



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**KOREA'S POST-CONFLICT PEACE OPERATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF KOREAN COMBAT
BATTALIONS IN EAST TIMOR AND LEBANON**

by

Seongkyoon Shin

March 2012

Thesis Co-Advisor:

Naazneen H. Barma
Sophal Ear

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) WashingtonDC20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE March 2012	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Korea's Post-Conflict Peace Operations: A Comparative Assessment of Korean Combat Battalions in East Timor and Lebanon			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Seongkyoon Shin				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number _____ N/A _____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis investigates the appropriate role of Korean peacekeepers in post-conflict societies and the function of the troop-contributing government of Korea in leading successful peace operations. It examines scholarly discussions regarding peacekeeping success—including conditions and criteria for successful peacekeeping—and applies the factors regarding mandates to Korean peace operations in East Timor and Lebanon. The two country case studies view the results of Korean peace operations from a long-term perspective, applying relevant evaluation factors closely related to the nature of peacekeeping force activities, and avoiding evaluations based on reports from local media and Korean pro-governmental news networks. For successful peace operations, troop-contributing governments should clearly and narrowly order the scope of force activities regardless of the specific field of activity. Despite claims that use of force is needed in more violent contemporary situations, rigorous adherence to the rule of engagement by military contingents will likely create positive outcomes if the force employs friendship-building efforts along with security operations. However, for more fruitful efforts in peacekeeping operations, the military troops and their government should be more deliberate regarding capacity-building activities to most benefit sustainable development and local ownership.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Korean peacekeeping; Peace operations; Scope of Mandate; Content of Mandate; Peacekeeping success; Civil-military activity; Humanitarian assistance; Friendship-building; Capacity-building; Local ownership; Sustainable development; Evaluation of military contingent's peace operations			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 139	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**KOREA'S POST-CONFLICT PEACE OPERATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF KOREAN COMBAT BATTALIONS IN
EAST TIMOR AND LEBANON**

Seongkyoon Shin
Captain, Republic of Korea Army
B.S. International Relations, Korea Military Academy, 2003

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2012**

Author: Seongkyoon Shin

Approved by: Naazneen H. Barma
Thesis Co-Advisor

Sophal Ear
Thesis Co-Advisor

Daniel Moran
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the appropriate role of Korean peacekeepers in post-conflict societies and the function of the troop-contributing government of Korea in leading successful peace operations. It examines scholarly discussions regarding peacekeeping success—including conditions and criteria for successful peacekeeping—and applies the factors regarding mandates to Korean peace operations in East Timor and Lebanon. The two country case studies view the results of Korean peace operations from a long-term perspective, applying relevant evaluation factors closely related to the nature of peacekeeping force activities, and avoiding evaluations based on reports from local media and Korean pro-governmental news networks. For successful peace operations, troop-contributing governments should clearly and narrowly order the scope of force activities regardless of the specific field of activity. Despite claims that use of force is needed in more violent contemporary situations, rigorous adherence to the rule of engagement by military contingents will likely create positive outcomes if the force employs friendship-building efforts along with security operations. However, for more fruitful efforts in peacekeeping operations, the military troops and their government should be more deliberate regarding capacity-building activities to most benefit sustainable development and local ownership.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	KOREA’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.....	1
B.	RESEARCH PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES	2
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	4
	1. Criteria for Evaluating Peacekeeping Success.....	4
	2. South Korean Scholarship on Peacekeeping.....	10
D.	METHODS AND SOURCES.....	11
II.	MANDATES AND MISSION IMPLEMENTATION	15
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	15
B.	THE SCOPE OF MANDATES	16
C.	THE CONTENT OF MANDATES.....	19
D.	MANDATES FOR MILITARY CONTINGENTS IN PEACEKEEPING.....	23
III.	ASSESSMENT OF A KOREAN COMBAT BATTALION IN EAST TIMOR..	27
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	27
B.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR.....	28
C.	KOREAN PARTICIPATION AND OBJECTIVES IN EAST TIMOR...30	
D.	THE KOREAN PEACEKEEPING MANDATE IN EAST TIMOR.....	35
E.	ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN EAST TIMOR.....	38
	1. Maintaining Security and Order	38
	2. Civil-Military Activities.....	41
	a. Activities by Mandate 1: Humanitarian Relief.....	43
	b. Activities by Mandate 2: Friendship-Building.....	45
	c. Activities for Capacity Building.....	47
F.	ASSESSMENTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN EAST TIMOR	50
	1. Assessment of Korean Force Security Activities.....	50
	2. Assessment of Korean Force Civil-Military Activities	53
	a. Assessment of Activities for Humanitarian Relief.....	53
	b. Assessment of Friendship-Building Activity.....	57
	c. Assessment of Capacity-Building Activity.....	60
G.	CONCLUSION	65
IV.	ASSESSMENT OF A KOREAN COMBAT BATTALION IN LEBANON.....	69
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	69
B.	THE LEBANON PEACEKEEPING MANDATE ASSIGNED TO THE KOREAN FORCE.....	70
C.	ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN LEBANON	75
	1. Security Activities of Dongmyeong Force.....	75
	2. Civil-Military Activities of Dongmyeong Force	78

a.	<i>Activities by Mandate 1: Humanitarian Assistance</i>	<i>79</i>
b.	<i>Activities by Mandate 2: Friendship-Building.....</i>	<i>80</i>
c.	<i>Activities for Capacity-Building</i>	<i>81</i>
D.	ASSESSMENTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN LEBANON.....	84
1.	Assessment of Korean Force Security Activities.....	84
2.	Assessment of Korean Force’s Civil-Military Activities	87
a.	<i>Assessment of Activities for Humanitarian Relief.....</i>	<i>87</i>
b.	<i>Assessment of Friendship-Building Activity.....</i>	<i>89</i>
c.	<i>Assessment of Capacity-Building Activity.....</i>	<i>90</i>
E.	CONCLUSION	92
V.	CONCLUSION	97
A.	SUMMARY	97
B.	EVALUATING THE HYPOTHESES.....	100
C.	PEACE OPERATIONS OF KOREAN FORCES: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE.....	101
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	105
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	121

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	The Composition of ROKBATT (Sangnoksu) to Deploy to East Timor (From: Choi, 2006)	34
-----------	--	----

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Levels of Responsibility in UN Peace Operation (From: The Challenges Project, 2005).....	24
Table 2.	Security Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in East Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksus forces, 2000–2003)	38
Table 3.	Civil-Military Operations and Activities of the ROKBATT in East Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksus forces, 2000–2003)	42
Table 4.	Civil-Military Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in East Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksus forces, 2000–2003)	43
Table 5.	Participants in Taekwondo Classes in East Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksus Units, 2000–2003)	46
Table 6.	Number of Timorese Patients Treated by Each Contingent (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksus Units, 2000–2003).....	54
Table 7.	Security Operation of the Korean Force and its Results in East Timor.....	65
Table 8.	Civil-Military Activity of the Korean Force and its Results in East Timor.....	66
Table 9.	Mandate from the Korean Government for Peacekeeping Operation in Lebanon Deduced from Reports of Force Activities	72
Table 10.	Security Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in Lebanon (From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011)	75
Table 11.	Donations from Korea forces to LAF (From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011).....	77
Table 12.	Civil-Military Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in Lebanon (From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011)	78
Table 13.	Capacity-building Activities of Korean Contingents in Lebanon (From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011)	82
Table 14.	Security Operation of the Korean Force and its Results in Lebanon.....	93
Table 15.	Civil-Military Activity of the Korean Force and its Results in Lebanon	94

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	Areas of Responsibility
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
CPO	Coordinated Patrol Operation
CRLO	Counter Rocket Launching Operation
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP	Entry Points
FRETILIN	Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
JEG	Japanese Engineer Group
JP	Junction Point
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
MDMP	Medicos Do Mundo Portugal
NGOs	Non-government Organizations
MNF	Multi-National Force
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ONUC	United Nations Mission in the Congo
OPORD	Operation Order
PKFH	UN Peacekeeping Force Headquarters
PK	Peacekeeping
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKBATT	Republic of Korean Battalion

SDF	Self Defense Force
TNI	Indonesia Armed Forces
UN	United Nation
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group India Pakistan
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
USGET	United States Support Group East Timor
WHO	World Health Organization

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I am most grateful to my wife, Kyeongmuk, who allowed me to focus on my studies, having little family care. Without her unconditional assistance and love this thesis and my degree would not be possible. As always, she has been there, providing all sorts of tangible and intangible support.

Second, my most sincere thanks go to Professor Naazneen Barma, whose valuable and definitive guidance and advice helped bring this thesis to a successful conclusion. She has always understood me and pushed me to do better work in my thesis. Without her considerate and constructive advice and help, I would not complete this thesis.

Third, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Sophal Ear. He helped me think critically. Also, his insights on stabilization and reconstruction activities of interveners, especially of military, have been essential to my understanding the subjects in my research area.

Fourth, I don't know how to thank Mr. Richard Cook. He has assisted me in innumerable ways, and whatever I might say here cannot do full justice to the extent and the value of his contribution. Not only in working on my thesis, but in most papers which I have written at NPS, his deliberated assistance has always been there. Richard has offered invaluable mentorship in and out of the classroom, and encouraged me to get over difficulties during my staying here.

Fifth, I need to thank Professor Arturo Sotomayor for helping me understand critical concepts regarding peace operations and civil-military relations. Also, I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Wade Huntley for providing me some great ideas and perspectives on Northeast Asia and thoughtful observations on Korean peninsula.

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my son, Giru, whose precious innocence gives me hope that, despite the challenges, peace and reconciliation are always possible.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

A. KOREA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Korea is widely perceived as playing a positive role in world affairs.¹ Consistent with its growing international importance, Korea is attempting to increase its contributions to Official Development Assistance (ODA) to reduce poverty in developing countries, and to peacekeeping operations (PKO) to maintain international peace and security.² In 2009, the Korean National Assembly passed a bill to expand PKO participation. It allows Korean armed forces to be dispatched upon the request of the United Nations (UN) without prior consent by the National Assembly. South Koreans see their country poised to adopt the image of a “Pacifist Middle Power.”³ And there is a feeling among Koreans that they should reciprocate for the international assistance the country received after the Korean War.⁴

Along with these trends within Korea, the international community has requested that South Korea play a greater role in maintaining and improving world peace. Although South Korea is the world's eleventh largest monetary contributor to the UN, it sends very few participants to post-conflict societies, ranking 32nd in troop contribution.⁵

1 SeungJu Lee et al., *Assessments and Supplements of Contribution Diplomacy* (Seoul: National Assembly Research Service, 2010), 1.

2 Ibid.

3 Seongryeol Cho, “The Role of Korean Army and International Peace Cooperation Activity in Transitional Period,” *Institute for National Security Strategy*, Vol. 3, 2007, 2. Seongryeol suggests the term “Pacifist Middle Power,” a synthesis of “Peace Country” and “Middle Power,” is a desirable new diplomatic strategy and national vision for Korea. He argues that Korea should pursue niche diplomacy, seeking an independent role in the international community while promoting the development of its alliance with the United States.

4 Kyudok Hong, “South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future,” *Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development*, Vol. 12, 174.

5 Official Webpage of UN's Peacekeeping Activities, “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/feb11_2.pdf.

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has asked South Korea to expand the Korean role in the international community by sending more troops on peacekeeping missions. Recently, he urged the Korean government to deploy another Korean peacekeeping force to Sudan.⁶

As a result of these internal and external influences, and consistent with its growing economic importance, Korea is stepping up its responsibility in international peacekeeping operations. In the face of increasing pressure to send more Korean troops to post-conflict societies, it is worth investigating how successful Korean troops have been in past operations and what more appropriate actions they could take in future deployments. The importance of this topic lies in identifying channels for more productive Korean contributions to international peace. This requires reviewing and evaluating previous Korean force activities in post-conflict societies and using the lessons learned to provide recommendations for adjusting future Korean missions.

B. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES

The Korean government and many Korean news organizations report that the missions of South Korean troops deployed in post-conflict societies have been a success. But it is important to go beyond reputation in order to objectively evaluate the efforts of military contingents, using success indicators relevant to peacekeeping activities in war-torn societies. This requires determining what standards produce successful military contingent activities in peacekeeping.

Can the objectives stated in the Korean National Assembly's motion regarding sending military troops abroad be the standard to guide the military contingents' conduct in peace operations? *The Agreement of the National Assembly for Deploying the Korean Force to East Timor* states that the purpose of deploying Korean military forces is to contribute to regional stability in the Asia-Pacific region and to contribute actively to the UN's international peacekeeping activities as a UN member state and a beneficiary

⁶ *The Chosunilbo*, "UN Chief Calls for Korean Peacekeepers in South Sudan," June 27, 2011, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/07/27/2011072701048.html.

country.⁷ This document offers no specific direction for military missions beyond promoting peace and security in East Timor, assisting and supporting the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), and supporting humanitarian rescue and assistance operations.⁸ These objectives and commands are too sketchy to define the specific direction of military force in peacekeeping. Likewise, *The Agreement of the National Assembly for Deploying the Korean Force to Lebanon* also lacks specifics, outlining broad, general objectives and assignments like contributing to international peace and maintaining security.⁹ It seems that the original objectives stated in the deployment of the PKO cannot serve as an objective standard against which to measure success.

Regarding the original objectives of peacekeeping operations, the UN officially says only that a peacekeeping mission works “to create the conditions for lasting peace in a country torn by conflict,” with no clear elucidation of what constitutes such conditions.¹⁰ Is the mission a success when the military acts in accordance with UN founding principles? The foundational purpose of the UN is “to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations and to promote social progress for better living standards and human rights.”¹¹ These standards are still too broad and vague for evaluating military actions in PKO.

Can fulfillment of the mandates from UN Peacekeeping Force Headquarters (PKFH) serve as the standard? To some extent, orders from PKFH do define the activities of subordinated military contingents from many different countries. However, these orders are modified constantly in response to the situation in the field. Indeed, the Korean peacekeeping force in Lebanon amended its operational plans and rules on average more than 35 times during the relatively modest 6-month deployment of each

7 The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, *The Agreement of the National Assembly for Deploying the Korean Force to East-Timor*, September. 28, 1999, <http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/>.

8 Ibid.

9 The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, *The Agreement of the National Assembly for Deploying the Korean Force to Lebanon*, Dec. 22, 2006, <http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/>.

10 Official Webpage of UN's peacekeeping activities, “What is Peacekeeping?” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>

11 Charter of the United Nations, “The UN Charter1: Purposes and Principles, Article 1,” <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.

contingent.¹² Moreover, on-site mandates from PKFH cannot define the general and fundamental direction of military peacekeepers' activities from various countries.

If there were specific mandates from its own government, a military peacekeeping contingent would most likely give priority to those mandates in implementing its mission in the field. Governmental mandates ordering specific directions for force activities would greatly influence the result of the forces' actions in the field.

Hypothesis 1: The Korean peacekeeping forces considered their governmental mandates as the most important standard of their action on the spot, which greatly impacted the results of their activities in post-conflict societies.

Because the sketchy, broadly defined directions in the National Assembly's action and the official UN objective of PKO do not provide appropriate standards for military contingent actions, the mandate from the government must be more specifically and narrowly defined. Such clearly mandated orders might yield more successful results in the military force's activities in peacekeeping.

Hypothesis 2: A clear mandate with suitable scope and contents results in successful outcomes of military force peacekeeping activity.

In other words, the success of Korean peacekeeping activities rests not on the official United Nations mandate *per se*, but on to the degree to which the supporting Korean government mandate defined clearly the activities expected of the Korean troops in terms of both scope and content. Detailed discussions of a mandate and its contents follow in Chapter II.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Criteria for Evaluating Peacekeeping Success

There has been much discussion about what conditions produce successful peacekeeping operations. This discussion includes such variables as assistance from the international community, the role of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council,

¹² For instance, the second Korean contingent in Lebanon had to overall modify its operation plan five times and to partly amend 29 times.

the absence of external support for the belligerents, levels of economic development, and more.¹³ In particular, the UN judges that when several key factors—correct diagnosis of the problem, speedy deployment, and so forth—are in place, the probability of a successful PKO is increased.¹⁴ However, how to judge the success or failure of peacekeeping operations is mostly overlooked in the lengthy discussion of peacekeeping.¹⁵

Full-fledged debates erupted after the announcement of *An Agenda for Peace* by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1992.¹⁶ Several peacekeeping scholars agreed with the need for clear analysis of the success or failure of UN missions so as to improve peacekeeping capabilities. Paul Diehl, William Durch and Steven Ratner stress standards related to the mission's mandate and factors that can be measured quantitatively, with a more positive approach to evaluating peacekeeping.¹⁷ On the other hand, Betts Fetherston and Robert Johansen emphasize the need for qualitative examination, attributing peacekeeping success to the promotion of deeper normative values like justice and the reduction of human suffering.¹⁸

13 Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004, 275; Darya Pushkina, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Civil Wars: Conditions for Success" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 2002), 15–36.

14 Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General of the UN, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operation: Current Development and Future Challenges," Address, June 12, 2002, Washington, DC.

15 Important works that attempt to answer this questions include Duane Bratt, "Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 1996, 64; Daniel Druckman et al., "Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, 1997, 151; Duane Bratt, "Defining peacekeeping success: The Experience of UNTAC," *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1996, 3.

16 Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations are one option to solve conflicts. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented a 24-page report, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*. This report emphasizes a clear and practicable mandate, the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate, the continuing support of the Security Council, and so on. (Marjorie Ann Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*, 2008, 21).

17 Daniel Druckman et al., "Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions," 151–152.

18 Ibid.

Seeking more systematic criteria for measuring success, Diehl develops two standards: limitation of armed conflict and facilitating conflict resolution.¹⁹ With respect to the first criterion, Diehl believes that peacekeepers can prevent and manage conflicts between opposing parties because the peacekeepers represent the international community.²⁰ He argues that containment of armed conflict should be one of the objective indicators measuring the success of peacekeeping operations. In terms of his second criterion for gauging the success of peacekeeping, Diehl stresses the ability of peacekeepers to create conditions for negotiation between rival parties. Since negotiators can better concentrate on peace talks and reconciliation in a secure environment, Diehl's second factor, assisting "conflict resolution," should be considered important in assessing the success or failure of peacekeeping operations.²¹

Ratner sets up ten major categories of responsibility for new UN peacekeeping and establishes a depth of responsibility with six categories that range from monitoring to providing public information.²² When Ratner emphasizes conflict prevention and inducing resolution as fundamental functional roles for mediators, his stance is similar to Diehl's with respect to evaluating a successful mission.²³ However, Ratner counts mandate fulfillment as another measure of mission success, while Diehl claims that "mandate fulfillment" cannot be considered a measure of success due to both the ambiguity of operational mandates and the difficulty of objectively assessing whether they have been achieved or not.²⁴

Durch admits that Diehl's two criteria offer useful benchmarks and starting points to evaluate successful peacekeeping, but Durch asserts that peace accords cannot be

19 Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 34–40.

20 Paul Diehl et al., *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 30.

21 Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, 37.

22 Ibid., 42–43.

23 Steven Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 42–43. Ratner stresses the following critical mediation mechanisms: face-saving and escape routes, redefinition of issues, containment of dispute, and follow-through on resolution.

24 Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, 33; Daniel Druckman et al., "Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions," 152.

framed from one universal standard.²⁵ Durch includes the fulfillment of the mandate among the elements for evaluating missions because the mandates establish the characteristics of the mission.²⁶ Since the publication of the UN's *Agenda for Peace*, most scholars who emphasize evaluation by objective factors include "contribution to peace resolution" as a central criterion, though they differ on the criterion of "mandate performance" because of the ambiguity of mandates.

The most controversial objections to Diehl's two criteria are raised by Johansen. In a review of Diehl's *International Peacekeeping*, Johansen finds fault with Diehl's first criterion by demonstrating that missions can be successful despite the absence of "peace resolution."²⁷ While emphasizing that qualitative information must be examined alongside quantifiable data, Johansen suggests two additional considerations. First, there is a need to "assess the effect of peacekeeping forces on local people affected by the peacekeepers' work." Second, there is a need to "compare the degree of misunderstanding, tension, or violence that occurs in the presence of UN peacekeepers to the estimated results of balance-of-power activity without peacekeeping."²⁸ These two indicators reflect the question, "Success for whom?"

Discussions of criteria for evaluating peacekeeping missions are outlined by Bratt in his article "Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations."²⁹ Bratt picks three of the five factors identified by Brown and Diehl—mandate performance, facilitating conflict resolution, and conflict containment—and adds one other, "limiting casualties," noting that peacekeepers can curtail the overall rate of casualties as well as

25 William Durch, "Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context" in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 36.

26 Ibid., 28–29: Durch emphasizes that "what an operation is asked to do has much to do with its success or failure. Historically, it is good at fulfilling certain mandates at following missions: monitoring borders, verifying cease-fire and so on."

27 Robert Johansen, "UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?" *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1994, 308.

28 Ibid., 309–310.

29 Duane Bratt, "Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations."

military losses because peacekeeping operations can limit civilian casualties if the mandate includes instructions related to humanitarian work.³⁰

Recent discussion concerning evaluation of peacekeeping success embraces a more humanitarian perspective and the impact of the conflict beyond the original conflict area. Pushkina adds two factors to existing judgments of successful peacekeeping—“reduction of human suffering” and “preventing the spread of conflict beyond the home state’s borders.”³¹ Since the UN is responsible for preventing massacres of civilians, the work of peacekeepers has to be assessed in terms of a decrease in human rights abuses and an increase in refugee resettlement.³² In Africa, where conflicts often spread to adjacent regions because of interconnected ethnic and economic factors, refugee flows, and diasporas, limiting the spread of conflicts to bordering countries should be among the factors used to measure success in peacekeeping operations.

In short, the peacekeeping literature does not produce consensus on the criteria for assessing peacekeeping operations, as such assessments are framed according to varying beliefs by actors from the United Nations, peacekeepers, and host country citizens about the appropriate role for peacekeeping operations.³³ However, among scholars who emphasize objective factors in assessing the success or failure of missions, the following criteria are significant: fulfillment of the mandate, facilitating conflict resolution, limitation of conflict and casualties, and contribution to international and regional security. In contrast, researchers who require qualitative assessment advocate use of the following criteria: influence on local people, reduction of human suffering, and lessening in the degree of tension or violence due to the presence of peacekeepers. Although academics’ choice of criteria differs, they hold several themes in common.

30 Duane Bratt, “Explaining Peacekeeping Performance: The UN in Internal Conflicts,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.4, Issue 3, 1997, 46.

31 Darya Pushkina, “Towards Successful Peace-Keeping: Remembering Croatia,” *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 39, No. 4, 395.

32 Ibid., 396.

33 Alex J. Bellamy, “The ‘Next Stage’ in Peace Operations Theory?” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2004, 21.

According to the forum of the National Research Council, since different actors have different criteria for assessing success, determining whose objectives should prevail is another variable in this complex drama.³⁴

Although several scholars make an effort to evaluate the overall mission of peacekeeping, there is little research on the activities of each peacekeeping component in post-conflict societies. There has been little research assessing mission accomplishment of donor military forces—the actual peacekeepers operating in the field. If the UN were to judge the success or failure of donors country-by-country or troops-by-troops, some hackles would be raised, possibly resulting in increased tension between the UN and troop-contributing countries, withdrawal of troops by countries who get low points, or denial of forces by these countries in later missions. The voluntary provision of forces from UN members is the most important requirement for managing peacekeeping operations.

The foregoing discussion shows that neither the objective criteria in assessing the activities of military troops nor the standard to be followed by peacekeeping military contingents are clearly defined or designated. In addition, despite various debates on the best approach to peacekeeping operations, there are few discussions of the impact of mandates on peacekeeper activities and specifically how mandates from troop-contributing governments affect military contingents' peacekeeping success. Scholars disagree on whether fulfillment of mandates should be an evaluation criterion for peacekeeping success. So, if the mandates from troop-contributing governments are specifically defined in terms of scope and content, could these mandates be an appropriate standard for military contingents in conducting their missions in the field? The answer seems to be “Yes,” and this standard is adopted for assessing the case studies described in this thesis.

34 Daniel Druckman et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,”163.

2. South Korean Scholarship on Peacekeeping

To date, the few demands to study Korea's PKO have led to an equally short supply of studies.³⁵ Korean studies of its PKO tend to center around its diplomatic effects. In a policy research paper for the National Assembly, Seungju Lee and Hyejung Lee assert a need to expand participation in PKO as a national contribution to diplomacy.³⁶ Kyeongman Jun also claims that the contribution to diplomacy via participation in peacekeeping operations underlines "a realization of national value, and assurance of national security, or the reinforcement of a state's image as long-term objectives."³⁷ Some experts discuss PKO as a method of preventive diplomacy, and some say that Korea has to utilize PKO to propagate a national image of rapid development as another way to promote Korea's soft power diplomacy.³⁸ Some say Korea needs to expand and improve its UN PKO because it significantly broadens Korea's diplomatic horizons.³⁹

Compared to the various discussions about PKO as a means of diplomacy, there are few studies of the content and focus of Korean military efforts in post-conflict societies. Also not discussed is the role Korean troops should play in helping development of the local societies to which they are dispatched. Moreover, there have been no discussions of the government's role in making peacekeeping (PK) activities successful by properly orienting its forces' activities.

35 Jekuk Jun, "Oversee Deployment of Korean Forces and Security on the Korean Peninsula," *National Strategy*, Vol.17, No.2, 2011.

