

**Transitions: Managing the Transfer of
Security Responsibility**

A Concept Paper for

Multinational Experiment 6 Objective 1.2

Version 2.0

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INTRODUCTION

1. Transition has become something of a buzz-word and the phrase is used widely. However it is often used in different ways by different communities and there is little consensus on what precisely is meant by the phrase. While its importance is not underestimated there is little guidance on how best to manage transitions so that they lead to a satisfactory and enduring outcome. This concept attempts to bring some coherence to its use and suggests some common approaches to how transitions can be analysed, planned and evaluated.

AIM

2. The aim of this concept paper therefore is to provide an authoritative exposition of the term “Transitions” to provide a common source from which MNE6 nations can develop their own guidelines and doctrine.

3. Version 2, this version, captures the findings from the three concept development workshops in Italy, Poland and Oslo in June, September and December 2009, discussions and inputs to the Transition Wiki as well as insights from reviews of literature and from papers commissioned specifically for MNE6. The concept will be updated following comments on this version and version 3 will provide the starting point for the limited objective experiment in Apr 2010.

STRUCTURE

4. Part 1 offers a range of descriptions of how the term “Transitions” is used, identifies some common characteristics and key considerations and from this draws conclusions as to what conditions are required for successful transitions. Part 2 describes some tools to enable transition managers to map, plan and evaluate transitions and to improve their understanding of the political and power environment that is fundamental to successful transition management.

PART 1 – UNDERSTANDING TRANSITIONS

THE MEANING OF TRANSITION

Current Uses

5. Although widely used there is currently no consensus on what is meant by the term transitions. It can be used as a noun to describe something that happens; a change from Situation A to Situation B or it can be used as a verb to describe something that is done, a transfer of responsibility for something from one group to another. Increasingly it is also seen as a process of change management that seeks to control and influence change as it occurs.

Transition as a Noun: A Change of Condition

6. As a noun, transition describes a change of condition, this can be both intended and unintended, the result of evolution due to the passage of time or of deliberate action. Transition can also refer to changes in the situation as a whole or to discrete elements of it.

7. Situations evolve over time, the result of a complex interplay of events within the country and more widely. Populations may tire of conflict and be more open to attempts to negotiate new political settlements, the balance of power between elites may shift as external support waxes or wanes. Alternatively world commodity prices may change increasing or undermining a key source of income for one side. The pace of evolution will vary, at times appearing almost glacial while at other times sudden changes, the death perhaps of a key individual, may

create opportunities leading to rapid change. Transition therefore is the normal result of a dynamic and interdependent world.

8. Taken as a whole transition tends to refer to a nation or region wide change at the macro level. The transition of the Eastern European states from Soviet dominated communist states to more western focused liberal democracies is one example, the transition of states from colony to independence is another as is the transition from agrarian societies to industrial.

9. Transition is also used as a noun to describe more limited changes. This can be within smaller geographical regions such as a province, district, town or village, within rural areas or urban areas. Alternatively transition can refer to changes in the status of different functional areas or service sectors; it is possible to talk of social transition, political, economic or security transitions. Conversely within a specific sector, for example health, it might refer to the transition from private healthcare to public provision. Understanding the function that is being transitioned, the area in which it is taking place and its relationship to other transitions is therefore key for any transition.

10. As a noun transition can therefore be considered the naturally occurring process of change that all states experience, the uncertain result of competing influences on and within a state. It can refer to changes within the state as a whole, within sub-national regions of a state or to specific sectors or functions.

Transition Management: Controlling Change

11. Change is inherently destabilising, there are those who will gain from any change and those who will lose. Different visions of what is desired and undesired will exist and will be contested. Those involved in any transition will therefore wish to control or manage the process of change. Transition Management refers to these efforts taken to control this process of change; to shape its direction, to manage the risks and mitigate negative impacts ensuring that change becomes enduring. Implicit within it is the ability to manage conflict between different groups.

12. Deliberate and perhaps forceful action may be taken to influence the direction of any change. While this may form part of transition management it also includes the broader, more subtle and less overt influence process. Transition management may be conducted by the international community when it intervenes within a situation however ultimately it must become the responsibility of the state itself as it manages an ongoing process of change. Part of any transition therefore is the development of the state's capacity to manage its own transition and the transfer of responsibility for this from external agents to the state.

Transition as a Verb: Transferring Responsibility

13. When used as a verb transition refers to the transfer of responsibility from one organisation to another. This however begs a number of questions as to what is meant by responsibility, responsibility for what, about what and where?

14. Responsibility can refer to responsibility for decision-making or for delivery. Where it applies to decision-making this can apply at many levels. In some cases it may be at the policy level with responsibility for decisions to do with overall objectives, priorities and resource allocations being transferred. In others it may be at the management level where responsibility for decisions about how that policy will be effected are transferred; decisions about the strategy or plan. Alternatively it could mean responsibility for lower level management decisions to do with the implementation of an agreed plan or strategy that is being transferred.

15. Where responsibility for delivery is being transferred this reflects those situations where different organisations may be providing services either on behalf of or in place of the state

and transition here therefore refers to a change between service providers. In some cases this may be from humanitarian agencies or even military forces providing access to immediate essential services to host nation provision. Alternatively it may be from an international NGO providing health services to some form of national health service. It may be from an unofficial non-state or shadow state actor such as a rebel grouping to an international organisation or an official state actor.

16. Transfer or responsibility therefore covers a spectrum of possibilities and it is important for those involved in managing any transition to understand what is meant by responsibility. Is it for decision making at the policy level, the management or the implementation level or is it for service delivery.

17. It is likely that such transfers will be phased or sequenced with some elements being transferred in their entirety at the same time while other elements are transferred in part over a period of time. A newly formed host nation government may for example take responsibility for policy decisions back from an intervening coalition on a certain day. However, below this, responsibility for lower level decisions or execution may be transferred progressively leading up to and following on from this date.

18. Transition as a verb therefore refers to the transfer of responsibility where responsibility can be for decision-making or delivery. Decision-making can be at several levels: policy, management or implementation.

Use In This Concept

19. **Transition.** This concept uses Transition as a noun to refer to a change in condition. This may be applied at a state level or sub-state; it may also be used to describe overall change or change within sectors.

20. **Transition Management.** Transition Management will be used to refer to the process of managing or controlling change.

21. **Transfer of Responsibility.** Transfer of Responsibility will be used to cover transition as a verb; the action of physically handing responsibility for decision making or delivery from one organisation to another.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSITIONS

Change

22. Transitions are about change; this is the primary characteristic of any transition and the cause of many other characteristics, tensions and dilemmas. The aim of transition management is to ensure that the direction of change remains positive, that desired changes once achieved are strengthened and built on, that they endure. Sustainability is therefore a key consideration in transition management.

Power Struggles

23. Transition invariably involves changes in the control of resources as the locus of decision-making changes from one individual or group to another; some will be empowered while others will be disempowered. Transitions will therefore be contested as each seeks to retain or maximise their power; power struggles will therefore be a characteristic of any Transition. These struggles may be overt and lead to violence and ultimately armed conflict or they may be more subtle involving political manoeuvring and deal making.

24. Transitions may also reflect a change in the dominant form of power; ideally from coercive power to more cooperative forms of power although they may also be from an overt form to a

more subtle though no less coercive form. Ideally the significance of popular support, the ability to bridge divided communities and generate political consensus will become a key source of political power supplanting the influence of military or militia power. The aim of transition management may, in part, be to encourage and enable such a shift in the prevalent form of power.

25. Power is intensely personal; while institutions may become powerful it is people that hold power and transitions are therefore about changes to those individuals; their interests and their fears become significant. Individuals disempowered by any change may lose access to wealth, they may lose status and influence within their community and the respect of their peers and subordinates. They may be fearful over the implications of any change, becoming vulnerable to retribution or to criminal proceedings. If these interests and fears are not addressed individuals and the communities that they control are likely to resist change and create instability. Addressing the interests and fears of these individuals is a key element of Transition Management.

Positions, Interests and Needs: In dealing with those who may be disempowered by transitions it may be helpful to think in terms of their positions, interests and needs:

- **Positions:** Parties may take up a particular position on an issue that may appear intractable: 'That tree belongs to me' v 'No, it belongs to me'.
- **Interests:** By discovering the interest behind that position it may be possible to resolve the disagreement: 'I want the fruit from that tree' v 'I want the shade that it provides'
- **Needs:** This can be taken one level deeper to the underlying need: 'I need food' v 'I need shelter'.

Addressing the interests or needs of individuals may prove both more politically acceptable and feasible than focusing on their positions and is likely to open up more options for those managing any transition

26. A key consideration therefore for those involved in transition management and transfers of responsibility is the development and maintenance of a thorough understanding of power and the dynamics of power within the environment. Interveners need to develop an understanding of who holds power, what it is dependent on and how it is exercised; they also need to remain alert to the different types of power and the ways in which they can be manifested.

