challenge as well and may be hard to separate entirely from an actor and his assumed motives.

Even if striving for hard and objective criteria, such as actions, to judge the character and classification of an actor as compliant and/or non-compliant, the **main tool** for analyzing an actor will be **inherently subjective** and **qualitative**. To understand the

⁵⁶ See the works of Pierre Bourdieu who tried to reconcile the objective (field) and the subjective (habitus). Bourdieu applied the methodological and theoretical concepts of habitus and field to do an epistemological break with the prominent objective-subjective antinomy of the social sciences. He wanted to unify social phenomenology and structuralism. Habitus and field are suggested as ideational launching pads since they can only exist in relation to each other. Although a field is constituted by the various social agents participating in it (and thus their habitus), a habitus, in effect, represents the transposition of objective structures of the field into the subjective structures of action and thought of the agent.

The relationship between habitus and field is a two-way one. The field exists by virtue of social agents who possess the dispositions that are required to form that field and fill it up with meaning. By participating in the field, agents incorporate into their habitus the know-how that will permit them in constituting the field as such. Habitus manifests the structures of the field, and the field plays the role of a mediator between habitus and practice.

See e.g. P. Bourdieu, (1990) Structures, habits, practices. In P. Bourdieu, The logic of practice (pp. 52-79). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Bourdieu, 1990.

See . P. Bourdieu (1977): Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Univ Press.

P. Bourdieu (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge.

⁵⁷ See e.g. P. Bourdieu and L. J. D. Wacquant. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

motives defining the character of actions, ethnographic and phenomenological approaches of *verstehen* (i. e. to comprehend, to understand, to grasp) will use the human capacity to know and understand others through emphatic introspection and reflection based on direct observation and interaction with people.⁵⁸ This is also the tool necessary to **harmonize efforts** by handling and exploiting the diversity of actors and the basis for inter-cultural understanding.⁵⁹ Hence, the method of classifying non-compliant actors will ultimately depend on the techniques used for harmonizing efforts and communicate across cultures.

The point of classification in science as in everyday life is to make sense of phenomena, i.e. that the naming of things supports the theory or the way of being and knowing making sense to us.

In military terms, the point is to allow for an **orientation** that helps coping with the environment. In consequence, an actor's ability to make sense of a situation and of his or her identity is tightly associated with their daily doings and the practical and conceptual tools they use in everyday practices. Social distinction, as a part of sense making and construction and maintenance of identity, is fundamental to human action: human beings mainly learn about themselves by interacting with others. While the nuances of social distinction and the specific histories of each grouping in such a classification are numerous, their futures may be guided through their interaction with the social environment. This more systemic view of social roles and identities addresses the research tradition of *symbolic interactionism*, seeing identity and motivation as systemic effects of an actor's position in relation to others.⁶⁰

*Symbolic interactionism*⁶¹ frequently uses the theatre metaphor to illustrate the interactive character of social interplay.⁶² If an actor is to maintain his or her role in a play, this also has to be received and affirmed by the auditorium. If an actor tries to play a role not accepted by others, the actor has to take this rejection into account and try to re-dress the role until it gets confirmed by others.

In similar ways, within a Stabilization & Reconstruction⁶³ operation, there may be a huge number of different actors encountering each other to finding out their internal

⁵⁸ M. Q. Patton, (2002). *Qualitative research & evaluation methods* (Vol. Third). California, London, New Delhi: Sage publications, Inc.

⁵⁹ See these themes further developed in Objective 1.3 "Harmonization" and Objective 4.3 "Cross-cultural awareness" both Multinational Experiment 6.

⁶⁰ See M. Scholz: Deliberations for Objective 1.1 after Multinational Workshop in Potsdam, 2009: The idea of a social network.

⁶¹ S. Stryker: From Mead to a Structural Symbolic Interactionism and Beyond, *The Annual Review of Sociology*, 2008, 34:15-31.

⁶² A. Dewulf, B. Gray, L. Putnam, R. Lewicki, N. Aarts, R. Bouwen and C. van Woerkum: Disentangling approaches to framing in conflict and negotiation research: A meta-paradigmatic perspective", *Human Relations*, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2009, pp. 155-193.

⁶³ CONCEPTS FOR ALLIANCE FUTURE JOINT OPERATIONS (CAFJO) PFP(NAAG)N(2006)0002 (NATO)

Stabilization: Describes the process of achieving an effective transition from immediate response to an insecure situation, to long-term development. It involves enabling a local population to develop politically, economically, and socially in the long-term so that it can sustain itself without threatening itself or others.

Reconstruction: Efforts undertaken by international and interagency organizations, supported by the military within means and capabilities, to enable a local population to develop longterm stability. The pillars of stability pillars are security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well being, governance and participation.

relations and identities in relation towards each other. This role identity⁶⁴ can be expected to provide a certain framing⁶⁵ of a situation, facilitating the role play of an actor over time.

2.2 Sovereign (State-Actors) and Non-sovereign Actors (Non-state Actors)

Discussing and finally classifying actors requires a brief look at the concept of state and sovereignty as points of departure. The agreement of Westphalia (1648) led to a fundamental change in the quality of relationships between the different actors, a formalization of wartime diplomacy and, finally, a regulation of the affairs of newly emerged entities, called European states. In fact, the main entities were not peoples or nations, but rulers and dynasties which were called 'states'.⁶⁶ The concept of sovereignty – understood as principle of non-interference – forms the core of states. The Westphalian System with its state centrism and the primacy of *domestic sovereignty* were non-debated pillars until some twenty years ago.⁶⁷

In the past 20 years the nation-state has changed in terms of contents and of scope,⁶⁸ though the concept of sovereignty still does represent the core of the

MC POSITION ON MILITARY SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, MCM-0054-2007, 13 November 2007 (European Union)

In the context of this document, the MC is using stabilization and reconstruction

with the following meanings:

a. *Stabilization* activities encompass actions undertaken by or in co-ordination with indigenous national authorities, mandated authorities or other civil agencies, to maintain or bring about a safe and secure environment.

b. *Reconstruction* efforts include the provision of emergency infrastructure, essential government services, rebuilding, and relief to prevent or ameliorate humanitarian emergency to enable the local population and institutions to restart and establish viable normal activities, including, inter alia political, economic, social, technical, legal, and environmental. This activity is principally a civilian lead including planning and resource implications.

⁶⁴ P.L. Hammack: "Narrative and the Cultural Psychology of Identity", *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2008, pp. 222-247.

⁶⁵ For a discussion on naming and framing: D.A. Schön, (1983) *The Reflective Practitioner*, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot.

⁶⁶ See R. H. Jackson: *Boundaries and International Societies*, in B. A. Roberson (ed.), *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory* (London, Washington: Pinter, 1998), 163-198.

⁶⁷ See e.g.: J. A. Caporaso: *Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty*, in: *International Studies Review*, Special Issue on Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order, 2000 International Studies Association, 1-25.

⁶⁸ See e.g. J. M. Hobson: *The State and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. J. A. Caporaso: *Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty*, in: *International Studies Review*, Special Issue on Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order, 2000 International Studies Association, pp. 1-25. R. A. Denemark: *World System History: From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations*, in: *International Studies Review*, Special Issue 1999: *Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures about the Next Millennium*, pp. 43-75, part. p. 45: "*There is no reason to assume that states are always to be as central to global social processes as they have been recently, ...*". Y. H. Ferguson/R. W. Mansbach: *Global Politics at the Turn of the Millennium: Changing Bases of „Us“ and „Them“*, in: *International Studies Review*, Special Issue 1999: *Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures about the Next Millennium*, 77-107, part. 83: "*The end of the Cold War provided a renewed impetus to move theory away from its long-standing state-centric bias.*" Y. H. Ferguson/R. W. Mansbach: *Technology and the Transformation of Global Politics*, Paper presented at Annual ISA Convention, Los Angeles, CA,

concept of a nowadays state.⁶⁹ In modern understanding, the state stands as a synonym for the prime actor and for organizational principles and a multi-variated understanding of sovereignty within the overall order.

Additionally, the state of today is not a homogenous construct and not a single unitary actor anymore. The erosion of saturated states, the parallel emergence and re-emergence of states has shaken up the international considerably. Since states run through phases of developments not all of them show an equal inner cohesion. Even in saturated, matured states inner cohesion may vary of the course of time.

The concept of weak/strong states and weak/strong powers may help to shed some light on the issue. The main focus refers to the socio-political cohesion of a state in terms of society.⁷⁰ Weak/strong powers refer to distinctions between states and their military and economic capabilities. The socio-political cohesion of a state displays rather no connection with the state as a power. States may perform different layers of social and societal cohesion. Loosing social and societal cohesion may drive a state into a phase of de-legitimization. Weak states, failing and, finally, failed states present one end of a "state continuum".

March 15-18, 2000. *"The most salient feature of the postinternational world is that it is no longer so predominantly a system of sovereign states, each supposedly enjoying exclusive control over a defined territory and with no authority above them."* (6): *"The erosion of state authority is accompanied by the emergence of new authority structures and networks and the growing importance of forms of 'governance' other than that of 'sovereignty-bound' actors as distinct from 'sovereignty-free actors.'*

⁶⁹ One of the key provisions in the very diverse agenda of the Westphalian Treaty was the recognition of the prerogatives of the princes within their own territory and their right to make alliances with other states. This formulation is generally regarded as a key attribute of sovereignty, particularly as the right of a state to create and carry out ones own foreign policy. Sovereignty has been one of the key notions in the wake of the Treaty of Westphalia. It bases on the principle of territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures (i.e. non-intervention into internal affairs), i.e. it rests on the principle of sovereignty, particularly on the European perception and interpretation of sovereignty. This is only one perspective of sovereignty, which is one of the most debated notions in IR. Stephen D. Krasner distinguishes at least four meanings of sovereignty.

1. *"Domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of public authority within a state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority;*
2. *interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to control transborder movement;*
3. *international legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual recognition of states or other entities;*
4. *and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations.*

These four meanings of sovereignty are not logical coupled, nor have they covaried in practice." (S. D. Krasner: Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton 1999, p. 9. Additionally, see e.g. Y. A. Stivachtis: The Distinction between an International System and an International Society, the Peace of Westphalia and the Evolution of International Society, Paper presented at the 1998 Annual International Studies Association Convention, Minneapolis, part. 5. The principle of non-intervention that usually has been connected with the Peace of Westphalia and was seen of one of the big achievements after the Thirty Years War was not exercised or applied until the end of the 18th century. It was firstly explicitly mentioned by Vattel and Wolf. See S. D. Krasner: Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton 1999, p. 21. For a rather long time, the principle of non-intervention played a key role in the definitions of sovereignty.)

Krasner is one of only few scholars who distinguish different types and dimensions of sovereignty. He does not take the meaning for granted, but de-assembles it and elucidates the backgrounds of the concept.

⁷⁰ See B. Buzan: People, States and Fear, 2nd ed., London 1991, 97.

In fact, weak states contain numerous communities, which display a high potential for hostile relationships. Those features are usually key issues in weak states. They vary from period to period in intensity within one research object/state. Moreover, they vary from research object/state to research object/state in their intensities, too.

Taking social and societal coherence as key dimensions, a state grid reads as follows:

- **Strong states** show a functioning social and societal cohesion; legitimized authorities exercise power; rules and norms are executed in a manner without applying violence.
- **Weak states** perform a decreasing social and societal cohesion; authorities erode; rules and norms are less and less followed and executable.
- **Failing states** have a hardly perceivable social and societal cohesion; anarchy in term of a state without rules grows more and more; a vacuum of rules and norms emerges; legitimized authorities decrease and/or lose their power to execute rules and norms.
- **Failed states** perform almost no social and societal cohesion and show a comprehensive vacuum of rules and norms; no legitimized authority is available; anarchy and rulelessness dominate.