36 Seungju Lee et al., *Assessments and Supplements of Contribution Diplomacy* (Seoul: National Assembly Research Service, 2010).

37 Kyeongman Jun, "Political Appraisal and Development way of PKO in Contribution Diplomacy," *Defense Policy Study*, Vol.26, No.2, Summer 2010.

38 Sangtu Ko et al., "Conflict Management in the Post-Cold War Era: Preventive Diplomacy and PKO," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.17, No.2, Fall, 2005; Sookjong Lee, "South Korea's Soft Power Diplomacy," *EAI Issue Briefing*, Jun. 1, 2009.

39 Soonchun Lee, "Korea's Diplomatic Tasks to Become a Global Korea," *Korean Observations on Foreign Relations*, Vol.11, No.1, 2009.

The Korean PKO Center, established in 2005, has held seminars on subjects such as PKO participation strategy contributing to national interests, led by Yeolsu Kim;⁴⁰ methods to gather public support for PKO, led by Jongchan Kim;⁴¹ and avenues to build a legal basis for PKO participation, led by Sungho Je.⁴² Kyudok Hong, in particular, emphasizes expanding Korean participation in PKO in order to increase the country's stabilization operation capability in advance of a sudden change in North Korea.⁴³

Finding successful standardized models to which troop-contributing countries may refer before sending their troops is an important goal for countries that wish to improve the reputation of their efforts within the international community and local societies. Additionally, in order to help peacekeeping forces contribute to more stable circumstances and long-term development in post-conflict societies, peacekeeping forces need suggestions for values or guidelines.

Studies evaluating the overall success or failure of missions deserve further development, but the activities of military contingents at the tactical level in post-conflict societies should be examined just as closely. Research on what activities and roles are truly needed from Korean forces deployed in post-conflict societies will benefit population rehabilitation and reconstruction of the local society, and also build the long-term positive image of Korea's PKO in the international community.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis examines the activities of Korean forces dispatched to East Timor and Lebanon. In the post-Cold War era, the international community has become much more involved in civil conflicts—beyond “traditional peacekeeping” in interstate conflicts—in

40 Yeolsu Kim, “PKO Participation Strategy to Contribute National Interests” (paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, June, 2005).

41 Jongchan Kim, “Ways to Gather Public Support for PKO” (paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, Jun., 2005).

42 Sungho Je, “Avenues to Build a Legal Basis for PKO Participation” (paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, Oct., 2006).

43 Kyudok Hong, “Shed Light on Korean Participation in PKO and Development Ways for the Future” (paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, Mar., 2008).

which a multidimensional role is required even of military contingents.⁴⁴ An increase in savage civil wars with ethnic and political turmoil requires the UN to participate in more aggressive peace operations, like peace enforcement and humanitarian relief. In recent conflicts, peacekeeping has called for combat forces that can implement diverse tasks while protecting vulnerable local populations and the peacekeepers themselves.⁴⁵

The Korean deployment of troops to Somalia in support of a UN resolution was the first time since the Vietnam War that Republic of Korea forces operated overseas. However, the deployments to East Timor and Lebanon are the only cases in which combat troops were the bulk of the forces deployed. Korean forces provided medical aid or supported reconstruction as their main mission in their other deployments, but the principle objective of the Korean forces in East Timor and Lebanon was maintaining security and peace, with civil-military activities as additional duties.

In July 2010 Korea established the “Onnuri Force,” a standby military unit for overseas dispatch composed of 1,000 infantry units, 1,000 preparatory units, and 1,000 of engineering, transportation, and medical corps assistance units.⁴⁶ Given the size and organization of this new military unit and the six-month rotation of military forces in PKO, future Korean PKO formations will likely be combat-battalion size. Thus, the East Timor and Lebanon cases can provide relevant lessons in preparing for future experiences.

Each case is explored in two major sections—security activity and civil-military activity. Both peacekeeping forces consisted mainly of infantry soldiers. They had two separate missions—restoring and maintaining order as their basic mission, and civil-military operation as a secondary mission. Separate indicators are used to evaluate success. In assessment of security activities, indicators are utilized which show improvement or deterioration of the security situation, such as crime rates and some contextual information regarding security. To assess civil-military activities, estimating

44 Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2004, 269.

45 James H. Lebovic, “Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6, December, 2004, 910.

46 Jinsub Cho, “Quick Response to the Requests of Troops Dispatch from the International Community: Establishment of ‘Onnuri force,’” *Defense Journal*, Vol. 440, August, 2010, 46–47.

factors based on the nature of the activities are used. For instance, in the case of capacity-building activities, an indicator is whether key concepts like ownership or sustainability were achieved in the local populations. There is detailed discussion of evaluation indicators within each case study.

Primary sources include “Homecoming Reports” by military officers who worked in East Timor and Lebanon as peacekeepers, documentation following the return of deployed units, and official documents and research papers from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in South Korea. Official United Nations’ documents concerning peacekeeping activities in East Timor and Lebanon are also used in this study. These sources are used to find out the Korean forces’ specific activities and results.

Secondary sources dealing with subjects regarding the PKO are used to establish a theoretical framework for the course and scope of research. The UN database and website, reports issued by the UN, and published Korean reports about PKO and Korean troop activities are utilized. Academic papers, journals, and scholarly books are referenced when applicable.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. MANDATES AND MISSION IMPLEMENTATION

A. INTRODUCTION

The literature review in Chapter I summarizes the discussions of evaluation criteria for assessing the success or failure of peacekeeping operations. Whether “fulfillment of the mandate” should be used to assess peacekeeping is especially controversial.

Some scholars do not believe in evaluating peacekeeping success by assessing the fulfillment of the UN mandate. Diehl says that the vagueness of mandates stems from political considerations, arguing that the ambiguity is “the price of approval in a multilateral coalition.”⁴⁷ However, because the UN, as the acknowledged representative of the world’s governments, contributes to and legitimizes international peace, the success of the mandate is an important indicator for assessing peace operations. Even Diehl acknowledges that the mandate cannot help being a critical factor for success, because the mandate is the starting point for setting standards for the different missions of peace operations.⁴⁸ He notes that the success of peacekeeping is frequently confirmed by the completion of the missions given to each peacekeeping component.⁴⁹

Bellamy says that the fulfillment of the mandates as a measure of peacekeeping success has “the advantage of remaining sensitive to different varieties of peace operation.”⁵⁰ Measuring how well a peace operation accomplishes its mandate is appropriate for evaluating different types of operations with different aims.⁵¹ That is, fulfillment of mandate can be used as a success indicator regardless of mission type.

⁴⁷ Daniel Druckman et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,” 152.

⁴⁸ Paul F. Diehl, *Peace Operations*, 123.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 122–123.

⁵⁰ Alex J. Bellamy et al., “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 4, Spring 2005, 175.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Many agree that the mandate itself is a condition for a successful peacekeeping mission. Since encouraging conflict resolution depends heavily on how well the mission achieves its mandate, an appropriate mandate should be regarded as a necessary condition of peace operations.⁵² Especially for peacekeepers who discharge their duty in the field, the mandate is a very significant factor in mission success because it influences “the characteristics of the field situation, what they call the ‘ground truth’.”⁵³

How must a mandate be defined if it is to guide a successful peacekeeping operation? Analysts focus on two elements: the scope of the mandate and the content of the mandate.

B. THE SCOPE OF MANDATES

The scope of mandate refers to whether the peacekeeping mandate from the authorities is specific versus vague and ambiguous, or narrow versus broad.⁵⁴

A clear mandate is important for peacekeepers, Durch says, because, historically and empirically, ambiguous or incomplete mandates render a simple mission more difficult and a difficult mission unworkable.⁵⁵ A mandate that does not stipulate what peacekeepers should do on the spot leaves room for arbitrary interpretation and performance by field components when the operational situation deteriorates.⁵⁶ Durch gives the example of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld’s difficulty implementing the ambiguous mandate for the United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC), a case also explored by Lefever in *Uncertain Mandate*. The initial ONUC mandate directed Hammarskjöld to “take the necessary steps” and report back “as appropriate.”⁵⁷

52 Nicholas Sambanis, “The United Nations Operations in Cyprus: A New Look at the Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Relationship,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1999, 81.

53 William Durch, “Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context” in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 26.

54 A mandate can be both broad and specific.

55 William Durch, 26.

56 Ibid., 27.

57 Ernest W. Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 27. William Durch, 27, “Its initial mandate of July 1960 authorized Hammarskjöld to ‘provide the Government with such military assistance as may necessary until...the national security forces may be able to fully meet their tasks...’”

Interpreting the Security Council resolution and establishing the rules of the operation were left to Hammarskjöld, who could not implement the mission without violating one or another of the resolution's clauses; the ambiguity also resulted in several skirmishes.⁵⁸ Mandates reflect a political calculus in the Security Council, so vague mandates are often issued to encourage "veto-wielders" to agree to UN peace operations.⁵⁹ But interpreting vague mandates complicates and confuses field peacekeeping. Peacekeeping failures due to unclear mandates are an obvious reason to support clearer and more specific mandates.

A clear and detailed mandate sets the expectations of the actors involved and insures public support for the peacekeeping mission, according to Diehl.⁶⁰ He lists ONUC, the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as failures due to vague mandates, whereas the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) operations and United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) are successful missions that benefitted from "clear and distinctly limited mandates." Open-ended mandates can lead peacekeepers to abandon neutrality and self-defense, the keystones of peacekeeping.⁶¹ Other scholars also point to problems with vague mandates. Ghali discusses the drawbacks of an unclear mandate in her research on UNEF 1 and UNEF 2.⁶² In her case study on UNIFIL, she cautions against a peacekeeper's partial understanding of the mandate as well as local parties applying their own interpretation.⁶³ Mullenbach finds that when the mandate is defined narrowly ("limited in its scope") peacekeeping operations are successful.⁶⁴ Thakur agrees, saying

58 Ernest W. Lefever, 210.

59 William Durch, 27.

60 Ibid., 73

61 Ibid., 74

62 Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force 1: 1956–1967" in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 113–115.; Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force 2: 1973–1979," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 137.

63 Mona Ghali, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978–Present," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 187.; Naomi Joy Weinberger, "Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Summer, 1983, 364.

64 Mark J. Mullenbach, "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 3, September 2005, 533.

that "peacekeeping is successful where it is limited to narrow, precisely defined tasks of over-seeing a military disengagement upon the cessation of hostilities, but fails when extended to embrace political tasks of conflict resolution."⁶⁵

In contrast, Poppe offers unique guidelines for peacekeeping in light of his own experience in Cyprus. Unlike most analysts, he supports "drawing the mandate in broad, flexible terms" because a broad, general mandate can induce the pervasiveness of mission activity.⁶⁶ In other words, a mandate defined in broad terms helps peacekeepers implement their mission through broad activities without limitations of operational scope.⁶⁷

A non-specific mandate renders even observation peacekeeping missions ineffective, so the peacekeepers follow accords other than the UN mandate. With a vague and indirect UN mandate, United Nations Military Observer Group India Pakistan (UNMOGIP)'s real duties were elucidated in a bilateral national agreement between conflicting parties.⁶⁸ Because of this additional accord, which was reinforced with even more specific orders, UNMOGIP can be evaluated as a successful mission.⁶⁹ The scope of a mandate is closely related to the resources necessary for implementing it, including appropriate levels of military force and funding. Birgisson points to the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), which suffered a manpower shortage in carrying out its original mission.⁷⁰

The UN sponsors scholarly discussions of successful conditions for peace operations to analyze failures of past missions and propose far-reaching reforms of UN peace operations. The Brahimi report says that vague and optimistic articles in mandates

65 Ramesh Thakur, *Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission* (Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberta Press., 1984), 2.

66 David H. Popper, "Lessons of United Nations Peacekeeping in Cyprus," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 64, No. 4, September 1970, 5.

67 Ibid.

68 Karl Th. Birgisson, "UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 277.

69 Ibid., 282.

70 Karl Th. Birgisson, "United Nations Yemen Observation Mission," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 211–215.

lead to inappropriate deployments with uncertain objectives, and urges the Security Council to adopt clear, attainable mandates backed with adequate resources.⁷¹

Of course, there is some disagreement about which missions can be considered a success. A mandate by itself cannot decisively influence the success or failure of peacekeeping missions.⁷² Yet, there is one clear point on which most scholars agree: “operations with clearly specified tasks are more likely to accomplish their missions successfully.”⁷³ Broadly defined mandates make it difficult to allocate the level of resources and manpower needed for a successful mission, and historical evidence shows that an unclear mandate allows arbitrary interpretations by peacekeepers—as well as peacekepts⁷⁴—and damages the neutrality and self-defense which are core principles of UN peace operations. A specific and clear mandate discourages peacekepts from divergent expectations of the peacekeepers, and also helps gain public support from the disputing parties as well as from troop-contributing countries.

C. THE CONTENT OF MANDATES

The content of the mandate refers to the actual activities or the specific orders included in the mandate by the authorities of the peacekeeping operations. In traditional peacekeeping operations, appropriate functions include “securing or maintaining a cessation of hostilities by providing a neutral third-party interposition or ‘buffer’ presence between opposing forces; maintaining public order, especially where outside intervention—in particular by great powers—is a possibility; and observing a cease- fire or truce, reporting any violations, often including diplomatic assistance in the execution of a political settlement.”⁷⁵

71 James D. Fearon et al., “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, 17–18.

72 Paul F. Diehl, *Peace Operations*, 133.

73 Ibid.

74 Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2008), 8. Fortna follow Christopher Clapham in using the term *peacekept* to refer to “decision makers within the government and rebel organizations.” In this thesis I utilize the term *peacekept* to refer also to the local population under the peace operation.

75 Richard W. Nelson, “Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1984–1985, 82.

History points to the type of content for peacekeeping missions successfully implemented by the UN. According to Durch, peacekeepers do well under certain mandates—“monitoring national borders for large-scale troop movements, verifying cease-fires between conventional armed forces, overseeing the subsequent separation of such forces, monitoring or supervising elections and mediating political transitions.”⁷⁶ On the other hand, peacekeeping efforts are less successful when they try to restore a government destroyed by conflict and guard against illegal weapons penetration.⁷⁷ Durch points out that these failed functions reveal two problems: peacekeepers who had not maintained impartiality and lack of equipment for implementing missions.⁷⁸

During the Cold War, peacekeeping worked relatively well by providing a buffer zone between the conflicting parties and even facilitating peace negotiations—well enough to receive the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize.⁷⁹ However, as peacekeeping evolves from the traditional mission to multi-dimensional missions including peacebuilding, peace enforcement, and humanitarian relief operations,⁸⁰ more variety and specific context for mandates is necessary. With changes in the nature and demands of peacekeeping, the contents of mandates must also change. Peacekeeping has become a catch-all phrase, covering much more than implementing and monitoring cease-fire agreements.⁸¹ Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping involves a wide range of tasks, including planning and managing elections, protecting human rights, supervising land reform, carrying out humanitarian aid under fire, and reconstructing failed states.⁸²

⁷⁶ William Durch, “Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context,” 28–29.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 29.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Shashi Tharoor, “The Changing Face of Peacekeeping,” in *Soldiers for Peace* ed. Barbara Benton (New York: Facts On File, 1996), 211–212.

⁸⁰ This classification follows Dr. Arturo Sotomayor, lecture on “From Peacekeeping to Peace-enforcement,” Seminar in Peace Operations, Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. July 12, 2011.

⁸¹ Shashi Tharoor, 212.

⁸² *The New York Times*, “The Future of UN Peacekeeping,” January 12, 1995.

Doyle and Sambanis argue that PK mandates should address the characteristics of the conflict—whether it is a less hostile or more hostile environment.⁸³ Since the capability of the international community is strengthened by the mandate of a peace operation, the UN needs to issue a mandate appropriate to the conflict situation.⁸⁴ With a data set of 124 post-World War II civil wars, Doyle and Sambanis tested the possibility of success in peacekeeping operations for four types of mandated operations: monitoring or observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, finding that UN mandates for peace enforcement led to positive results in terms of ending a war.⁸⁵ For firmer success—minimum democratization without recurrence of war—their research points to mandates including multidimensional functions.⁸⁶ This research suggests that the UN peacekeeping mandates should focus on enforcement operations and peacebuilding.⁸⁷ A successful PK operation, Doyle and Sambanis claim, needs extensive mandates reflecting the multidimensional functions of UN peacekeeping.

The necessary contents of mandates were thrashed out by the UN secretaries-general in attempts to find a doctrine for UN peace operations—from the *Agenda for Peace*⁸⁸ in 1992 to *In Larger Freedom*⁸⁹ in 2005. In order for the UN to continue meeting demands for peacekeeping operations, these two documents propose that mandates include post-conflict tasks such as, “support to the reestablishment of rule of law and security structures; the extension of state authority and the rehabilitation of local administration; the promotion of human rights; gender mainstreaming; the protection of

83 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), 781.

84 Ibid., 786.

85 Ibid., 791.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid., 795.

88 United Nations General Assembly, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (A/47/277-S/24111)* (New York: United Nations, 1992).
http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf.

89 United Nations General Assembly, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (A/59/2005)* (New York: United Nations, 2005).
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.59.2005_En.pdf.

children associated with armed conflict; and support to the provision of humanitarian assistance.”⁹⁰ They acknowledge that peacekeepers should be mandated to prevent belligerents or spoilers from intimidating civilian populations.⁹¹

With increasing demands for peace operations, peacekeepers tend to deploy where conflicts continue—places that are not in a military stalemate. Peace operations demand not only deploying into post-conflict situations, but trying to create them. For this, military contingents must be able to defend themselves and civilians from threats by belligerents. This means that the UN mandates need a robust rule of engagement for military contingents so they do not yield the initiative to aggressors.⁹² When peacekeepers are dispatched into potentially unsafe areas, Security Council Resolutions must provide strong mandates which meet the requirements of peacekeeping missions with specific articles on the use of force not only for self-defense but also to protect civilians and vulnerable populations.⁹³

Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century searched for ways to improve the planning, conduct and efficiency of peacekeeping operations. The Challenges Project continues to work with diverse organizations to enhance the broad abilities of international peacekeeping missions in response to the challenges of complex peace missions. Because more than three-quarters of UN missions are implemented in weak and failed states, the project calls for mandates that “cover a wide spectrum of tasks.”⁹⁴ This project argues that since contemporary peace operations occur in complex security, political and humanitarian circumstances, a proper peacekeeping directive must include a “broadening of mandate” with “the use of force.”⁹⁵ In other words, the Security

90 Salman Ahmed et al. “Shaping the Future of UN Peace Operations: Is There a Doctrine in the House?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2007, 21.

91 Ibid., 25.

92 *International Legal Materials*, “United Nations: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” Vol. 39, No. 6, November 2000, 1435.

93 Clifford Bernath et al., “A Peacekeeping Success: Lessons Learned from UNAMIL,” in *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Brill Academic, 2005), 128–129.

94 The Challenges Project, *Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination* (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005), 38.

95 Ibid., 12.

Council should provide each mission with executive authority that matches difficult situations in fragile states, and the UN missions should be allowed to use active military force to deal with rule-of-law issues.⁹⁶

To sum up, discussions over the content of mandates have not just been about what kinds of contexts are needed in mandate for a successful mission. However, many scholars and the UN itself have articulated “required contents” of mandates for contemporary missions, based on changes since the end of the Cold War. Most call for use of force as necessary to restore law and order, and for providing the mission with mandates which guarantee its administrative authority in implementing peace and sustainable development in the post-conflict society.

D. MANDATES FOR MILITARY CONTINGENTS IN PEACEKEEPING

The Challenges Project notes that “those closest to the people affected by the conflict are critical to the success of any peace operations.”⁹⁷ This implies that tactical success greatly influences overall peacekeeping success. As shown in Table 1, military units are classified as among the components at the tactical level of responsibility.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Ibid., 19.

⁹⁷ The Challenges Project, *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century-Concluding Report 1997–2002* (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005), 268.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 258.

Strategic Level • UN Security Council • UN Secretariat • Member states • Other international organizations Operational Level • SRSG/Special Envoy and staff • Force Commander and staff • Humanitarian Coordinator and staff • Civilian Administrator and staff • Police Commissioner and staff • NGO managing headquarters	Tactical Level • Military units • International civilian police contingents • Cells from international organizations for specific purpose, e.g. election monitors • NGOs • Other international organizations • Special teams from member states, e.g. justice trainers
---	---

Table 1. Levels of Responsibility in UN Peace Operation (From: The Challenges Project, 2005)⁹⁹

For peacekeeping military contingents in the field, the mandate is a significant factor in implementing their mission because the military is strongly governed by the limitations of its mission strategy.¹⁰⁰ Military personnel are accustomed to implementing specifically articulated mandates¹⁰¹ rather than creating the scope of their mission, themselves. Therefore, I hypothesize that more specific and clearer mandates for military contingents are necessary for successful peacekeeping.

Military forces are supposed to prepare an initial framework for overall peacekeeping operations. Military forces in peacekeeping are responsible for law enforcement and therefore need a strong mandate—including active use of force—to create a more conducive situation for various civilian components. Given the field situation and the required mission of protecting civilians from physical menace, I hypothesize that a mandate which authorizes robust use of military power leads to more successful peacekeeping by the military contingents.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Oldrich Bures, “Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping,” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, 2007, 414.

¹⁰¹ Alan James, “Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,” *International Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 2, Spring 1995, 244. “Force commanders have criticized the imprecision of mandates.”

However, there is a “fantastic gap” between the UN mandate and the will of peacekeeping forces in the field.¹⁰² The UN provides a mandate but never tells the peacekeepers how to implement it. This means that there are obvious limits to UNSC resolutions—even mandates issued by the UN mission—that directly impact military operations in the field. It is worth noting that the UN does not give individual mandates to troop-contributing countries. Furthermore, Operation Order (OPORD) of PKFH does not designate specific tasks for individual military contingents from different countries.

With the exception of personnel for observation missions, military troops are more affected by orders from their own governments than by UN orders. This is because the military contributions by member states are affected by political considerations, although the UN officially says that “the mandate is what member states are likely to bear and willing to commit to.”¹⁰³ The motives of states in peacekeeping missions may differ from those articulated in the official mandate.¹⁰⁴ Peacekeepers’ activities and accidents, especially personnel loss, greatly influence domestic politics and public opinion, so contributing governments seek to meddle in the military operations of their troops. Notoriously, military field commanders consider their own governments’ mandates more important than those of the peacekeeping mission commander.

Thus, evaluating military forces’ activities in peacekeeping by the characteristics of their mandates requires closely examining the mandates ordered by the governments of troop-contributing countries.

102 *The New York Times*, “U.N. Bosnia Commander Wants More Troops, Fewer Resolutions,” December 31, 1993, A3.

103 Harvey Langholtz et al., *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations* (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 77.

104 Chiyuki Aoi et al., “Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping,” *Centre for International Political Studies*, No. 56, 2007, 3. <http://www.cips.up.ac.za/>.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. ASSESSMENT OF A KOREAN COMBAT BATTALION IN EAST TIMOR

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1999, South Korea sent peacekeeping troops to East Timor at the request of the UN. Korean involvement in peacekeeping missions began in 1993 when the Korean military was deployed to Somalia. The deployment in East Timor is the first case in which combat troops were the bulk of the forces deployed. Their activities started in October 1999 when they undertook missions in Lautem province. The Republic of Korean Battalion (ROKBATT) moved to the Oecussi district after taking over from Jordanian forces in January 2002, and the PK mission finished in October 2003.

During the deployment in East Timor, a total of 3,283 soldiers implemented missions that included policing operations, humanitarian assistance and friendship-building activities, providing medical aid and preventive measures for infectious diseases, building infrastructure, operating Taekwondo classes and invitational events for residents. The “Saemaul Movement” in the village of Homé—a capacity-building program to encourage sustainability of local populations—received high interest and admiration from the United Nation Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), Non-government Organizations (NGOs), and other forces. Their diverse and enthusiastic activities earned the Korean forces a special nickname from the local people—“Malai Mutin,” meaning “the king of multinational forces.”

Positive reports came from Korean pro-governmental media or relied on documents issued by governmental institutions and military reports, but these are not reliable assessments of the Korean forces’ long-term impact. More objective evaluation is needed to precisely assess the Korean forces’ peacekeeping efforts in East Timor. A long-term perspective needs to know whether ROKBATT activities were helpful for East Timor’s sustainable development.

To find out the scope and content of a mandate that can best assure successful peacekeeping, one must first examine the mandate from the troop-contributing government. Then, one should look closely at the forces' activities with regard to the mandate, and the results of their activities.

This case study of Korean peacekeeping in East Timor begins with the historical background of conflict in East Timor and the participation process of Korean forces. It then examines the Korean government's mandate, including the clarity and specificity of the mandate's scope and whether it contained the required elements for a contemporary peacekeeping mission. Korean forces' activities in accordance with their mandates are then examined, using several indicators of success. Finally, an assessment of the overall success or failure of the Korean peacekeeping force with regard to the scope and content of its mandate is presented.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR

East Timor is located in Southeast Asia on the east-southeast edge of Indonesia, north of Australia. This small island has been cultivated by colonial powers, not by the Timorese. In the early 16th century, the island was colonized by the Portuguese. The Portuguese struggled with the Dutch, who had colonized Indonesia. The dispute between the two colonial powers resulted in an 1859 treaty in which the Portuguese yielded the western part of Timor Island.¹⁰⁵ Japan occupied Timor from 1942 to 1945, but the Portuguese reasserted authority after the end of World War II. East Timor remained one of several Portuguese colonial territories until 1974. It was liberated from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975 as a result of the Revolution of Carnation in Portugal.¹⁰⁶ The left-wing Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) declared independence in November 1975 and was ready to build an independent state.