Uncertainty and Instability

27. Due to their contested nature transitions are also characterised by instability and uncertainty. Leading up to any significant event within a transition, such as an election, individuals and organisations will seek to strengthen their positions and demonstrate their influence in order to emerge in the best position possible. After a transition the result may be challenged with those who have lost out mobilising their resources and support to undermine or undo the transition.

28. This contrasts with the perspective of many interveners who see such events as part of an exit strategy; a time when commitments can be scaled back and resources cut. Conversely the lead up to an event and its immediate aftermath may require additional resources. The provision of adequate and appropriate resources to manage this instability is a key consideration.

Instability in Zimbabwe: The 29 March 2008 elections radically changed Zimbabwe's political landscape. For the first time Robert Mugabe came second in the presidential voting and the opposition won control of the parliament. Mugabe reacted by withholding the presidential results for 5 weeks and launching a countrywide crackdown. Following the elections there was a sharp increase in state-sponsored violence as the state security

services and government militias unleashed a campaign of intimidation, torture and murder against opposition activists, journalists, polling agents, public officials and those suspected of voting for the opposition. A fact finding mission by six retired South African generals in May 2008 found "shocking levels of state-sponsored violence". *Source: International Crisis Group Paper "Negotiating Zimbabwe's Transition" dated 21 May 08*

29. Any transition is the result of a wide range of internal and external influences many of which may be unforeseeable and beyond the control of both host nation and intervening elements. As such transition management does not lend itself to rationalist planning methodologies that rely on an ability to predict and control dynamics; instead a more dynamic or evolutionary approach is required that emphasises the importance of learning and adapting. Adopting a more dynamic approach to planning and enabling organisational learning and adaptability are key considerations for transition management.

The Centrality of Politics.

30. Politics is central to any process of change as those involved use their influence to shape the future to meet their desired objectives; it is therefore another characteristic of transition. Host Nation politics will come to the fore but so will international and organisational politics. Politics therefore imbues all transitions, transitions are inherently political and it is the hidden informal politics within the country and the national and organisational politics back at home and at head office that may dominate. Those involved in transition management must remain aware of the political context at home and in country and remain politically astute.

Host Nation Politics.

31. Host nation politics will play out at every level from national to local and across all groupings and factions. These will interact and play off each other exploiting strengths at one level to gain advantages at another.

Appointment of Governors: In Afghanistan governors at the provincial and district level are political appointees. In one district the ISAF forces found the district governor to be corrupt. He was also actively undermining their efforts to stabilise the district; as a result they engineered his dismissal and replacement. His appointment was however part of a broader political settlement which was undermined by his dismissal; balance was only re-established when another governor from a similar faction was appointed to a different district.

32. Regardless of any political agreements that may have been made with the international community as part of a settlement and notwithstanding any democratic institutions that may have been created it is more than likely that traditional forms of politics will continue. Genuine democracy requires considerable social change and takes time to evolve; newly created formal democratic institutions are likely to provide a thin veneer of democracy which can mask the reality of continuing patronage and deal making. Those involved in transition management must understand these traditional models and informal structures. They must understand who remains significant, regardless of formal positions and authorities and what their positions and interests are. A key consideration therefore is the conduct and maintenance of a thorough political analysis of the host nation.

The Continuing Influence of Sher Muhammad Akhonzada: When British troops first moved into Helmand a key concession was the removal of the existing provincial governor Sher Muhammad Akhonzada on the grounds of his involvement in the drugs trade (10 tonnes of heroin were found in his cellar). Removed by President Karzai in January 2006 and made a senator within the national government he nevertheless retained considerable power within the Province through his control of much of the police; his brother Amir was also made deputy governor. His continued influence is in part due to his long relationship with the President including time fighting together against the Soviets. There was a strong push by elements within the Afghan government for him to return as Governor in 2009 during the lead up to the

national elections as a means of ensuring political support within the Province for the President.

International Politics.

33. At the international level the politics of those nations directly involved as interveners will be a significant factor as will those of neighbouring countries. For intervening nations the priority will always lie with their domestic politics; resolving the situation in the host nation in the way that might be best for that nation and its population will come second to an intervener's own national interests. As a result concerns over the level of financial and other commitments and the need to maintain domestic popular and political support will create a desire to demonstrate rapid progress. Decision-making will be dominated by political assessments at home rather than more technical and possibly better informed assessments from the field. It is therefore these external views that will drive the timeline. A key consideration for transition managers therefore is how to mitigate this risk and to develop an effective way of informing and educating key opinion formers and decision makers at home.

34. In addition decisions may also fall prey to broader political imperatives that have little to do with the situation in hand. Consequently "shockproofing" any transition so that advances made endure even if external political events force a change in effort becomes a key consideration.

China Vetoes UN Mandate: The UN preventative deployment force to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) was formed in 1995 to prevent the spread of ethnic conflict from Bosnia and help stabilise Macedonia. UN mandates are set for six months and are regularly reviewed by the Security Council. The renewal of the mandate came up for discussion at the Security Council on 25 February 1999 but was vetoed by China. As a result the mission was closed three days later when the existing mandate expired. Two weeks earlier Macedonia had established formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan and in return Taiwan had promised 1 Bn USD of financial investment. Although denied by China it is widely suspected that China's veto had little to do with the situation in Macedonia and far more to do with the broader international politics about China and Taiwan. Source: UN website accessed 12 Jan 2010

35. Different intervening nations will also have different national interests and perspectives and these will create fault lines within any international coalition that host nation politicians will exploit. It is important to minimise and mitigate these fault lines as part of a multinational and interagency comprehensive approach; a key consideration therefore is how to best achieve this. It is also worth remembering that intervening nations also transition; governments at home also change and these domestic transitions can have a significant impact on the approach.

Organisational Politics.

36. Organisational politics will also come to the fore both inter-organisational and intra-organisational. Organisations will be competing with each other to demonstrate their value and therefore influence. The involvement of NATO in the Balkans was key to demonstrating its utility in a post Cold War world and its continuing involvement in Afghanistan is also shaping how the organisation evolves. Decisions made in the field are therefore inevitably shaped by broader organisational politics. Similarly the UN family is under pressure to reform and demonstrate greater effectiveness, decisions made are therefore coloured by wider organisational concerns.

37. These tensions also play out within organisations with those in the field being more focused on resolving the problems in the field while for those at head office maintaining future organisational position, status and resources may be a higher priority. Understanding the pressures and constraints that organisations may be under may enable a more productive

interagency approach. Political analysis must therefore extend beyond the immediate area of the transition to include the national and organisational political drivers of key nations and organisations.

The Development of Capacity.

38. Handing back responsibility immediately raises questions over the ability of those taking on responsibility. Ensuring that these individuals, institutions and organisations are capable of assuming responsibility becomes a key aspect of any transition and therefore the development of appropriate capacity is another characteristic of transitions.

39. Interveners have a tendency to recognise only that capacity which is in a form similar to their own and to create capacity that mirrors their own. Approaches appropriate for highly developed western nations may not be the most appropriate methods for fragile states typically burdened with poor infrastructure and low levels of literacy. The aim should be to develop capacity that can endure and that is self-sustaining.

40. It is rare to find a complete vacuum, in the majority of cases some capacity will exist; mechanisms will exist through which services are provided (however imperfectly) and governance (in some form) effected. In many cases these existing mechanisms may have considerable legitimacy and accountability in the eyes of local people and it may make more sense to build on and develop existing mechanisms than create and impose new mechanisms.

Informal Policing in Nigeria: In Nigeria informal policing is common within poor communities. Such groups are usually established by communities as “night watchmen”. They are invariably made up of local people “of good character” whose selection is managed by local committees and are overseen by groups of community heads or elders. They often draw their legitimacy from traditional and cultural practices and operate according to local norms. Although some of their practices may not fit with western ideals of policing they enjoy strong support from their communities with research demonstrating in some cases up to 94% satisfaction with their performance. Their popularity is in part because, unlike the formal policing structures, they are present, responsive and accountable to local leaders. Formal policing structures are frequently criticised as being overly bureaucratic, slow to respond and corrupt. Approaches that develop these existing informal policing capacities may prove more successful than those that focus purely on the formal policing structures. *Extracted from Alemika and Chukwuma, “The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria” Nov 2004.*

41. A key consideration therefore is the identification of what capacity exists, what the appropriate requirement is and which existing capacities can and should be developed and which cannot or should not.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS

Sustainability

42. Transition management seeks to ensure that the direction of change remains positive, that gains made are institutionalised, that they endure and are sustained. For changes to be sustainable they need to be politically, socially and culturally acceptable to a critical mass of the population. The changes also need to be appropriate to the level of technical capability within the country, literacy and numeracy and to the state of the infrastructure. There is little point developing a complex IT based management system in a country where the electrical supply is at best intermittent and where many managers and staff may be illiterate. Ultimately changes also need to be affordable although in the short term costs may be carried by international donors.