Based on the erosion of the Westphalian understanding of states the following grid emerges:

- **Postmodern states** (or post imperial states) diverge from classical sovereignty and balance; there is no separation in domestic and abroad issues. Domestic sovereignty erodes, because interference in former domestic issues on a mutual basis is the rule. Borders become less and less important; they are transcended; their security is based on mutual openness, transparency, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.
- **Modern states** follow the traditional path of *raison d'état*, certain interests and the concept of power in terms of military and political power.
- **Premodern states** often refer to former colonies which were drawn into chaos; they are of the status of a failed state. Power and legitimization to apply power and violence usually has waned away. They are unable to secure its territory, thereby opening up room for parallel actors. Usually they fill this power gap and try to squeeze opportunities for themselves. Sometimes, they are labeled as sanctuaries for terrorists and general unrest.

Hybrid orders are formed by all types of states (plus by the below described non-sovereign actors). They exist next to each other, not necessarily in clusters. Even within some strong states erosion emerged over the past decades. The 'rise of new pluralism and multi-centrism' has become a phenomenon, which has to be regularly dealt with. The difference between 'inside and outside' (domestic and abroad) has become blurred, if not to say irrelevant. In parallel to the sovereignty-bound state, a considerable number of **non-sovereign actors (non-state actors)** such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs are groups of private citizens that act on the national and/or international level. Many of them have a consultative status within the framework of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), environmental-protection, and lobbying groups, political action committees (PACs), anti-globalization movements

and armed non-sovereign actors have surfaced. Non-sovereign actors also include actors on the private, individual level (i.e. citizens and citizen groups), and the so-called 'leaderless public'.⁷¹

Some non-sovereign actors influence decision-making in states considerably. Sometimes they push the elected elites out of their positions and functions. Gangs perform a similar behavior. Non-sovereign actors often wedge themselves into the chain of decision-making without taking a share of responsibility for the results. They participate in power-games without bearing responsibility for consequences.

Non-sovereign actors refer to a heterogeneous group of non-state actors, which perform loose cohesion and apply flat structures. Informality characterizes intra/action and interaction. They are part of the order and the power structures. Cooperation and confrontation may exist at the same time and vary over the course of time. For reason, a higher level of dynamic and a lower level of accountability are part of the game.

It is difficult, if not impossible to classify non-sovereign actors accordingly to existing hierarchical criteria. They are organized in non-hierarchical, sometimes transnational manner, thereby often contradicting and even topple usual patterns of behavior. They are usually less controllable and sometimes follow anarchist-concepts.

Non-sovereign actors behave differently than sovereign actors and have different interests. They are less bureaucratic and faster in decision-making and in implementing their aims. They usually are inter-societal organizations, which in a few cases support the agreements among states on issues of international public importance (e.g. environmental issues).

Some of the non-sovereign actors display strong influence on the decision-making processes of sovereign actors although the latter usually withholds this fact. Non-sovereign actors existed, of course, already before 1989; the difference to the current situation is that they are better organized and exercise considerably more influence in the economic and environmental, and, finally political arena.

Avoiding the hotchpotch of actors, particularly of non-sovereign actors, additional criteria need to be applied. The following criteria are a first approach.

- **Organizations:** Non-sovereign actors are usually flat in its structure; they use modern means of communication in a natural manner and easily impact all levels of society. They have their own rules of engagement which are distinct of the code of conduct between states. Their patterns of behavior are flexible and situative. They are usually not bound by bureaucracy. Decision-making and application of decisions require less time.
- **Interests:** Non-sovereign actors perform different interests as compared to states. Single topics and issues may be pushed to the top without taking a virtual overall framework into account. The change in their stance between supporter and opponent.
- **Impact on states and state's activities:** Some non-sovereign actors influence states and their organization sustainable but hardly take over responsibility for their impact. Sometimes they push elected elites aside, but their actions usually do not form any consequences in terms of legalized responsibility.

⁷¹ See J. N. Rosenau: Turbulences in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, NJ 1990, pp. 118-132.

- **Responsibility:** Many non-sovereign actors play vital roles within the power game but do not take over responsibility, because are not subdued to re-election and political and societal judgment. For reason, they are in a position to take over an avant-garde function.

If influence by such groups would be fully taken into consideration by the state, the traditional position and strength of the sovereign actor could be undermined. However, exactly such developments could be observed particularly in the past decades.

Some scholars refer to the post-nation-state era⁷², which faces a parallel phenomenon in terms of an increased number of new nation states. The significant increase in non-sovereign actors marks an overlaying phenomenon. This development provoked an intensive discussion, which targeted at alternatives to the order of states. Universalistic approaches, world governments, new mediavist ideas, non-historic approaches, systems but no societies, societies but no systems and the rebirth of the nation-state were broadly discussed.

One of the most important findings is that the state is not obsolete or in danger. It will not be pushed aside by other actors, particularly not by non-sovereign actors. The state will be challenged by those actors but not replaced by them.⁷³

⁷² See A. Beyerchen: Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery, D. S. Albert./T. J. Czerwinski: Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, NDU, Washington 1997, Chapter 7, (<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/complexity/comch04.html>, entry 18.3.2004).

⁷³ See P. F. Drucker: Neue Realitäten. Wertewandel in Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2. Aufl., Düsseldorf et al., 1990, 98-132.

Additional to the concept of sovereignty other concepts such as power (ie. power to persuade/power to coerce) need to be added. *Joseph Nye's* works provide a more timely interpretation of the concept of power which should be taken into account in any comprehensive assessment. He distinguishes between soft power and hard power. Hard power refers to military and political capabilities to bring one's interest through. Soft power refers to persuasion, to attractive ideas and ideals to materialize one's interests. *Nye's* definition is not congruent with *Robert Kagan's* definition. He frames *hard power* as military aspects. *Soft power* covers economy and diplomacy. According to *Nye*, power within the international order is unevenly structured. It is layered in a chessboard-manner way. Currently, power presents itself on a three-dimensional chessboard.

1. *Military power:* the U.S. hold a monopoly since it is the only state, which possesses nuclear weapons and conventional weapons with global reach. The systemic structure is (unipolar).
2. *Economic power:* The systemic structure is multipolar. The U.S. and other players have to negotiate to reach and maintain a position.
3. *Cultural power:* This dimension is a free-floating, transnational area, which mainly operates outside government control. Cultural power is reflected in movies, music, food, dress codes etc. It is nonpolar structured and shows a high level of entropy and diversification.⁷³ There is neither hegemony, nor unipolarity of multipolarity. Power understood as a spectrum of options to design order and to bring national interests through is only in a restricted manner available.

Understanding power in a multilayered way opens up a new understanding of what can be done to design the current international order. Those layers must not be seen as totally separated and closed, but as osmotic and variable layers which communicate on several inner dimensions and inter-dimensions. For reason, action within one layer may have backlashes (in most cases unintended ones) within other layers. See J. Nye/R. Keohane: Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed., Glenview, Ill., S. Foresman/L. Brown 1989. R. Keohane/J. Nye: Power and Interdependence in the Information Age, in: Foreign Affairs, September/October 1998, 81-94. J. Nye/W. A. Owens: America's Information Edge, in: Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, 20-36. J. Nye: America's Power - By Invitation, The Economist, Mar. 21, 2002.

2.3 Diversity of Actors within the Operational Environment⁷⁴

The above mentioned indicates a multi-variated spectrum of actors who may change in shape and content in the course of time. Hence, an operational context in the 21st century is characterized by a broad range of diverse actors relevant for the operations and is best thought of as a **conflict ecosystem**.⁷⁵ A systemic view of the conflict seeks to look at an actor's interests or relations through the context of other actors' interests and relations. The systemic approach also implies that any single change at any point in the ecosystem will influence the sphere and possibilities for other actors in that ecosystem. The ecosystem may include government, ethnic, tribal, clan or community groups, social classes, urban and rural populations, and economic and political institutions. Hence, not only political actors, but also businesses, media, local government and various kinds of infiltrators may be of relevance to understand the conflict and its possible solutions.

David Kilcullen's ideational framework of conflict ecosystem may serve as pacemaker for an interdisciplinary approach to the issue. It stands in line with the basic idea of comprehensiveness and the Comprehensive Approach as such:

"It includes many independent but interlinked actors, each seeking to maximize their own survivability and advantage in a chaotic, combative environment. Pursuing the ecological metaphor, these actors are constantly evolving and adapting, some seeking a secure niche while others seek to become "top predator" or scavenge on the environment. Some actors existed in the environment before the conflict. They include government, ethnic, tribal, clan or community groups, social classes, urban and rural populations, and economic and political institutions. In normal times, these actors behave in a collaborative or competitive way: but now, due to the internal power struggle, they are combative and destructive. The relatively healthy competition and creative tension that sustains normal society has spun out of control, and the conflict threatens to destroy the society. ... It is critically important to realize that we, the intervening counterinsurgent, are not outside this ecosystem, looking in at a Petrie dish of unsavory microbes. Rather, we are inside the system. The theater of operations is not a supine, inert medium on which we practise our operational art. Rather it is a dynamic, living system that changes in response to our actions and requires continuous balancing between competing requirements. ... But in such a

⁷⁴ See Objective 1.3 Multinational Experiment 6 Harmonization Mindset paper 2009-05-28.


⁷⁵ *"Insurgencies are popular uprisings that grow from, and are conducted through pre-existing social networks (village, tribe, family, neighborhood, political or religious party) and exist in a complex social, informational and physical environment. Think of this environment as a sort of "conflict ecosystem".*

It includes many independent but interlinked actors, each seeking to maximize their own survivability and advantage in a chaotic, combative environment. Pursuing the ecological metaphor, these actors are constantly evolving and adapting, some seeking a secure niche while others seek to become "top predator" or scavenge on the environment. Some actors existed in the environment before the conflict. They include government, ethnic, tribal, clan or community groups, social classes, urban and rural populations, and economic and political institutions. In normal times, these actors behave in a collaborative or competitive way: but now, due to the internal power struggle, they are combative and destructive. The relatively healthy competition and creative tension that sustains normal society has spun out of control, and the conflict threatens to destroy the society.

This new state of the environment also produces new actors. These include local armed organizations, and foreign armed groups drawn into the conflict from outside." David J. Kilcullen: Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf (entry 24.06.09).

complex, multi-actor environment, “control” does not mean imposing order through unquestioned dominance, so much as achieving collaboration towards a set of shared objectives.⁷⁶”

These deliberations stand in close connection to the Hobbsian way of defining the state of nature.⁷⁷ The following graph provides an insight into a conflict ecosystem.⁷⁸



Deconstructing the ideas of the field theory, a ‘field’ typically contains of four types of actors. There are the **most powerful and respected actors** (1) which are both influential and act according to the fields own rules as well as those being loyal (2) to that rules without gaining much influence. There are also the powerful actors that act according to other informal rules than stipulated by the field (3) as well as the least influential ones, acting according to other rules that stipulated by the field not having

⁷⁶ D. J. Kilcullen: Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf (entry 02.07.09), pp.2-3.

⁷⁷ See Thomas Hobbes – Leviathan: In the State of Nature (=the condition of men living without government; it is a state of war; of everybody against everybody) they quarrel so readily that no one is safe, and the felicity which all desire is unattainable. That requires domestic peace and the existence of government, which makes equality and living together possible. Security and preservation of life (=Right of Nature) are key issues for the government. It is the common power (common wealth, state) that is necessary, but artificial to men. The state provides protection against foreign enemies and safety at home. It arbitrates disputes and sees to it that people keep whatever contracts they make with one another. But it does not otherwise interfere in their pursuit of their ends, by telling them how to live or by concerning itself with their misfortunes. Covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all, i.e. the sovereign is armed (with all arms of state and church) and has absolute authority but only for the limited purpose of solving the original problem.