¹⁰⁵ "The World Factbook: Timor-Leste," Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html>.

¹⁰⁶ Ruth Wedgwood, *East Timor and the United Nations*, Paper prepared for the Columbia International Affairs Online Curriculum Modules, August 2001, 1. See also Yongho Choi, *From East Timor to Timor-Leste* (Seoul: Institution for Military History, 2006), 21.

Within ten days of the declaration of independence, the island was incorporated into Indonesia, becoming its 27th province in July 1976. Notwithstanding dogged efforts by the Indonesian government, East Timor could not be combined into Indonesian society due to differences in historical background, culture and religion.¹⁰⁷ Indonesia tried to stabilize the small island over three decades through brutal military repression that resulted in an estimated 100,000 casualties.¹⁰⁸ The illegal occupation by Indonesia was condemned by the international community in several resolutions and annual votes by the UN General Assembly.¹⁰⁹

Tenacious strides of the Timorese toward independence led President Habibie of Indonesia to hold a referendum at the end of 1999. With the advent of the post-Cold War era, human rights issues were emerging, and the 1991 massacre of pro-independence Timorese in the Santa Cruz cemetery again drew the attention of the international community.¹¹⁰

Under supervision by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the referendum for independence was held on August 30, 1999. Although the vast majority of Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia,¹¹¹ the pro-Indonesia militia, supported by the Indonesian military (TNI), “commenced the wide-ranging, scorched-earth campaign of retribution,” killing approximately 1,300 Timorese.¹¹² More than 300,000 people were compulsorily relocated into West Timor as refugees. Most of the physical infrastructure was destroyed, including roads, water supply systems, schools and hospitals.

107 Gichang Kwon, “Analysis on Military Operations of UN PKO in East Timor: Focusing on Soft Power of the ROK and Australian Forces” (MA diss., Seoul National University, 2007), 16.

108 “The World Fact book: Timor-Leste,” 100,000 to 250,000 Timorese were killed by repression. At the time, the population of East Timor was 600,000.

109 Joseph Nevins, “The Making of Ground Zero in East Timor in 1999: An Analysis of International Complicity in Indonesia’s Crimes,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 4, 627–628.

110 In the Santa Cruz massacre, pro-independence Timorese were shot; 173 Timorese died, about 250 people were missing, and more than 270 people were wounded.

111 The data shows that 98.6 percent of the 451,792 eligible voters registered and cast their ballot, of which 78.5 percent favored independence.

112 “Background Note: Timor-Leste,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35878.htm>.

As the situation deteriorated, under pressure from the international community, the Indonesian government accepted a peacekeeping force on 12 September 1999. However, the UN needed time to organize and dispatch the peacekeeping forces.¹¹³ The deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was permitted under Resolution 1264 of 15 September.¹¹⁴ The mandate, issued under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, was called “one of the most strongly worded mandates ever given by the Security Council.”¹¹⁵

Conflict in East Timor resulted in civilian casualties with large-scale displacement and suffering. The peacekeeping missions in East Timor were different from Cold-War era conflicts. The East Timor mission was “an important illustration of the shift from traditional peacekeeping to more complex and multifunctional peacekeeping and peace support operations.”¹¹⁶ It illustrates the need for “peace enforcement” to protect civilians and vulnerable people, and highlights the peacekeepers’ need to protect themselves from poorly identified and factionalized belligerents.

C. KOREAN PARTICIPATION AND OBJECTIVES IN EAST TIMOR

Following the UN’s decision to dispatch two brigade-sized multinational infantry forces for a limited time, Australia and the UN sounded out member countries about their willingness to participate in the mission. South Korea also received an informal request from the UN and Australia to attend the PK mission.¹¹⁷

It was difficult for the Korean government to agree to the troop request. First, at the time, Korea and Indonesia maintained close economic cooperation, and the government did not want an uncomfortable relationship with Indonesia. About 400

¹¹³ Yongho Choi, 53.

¹¹⁴ United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution (1999), S/RES/1264 (1999)*, September 15, 1999, <http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm>.

¹¹⁵ Michael G. Smith et al., *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 45. It specifies that the Multinational Force should “restore peace and security in East Timor,” “protect and support UNAMET,” and “facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.”

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 23.

¹¹⁷ Dosaeng Jung, 147.

Korean enterprises had invested more than billion dollars in Indonesia.¹¹⁸ Indonesia was an important trade partner, supplying Korea with 70 percent of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 4.5 percent of its oil.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, the Korean government had to consider the security of 20,000 Korean immigrants living in Indonesia. In addition, since Korea did not have a standing force for the PK mission, it was unlikely to have prepared troops by the UN's mid-September deadline. Finally, and more importantly, because the UN had requested combat troops, the Korean government had to consider the threat to the lives of its soldiers. The government was aware of the potential for Korean troops to collide with militia backed by the Indonesia armed forces (TNI). For these reasons, South Korea was cautious about sending its troops to East Timor.

However, Korean President Daejung Kim's active support for East Timor at the summit conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on 12 September, along with Indonesian President Habibie's request for UN peacekeeping troops, changed the situation both within and outside of the Korean government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that "South Korea welcomed the decision of the Indonesia government," offering to "appropriately participate in the PK mission within its scope."¹²⁰

President Kim's will was a big factor in the decision. Unlike the normal decision process for sending Korean troops abroad—when the UN requests, the Korean government makes a decision, and finally the government receives approval from the National Assembly—in this case, the Presidential decision came first, followed by the formal request from the UN and approval by the Korean National Assembly. There was heated debate between the ruling People's Party for New Politics and the opposition Grand National Party. However, the government and ruling party were adamant about deploying Korean forces, claiming that participation in the PK mission in East Timor was a significant way to achieve the humanitarian foreign policy objectives of Kim's

118 Yongho Choi, 106.

119 Jihyun Yang, "In Pursuit of Power or Peace? Korean Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations" (MA diss., Kyunghee University, 2008), 32.

120 Sanggeun Song, "Government Pushing to Send Troops to East Timor," *Donga Ilbo*, September 14, 1999. 1.

government.¹²¹ In reality, it was a means of highlighting Kim's image as "Human Rights President Daejung Kim." After dispatching Korean troops to East Timor, President Kim received the Nobel Peace Prize.¹²²

Strong governmental pressure resulted in approval by the National Assembly on 28 September 1999. On 4 October 1999, the Korean PK force—named Sangnoksu (meaning "evergreen")—left for East Timor to join the INTERFET. As UNTAET was established, ROKBATT changed its mission from MNF to PKO on 28 February 2000.¹²³

In the 1990s, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was eager to change its international reputation as a "receiving country" to a "giving country."¹²⁴ The government made several statements of the ROK's desire to participate in UN activities, claiming a "legacy of historical experience" and "pay-back syndrome."¹²⁵ The PK mission in East Timor was perceived as an opportunity to change Korea's role in regional security. Japan could not send a combat force because the Japanese pacifist constitution limited its Self Defense Force (SDF) from deploying out of its territory. The U.S. hesitated to send troops in the wake of the failure in Somalia and domestic criticism of over-deploying the military.¹²⁶ The significance given by the ROK to peacekeeping in East Timor, therefore, is in accord with its developing self-concept as "a new middle power." According to power transition theory, "a small power has limited geographical interests with its relative inability to influence political and military activities in the international system," while a middle power's support is an important factor in maintaining the international

121 Doseang Jung, "A Study on the Korean Policy Making Process of Overseas Dispatch of PKO Forces" (PhD diss, Dankook University, 2006), 156.

122 Ibid., 157. In South Korea, strong suspicions were voiced that the President's decision to send military forces to East Timor was made with the Nobel Peace Prize in mind.

123 "United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)," United Nations Peacekeeping, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm>.

124 *Facts about Korea* (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1995), 59. Soon after his inauguration in 1993, President Kim Youngsam said that "Korea will actively contribute to world peace by participating in UN PK operations and by taking a more prominent role in the promotion of regional peace and prosperity."

125 Amadu Sesay, "Dividends on Investments in History: Korea and UN peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations," *Korean Observer*, Vol. 28, Issue 2, 1997, 201–203.

126 Ian Clark, "Why the 'World Policeman' Cannot Retire in Southeast Asia: A Critical Assessment of the 'East Timor Model'" (MA diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 11.

status quo.¹²⁷ The ROK's participation in an Asian-based PK operation can be understood as part of an attempt to increase its status to a middle power country.

The ROK's desire to modify its status in the region could be facilitated by participation in world projects. A report submitted by the committee of Unification and Foreign Affairs, after a review procedure in the National Assembly, cited the following objectives of Korean military participation in East Timor: "by contributing to regional peace and stability and by efforts for the improvement of democracy and human rights, we can enhance Korea's status and image in the international community."¹²⁸

In sum, Korea's contribution to PK in East Timor can be understood as an attempt to change its image by expanding its role in regional security. The Kim administration's push to join Asian regional organizations was a step toward the ROK becoming a middle power, as was the decision to send the Korean military to East Timor. At the same time, the ROK's commitment to the security of Southeast Asia laid groundwork for a gradual expansion of South Korean economic influence in Asia.¹²⁹ For the Korean government, diplomatic and economic interests preceded consideration of humanitarian assistance for East Timorese. The Korean government's long-term strategy of PK involvement served its own interest while coinciding with the long-term welfare of locals in East Timor.

The South Korean Defense Ministry issued "Guidelines for Organization of ROKBATT to be Sent to East Timor" to Army Headquarters and the Special Warfare Command on 15 September 1999, two days after it tentatively decided to send troops to East Timor. The formation of the forces originally followed the existing formation of a special force battalion, with some added combat support functions.

¹²⁷ Woosang Kim, "Korea as a Middle Power in Northeast Asia," in *The United States and Northeast Asia*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 126.

¹²⁸ National Assembly, Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, *Examination Report of Korea Military Participation in East Timor Multi National Forces* (Seoul: National Assembly, 1999), 3–4.

¹²⁹ Ibid. The Korean government also provided an economic objective for military participation: "Third, after peace is reached in East Timor, we can have a favorable situation to participate in the rebuilding and development of East Timor."

Considering the characteristics of the mission, Army Headquarters added combat equipment, such as armored vehicles, 81mm mortars and so forth. Figure 1 shows the configuration of the troops.




Figure 1. The Composition of ROKBATT (Sangnoksu) to Deploy to East Timor (From: Choi, 2006)¹³⁰

Because the infantry force charged with policing activities was only 200 soldiers, the Sangnoksu force lacked troops in its security and civil-military activities, although it was responsible for controlling a broad area—1,702 square kilometers, 12 percent of the territory of East Timor.¹³¹ In comparison, the Filipino and Thai battalions, assigned control of similarly sized areas, each had 1,000 to 1,200 soldiers.¹³²

The Sangnoksu force completed its deployment to Los Palos, capital of Lautem Province, on 22 October 1999. Before the ROKBATT arrived, much of Lautem had been burnt in revenge for the referendum vote against autonomy because the district was the center of Timorese resistance.¹³³ Los Palos, Lautem’s capital, was the base of the

¹³⁰ Yongho Choi, 121.

¹³¹ Seungho Wui, “Study on the ROK Forces’ Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor” (MA diss., Dankook University, 2006), 87.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ East Timorese Public Administration, Lautem, *Profile of Lautem District March 2002*, ed. Richard Simpson (Dili: East Timorese Public Administration, Lautem, 2002), 6. This document says that “all but two of the traditional houses were destroyed during the period of Indonesian occupation.”

“Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor” (FRETILIN) led by Xanana Gusmao, the current Prime Minister of Timor Leste.

Oecussi district, where the ROKBATT moved after its operation in Lautem, also suffered badly after the referendum in 1999, with more than 90 percent of its buildings damaged.¹³⁴ It is an enclave region located within West Timor, a territory of Indonesia.¹³⁵ Here, unlike in Lautem district, there were ever-present dangers that the TNI or pro-Indonesian militia might permeate the borders. The 5th Contingent of the Sangnoku force had to face such possibilities.

D. THE KOREAN PEACEKEEPING MANDATE IN EAST TIMOR

The UN issued Security Council Resolution 1272 on 25 October, 1999, establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor to which INTERFET officially transferred its authority. UNTAET had a much broader and more complex mission, containing broadly defined mandates to help East Timor sustain independence.¹³⁶ The UNTAET mandate includes the following elements:

- a. To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;
- b. To establish an effective administration;
- c. To assist in the development of civil and social services;
- d. To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;
- e. To support capacity-building for self-government;
- f. To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ “District Profile of Oecussi Enclave,” Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management, <http://www.estatal.gov.tl/English/Municipal/oecusse.html>.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Michael G. Smith et al., 19.

¹³⁷ United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution (1999), S/RES/1272 (1999)*, October 25, 1999, <http://www.laohamutuk.org/reports/UN/UNDocs/1999/SCRes1272.pdf>.

However, the mandate of UNTAET does not clearly specify the activities of military contingents stationed there. With regards to the military operations and activities of the Korean force, PKFH issued several orders—particularly the military operational concept of “oil spot”¹³⁸—but the Korean forces interpreted those as advisory rather than operational instructions.¹³⁹ At the same time, the Korean Ministry of National Defense gave Order 99-4 which included guidelines for the overall operations and activities of ROKBATT in East Timor. Order 99-4 consisted of the following elements:

- a. - Establishing friendly relations with the local population (“winning the hearts and minds”)
 - Implementing placatory activities to gain Timorese trust in Korean force activities
 - Providing as much food and medical assistance as possible
 - Trying actively to restore mutual trust between militia and residents
- b. - Maintaining security and order
 - Limiting activities of the militia by implementing show of force operations with armored vehicles
 - Patrolling and operating checkpoints and lookouts at major hot spots
 - Disarming and demobilizing the militia
- c. - Using force only to protect themselves in response to attack (guideline with respect to self-defense)
 - Following general self-defense guidelines of the UN
 - Not carrying out pre-emptive strikes
 - Not harming the adversary when there is no damage, even in cases of assault

138 Alan Ryan, “The Strong Lead-nation Model in an Ad-hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilize in East Timor,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.9, No. 1, Spring 2002, 26. The “oil-spot” concept is based on the idea of establishing dominance in a key secured area from which surrounding areas are subsequently influenced and controlled as more troops arrived in East Timor.

139 Yongho Choi, 166.

- Refraining from use of arms under any circumstances, as much as possible.¹⁴⁰

The scope of the mandates from the Korean government is clear and specific. Order 99-4 explicitly describes the key concept of Korean force activity as “establishing friendly relations with the local population,” so there is little room for misinterpretation. It gives especially detailed instructions regarding the sphere of “security activity.” The order describes what the Korean force had to do in policing activity—such as patrols, operating checkpoints and lookouts, etc.

With regard to civil-military activity, although Order 99-4 mentioned a general direction—the key concept mentioned above, “establishing friendly relations with local population”—there is little mention of specific activities except for comments about providing food and medical assistance. Due to the lack of specific directions, the Korean force had to contrive implied tasks based on provisions calling for them to gain the trust of locals and to restore mutual trust between militias and residents. In reality, each contingent of the Korean forces applied unique and creative ways of implementing the broadly-defined mandate for civil-military activity.

Contrary to expert recommendations for the content of contemporary mission mandates (as discussed above), the order issued by the Korean government strongly restricts the use of force.¹⁴¹ Another difference between the Korean government’s order and the required contents that most scholars call for is no mention of sustainable development of the post-conflict society.

In sum, the mandate ordered by the Korean government for their forces deployed to East Timor is clear and specific overall. However, it is more clearly defined in security activity and less specifically defined in civil-military activity. With respect to the content of the mandate, the government order does not contain the required elements

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 167.

¹⁴¹ Although most scholars claim that use of force is necessary to restore law and order, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Korean force was restrained by its government’s mandate from using arms even in the case of assault.

of current peacekeeping missions, such as use of force and consideration of sustainable development of a post-conflict society.

E. ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN EAST TIMOR

1. Maintaining Security and Order

It is hard to categorize all activities of the Korean forces in accordance with the mandate regarding security operations. However, when Korean forces activities associated with maintaining law and order are put together, they can be divided as shown in Table 2.

Mandate	Activities
1. Limiting militia's activities by patrols	- Regularly patrolling roads and residential areas - Patrolling countryside with armed vehicles
2. Operating checkpoints and lookouts	- Providing security for diverse facilities - Managing the Junction Point
3. Disarming and demobilizing militia	- Seizing guns and ammunition - Collecting arms by resident report
4. Friendship-building through pacifying psychological warfare (implied by other clauses)	- Releasing militia families and helping them to return home - Participating in the family events of residents

Table 2. Security Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in East Timor
(From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksu forces, 2000–2003)

With respect to activities surrounding security Mandate 1, the Korean force implemented regular patrols of main roads and residential areas. In Lautem province, ROKBATT patrolled roads and residential areas three times a day and its armored vehicles patrolled the four regions on alternate days to police the countryside of Los Palos.¹⁴² At Oecussi, dividing the district into two sub-regions, the ROKBATT carried out policing operations by stationing combat companies in each sub-region.

Following security Mandate 2, ROKBATT provided security for the diverse facilities of the UN, public institutions like hospitals, and a refugee camp. At Oecussi,

¹⁴² Yongho Choi, 170.

the ROKBATT also managed the Junction Point (JP) along the border. While operating five observation posts and patrolling the border, an operation similar to that executed in the Korean Demilitarized Zone, the Sangnoksu force also guarded returning refugees.¹⁴³

There seemed to be somewhat less active involvement of Korean forces under Security Mandate 3. As soon as the Korean force arrived at Lautem, it seized 420 illegal guns and 5,000 rounds of ammunition.¹⁴⁴ This was the only case in which the Sangnoksu force actively followed Mandate 3. The Korean forces did not take active measures regarding disarming and demilitarization, and seemed unprepared to implement those tasks. No training for such operations was done during the preparation period or in training during deployment. Rather than trying to forcibly disarm combatants, the Korean force followed another command concept in Order 99-4—winning the hearts and minds of residents. That is, the Sangnoksu force followed the general direction of activities mandated in the Korean government order even though Order 99-4 did not explicitly order it as a realm of security operation. Nevertheless, the ROKBATT collected many arms caches based upon residents' reports. The 2nd Contingent collected more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition and grenades based on voluntary reports by the Timorese.¹⁴⁵

The Koreans focused on disarming tasks were influenced by another specific mandate—minimizing use of arms under any circumstances. ROKBATT was concerned about disputes in the process of disarmament and avoided them, as demonstrated by the fact that the 1st Contingent did not try to seize the air guns that many residents owned even though the force recognized air guns as a potential security threat.¹⁴⁶ However, the Sangnoksu force encouraged people to register the air guns and then put them under the control of village chiefs.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 187

¹⁴⁴ Ministry of National Defense, "Participation and Outcomes of Peacekeeping in East Timor," *Defense Report*, No. 126, April, 2001.

¹⁴⁵ Youngho Song, *The 2nd Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force* (Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2001), 59.

¹⁴⁶ Inchul Park, *The 1st Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force* (Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2000), 51.

Meanwhile, with respect to security Mandate 4, in accordance with provisions for “restoring mutual trust between militia and residents” and “implementing placatory activities,” the Korean force tried to minimize all disputes, even minor ones in its Areas of Responsibility (AOR). It released militias and their families interned by Lautem residents and helped those who had taken shelter in the Los Palos church return to their homes.¹⁴⁷ The Sangnoksus force held sports matches to promote harmony and goodwill among residents. Sometimes it combined policing activities with friendship-building efforts by participating in local family events like weddings and funerals.¹⁴⁸ To ease the anxiety of Tutuala residents about Indonesian fishing boats near Tutuala beach, ROKBATT stationed troops at the beach for two months. This was not the security mission originally described in the policing operation plan, but the task met residents’ demands. The Korean force also organized a citizen report system to deal with problems in the daily lives of local people.¹⁴⁹

The Sangnoksus force tried to minimize disputes among residents in its AOR. Through its information-gathering activities, each Korean contingent collected and evaluated information regarding the security risk presented by potentially threatening persons, mainly pre-militia members, among residents.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, ROK forces actively sought to minimize potential conflict between malcontents and other residents by periodically patrolling areas of concern and conducting friendship-building activities like soccer matches. For instance, in August 2001, the Sangnoksus force held a volleyball and soccer match for “the unity and harmony of local residents,” a match in which more than 1,000 people participated.¹⁵¹

147 Ministry of National Defense, “Sangnoksus Force, Full-fledged Deployment of Peacekeeping Operation in East Timor,” *Defense Report*, No. 109, November, 1999.

148 Yongho Choi, 185.

149 Ibid., 171.

150 Inchul Park, 52. The intelligence department of the Sangnoksus force created and maintained a table of potentially threatening persons.

151 *TimorToday*, “Soccer and Volleyball Match Held for the Unity and Harmony of Locals,” 16 August, 2001.

The Korean force also mediated the border dispute between Oecussi and West Timor. Due to the differing claims of TNI, PKF Headquarters and local people, the borderline had not been confirmed. To solve this problem, the Sangnoksu force thoroughly searched the whole area near the border to find beacon poles installed by the TNI several decades earlier. They eventually found 150 beacon poles and encouraged the parties to sign an agreement based on the locations of the poles.¹⁵² The force also made unrelenting efforts to keep amicable relations with the TNI through regularly coordinated meetings, friendship activities, and joint patrols.¹⁵³

In summary, ROKBATT mainly followed the mandate of its government to maintain security and order. On the whole, it tried to keep to the specific mandates elucidated in Order 99-4. However, in addition to fulfilling specified mandates for security operations, the Korean force added to its security missions through friendship-building with local people and creating a peaceful atmosphere. It avoided rigid policing under military principles. Importantly, the Sangnoksu force was influenced by the mandate to refrain from use of force as well as the general code of conduct, both specified in Order 99-4.

2. Civil-Military Activities

Each unit, from the 1st to the 8th Contingent, employed continuing and creative civil-military activities, as shown in Table 3.

¹⁵² Jungwoo Rim, "Study on Disputes in East Timor and Korean Military Forces' PKO" (MA diss., Korea University, 2009), 40.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 187

Division		Main Activities and Characteristics
Lautem (Oct 1999 ~ Oct 2001)	1st Contingent	- Security maintenance - Support for the return of internally displaced people - Orphan invitation event and visits to asylums - Humanitarian relief: medical aid, haircutting
	2nd Contingent	- Strengthened coordinating system with UN organizations and NGO - Taekwondo education and Saemaul movement - Humanitarian relief (continued)
	3rd Contingent	- Reconstruction of basic social facilities: roads, bridges, etc. - Humanitarian relief : medical aid, service to the local community - Blue Angel Operation
	4th Contingent	- Various events with the locals populace (movies, sports games) - Blue Angel Operation (continued) - Saemaul movement of 'Homé' village
Oecussi (Oct 2001 ~ Mar 2003)	5th Contingent	- Conclusion of mission in Lautem - Establishment of Korean operations in Oecussi - Multi-functional humanitarian relief thru Blue Angel Operation
	6th Contingent	- Enhancement of friendship with the local populace - Blue Jean Operation: return of military uniforms - Oecussi mini-World Cup
	7th Contingent	- Young people support: Golden-bell challenge - Walking national territory with the local populace - Blue Angel Operation (continued) - Capacity-building education: equipment handling, tune-up
	8th Contingent	- Humanitarian aid and capacity-building education - Taekwondo and soccer education and cultural activities - Preparation for the return to home

Table 3. Civil-Military Operations and Activities of the ROKBATT in East Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksung forces, 2000–2003)

Order 99-4 definitely mentioned only medical assistance and humanitarian relief in the category of civil-military activities. Following Order 99-4, ROKBATT set up a sketchy concept of civil-military activities focused on humanitarian relief, friendship-building, and capacity-building. ROKBATT used some activities to help the local population gain ownership in reconstructing their society and fostering self-reliance, but limitations arose in maintaining continuity and in ROKBATT's ability.

The follow-on contingents did not continue the activities of the previous contingents. Korean force civil-military activities can be divided in the following manner.

Mandate	Activities	
1. Humanitarian relief	- Medical assistance - Infrastructure reconstruction	- Providing relief goods - Blue Angel Operation
2. Friendship-building	- Taekwondo education - Religious activity support - Cultural exchange activities	- Orphan invitations - Haircut service - Blue Angel Operation
3. Capacity-building	- Saemaul movement - School facility remodeling	- Language classes - Computer class

Table 4. Civil-Military Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in East Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksung forces, 2000–2003)

Civil-military Mandate 1 is the specified mission. Civil-military Mandate 2 is the implied mission. Civil-military Mandate 3 is deduced by examining Sangnoksung force activities.

a. Activities by Mandate 1: Humanitarian Relief

The Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations defines “humanitarian assistance” as follows:

Humanitarian assistance mainly stands for emergency, life-saving assistance, providing such as adequate food, water, health care. And it includes “enabling” programs like clearing mines, providing physical security and building or reviving institutions.

“Humanitarian assistance”—short-term and emergency needs—and “development assistance”—long-term economic and social support—should be divided, but these areas overlap. Ideologically, the humanitarian assistance should no longer be needed after a peace accord, but in reality, humanitarian crisis goes on for a very long time so that the humanitarian assistance is frequently required assisting in recovery and reconstruction. Thus, resuscitating a health care system or supporting local efforts to revive elementary school teaching is often comprised in this “humanitarian assistance.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003), 159–168.