Participation and Local Ownership

43. Development practice has long championed participation as a means of improving the sustainability of development programmes¹. Participation can ensure that local needs and priorities drive programmes that solutions and approaches are appropriate and that their implementation accords with local social and cultural norms. As such participation generates a sense of local ownership and buy-in building commitment to a project across a community, reduces dependency and enhances local capacity making it easier to transfer responsibility. Participation is therefore a key element in ensuring sustainable change.

Insert Box on National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan:

44. While the principle of widespread participation and local ownership is surely right (and is strongly supported by assessments of development projects) its application, particularly immediately post or even during conflict is much harder. In such situations local ownership can all too easily become factional or elite ownership, both of which can exacerbate tensions, reinforce some of the underlying drivers of conflict and undermine stabilisation efforts. In trying to apply this principle it is therefore important to explore what is meant by both ownership and participation: participation by whom in what, ownership by whom of what?

Ownership

45. Paragraphs 14 to 16 discuss the issue of responsibility in terms of transfers of responsibility and this links directly to the question of ownership. Discussion usually focuses on ownership of the change process, the level of involvement and responsibility in the management of any transition. However ownership should also apply to the object of any change. Indeed the aim of many transformation processes is to generate indigenous ownership of the thing being changed. A key objective in stabilisation is often the development of responsive and accountable government; the development of a health sector that is responsive to the needs of the population or a security sector that is accountable to government, a police service that responds to the population's security needs and that is accountable to them. Ownership should therefore be thought of in terms of both the process of change and as an objective of change in its own right.

46. Attitudes towards ownership differ between host nation and external actors.² In general host nation actors see ownership as part of their sovereign right. From their perspective any transformation process should be initiated and driven by the host nation; the role of the international community is to assist in the realisation of this internally defined and managed change programme. Conversely external actors see ownership as conditional dependent on the presence of sufficient capacity and responsibility.

47. This external actors' perspective is based on an important but rarely recognised assumption. This is that a western liberal model and the values that underwrite it are both the right answer and the means of achieving it. Transition therefore happens when these have been internalised by the host nation and inculcating these then becomes a key element of building and defining "sufficient capacity". Invariably it is the external actors that define what is sufficient capacity and not the host nation.

48. This has a number of implications. External actors assume the position of leadership based on their technical knowledge and expertise in the development and application of these western models and approaches. As a result technical expertise is seen as more significant than country-specific knowledge or expertise and transition becomes seen as a largely technical rather than a political process.

49. Secondly, forced into a subordinate position, local actors apply their strengths, their superior knowledge and understanding of the political and power dynamics in-country, to

¹ OECD DAC principles.....

² See Andersen, M. S. for a fuller discussion of attitudes towards ownership and their implications.

subvert or suborn change to their advantage. All too often by assuming leadership roles and through the provision of skills and resources external actors intervene into what has been likened to a political marketplace.³ They do so without either recognising their role within it or the rules by which it operates and therefore can be outwitted by canny local actors.

50. Interveners therefore need to recognise the criticality of local understanding as well as technical understanding and appreciate that local players will always have a better understanding of these internal dynamics than external interveners; they too have vital expertise. Considering ownership from this perspective the role of external and internal players becomes less one of external expert benevolently coming to help internal actors to a more equal negotiated partnership. A relationship built on the recognition that while external interveners may bring resources and expertise internal actors bring the political and social understanding that enables that resource and expertise to be applied effectively to resolve the situation.

51. This is not to suggest that these internal actors will necessarily be motivated by benevolence and good will. There are good reasons to approach local partners with considerable caution however while indigenous elites may not share similar aims and objectives they frequently possess the capacity to block or subvert change initiatives and therefore bypassing or ignoring them is rarely an option.⁴ Deciding who should participate and in what capacity is a vital question and will be discussed further below (See Paragraphs 64 to 69).

Ownership of What, Participation in What?

52. Ownership therefore relates to both the process of change (transition management) and the object of change, the aim being to generate sufficient ownership of both the process and of the object itself. Ownership comes through participation and therefore it is right to explore the degree and reach of possible participation.

53. The degree of participation can be thought of as a spectrum that extends from initiation at one end to legitimisation at the other. At the former the host nation is responsible for initiating change and drives the process with the external actors assuming a supporting and enabling role. At the other end of the spectrum external actors initiate and drive the transition with local actors being brought in to provide a “local face” and an air of legitimacy. Between this lies local involvement in decision-making, consultation, where local views and ideas may be sought but decisions are retained by external actors and information sharing, where locals are informed about change and may comment or even be involved in minor decisions about its implementation but where all significant ideas and decisions remain with the external actors.



From Hansen, A. S.

³ See De Waal, A. for a discussion of the “political marketplace” and how this has affected transition of UN peacekeeping missions.

⁴ See Donais, T. “Operationalising Local Ownership in SSR” DCAF, 2008. pp280-281 for a more detailed discussion.

54. These different degrees of ownership can be thought of as reaching across a number of levels:

- a. **The Policy Level:** Defining the problem(s) and prioritising them – setting the policy.
- b. **The Management Level:** Identifying potential solutions and selecting the preferred approach – developing the strategy.
- c. **The Implementation Level:** Designing the implementation of the selected approach – developing the plan.
- d. **The Delivery Level:** Conducting the activities that actually implement the plan – executing the plan.

55. At each level involvement can include monitoring and evaluating the conduct and impact of the activities in order to learn lessons and redefine the problem(s), adjusting the approach and plan as required. Involvement in this function can be a key enabler to building local capacity and developing local ability to manage an ongoing process of change; a key step towards a successful and enduring transition.

56. In principle the greater the degree of participation and the broader the reach of participation across these levels the more likely it is that interventions will be appropriate to the situation and will be politically, culturally and socially acceptable; that change will be enduring.

57. The reality however is that in most cases, particularly in post conflict and stabilisation situations both the degree and reach of participation is much more limited. There are both demand and supply side reasons for this.⁵ On the demand side governments frequently lack legitimacy, local actors might lack expertise and society may be so fractured and disorganised that it is impossible to reach consensus on the way forward. On the supply side however interveners' attitudes can close off opportunities for participation while their own bureaucratic processes can impose funding cycles or deadlines and often demand a high level of predetermined detail all of which closes down the space for genuine participation. Finally interveners will have their own political and organisational agendas which may not align with those of the host nation.

58. On the demand side, while lack of legitimate capacity is frequently a genuine problem and a limiting factor it can be overstated. External interveners tend to look for capacity that matches their methods and approaches, the ability to do things their way and frequently overlook existing capacity that does things, however imperfectly, in a local way. Capacity may already exist; it just needs to be built on and developed.

Mentoring the Iraqi Army: Reflecting on his experiences mentoring the Iraqi Army Colonel Tim Robinson, then commanding officer of 9/12 Lancers commented that : *"...we need to study the indigenous army we will work with. We have been inclined to focus on how to mould a shapeless product in our image rather than exploiting what it already is..."* British Army Review number 147.

59. Similarly interveners tend to focus on legitimacy from a state-centric perspective and can miss many existing traditional, informal or semi-formal mechanisms that exist and that have considerable authority and legitimacy in the eyes of local populations. The lack of legitimate capacity is a constraining factor however a more careful examination may well reveal more options for engagement and participation than is immediately apparent. A thorough analysis of who may be potential transition partners is required. This is discussed further in paragraph 62 and in Part 2.

⁵ For a more detailed discussion see Nathan, L. "The Challenge of Local Ownership of SSR: From Donor Rhetoric to Practice" 2008

60. Dealing with the supply side constraints is partly a question of developing a more reflective approach that recognises and where appropriate challenges how our own attitudes and experiences shape the way we understand what we see on the ground. But it is also about how we reconcile the competing desires for confidence that our resources are being applied in the most effective (and ethically acceptable) manner with the need for greater flexibility that enables a more dynamic evolutionary approach. Part 2 suggests an approach to planning that may help with this.

Ownership by Whom, Participation by Whom?

61. As discussed international interveners tend to focus on state-centric solutions. Ownership therefore tends to be equated with government ownership, ensuring that elements of the government are involved in the management of any transition. For security sector transitions ownership is often defined even more tightly with the emphasis being placed firmly on uniformed personnel. This is understandable as in many fragile and conflict affected states the military may appear the most competent organisation; an organisation, perhaps the only organisation, capable of effecting change. However at a time when government legitimacy in the eyes of the population may be limited or contested there is a danger that such an approach merely reinforces power in the hands of existing elites. It may therefore be important to think more in terms of national ownership that brings together a broader selection of government elites, civil society and the wider population.