⁷⁸ D. J. Kilcullen: Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf (entry 24.06.09), p. 3.

much capital (4), i.e. the **non-respected actors**. Changing the conditions of the field so that non-violent strategies quickly accumulate power in the society/field compared to actors following violent strategies.

Hence, Coalition forces should try to achieve monopoly on violence execution, identify key actors' agendas and offer possibilities for strategy change for violence practicing actors, as well as offer resources to non-violent political actors.

A basic consequence of social distinction and seeing actors as inhabiting a social field is that a **change in position** also means a **change in social distinction, self-perception, identity and thereby also interests**. In other words, identity and interests should not be seen as emanating from individuals or groups in themselves, but through an interaction with the environment. With this systemic and interactionist view, a change of an actors path of action means a change also in the rest of the social field. Hence by interacting in specific ways, actors may be pushed to changed or locked into frozen positions through the action of other actors.

2.4 Towards a Multi-dimensional Viewing of Actors

2.4.1 Basic Deliberations

The hybridity of orders raise the key question of "what could be different viewing points of actors?", Formulating is differently "Which would be the observation unit(s) in the new societal setting, i.e. the hybrid order, thereby taking into account that classifying actors is a highly contentious and subjective process."⁷⁹

One way would be to redefine the state as an actor in terms of addressing new tasks and to undertake efforts to include non-sovereign actors. This is only one possibility to solve the issue of a more diversified actor's arena. It seems that social reality is at least one-step ahead of theory. So far, theoretical efforts, which deal with the changed actor's picture, are rather rare and underdeveloped. We admit that it is a big challenge to frame the very diverse collection of actors in one model or integrate them into an applicable approach. The presented way is a very first effort, which needs to be developed and refined. The state could stand synonymously for a politico-societal-economic-historical construct with a high degree of networking effects. It is important to understand that the state neither has declined nor has it become obsolete, but its tasks have been reshaped and, probably, reduced to core tasks, such as provision of security for citizens.

Sovereign and non-sovereign actors cannot be separated but form a network ('map of intra-actions and interactions'). Centers of intra-action and interaction may vary over time and between different areas. Within a certain time-area constellation, intra-actions and interactions will lead to a pattern, which is best described with the term 'cascades'.⁸⁰ Cascades are asymmetric, fuzzy, interlocking, un-systematic, surprising and illogical. They vary in their intensity and duration and they may become the causes and effects (both at the same time) for further developments.

Finally, sovereignty obviously is not a sufficient criterion to sort actors and to bring them into certain relations. Additionally, sovereignty is not appropriate to filter virtual

⁷⁹ See A. Wendt: Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, 1999. A. Wendt: On the Via Media: a response to the critics, Review of International Studies (2000), 26, 174.

⁸⁰ See J. N. Rosenau.: Turbulences in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990), 298-312.

actors and bring them into relations with other actors. Finally, sovereignty is not applicable to fine-tune a spectrum of rather different actors.

For reason, additional criteria are required to arrive at a broader picture regarding actors ("multidimensional viewing").

The following sections cover different approaches towards a multidimensional viewing on actors.

- Security complexes serve as a basis to design order complexes. They serve as a mental tool to categorize and finally summarize actors into core-periphery-semiperiphery.
- Capabilities and effects have gained ground in the military debate. Those dimensions may serve as benchmarks to categorize actors alongside challenges and, finally, link them. The nexus of capabilities and effects seems to provide a twinned dimension with a high level of explanatory power.
- Relations are a non-negotiable feature between actors. They may serve as a criterion to bring some more order into actors. Relations transcend interaction which is considered as something that "anyway" takes place. Relations may display various manners.

The two basic dimension of sovereignty and of social and societal coherence (as described in the introductory chapter) shall serve as the foundation of all further viewing points.

2.4.2 Starting with an "Actors-based-plus"-Construction

As a step further, an actors-based construct will be introduced. It is an analogy of Buzan's idea of 'security complexes' and is called *order complexes*.⁸¹ Order complexes are relatively homogenous groups of actors (be the sovereign and/or non-sovereign), which can be separated according a time-space-power line. They are an important tool to structure the geopolitical map and the international order. Additionally, they support more differentiated analyses and more adequate tools to handle a situation. Order complexes are neither monoliths nor homogenous constructs or accumulations of actors (be they states or non-sovereign actors). Finally, they do not have to be accumulated on a certain region but can be spread in geographical terms.

A separation between core, semiperiphery, periphery and important non-sovereign actors (real and virtual) seems appropriate.⁸² Even though the separation seems simplified, it supports a more precise observation of actors, their interests, their impact and capabilities.

⁸¹ See Buzan: *People, States & Fears. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed., New York et al. 1991, 209-226.

⁸² See J. M. Goldgeier/M. McFaul: A tale of two worlds: core and periphery in the post-cold war era, in: *International Organization* 46, 2, Spring 1992, pp. 467-491. J. M. Goldgeier/M. McFaul: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Europe, paper presented at the 39th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, March 18-21, 1998, Minneapolis. C. Chase-Dunn/T. Hall: *Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems*, Boulder CO 1997. On Semiperiphery: I. Wallerstein: *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1750*, New York 1980. C. Ragin /D. Chirot: *World System of Immanuel Wallerstein*, in: T. Skocpol (ed.): *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge 1984, 296-299.

1. **Core actors** particularly states formed the center of the order for a longer period of time. They stand for certain values such as democracy and economic independence. In case of conflict, negotiations and dialogue usually support solutions.⁸³ Military confrontations are rather rare. Coalition and bandwagoning support peace among the actors. The main target is to secure existence without questioning the existence of other actors.
2. **Semiperiphery actors** are actors, which are neither part of the core nor part of the periphery. They keep the overall order in permanent tension and try to become part of the core. Semiperiphery actors are in a sandwich position. The core considers them as not mature enough to be part of it. They do not fulfill the criteria to be member of the core club. On one hand, the semiperiphery is a convenient buffer towards the periphery for the core. On the other hand, the core is afraid that the semiperiphery once will fulfill the core-criteria and finally will become a core member. The semiperiphery tries to establish strong public structures, nationalist movements and performs high economic ambitions. In case of success (i. e. the core-criteria are fulfilled) the core sets activities to re-buff the semiperiphery and disappoints it.
3. **Periphery actors** are actors, which are located at the rim of order complexes. Geographic position, religious aspects and cultural reasons or politico-economic backgrounds pushed them to the rim. Those actors are not yet part of the order complex and are slowly approaching the core standards. Usually periphery actors are located close to a grey zone or border other periphery actors of another order complex. They are more approachable to crisis than semiperiphery and core actors.
4. **Important non-sovereign actors, which exist virtual and real, are a rather new phenomenon.** They can result from states and non-state actors. Those actors make use of new communication technologies. For reason, it is of less importance where those actors are located (de-territorialization). Their assets are their capabilities and effects. Those actors cover a huge variety of entities, stretching from terrorist groups to organized crime but also to transnational enterprises and NGOs. Their key challenge is their variety. Additionally, they change within one issue and oscillate between the two extremes of supporters and opponents.

2.4.3 Adding Capabilities and Effects

In addition to the previously mentioned “dimensions” an actor may assume, it seems advisable to add “capabilities and effects”. Those two dimensions refer to “what is an actor able to accomplish?” and “which are possible consequences if an action is undertaken or not undertaken?”

The *2005 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America* offers a new classification of actors.⁸⁴ Instead of a linear approach, a capability and effect-based

⁸³ See eg. R. Fisher and W. Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1983).

⁸⁴ See <http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-zxg/National%20Defense%20Strategy%20Mar05-U.pdf>. (entry 02.07.09).

See alike the National Defense Strategy 2008 implicitly builds on those categories and transforms them further. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf> (entry 23.09.09).

concept was introduced. Additionally, possible relations were integrated. The strategy paper proposes four types of relations between the US and other actors:

Capabilities are attributes characterizing actors and enable them to pursue particular activities and distinguish them from others significantly. Those attributes may refer to features of actors and/or to access opportunities.

Effects refer to consequences resulting from attributes and/or combinations of attributes of actors and/or combinations of capabilities of several actors. Effects are the result of applied capabilities.

Effects may perform the following **dimensions**:

1. **Traditional effects.** These challenges are most often associated with states employing armies, navies, and air forces in long-established forms of military competition. *Traditional* military challenges remain important, as many states maintain capabilities to influence security conditions in their region. However, allied superiority in traditional domains, coupled with the costs of traditional military competition, drastically reduce adversaries' incentives to compete with us in this arena.
2. **Irregular effects.** Increasingly sophisticated *irregular* methods e.g., terrorism and insurgency challenge security interests. Irregular opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action. Two issues have intensified the danger of *irregular* challenges: the rise of extremist ideologies and the absence of effective governance. Political, religious, and ethnic extremism continues to fuel conflicts worldwide. The absence of effective governance in some parts of the world creates harbors for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. The unwillingness or negligence of some to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation makes it difficult to tackle those challenges.
3. **Catastrophic effects.** Some hostile forces are seeking to acquire *catastrophic* capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Porous international borders, weak international controls, and easy access to information related technologies facilitate these efforts. Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, proliferation, and problem states that possess or seek WMD, increasing the risk of WMD attack. Proliferation of WMD technology and expertise makes contending with *catastrophic* challenges a prime priority.
4. **Disruptive effects.** In rare cases, revolutionary technology and associated military innovation can fundamentally alter long-established concepts of warfare. Some potential adversaries are seeking *disruptive* capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities and offset the current advantages of some actors. Some

Additionally see in the National Military Strategy 2005: "The NDS [explanation: National Defense Strategy supports the NSS by establishing a set of overarching defense objectives that guide the Department's security activities and provide direction for the National Military Strategy. The NDS objectives serve as links between military activities and those of other government agencies in pursuit of national goals." <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf> (entry 23.09.09).

The NDS 2008 is more objective and risk oriented as compared to the 2005 version.

disruptive breakthroughs, including advances in biotechnology, cyber operations, space, or directed energy weapons, could seriously endanger our security. As such, breakthroughs can be unpredictable; one has to recognize their potential consequences in time and hedge against them.

Not covered by the 2005 strategy paper are the two following categories. Based on empirical finding, two additional categories are to be developed to cover the full spectrum of challenges.⁸⁵

5. **Erratic effects.** Action and reaction may change in terms of capability and effect widely. Advantage and disadvantage may gap considerably and change over the course of time. Actors and non-state actors are involved. It may refer to certain consequences of globalization.
6. **Creeping effects.** Action and reaction occur in a slow, often under the surface manner. Usually, backloops are rather slow. Actors and non-state actors are involved. It refers particularly to demographic and certain environmental issues.

Knotting those effect and capability categories together the following **relations** may emerge:

1. **International partnerships.** International partnerships continue to be a principal source of strength. Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than one could achieve on ones own.
2. **Key states.** Several key states face basic decisions about their roles in global and regional politics, economics, and security, and the pace and direction of their domestic evolution. These decisions may change their strategic position in the world and their relationship with other states, such as big players. This uncertainty presents both opportunities and potential challenges. Some states may move toward greater cooperation, while others could develop a confrontative stance. Over time, some rising powers may be able to pose a threat (e.g. because of military and technological competition), or threaten interests by pursuing dominating key regions. Moreover, large states with a powerful background could become dangerously unstable and increasingly ungovernable, creating significant future challenges.
3. **Problem states.** Problem states (states of concern) will continuously undermine regional stability and pose a threat. These states are hostile to generally accepted principles, often disregard international law and violate international agreements. They may seek weapons of mass destruction or other destabilizing military capabilities. Some support terrorist activities either directly or indirectly (e.g. by harboring terrorists or by tacitly accepting money laundering etc.).
4. **Significant non-state actors.** Currently, challenges emerge from a number non-state source, too. This category comprises terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and criminals, but also NGOs or Multinational enterprises that dictate or govern business in their understanding. This category of actors is rather varied. This is a key reason for their unpredictability.