Korean forces provided emergency life-saving assistance with health care and relief goods and provided an enabling program by building infrastructure and helping in flood recovery. Providing medical aid was a major civil-military activity of the Korean force. Each contingent was continuously employed, following the specified mandate. The medical corps of the ROKBATT operated a mobile medical clinic from village to village in the Lautem area. At Oecussi, stationed clinics were set up by two company posts. According to Contingent Homecoming Reports, each medical corps of the Sangnoksu force treated an average of 100 to 150 patients per day. The Sangnoksu force distributed many relief goods to the Timorese compared with Portuguese and Thai forces.¹⁵⁵ With the support of several Korean firms, Korean forces delivered daily necessities, clothes, and even children's toys to local people.¹⁵⁶ The 6th Contingent conducted a "blue jeans" operation in which residents' military uniforms could be exchanged for jeans supplied by a Korean company.¹⁵⁷

There have been extensive debates on the military's role in rebuilding social infrastructure in post-conflict societies. Some say that NGOs should cope with such activities because they can respond more quickly to disasters and have neutral intentions.¹⁵⁸ Others argue that the military should participate in infrastructure reconstruction where rapid recovery is required, like repairing roads and hospitals,¹⁵⁹ because peacekeeping forces already in place can undertake reconstruction activities quickly and efficiently.¹⁶⁰

155 Chulhwan Choi, "Analysis of CMA (Civil Military Affairs) Represented on PKO activities in Timor Leste"(MA diss., Kyungbuk University, 2004), 113.

156 Peace Keepers News, "ROK Batt, Supported by Korean firm, held delivering goods in Don Bosco Church," *TimorToday*, Dec 09, 2001, http://www.timoraid.org/v1/timortoday/news/pkf_news_0043.htm.

157 Jongchul Choi, *The 6th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu Force* (Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2002), 127.

158 Garland H. Williams, *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 13.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid.

The *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* notes that building infrastructure and helping in recovery after floods must be regarded as an appropriate military-contingent task in a humanitarian mission if it is an “enabling condition for a functioning peacetime society.”¹⁶¹

Although not a designated mission according to civil-military Mandate 1, as an enabling program in humanitarian assistance, the engineering corps of the Sangnoksu force completed several projects and actively participated in flood recovery. Three bridges were constructed or repaired by ROKBATT at Iliomar and Los Palos.¹⁶² The Tumin Graveyard, a holy place long cherished by local people, was repaired in Oecussi.¹⁶³ Additionally, irrigation canals were constructed on the Tono river, enabling triple cropping for a year at 5,000 hectare of rice per paddy.¹⁶⁴ When Lautem was hit by flash floods in 2000 and 2001, Korean military contingents assisted recovery activities, rescuing isolated people and providing emergency facilities for the homeless. It evacuated 200 Timorese trapped by a landslide, provided aid to flood victims,¹⁶⁵ and built an alternative road between Baucau and Los Palos.¹⁶⁶ The Korean forces also repaired damaged institutions quickly by transporting necessary material from Korea.

b. Activities by Mandate 2: Friendship-Building

Friendship-building was not specified as a civil-military activity within the official mandate. However, it was specified as a general direction of all Korean force activities in East Timor. Developing good relationships with the local population helps

161 Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 159–168. The *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* says of humanitarian assistance that “Recovery assistance does much more than rebuild structures and institutions. It aids in the consolidation of the peace and must help to re-establish the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society.”

162 The East Timor Government, “East Timor Update April 2001,” April 2001, 8. http://www.gov.east-timor/old/news/East_Timor_Update/200104/.

163 Chulhwan Choi, 102.

164 Ibid., 112.

165 Suara Timor Lorosae, “Lautem Hit by Flash Floods,” *East Timor Headlines*, 25 June, 2001, 1.

166 Suara Timor Lorosae, “PKF Build Alternative Road between Baucau and Los Palos,” *East Timor Headlines*, 6 July, 2001, 1.

“alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief communities.”¹⁶⁷ In order to gain the confidence and cooperation of the local population, the Sangnoksu force implemented a variety of friendship activities.

The most nationally characteristic ROKBATT activity was holding Taekwondo classes. The Taekwondo classes were meant to propagate Korean culture to the Timorese through physical and mental training while building a positive relationship with the local people.¹⁶⁸ Taekwondo education was continuously employed throughout most contingents, as shown in the Table 5. The Sangnoksu force even dispatched Taekwondo instructors to the East Timor Military Academy to teach cadets at the Academy’s request.¹⁶⁹

Division	1st unit	2nd unit	3rd unit	4th unit	5th unit	6th unit	7th unit	8th unit
Participants	-	250	1,100	1,062	2,029	1,204	540	323

Table 5. Participants in Taekwondo Classes in East Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksu Units, 2000–2003)

The Sangnoksu force held a monthly orphan invitation event for children who had lost their parents during the war and brought comfort packages to facilities for the underprivileged and disadvantaged every month. It also provided haircut services. For instance, the 4th Contingent offered a haircut service for three months to about 1,000 residents in eight different towns.¹⁷⁰ The haircut service allowed Korean soldiers to collect information about local disputes and friction.¹⁷¹

167 Joint Pub 3–08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), III–16.

168 Yongho Choi, 203.

169 Ibid., 204

170 Peace Keepers News, “UN Forging a Whole New Dimension in Operations called “Eagle’s Eye Operation (EEO),” *TimorToday*, 16 July, 2001.

171 Gichang Kwon, 30.

ROKBATT was also interested in supporting religious activity. Ninety percent of Timorese are Catholic. Most chaplain officers of the Sangnoksu force deployed from Korea were Catholic priests, and they were actively involved in religious support activities.¹⁷² By holding religious services with local Timorese, the Korean troops tried to win the minds of the local people. Father Lim Sung-ho was invited from Korea, and a chapel in the Sepelata region was reconstructed during his visit.¹⁷³

The Sangnoksu force used traditional performances and folk plays of both countries to promote intercultural awareness. ROKBATT integrated with cultural events such entertainment as music by an Oecussi band and dancing. On the occasion of the Football World Cup in Korea and Japan, ROKBATT, with the Japanese Engineer Group (JEG), organized a soccer competition for improving its relationship with locals and for promoting harmony among local populations.¹⁷⁴

The Blue Angel Operation was a comprehensive civil-military operation uniting all activities related to humanitarian assistance and friendship-building. Some civil-military activities with modest beginnings in the early stages of reconstruction developed into the Blue Angel Operation as time went on. Initiated by the 3rd Contingent, this monthly event made the rounds from village to village, providing medical aid, barber service, donation and repair of farming equipment, etc. Friendship-building activities included many cultural and sports exchange events with performances of local songs and dances as well as traditional Korean Samul-nori percussion music. During a garrison tour, Korean soldiers showed pictures and video clips about ROKBATT's activities to enhance the trust of the local community.

c. Activities for Capacity Building

There was no specific mandate for capacity-building in Order 99-4 despite several clauses associating the mission with the UNTAET mandates for development

¹⁷² Gichang Kwon, 31.

¹⁷³ Peace Keepers News, "ROK Batt soldiers receive the sacrament of confirmation and baptism in ET chapel," *TimorToday*, 20 September, 2001.

¹⁷⁴ UNMISSET Spokesperson's Office, "PKF Organizes Soccer Tournament in Oecussi," *United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor*, 18 February, 2003.

assistance, capacity-building, and establishing conditions for sustainable development. Furthermore, there was no consideration of sustainable development in the Korean mandate. However, examining all activities by the Korean peacekeeping contingents shows that several involve capacity-building.

For example, ROKBATT participated in several activities to improve the educational environment and create an academic atmosphere. The 1st Contingent taught English to 2,160 students.¹⁷⁵ The 4th Contingent taught 55 high school students computer usage,¹⁷⁶ the 5th Contingent operated a Korean class three times a week.¹⁷⁷ Contingents 6 through 8 provided scholarships to poor and orphaned students every month.¹⁷⁸ The Sangnoksus force repaired schools damaged by violence, built classrooms, installed chalkboards, and provided classroom materials. Additionally, the Korean contingent along with the United States Support Group East Timor (USGET) repaired several schools damaged by riots.¹⁷⁹ In post-conflict reconstruction, helping a community repair its educational facilities is necessary because “new or refurbished schools send a powerful signal that the times have changed.”¹⁸⁰

To help the Timorese recognize the value of their nation’s territory, the ROKBATT designed and held an “Around Oecussi Field Trip” in which students (one from each of the district’s schools), teachers and NGOs participated.¹⁸¹

175 Inchul Park, 62.

176 Jung-ha Lee, *The 4th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksus force* (Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2001), 112.

177 Inwoo Nam, *The 5th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksus force* (Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2002), 126.

178 Youngduck Kim, *The 7th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksus force* (Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2003), 123–135.

179 Chulhwan Choi, 112.

180 James Dobbins et al., *The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2007), 146.

181 UNMISSET, “East Timor Media Monitoring,” *Asia Pacific Solidarity Network*, 18 Feb, 2003

“Ring the Golden Bell,” a series of quiz competitions, was organized by the Korean force, according to one Korean officer, “to create in Timorese students an enthusiasm for learning.”¹⁸²

Korean peacekeepers from the 2nd through the 4th Contingents undertook a project to encourage sustainable development. The Saemaul Undong project (Korean for “movement to build a new village”) was a Korean government model for rural development used throughout the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁸³ The movement in Korea had several positive outcomes, including rural modernization and improved crop diversification and productivity.¹⁸⁴ Applying the ideas of Saemaul Undong in the Homé village began with the Korean 2nd Contingent.¹⁸⁵ Following on their efforts, the 3rd Contingent also established a bond with the Homé village. Military officers from the two contingents planned the project in conjunction with the Korea Saemaul Undong Center and Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute before deploying to East Timor. However, an officer from the 2nd Contingent says, “It was difficult to lead the participation of the local people and to show visible performance within such a short period of time.”¹⁸⁶ The 4th Contingent renamed the movement the “Homé Community Project” and undertook various programs including digging and maintaining wells and education in organic farming techniques. With income-generating businesses supported by the Korean force, like fish farming, the Homé project in this stage seemed more successful, with increased local participation and a more positive response. During this phase, seven public wells were dug, a poultry farming facility was constructed, and joint funding for the village was raised. Village residents repaired the Homé elementary school with the proceeds from crop sales and help from the Sangnoksung engineering corps.¹⁸⁷ This project was greatly admired by UNTAET, NGOs and other countries’

182 Ibid.

183 Mick Moore, “Mobilization and Disillusion in Rural Korea: The Saemaul Movement in Retrospect,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4, 580.

184 Ibid., 585–592.

185 Youngho Song, 74.

186 Ibid., 75.

187 Jungha Lee, 105–109.

forces.¹⁸⁸ Executive officers and agriculture officers of the UNTAET visited the Homé village and the Civil-Military Affairs Commissioner of the PKF in UNTAET directed public release of a campaign on a national scale.¹⁸⁹

F. ASSESSMENTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN EAST TIMOR

1. Assessment of Korean Force Security Activities

Maintaining law and order was supposed to be the most important task for the Korean force in implementing its peacekeeping mission. Establishing “a secure environment” by providing security is vital because it generates “the conditions for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities,” as the US military’s *Field Manual 3-07.31 Peace Ops* emphasizes.¹⁹⁰ In other words, in order to create a new chance for reconstruction in a war-torn society, “reestablishment of a secure environment” is critical.¹⁹¹ Therefore, a successful security operation was a keystone of success not only for the Korean peacekeeping operation but also for the overall peace operation in East Timor.

In this part of the assessment of ROKBATT’s security operation, the outcome of its activities is defined chiefly by the following factors: crime rates, a perception of security and the rule of law, and peacekeeper casualties.¹⁹² Prior to the deployment of the Korean forces, security concerns in Lautem were serious. According to the UNTAET report on trials for crimes committed in 1999, most of the crimes that occurred during

188 Dongi Sung, “Popularity of Saemaul Movement in East Timor,” *Dongailbo*, December 20, 2001, <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=020&aid=0000104273>. One civil servant in Los Palos said, “We really appreciated the Sangnoksul force for educating us about new farming skills and helping the Timorese have an ownership of their community.”

189 Yongho Choi, 207.

190 U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force, *Peace Ops: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations*, FM 3-07.31, October 2003, p. III-1.

191 George K. Tanham, *War Without Guns: American Civilians in Rural Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 138.

192 Seth G. Jones, *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict* (CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), 8. These factors are referred to in the “Model of Reconstructing Internal Security” in “Establishing Law and Order After Conflict” by the Rand Corporation.

pre- and post-ballot violence—between April and September 1999—took place in the Lautem area.¹⁹³ Also, violent murders of clergy and lay people in Los Palos were reported in Lautem on September 25, just before Korean troops arrived.¹⁹⁴

However, this challenging security situation in Lautem district gradually improved with the deployment of Korean forces. Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that the security situation in Lautem stabilized rather quickly following the arrival of Korean peacekeeping forces. The civilian police report crimes committed in East Timor in 2000 states that only 116 crimes occurred in Lautem, which was 4.4 percent of the total 2,636 crimes committed in East Timor in 2000.¹⁹⁵ This is a fairly low crime rate considering that Lautem includes more than 6 percent of the total Timorese population.¹⁹⁶ Reducing crime is very important in a post-conflict society because “it contributes heavily to building higher levels of generalized trust.”¹⁹⁷ A decrease in level of crime prompts optimism within the society.¹⁹⁸

In addition, the fact that the East Timor Court sentenced ten pro-Indonesian militiamen to imprisonment in the first conviction for past violence also signaled an enhanced security situation in Lautem.¹⁹⁹ If the lingering threat posed by pro-Indonesian militias had been deemed serious in Lautem, the adjudication might have been tempered out of fear of retaliation. On 3 April 2003, Lautem became the first place where the UN

193 The UNTATE, “First Trial for 1999 Crimes Against Humanity Opens in East Timor,” 9 July 2001, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/news/01jul09.htm>.

194 *East Timor Legal News*, “East Timor Crimes Against Humanity 1999 Militia Murders Atrocities,” http://1999horrorsofeasttimor.blogspot.com/2008_05_24_archive.html.

195 The East Timor government, “East Timor Update, December 2000 ~ January 2001,” 11. http://www.gov.east-timor.org/old/news/East_Timor_Update/200012/Eng.pdf.

196 National Statistics Directorate, *Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004* (Dili: National Statistics Directorate and United Nations Population Fund, 2006), 23.

197 Jennifer A Widner, “Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of Severe Conflict,” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 224–225.

198 Ibid.

199 *Toronto Star*, “10 Jailed for Timor Carnage,” December 12, 2001, A23.

turned over police duties to local authorities. The UN announced, “Lautem is the first to be granted such complete security and law enforcement authority by UNMISSET.”²⁰⁰

Lastly, it is undeniable that the high rate of voter registration, 99.3 percent in the 2001 national election in Lautem, was facilitated by the stable environment. The ROK contingents put forth much effort to facilitate the 2001 vote by minimizing security risks with checkpoints, night patrols near the ballot-counting locations, and other security-related efforts.²⁰¹ According to a national survey of voter knowledge, Lautem residents were somewhat positively aware of the security situation in their residential area.²⁰² Relatively speaking, the problem of violence was not a particular concern in the Lautem district.

These results demonstrate that the policing efforts by the Sangnoksu force improved the security situation in Lautem district. Of course, it is hard to say that changes in the security environment were due only to activities of the Korean forces. There were many actors involved, including the UN police. Many complained about the operations of the UN police in East Timor in regard to residential crimes.²⁰³ The same was true in Lautem. In Los Palos, residents complained that gangs of youths prowled at night, intimidating people, throwing stones, breaking into houses, and killing domestic animals. They alleged that “police were unwilling or unable to control this.”²⁰⁴ However, Lautem district was the least criminalized area, as shown by the above-mentioned corroborating figures. It is clear that, in concert with other contingents of the UN, the Korean force contributed to a reduction in violence with its security operation.

In fact, the Korean forces had a fundamental limitation on their policing activities due to the fact that no more than 200 infantry soldiers were responsible for a large

200 *UN News Service*, “Timor-Leste: UN Transfers Security Duties in Lautem District to Local Police,” 3 April, 2003, <http://reliefweb.int/node/122866>.

201 Jungha Lee, 61.

202 *The Asia Foundation*, “East Timor National Survey of Voter Knowledge,” 21. <http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/EastTimorVoterEd.pdf>.

203 Michael G. Smith et al., 445.

204 The UNDP, *Community Development and Local Development Fund* (Timor-Leste: Dili, UNDP Timor-Leste, 2003), 7, www.undp.east-timor.org.

territory. The ROKBATT's activities to maintain security and order were augmented considerably by building friendships with local populations and creating a peaceful atmosphere, in addition to implementing the policing operation specifically mandated in Order 99-4. The effectiveness of the Korean security activities seemed to work. That is to say, ROKBATT's attempts to create a friendly relationship with the local population helped to improve the security situation in the districts in which it deployed.

2. Assessment of Korean Force Civil-Military Activities

a. Assessment of Activities for Humanitarian Relief

Humanitarian relief involves short-term activities that focus on “providing goods and services to minimize immediate risks to human health and survival.”²⁰⁵ In peace operations, this mission is usually assigned to UN relief agencies, donors and NGOs. However, in accordance with the specific mandate by the Korean government, the Sangnoksu force actively participated in this humanitarian relief mission with some support in the form of relief goods sent by the Korean government and Korean firms.

There have been many discussions about how to measure and analyze the impact of humanitarian assistance by international agencies. Three main approaches are generally argued: a scientific approach, a deductive or inductive approach, and participatory approaches.²⁰⁶ However, since “relief interventions are often of short duration capacity and resources are stretched,” many scholars say that it is hard to translate activities of humanitarian relief into measurable indicators which show clear improvements in the analysis of impact.²⁰⁷ This is even more the case in humanitarian relief efforts by a military contingent, given its limited deployment duration in a post-

²⁰⁵ Benita M. Beamon et al., “Performance Measurement in Humanitarian Relief Chains,” *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2008, 5.

²⁰⁶ Alistair Hallam, *Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1998), 82–85. “Scientific approach, which generates quantitative measures of impact; Deductive or inductive approach, which is more anthropological and socio-economic in its methods and approach; Participatory approaches, which gather the views of programme beneficiaries. Participatory approaches are widely recognized as a key component in understanding impact, but have rarely been used in the humanitarian sector.”

²⁰⁷ Humanitarian Policy Group, *Measuring the Impact of Humanitarian Aid: A Review of Current Practice* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004), 3.

conflict area. The Korean force was stationed less than two years at each location, and its relief goods were considerably limited because it was not the principal agent in the humanitarian mission. (Nonetheless, the amount of relief goods supported by the Korean government and firms was the envy of the other military contingents.) Therefore, rather than scientific or quantitative impact indicators, contextual information—information spread via word of mouth—may be used to evaluate humanitarian relief. That is, what was said about Korean force humanitarian assistance and what kinds of changes in the health sector appeared in the stationed regions can help gauge the effectiveness of Korean humanitarian activity.

ROKBATT medical teams likely gave high priority to treating as many patients as possible, as shown in Table 6. Given the poor working environment and the lack of army doctors in ROKBATT—only three military doctors in each contingent—the number of Timorese patients to which the medical team offered medical treatment is a marvel. Its performance records show a significant difference compared with the medical teams of other countries.²⁰⁸ The medical chief of the Australia force raised objections to the big difference in the number of patients treated by the two countries.²⁰⁹ However, the difference was due to the perspective gap between the Australians, who gave weight to capacity-building through teaching medical skills, and the Koreans, who wanted to treat a large number of patients for humanitarian reasons. Since humanitarian relief is a short-term activity, the Korean force’s strategy of trying to cope with many patients is understandable.

Division	1st unit	2nd unit	3rd unit	4th unit	5th unit	6th unit	7th unit	8th unit
Participants	-	150 per day	10,319	4,266	5,942	3,651	4,629	3,009

Table 6. Number of Timorese Patients Treated by Each Contingent (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksung Units, 2000–2003)

²⁰⁸ Chulhwan Choi, 97–98.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

Given the dismal health sector situation in Lautem after the violence following the referendum—“all ten health posts were destroyed, Los Palos hospital was looted and damaged”²¹⁰—the Korean force medical team attached great importance to treating many patients. Lautem district was one of the most severely affected areas in terms of resident health problems. Due to the prolonged wet season, the disease transmission season in Lautem is longer than in any other part of East Timor.²¹¹ A report by the World Health Organization (WHO) in January 2001 shows that Lautem reports the highest number of cases of endemic diseases²¹²—especially diarrhea, upper and lower respiratory infections, and malaria—all of which are regarded as significant health problems in a developing society. To respond, the Sangnoksu force put every effort into taking care of as many patients as possible. This is a positive step toward a better future for many people in need.

It is said that preventing a rise in mortality rates is often the first objective of humanitarian assistance.²¹³ Changes in the infant mortality rate in Lautem district reveal much about the humanitarian relief mission. The infant mortality rate in Lautem decreased by 10.4 percent, from a rate of 115.8 percent in 1996 to 105.4 percent in 2002.²¹⁴ Census data in 2004 record that three sub-districts in Lautem—Los Palos, Lautem, Luro—saw the most rapid decline in infant mortality.²¹⁵ While “mortality is an extremely late indicator”²¹⁶—that is, estimating mortality is not suitable in emergency assessment²¹⁷—the positive figure regarding the health sector indirectly show that, to

210 Andrew Rosser, “The First and Second Health Sector Rehabilitation and Development Projects in Timor-Leste,” *Institute of Development Studies*, November 2004, 3.

211 World Health Organization, *WHO’s Contribution to Health Sector Development in East Timor* (Dili: World Health Organization, 2001), 1.

212 *ReliefWeb Report*, “East Timor: Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin Week 01/2001,” January, 2001, <http://reliefweb.int/node/75227>.

213 Humanitarian Policy Group, *Measuring the impact of humanitarian aid: A review of current practice* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004), 18.

214 National Statistics Directorate, *Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004* (Dili: National Statistics Directorate and United Nations Population Fund, 2006), 84.

215 Ibid.

216 Humanitarian Policy Group, 18.

217 Ibid.

some extent, the medical activities of the Sangnoksu force contributed to the humanitarian assistance sector within the overall peace operation in East Timor.

With only 18 members, including three military doctors, the Korean medical corps faced some limitations, especially in coping with tropical diseases. Lautem had the highest incidence of malaria and Oecussi had relatively high levels.²¹⁸ One Homecoming Report mentions the absence of a medical specialist trained in this category of diseases. The Korean forces had to seek the help of the United States Support Group East Timor (USGET) to cope with malaria.²¹⁹

Medical activities by the Korean force were very well received by Timorese residents. One emergency case received a very positive response by the local community, when a Korean medical team saved the lives of two pregnant women by driving six hours round-trip in inclement weather.²²⁰ The cooperative health services provided by Medicos Do Mundo Portugal (MDMP) and the ROKBATT were accepted as the main health services agency in Lautem.²²¹

The Blue Angel Operation to support those whose homes were inundated by big floods in 2001 had a positive reputation among the local people. Through this civil-military operation, ROKBATT provided relief goods, medical aid, and more.²²² These humanitarian activities by the Korean force were spotlighted by UN PKF Headquarters as successful cases of civil-military activity.²²³

With respect to infrastructure reconstruction, the Korean forces' involvement in flood recovery deserves positive evaluation. The Korean peacekeeping force made great efforts to offer humanitarian assistance in a difficult situation.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Jongchul Choi, 132–133. “In order to treat patients with malaria and high fever, the Sangnoksu force participated in the Joint Medical Support Activity with USGET in August 2002.”

²²⁰ *Yonhap News Agency*, “Medical Emergency Response by the Sangnoksu Force,” December 11, 2001. <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LPOD&mid=etc&oid=001&aid=0000119316>.

²²¹ East Timorese Public Administration, Lautem, *Profile of Lautem District March 2002*, ed. Richard Simpson (Dili: East Timorese Public Administration, Lautem, 2002), 17.

²²² *TimorToday*, “Korean Deliver Relief Goods to Flood Victims: ROK Batt Carries out Blue Angel Operation for Submerged Village,” October 7, 2001.

²²³ *TimorToday*, “Peace Keepers Soaring High with Civil Military Activities,” September 18, 2001.

Participating actively in many recovery constructions efforts and demonstrating a superior work rate, the engineering unit of the Sangnoksus force was favorably spotlighted, compared with less capable Pakistani and Bangladesh engineering units.²²⁴

In truth, the Korean force was inadequate, poorly equipped and had limited capabilities for such tasks. The Sangnoksus force was sent on a “peace enforcement” mission rather than a “peace-building” mission when it first deployed. Thus, ROKBATT consisted chiefly of infantry. It had only one engineering company comprised of 46 soldiers. Furthermore, some equipment was not appropriate for construction activities in post-conflict East Timor. One Homecoming Report points to the need for multifunctional compact construction equipment rather than military engineering equipment.²²⁵ On the one hand, some of infrastructure building activities were hardly to be regarded as enabling program in the aspect of humanitarian assistance, especially building a horse racetrack in Oecussi by the 6th contingent. There has been little necessity to use the force’s precious assets and efforts to construct such a facility.