62. In considering who should participate and who might be suitable transition partners it is helpful to consider four categories⁶:

- a. National government actors and national elites.
- b. Local government actors and local elites.
- c. Service providers.
- d. Customers.

63. Elites should include opposition, including those actively or even violently opposing change. Similarly service providers both state and non-state providers should be considered as it is these that often prove more effective, more accountable and therefore more legitimate to local populations.⁷ Including customers ensures that local population perspectives are taken into account. All too often security transitions take an institutional perspective and consequently developments in security capacity can have little impact on improved security at the local level.⁸ When considering security reform it may be helpful to think in terms of reforming insecurity rather than security as this immediately places the emphasis on the needs of the population rather than the current providers. As an ideal it is therefore suggested that transition managers should attempt to include participation from across these four categories and should include both formal and informal structures. For security transitions it is also worth thinking in terms of both security and insecurity.

Choosing Partners

64. Despite this ideal and the principle of maximum participation, putting this into practice is considerably harder and a more incremental approach may be more practical, increasing participation and ownership as the security situation allows and as knowledge and understanding of the environment and its dynamics increases.

⁶ From Scheye, E. "Unknotting Local Ownership Redux: Bringing Non-State/Local Justice Networks Back in" 2008

⁷ Scheye discusses this in some depth from the perspective of developing capacity within the judicial system.

⁸ Ismail, O. "Enabling Local Ownership: Participation and Capacity Building in SSR" 2008

65. At the early stages of any intervention external actors will lack understanding of where power lies and how it is exercised, what mandate individuals have and what their agendas and interest are. In many cases they will be naturally drawn to those that fit their stereotypes or that are the easiest to engage with – those perhaps that are more westernised, speak the same language or share (or purport to share) similar values. These may not be the most appropriate interlocutors.

Insert Box on Prince of the Marshes (Basra):

66. In the early stages, particularly where the environment is insecure potential interlocutors, particularly those from marginalised groups, are unlikely to raise their head above the parapet and will be unwilling to come forward. As a result external interveners may have to walk a delicate balance between expediency, a need for effectiveness and a desire for legitimacy. The domestic political desire to demonstrate progress rapidly will impart a sense of urgency which in turn will push interveners towards those currently possessing the power and ability to influence the situation even though these might be the ones implicated by the conflict and whose mandate may be based on little more than the ability to intimidate opposition. The following factors may help in identifying which partners to engage with:

- a. **Effectiveness.** What ability does the potential partner have to influence the situation, can they instigate change? Could they instigate change if supported?
- b. **Mandate.** What mandate does the individual or group have, on what is their authority based and who do they represent. Who do they not represent?
- c. **Accountability.** To whom are they accountable and what mechanisms exist to exercise this accountability?
- d. **Values.** To what cultural, ethical and legal norms do they operate; are these tolerable, can the extremes be managed and what scope is there for developing their approach? Will working with them contravene any moral, ethical or legal “red cards” or send a message that will critically undermine efforts?
- e. **Broader Consequences.** What impact will working with them have on the wider effort? How will it impact on other sectors or lines of operation, in other parts of the country or at different levels of governance (district, province, national)?
- f. **Longer-Term Consequences.** What impact will working with them have in the longer term, might short term benefits be outweighed by longer term costs, can these be mitigated or reversed subsequently? Might engaging with them create a form of path dependency that forces the transition in a particular direction?

67. In attempting to identify key partners there will be an inherent tension between the demands of peacemaking and its desire to secure a peace agreement and ceasefire and the longer term and perhaps more enduring requirements of statebuilding with its emphasis on rebuilding the social contract between government and population. Managing this tension will be difficult however case history suggests that where participation in terms of its degree (para 53), reach (para 54) and category (para 62) is kept broad success is more likely to be enduring. While the level of insecurity may limit this in the early stages of an intervention the objective should be to deepen participation as opportunities arise. Wherever possible interveners should avoid committing to one individual or faction but instead take every effort to keep options open.

68. While it may be tempting and initially easier to work with existing elites and factions there is a danger that this will simply entrench existing systems and structures, the ones that failed originally. At best this may buy time for other activities designed to broaden this base to take effect, at worst it may lead to renewed conflict. Transition offers an opportunity to reshape

systems and structures so that they connect rather than divide communities or factions; participation, giving voice to those normally excluded is one way of doing this.

69. Finally it should be remembered that different groups will be separated by mistrust, misinformation and fear; the result of a painful historical legacy. Bringing representatives of these factions together will be an intensely human business, it will take time and effort to resolve; it is not a simple technical process.

Power and Political Analysis

Types of Power

70. In a stabilisation environment it is likely that the dominant form of power will be “power over”, the ability to coerce or compel people to do your will. Such power may be overt as in the presence (and actions) of militias controlled by local strongmen or warlords or more subtle manifesting itself in the ability to control access to decision-makers, to control the agenda or to veto decisions that are not in your interest. This type of power tends to be destructive; it is invariably zero-sum and parties either win or lose. It encourages a competitive approach and therefore separates and divides communities and groups rather than bringing them together. As discussed in paragraph 24 part of the aim of transition management should therefore be to bring to the fore other forms and manifestations of power creating or reinforcing alternative sources of power.

Types of Power: Power can be considered as one of four types:

- **Power Over:** The ability to compel or coerce others to do what you want.
- **Power To:** This can be considered either from the perspective of leadership or as individuals. As a leader it is an enabling power that sets the conditions where others are able to achieve their objectives. As individuals it is synonymous with “agency” where individuals have the ability to act in their own interests through the day to day decisions that they make – essentially the application of their free will.
- **Power With:** The power of collective action where individuals who may lack power by themselves are able to exert power when acting in concert with others. This is the power of unions and of popular protest. It can perhaps be seen most clearly in the overthrow of communist rule in Poland, Hungary and other former Eastern Block countries.
- **Power Within:** Often described as inner strength or spiritual power this can be seen as the ability to endure and to keep going despite setbacks.

Sources of Power

71. Power can be drawn from a number of different sources. It may emanate from traditional authority structures or norms, from the control of resources, of information, the possession of knowledge or skills or from networks of contacts.

72. Culture or tradition may afford certain individuals in society considerable influence and therefore power. In Ireland for example the Catholic Church has until relatively recently enjoyed considerable power due to its position in society and the deference given to it. Changes in society, the creation of a more questioning culture and greater information about some of the abuses of that power have however greatly reduced its power. Culture and tradition are not immutable and changes can radically affect the distribution of power.

73. Resources and the ability to deploy them to buy loyalty or to employ them to favour a particular group are the basis of patronage systems and a significant source of power. In analysing the significance of resources however it is worth considering the full cycle from supply through production and distribution to their exchange. This analysis may identify

additional dependencies and bring to the fore new points of leverage that can challenge unconstructive power players.

74. Those in power frequently control access to information and through that exert control over society. Communities are unlikely to be able to access sources of money if they are unaware that they exist. Equally they are unlikely to hold local leaders to account against laws which they are unaware of.

75. Linked to information is the possession of certain knowledge or skills. An individual who understands how a local irrigation network works and has the ability to repair or maintain it may have considerable power in certain circumstances. Similarly a group of workers with skills that are in short supply may have power over their bosses should they decide to band together and withhold their labour.

76. Finally the ability to exploit networks of contacts can be a source of power. The ability to use such contacts to circumvent or break through gatekeepers, those who control access to the powerful, can in turn empower those with the contacts who in effect become gatekeepers or “fixers”.

Managing Power

77. Not only do those attempting to manage transitions need to understand these different types and sources of power within the country and across the wider international community but they also need to become adept at leveraging them. Part of any transition is likely to be the change from dominant and coercive “power over” to other more constructive forms that involve persuasion, negotiation and compromise. Within a security transition building security capability in terms of military and police skills is one part however unless this is matched by building the mechanisms and capacity of those who will hold these forces to account it is possible that external efforts will simply create another form of “power over” and source of potential instability.

78. Understanding these power structures can help those intervening find ways of changing the existing power structures. Increasing the flow of information through the media, local radio or even directly through open town hall meetings can alter the balance of power within a community and empower local communities to hold their leaders to account. Similarly increasing the level of skills within a community can empower new individuals. Where power is centred on the ability to break through gatekeepers creating new paths by which communities can access power structures may also unlock more constructive forms of power.