⁸⁵ See A. Riemer, *The International Order at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Theoretical Considerations*, Frankfurt/Main 2007, p. 96.

The approach does not take into account the location of actors, but their strategic capabilities, possible effects and intensities of relations. The approach is strongly interest-driven and tailored to a large power. It is a practical approach with no theoretical underpinning. Experience and application of previous approaches after September 11, 2001 forced to rethink the 'actors-line' and to re-shape the taxonomy. For reason, the theoretical background is rather small. The taxonomy is typical for US-strategic assessments and thoughts. It is consciously simple and does not take any hierarchy or interrelations into account.

The main message extracted is the idea of 'capability-and-effect-basing'. It should be underpinned by theoretical thought and combined with potentials for change.

2.4.4 Adding Network Considerations⁸⁶

Network considerations depart from the idea that all actors are more or less interrelated. The main target is to present and explain social order. The main ideas were not applied to issues within the international order, yet. The following paragraphs will provide a first general assessment on what would have to be done make the approach applicable.

With regard to the international order, it would be helpful to find rules of behavior, norms and values that create, design and stop intra-action and interaction. For reason, actors and their relations are of main importance in network considerations. They lead to overlaying personal/individual networks and overall networks. It is possible to categorize them in a quantitative manner. On the macro level, an additional qualitative description seems helpful.

Referring to networks puts the focus on actors' relations. Those relations are of creative nature. Apart from the 'ingredients' the position of the actors, their importance, their capabilities and effects form the quality of the network. Networks describe the particular situation of a single actor as a system of intertwined relations. Network analyses are a scientific method to comprehend and describe order in a precise way. Social network analyses focus on human beings and their interrelations.

Applying that rudiment finding to the current international order the following **types of relations** could emerge:

- Exchange and communication relations (who or what triggers and/or influences decisions; who is partner and/or competitor of whom; where/who are the information sources etc)
- Physical relations (traffic junctions; lines of communications; resources etc.)
- Cooperative relations (strategic partners, supporters, period of cooperation; cooperation target)
- Confrontational relations (strategic opponents; outsider; period of confrontation; target of confrontation; solution options; time for solution; sustainability)
- Mixed relations (who cooperates with whom; who confronts whom; position of partners/opponents; period of confrontation/cooperation; target of confrontation/cooperation; solution options; time for solution; sustainability).

⁸⁶ See M. Schnegg/H. Lang: Netzwerkanalyse: Eine praxisorientierte Einführung, Methoden der Ethnographie, Heft 1, <http://www.methoden-der-ethnographie.de/heft1/Netzwerkanalyse.pdf> (entry 17.10.2005). Literature in IR theory has not yet covered this issue.

- Formal state of relations (type of state; legality; based on bilateral/multilateral/international agreements; forum of agreement; options to pressure on keeping the agreement).

Additionally, the level of activity, distance and brokerage are included. Applying matrices, graphs and records can categorize actors. Attributes may be used as supplements and support a dynamic examination. Evaluation and interpretation are subject to the questions and targets. Since network analyses are empirical tasks, a certain degree of individuality is part of work. For reason, network procedures are easily adaptable to the specific case.

2.5 Conclusions

It is of utmost important to start with grasping the actor(s) and not to begin with the non-compliant slot.⁸⁷

- In all phases of a development, any actor must be aware of a changing environment with its specific features, since actors themselves (conscious and/or unintended) become part of the environment. This is a “natural process” because of interaction between actors and the environment. This fact includes Coalition forces either.
- The most dangerous and at the same time difficult to handle actors are those who hide themselves in the hybrid environment; they make use of this environment in support of their own objectives and against the Coalition’s objectives, simply because they are the ones most familiar with it; for reason, they belong to the extreme part of the non-compliance spectrum up to the Irregular Adversary spectrum of actors.
- These actors follow very much an effects-based approach in support of their objectives, eg. by engaging public opinion in the Coalition’s homeland to influence the political level. Their approach is in general “What can be done?” and “What effects could be achieved?” With terrorist activities they can engage the political level immediately. Therefore, Operational Commanders must be able to think in political categories in order to understand and assess the opponents’ intentions and develop counter-strategies.
- Actors have their specific interests and intentions which probably cannot be changed in time.
- Adequate operational planning to a complex non-permissive environment is key to success. This implies to integrate the multidimensional viewing of actors.
- Particularly for transition phase it is vital to identify the key actors. They can either be more or less supportive to Coalition efforts or not supportive. Their support may vary over the course of time.
- During interaction, specific phenomena may occur. One of these phenomena is non-compliance of actors within a spectrum of deviation from the compliant status.
- For reason, it is highly required to step down from the black-and-white friend-and-foe-only perception. Additionally, it is of utmost importance for the

⁸⁷ D. Muhr: Deliberations after Multinational Workshop Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Vienna, 2009.

sustainable success of the Coalition force not to pre-tag actors either as good or bad. This would lead to not controllable vexed consequences for the overall undertaking and certainly would lead to a detrimental outcome.

- Compliance and non-compliance are phenomena, i.e. they refer to any observable occurrence; phenomena may be perceived through a person's senses or with their mind. One could also call them appearances.

3 Compliance – Non-Compliance Spectrum

3.1 General Deliberations

There is no such a “thing” like “objectivity in compliance and non-compliance”. For reason it is important to agree on what kind of behavior is still compliant and what kind of behavior is not compliant anymore. A common point of departure or reference will be of utmost importance to set the trace for action, and, finally, for an acceptable Comprehensive Approach. Additionally, non-compliance – non-compliant activities conducted by actors, which make them non-compliant actors to certain extend and non-compliance itself form an inseparable triangle. None of the terms can be defined without the other two.

Measurement of the intensity of non-compliance of a non-compliant actor who conducted non-compliant activities, requires

- a definition of the point of departure/reference for compliance;
- to design a catalogue of activities of compliance/non-compliance;
- to sort those activities along a number of clear-cut criteria;
- to define the deviation gap permitted (i.e. until which point compliance will still be accepted by the observer and up to from which point the non-compliance area is touched).

3.2 Types of Non-compliance as a Starter⁸⁸

Scrutinizing the notion of non-compliance requires a multidimensional look on the term. Possible motivations to arrive at the state of non-compliance are reasonable to start with. Defining non-compliance, at least two drivers or triggers can be defined:

- **Issue-driven** non-compliance: eg. economic, political, ideological, cultural, traditional
- **Actor-driven** non-compliance: eg. forced, deliberate, accidental, intentional, unknowing, irregular

For reason, non-compliance has to be view as a multidimensional concept. The following dimensions serve as basis for discussion:

- level of compliance/non-compliance
- levels of intensity
- space (referring to particular areas and regions)
- Time (over a certain period of time, interests as well as intentions can change and can change also the actor itself and the relationship to non-compliance)

⁸⁸ D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Vienna, 2009.

- actors pretending a specific *interest* (seen as a more long-term perception) or *intention* understood as a more short-time perception (deception).

3.3 How does Non-compliance emerge: Theoretical Considerations

Addressing the term “safe and secure environment” as the key objective of the Coalition leads to the issue of defining processes in social sciences. Concepts and definitions in social sciences (and in societal and political practice as well) are based on experiences and expectations. Any definition such as ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘peace’, ‘power’ or ‘equality’ is limited to ‘time-area-constellations’ and to individual ‘experience-expectation patterns’.

Non-compliance seems to be a similar phenomenon, open to receive a very versatile and therefore, not very useful connotation. What can be said is, since non-compliance is a multifaceted phenomenon its process of emergence must be multifaceted either. The key challenge in any definition work is to come to a close definition. Otherwise, everything will end up in non-compliance. Then – per definition – nothing will be non-compliant at all.⁸⁹

There are several roads to achieve a reduced level of complexity in orders and tackle compliance and non-compliance: One road is to look for similarities during eras; the second road refers to the selection of issues (‘potentials for challenges’), which may bring orders at the brink of changes. Both roads are not mutually exclusive and should not be strictly separated. Both roads are time-space-power-bound. One generic way to explain this phenomenon is the **concept of securitization** and the **concept of existential threats**.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ “When everything is crisis, nothing at all is crisis.” Paul Ricoeur: Ist »die Krise« ein spezifisch modernes Phänomen?, in: K. Michalski (Hrsg), Über die Krise. Castalgandolfo-Gespräche 1985, Stuttgart 1985, 38-63.

⁹⁰ See B. Buzan / O. Waever/ J. de Wilde: Security. A new framework for analysis, Boulder, CO 1998, particularly pp. 23-26. For further details see . B. Buzan: American Exceptionalism, Unipolarity and September 11: Understanding the Behaviour of the Sole Superpower, http://www.siss.org.cn/english_journal/2004/2005_spring. A. Riemer (2007): A. K. Riemer: The International Order at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt/Main 2007, pp. 93-94. See B. Buzan / O. Waever / J. de Wilde: Security. A new framework for analysis, Boulder, CO 1998, p. 27. B. Buzan (2004) The United States and Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 171. S. Guzzini (2002) “Foreign policy without diplomacy: the Bush administration at a crossroads”, International Relations 16(2): 291–297. B. Buzan: American Exceptionalism, Unipolarity and September 11: Understanding the Behaviour of the Sole Superpower, http://www.siss.org.cn/english_journal/2004/2005_spring.

Securitization refers to the fact that phenomena such as non-compliance are not something objective, but are constructed, e.g. according to personal/national interests, personal experiences and/or expectations etc. Securitization is an extreme version of politics and politicization. It refers to activities, which go beyond classical politics. Theoretically, issues may assume three forms: They are non-politicized and therefore not part of the societal debate and not dealt with by the state; they are politicized and therefore part of the societal discussion agenda and require action from the government, and/or near-government institutions; finally, they are securitized. There is no typical or ideal path of securitization. Securitization is not bound to any particular group of actors, but such might raise an issue to the level of general consideration and, finally, importance. The crucial point is that an existential challenge legitimizes actors to break existing rules and justifies lifting the necessary action to the level of an emergency. Moreover, it is not the securitized object that launches the procedure of securitization but the perceiving audience.

Successful securitization covers the following main aspects: An existential threat is created (i.e. a phenomenon which permit a deviation from compliant rules and norms); a perceiving

Buzan distinguishes in his concepts between referent objects, actors, and analysts. Additionally, he points to the problems of identifying existential threats:

- **Referent objects** are the objects/topics/issues, which are securitized.⁹¹ They refer to issues, which are perceived by an audience when being under existential challenge. Usually, those issues show a legitimate claim that their survival is necessary. The special nature of security challenges justifies the use of extraordinary measures to manage them. Then, security questions refer to issues, which endanger or threaten the referent object they have an impact on the survival of the referent object.⁹² In consequence, questions on survival are questions about existential challenges. This is a rather straightforward approach to security.
- **Actors** may securitize various referent objects by declaring them as being under threat. They choose definite activities or might decide to remain passive. Actors may be individuals, lobbying groups, media etc. They can 'make an issue becoming a challenge for the public arena'.
- **Analysts** have an interpretation function and such interpretations may lead to actions or non-actions by actors. Analysts may contribute to a securitization of referent objects; they may 'frame' a challenge and point to possible network effects and consequences.

An 'existential threat for an actor and/or analyst and/or referent object not necessarily poses an 'existential challenge' to others. Two questions emerge:

- What will happen if one does not undertake actions (i.e. one remains passive)?
- What will happen if one undertakes actions (i.e. one will be active)?

Both questions lead to a number of possible answers in terms of outcomes. Moreover, different levels of involvement have to be taken into account. This refers to the actor, the analyst and the referent object. In many cases, congruence between these levels is not always a given condition. On the contrary, in most of the cases actors and analysts show different experiences and expectations concerning a possible development of the referent object. The stage of preparing information on a particular combination of variables and possible consequences (=causes and effects, or more specifically existential potentials for change) is not congruent with the stage of taking a decision on a particular combination of variables and possible consequences.