In summary, the specific mandated humanitarian activities were relatively successful. Although the medical team had limited capability for handling some tropical diseases, it helped lessen severe health conditions during the initial post-conflict period. However, with regard to unmandated tasks—especially rebuilding infrastructure—it is hard to say that the forces were successful. The Sangnoksus force played a limited role in post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction due to its lack of personnel and equipment.

b. Assessment of Friendship-Building Activity

The Sangnoksus force conducted diverse civil-military activities in friendship-building and cross-cultural understanding. Occasional one-time events were held by each contingent to invigorate communication and foster informal relationships with the local population.

²²⁴ Michael Smith et al. 137.

²²⁵ Sajin Kim, 109.

Increasing the closeness and cross-cultural awareness between intervener and recipient is recognized as an important factor in a peace operation. Several scholars argue that a positive relationship with the local population is decisive for a successful mission.²²⁶ Whalan claims that the power of a peace operation is dependent on the recognition achieved by local actors.²²⁷ Others note that sustainable development of a local society is possible only when harmony with the local population accompanies the operational and tactical aspects of the peace operation.²²⁸ Even though friendship-building activities and a solid connection with local cultures seem critical to the success of peace operations, an empirical link has not yet been clearly presented.²²⁹ Therefore, narrative resources which describe the locals' perception of the Korean force and local cooperation with Korean force activities are used as indicators.

With vigorous efforts by all contingents of the Korean force to teach Taekwondo, the popularity of the sport boomed, not just in Lautem and Oecussi. Taekwondo became popular throughout East Timor, and the national East Timor Taekwondo championship was among the Independence Day events in May 2002. Taekwondo classes were held to propagate Korean culture through physical and mental training and to build positive relationships.²³⁰ A UNTAET headquarters spokesman described the effects of Taekwondo classes on relations with locals:

226 Marianne Heiberg, "Peacekeepers and Local Populations: Some Comments on UNIFIL," in *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations, and Prospects: The Lessons of 40 Years of Experience*, ed. Indarjit Rikhye et al. (London: Macmillan, 1990), 148.

227 Jeni Whalan, "The Power of Friends: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 5, 2010, 628.

228 Maren Tomforde, "How Much Culture is Needed? The Intercultural Dilemma of the Bundeswehr in ISAF," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, No. 4, August 2010, 526.

229 Robert A. Rubinstein et al. "Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 4, August 2008, 543.

230 Yongho Choi, 203.

How can human beings connect even without the lack of a common language? The children barely know a word of Korean. Their taekwondo teacher has nothing more than a bare-bones understanding of Tetum and Bahasa Indonesia. Yet both sides have broken the language barrier. Outside the classroom, a soldier and a young Timorese are engaged in an animated conversation. There is that familiar hodge-podge of words and gestures. Suddenly both explode in laughter. “When you talk to friends, maybe you don't need the same words.”²³¹

Taekwondo became a regular subject at the Timorese Military Academy, and many Timorese martial art experts fostered by ROKBATT became Taekwondo instructors. Taekwondo is now one of the sports programs aimed at reducing violence among street gangs, with 700 young children from East Timor participating.²³²

There were no reports of disputes between Korean soldiers and local populations in incident data from the headquarters of the PKF. This was not true for other countries’ forces. There were gender incidents involving local women and Jordanian forces.²³³ Furthermore, Timorese residents showed a cooperative attitude in several friendship-building events when local bands played and people performed their traditional dance, Tebe-Tebe. Residents in Luro invited the Sangnoksu force to a play performed by 40 Timorese students as a token of gratitude for the Koreans’ enthusiastic local activities.²³⁴ The fact that residents voluntarily reported concealed arms and ammunition also demonstrates the extent to which the Sangnoksu force succeeded in winning the support of locals.

There is other evidence of successful friendship-building. The East Timor news reported that the Sangnoksu force received big applause from local residents and those in the Laga region cheered, “Viva Korea!” for the Korean forces’ civil-military activities.²³⁵ The Timorese Prime Minister eulogized Korean force activities, saying that

231 Lynn Lee, Public Information Officer of the UNTAET, “Rules of Communication,” *The Year in Review in 2001*, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2001/Asia_countries/East_timor.htm.

232 Peace and Sports, “Locally-Based Projects in Timor Leste,” <http://www.peace-sport.org/timor-leste/locally-based-projects-in-timor-leste.html>

233 Jungha Lee, 138.

234 Inchul Park, 78.

235 *TimorToday*, “Korean Battalion Provides Support to ET Defense Force,” June 20, 2001.

“ROKBATT played a very visible and positive role.”²³⁶ The Lautem local government named a street in downtown Los Palos “Lua Maluku Korea” (Friend Korea Street²³⁷) while Oecussi residents built a memorial park to commemorate five Korean peacekeepers who died on PKF duty.²³⁸

Such friendship-building activities are acknowledged as significant for preventing the recurrence of conflict and avoiding disputes between peacekeepers and recipients.²³⁹ As noted above, the districts where the Korean forces were deployed recorded a relatively low residential crime rate, and there were few disputes between Korean peacekeeping soldiers and locals. Activities aimed at friendship-building helped peacekeepers and recipients overcome cultural and ethnic differences. Overall, ROKBATT’s activities for friendship-building and cross-cultural understanding, which were mandated as a general guideline for all its activities and its code of conduct, worked successfully.

c. Assessment of Capacity-Building Activity

In a peacekeeping operation, capacity-building activities are related to development assistance—“long-term economic and social support.”²⁴⁰ Homecoming Reports say the Korean force implemented activities to help the educational environment and the Saemaul Undong project for capacity-building.

Capacity-building helps local people to “increase their capacity to meet their community’s needs [and] engage new opportunities.”²⁴¹ The development strategy of the intervener is to fulfill the local people’s needs and offer them new chances to

236 Marcia Poole, “ROKBATT Bids Farewell to Timor-Leste: ‘We Say Good-bye to Friends Who Have Given Their Best’,” *UNMISSET Press Release*, 21 October, 2003.

237 Ministry of National Defense, “Praise and Thanks to Evergreen Unit Soldiers,” *Defense News*, Vol. 115, May, 2000.

238 Juro Cho, “Cultivating a Field of Peace in Conflicting Area,” *Defense Daily*, 23 October, 2003.

239 Robert A. Rubinstein et al., 543.

240 Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 166.

241 Faculty of European Studies and Regional Development. “*In search of more sustainable capacity development*” (Workshop presentation given at Fulbright Workshop at Slovak University for Agriculture, 2009), slide 6.

develop their community. There can be no sustainable peace without development in post-conflict situations. The World Bank emphasizes local ownership and indigenous capacities with respect to capacity-building and sustainable development in a post-conflict society.²⁴² That is, capacity-building is meant to help people and communities manage change themselves over many years following the conflict.

To evaluate the capacity-building activities of the Korean force, two critical concepts of post conflict development are utilized, ownership and sustainability.²⁴³ Capacity-building activities are assessed to see if they helped the locals gain local ownership, whether the activities were continued by the next contingent and lasted when the force left, and whether the activities had a long-term impact on social development.

The Sangnoksu force's education activities were not conducted continuously by all contingents. When each contingent was relieved of duty every six months, most education activities were not handed over. Education activities tended to be one-time events, and some were unnecessary or did not meet a community need. According to 2004 census data, both Lautem and Oecussi had a relatively rates of illiteracy rate, over 60 percent compared with a national average of 54 percent.²⁴⁴ More importantly, Lautem and Oecussi residents had the least ability to use the official languages, Tetum and Portuguese. In these districts, more people used Indonesian and local languages than the official languages.²⁴⁵ Using an official language is significant, especially in a post-conflict society, because it is an important means for people to gain a sense of national unity and social integration.²⁴⁶ Also, the official language can become

²⁴² Andrew McGregor, "Development, Foreign Aid and Post-Development in Timor-Leste," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2007, 155.

²⁴³ W. Lambourne, et al. "Peacebuilding Theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Implications for Non-UN Interventions," *Global Change, Peace and Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2008, 280.

²⁴⁴ National Statistics Directorate, *Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004*, 72.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 70; Timor Leste Ministry of Finance, *Final Statistical Abstract: Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards 2007* (Timor-Leste: Dili, National Statistics Directorate, 2008), 27.

²⁴⁶ Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nationbuilding and the Need for Inclusive Governance," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July/August 2006), 584–585.

a central point of patriotism.²⁴⁷ However, inappropriately, the Korean forces tried to teach English (and even Korean) to local people without deliberating on what was really needed by the Timorese.

For developing countries, fulfilling children's developmental capability and providing satisfactory educational opportunity is very important.²⁴⁸ Especially in countries with a large proportion of young people, national development is greatly influenced by improvement in their ability.²⁴⁹ The Korean force held events like quiz competitions and speech contests. According to one Korean officer, these were meant "to create in Timorese students an enthusiasm for learning."²⁵⁰ However, there was no consistency or continuity in such activities during the Korean deployments; these events ended every six months when new contingents arrived. The educational activities were one-time events in which each contingent honored its achievements without long-term considerations. This indicates that, for the military, an unclear mandate cannot guarantee consistent activities.

The Saemaul Movement was the most remarkable project among the various activities of the Korean force in East Timor in terms of building post-conflict social capacity. As noted above, this project received great marks from NGOs, local governments and local populations. The Homé Project had good intentions, with the Sangnoksu force reaching out for local participation and encouraging ownership of the project. However, good intentions do not always produce the expected results. This was the case with the Homé Project, mainly due to limitations in its sustainability and ownership.

First of all, the voluntary participation of residents was extremely limited. Even though the project produced some small changes in ownership, having to do income generation based on crop sales, in most project activities, residents just followed the

247 Ibid., 577.

248 Sally Grantham-McGregor et al., "Child Development in Developing Countries," *The Lancet*, Vol. 369, January 6, 2007, 60.

249 Ibid.

250 UNMISSET, "East Timor Media Monitoring," *Asia Pacific Solidarity Network*, 18 February, 2003.

village leader's instruction, with encouragement from the Korean force.²⁵¹ Local participation in the decision-making process is important for building legitimacy and creating ownership.²⁵² This process was absent in the Homé Project, and the ROKBATT was aware of it. The Homecoming Report of the 4th Contingent suggested the need to encourage women's associations or young adult groups to carry out the project by themselves.²⁵³ But this did not happen.

Another problem is that the project did not last long after the Korean force moved to the Oecussi district in December 2001, partly because it did not achieve local ownership. "Sustainability is the result of local ownership."²⁵⁴ It would be very difficult to give the locals ownership of the project within the six-month rotation of each contingent. As the literature notes, "[P]ost-conflict ownership may not only be difficult to achieve, but also inherently problematic," given the fact that "local ownership is why conflicts emerged in the first place."²⁵⁵

However, there is a more important reason for the failure. The Homé Project was not passed on effectively to other institutions, NGOs or the local government. The 5th Contingent proposed cooperation with the Korea Saemaul Undong Center for continuation of the Homé Project,²⁵⁶ but there was friction between the Ministry of National Defense and the Saemaul institution. Although the Korea Saemaul Undong Center implemented other projects in East Timor from 2002 to 2003, they were not connected to the Homé Project. The institution implemented its own projects in different regions in Lautem—Somoxo, Sika and others—but even those activities were on hiatus

251 Jungha Lee, 109.

252 Jeni Whalan, "The Power of Friends: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 5, 2010, 633.

253 Jungha Lee, 109.

254 Lambourne, W et al. 280.

255 Benjamin de Carvalho et al, *Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia* (Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2011), 5.

256 Inwoo Nam, 30.

after 2004.²⁵⁷ Additionally, they bypassed local institutions, so there was little cooperation with local government.²⁵⁸ Several projects by the Korea Saemaul Undong Center, as well as the Sangnoksus Homé Project, could not be continued due to limited collaboration with Timorese governmental institutions.

Saemaul Undong seemed like a good model project for reconstruction of the post-conflict rural communities of East Timor because it incorporates many necessary concepts of local capacity-building, such as ownership, a bottom-up approach, follow-up support, and an incentive program.²⁵⁹ Currently, 70 developing countries have imported the concepts of the Saemaul Movement.²⁶⁰ However, in East Timor, efforts to seed this concept by the Korean force failed. Obviously, this was due to the disregard of project sustainability by the intervener—not the Sangnoksus force, but the Korean government—as shown in the mandate. The Korean government mandate did not enunciate specifics regarding capacity-building and sustainable development. Also at fault was the Korean force’s inability to implement the project appropriately. It was not well trained to implement such a mission and it was not the task of the military, but of other institutions—NGOs and donor institutions.

Overall, capacity-building activities by the Korean forces resulted in failure. No mandate or a vaguely articulated mandate for such a mission could not yield good fruit. Although the Korean force tried to teach the Timorese how to catch fish, it

257 “International Activities: East Timor,” Korea Saemaul Undong Center, http://saemaul.com/english/international_act_easttimor.asp. Mostly, they were development support programs—for example, building a community center in Somoxo, a farming tool supply in Sika, and a power generator supply in Bauro.

258 Alastair J. McKechnie, “Building Capacity in Post Conflict Countries,” *World Bank Institute*, No. 5, March 2004, 1~2. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDRC/Resources/CDBrief05.pdf>. “Donors are often tempted to bypass weak government capacity and rebuild the country themselves, that is, contract services directly and provide assistance in kind. This strategy appears most attractive when government institutions are demonstrably weak, skilled nationals are in short supply, and fiduciary systems to ensure money goes to intended purposes are poorly or not at all developed.”

259 Edward P. Reed, “Is Saemaul Undong a Model for Developing Countries Today?” (paper presented to the International Symposium in Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of Saemaul Undong, Seoul, Korea, September 30, 2010), 13. <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SaemaulUndongReedSept2010FINAL.pdf>.

260 Andrei Lankov, “Saemaul Undong Sets Model for Developing Countries,” *The Korea Times*, April 16, 2010. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/11/291_64301.html.

did not know how to attract and to cooperate with necessary local actors. The method for teaching the local population how to fish was not precisely mandated.

G. CONCLUSION

This chapter examines the Korean government's mandate and the Korean forces' activities according to the mandate, divided into two major sections: security activity to restore and maintain order; and civil-military activity. The security operation of the Korean force and its result are summarized in Table 7.

Mandate		Activity	Evaluation
Scope	content		
Clear	Restriction of "use of force"	- Missions mostly followed the mandate - Accompanied by friendship-building activity	Success

Table 7. Security Operation of the Korean Force and its Results in East Timor

The Sangnoksu force mostly followed the mandated security tasks in Order 99-4 as written. Influenced by the general direction in the order, the force accompanied security activities with friendship-building activities. Due to the clause which strongly restricted the use of force, the Korean force tried to implement its security mission without disputes with locals. The evidence confirms several positive results in the security situation resulting from the Korean force activities.

Civil-military activity and its results are summed up in Table 8.

Division	Mandate		Activity	Evaluation
	Scope	content		
Humanitarian assistance	Clear	Little consideration for sustainable development	- Specified missions by mandate - Accompanied with infrastructural reconstruction (unclearly specified mandate)	Relative success
Friendship-building	Less clear		- Not exactly specified for civil-military activity - But specified as general direction of overall activity	Success
Capacity-building	Ambiguous		- Mission with no elucidated mandate	Failure

Table 8. Civil-Military Activity of the Korean Force and its Results in East Timor

Overall, civil-military activity was less specifically defined in Order 99-4 than the security mission. The Korean force's activities for humanitarian assistance were a relative success considering that this mission was a short-term activity set in motion during the initial period following conflict. However, it was limited in addressing rebuilding of the infrastructure, which was not mandated by the governmental order.

Friendship-building activities were successful in overcoming cultural differences and attaining cooperation from the locals. Although this mission was not christened as a civil-military activity, friendship-building was mandated by another clause directing general objectives and the code of conduct.

On the other hand, the Sangnoksu force's activity for capacity-building was not successful. There was no clear mandate from the Korean government for such a mission, and the mandate contained no clause regarding deliberation for long-term development of post-conflict Timorese society. Not unexpectedly, therefore, the Korean force did not implement this mission continuously. Also, the force was not suitably trained and prepared to fulfill such an implied mandate. As a result, it did not convey ownership to the local people and the project was not sustained after the Korean force left.

In conclusion, the case study of the Korean peacekeeping mission in East Timor indicates the following: for military peacekeeping contingents, the troop-contributing government should mandate clearly and specifically the terms of the mission's scope; it should include a mandate to refrain from the use of force; and should contain a specific mandate regarding sustainable development if its force is supposed to implement such a mission.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. ASSESSMENT OF A KOREAN COMBAT BATTALION IN LEBANON

A. INTRODUCTION

The tenuous cessation of major violence made possible by the presence of the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL I was shattered on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah levied war against Israel by launching rockets into Israeli territory. Israeli forces entered the war with their overwhelming naval, air and land attacks. Intense fighting, in which 1,187 Lebanese and 160 Israelis were killed, continued until August, 2006.²⁶¹ In response, the UN decided to strengthen the UNIFIL force and asked member states to contribute their military forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1701.

After the request by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the Roh Moo-hyun administration agreed to dispatch Korean forces to Lebanon on November 8, 2006. The Roh government announced the following rationale for participation in the peacekeeping operation: “As a member of international society and holding the honorable status of a country that produced a Secretary-General of the United Nations, we have a duty to aid in the fulfillment of the mission of the UN. Also, through contributing to peace in the Middle East with UNIFIL, we expect to use this chance to improve relations with Arab countries.”²⁶²

The Korean National Assembly approved the motion on December 22, 2006, and the Dongmyeong (“Light from the East”) force of 360 troops was organized in June 2007. As the fifth peacekeeping-operation mission in Korean history, the Dongmyeong force began its peacekeeping mission in July. This was the second overseas deployment of Korean combat troops, the first being its peacekeeping in East Timor. A motion for extension of the Dongmyeong force’s mission passed in July 2008, and the force remains in Lebanon today.

²⁶¹ UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Background,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml>.

²⁶² National Assembly, Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee, *Examination Report of Korea Military Participation in Lebanon PKO* (Seoul: National Assembly, 2006), 4.

This chapter examines the Dongmyeong force's peacekeeping operation in the same manner as the chapter on East Timor, and also provides a comparison of the two cases. This chapter first discusses the Lebanon peacekeeping mandate assigned to the Korean force. Then, activities of Korean forces in Lebanon in accordance with mandates are examined, divided into security activity and civil-military activity. Finally, the successes and failures of the peacekeeping operation are assessed in light of the scope and content of the mandate.

B. THE LEBANON PEACEKEEPING MANDATE ASSIGNED TO THE KOREAN FORCE

Following the two-month war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Security Council issued Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006. The UN announced that the resolution “has significantly enhanced UNIFIL and expanded its original mandate.”²⁶³ Subsequently, UNIFIL was strengthened from 2,000 to 15,000 troops. Resolution 1701 is composed of the following elements:

- a. Monitor the cessation of hostilities
- b. Accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the south, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon
- c. Coordinate these activities with the governments of Lebanon and Israel
- d. Extend assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons
- e. Assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area
- f. Assist the government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel.²⁶⁴

263 UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Mandate,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml>.

264 United Nations, *Security Council, Resolution (2006), S/RES/1701 (2006)*, August 11, 2006. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml>.

This resolution clearly defines the scope of the military contingents' missions as "monitoring hostile actions in the Blue Line; supporting and assisting LAF to prevent armed personnel, assets and weapons from flowing into the region between the Blue Line and Litani river; and humanitarian assistance."²⁶⁵ However, the resolution is vague with respect to use of force.²⁶⁶ In other words, although the clauses listed above called for a traditional peacekeeping operation under Chapter 6 of the UN charter, the materiel and arms of the military contingents did not match the equipment necessary to implement the Chapter 6 mission. This is mainly due to the vague meaning of one sentence in Resolution 1701:

UNIFIL is to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces...to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment...to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.²⁶⁷

The robust rule of engagement bred deep distrust among Southern Lebanese.²⁶⁸ Some military contingents tried to enforce their own "proactive interpretation" of the mandate, which resulted in peacekeeper casualties from a roadside car bomb.²⁶⁹ Even though Resolution 1701 is specific in its scope of the security mission for the most part, its mandate on use of force is not clear.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ronald Hatto, "UN Command and Control Capabilities: Lessons from UNIFIL's Strategic Military Cell," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 190. "France deployed 13 AMX Leclerc heavy tanks (54 tons), 35 AMX 10P light-tracked armored combat vehicles, Mistral man portable anti-aircraft missiles, four 155 mm AUF1 self-propelled tracked howitzers, and a Cobra counter-battery radar system."

²⁶⁷ United Nations, *Security Council, Resolution (2006), S/RES/1701 (2006)*, 3–4.

²⁶⁸ Karim Makdisi et al., "UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East," *EuroMeSCo*, No. 76, 2009, 25.

²⁶⁹ Karim Makdisi, "Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the 'War on Terror'," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011, 16. "Spanish and French contingents, in particular, faced local protests as they attempted to impose their own proactive interpretation on the UNIFIL mandate by searching homes aggressively for illegal weapons. However, following a roadside car bomb in June 2007 which killed four Spanish peacekeepers, UNIFIL troops as a whole retreated to their bases and they have largely adopted a much less aggressive posture in southern Lebanon."

The Korean government gave several orders to the Dongmyeong force regarding the general direction of its activities in Lebanon. For example, on 5 November 2007, the Korean Chiefs of Staff issued the “Dongmyeong Force General Operation Guideline.” However, they restricted access to specific contents of the mandate. The Korean force’s operation under UNIFIL is a current military operation. In such cases, mandates issued by governmental institutions—the Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff—are treated as confidential materials. However, based on missions and activities of the Dongmyeong contingents delineated in Homecoming Reports and the fact that the Korean force is mandated to follow general directions of the UNIFIL mandate, one can deduce the mandates followed by the Korean contingents. As of February 2012, ten Korean contingents have been deployed in UNIFIL. Identification of their likely mandates is based on my analysis of the activities of five Dongmyeong contingents, using the 1st and 2nd Contingents’ reports for identifying initial period activities; the 4th and 5th Contingents’ reports for intermediate period activities; and the 8th Contingent’s report for current activities. The results are shown in Table 9.

Mandate on Security Activity	Mandate on Civil-military Activity
1. Surveillance patrol/ Operate checkpoints	1. Humanitarian assistance
2. Counter-intelligence operation/ Operate EOD team	2. Friendship-building
3. Support and Cooperation with LAF	3. Capacity-building
4. Enhancing positive relations with local populations/ Refraining from any activity likely to aggravate the relationship with locals	

Table 9. Mandate from the Korean Government for Peacekeeping Operation in Lebanon Deduced from Reports of Force Activities

According to one Homecoming Report, security operations by the Dongmyeong force mainly followed the guidelines of UNIFIL Headquarters and the command of the UNIFIL Western Brigade.²⁷⁰ The Korean government likely ordered the Dongmyeong

²⁷⁰ Woong-gun Kim, *The 1st Contingent Homecoming Report: Outcomes and Lessons of Dongmyeong Force* (Seoul: Korean Lebanon Peacekeeping Force, 2008), 130.

force to follow the general guidelines of UNIFIL Force Headquarters. Mandates 1 and 2 follow from clause “a” of the UNIFIL mandate. Mandate 3 follows clause “b.”

One fact clearly identified throughout Homecoming Reports is that the Dongmyeong force does not distinguish its security activities from its efforts to give a good impression to local residents. All the Korean contingents have thought that the success of their security operation could be achieved by building a positive relationship with local society, not just by a rigid military operation following mandates calling for maintaining law and order. Thus, one clear mandate from the Korean government regarding security activity is an instruction to enhance positive relations with local populations and to refrain from any activity that might aggravate the relationship with locals—that is, Mandate 4. This is similar to the East Timor peacekeeping mandate from the Korean government, which ordered the Sangnoksus force to establish friendly relations with locals as the first clause in Order 99-4.

Compared with the Sangnoksus force case in East Timor, the Dongmyeong force was not given specific orders in its security activity. In East Timor, the Korean government named the scope of its forces’ security activities one by one.²⁷¹ On the other hand, the Korean government appears to have ordered the general direction of civil-military activity because all the Homecoming Reports mention the same clear objective: to “build a pro-Korean mindset by promoting projects the locals want; win popularity from the residents; and, by both of which, ensure the safety of troops.”²⁷² Seeing that most activities for humanitarian assistance and friendship-building have been implemented continuously throughout the deployment of all the contingents, it appears there is a clear mandate for these two categories, Mandates 1 and 2. But the mandate for capacity-building is not clear, given that activities associated with capacity-building were not continued by subsequent contingents and that every contingent, without exception, held a project information session for village representatives and local government officers soon after their arrival.

²⁷¹ See the Order 99-4 and Table 2. Security Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in East Timor.

²⁷² Gyeongsik Park, *The 8th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Dongmyeong Force* (Seoul: PKO Center, 2011), 67.

We can see that mandates for civil-military activities were composed almost the same as in the East Timor case. This means that the Korean government's general directions for civil-military activities have not changed in the last ten years,²⁷³ as demonstrated by the figures for forces activities in the field. The difference in the Lebanon case is probably that both Mandate 1 and 2 are clearly stated by the Korean government.²⁷⁴ However, Mandate 3 continues to be less defined.

In terms of the content of the mandate, it seems the Korean government did not clearly direct activities regarding the use of force except for an instruction to follow UNIFIL's rule of engagement. This is a salient point, and differs from the governmental direction in East Timor where the use of force was very restricted. The Dongyeong force was equipped with armored vehicles, 81mm mortars, and heavy machine guns, as were other military contingents from NATO countries. This is different from the East Timor peacekeeping case in which the Sangnoksu force withdrew its mortars with the 1st Contingent's return, while the MNF replaced the UNTAET.