79. A framework through which transition managers can analyse power and political structures is outlined in Part 2.

Adequate and Appropriate Resources

80. Frequently a handover of responsibility, particularly if to a newly developed host nation capability is likely to be to less experienced individuals and organisations. Such a transfer will often therefore lead to a reduction in overall capability. Reducing external support at this time exacerbates this and can undermine the positive impact of any transfer. Under pressure to reduce troop numbers interveners frequently resort to replacing “boots on the ground” with more technical alternatives such as sophisticated surveillance assets. This exacerbates the problem as those assuming responsibility will rarely have access to such assets and therefore the difference in capability prior to and after a transfer can become even more stark. Support and resources need to be maintained leading up to, throughout and beyond the immediate transfer point. It may even be worth considering running more “mandraulic” processes better suited to indigenous capabilities in parallel during the lead up to a transfer of responsibility.

81. Resources may be required to cover the following generic areas:

a. **Analysis and Understanding.** This concept stresses the criticality of generating and maintaining a thorough understanding of the political and power dynamics in country, within and between intervening organisations and nations and in other key actors in the neighbourhood. Resources need to be dedicated to building up such knowledge and maintaining and refining it as part of ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Specific skill sets will be required for this and may include political science, country specific knowledge, language and cultural understanding.

b. **Building Relationships.** Much of the success of any transition depends on the quality of the personal relationships built up between key protagonists. Building relationships takes time and resources must be dedicated to it; it should not be seen as a frustrating overhead.

Relationships: In early 2009 the US Joint Center for Operational Analysis conducted a review into the Comprehensive Approach in Iraq and during the course of this interviewed a number of key US, Allied, International and Iraqi actors. A common theme was the importance of personal relationships. One interviewee, a senior military officer, highlighted the need for personal relationships based on mutual respect as one of his top “takeaways” and stressed the need to dedicate time and effort to sustaining these relationships.

c. **Service Provision.** Sufficient resources will be required to continue providing current levels of service recognising that during transfers of responsibility many roles will require two people, the one handing over responsibility and the other assuming responsibility; tasking levels will probably need to reduce during this period.

d. **Dealing with Uncertainty and Instability.** Sufficient spare, or uncommitted, capacity must be retained to deal with the inevitable surprises that emerge from what will be a contested and uncertain process. These resources will need to be capable of being applied rapidly and flexibly. Once committed these resources will need to be regenerated to deal with any further or subsequent shocks.

e. **Developing Capacity.** Developing capacity is a characteristic of transitions and therefore resources need to be allocated to develop it.

82. Resources should be designed to enable a variety of options; the application of hard or soft power. Resources may come from a variety of sources international or host nation and may include governmental resources, international organisations, non-governmental organisations or private sector. The art may be less about co-opting others resources to a single agenda but creating space within which they can operate to mutual benefit.

Creating Space: In some situations mid level leaders such as academics, professional bodies or religious leaders can provide a vital bridging role between communities and across levels of society. It can be hard for intervening governmental actors to develop links with these groups, who may be wary of being associated too closely with the state. Instead it may be easier for external professional bodies, academics or religious leaders to develop effective links. Rather than trying to co-opt these it may prove more effective for interveners to create the space within which this engagement can take place and simply remain informed of its development.

Dynamic Planning and Implementation

83. Approaches to planning vary and can be considered as lying within a spectrum that stretches from rational and objective at one extreme to dynamic and political at the other. The rational approach begins by bounding the problem before going on to clarify the goals of any intervention, identify options, consider the alternatives and investigate the consequences before finally selecting the best option. Its strengths are that it provides a clear sense of purpose and direction however critics suggest that it ignores reality. Real situations are frequently more complex and less predictable than such rationalist approaches assume. In addition it is rarely possible to isolate a problem completely and consequently analysis is

always based on a simplification of reality. In complex environments these over simplifications may critically undermine the effectiveness and credibility of actions; rationalist planning approaches may fail to connect with the underlying problem or gain traction over it.

84. At the other end of the spectrum, the political or incrementalist approach sees policy or decision-making as serial. Objectives are rarely stated explicitly and are closely linked with implementation. Existing strategies tend to be modified through a series of minor changes to reflect changes in the situation, current concerns or perceptions and overall a more evolutionary approach is taken. This reflects the view that few problems are solved once and for all, and therefore a series of gentle corrections to the tiller are more effective than radical shifts of direction. Whilst the incrementalist approach is perhaps closer to the reality of everyday business, its critics suggest that it tends to be overly cautious, reinforces the status quo and encourages inertia. It is, in their view, ill-suited to driving through change.

85. The majority of planning approaches in use tend to lean towards the rationalist approach. As it is better able to exploit uncertainty and instability and to create space within which transition partners can be meaningfully engaged a more incrementalist approach to transition planning will be more appropriate. A suggested planning approach is described in Part 2.

Learning and Adapting

86. Paragraph 0 highlights the importance of organisational learning and adaptability as a response to the uncertainty and instability that accompanies any transition. Increasingly interveners are having to operate in situations that are both complicated and complex.

Complicated or Complex: In this sense complicated means not simple but knowable, complex means not simple and not fully knowable. The electronics in an aeroplane can be thought of as complicated – if you spent enough time analysing it you could understand how it works and predict what will happen if you press a certain button. A plane full of passengers is however complex, you could spend years analysing each passenger and yet even then you could not predict what a passenger's response will be to a specific event.

87. Where situations are complicated they remain nevertheless ordered. Cause and effect applies and given enough knowledge and understanding likely responses can be predicted. The majority of the tools and techniques used to analyse and plan activities are designed to help understand and respond to such complicated situations. However we also operate in increasingly complex or unordered environments. In such environments cause and effect still applies but is only discernible retrospectively; the sheer number of variables and interactions means that predicting likely results is impossible. Few current approaches are aimed at operating in these environments. If we are to become better learners and adapters we need to become better at operating in both complex and complicated situations.⁹

Learning in Complicated Situations

88. Where situations are complicated but ordered the focus for learning is the environment. Learning can be enhanced by clearly articulating and testing both our assumptions about that environment (that which is knowable but currently unknown) and the logic that lies within and behind our plan. This logic or "Theory of Change" is based on our understanding of the problem and therefore learning is also dependent on our articulation or framing of the problem. Including indicators or even conducting specific activities that deliberately explore the validity of our assumptions and our logic allows us to develop a better understanding of the environment and of the problem, to reduce the number of knowable unknowns, to refine and reframe the problem and ultimately to operate in a more effective manner.

Theories of Change: Theories of change can be thought of at both the macro and the micro

⁹ Snowden highlights this and has developed the Cynefin Framework as a way of making sense of these situations. See Snowden, D. J. "The New Dynamics of Strategy..." for a fuller discussion.

level. At the macro level they describe the overall approach to the problem, the commander's intent paragraph within a set of military orders can be thought of as a simple macro level theory of change. At the micro level they are perhaps best thought of as the arrows that tend to be used to link diagrams of objectives and sub-objectives. They are the rationale that explains why sub-objectives A and B are expected to lead to objective C.

89. Effective information management and exploitation is key to learning in this environment. Assumptions, logic and knowledge must be captured and retained so that it can be regularly reviewed and refined. The aim should be to develop corporate knowledge and memory rather than individual.

90. One of the principal dangers of operating in the ordered domain is that it encourages the formation of communities of likeminded. While this makes sense the danger is that such groups fall into a common way of viewing the situation; they can be slow to recognise that the situation has fundamentally changed and resist change and new ways of thinking. The use of "Red Teams" to deliberately challenge thinking can be an effective way of countering this as can the bringing together of experts from a radically different field. Such experts will inevitably come to the problem with a fundamentally different perspective and will challenge accepted norms often coming up with novel and creative solutions.

Learning in Complex Situations

91. Where situations are complex and unordered learning is less about enhancing knowledge of the environment and more about learning about ourselves. As prediction is difficult the appropriate approach is to probe the situation to make possible patterns more obvious, sense what they are and then respond by stabilising patterns which seem positive and destabilising those that seem negative. Learning should therefore focus on identifying and improving that which makes us quick to identify patterns and which makes us better able to react quickly to those patterns, to adapt.

Informing and Educating Domestic Audiences

92. Paragraph 33 highlights the importance of international politics and how domestic concerns are likely to drive decisions about transitions in-country. Transition managers therefore have a dual responsibility. They must first monitor political developments across intervening countries' and organisations' domestic political environments so that they can anticipate and pre-empt potential issues that might influence their transition. Secondly they must seek to educate and inform domestic opinion leaders and decision-makers to ensure that the implications within country of any decisions made for domestic reasons are fully appreciated.