The usual disintegration of the triangle actor, analyst, and referent object, opens the way for different perceptions, which may arise when a threat is perceived as such. Additionally, differences may arise on the necessity of undertaking or not undertaking actions. If actions are taken, differences about which steps have to be applied may emerge too. Different roles and different interests may lead to a challenge as such. Others are not even perceived or are on purpose neglected for various reasons.

audience with the necessary power within the system brings the issue to public debate and frames the issue as an existential challenge; an appropriate emergency action has to be triggered; a significant effect on inter-unit-relationships must be a result in case of non-treatment; existing rules on a legitimate basis must be broken.

⁹¹ See B. Buzan / O. Waever / J. de Wilde: Security. A new framework for analysis, Boulder, CO 1998, p. 21.

⁹² The term 'survival' refers to the particular systemic condition of sustainable and deep-going change.

The concept of securitization is supportive to understand non-compliance since it offers “floating thresholds”. Additionally, it boils down the phenomenon to reduce complexity in hybrid orders. It supports clearing the stage of the many possible shades of phenomena of non-compliance.

3.4 Connecting the Dots towards Definitions: Securitization and Non-compliance⁹³

Compliance and non-compliance are best described by a multidimensional spectrum which covers types of activities (for reason also intensities which lead to effects) and, finally, actors. Securitization offers the meta-bond which keeps the whole spectrum together.

Non-compliance refers to *„all kinds of activities and behavior detrimental to the achievement of the Coalition strategic end-state and its implementation.“*

Non-compliant actors are *“all actors that show any kind of activities and behavior able to counter the achievement of the Coalition strategic end-state and its implementation.”*

An action is labeled as **non-compliant** if it *distrusts or otherwise interferes with Coalition efforts to achieve lawful goals/objectives in support of the host nation and/or international mandate (s).*

A **non-compliant actor** is *any person or group that distrusts or otherwise interferes with Coalition efforts to achieve lawful goals/objectives in support of the host nation and/or international mandate (s). (Clifford’s definition approach)*


Successful missions require going beyond irregular adversaries since already non-compliant actors may endanger the sustainability of Coalitions. Non-compliant actors are the potential recruitment base, target audience and supporters of irregular adversaries and may themselves turn into irregular adversaries.

Irregular Adversaries can be defined in more narrow terms: IA [Irregular Adversary] refer to *actors who retreat to violence or intentionally obstruct humanitarian and military activities in the immediate stabilization phase; they use non-violent and/or violent measures with the intention to obstruct e.g. the post-conflict reconstruction process and or achieve political goals that counter the Coalition political objectives. Irregular Adversaries are a sub-group of NCA [non-compliant actors].*

The following figure presents a launching point to start with to come to grips with non-compliance and related phenomena.⁹⁴

⁹³ The definitions are based on Multinational Experiment 6 Baseline Assessment & Results, Food for Thought paper, ppt-slides.

⁹⁴ The figure is based on Multinational Experiment 6 Baseline Assessment & Results, Food for Thought paper, ppt-slides.



What is an acceptable level of Compliance?

- Is total compliance necessary?
- How much compliance is needed for the regulation to be a success?
- Is strict compliance to the letter of the law necessary or is substantive compliance sufficient?

Do those being regulated have the capacity to comply?

- Will it be necessary to build capacity within the regulated sector or population to achieve compliance?
- If yes: Is it in the interest of the sector or population to develop its own capacity?

There are a number of strands and stepping-in possibilities on how to define non-compliance and, finally, non-compliant actors. For reason, it is highly recommended to keep the **definition of non-compliant actors rather open** than closing it in a definite way.⁹⁵

Although the core of the concept justifying the intervention of international Coalition forces is international law, a more open social or political process of inclusion or exclusion of actors undermining the conditions for establishing a new state could contribute to the efficiency of Stabilization & Reconstruction operations. As Stabilization & Reconstruction operations are about transformation of the Coalition and the country through a process of increasing stabilization founded on successively increasing trust and social capital, classification and re-classification of actors becomes an active instrument of the operation as the process progresses. In other words, classifications become a way of signaling the development of interactions of roles and identities over time. Seeing classification of actors as a social and political process may seem provocative and uncertain. However, the idea of finding a firm point of reference only in nature or international law with objective hard criteria may lead to a mere covering of the real processes of classification. As an actor's actions hardly can be judged without assumptions about that actor's intention, hence drawing on his or her character, any classification of non-compliant actors will have some reference to established prejudices about that actor. Opening

⁹⁵ E. Bjurström: Discussion paper for Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, May, 2009.

up the process for criticism and moral debate seems like a more convincing way to secure human right.

3.5 *Dynamizing Non-compliance*

The following model provides an explanatory foundation for non-compliance with intentions, mechanisms, activities and effects of non-compliant actors.⁹⁶

Scientific modeling is the process framing generating abstract, conceptual, graphical and/or mathematical delineations. Modeling is an essential and inseparable part of all scientific activity, and many scientific disciplines have their own ideas about specific types of modeling. There is little general theory about scientific modeling, offered by philosophy of science, systems theory, and new fields like knowledge visualization.

A model is a simplified abstract view of the complex reality. It may focus on particular views, enforcing the "divide and conquer" principle for a problem. Formally, a model is an interpretation which deals with empirical entities, phenomena, and physical processes in a logical way. For the scientist, a model is also a way in which the human thought processes can be amplified. A model's language is usually rather artificial.


In the underlying context an explanatory, descriptive model is introduced.⁹⁷ An **explanatory model** refers to the explanation of what exists or has existed. The meaning we attach to the verb "explain" is very important. It refers to an interpretation of a given event or in the sense of explaining what has happened. Although some writers distinguish between 'description' (what has happened) and 'explanation' (why has it happened), this distinction is very difficult to make in practice. The process of explanatory analysis covers a large variety of techniques and styles. The analyst may use intuition or more systematic methods to develop ideas. She/he may build a description/explanation by making a set of interconnected deductions from one or two pieces of information, or she/he may take an enormous amount of information and try to make some useful generalizations. Descriptions/explanation may take the form of purely verbal statements, an explanation based on some statistics, or a combination of the two. The descriptive/explanatory analysis makes the reader understand the past and present.

The following figure illustrates an explanatory model for non-compliance on a very general basis. It will be enhanced and detailed in step-by-step basis on the following pages.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ D. Muhr: Presentation Multinational Workshop Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Vienna, 2009.

⁹⁷ See A. Riemer, Lecture on "Research Methodology" in the Ph.D. program "Military Sciences" between the Austrian National Defense Academy and the Zrínyi Miklós Defense Academy, Fall 2008.

⁹⁸ D. Muhr: Presentation Multinational Workshop Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Vienna, 2009.



The model departs from the following **assumptions**:⁹⁹

An actor's or an order's specific interests, values, intentions may be affected by a Coalition's intervention.

An intervention may lead to intended and/or unintended change in vital interests (usually simple and very basic needs; for reason, strategies are rather short-term).

A certain event or incident could trigger the mechanism of non-compliance.

The actor/order tries to contact another group, another actor/ order to support specific interests, values, intentions. This step raises the frequency within the model since additional players are involved. In a complex environment it is sometimes impossible to identify the "real actors" behind specific activities. One approach is to pose the question "*cui bono?*"¹⁰⁰ "For whose advantage?" to identify possible suspects for non-compliant activities.

⁹⁹ D. Muhr: Deliberations for Multinational Workshop Objective 1.1 Multinational Experiment 6, Vienna, 2009.

¹⁰⁰ A maxim of Cassius, quoted by Cicero, For whose advantage? Generally used, however, as, What is the good of it?

The Roman orator and statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero, in his speech Pro Roscio Amerino, section 84, attributed the expression *Cui bono?* to the Roman consul and censor Lucius Cassius Longinus Ravilla:

L. Cassius ille quem populus Romanus verissimum et sapientissimum iudicem putabat identidem in causis quaerere solebat 'cui bono' fuisset.

The famous Lucius Cassius, whom the Roman people used to regard as a very honest and wise judge, was in the habit of asking, time and again, 'To whose benefit?'

Another example of Cicero using "*cui bono*" is in his defence of Milo, in the Pro Milone. He even makes a reference to Cassianus: "let that maxim of Cassius apply". (Cicero, Pro Milone 32.3).

Strand 1: the problem is solved; no further escalation is most likely; the mechanism returns to the point of departure. No feedback loop is triggered, since the process ends before reaching a knotting point which could trigger a feedback.

Strand 2: the problem is not solved satisfactorily; further escalation is most likely; the mechanism continues. An activity is aimed to cause certain effects in line with the actor's/ order's intentions sometimes in line with a certain strategy. The activity can either be compliant or non-compliant. Assessment as such does not reflect the level of compliance/non-compliance itself. Actors and activities have to be assessed in parallel. One result can be non-compliance in numerous degrees. The benchmark for non-compliance is whether the actor/activity is detrimental to the Coalition's objectives. The effects will then be assessed by actors/ orders whether the activity supports their intention or strategy.

a) If compliant, the mechanism ends and bounces back to the point of departure.

b) If non-compliant, effects will lead to the feedback-loop (which is an assessment step).

Strand 3: no mechanism is triggered at all; the actors himself triggers already the effects. This is considered the most dangerous strand, since it starts almost without precursing signals and, therefore, offers more or less no chance to intervene in the sense as to block a detrimental development.

The **knotting point** are the key influencable moments for both, the Coalition forces and already existing non-compliant actors/groups (up to the Irregular Adversaries spectrum) to recruit support for their own ideas and interests. For reason, understanding and observing those knotting points is of highest importance to control developments and to be, finally, success in strategic term. Interfaces within the framework of a **Comprehensive Approach must be installed at the angles**. They provide vital exists. If a lever starts to move, situation usually is difficult to be influenced and finally, handled according to a Coalition's strategy.

The most success-promising stepping-in slot in the mechanism is at the very beginning, i. e. the mechanism should not even start. This implies the application of a Comprehensive Approach with a high level of integrating local actors on the ground. If the mechanism is constantly "on the run" the Coalition will suffer in terms of their strategic objectives. It has to take into account that a rational non-compliant actor will try to keep the mechanism running and drive it into a direction of his/her interest.


The **first step** in a counter strategy is to **understand** the **mechanism** and figure out possible **effects** by ones own activities. If ones own effects support the non-compliant actor's strategy it is advised to stay passive and not undertake steps (simply because to fire up the mechanism in certainly unintended and detrimental directions).

Whereas the motives for crime are typically rather simple (greed, jealousy, hatred and fear), politics is far more complex. Ideology, religion, customs, and historical developments (such as long-standing feuds, bigotry, and racism) have to be taken into account. Political movements typically have more than one actor and motives can vary widely. For reason, it is high advisable for an Operational Commander to take this principle as an ideational guideline into account. This implies that he/she is a *homo politicus* and thinks outside the "military-only"-box.

This suggestion seems to stand in stark contrast to traditional military principles – better deciding something wrong instead of doing no decision at. Doing nothing and wait and see in a particular moment until one has a reasonable basis for decision is in a strict understanding a decision as such.

3.6 Enhancing and Detailing the Explanatory Model in a Step-by-Step-Manner

The underlying chapter offers an explanatory model regarding possible options on influencing non-compliant actors in a non-permissive hybrid environment. For the sake of transparency and making the model easier to comprehend the model will be unfolded in a step-by-step manner.



Further explanatory remarks regarding the unfolding process:¹⁰¹

1. Actors with relations to other actors shape an order.

- An order is an ideational framework consisting of actors, their actions and interactions and shows three levels of interaction:
- Ideational or intersubjective (How is the world socially constructed? What does/do the single individual and/or groups of individuals perceive?)