However, one implied mandate from the Korean government, Mandate 4, applies at the advisory level. It seems likely that it orders the Dongmyeong force to refrain from hasty action in applying the UNIFIL rule of engagement. Mandate 4 is a contradictory one, compared to the directions included in Resolution 1701—"Commanders may take all necessary and appropriate action in self-defense, including preemptive self-defense in cases where there is adequate evidence that hostile units are committed to an immediate attack."²⁷⁵ In this context, there is an element of uncertainty in judging the content of a mandate regarding "use of force." As in East Timor, the Korean government mandated using force as little as possible in Lebanon.

There was likely no consideration of sustainable development of the post-conflict society in the Korean government mandate, as with the East Timor case. This is at

²⁷³ During those ten years, Korea dispatched medical and engineer units to Afghanistan and Iraq under the MNF, and a division-sized Korean force was deployed in Iraq from 2003–2008 under the MNF.

²⁷⁴ See Table 8. In the East Timor case, Mandate 1 was clearly defined, but Mandate 2 was less specific.

²⁷⁵ Thom Shanker, "Trying to Avoid the Perils of Peacekeeping," *New York Times*, 19 August, 2006.

variance with both from scholarly consensus on the required contents of peacekeeping mandates and the UNIFIL mandate. Interestingly enough, as a lesson learned, the 8th Dongmyeong Contingent claimed the need for a long-term perspective in conducting civil-military activities.²⁷⁶

In short, it is difficult to judge the scope of the security activity mandate from the Korean government except for the clearly identified Mandate 4. In terms of civil-military activities, the Korean government's mandate defines more in the area of humanitarian assistance and friendship-building, but defines less in the area of capacity-building. With respect to the content of the mandate, it can be said that the Korean government order still did not contain a required element of current peacekeeping missions—consideration of sustainable development. And somewhat equivocally, the Korean government advises minimum use of force.

C. ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN LEBANON

1. Security Activities of Dongmyeong Force

The Dongmyeong forces' security activities can be divided as shown in Table 10.

Mandate	Activities
1. Surveillance patrol / Operating checkpoints	- Patrols for observation around Litani River - Patrols for presence in refugee camps and main roads - Patrols for contact in Lebanese villages - Operate checkpoints at entry point to Litani River.
2. Counter-intelligence operation / Operating EOD team	- Collect information through contacts with residents. - Gather geographical intelligence - Detect IEDs in AOR
3. Support and Cooperate with LAF	- Conduct combined operations and joint tactical discussions with LAF - Implement goodwill activities and donate materials.
4. Enhancing positive relations with local populations/ Refraining from any activity likely to aggravate the relationship with locals	

Table 10. Security Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in Lebanon
(From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011)

²⁷⁶ Gyeongsik Park, 89.

Activities following security Mandate 1 are the most important security mission. The Dongmyeong force was responsible for reconnaissance and surveillance missions around the Litani River through which illegal personnel and arms enter the Southern Lebanon region.²⁷⁷ To fulfill the first mandate, the ROKBATT implemented observation patrols with armored vehicles with which it surveilled for Entry Points (EP) near the river. It also ran a checkpoint on the Litani Bridge according to directions from UNIFIL Headquarters. The 8th contingent operated a guard post on EP #28 to enhance the task.

In three refugee camps—Qasmieh, Shabriha, and Jal Ek Baher—the Korea force patrolled to demonstrate its presence as a peacekeeping force to illegal paramilitary groups hiding in the refugee camps. However, since the UNIFIL mandate restricted patrol tasks to monitoring hostilities, the Dongmyeong force most likely employed only passive actions without contacting refugees. This response was also greatly influenced by its own government's Mandate 4. On the other hand, the Korean force tried to actively apply contact patrols by patrolling Lebanese villages on foot and contacting residents directly. This was because Korean peacekeepers regard such patrols as a means to positive relations with local populations. The patrols increased the frequency of contact with local residents.²⁷⁸ Korean peacekeepers implement contact patrol, considering it as one of civil-military activities.²⁷⁹

Contact patrols are also a major activity in fulfilling security Mandate 2. The Korean force maintains a list of residential collaborators, and the number of people on the list increased the longer the Dongmyeong forces were stationed there. Using direct contact with residents to collect regional information, the Dongmyeong force identified the Hezbollah's efforts to construct a communication line and reported it to UNIFIL

²⁷⁷ Hussein Dakroub, "Security Worries Escalate in South," *The Daily Star*, 13 December, 2011. The UNIFIL Force Commander stressed the importance of this mission in his speech, saying, "One of the most important provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 is to ensure that there are no armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River."

²⁷⁸ Namsik In, *Implications and Challenges of Korean Peacekeeping Troops in Lebanon* (Seoul: Institution of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2007), 17.

²⁷⁹ Chan-Ock Kang, *The 2nd Contingent Homecoming Report: Outcomes and Lessons of Dongmyeong Force* (Seoul: Korean Lebanon Peacekeeping Force, 2008), 120.

Headquarters.²⁸⁰ Additionally, the Korean force employed an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team which implemented over one hundred Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) detecting operations on average per contingent.

Mandate 3 is an order to support and assist the LAF's military control of Southern Lebanon under the UNIFIL mandate. The ROKBATT fulfilled this mandate by participating in several joint military operations with the LAF, including a Coordinated Patrol Operation (CPO) and a Counter Rocket Launching Operation (CRLLO). However, the Dongmyeong force supplemented these tasks with efforts to create a positive relationship with LAF. With the necessity for frequent base changes due to military stabilization operations all over Lebanon, the LAF has poor facilities. The Korean force tried to fulfill security Mandate 3 by providing LAF forces with various materials and through good will sports activities as shown Table 11.

1st Contingent	- Donating vehicles (13 SUVs) - Supplying electronics (computer, washer)	- Sporting apparatus - Road pavement
2nd Contingent	- Constructing military amenities	- Constructing water supply
4th and 5th Contingents	- Remodeling LAF Operations Center - Supplying electronics (computer, Washer)	- Generators
8th Contingent	- Donating vehicles (bus and SUV)	- Building communication network

Table 11. Donations from Korea forces to LAF
(From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011)

The security Mandate 4 directly or indirectly influenced all the security activities of the Korean forces. Homecoming Reports show that the Korean peacekeepers were very cautious in their behavior when they met local populations because disharmony with residents could endanger the efforts of the military force and even the lives and safety of the peacekeepers. In implementing contact patrols, excessive activity to acquire information was taboo in the Korean force.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 117.

The force did not try to contact people in the refugee camps. Furthermore, the security Mandate 4 had an impact on Mandate 3 as well, as the Korean forces tended to rely on material donations and friendship exchanges with the LAF.

In its missions related to maintaining security and order, ROKBATT chiefly kept the mandates elucidated in UNIFIL mandate. However, while following the UNIFIL mandates, the Korean implementation was probably greatly influenced by specific directions from the Korean government—that is, Mandate 4. In common with the East Timor case, it put more emphasis on fulfilling the governmental mandate first, although the Dongmyeong force was not ordered by its government to conduct overall security tasks. This is clearly demonstrated by the influence of Mandate 4 in implementing other security mandates. As with East Timor case, both Korean peacekeeping forces conducted their security missions along with efforts at friendship building with local societies while refraining from use of force.

2. Civil-Military Activities of Dongmyeong Force

The Dongmyeong force's civil-military activities are shown in Table 12.

Mandate	Activities
1. Humanitarian assistance	- Medical aid activity/Angel Gabriel Project
2. Friendship-building	- Taekwondo classes - Resident invitation events
3. Capacity-building	- Computer and Korean classes - Supporting local government institutions - Residents' Long-Cherished Project
4. Enhancing positive relations with local populations/ Refraining from any activity likely to aggravate the relationship with locals.	

Table 12. Civil-Military Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in Lebanon (From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011)

a. Activities by Mandate 1: Humanitarian Assistance

Following Mandate 1 for humanitarian relief, the Korean force vigorously implemented medical aid activity. Soon after deploying to Lebanon, the 1st Contingent increased medical aid services to four times a week and the consultation hours of the medical team to six hours a day.²⁸¹ The 8th Contingent of the Dongmyeong force provided medical services even on weekends. Veterinarians deployed with the Dongmyeong force took care of livestock, a service welcomed by residents. Furthermore, the Korean force helped the Lebanon government establish a Blood Bank in Tyre.²⁸² To date, the medical team has treated more than 30,000 patients, out of a population of 50,000, along with 6,100 livestock in outreach efforts to local villages.²⁸³

In providing relief, the Dongmyeong force distributed medical wheelchairs, hearing aids, crutches and other medical equipment for disabled and special needs children under the name of the Angel Gabriel Project.²⁸⁴ The project was introduced by the 5th Contingent and received positive publicity from the local news media.²⁸⁵ Following these first efforts, the Korean forces continued the project with the support of a private Korean medical firm.²⁸⁶ The Korean force in Lebanon actively carried out humanitarian assistance under the civil-military affairs Mandate 1 as specifically ordered by its government.

As in East Timor, ROKBATT in Lebanon also actively participated in humanitarian assistance, focusing on emergency life-saving assistance involving health

281 Woong-gun Kim, 163. The Italian Battalion—which had charge of the region before deployment of the Korean force—implemented its medical aid service twice a week, 4 hours a day.

282 Ghinwa El-Deek, “In Blood as in Peace,” *Al Janoub: UNIFIL Magazine*, No. 11, January 2012, 13. <http://unifil.unmissions.org/>.

283 Philip Lglauer, “Lebanon Celebrates 68th Independence Day,” *The Korea Times*, November 27, 2011.

284 *Yonhap News Agency*, “Dongmyeong Force Donates Medical Equipment to Locals,” September 20, 2009. <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/>.

285 Mohammed Zaatari, “UNIFIL's Korean Troops Aid Children with Special Needs,” *The Daily Star*, October 03, 2009. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Oct/03>.

286 Gwongu Lee, “Kyeongnam Medical Company Assists Drug for Dongmyeong Force Peacekeeping in Lebanon,” *Yakup News*, January 13, 2012. <http://www.yakup.com/news/>.

care services and provision of relief goods.²⁸⁷ Unlike the case in East Timor, where the Sangnoksu engineering unit constructed bridges, roads, and even irrigation canals, the engineering unit of the Dongmyong force did little infrastructure reconstruction. There likely was a different direction given by the Korean government for participating in such enabling programs. Under Mandate 3, capacity-building, the Dongmyeong force helped the locals reconstruct their facilities.

b. Activities by Mandate 2: Friendship-Building

Friendship-building is the mandate most emphasized by the Korean government and in all the Homecoming Reports. The Dongmyeong force determined that activities for friendship-building were the key element in achieving the objectives of overall civil-military activities. It was referred to as the “Korea Effect.”²⁸⁸ Although there was somewhat of a difference in terms of clarity in the scope of the mandate, the Dongmyeong force attained the objectives in similar ways in East Timor.²⁸⁹

As in East Timor, the Korean force continuously used Taekwondo classes to build positive relationships with the local people. Taekwondo classes were first run in three villages and were expanded to five villages in response to local demand. Korean peacekeepers now instruct an average of 250 children every year.²⁹⁰ To date, 56 martial-art experts have been fostered by ROKBATT.

The Korean force organized several invitational events to cultivate friendship between peacekeepers and local residents. In these events, the two parties participate in goodwill sports matches and cultural exchanges while performing traditional dances and sharing traditional foods. The Dongmyeong force concludes with

²⁸⁷ As noted in Chapter III, the terms ““emergency life-saving assistance” and “enabling program” come from the *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping*.

²⁸⁸ Jinsub Cho, “Variety of Civil Operations Elevate the Status of the Korean Force, *Defense Journal*, Vol. 452, August 2011, 9.

²⁸⁹ In the East Timor case, friendship-building was not specified in civil-military activities in the mandate, but specified as a general direction of all Korean force activities. In other words, it was less clearly mandated in East Timor.

²⁹⁰ Suckho Ahn, “Becoming Popularity in Taekwondo and Korean Classes in Lebanon,” *Segye Ilbo*, July 19, 2011. <http://www.segye.com/>.

a “brotherhood ties” ceremony, which signified a declaration of fraternity.²⁹¹ These events were started by the 1st Contingent, and subsequent troops have organized similar events every month in different villages. For the purpose of friendship-building, ROKBATT also invites residents to weekly showings of the latest films.

The Dongmyeong force also carries out the “Inviting Korea” event. As part of a goodwill exchange program, every Korean contingent invites Lebanese officials and students to Seoul in hope of promoting a pro-Korea mindset.²⁹² Two Lebanese mayors in AOR attended the inauguration of the Korean President,²⁹³ and a popular Lebanese singer was named an honorary ambassador for the Republic of Korea UNIFIL force and appeared on a widely-viewed Korean TV program.²⁹⁴ These activities are intended to promote a pro-Korean attitude, and this objective is clearly identified in Homecoming Reports.

c. Activities for Capacity-Building

As with the East Timor case, there is no elucidated mandate for capacity-building from the Korean government, nor is there any consideration for sustainable development of the local society. However, after examining all activities throughout the Korean peacekeeping contingents and categorizing them based on the nature of the activities, one can organize capacity-building activities of ROKBATT in the manner shown in Table 13.

²⁹¹ *The Daily Star*, “South Korean Peacekeepers Reach Out to Locals,” July 29, 2007. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/Oct/29>. Currently, the Dongmyeong force has established bonds with all five villages in its AOR.

²⁹² Sung-ki Jung, “Lebanese Students Invited for Cultural Tour,” *The Korea Times*, January 29, 2009.

²⁹³ *Yonhap News Agency*, “Mayors of two Lebanese Cities to Visit South Korea,” February 22, 2008.

²⁹⁴ *The Daily Star*, “Kassis Honorary Envoy for Korean UNIFIL,” August 26, 2008.

Division	Capacity-Building Activities		
1st Contingent	- Building bridges/paving roads (2 places) - Construction of village sewage treatment plant - Construction of senior community center and children playground (2 villages) - Improving medical facilities (4 villages) - Remodeling school facility and government office		
2nd Contingent	- Paving roads /maintaining village street (4 places) - Donating garbage trucks - Constructing village park - Supporting orphanage	Operating computer/Korean language classes	
4th Contingent	- Installation of sewing class (4 villages) - Donation of wastebaskets and garbage trucks - Paving roads (2 places) - Constructions town square and gymnasium	Operating sewing classes	
5th Contingent	- Installation of water purifiers (16 places) - Installation of village rest areas (21 places) - Installation of bench (126 places) - Expansion and maintenance roads (2 places) - Construction of a soccer field - Remodel of government office - Donation garbage trucks		
8th Contingent	- Construction of water treatment plant - Construction of agriculture factory - Construction of village sports park - 'Korean Road' project		

Table 13. Capacity-building Activities of Korean Contingents in Lebanon
(From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011)

Based on its own judgment that supporting the educational environment is significant for the development of the local society and that targeting the young and vulnerable would quickly impact of civil-military activity,²⁹⁵ the Dongmyeong force implemented several projects related to education. To date, it has assisted in remodeling of 15 of the 17 schools in its AOR. In those projects, the force has provided computers, desks, chairs, and school supplies with the support of Korean firms.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵ Chan-Ock Kang, 91.

²⁹⁶ Hong-guk Oh, 233.

The 2nd Contingent equipped computer and Korean-language classes in five villages, and currently nearly 400 Lebanese have completed the courses.²⁹⁷ The force also ran a scholarship program for students in financial need.²⁹⁸

One of the most focused programs of the Korean force was a local development program named “Residents’ Long-Cherished Project,” for which over five million dollars was spent as of 2011.²⁹⁹ This program implements a locally desired development project. To do that, every Contingent held a meeting to hear what the locals needed from local officers and village leaders. Unlike in East Timor, where the Korean engineering unit constructed parks, roads, and other facilities, the Dongmyeong force tried to construct projects with a local construction company after competitive open bidding. Most of the activities associated with the project involve road paving, donation of wastebaskets and garbage trucks, construction of parks and the like. Additionally, through a sewing class and agriculture factory project, the Dongmyeong force has worked to create jobs and increase incomes for residents.

Under the Residents’ Long-Cherished Project, the Korean force supported the local government which suffered from poor facilities due to lack of funding.³⁰⁰ To improve the poor situation of Lebanese governmental organizations, the Korean force improved aging facilities and built town halls and squares. It also donated office equipment, including computers, printers and copiers, to help cover local governments’ administrative needs.

The Korean force in Lebanon employed similar educational projects as in East Timor under Mandate 3, while trying to improve educational environments and operating computer and Korean classes. However, the Saemaul Project was not used in Lebanon. Instead, the Dongmyeong force introduced the Saemaul Movement to local leaders and university students in its invitational events—invitations to the force base and

²⁹⁷ Jinsub Cho, 8.

²⁹⁸ Mohammed Zaatari, “South Korea UNIFIL Soldiers Pay Student’s Fees,” *The Daily Star*, November 4, 2011.

²⁹⁹ Jinsub Cho, 9. The Korean force invested over 5.1 million dollars overall for the Residents’ Long-Cherished Project.

³⁰⁰ Hong-guk Oh, 237.

even to Seoul. These were somewhat passive measures compared to the active, participatory schemes of the Sangnoksu force in the Homé Project. As an alternative, Korean peacekeepers contributed to local infrastructure reconstruction by promoting the Residents' Long-Cherished Project. However, as in the East Timor case, these activities were not continuously implemented by follow-on contingents and such projects were not connected with one other. It appears this is due to ambiguous governmental mandates in regard to this capacity-building sector.

D. ASSESSMENTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN LEBANON

1. Assessment of Korean Force Security Activities

Evaluating the effectiveness of the security activities of the Dongmyeong force in its AOR is not easy. Unlike Korean peacekeeping operations in East Timor, where the force took charge of an entire district, the Dongmyeong force has controlled small portions of the Southern Lebanon district as one of several military contingents in the UNIFIL Force. This means actions by the Dongmyeong force have limited connections to the security situation of the province. The force's main security mission was not policing, but just observation. Therefore, it is hard to say that the security situation in the Southern Lebanon, especially the major southern city of Tyre, results from security activities of the Dongmyeong force.³⁰¹

However, it can be said that the force's security activities overall, along with those other diverse UNIFIL contingents have not been positive. Since the beginning of UNIFIL II in August 2007, terrorist acts and conflicts have continued around Tyre. An attempt to destroy a UNIFIL patrol vehicle on October 2007 failed due to a technical problem in the bomb's detonator.³⁰² More recently, there were three terrorist attacks in

³⁰¹ The Korean force is taking charge of a small northern portion of Tyre city and its countryside, including the five villages of Abbasiyah, Shabriha, Tair Debba, Borj Rahhal, and Bourghliyah.

³⁰² Hani M. Bathish, "Judge Charges 10 Suspects in Plot to Attack UNIFIL," *The Daily Star*, October 17, 2007. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Oct/17/>.

November and December 2011 in Tyre.³⁰³ This shows that illegal arms and personnel—mainly terrorists in refugee camps and local gatherings—continue to flow into the region through the Litani River and other routes. That is, a crucial security mission of UNIFIL was not effective. Although the 5th Korean Contingent installed lampposts to enhance its observation mission in EP #28 (the Kasimia Bridge, a must-pass place for entering southern Lebanon) there is a fundamental limitation in implementing this mission effectively. With an average of more than 10,000 vehicles passing over the Kasimia Bridge every day, it is not feasible to identify a suspected terrorist vehicle, as one Homecoming Report admits.³⁰⁴

In spite of this, there is some positive information regarding the results of a security operation by the Korean force. There have been no terrorist attacks at the villages where the Dongmyeong force is in charge. According to Lebanese local news, the Dongmyeong force is the only UNIFIL military contingent which can conduct its diverse activities without the protection of a LAF escort.³⁰⁵ This reveals to some extent the effectiveness of the Korean force security activities in its AOR. In addition, no Korean peacekeeper casualties have been reported since deployments began over 4 years ago.³⁰⁶

These facts all attest to the success of Korean force security activities strongly influenced by Mandate 4. As noted above, the Dongmyeong force emphasizes positive relations with locals and the LAF while conducting its security missions. In fact, such a specific mandate from the Korean government likely contributed to the relative success of the Dongmyeong force security mission. Southern Lebanese leadership speeches attest

303 A warehouse and a restaurant were destroyed by an explosion on November and December 2011. Also, five French peacekeepers were wounded by IEDs. *CNN*, “Bomb Wounds French Peacekeepers in Lebanon,” December 9, 2011. <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-09/middleeast/>; Mohammed Zaatar, “Activists Hold Solidarity Gathering, Condemn Attack on Tyre Restaurant,” *The Daily Star*, December 31, 2011.; Chana Ya'ar, “Explosion Rocks Hizbullah Weapons Warehouse,” *Arutz Sheva*, November 23, 2011. <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150026>.

304 Wangyun Yeom, 196.

305 *LBCI News*, “Korean UNIFIL troops a ‘Godsend’ for residents in the South,” October 24, 2011. <http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news>.

306 Overall fatalities of UNIFIL are 292 to this date. In the second session of UNIFIL (July 2007 to present), 13 peacekeepers died in the discharge of their duties. UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Commemorates International Day of UN Peacekeepers,” <http://unifil.unmissions.org/>.

to this. At a meeting to discuss the attack on Irish peacekeepers, Tyre's mayor complimented the Dongmyeong force activity, saying that "Special and close ties have been built among the Korean troops and Southerners, and we are proud to have built ties with peace-loving individuals."³⁰⁷

Since the Dongmyeong force manages only a small portion within the Southern Lebanon district (and therefore few statistical resources, like crime rates, are relevant to describing the security situation), it is hard to find a causal connection between quantitative data regarding the security situation and the Korean force's activities in regard to just "observing" law and order. However, residents' positive perceptions of the security activities of the Dongmyeong force influenced by Mandate 4 help the Korean peacekeepers conduct their mission with lessened concern for personal safety. Such an approach might even mitigate negative local attitudes toward UNIFIL forces.³⁰⁸ UNIFIL Force Commander Major-General Alberto Asata Cuevas emphasizes the importance of close cooperation with local residents, organizations and the LAF in enhancing security measures.³⁰⁹ The Dongmyeong force activities in this spectrum help to maintain a secure environment in its AOR, even if not in the overall Tyre region. The UNIFIL Commander evaluated the Dongmyeong Contingent as an exemplary peacekeeping force that was achieving positive recognition from LAF and residents.³¹⁰

To sum up, the evidence cannot demonstrate that efforts by the Dongmyeong force have improved the security situation, given the ongoing conflicts in the region and the force's operational limitations in dealing with the challenging security environment. The UNIFIL force has had difficulty helping the LAF manage conflicts in the region, so its security operation cannot be called a success. Indeed, conflicts in Lebanon are most influenced by internal and external political and diplomatic situations involving diverse

307 Mohammed Zaatari, "Local Authorities Meet with UNIFIL to Discuss Attack," *The Daily Star*, January 15, 2008.

308 Many residents recognized the Korean force as just one among the US allies when it first deployed there. However, they now regard Korean peacekeepers as their friends and brothers, according to several interviews with local residents. Ung-suk Ko, "Local Lebanese 'Dongmyeong force is Our Brother'," *Yonhap News Agency*, June 29, 2010.

309 Hussein Dakroub, "Security Worries Escalate in South," *The Daily Star*, 13 December, 2011.

310 *Yonhap News Agency*, Third Anniversary of Dongmyeong Force in Lebanon," July 18, 2010.

stakeholders, like domestic political parties and Hezbollah (backed by Syria and Iran³¹¹) rather than by effective security operations of UNIFIL forces. In this context, judging the success or failure of Korean force security activity is difficult. However, to the extent that Korean peacekeepers have successfully allayed local mistrust of peacekeeping activities and boosted residents' hopes for the security situation, the Dongmyeong have gained at least limited success in the security mission in its AOR. Such success is obviously greatly impacted by Mandate 4.

As in the East Timor case, the limited success of the security mission of the Korean force in Lebanon results from its friendship-building efforts coupled with its security activities.³¹² Although the Korean government only specifically ordered Mandate 4, it is clear that the mandate had a dramatic influence on other security missions. This suggests that even though governmental mandate offers condensed direction, the peacekeeping forces were more focused on fulfilling its governmental mandates. This yielded more positive outcomes when the mandate was specifically stated.

2. Assessment of Korean Force's Civil-Military Activities

a. Assessment of Activities for Humanitarian Relief

Given the post-conflict environment with large displaced populations and exposure to communicable diseases, short-term relief and assistance by peacekeeping contingents is necessary.³¹³ Lebanese living in the Southern district were subject to insufficient medical facilities and difficult conditions created in the last two decades.³¹⁴ In response, the Korean force has tried to reach as many patients as possible with its

311 Nadim Shehadi, "Futile Victory," *The World Today*, Vol. 64, No. 6, June 2008, 13.

312 As described in the previous chapter, despite limitations on policing activities stemming from the limited number of soldiers responsible for a large area, the Korean force in East Timor had positive results in its security operations, making up for its weakness by building friendships with local populations and creating a peaceful atmosphere.

313 Hugh Waters et al., *Rehabilitating Health Systems in Post-Conflict Situations* (Helsinki: United Nations University, 2007), 2–3.