Informing Domestic Audiences: The effort that General Petraeus put into his briefings of the US Senate and its impact on transition within Iraq is well known. In Afghanistan in 2008 the then COMISAF, General McKiernan, also placed a high priority on identifying and briefing key US opinion formers bringing in new staff to do so and running a number of Opinion Leaders' visits to theatre. These visits were given a high priority and enjoyed considerable access to key leaders in-country. Such efforts shaped the domestic political environment and helped build the case for more resources to support the campaign.

93. Where decisions are likely to be made that will affect any transition the transition managers may need to look for ways to mitigate the impact of that decision, "shockproofing" both the mission and progress made.

"Shockproofing" Gains

94. The fact that transitions are influenced by external and internal politics and the uncertainty and instability that implies means that the timeline for any transition is not under the control of any transition manager. It is likely that the situation will change rapidly and in some cases

responsibility may need to be transferred at short notice and before sufficient capacity has been built across all areas.

95. It makes sense therefore for transition managers to constantly ask what the implications of an early withdrawal would be and to find ways to “shockproof” progress against such instances, building in resilience as a key part of capacity building. This may mean prioritising building local capacity to train rather than training people directly even though initially this may mean fewer trained people. It may mean placing an early emphasis on developing management and accountability structures in parallel with front line service delivery. Alternatively it may mean focusing on specific capabilities or sectors first, achieving a baseline standard in these before moving to other areas and building those capacities.

Enabling a Multinational and Interagency Comprehensive Approach

96. The management of any transition is inherently difficult and is likely to be beyond the scope or capability of any single organisation or nation. Transition management requires a multi-organisational, multi-sector and in most cases a multinational approach. However as discussed in paragraphs 35 and 36 these different nations and organisations are likely to have different objectives and different perspectives of the problem. These differences will be exploited by host nation actors as they seek to leverage the international community’s efforts to achieve their own ends. The challenge for transition management is to minimise and manage these differences creating sufficient critical mass that is heading in a common direction

97. Studies¹⁰ have demonstrated the importance of inclusion in generating a unified approach across different organisations. A collaborative analysis of the situation and approach to framing the problem has been shown to be a major contributing factor to achieving a unified approach. Bringing the key organisations and individuals together, those capable of significantly influencing the situation, as part of a collaborative approach to analysis, planning and evaluation can create a shared perspective, organisational buy-in and consequently a more unified approach.

98. One approach to achieving this is described in the Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation concept¹¹ developed as part of Multinational Experiment 5; the key ideas within this are included in Part 2. Studies led by Sweden as part of Multinational Experiment 6 have also led to the development of a handbook offering guidance on the practical harmonisation of activities within a stabilisation environment.¹²

Developing Appropriate Capacity

99. Paragraphs 38 to 40 stress the need to develop appropriate capacity and wherever possible to build on what already exists. In doing this decisions need to be made about what capacity is required and which existing capacities can be retained and developed and which should not be. Developing capacity will need to address both capability and will; it will also need to address the mechanisms through which capacities are managed and held to account.

Achieving An Appropriate Balance

100. Capacity building takes place at every level from the individual up to the organisation. As well as developing skills and knowledge capacity development also includes the unwritten rules and ways of behaviour (the institutions) by which organisations operate and interact with the state, the political elites and the population. It should also include the ability to learn and

¹⁰ Insert reference to the WB study

¹¹ Insert cross reference to CIP/CIME concept

¹² Insert reference to the Swedish handbook.

adapt, to grow and improve as the situation evolves and it is this ability that makes any development sustainable. This evolution can however go in both directions; it can be positive and beneficial or it can be negative and destructive. New organisations can be taken over by elements of society and made to serve their own ends; newly trained media can be co-opted to support one leader and to stimulate suspicion and fear of others, education departments can be steered to promote one view of history at the expense of others, newly equipped and trained security forces can become highly competent militias. Capacity building must therefore recognise these political threats and ensure that sufficient checks and balances are created to constrain such negative changes. Getting the balance right between developing the hard skills and knowledge required to address the immediate problem, the institutions through which these new capabilities will relate to and be held accountable by the population and the ability to learn and adapt will be difficult and the tendency will be to focus on the immediate. However it should be stressed that capacity development is political and therefore deferring development of the mechanisms, particularly within the security sector, through which these new capacities will be managed may in the longer term undermine the broader transition.

Developing Existing Capacities

101. Paragraph 66 discusses factors that should be taken into account when choosing which partners to engage with and these factors remain broadly appropriate when considering whether an existing capacity is suitable for development. Is the capacity effective, does it deliver services required by the population and do they make use of it? Why do they use it as opposed to other systems or mechanisms? To what extent is the capacity accountable, to whom and via what mechanism? What values or norms does the capacity operate to, how acceptable are these to the population and is there scope to develop their approach? What are the broader or longer term consequences of developing this capacity, does its development send unhelpful messages to sections of the population that might undermine the broader transition?

Capability and Will to Transfer

102. The ability and willingness of those handing over responsibility is often taken for granted however there are many factors that can make it hard for organisations to do so. Individuals and organisations will often have invested heavily in the situation, they are likely to have become personally and organisationally involved. As individuals experienced and expert in their field they may find it difficult to hand over to individuals less experienced and skilled as they are recognising that this is likely to lead to a drop in standards; a drop that may well lead to a loss of lives.

In Iraq leading up to the transition of security responsibility from the coalition to the Iraqi forces there was concern that the very “can do” ethos of the American military would make it difficult for them to sit quietly in barracks while Iraqi forces made inevitable mistakes as they developed their skills. The combination of ethos and investment in terms of money and lives creates a commitment to the situation such that it can be very hard for intervening organisations to let go. In Kosovo... *Insert Halvor Hartz's vignette on unwillingness of police training mission to handover*

103. Individuals' jobs and organisations' funding streams may also be tied to their involvement; transfer may lead to individuals losing their jobs and organisations losing income. There is therefore a natural tendency to delay transfer arguing that those taking on responsibility are not yet ready or that the situation is too volatile, progress not yet embedded sufficiently and the risks too high. Those managing any transition need to remain alert to this tendency and be prepared to challenge such reporting.

Will to Take On Responsibility.

104. Just as the willingness of those handing over responsibility tends to be assumed so too does the willingness of those receiving responsibility. This willingness is required at every level; it is required of those who will be delivering the service on the ground and of those at higher levels shaping the strategy and taking the policy decisions. Inclusion and participation has a part to play in developing the will to take on responsibility. A review of lessons from Liberia¹³ highlights how external agents can interpret the reluctance of local actors to assume responsibility as an innate lack of motivation. However when viewed from their perspective all too often they are expected to implement policies and strategies developed by others with no input from them and which in their view may be neither appropriate nor required. They are then left to carry the blame for the project's inevitable failure; in such circumstances reluctance is not unreasonable. Inclusion and participation can help ensure the willing participation of those responsible for providing the service at ground level.

105. At higher levels those in authority may be extremely wary of taking on responsibility for decision-making. In many fragile and conflict affected states difficult decisions may have to be made that impact negatively on elements of society. Host nation leaders may be unwilling to assume this responsibility preferring to leave the blame and the risk on the shoulders of interveners. The decision of when to assume responsibility for decisions is intensely political and local leaders will do all they can to ensure that the blame for unpopular decisions lies with external actors while credit for any positive effects lies with them.

Capability to Take on Responsibility.

106. Capacity development tends to focus on the capability aspects seeing it as a largely technical process. Those taking on responsibility need to have the requisite skills, education and training, they need to have the right resources, and they need to have the right processes in place. Much of this is technical and provided that this is not divorced from the political context such a technical approach is often warranted. Capability developers should however recognise local expertise; local people understand their environment best and may have better insights into how external expertise can be applied.

CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

TO FOLLOW

107. This concept therefore proposes that successful transition management will draw on the following principles and approaches.

108. Addressing the interest and fears of those powerbrokers who are likely to be disempowered through any transition is a key element of transition management (para 25)

109. Recognising and addressing the political aspects of any transition is key to success. This analysis would include not only politics within the transitioning nation but also across and within the intervening nations and organisations.

110. Maximising participation and ownership within the constraints of security and accessibility both in terms of its degree and reach.

111. Process Define the Destination

112. Political Analysis

¹³ Andersen, A. ...

PART 2 – PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING AND ASSESSING TRANSITIONS

MAPPING TRANSITIONS

Transitions Framework

113. The “Transitions Framework” below provides a common means of identifying where any particular transition fits into the broader mosaic of transitions. It helps to identify the relationships and dependencies between different transitions. It also highlights potential overlaps and gaps. It can be used both in the planning stage to identify where an intervention may be most effective or most needed and during the implementation phase as a means of managing identified dependencies. It is intended to be used in an iterative manner, having applied the framework once insights gained should be used to inform a second iteration.