¹⁰¹ The underlying model was introduced during the NATO Concept Development and Experimentation Conference, Rome 16-19 Nov 2009 in the wake of the workshop “Deterring Non-State Actors” (17 Nov 2009) by the authors of the study report.


- Behavioral (What does/do the individual or/and groups of individuals do on a regular basis to keep global arrangements alive? How is the world perceived by opinion leaders?)
- Institutional (This level refers to institutions and regimes within a state or between states and/or non-sovereign actors)

2. **Several orders shape an environment.** As the orders have relations to each other or do not even have relations and some actors are multi-rollers and/or multi-hatters (the same goes with orders) the environment is complex in nature.


3. In some cases one finds **hybrid orders**, which are orders embracing different types of observables (i.e. actors, no matter whether they find themselves in the compliant and/or non-compliant spectrum of activities in a generic understanding plus the different environment[s]) **who intra-act and inter-act.**

4. Exemplifying the underlying case, a **non-compliant actor is pinned into a network**, thereby forming an order (indicated in dark grey in the above graph). Even non-compliant actors have relations to actors and orders, who and which are compliant in their behaviour. Some non-compliant actors even have several roles to play, some of which are in the compliant, other are in the non-compliant spectrum of behaviour, e.g. tribal leader, war criminal, supporter for irregular adversaries and minister for reconstruction at the same time.

5. Actors and orders have **relations outside the environment**, either. Non-compliant actors often show relations to other states (patron states or host states).



6. All actors and orders have **vital interests in and outside the environment**. In case of an **intervention from outside**, the intervener, **hits the environment** with its actors and orders and by nature, **becomes part of the environment, too**. This is an **“enhanced environment”**.



7. An intervention will, by nature, cause **changes in the environment** and will hit vital interests of actors and orders. All vital interests of the actor or order which were the reason for the intervention itself will be touched.

8. As a next step, actors and orders will **develop counter-strategies** against the intervening actor to protect vital interests.

9. In case of hitting the vital interests of respective actors and orders, reactions which could lead to **complete non-compliance up to active resistance of Irregular Adversaries** will follow.

10. To carry out the counter-strategy, activities will take place to achieve certain effects in **supporting the counter-strategy or hampering the strategy of the intervener**.

11. Some of the effects will **hit the will of the intervener** to further carry out its strategy concerning the environment, its centre of power, e.g. **undermine the political will in the home-countries via international media**. Home-countries as well as the global information domain have become part of the “enhanced environment”.

12. **Effects are designed to influence the political situation in the environment itself**, e.g. make clear and obvious that the intervener will never achieve its objective to establish a safe and secure environment.

13. A **non-permissive environment**, which makes the whole situation even more complex, especially if it shows feature of hybridity is another challenge.

14. If the effects are achieved then the feedback-loop which goes back to the actor or the order as a positive one, will trigger the counter-strategy of the non-compliant actors even more. The **result** can be even **more unpredictable** spiral effects in the “enhanced environment”.

15. **Intervention points** for influencing measures are obviously necessary at first on the strategic level, to deter patron states, host states and actors to support non-state actors in the environment (see A). They have become already part of the “enhanced environment” as well as the Coalition itself.

16. An approach is to shape the environment in that way, that **it becomes a non-permissive environment for the non-compliant actor**, e.g. to establish a safe and secure environment and maintain nation building in a Comprehensive Approach (see B). This idea is right, as the environment is a main reason for having a specific type of actors and orders in place. But as a reaction, the Comprehensive Approach will be a main target in the counter-strategy of the non-state actor. A **Comprehensive Approach seems to be the proper approach**, but is in a non-permissive hybrid environment probably not robust enough. Strategic and tactical measures (such as e.g. deterrence) are to be conducted at the same time and in a co-ordinated manner.¹⁰²

¹⁰² See Barack Obama's speech in West Point, N.Y. on Dec. 1st, 2009 where he outlined the reviewed strategy in Afghanistan. His speech was headed by “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, the US-President mentioned:

“We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months. Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security. Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. ...These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

... And we can't count on military might alone. We have to invest in our homeland security, because we can't capture or kill every violent extremist abroad. We have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence, so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.

We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. And that's why I've made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them -- because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons; true security will come for those who reject them.

We'll have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I've spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships. And we have forged a new beginning between America and the Muslim world -- one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human dignity.

And finally, we must draw on the strength of our values -- for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That's why we must promote our values by living them at home -- which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their

17. Another possible approach is to try to **change the orders** (see C). The orders are more or less a product or a result of the environment which very often suffered from years of war. In a hybrid environment the orders are very often horizontal hierarchies almost impossible to change. Moreover are the actors within the orders multi-hatters and multi-rollers. Most of the influencing measures will be of short-term quality, take place on the tactical level and must be co-ordinated with the long-term conduct of Stabilization and Reconstruction operations.

18. The same goes with the attempt to **intervene the actors themselves** (see D). In a hybrid environment with hybrid orders the intervention may cause unpredictable and unintended effects.

19. **Cut off relations** between actors and orders is another possible approach and will be very hard to be conducting either (see E).

20. **Prevent activities** in supporting a non-compliant actor's counter-strategy is necessary as well (see F).

21. After conducting these activities it is required to **contain the effects on the environment** (see G, I), e.g. hindering information to be spread out to home-countries by international media is almost impossible. Limitations by the rules of law are normal and will be utilized by non-compliant actors.

22. **Deter the impact of positive feedback-loops for non-compliant actors in supporting their counter-strategy** is another intervention point (see H).

3.7 Conclusions¹⁰³

- Compliance and non-compliance are to be understood as a **phenomenon**. It requires a specific scientific approach on the analytical level. The tool chosen to analyze is usually a **mix or set of scientific approaches** or tools. Operational commanders as well as actors, who carry out the comprehensive strategy up to the strategic level, need to have a scientific toolset to be able to analyze the phenomenon and deal with it appropriately.
- Fostering compliance and establishing active and passive resistance against non-compliance should be seen as **counter-strategies** to non-compliance. This supports the idea of creating and **fostering a non-permissive environment** for non-compliance and Irregular Adversaries.
- Additionally, one must understand the **interconnections**. Trial and error is certainly not an advisable way to deal the phenomenon since it causes numerous unintended effects which are usually detrimental to the Coalition's strategy.
- If an activity is to hinder or hamper the achievement of the Coalition strategic vision or goals, one has to analyze the actor's **intent** and **interests** behind this activity. The hampering moment is the defining moment whether a

human rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the source, the moral source, of America's authority."

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address> (entry 2.12.2009).

¹⁰³ D. Muhr: Presentation Objective 1.1, Engaging local actors at Multinational Workshop Outcome 1, Motta di Livenza, ITA, June, 2009 and deliberations after the workshop.

phenomenon is compliant or non-compliant. The phenomenon refers to both, the actor AND the activity. Both objects together form the phenomenon of compliance/non-compliance.

- **Compliance and non-compliance are phenomena, i.e. they refer to any observable occurrence;** phenomena may be perceived **through a person's senses or with their mind.** One could also call them appearances. Compliance and non-compliance are dynamic and multidimensional by nature since they are locked in a complex, dynamic environment and are performed in such types of orders. Additionally, compliance and non-compliance are **relative** and **subjective phenomena** shaped by the experience-expectation horizon of an observer and of the observed. During interaction, specific phenomena may occur. One of these phenomena is non-compliance of actors within a spectrum of deviation from the compliant status.
- Operational Commanders must be aware that non-compliant actors up to Irregular Adversaries **conduct a kind of effects-based operations** based on a comprehensive understanding of their own environment. Local actors in complex environments are very often in leading positions in the political, economic, ethnic, tribal, religion or military sense. These kinds of people have a comprehensive understanding of their own environment. As the Coalition becomes part of the environment it is of utmost necessity to understand the environment in a comprehensive manner, too. This request transcends managing information.
- One of the key conclusions is that according to the proposed explanatory model and the identified importance of the knotting points (intervention points) a **Comprehensive Approach must entail very robust interfaces.** The reason is that the actual application of a Comprehensive Approach very often is not in the direct interest of non-compliant actors.
- Future endeavors should **focus on “robusting” the Comprehensive Approach** to sustain within the knotting point phases and provide reasonable exits.
- This implies a **coherent strategy covering all intervention points.** Additionally, the strategy is to be adapted on a permanent basis, since it is applied in an ever-changing environment and even more changing orders. Moreover, the strategy becomes part of the environment and vice versa.

4. Coping with Non-compliance in a Non-permissive Hybrid Environment

“ISAF’s strategy to defeat the insurgency and achieve this end state, based on an indepth analysis of the nature of the conflict, includes four major pillars:

ISAF will become radically more integrated and partnered with the ANSF to enable a more rapid expansion of their capacity and responsibility for security.

ISAF will place support to responsive and accountable governance, including subnational and community governance, on par with security.

ISAF's operations will focus first on gaining the initiative and reversing the momentum of the insurgency.

*ISAF will prioritize available resources to those critical areas where the population is most threatened.*¹⁰⁴

Those region-oriented principles which appear to be of tailor-made nature bear some generic grain which could be applied in the case of dealing with non-compliance in a non-permissive hybrid environment.

Non-compliance has emerged as a particular phenomenon within non-permissive hybrid environments. For reason it has become an issue Coalitions are naturally confronted with in their missions.

The underlying chapter covers a wide framework regarding the concept of Comprehensive Approach.

The point of departure is the Comprehensive Strategy. It is considered a vital basis of understanding and is grounded on the *Multinational Experiment 5 Synthesised Findings*. Additionally, operational/in-country level of planning and the organization for flexibility in planning are dealt with. They serve as additional parameters to be integrated into any comprehensive understanding on how to deal with non-compliance in hybrid orders.

Finally, based on those *Multinational Experiment 5 Synthesised Findings* the phenomenon of non-compliance will be locked into a Coalition's decision making process.

4.1 Comprehensive Approach

The Comprehensive Approach is considered to be the most appropriate approach in current crisis management operation. **Stabilization** requires a **holistic**, i.e. comprehensive tackling of the situation, thereby **overcoming traditional borders** between various actors involved for the sake of the success of the operation. It is a principle which must be reflected and applied on all levels of the operation, starting with a **comprehensive strategy** and stretching to **implementation planning** and **management** and **evaluation** and to the single actors in the theatre.

The more non-permissive an environment is, the more one has the need for a Comprehensive Approach beginning with a comprehensive strategy. At the same time, it is even more unlikely to follow a Comprehensive Approach because civilian actors, especially NGOs need to be even more impartial for their own security reasons. It must be assumed that many NGOs as well as other organizations would express their interest not being involved into Coalition military efforts and operations. For reason, the Comprehensive Approach must be conducted in a careful way. Security matters become much more important than in a permissive environment.¹⁰⁵

Due to the spectrum of actors in stabilization operations which covers also non-compliant actors and irregular adversaries the consequent application of a Comprehensive Approach in a Coalition engagement is indispensable. For reason,

¹⁰⁴ p. 2-15 of the unclassified version of COMISAF's INITIAL STATEMENT, available http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (entry 21.09.09).

¹⁰⁵ I. Woodmansey: Presentation at the Workshop Outcome 1 Multinational Experiment 6 in Motta di Livenza, ITA, June 2009.

all levels involved are confronted with the topic of non-compliance and non-compliant actors. Finally, all levels have to take into account the permanent and revolving nature of non-compliance.

This phenomenon must be addressed in a Coalition's strategy, which, by nature of the undertaking, has to be comprehensive and flexible, too. For reason, the **strategy** has to provide **adequate guidelines** and **appropriate strategic objectives** concerning each phenomenon of non-compliance. This implies that from a certain planning level on it is not possible to hide behind catchphrases and too generic guidelines (e.g. safe and secure environment, rule of law as strategic goals).