314 Hong-guk Oh, "The Republic of Korea Armed Forces' Civil Operations in Lebanon," *Military History*, Vol. 73, December 2009, 228.

medical services, in the same way as the Korean medical unit did in East Timor. Recently, the Korean medical team in Lebanon provided 40,000 residents with medical checkups.³¹⁵ This is praiseworthy, given that the number of residents in its AOR is about 50,000. Active response by the Korean force to immediate health needs is also an essential step toward post-conflict rehabilitation of the health sector.³¹⁶

However, beyond the number of patients treated, it is necessary to check whether the medical activity of the Korean medical team was appropriate for improvement of local health conditions. According to research by experts in the World Health Organization (WHO), one of most significant health problems in countries recovering from war is “the growing numbers of people with illnesses such as high blood pressure and diabetes.”³¹⁷ This was true in Lebanon.³¹⁸ To deal with this problem, the Korean medical team tries to help as many patients as possible with these categories of health problems. Sixty-five percent of the patients treated by the Dongmyeong medical unit suffer from high blood pressure and diabetes.³¹⁹ When these accomplishments are compared with the East Timor case, the Dongmyeong force can be proud of themselves and the Korean government. In reality, the medical unit in East Timor faced limitations in dealing with the health problems of the local society, especially tropical diseases, and the medical unit had to seek the help of other international institutions. However, this is

315 *The Daily Star*, “South Korean UNIFIL Provide 40,000 Checkups,” January 13, 2012. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/>.

316 Hugh Waters et al. They suggest three steps for health sector rehabilitation in post-conflict society: “(1) an initial response to immediate health needs; (2) the restoration or establishment of a package of essential health services; and (3) rehabilitation of the health system itself. These three approaches should operate synergistically and as part of a continuum.”

317 *The Daily and Sunday Express*, “Health Alert on Post-conflict Areas,” January 1, 2012. <http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/292951>.

318 In Lebanese society, chronic and degenerative diseases became more prevalent. Diabetes and hypertension affected respectively, 13 and 26 percent of the adult population. Centre for Administrative Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, *Welfare in the Mediterranean Countries: LEBANON* (Italy: C.A.I.MED., 2005), 15. <http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/9383.pdf>.

319 *KBS World*, “S. Korean Unit in Lebanon Treats 20,000th Patient,” May 3, 2010, <http://world.kbs.co.kr/>.

different in Lebanon, perhaps because of the Korean forces' accumulated experience in medical aid services in post-conflict societies.³²⁰

Medical activities by the Korean force are well received by Lebanese residents. Many residents wait in line to get medical service every morning.³²¹ In recognition of these medical efforts, local residents gave the Dongmyeong force a special nickname, "God Sent."³²² The medical efforts by the Dongmyeong force are successful in that they took proper actions to deal with initial post-conflict health problems.

b. Assessment of Friendship-Building Activity

The friendship activities of the Korean force can be assessed by residents' evaluations about how they felt toward the activity of the UNIFIL force in their region and how they perceive South Koreans. Since the activity of the Dongmyeong force has been an ongoing operation for only four years, it is hard to evaluate locals' long-term perceptions of the Korean force. However, its current reputation among residents as expressed in news articles is positive. Rather, the local society sees the Korean peacekeepers as kind-hearted, generous people who suffered a similar difficult security situation. They call the Korean force their "brothers and congenial friends."³²³ As for the most well-known Korean activity, a local news station reports that Taekwondo training is in public favor throughout the south of the country, helping build bridges with the local population.³²⁴ The number of Taekwondo students increased throughout the villages, creating the need for training space in local municipalities. Taekwondo has been included in regular education courses at the Lebanese Military Academy since

320 The Korean medical units continuously participated in diverse overseas missions in post-conflict societies. They were deployed at Iraq, Western Sahara, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The Ministry of National Defense, "Activities of Korean Forces Out of Korea," <http://www.peacekeeping.go.kr/>.

321 Ung-suk Ko, "Local Lebanese 'Dongmyeong Force is Our Brother'," *Yonhap News Agency*, June 29, 2010.

322 *LBCI News*, "Korean UNIFIL Troops a 'Godsend' for residents in the South," October 24, 2011. <http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news>.

323 Ung-suk Ko, "Local Lebanese 'Dongmyeong Force is Our Brother'," *Yonhap News Agency*, June 29, 2010.

324 Jihad Siqlawi, "South Korean UN Troops Kick up Taekwondo Storm in Lebanon," *Agence France-Presse*, April 18, 2008.

2009.³²⁵ Active cooperation of residents and local authorities reflects successful friendship-building through Taekwondo education.

Friendship-building is well documented in community stories. A local news outlet reports that the Korean contingent has successfully wooed inhabitants with its variety of services.³²⁶ Local residents think that the Korean peacekeepers believe that peacekeeping success is achieved by building close ties to the local society. A Lebanese local news source says that the Dongmyeong force made “a qualitative leap in relationships” with locals and the force has the most outstanding achievement among the various UNIFIL efforts.³²⁷ Additionally, locals appreciate that the Koreans try to understand their culture and to get close to them as friends.³²⁸

Although it is too early to speculate on a long-term outcome, the Korean force is gaining in terms of friendship-building. It has implemented various friendship activities throughout all its contingents under the clearly stated Korean government Mandate 2. Compared to the East Timor case, the Korean government mandate about friendship-building in Lebanon is much more clearly defined.³²⁹ This clear mandate on friendship-building has produced quite quick positive outcomes. Indeed, the evidence confirms that residents had a positive reaction from as early as 2008 with the projects of the 2nd Contingent.

c. Assessment of Capacity-Building Activity

The diverse development programs of the Korean force received a very positive reputation from the local society, calling the Korean peacekeepers a “present

³²⁵ Suckjong Lee, “Dongmyeong Force Invites Lebanese Military Cadet for Friendship,” *Defense Daily*, September 8, 2009.

³²⁶ Amal Khalil, “Celebrating Seoul in South Lebanon,” *Alakhbar*, December 22, 2011. <http://english.al-akhbar.com>.

³²⁷ *LBCI News*.

³²⁸ Chungsin Jung, “Dongmyeong Force’s Success in Achieving Peace and Winning the Mind,” *Munhwa Ilbo*, June 1, 2008.

³²⁹ As discussed in Chapter II, friendship building was offered as a general direction of civil-military activities in East Timor.

bestowed by God” and changing a street called “Maraka” to “Korean Road” as thanks to the Dongmyeong capacity-building activities and to memorize the positive relationship between the two parties.³³⁰

Aside from these encouraging words, capacity-building activities in post-conflict societies should be evaluated by the two critical concepts of ownership and sustainability. For example, local firm began several construction projects after competitive open bidding, and sewing classes and construction of an agriculture factory were intended to help local populations gain ownership. These projects might indicate that ROKBATT has promoted activities in the proper direction, meeting the objective of development activity in a post-conflict area. Yet, many other projects were implemented to promote Korean products and some were not appropriate to the local environment. For instance, a donated garbage truck shipped from South Korea was unusable because it did not match the garbage collecting system in Lebanon.³³¹

The Korean force started the Residents’ Long-Cherished Project with the aim of creating a pro-Korean mindset under Mandate 4, rather than to fulfill Mandate 3. In other words, while activities under Mandate 3 were supposed to increase the capacity-building of the local society when classified according to the nature of the activity, the Dongmyeong force did not have such recognition. This is likely due to the vagueness of the Korean mandate and a failure to clearly define the objective of these activities. Except for the 8th Contingent, most Dongmyeong Contingents explain in their Homecoming Reports that they conducted development programs to promote a pro-Korean mindset. It is likely that there is no consideration of sustainable development for post-conflict society in the Korean government mandate. Most of the Residents’ Long-Cherished Projects were begun to meet the expectations of residents, not the Korean force’s own judgment, and were pursued without serious long-term consideration of

330 Sisoo Park, “Unit Sparks Hallyu in Lebanon,” *The Korea Times*, July 18, 2011.
<http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/>.

331 Hong-guk Oh, 235.

sustainable development. Therefore, the projects are not distributed properly in accord with village population proportions, as pointed out by the 5th Contingent.³³²

Owing to troop shifts, many projects are short-term, and many local residents realize that programs are severed every six months.³³³ In other words, there was little interconnection of development programs between the Korean contingents. It also seems that residents just want somebody to get a program accomplished rather than take responsibility for development themselves. It can be said that the Dongmyeong force's capacity-building activities have not suitably promoted ownership.

These somewhat negative results might be anticipated by referring to the case of East Timor where a vague governmental mandate regarding capacity-building did not result in many positive outcomes. However, the Korean government did not objectively evaluate the results of East Timor peacekeeping. This is surely due to the government's lack of appropriate standards for assessing peacekeeping operations. Likewise in Lebanon, the unclear capacity-building mandate not only failed to guide consistent activities among the successive Sangnoksung contingents, but also has not had positive results. However, the 8th Dongmyeong Contingent began to recognize these problems, itself a positive development.³³⁴ The issue is whether the Korean government also recognizes the problems and will order a new, more concrete mandate regarding capacity-building. Given that the Korean peacekeeping operation in Lebanon is a current operation, long term results may take a while.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter examines mandates assigned to the Korean force in UNIFIL and its activities according to the mandate, comparing them with the East Timor case discussed in Chapter III. The security operations and results are summarized in Table 14.

³³² Wangyun Yeom, 243.

³³³ Gyeongsik Park, 89.

³³⁴ Presently, ROKBATT in Lebanon implements its capacity-building activities in accordance with three objectives: a "Welfare Life-up Project" to improve the quality of residents' life, the "Clean Water Project" to promote hygiene and health of residents, and a "Korean Memorial Project" to promote the role of the Dongmyeong Force in Lebanon in the long term. Jinsub Cho, 7.

Mandate		Activity	Evaluation
Scope	content		
Uncertain/ Clear in Mandate 4	Advised minimum “use of force”	- Mostly followed the UNIFIL mandate - Accompanied by efforts to reach a positive relationship with locals under Mandate 4	Equivocal But limited success

Table 14. Security Operation of the Korean Force and its Results in Lebanon

The Dongmyeong force mostly followed the UNIFIL mandates in implementing security tasks, except for Mandate 4. Therefore, it is difficult to judge whether the scope of the mandate from the Korean government is clear. However, the Korean force activities are intensely influenced by Mandate 4. As in East Timor, ROKBATT in Lebanon employed friendship-building efforts alongside its security tasks. In terms of the mandate's content, the Korean government probably advises applying the UNIFIL rule of engagement in limited circumstances. This differs slightly from the Korean government's strong restrictions on use of force in East Timor. In both case studies, the Korean government hesitates to mandate use of force, to protect vulnerable people and even the armed force itself.

Given continuing violence and conflict in the northern part of southern Lebanon, it is hard to say that Korean force security operation produced successful outcomes. In its own AOR, the security activities of ROKBATT are a partial success although it is too early to judge the long-term results. There are so far no peacekeeper fatalities in the Korean force's AOR. Only a few conflicts, and no terrorist attacks, have been reported there. Under the influence of Mandate 4 and a mandate for minimum use of force, the Korean force has changed residents' perception of UNIFIL security activities in the area.³³⁵ Although it is not as explicit a success as the East Timor case, the Dongmyeong force's security activity has had some limited success.

³³⁵ Lebanese believed that the UNIFIL force was secretly passing information to Israel. This was different in the Korean force's AOR, where residents waved their hands at Korean UNIFIL peacekeepers and their armored vehicles. Tae-Hoon Lee, "Inconvenient Truth about Korean Troops Abroad," *The Korea Times*, August 8, 2011. See also, Sungho Jung, "Plant a Peace in Lebanon," *KBS News*, August 23, 2009. <http://news.kbs.co.kr/world/2009/08/23/1832986.html>.

Civil-military activity and its results are presented in Table 15.

Division	Mandate		Activity	Evaluation
	Scope	content		
Humanitarian assistance	Clear	Little consideration for sustainable development	- Vigorous efforts in medical aid following a clear mandate	success
Friendship-building	Clear		- Diverse activities to promote Pro-Korean mindset following clear mandate	success
Capacity-building	Vague		- Employing projects to meet residents' demands	failure

Table 15. Civil-Military Activity of the Korean Force and its Results in Lebanon

With respect to humanitarian assistance and friendship-building activities, more clearly mandated by the Korean government than in the case of East Timor, it is clear that they made the grade. The medical aid of ROKBATT, an important initial activity in post-conflict humanitarian relief, achieved desirable results, treating nearly 80 percent of residents and dealing with ailments requiring attention in the community. The Korean force's experience providing medical services in post-conflict societies is clearly reflected in the Korean mission in Lebanon, and friendship-building activities have both a pro-Korean mindset and positive recognition.

On the other hand, there is probably no explicit mandate about capacity-building, as with the East Timor case. Whether or not there is an order related to sustainable development is not clearly confirmed. Considering the purposeful direction that capacity-building activity ought to produce in a post-conflict society, in this field the Korean forces appear to have lost their way. There was no consistent direction and little interconnection of capacity-building activities. The Korean forces failed to encourage locals to take ownership of their long-term social development. Many Residents' Long-Cherished Projects (and especially donation activities) were conducted in conjunction

with visits by important figures. Some are probably no more than attractive products meant to last only as long as the sponsoring contingent's deployment. This approach is never good for sustainable development in a war-torn society.

If the Korean government had learned from past peacekeeping experiences in the capacity-building field, it could have nipped in these problems in the bud. This did not happen because the government had not yet conducted objective evaluations based on appropriate criteria for judging success in encouraging local ownership and sustainable development.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis investigates the appropriate role of Korean peacekeepers in post-conflict societies and the function of the troop-contributing government of Korea in leading successful peace operations. It examines scholarly discussions regarding peacekeeping success—including conditions and criteria for successful peacekeeping—and applies the factors regarding mandates to Korean peace operations in East Timor and Lebanon. The two country case studies view the results of Korean peace operations from a long-term perspective, applying relevant evaluation factors closely related to the nature of peacekeeping force activities, and avoiding evaluations based on reports from local media and Korean pro-governmental news networks.

A. SUMMARY

From the literature review, it is clear that there is little research on the activities of each military peacekeeping component and on assessing mission accomplishment of donor military forces. Discussions in Korea about peace operations tend to center on its diplomatic effects, downplaying the appropriate role of Korean forces with respect to reconstruction of post-conflict societies. This means that activities of military peacekeeping contingents at the tactical level required close examination.

Considering discussions on peace operation mandates for successful mission implementation, I conclude that a clear scope of mandate, specifically and narrowly stated, is necessary to prevent conflicting interpretations by various peacekeepers and military contingents. A specific and clear mandate not only helps forefend peacekeepers' divergent expectations as to the results of peace operations, but also gets public support from troop-contributing countries and local parties in dispute. With regard to the content of mandates, most scholars and the UN regard a use of force to restore law and order as required content in mandates for contemporary peace operations. The scholars also advise including clauses regarding sustainable development in the post-conflict society.

Given that the military is strongly governed by the limitations of its mission strategy and that military personnel are accustomed to implementing specifically spelled-

out mandates,³³⁶ more specific and clearer mandates are needed for successful peacekeeping by military contingents. Since military troops are supposed to prepare an initial framework for overall peace operations, they need a strong mandate, and one that includes active use of force. Because none of the UN authorities specify tasks for individual military contingents from different countries, it is necessary to examine closely the mandates ordered by the governments of troop-contributing countries.

In light of the foregoing research, the thesis presents comparative case studies of Korean peace operations in East Timor and Lebanon. The East Timor case is the main focus. The Lebanon case verifies the findings in the East Timor case.

The case study of Korean peacekeeping in East Timor demonstrates that the Korean force conducted a successful mission except for one element of civil-military activities, capacity-building. Achievements in security activities resulted from clear Korean governmental mandates, with a strong restriction on use of force. The Korean force mostly followed the mandate, not just implementing rigid security operations, but accompanying those operations with friendship-building efforts in its security tasks. Civil-military activities were less successful than security activities. Humanitarian activities were a relative success, considering that they were a short-term activity begun in the period immediately following the conflict. Friendship-building efforts by the Korean force resulted in positive outcomes, overcoming cultural differences and gaining cooperation from local populations. The successes in these two fields stemmed from clear mandates. In the capacity-building field, there was no clear mandate and no clause regarding deliberations for sustainable development. As a result, the Korean military contingents did not implement this mission continuously and were unable to inspire the local ownership and long-term development needed to sustain capacity-building projects after the force left.

In the Lebanon case study, the Korean governmental mandate is hard to discern because it is a current military operation with access to specific contents of the mandate restricted and treated as confidential. Therefore, I deduce the mandates by classifying the

³³⁶ See both Oldrich Bures, 414 and Alan James, 224.

force's activities based on their nature. Also, the fact that the Korean force in Lebanon only took charge of small portions of the Southern Lebanon district presents a difficulty in finding statistical data relevant to the force's activities there. However, use of limited contextual resources, including local and Korean news, and scholarly works, produces conclusions similar to the East Timor case. Specifically ordered mandates by the Korean government produce positive results compared to the obviously negative results of activities with a vague mandate.

In regard to security activities in Lebanon, the Korean peacekeepers are more focused on fulfilling their governmental mandate. This impacts overall security activities even though the government mandate does not articulate all the activities in that field. As in the East Timor case, the force's endeavors to win the hearts and minds of local populations while conducting security operations produced limited success in its AOR. Strong mandates for humanitarian and friendship-building activities brought about consistent and vigorous efforts among all the Korean military components, which produced successful outcomes. However, capacity-building is as yet not clearly defined by the Korean government mandate, and there are no successes to report so far. Fortunately, the current contingent recognizes these problems and has initiated capacity-building activities with clear objectives and appropriate directions aimed at achieving them.³³⁷

In a nutshell, the conclusions from this study are as follows: For successful peace operations, troop-contributing governments should clearly and narrowly order the scope of force activities in all fields of engagement. Despite claims that use of force is needed in more violent contemporary situations, rigorous adherence to the rule of engagement by military contingents will likely create positive outcomes if the force employs friendship-building efforts along with security operations. However, for more fruitful efforts in peacekeeping operations, troop-contributing governments should be more deliberate regarding capacity-building activities to most benefit sustainable development and local ownership.

337 Jinsub Cho. 7.

B. EVALUATING THE HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1: The Korean peacekeeping forces considered their governmental mandates as the most important standard of their action on the spot, which greatly impacted the results of their activities in post-conflict societies.

Hypothesis 1 is supported by both case studies. Korean peacekeepers generally tried to follow the UN mandates, but they cared more about fulfilling the governmental mandate. Especially in the security operations, Korean forces sought to keep their government's direction regarding use of force rather than just abiding by the rule of engagement of their peacekeeping mission. Clear governmental directions greatly influenced the continuance of force activities designated by the mandates, while unclear governmental orders meant that activities were attenuated. To a great extent, Korean peacekeepers regarded fulfilling governmental mandates as their most significant benchmark. Clearer standards in governmental instructions are more helpful for attaining the objectives.

Hypothesis 2: A clear mandate with suitable scope and contents results in successful outcomes of military force peacekeeping activity.

Hypothesis 2 is partly verified by this research. The Korean military forces in peace operations did better jobs in the areas in which the Korean government gave clear mandates, meaning the mandate specifically and narrowly described spheres of activities. Because the military culture emphasizes following specific directions rather than creating the scope of its tasks, providing peacekeeping forces with clear orders is more suitable, as shown by the case studies. Yet, contrary to scholars' argument that active use of force is suitable content for contemporary mandates, this research shows that limited use of force was much more effective in successful peacekeeping missions.

This is not to say that following the governmental mandate would result in more productive outcomes than following the UN PKFH mandate, even if the mandates from the troop-contributing government were appropriate in regards to scope and content. The governmental peacekeeping mandate fills gaps caused by vague PKFH and UN mandates, providing the scope and elements the military contingents need. The governmental

mandate should not present absolute standards and objectives for the force's activities in peace operations without respecting the mandate from UN authorities.

In order to get more plausible explanations for this hypothesis, research is needed on the activities and results of other military contingents that actively follow the rule of PKFH without specific directions from their own governments. Research on other countries' activities in East Timor and Lebanon is also needed to supplement the results of these case studies.

C. PEACE OPERATIONS OF KOREAN FORCES: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Korean peacekeepers establish close relationships with post-conflict societies with good intentions. In the words of the head of one Korean force,

During the Korean War, Lebanon helped Korea by donating \$50,000, which was considered a large sum at the time. Thanks to Lebanon's support, Korea is now the 11th largest economy in the world. Koreans will never forget Lebanon's sacrifices. We know better than anyone else the value of peace and the sorrow brought by sacrifices.³³⁸

In response to these decent aims, current Korean forces have achieved a remarkable result, articulated by a Lebanese local leader.

[O]ur love and appreciation for the Korean peacekeepers is not based on this support, much needed though it is. Rather, our appreciation and gratefulness goes beyond that, to the relationship of brothers in humanity that ultimately defines our utmost love for UNIFIL and its soldiers.³³⁹

However, a positive local reputation is not enough to explain the success of military contingents' peacekeeping operations. To fully understand the effect of Korean peacekeepers' activities and gain more fruitful results from future efforts, the Korean

338 *LBCI News*, "Korean UNIFIL troops a 'Godsend' for Residents in the South," October 24, 2011. <http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news>.

339 Hussein Saad, "Bonded in Humanity," *Al Janoub: UNIFIL Magazine*, No. 3, September 2012, 17. <http://unifil.unmissions.org/>.

government should look closely at past peace operations in war-torn countries other than East Timor and Lebanon.³⁴⁰

What stands out from this study is that the Korean peacekeepers did well in fulfilling some but not all parts of the governmental mandate. What was done well can be done better, and what was done wrong needs to be corrected. This leads to four specific recommendations.

First, the Korean force did outstanding work in humanitarian assistance. As demonstrated in Lebanon, the medical aid service of the Korean force seems to have developed more efficient and effective practices since its earliest missions. The Korean government should continue emphasizing medical aid service in its peace operation mandates, and the force should continue to actively implement and develop this field.

Second, Korea's historical narrative of the devastating Korean War and successfully reconstructed society allows Korean peacekeepers to get close to local people in societies undergoing similar post-conflict destabilization. Cultural exchange and friendship-building activities attract residents and produce positive results relatively early. Efforts to overcome cultural differences by friendship-building have a beneficial influence on overall peace operations in the field.³⁴¹ If Korean peacekeepers continue to cultivate relationships with local populations through diverse friendship efforts, peace operations as a whole will be positively affected.

Third, with respect to security activity, mandates restricting use of force by the Korean government have changed residents' negative perceptions of local peacekeeping activities. This helped the Korean peacekeepers to be secure in their activities, and also encouraged cooperation from locals in conducting security operations. The Korean

340 The Korean forces have participated in diverse oversea operations in post-conflict societies since its first mission in Somalia in 1993. To date, Korea has implemented 14 missions under the UN and MNF, although only East Timor and Lebanon involved combat battalions. However, for a comprehensive understanding of post-conflict reconstruction activities and more diverse lessons learned, Korean missions in other places should be examined.

341 *International Legal Materials*, 1488. The UN says that "personnel in the field must go out of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know their host environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding that they are guests in someone else's home."

mandate for minimum use of force is not without irony, as the government's decision to limit the rule of engagement was based on domestic political considerations and public opinion rather than a concern for the efficiency of peace operations. At any rate, minimum use of force has been conducive to security activities, attracting positive recognition by residents. It should be regarded as necessary content for future Korean government mandates in peace operations.

Last, but certainly not least, the Korean government should closely reexamine the capacity-building activities of its deployed forces in peace operations. Activities not conducive to sustainable development of post-conflict societies simply give the locals fish without teaching them how to catch the fish themselves. To achieve the latter, Korean peacekeepers must encourage local populations to develop local ownership of their society. This can be achieved by promoting local actors to participate in the design, management and implementation of capacity-building activities.³⁴² These responsibilities should not be held only by external actors. The UN says regarding local ownership,

Effective approaches to local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.³⁴³

Attracting local ownership is important for implementing military contingents' capacity-building activities as well as for the sustainability of the peace process.³⁴⁴ Therefore, the Korean government mandate should include clauses clearly defining how the forces should support sustainable development. Since the success of the contingent's peacekeeping activities stems from a clear governmental mandate, the troop-contributing country should specify the scope of the capacity-building activities. Also, if the Korean

342 Timothy Donais, "Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes," *Peace & Change*, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2009, 7.

343 UN DPKO/DFS, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008), 40.

344 Benjamin de Carvalho et al, *Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia* (Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2011), 7.

force will be required to teach locals how to catch fish, the Korean government should first educate its deploying soldiers how to teach these skills.