Why?			
Transitioner: - Strengthen a Political Settlement - Stimulate a Political Settlement		Transitionee:	

What?		
Decision- Making or Delivery?		
Function: - Domain/Sector: - Political - Social - Education - Health - Etc. - Economic - Security - State Security (External) - Regime Security (Internal) - Popular Security - Justice	Area: - National - Regional (Sub National) - Local	Level: - Policy - Management - Implementation

Who?			
International, Neighbourhood, Host Nation			
- National Government & Elites - Official - Shadow	- Local Government & Elites - Official - Shadow	- Service Providers - Formal - Informal	Customers & Beneficiaries

When?	
Drivers: Elections – Mandates – Funding – Staffing – Etc.	Dependencies: Precursors – Synergies – Successors

Why?

114. As each transition is unique it is important to understand the rationale behind any transition. This needs to be considered from the perspective of both those that the transfer of responsibility is from (the In-Place Provider) and those that it is to (the Assuming Provider).

115. For those transferring responsibility is this part of an exit strategy designed to reduce the intervening actor's exposure, an operational strategy, a plan to achieve broader political goals, or part of a wide-ranging mandate that is focused on development, poverty alleviation, and/or conflict resolution? Is the transition being driven by domestic political requirements and timelines, or by less restrictive consensus-based operations? Similarly the rationale for those assuming responsibility and for those opposing such a transfer should be identified.

What?

116. What is it that is being transferred? This question can be considered against three filters: function, area and degree.

117. **Function.** This refers to the subject of the transition. Firstly does it fall within a specific domain: political, economic, social or security. Secondly does it refer to a specific sector such as health, education or rule of law. Within the security domain is it to do with securing the state against external threats, securing the regime against internal threats or is it providing popular security for the population, reducing their sense of insecurity?

118. **Area:** Area refers to the geographical scale on which a security transition takes place. Is the security responsibility being transferred nationwide, within a sub-national boundary such as a province or state or at a more local level within a specific community or district?

119. **Degree of Responsibility:** Reflecting paragraph 14 and 15 this revisits the question of what is meant by responsibility. Is the security task in question being transitioned at the policy level; the level at which decisions about the overall purpose and priorities are made and at which resources are allocated. Or is it at the management level; the level at which the approach to realising the policy is decided. Alternatively is it at the delivery level; the level at which the activities are actually conducted and the service provided.

120. Plotting the results of this analysis on a series of charts or tables can identify quickly areas where there are gaps or overlaps and suggest where relationships and dependencies will need to be managed, where additional work may be required or where overlaps need to be resolved. Example charts are shown at ...[to follow]

Who?

121. The aim of this step is to identify who potential transition partners could be and who should be involved in developing the transition process; the question is therefore twofold: potential partner or potential participant. If participant the nature of that potential participation should be defined. The question should be considered in terms of international and regional actors as well as indigenous. Within the country actors should be considered in terms of:

122. **National Governments and National Elites.** As well as official state institutions and individuals this should also include unofficial and informal actors that are influential at the national level. This should include those that oppose the proposed transition.

123. **Local Governments and National Elites.** As for the national level this should again include state and non-state, formal and less formal institutions and individuals including those that may oppose the transition.

124. **Service Providers.** The analysis should include all those who are currently or could conceivably deliver the service including international or regional actors. Official state provision as well as any informal or shadow providers should be considered.

125. **Customers or Beneficiaries.** The final grouping is to consider those for whom the service is being delivered. Who are they? Can they be enabled to provide the service from their own resources? What is their role in defining what the service is, how it should be delivered and in assessing its performance?

126. In addition to identifying potential partners and participants it is also worth asking who "we" are and how "we" are perceived by different potential partners or participants. How would this perception affect their relationship with us and the implications for the transition.

When?

127. The aim of this question is to identify both events or issues that are likely to drive timelines and to identify dependencies within the transition and across the broader mosaic of transitions that will influence sequencing or phasing. Drivers may include such things as election timetables both within the host nation and within intervening nations, mandates, financial approvals processes and deadlines or staffing turnovers.

128. It can also be used to identify suitable indicators that can help identify the “ripeness” of the situation for change. This is discussed further in paragraphs 154 and 156.

PLANNING TRANSITIONS

129. [Planning process to be described here.]

Collaborative Planning

Adaptive Planning


ANALYSING POLITICAL AND POWER DYNAMICS

Political Analysis Framework

130. The framework shown here is adapted from Leftwich’s development of the DFID “Drivers of Change” framework and provides an approach for analysing and understanding the politics of decision-making processes. It can be applied at many levels either to analyse decision-making at the national level or more locally within communities. It can also be applied to help understand decision-making processes within a sector or an individual institution. A more detailed explanation of the framework can be seen at the reference¹⁴.

131. The level of information required to complete this is high and much will not be readily available at the beginning of any intervention. The intervention itself and other events will also affect the situation and therefore the framework should be seen as something that evolves and is updated as understanding grows and as the situation evolves. Reviewing the framework should become part of any evaluation during the course of the transition. Those conducting the analysis are strongly advised to draw on as broad a range of organisations as possible in conducting it: military, diplomatic and developmental communities will all be able to add valuable insights; the use of a political scientist is also recommended.

¹⁴ Insert reference to Leftwich



Step 1 – Structural Analysis

132. Before analysing the detail of the framework it is necessary to gain as full an understanding of the structural context within which the decision making process sits, both the international and national environments should be analysed and in particular the relationships between them.

Step 1.1 – International Environment

133. The analysis should describe the nature of the relationships with neighbouring countries, former colonial powers, international and regional organisations. It should identify the influence that each of these has within the country and the nature and source of that influence. It should also describe the history of these relationships in order to see how they have evolved and how they might be perceived by different elements within the country. The analysis should also cover relationships with external businesses or companies. It may be appropriate to include relationships with international crime organisations.

Step 1.2 – National Environment

134. Within the country the analysis should include the economic structure and processes, the social structure and processes and cultural and ideological systems. For each the intention is not to provide a detailed description of the sector but to identify how it impacts on power dynamics and influences decision-making.

135. **Economic Structure.** The analysis might cover employment patterns, business and union organisations, the strength of regulatory control, the source of wealth within the country and its influence with decision making structures and processes.

136. **Social Structure.** This analysis seeks to identify the significance of different groupings and the manner through which they access and influence decision-making processes. What is the make up of society and how is the relationship between these different groupings moderated? How do they express their interests and needs, through patrons, pressure groups, parties or in other ways? What is the significance of traditional forms of representation, or religious leaders and institutions?

137. **Cultural and Ideological Systems.** Although there will be overlaps here with the social structures the aim of this is to focus on how social attitudes may affect relationships towards those in power. Does for example the culture encourage deference and respect for those in power, does it naturally lean towards forms of patronage?

Step 2 – Framework Analysis

138. The second step analyses the elements of the framework itself. Each element will have its own political dynamics and it is the relationship between these different dynamics that will shape the decision-making process and define how power is exercised.

Step 2.1 – Legitimacy

139. Legitimacy can be considered in three forms: geographic, constitutional and political. Each should be considered and the impact that they have on deciding both the form and location of power.

140. **Geographic Legitimacy.** This refers to the extent to which the population or elements within it accept the legitimacy of the state as a nation rather than calling for autonomy or secession.

141. **Constitutional Legitimacy.** This refers to the extent to which the rules of the political game are thought to be fair and appropriate.

142. **Political Legitimacy.** Building on constitutional legitimacy this refers to the extent to which the population accepts that the rules have been fairly applied.

Step 2.2 – Inputs

143. The framework defines two types of input. Firstly the initiating demands that begin a political decision-making process and secondly the level of support that a regime enjoys for any initiative.

144. **Demands.** Political activities originate from a range of demands and ideas and from the opposition to those demands and ideas. These initiating demands may originate from a range of sources within the country such as ethnic or social groupings, union or trade movements or from existing elites. Demands do not just emanate from within the country they can also come from external organisation such as donors, powerful corporations or the international financial institutions. It is important to analyse what these demands are, how they arise and who instigates them.

145. **Support.** The second type of input is the level of support. This might be internal support such as the support of the military for the regime, or of the main economic interests. It might also be external support in the form of financial aid from major donors or investment from major businesses. The threat of withdrawal of support from these key players may be a powerful driver in the decision-making process and therefore understanding the basis of this support and its explicit or implicit boundaries is essential.

Step 2.3 – Modes

146. Modes refer to the form in which demands are articulated and support expressed. Interests may be expressed in many ways. Internally it may be through political representation, petitions or by demonstrations, strikes or riots. Externally it might be through threats, conditionality, treaties or ultimately force. This analysis identifies the route by which interests enter the political decision-making process.