Multinational Experiment 5 in its *Synthesised Findings* states the following:

The ultimate focus of a Coalition's intervention in stabilization operations should be on developing, supporting and sustaining legitimate, indigenous governance through the use of all available instruments of power. This is accomplished in great part by ensuring rule of law and social well being capacities are firmly established.

Shared strategic guidance is needed early to clearly convey the Coalition's focus and intent. It also is necessary to establish coherence and ensure the appropriate resources and authorities are delegated to leaders in theatre.

Active dialogue among civilian and military organizations within and external to the Coalition, and at all levels of activity, is important to sharing perspectives as well as information pertinent to resolving a crisis. This expands the Coalition's scope of awareness, sharpens its situational discernment, and facilitates cooperation among the actors.

Differences in motives, objectives, perspectives and cultures between the varieties of actors involved must be understood and accounted for. This understanding contributes to flexibility in thinking, adaptability in planning and compromise in developing objectives, which are essential elements of a successful Comprehensive Approach.

Comprehensive Approach is, therefore, largely about the three former groups – security, governance and economic development. These are the actors from whom one can most likely expect enhanced coordination. When talking about civilian-military relations in the Comprehensive Approach context, one should recognize that there needs to be a distinction between humanitarian-military relations, and the relations between the military and other non-humanitarian civilian actors.

It is worth defining the actors involved in the crisis. Which organizations can be expected to engage in a Comprehensive Approach? Roughly speaking, one may differentiate between four sets of actors in contemporary crises: security, governance, economic development and humanitarian. Personnel in the latter group are cautious about engaging with the three former groups, since their access and security are based on being perceived as impartial and independent from political influence. They work in the conflict and as such do not address conflict drivers but work to alleviate suffering; whereas the other three groups work on the conflict with the intent to mitigate the drivers of conflict. In practice there are grey zones between development and humanitarian assistance, but once an activity is considered political or undertaken in support of the authorities (e.g. building of infrastructure, government clinics or public schools) it can no longer be deemed as humanitarian action.

4.2 Coalition Comprehensive Strategy: Premises of Strategic Conceptualizing

A Coalition's Comprehensive Strategy needs to consider the following **premises** in the conceptualizing phase:¹⁰⁶

1. Strategy is proactive and anticipatory but not predictive. Strategy is clear on what are facts, assumptions, and possibilities.
2. Strategy is subordinate to policy. Political purpose dominates all levels of strategy. Policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate aims in an acceptable manner. For reason, policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate goals, and strategy informs policy of the art of the possible.
3. Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the environment. It must be consistent with the nature of the strategic environment.
4. Strategy maintains a holistic perspective. It demands comprehensive consideration.
5. Strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and other actors. Any strategy, once known or implemented, threatens the status quo and creates risk for the equilibrium of the strategic environment.
6. Strategy is grounded on what has to be accomplished and why it has to be accomplished. Strategy focuses on a preferred end state among possible end states in a dynamic environment.
7. Strategy is an inherently human enterprise. The role of belief systems and cultural perceptions of all the players is important in the development and execution of strategy.
8. Friction is an inherent part of strategy. Friction cannot be eliminated, but it can be understood and accounted for to a greater or lesser extent.
9. Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. This focus makes strategy inherently adaptable and flexible. It learns from experience and must be sufficiently broad and flexible in its construction to adapt to unfolding events and an adversary's countermoves.
10. Strategy is hierarchical. The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates span of control.
11. Strategy exists in a symbiotic relationship with time. Strategy must be integrated into the stream of history. Strategy is about thinking and acting in time in a way that is fundamentally different from planning.
12. Strategy is cumulative. Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative. Strategies at different levels interact and influence the success of higher and lower strategy and planning over time.
13. Efficiency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy. Strategic objectives, if accomplished, create or contribute to creation of strategic effects that lead to the achievement of the desired end state at the level of strategy being analyzed. In that way, they ultimately serve national interests.
14. Strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among the objectives sought, the methods used to pursue the objectives, and the resources available.
15. Risk is inherent to all strategy. Strategy is subordinate to the uncertain nature of the strategic environment.

¹⁰⁶ H. R. Yarger: Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB641.pdf>, pp. 66-68.

4.3 Non-compliance in the Coalition's Decision Making Process

Since the *Synthesised Findings Multinational Experiment 5* provides a valuable framework to come to grips with non-compliance it should be taken is working grid.

During Multinational Experiment 5 a flexible and iterative decision-making process was produced that helps to produce a unified strategy and associated implementation guidance.

Dealing with a non-permissive environment an iterative process allowing frequent interactions between planning and decision-making levels is an effective way of implementing the strategic intent while taking into account the realities of the field. There needs to be a very active relationship between the strategic level and the Coalition special representative in order to coordinate the parallel work of different actors. The Operational Commander must also take part in the development of the strategy. The interplay between the Coalition special representative and the political contact group should be very intense and dynamic.¹⁰⁷

Strategic planners are in charge of elaborating:

- the Strategic Vision (it has to be possible to be realized and not an illusion),
- the Transition State,
- the Strategic Objectives,

based on the ambition for the area under consideration, on the understanding of what the situation is and could become, on the means which might be committed and at what cost, potential Coalition members will have to agree on what they want to achieve.¹⁰⁸

After being briefed on the Coalition Strategic Assessment, the strategic planners will develop the Strategic Vision and present it for validation to the Senior National Representatives.

Based on guidance from the Senior National Representatives, the Strategic Planners will develop one or various Transition States to be presented to the Senior National Representatives, who will then adjust and adopt one of the possibilities they are given. This Transition State is then compared with the unsatisfactory situation. The main obstacles to the Transition State will be highlighted ("we will not reach that transition state, if we do not address the problem of..."). This Transition State needs to be validated by the Senior National Representatives before planners pursue the next step of the planning process.

Planners then elaborate the Strategic Objectives, taking into account the obstacles defined previously. These objectives will be presented together with the timeframe considered necessary for their realization. They should not be a simple part of the Transition State in some generic domains (policy, economy, etc) but rather provide the working basis to develop comprehensive strategic roadmaps.

Most of the time, reaching each strategic objective will require the commitment of resources of several instruments of power.

¹⁰⁷ See Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning, Multinational Experiment 5.

¹⁰⁸ See Strategic Planning Guide, Multinational Experiment 5.

The aggregate of these 3 first outcomes of the planning process constitute the general approach to the conflict resolution. These elements will represent the foundation for the crisis resolution planning; they might also be used for drafting a United Nations Resolution, or as the basis for setting up a Coalition of the willing, or putting in place the conditions for a lead nation to volunteer.¹⁰⁹

Each assessment should address each step as well as the headings (in italics) below. The bullet points are possible topics to consider but are purely indicative and should in no way constrain assessments.

Other points may also be added as deemed useful by each nation.

Dealing with a non-permissive environment the following steps of strategic planning along with the outcomes of Multinational Experiment 5 are appropriate (adopted).¹¹⁰

Step 1: Situation Assessment

1.1 – Conflict Analysis Overview: what is currently happening and why?

- Historical background of conflict or instability (past conflicts or tensions, etc) and its potential consequences locally, regionally or even internationally with special emphasis on actors and compliance
- Characterizing the environment and the relevant orders
- Comprehensive identification and analysis of each cluster of root causes of conflict
 - o national context
 - o regional or international context

1.2 - Main Actors and Stakeholders (prioritized): who is doing what and why?

- Characterization of the main actors and stakeholders, within and throughout the region of concern: Identification of the main actors and interest or identity groups, their leadership, and brief description of their assumed perspectives and potential attitude regarding the intervention with special regard to actors who shape the non-permissiveness of the environment.
- Assessment of the role of key external actors, both multilateral and bilateral outside the region. Taking stock of external actors' intervention and priorities, and assessment of the way the degrading situation was addressed
- Assessment of actors conducting non-compliant activities up to the Irregular Adversaries spectrum especially non-compliant actors per se, who in some cases might be the reason for intervention
- Identifying key actors and key orders for each phase of an intervention from maneuver over stabilization to transition and options to influence them to behave compliant
- Identifying key actors for taking part in the solution for a safe and secure environment

¹⁰⁹ See Strategic Planning Guide, Multinational Experiment 5.

¹¹⁰ D. Muhr: Deliberations to Strategic Planning Guide to Problem Statement Multinational Experiment 6, Vienna, 2009.

1.3 – Domestic Dynamics Driving Conflict and/or Instability, Higher and Lower Priority: what is to be addressed in a short and longer term?

- Description of the dynamics of conflict in the country and the region of concern (usually based on the fundamental interests and grievances of key stakeholders)
- Key factors relating to present conflict situation and possible inter linkages between them (actors, stakeholders, natural conditions and resources, political and socio-economic issues at stake, etc.)
- Uncertainties/areas for which information is lacking in the present or which could become important later-on
- Analyzing interests, intentions, mechanisms for non-compliance of key actors up to the Irregular Adversary spectrum
- Analyzing effects of non-compliant activities of key actors
- Developing strategies to counter key actors conducting non-compliant activities
- Options to build up a non-permissive environment for non-compliant actors per se and Irregular Adversaries

1.4 – External factors (potential key factors to consider for future planning purposes)

- Overview of main security, political, institutional, economic, infrastructural and social factors, as applicable, that could influence the situation
- Relations with neighboring states and/or populations
- Action of the international actors already in the country, their involvement in the crisis and the effect of an intervention on their action, lessons learned from previous engagement, identification of future role for the international community at large.
- Analyze the situation as an assessment of the environment that is not necessarily limited to a certain state or region

Step 2: Prospective Assessment

2.1 - Based on the situation analysis

- Potential impact of the situation in the absence of an intervention
- Events that could aggravate the situation or opportunities that could improve it.
- Can the situation be resolved without intervention from other actors? Is outside intervention desirable, from the local perspective?
- Ability of regional actors to deal satisfactorily with the situation of concern.
- Best and worst case scenarios
- Options to influence actors to act compliantly

2.2 - Based on the different actors and stakeholders

- Who is going to benefit from the intervention and what?
- Who is going to loose and what?

- Consequences of these benefits and losses and their influence in-country and on the Coalition action in the sense of non-compliance and Irregular Adversaries
- Identify triggers for non-compliance and circumstances which make actors conducting non-compliant activities or joining Irregular Adversaries

Step 3: Strategic Reference

3.1 - Constraints, restraints and caveats (what are we limited by and what do we want to limit ourselves to?).

- Limits of conducting a Comprehensive Approach due to the non-permissive environment

3.2 - Views on the potential political aim and approaches (What should be achieved, how and with what?)

- The broad political aim that should guide multinational action
- Political solutions with or without the non-compliant actors per se or Irregular Adversaries
- Definition of who is part of the problem and who is part of the solution, and why
- A broad idea of a potential approach (direct intervention vs. support to a regional organization, etc)
- Multilateral actors to involve and in what capacity
- Existing on-going planning processes outside the Coalition and how they might be influenced by the Coalition

3.3- Potential level of civil and military contributions and intended national or organizational role within a multinational intervention (what could our commitment be and what role do we want to play).

3.4 – Risk assessment

- Significant risks involved in Coalition effort
- Risks to conduct a Comprehensive Approach for security reasons

Cooperative Implementation Planning and Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation – Output:

Step 4: The objectives for the Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation processes are:

- Make actors part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Harmonize efforts through participation
- Make the environment a non-permissive for key non-compliant actors and Irregular Adversaries
- Support the development of the higher level overall Coalition strategy through the provision of specialist advice in response to requests for information
- From this Coalition strategy to develop a country-level, multinational and inter-agency 'Framework Plan' that details a set of desired outcomes that are shared across many organizations

- To enable the coherent development of organization-specific activity or program plans that can contribute to the achievement of outcomes in the shared Framework Plan.
- To enable dialogue and coherence during the implementation of activities and programs related to the shared Framework Plan.
- To evaluate changes in the conflict environment over time, review progress against the Framework Plan adjusting it as required.
- To provide a reporting mechanism to the strategic level and national capitals.
- To act as coordination mechanism between implementation partners, to include relevant international organizations, non-governmental organizations and host nation governments and civil society. Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation Outline Concept Multinational Experiment 5

4.4 Conclusions¹¹¹

Referring to the premises mentioned at the beginning of the underlying chapter strategic conceptualizing is a permanent process, i.e. the premises are to be monitored and in case of deviation strategic concepts have to be adapted.