I hope this thesis provides an impetus for strengthening Korean peace operations in the future.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Ahmed, Salman, Paul Keating and Ugo Solinas. "Shaping the Future of UN Peace Operations: Is There a Doctrine in the House?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2007: 11–28.
- Ahn, Suckho. "Taekwondo and Korean Classes Becoming Popular in Lebanon." *Segye Ilbo*, July 19, 2011. <http://www.segye.com/>.
- Aoi, Chiyuki, Cedric Coning, and Ramesh Thakur. "Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping." *Centre for International Political Studies*, No. 56, 2007: 1–18. <http://www.cips.up.ac.za/>
- Asia Foundation. "East Timor National Survey of Voter Knowledge." <http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/EastTimorVoterEd.pdf>.
- Bathish, Hani M. "Judge Charges 10 Suspects in Plot to Attack UNIFIL." *The Daily Star*, October 17, 2007. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics>.
- Beamon, Benita M., and Burcu Balcik. "Performance Measurement in Humanitarian Relief Chains." *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, Vol. 21 No. 1, 2008: 4–25.
- Bellamy, Alex J. "The 'Next Stage' in Peace Operations Theory?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.1, 2004:17–38.
- Bellamy, Alex J., William Durch, and Paul Diehl. "Who's Keeping the Peace?: Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations." *International Security*, Vol.29. No.4, 2005: 157–195.
- Bernath, Clifford, and Sayre Nyce. "A Peacekeeping Success: Lessons Learned From UNAMIL," in *International peacekeeping: The yearbook of international peace operations*, edited by Kondoch Langholtz, 119–142. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Brill Academic, 2005.
- Birgisson, Karl Th. "UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, edited by William Durch, 273–284. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- . "United Nations Yemen Observation Mission." in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, edited by William Durch, 206–218. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- Bratt, Duane. "Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 1996:64–81.

- . “Defining Peacekeeping Success: The Experience of UNTAC.” *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1996: 3–5.
- . “Explaining Peacekeeping Performance: The UN in Internal Conflicts.” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 4, Issue 3, 1997: 45–70.
- Browne, Marjorie Ann. “United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current Issues.” *CRS Report for Congress*, 2000.
- . “United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress.” *CRS Report for Congress*, 2008.
- Bures, Oldrich. “Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping.” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, 2007: 407–436.
- Carvalho, Benjamin De., and Niels Nagelhus Schia. *Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia*. Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2011.
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “The World Factbook: Timor-Leste.” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html>.
- Centre for Administrative Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. *Welfare in the Mediterranean Countries: Lebanon*. Italy: C.A.I.MED., 2005.
<http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/9383.pdf>.
- Challenges Project. *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century-Concluding Report 1997–2002*. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005.
- . *Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination*. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005.
- Charter of the United Nations. “The UN Charter1: Purposes and Principles, Article 1.” <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.
- Cho, Jinsub. “Quick Response to the Requests of Troops Dispatch from the International Community: Establishment of ‘Onnuri force’.” *Defense Journal*, Vol.440, August 2010: 46–47.
- . “Variety of Civil Operations Elevate the Status of the Korean Force.” *Defense Journal*, Vol. 452, August 2011: 6–9.
- Cho, Juro. “Cultivating a Field of Peace in Conflicting Area.” *Defense Daily*, October 23, 2003.

- Cho, Seongryeol. "The Role of Korean Army and International Peace Cooperation Activity in Transitional Period." *Institute for National Security Strategy*, Vol. 3, 2007: 1–27.
- Choi, Chulhwan. "Analysis of CMA (Civil Military Affairs) Represented by PKO Activities in Timor Leste." MA diss., Kyungbuk University, 2004.
- Choi, Jongchul. *The 6th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force*. Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2002.
- Choi, Yongho. *From East Timor to Timor-Leste*. Seoul: Institution for Military History, 2006.
- Clark, Ian. "Why the 'World Policeman' Cannot Retire in Southeast Asia: A Critical Assessment of the 'East Timor Model.'" MA diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2002.
- CNN. "Bomb Wounds French Peacekeepers in Lebanon." December 9, 2011. <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-09/middleeast/>.
- Daily and Sunday Express*. "Health Alert on Post-conflict Areas." January 1, 2012. <http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/292951>.
- Daily Star*. "South Korean peacekeepers reach out to locals." July 29, 2007. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/Oct/29>.
- . "South Korean UNIFIL Provide 40,000 Checkups." January 13, 2012. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/>.
- . Kassis Honorary Envoy for Korean UNIFIL." August 26, 2008.
- Dakroub, Hussein. "Security Worries Escalate in South." *The Daily Star*, December 13, 2011.
- Deek, Ghinwa El. "In Blood as in Peace." *Al Janoub: UNIFIL Magazine*, No. 11, January 2012: 13. <http://unifil.unmissions.org/>.
- Diehl, Paul F. *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
- . *Peace Operations*. Malden: Polity Press, 2008.
- Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. *Evaluating Peace Operations*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.
- Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole Degrasse. *The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2007.

- Donais, Timothy. "Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes." *Peace & Change*, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2009: 3–26.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4, December 2000: 779–801.
- Druckman, Daniel, and Paul Stern. "Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions." *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, 1997: 151–165.
- Duffey, Tamara. "Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, 2000: 142–168.
- Durch, William. "Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context." in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, edited by William Durch, 16–38. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- . "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s." in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the UN Civil Wars of the 1990s*, edited by William Durch, 1–34. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- East Timor Government. "East Timor Update April 2001." http://www.gov.east-timor/old/news/East_Timor_Update/200104/.
- . "East Timor Update December 2000 ~ January 2001." http://www.gov.east-timor.org/old/news/East_Timor_Update/200012/Eng.pdf.
- East Timor Legal News*. "East Timor Crimes against Humanity 1999 Militia Murders Atrocities." http://1999horrorsofeasttimor.blogspot.com/2008_05_24_archive.html.
- East Timorese Public Administration, Lautem. *Profile of Lautem District March 2002*. edited by Richard Simpson. Dili: East Timorese Public Administration, Lautem, 2002.
- Facts about Korea*. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1995.
- Faculty of European Studies and Regional Development. *In search of more sustainable capacity development*. Presentation at Fulbright Workshop, Slovak University for Agriculture, 2009.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States." *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004: 5–43.

- Fortna, Virginia Page. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2004: 269–292.
- . *Does Peacekeeping Work?* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Ghali, Mona. "United Nations Emergency Force I: 1956–1967." in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, edited by William Durch, 104–130. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- . "United Nations Emergency Force II: 1973–1979." in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, edited by William Durch, 131–151. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- . "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978–Present." in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, edited by William Durch, 181–205. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- Grantham-McGregor, Sally., et al. "Child development in developing countries 1." *The Lancet*, Vol. 369, January 2007: 60–70.
- Hallam, Alistair. *Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies*. London; Overseas Development Institute, 1998.
- Hatto, Ronald. "UN Command and Control Capabilities: Lessons from UNIFIL's Strategic Military Cell." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. 2: 186–198.
- Heiberg, Marianne. "Peacekeepers and Local Populations: Some Comments on UNIFIL." in *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations, and Prospects: The Lessons of 40 Years of Experience*, edited by Indarjit Rikhye, London: Macmillan, 1990.
- Hoare, Mark. "The Prospects for Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation in a More Uncertain Asia-Pacific." *Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Papers*, No.123, 2003: 1–43.
- Hong, Kyudok. "Shedding Light on Korean Participation in PKO and Development: Ways for the Future." Paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, March 2008.
- . "South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future." *Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development*, Vol.12, 2009: 173–187
- Humanitarian Policy Group. *Measuring the Impact of Humanitarian Aid: A Review of Current Practice*. London; Overseas Development Institute, 2004.

- Hwang, Yousung. "Evergreen Force in East-Timor received the UN medal." *Donga ilbo*, August 14, 2000.
- In, Namsik. *Implications and Challenges of Korean Peacekeeping Troops in Lebanon*. Seoul: Institution of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2007.
- International Legal Materials*. "United Nations: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations." Vol. 39, No. 6, November 2000: 1432–1498.
- James, Alan. "Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era." *International Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 2, Spring 1995: 241–265.
- Je, Sungho. "Avenues to Build a Legal Basis for PKO Participation." Paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, October, 2006.
- Johansen, Robert. "UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?" *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1994: 307–310.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3–08, Volume I*. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996.
- Jones, Seth G. *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict*. CA: Rand Corporation, 2005.
- Jun, Jekuk. "Oversee Deployment of Korean Forces and Security on the Korean Peninsula." *National Strategy*, Vol.17, No.2, 2011: 33–67.
- Jun, Kyeongman. "Political Appraisal and Development Way of PKO in Contribution Diplomacy." *Defense Policy Study*, Vol.26, No.2, Summer, 2010: 9–43.
- Jung, Chungsin. "Dongmyeong Force's Success in Achieving Peace and Winning Minds." *Munhwa Ilbo*, June 1, 2008.
- Jung, Doseang. "A Study on the Korean Policy Making Process of Overseas Dispatch of PKO Forces." PhD diss., Dankook University, 2006.
- Jung, Sungho. "Plant a Peace in Lebanon," *KBS News*, August 23, 2009.
<http://news.kbs.co.kr/world/2009/08/23/1832986.html>.
- Jung, Sung-ki. "Lebanese Students Invited for Cultural Tour." *The Korea Times*, January 29, 2009.
- Jung, Uihun. "Peacekeeping is military diplomacy." *Kookbangilbo*, February 10, 2010.
- Kang, Chan-Ock. *The 2nd Contingent Homecoming Report: Outcomes and Lessons of Dongmyeong force*. Seoul: Korean Lebanon Peacekeeping Force, 2008.
- KBS World*. "S. Korean Unit in Lebanon Treats 20,000th Patient." May 3, 2010.
<http://world.kbs.co.kr/>.

- Khalil, Amal. "Celebrating Seoul in South Lebanon." *Alakhbar*, December 22, 2011.
<http://english.al-akhbar.com>.
- Kim, Jongchan. "Ways to Gather Public Support for PKO." Paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, June, 2005.
- Kim, Jongwon. "77 percent of Koreans favor sending troops for peacekeeping." *Kookbangilbo*, February 2, 2010.
- Kim, Woong-gun. *The 1st Contingent Homecoming Report: Outcomes and Lessons of Dongmyeong force*. Seoul: Korean Lebanon Peacekeeping Force, 2008.
- Kim, Woosang. "Korea as a Middle Power in Northeast Asia." in *The United States and Northeast Asia*, edited by G. John Ikenberry, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008.
- Kim, Youngduck. *The 7th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force*. Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2003.
- Kim, Yeolsu. "PKO Participation Strategy Contributes to National Interests." Paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, June 2005.
- Ko, Sangtu, Woondo Choi, and Taeyoung Yoon. "Conflict Management in the Post-Cold War Era: Preventive Diplomacy and PKO." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol.17, No.2, Fall, 2005: 35–62.
- Ko, Ung-suk. "Local Lebanese 'Dongmyeong Force is Our Brother'." *Yonhap News Agency*, June 29, 2010.
- Korea Saemaul Undong Center. "International Activities: East Timor." http://saemaul.com/english/international_act_easttimor.asp.
- Kwon, Gichang. "Analysis on Military Operations of UN PKO in East Timor: Focusing on Soft Power of the ROK and Australian Forces." MA diss., Seoul National University, 2007.
- Lambourne, Wendy, and Annie Herro. "Peacebuilding theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: implications for non-UN interventions." *Global Change, Peace & Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2008: 275–289.
- Langholtz, Harvey, Boris Kondoch, and Alan Wells. *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004.
- Lankov, Andrei. "Saemaul Undong Sets Model for Developing Countries." *The Korea Times*, April 16, 2010.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/11/291_64301.html.

- LBCI News. "Korean UNIFIL Troops a 'Godsend' for Residents in the South." October 24, 2011. <http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news>.
- Lebovic, James H. "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6, December 2004: 910–936.
- Lee, Gwongu. "Kyeongnam Medical Company Assists with Drugs for Dongmyeong Force Peacekeeping in Lebanon." *Yakup News*, January 13, 2012. <http://www.yakup.com/news/>.
- Lee, Jungha. *The 4th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force*. Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2001.
- Lee, Lynn. "Rules of Communication." *The Year in Review in 2001*. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2001/Asia_countries/East_timor.htm.
- Lee, SeungJu, and Hyejung Lee. *Assessments and Supplements of Contribution Diplomacy*. Seoul: National Assembly Research Service, 2010.
- Lee, Soonchun. "Korea's Diplomatic Tasks to Become a Global Korea." *Korean Observations on Foreign Relations*, Vol.11, No.1, 2009: 11–35
- Lee, Suckjong. "Dongmyeong Force Invites Lebanese Military Cadet for Friendship." *Defense Daily*, September 8, 2009.
- Lee, Tae-Hoon. "Inconvenient Truth about Korean Troops Abroad." *The Korea Times*, August 8, 2011.
- Lee, Sookjong. "South Korea's Soft Power Diplomacy." *EAI Issue Briefing*, June 1, 2009.
- Lefever, Ernest W. *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
- Lglauer, Philip. "Lebanon Celebrates 68th Independence Day." *The Korea Times*, November 27, 2011.
- Lorosae, Suara Timor. "Lautem Hit by Flash Floods." *East Timor Headlines*, June 25, 2001, 1.
- . "PKF Build Alternative Road between Baucau and Los Palos." *East Timor Headlines*, July 6, 2001, 1.
- Makdisi, Karim. "Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the 'War on Terror'." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011: 4–20.

- Makdisi, Karim, Timur Goksel, Hans Bastian Hauk, and Stuart Reigeluth. "UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East." *EuroMeSCo*, No. 76, 2009: 1–39.
- McGregor, Andrew. "Development, Foreign Aid and Post-Development in Timor-Leste." *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2007): 155–170.
- McKechnie, Alastair J. "Building Capacity in Post Conflict countries." *World Bank Insitute*, No. 5, March 2004: 1–4.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDRC/Resources/CDBrief05.pdf>.
- Ministry of National Defense. "Participation and Outcomes of Peacekeeping in East Timor." *Defense Report*, No. 126, April, 2001.
- . "Praise and Thanks to Evergreen Unit Soldiers." *Defense News*, Vol. 115, May, 2000.
- . "Sangnoksu Force, Full-fledged Deployment of Peacekeeping Operation in East Timor." *Defense Report*, No. 109, November, 1999.
- Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management. "District Profile of Oecussi Enclave." <http://www.estatal.gov.tl/English/Municipal/oecusse.html>.
- Moore, Mick. "Mobilization and Disillusion in Rural Korea: The Saemaul Movement in Retrospect." *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4.
- Mullenbach, Mark J. "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 3, September 2005: 529–555.
- Nam, Inwoo. *The 5th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force*. Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2002.
- National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. "The Agreement of the National Assembly for Deploying the Korean Force to East-Timor." <http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/>.
- . "The Agreement of the National Assembly for Deploying the Korean Force to Lebanon." <http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/>.
- National Assembly, Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee. *Examination Report of Korea Military Participation in Lebanon PKO*. Seoul: National Assembly, 2006.
- National Assembly, Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, *Examination Report of Korea Military Participation in East Timor Multi National Forces*. Seoul: National Assembly, 1999.

- National Statistics Directorate. *Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004*. Dili: National Statistics Directorate and United Nations Population Fund, 2006.
- Nelson, Richard W. "Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model." *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1984–1985: 67–89.
- Nevins, Joseph. "The Making of Ground Zero in East Timor in 1999: An Analysis of International Complicity in Indonesia's Crimes." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 4. July/August 2002: 623–641.
- . "What is Peacekeeping?"
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>.
- New York Times*. "U.N. Bosnia Commander Wants More Troops, Fewer Resolutions." December 31, 1993, A3.
- . "The Future of UN Peacekeeping." January 12, 1995.
- Oh, Hong-guk. "The Republic of Korea Armed Forces' Civil Operations in Lebanon." *Military History*, Vol. 73, December 2009: 210–246.
- Park, Gyeongsik. *The 8th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Dongmyeong force*. Seoul: PKO Center, 2011.
- Park, Heenam. "Dongmyung Force in Lebanon Was Awarded the UN Medal for Their Successful Contribution to Peacekeeping." *Sisamagazine*, Nov. 17, 2009.
- Park, Inchul. *The 1st Contingent Homecoming Report: Activities of Sangnoksu force*. Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2000.
- Park, Sisoo. "Unit Sparks Hallyu in Lebanon." *The Korea Times*, July 18, 2011.
<http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/>.
- Peace and Sports. "Locally-Based Projects in Timor Leste." <http://www.peace-sport.org/timor-leste/locally-based-projects-in-timor-leste.html>
- Peace Keepers News*. "ROKBATT Soldiers Receive the Sacrament of Confirmation and Baptism in ET Chapel." September 20, 2001.
- . "ROKBATT, Supported by Korean Firm, Held Delivering Goods in Don Bosco Church." December 9, 2001.
http://www.timoraid.org/v1/timortoday/news/pkf_news_0043.htm.
- . "UN Forging a Whole New Dimension in Operations called 'Eagle's Eye Operation (EEO)'." July 16, 2001.

- Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operation, 2003.
- Poole, Marcia. "ROKBATT Bids Farewell to Timor-Leste: 'We Say Good-bye to Friends Who Have Given Their Best.'" *UNMISSET Press Release*, October 21, 2003.
- Popper, David H. "Lessons of United Nations Peacekeeping in Cyprus." *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 64, No. 4, September 1970: 1–9.
- Pushkina, Darya. "A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006:133–149.
- . "Towards Successful Peace-Keeping: Remembering Croatia." *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol.39, No.2, 2004: 393–415.
- . "United Nations Peacekeeping in Civil Wars: Conditions for Success." Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 2002.
- Ratner, Steven. *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War*. London: Macmillan Press, 1995.
- Reed, Edward P. "Is Saemaul Undong a Model for Developing Countries Today?" paper presented for International Symposium in Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of Saemaul Undong. Seoul, Korea, September 30, 2010.
<http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SaemaulUndongReedSept2010FINAL.pdf>
- ReliefWeb report*. "East Timor: Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin Week 01/2001." January, 2001. <http://reliefweb.int/node/75227>.
- Rim, Jungwoo. "Study of disputes in East Timor and Korean military forces' PKO." MA diss., Korea University, 2009.
- Rosser, Andrew. "The First and Second Health Sector Rehabilitation and Development Projects in Timor-Leste." *Institute of Development Studies*, November 2004: 1–20.
- Rubinstein, Robert A. "Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations." *Security Dialogue*, Vol.36, No.4, December, 2005: 528–544.
- Rubinstein, Robert A., Diana M. Keller, and Michael E. Scherger. "Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 4, August 2008: 540–555.

- Ryan, Alan. "The Strong Lead-nation Model in an Ad-hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilize in East Timor." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2002: 23–44.
- Saad, Hussein. "Bonded in Humanity." *Al Janoub: UNIFIL Magazine*, No. 3, September 2012: 17. <http://unifil.unmissions.org/>.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. "The United Nations Operations in Cyprus: A New Look at the Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Relationship." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1999: 79–108.
- Sesay, Amadu. "Dividends on Investments in History: Korea and UN peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations." *Korean Observer*, Vol. 28, Issue 2, 1997: 181–217.
- Shanker, Thom. "Trying to Avoid the Perils of Peacekeeping." *New York Times*, 19 August 2006.
- Shehadi, Nadim. "Futile Victory." *The World Today*, Vol. 64, No. 6, January 2008: 11–14.
- Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. "The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nationbuilding and the Need for Inclusive Governance." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 4, July/August 2006: 575–596.
- Siqlawi, Jihad. "South Korean UN Troops Kick up Taekwondo Storm in Lebanon." *Agence France-Presse*. April 18, 2008.
- Smith, Michael, and Moreen Dee. *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.
- Song, Sanggeun. "Government, Propelling Sending Troops to East Timor." *Donga Ilbo*, September 14, 1999. 1.
- Song, Youngho. *The 2nd Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force*. Seoul: Joint Staff College, 2001.
- Sotomayor, Arturo. "From Peacekeeping to Peace-enforcement." Lecture note, Seminar in Peace Operations, Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. July 12, 2011.
- Sung, Dongi. "Popularity of Saemaul Movement in East Timor." *Dongailbo*, December 20, 2001.
<http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=020&aid=0000104273>.
- Tanham, George K. *War Without Guns: American Civilians in Rural Vietnam*. New York: Praeger, 1966.

- Thakur, Ramesh. *Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission*. Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberta Press, 1984.
- Tharoor, Shashi “The Changing Face of Peacekeeping.” in *Soldiers for Peace edited by Barbara Benton*, 208–223. New York: Facts On File, 1996.
- Timor Leste Ministry of Finance. *Final Statistical Abstract: Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards 2007*. Timor-Leste: Dili, National Statistics Directorate, 2008.
- TimorToday*. “Korean Battalion Provides Support to ET Defense Force.” June 20, 2001.
- . “Korean Deliver Relief Goods to Flood Victims: ROK Batt Carries out Blue Angel Operation for Submerged village.” October 7, 2001.
- . “Peace Keepers Soaring High with Civil Military Activities.” September 18, 2001.
- . “Soccer and Volleyball Match Held for the Unity and Harmony of Locals.” August 16, 2001.
- Tomforde, Maren. “How Much Culture is Needed? The Intercultural Dilemma of the Bundeswehr in ISAF.” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, No. 4, August 2010: 526–538.
- Toronto Star*. “10 Jailed for Timor Carnage.” December 12, 2001, A23.
- UN’s Peacekeeping Activities Official Webpage. “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations.”
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/feb11_2.pdf.
- UN DPKO. *UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials*. New York: The UN DPKO, 2009.
- UN document ST/SGB/119/Rev.1. “Regulations for the United Nations Medal.” February 16, 1966. <http://www.un.org/russian/peace/pko/medals/stsgb119r1.htm>.
- UN News Service*. “Timor-Leste: UN Transfers Security Duties in Lautem District to Local Police.” April 3, 2003. <http://reliefweb.int/node/122866>.
- UNDP. *Community Development and Local Development Fund*. Timor-Leste: Dili, UNDP Timor-Leste, 2003. www.undp.east-timor.org.
- UNIFIL. “UNIFIL Background.”
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml>.

- . “UNIFIL Commemorates International Day of UN Peacekeepers.”
<http://unifil.unmissions.org/>.
- . “UNIFIL mandate.”
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml>.
- United Nations General Assembly. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (A/47/277 - S/24111)*. New York: United Nations, 1992. http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf.
- . *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all (A/59/2005)*. New York: United Nations, 2005.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.59.2005_En.pdf.
- United Nations Peacekeeping. “United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).”
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm>.
- United Nations, *Security Council, Resolution (2006). S/RES/1701 (2006)*. August 11, 2006. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml>.
- . *Security Council. Resolution (1999). S/RES/1272 (1999)*. October 25, 1999.
<http://www.laohamutuk.org/reports/UN/UNDocs/1999/SCRes1272.pdf>.
- UN DPKO/DFS. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008.
- UNMISSET Spokesperson’s Office. “PKF Organizes Soccer Tournament in Oecussi.” February 18, 2003.
- UNMISSET. “East Timor Media Monitoring.” Asia Pacific Solidarity Network, February 18, 2003.
- UNTATE. “First Trial for 1999 Crimes Against Humanity Opens in East Timor.” July 9, 2001. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/news/01jul09.htm>.
- U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. *Peace Ops: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations, FM 3-07.31*. October 2003, III-1.
- U.S. Department of State . “Background Note: Timor-Leste.”
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35878.htm>.
- Waters, Hugh, Brinnon Garrett, and Gilbert Burnham. *Rehabilitating Health Systems in Post-Conflict Situations*. Finland, Helsinki: United Nations University, 2007.

- Wedgwood, Ruth. *East Timor and the United Nations*. Paper prepared for the Columbia International Affairs Online Curriculum Modules, August 2001.
- Weinberger, Naomi Joy. "Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Summer 1983: 341–369.
- Whalan, Jeni. "The Power of Friends: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 5, 2010: 627–637.
- Widner, Jennifer A. "Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of Severe Conflict." In *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, edited by Robert I. Rotberg, 222–236. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Williams, Garland H. *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2005.
- World Health Organization. *WHO's Contribution to Health Sector Development in East Timor*. Dili: World Health Organization, 2001.
- Wui, Seungho. "Study of the ROK forces' peacekeeping operations in East Timor." MA diss., Dankook University, 2006.
- Ya'ar, Chana. "Explosion Rocks Hizbullah Weapons Warehouse." *Arutz Sheva*, November 23, 2011. <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150026>.
- Yang, Jihyun. "In Pursuit of Power or Peace? Korean Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations." MA diss., Kyunghee University, 2008.
- Yeom, Wangyun. *The 4th and 5th Contingents Homecoming Report: Outcomes and Lessons of Dongmyeong force*. Seoul: The Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010.
- Yonhap News Agency. "Dongmyeong Force Donates Medical Equipments to Locals." September 20, 2009. <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/>.
- . "Mayors of two Lebanese Cities to Visit South Korea." February 22, 2008.
- . "Medical Emergency Response by the Sangnoksu Force." December 11, 2001. <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LPOD&mid=etc&oid=001&aid=0000119316>.
- . "Third Anniversary of Dongmyeong force in Lebanon." July 18, 2010.
- Zaatari, Mohammed. "Activists Hold Solidarity Gathering, Condemn Attack on Tyre Restaurant." *The Daily Star*, December 31, 2011.

- . “Local Authorities Meet with UNIFIL to Discuss Attack.” *The Daily Star*, January 15, 2008.
- . “South Korea UNIFIL Soldiers Pay Student’s Fees.” *The Daily Star*, November 4, 2011.
- . “UNIFIL’s Korean Troops Aid Children with Special Needs.” *The Daily Star*, October 03, 2009.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval PostgraduateSchool
Monterey, California
3. Professor Naazneen H. Barma
Naval PostgraduateSchool
Monterey, California
4. Professor Sophal Ear
Naval PostgraduateSchool
Monterey, California
5. Headquarters of Amry, Library
Republic of Korea Army
Gyeryong, Republic of Korea
6. Captain Seongkyoon Shin
Republic of Korea Army
Seoul, Republic of Korea