Step 2.4 – Gatekeepers

147. Gatekeepers are those individuals or organisations that control access to the decision-makers; they are the ones that set and control the agenda. They may be part of the formal process or they may be informal “fixers” or “advisers”.

Step 2.5 – Lobbying

148. Throughout the process individuals and organisations will be seeking to influence decisions in their favour and there is usually a link here between those instigating or opposing specific inputs to the process. Lobbyists may be internal or external, they may represent specific groups or sectors or powerful individuals. Identifying how pressure is applied by lobbyists (particularly those from within the country) may also provide insights into how decisions are made within the inner circle of decision-makers and into where real power lies; internal lobbyists are likely to have a better understanding of local power dynamics than those from outside.

Step 2.6 – Decision Making Power Map

149. Ultimately in any decision-making process issues come before the key players, are discussed and a decision is made. Gaining an understanding of the power relationships, thought processes and influences that drive this inner cabal is difficult but some insights are usually possible. Senior officials or diplomats that have regular contact with the individuals will be able to provide some insights, psychological profiling of key individuals may also help as might intelligence sources.

Step 2.7 – Decisions and Outputs

150. The outputs from the decision-making process are the decisions; these may be laws passed, resources allocated, contracts awarded. Using one decision as a case study can provide valuable insights into the wider political processes.

Step 2.8 – Implementation

151. Getting a decision is however only the beginning and it would be wrong to end the analysis there. Many a policy decision founders as moves into implementation. Effective implementation depends on the capacity of the bureaucracy and its independence from other influences. Where these are lacking policy decisions may be subverted or suborned to other agendas. Identifying where power lies within these bureaucracies and across different levels from decision-maker down to ultimate provider is therefore critical. Again a case study of a particular decision may provide useful insights into the power dynamics at play.

COLLABORATIVE PLANNING AS A TOOL FOR UNITY OF EFFORT

152. The Cooperative Implementation Planning Concept developed for Multinational Experiment 5 argued that collaborative planning and analysis was a key tool in the development of a genuine comprehensive approach. The issue was less about structural or procedural change but rather about creating an environment where genuine dialogue, as opposed to debate, could take place. The key assertions and insights from the concept are summarised here:

153. [Summary of CIP concept and cross reference to be inserted]

MONITORING AND EVALUATING TRANSITIONS

154. [More to Follow]

155. Monitoring and Evaluation are discussed in [insert cross-reference to FR/US focus area outputs] and in the UK [insert cross reference to the UK Joint Doctrine Note]. This section will therefore discuss the implications for Transitions and for Transfers of Responsibility.

156. In order to assess the ripeness for any transfer of responsibility or transition it is necessary to track and monitor development across three areas:

157. **The Context.** As well as monitoring the overall stability of the environment it will be necessary to monitor the political environment at home, across the intervening nations and organisations as well as within the country itself. In addition to the political environment popular attitudes should also be tracked. The development of a suitably stable or supportive environment may be an essential precursor to any transfer. Alternatively worsening trends may cause planned transfers to be brought forward or delayed.

158. **The In-Place Provider.** Understanding of the political and power dynamics within a country is critical for effective transitions. It may therefore be appropriate to assess the interveners understanding of the environment to ensure that an essential base level of understanding has been acquired prior to any transfer. Additionally tracking the level of willingness to transition might indicate where reporting is becoming coloured by the natural reluctance to hand-over and where further effort may no longer be required.

159. **The Assuming Provider.** The assuming provider needs to demonstrate sufficient commitment, legitimacy and capability. Indicators should be identified that track the willingness to assume responsibility across different levels and locations: policy, management and implementation; national, regional and local. The population's perceptions of the legitimacy of the assuming organisation should be tracked alongside the maturity and effectiveness of those mechanisms through which they will be held to account and by which they will respond to evolving needs. Finally indicators will be required that track the level of capability of those assuming responsibility across the full range of delivery, management and support functions.

PART 3 – SUMMARY

Terminology

160. There is currently no consensus on the use of the term “Transition”. This concept defines it as a noun to refer to a change in condition. This change may be at a state level or sub-state; it may refer to overall change or to change within specific domains or sectors. “Transition Management” is used to describe the process of managing or controlling a transition. Initially this may be by external actors however ultimately transition management is the responsibility of the host nation and developing the capacity to do so should be a key element of any transition. The action of physically handing responsibility for decision making or delivery from one organisation to another is described as a “Transfer of Responsibility”. A security transition may therefore contain several transfers of security responsibility.

Characteristics

161. The dominant characteristic of transition is change. Transitions involve a change in the locus of decision-making and consequently such change will be contested. Secondary characteristics are therefore power struggles and the uncertainty and instability that these lead to. These power struggles take place within the political domain and therefore politics is central to any transition; politics is not however confined to that country; it will also be played out across and between the intervening nations and organisations. The final characteristic of any transition is the need to develop appropriate capacity, ideally building on and reforming existing capacity rather than replacing it.

Considerations

162. Successful transitions are those that endure and therefore sustainability is a key consideration for transition management. The significance of power and politics emphasises the importance of building and maintaining a thorough understanding of the power and political dynamics of the environment and this will remain an important consideration leading up to and throughout any transition. The uncertainty and instability inherent in any transition highlights the significance of adequate and appropriate resources and therefore identifying, corraling and managing these is another key consideration. The combined impact of uncertainty and the need to engage in a genuine negotiation with potential transition partners calls into question the suitability of many current planning approaches and suggests that a more incremental or evolutionary approach to planning transitions may be required. This in turn calls for adaptability and therefore learning becomes critical for successful transitions. Transition timelines will inevitably be driven by pressures external to the immediate environment as domestic pressures impinge on actions in-country and therefore informing and educating decision makers and opinion formers across the intervening actors becomes a key consideration as does the need to “shockproof” or instil resilience into transitions from the start. The final key consideration is the need to identify existing capacity and the ability to discern which capacities should be retained and developed and that which should not.

163. **Sustainability.** Local ownership is key to ensuring the sustainability of any transition and participation is

164. **Power & Politics.** In a stabilisation environment although there may be a veneer of democracy it is likely that traditional forms of politics will continue and those managing transitions must become adept and understanding and using these. Within the transitioning country the dominant form of power is likely to be coercive. Part of the aim of transition management should therefore be to bring to the fore other forms and manifestations of power, creating or reinforcing alternative sources of power. Transition managers must not only understand these different types and sources of power within the country and across the wider international community but they must also become more adept at leveraging them. It is also

important to recognise that power is also held by individuals and therefore managing the personal interests and needs of those who may be disempowered by any transition will be a key element of transition management.

165. Resources. Transfers of responsibility will frequently be to less experienced individuals and organisations and a transfer is therefore likely to lead to a reduction in overall capability. Reducing external support at this time or replacing “boots on the ground” with more technical alternatives can exacerbate this problem just as instability is likely to increase. External support and resources need to be maintained leading up to, during and in the immediate aftermath of any transfer. Resources may come from a variety of sources and the art may be less about co-opting others’ resources onto a single agenda and more about creating space within which they can operate to mutual benefit.

166. Planning. Transition management occurs in situations that are both complicated and complex; existing planning methodologies are optimised for the former rather than the latter. A more dynamic or incrementalist approach to planning is required for transition planning as this is better able to exploit uncertainty and to create space for meaningful participation by transition partners and stakeholders.

167. Learning & Adapting. Those involved in any transition need to be able to learn and adapt in both complicated and complex environments. In complicated environments the focus for learning is on the environment; articulating and testing assumptions and theories of change are vital tools. In complex environments the focus is on ourselves; improving how we recognise and react to evolving patterns becomes critical. Both types of learning are required.

168. Informing & Educating. Transition managers must monitor political developments across the intervening countries and organisations political environment. They must also seek to inform and educate domestic opinion leaders and decision-makers.

169. Shockproofing Gains. Due to external political pressures the timeline for any transition will not be under the control of transition managers. “Shockproofing” changes by building in resilience from the start will be a key element of successful transition management and should shape the approach taken.

170. Comprehensive Approach. Managing transitions is likely to be beyond the scope of any single organisation or nation. Transition management requires a multi-organisational, multi-sector and multinational comprehensive approach. Inclusion is a key tool for generating a unified approach across different organisations; bringing individuals together can create a shared perspective, organisational buy-in and consequently a more unified approach.

171. Developing Capacity. Capacity development includes the development of skills and knowledge and the ability to learn and adapt, it also includes the development of the rules and behaviour (the institutions) by which organisations and individuals act. This is critical if indigenous institutions are to take responsibility for managing their own ongoing transitions. Achieving a balance across these is difficult and there will be a tendency, which should be resisted, to focus on the more technical skills and knowledge at the expense of the more political development of the institutions and the ability to learn and adapt.

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