Based on this premises and the request of permanent premises monitoring, a Coalition intervening into hybrid orders in a particular environment, therefore, needs to

- adopt a Comprehensive Approach which finally starts up with a comprehensive strategy,
- be able to follow the strategic vision in a flexible way (alongside the “moving orders and environments” – adaptive – probably in a self-adaptive manner at least in certain issues),
- have adaptive goals to be able to use all opportunities the environment and the orders and actors offer,
- understand compliance and non-compliance as phenomena,
- establish appropriate instruments and tools to cope with phenomena on the operational level, especially on the interfaces between the strategic and the operational level as well as between the civil and military segment of the Comprehensive Approach, and,
- avoid the approach of achieving a strategic end state since there is simply no such a state at all in a complex and highly volatile environment and in hybrid orders. For reason, it is highly recommended not to include a strategic end state as an apodictic and stasis-like concept. It is suggested to work with “flexible goaling”, i.e. to adapt goals and make them part of the environment and the hybrid order and vice versa. This means that goals and environment/hybrid order are shoving and shaping each other permanently. The first reasonable step to bring this process into going is to make the hybrid order’s goals ones

¹¹¹ D. Muhr: Deliberations to Strategic Planning Guide to Problem Statement Multinational Experiment 6, Vienna, 2009.

own goals and match them with the Coalition's goals (particularly necessary under the given restraints in terms of time and resources).

Additionally, the following issues must be taken into account:

- As the environment and orders are complex and dynamic by nature, it is not useful to pursue a static strategy with static goals by static means and approaches. Although a strategy defines itself as a long-term compromise of a Coalition, it needs to be comprehensive by nature as well as support all kinds of opportunities for the Coalition.
- The comprehensive Coalition strategy needs to be carried out along a well-planned and well-conducted change management. The Coalition is one order interacting with others in a dynamic complex environment. The Coalition itself as well as other orders is also part of a permanently changing environment, though change within the environment may assume different qualities.
- The Coalition itself is also changing in terms of interest, intention and nature. This is a rather normal process, since it is an order in itself with a high degree of dynamic and complexity.
- A static Comprehensive Approach (i. e. applying the tools of power in a linear manner and acting *ceteris paribus*) is also not appropriate to cope with the situation. A more or less static approach is more helpful in a permissive environment.

Definitions

Along with Strategic Planning Guide Multinational Experiment 5:

Conflict: A situation when two or more parties find their interests incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take action, which damages the other parties' ability to pursue their interests.

Interest: Aspiration from an entity prone to motivate its behavior and to improve its state. Interests can be concurring, diverging, or incompatible.

Conflict of interests: Incompatibility of interests among different entities.

Crisis: Situation where the equilibrium between antagonist forces or interests within or between states is broken, potentially leading to violence.

Strategic Forum: Persons directly involved in and supporting the process described in this document; a notional three-tiered functional structure of the Strategic Forum could be the following:

- A high level policy contact group, including a chairman;
- A strategic working group (civil and military);
- An assessment team.

Strategic Vision: a description in broad terms of the situation as it would fulfill political objectives. This strategic vision provides the long-term perspective for the Coalition effort.

Transition State: The point at which relative, sustainable stability occurs because motivations and sources of violence have been addressed and, as a consequence, have diminished and local capabilities have been reinforced. It is the single, unambiguous purpose towards which the plan is directed, and which will be attained by the achievement of the Strategic Objectives. The transition state must be sufficiently rich in context and content for subordinate levels to be able to use it to conduct their own planning. It will take into account the specificities of the situation and address the symptoms and the causes of the conflict. Whilst Coalition engagement may continue beyond the transition state, it marks a fundamental shift in the nature of Coalition's engagement.

Strategic Objectives: A description of the situation in terms of major achievements needed to reach the transition state. SOs are the highest level breakdown of the transition state.

Outcome: Key result to be achieved in order to reach one or several Strategic Objectives. Achieving outcomes may require the involvement of several instruments of power and will have to be agreed and endorsed at the strategic level. These outcomes are elaborated in collaboration with the CIP Forum via its core staff and might be adjusted and refined during the implementation planning with the strategic level approval.

Strategic Roadmaps: Possible sets of coherent outcomes derived from the Strategic Objectives. They each indicate an overarching approach to guide the Coalition's efforts. The achievement of all of the outcomes that comprise a Strategic Roadmap marks the attainment of the transition state. It also provides a preliminary idea of the constraints as well as of the possible resources, time frames and synchronization requirements.

Instruments of power: National or organizational means applicable to solve a conflict, including political, diplomatic, economic, informational, developmental, military, law enforcement activities, state-led/institutional humanitarian assistance and civil administration support.

Along with Decision of Multinational Experiment Executive Steering Group Meeting, Granada, Spain, 26 Mar 09, Decision Sheet, 20090331:

Non-compliance: All types of activities and behavior detrimental to the achievement of the Coalition strategic vision/objectives and their implementation.

Non-compliant actor: An individual or group that performs activities or exhibits behaviors to counter the achievement of the Coalition strategic vision/objectives and their implementation. See Multinational Experiment Executive Steering Group Meeting, Granada, Spain, 26 Mar 09, Decision Sheet, 20090331.)

Adversary - A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged." NATO AAP-6.

"Irregular Adversary": The following characteristics associated with an "Irregular Adversary" are proposed to allow sufficient flexibility for experiment design and scenario development to ensure adequate evaluation of experiment objectives and outcomes and may include but are not limited to:

1. Not constrained by generally accepted conventions of international behavior, such as the Geneva Conventions with respect to agreed international standards covering the conduct of warfare. Often violate status as a regular combatant, feign civilian or non-combatant status or commit hostile acts in disobedience of the laws of war. Normally not a member of the regular armed forces, police or other internal security forces and lack the political discipline imposed by national sovereignty and accountability. May operate independently or outside the framework of a political state and often feel no allegiance to a nation or accepted political ideology.
2. Have a long term focus and use protracted efforts "below the threshold of war" to disrupt the ability of the government, the civilian security forces and the armed forces to carry out their tasks and to prevent the economy and political and public life from functioning normally. Employ a general strategy of avoidance and are often indistinguishable from the civil population. A key tenant may be focused on population control/popular support. Combat forces are only partially and occasionally visible and when directly confronted with a stronger military opponent, they transform, reorganize, and weave into various physical environments and human activities.
3. Exploit increasingly inexpensive but lethal weapons in an erosion strategy aimed at weakening political resolve by inflicting mounting casualties over time, often with external support from sovereign governments, transnational organizations or building of alternate or 'shadow' governments, as alternatives to standing sovereign governments, to demonstrate strength while delegitimizing the standing government. They are frequently characterized by particularly extreme violence with a degree of brutality, which ensures maximum media coverage, against both military and civilian targets. At the same time, they are adept at presenting their own suffering and commitment in the media to influence the

international community. Note: Transnational is defined as extending or going beyond national boundaries.

Along with others:

Non-compliant actor per se:

In the underlying study *non-compliant actor per se* is an actor that stays with activities in the spectrum of non-compliance although comprehensive efforts were taken to bring him/her/them into the compliance spectrum of activities. This behavior does not necessarily mean that a non-compliant actor per se cannot be brought to the compliant spectrum of behavior and/or activities. Their activities are also in the Irregular Adversary spectrum. In many cases non-compliant actors per se are the reason for an intervention.

Hybridity:

In the underlying context, hybridity refers to the fact that Actor 1 mixes activities with Actor 2 and vice versa (interaction). The result/outcome/output is a hybrid mixture of both. Apart from action as a result, new actors may also be an outcome of hybridity.

Inserted into the concept complex orders, hybridity in terms of “hybrid activities” is the order of the day, i.e. it is a normal procedure.

Orders:

An order is an ideational framework consisting of actors, their actions and interactions and shows three levels of interaction:

1. Ideational or intersubjective (How is the world socially constructed? What does/do the single individual and/or groups of individuals perceive?)
2. Behavioral (What does/do the individual or/and groups of individuals do on a regular basis to keep global arrangements alive? How is the world perceived by opinion leaders?)
3. Institutional (This level refers to institutions and regimes within a state or between states and/or non-sovereign actors)

Hybrid Orders:

Hybrid orders are orders embracing different types of observables (i.e. actors, no matter whether they find themselves in the compliant and/or non-compliant spectrum of activities in a generic understanding plus the different environment[s]) who intra-act and inter-act. For reason, the above described order will be tagged “hybrid order” in the underlying understanding.

Environment:

In the underlying work environment refers to the area of intervention, including all actors and orders between those actors and can be characterized by general features.

Hybrid Environment:

Numerous hybrid orders will be labeled as hybrid environment.

Non-permissive Environment

In the underlying study, the notion of non-permissive environment refers to the fact that conditions to stabilize and reconstruct an order are not supportive and favorable enough to comply this aim; usually, the local government is not willing and/or able to support respective Coalition's efforts effectively. In a non-permissive environment, actors, activities, triggers, methods and mechanisms of non-compliance receive an additional spin in development. It makes forecasts and handling of the situation even more complex than it is anyway in a permissive environment.

Non-permissive hybrid Environment

In the underlying study and with regard to non-permissive hybrid environment features of hybrid environments matter even more: Complexity, non-linearity, etc. play an even greater role. Spiral effects attend, leverages of mechanisms become rather important. A non-permissive hybrid environment provides lots of opportunities to actors in the non-compliant spectrum up to the Irregular Adversaries level. Their greatest advantage is the knowledge of actors with their respective interests and intentions, mechanisms in the environment and achievable effects to support their objectives. In a non-permissive environment the objective to achieve a safe and secure environment to a manageable extent is crucial to be able to establish a Comprehensive Approach. Moreover, it is impossible to separate actors in the extreme non-compliance spectrum from others. They represent a hybrid order itself which can hardly be separated from others, since they are "multi-rolers&multi-hatters".

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Stabilization: Describes the process of achieving an effective transition from immediate response to an insecure situation, to long-term development. It involves enabling a local population to develop politically, economically, and socially in the long-term so that it can sustain itself without threatening itself or others.

Reconstruction: Efforts undertaken by international and interagency organizations, supported by the military within means and capabilities, to enable a local population to develop longterm stability. The pillars of stability pillars are security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well being, governance and participation.

MC POSITION ON MILITARY SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, MCM-0054-2007, 13 November 2007 (European Union)

In the context of this document, the MC is using stabilization and reconstruction with the following meanings:

- a. *Stabilization* activities encompass actions undertaken by or in co-ordination with indigenous national authorities, mandated authorities or other civil agencies, to maintain or bring about a safe and secure environment.
- b. *Reconstruction* efforts include the provision of emergency infrastructure, essential government services, rebuilding, and relief to prevent or ameliorate humanitarian emergency to enable the local population and institutions to restart

and establish viable normal activities, including, inter alia political, economic, social, technical, legal, and environmental. This activity is principally a civilian lead including planning and resource implications.

Capabilities:

Are attributes characterizing actors and enable them to pursue particular activities and distinguish them from others significantly. Those attributes may refer to features of actors and/or to access opportunities.

Effects:

Refer to consequences resulting from attributes and/or combinations of attributes of actors and/or combinations of capabilities of several actors. Effects are the result of applied capabilities.