



Framework Concept

INTEGRATED COMMUNICATION IN MULTINATIONAL COALITION OPERATIONS WITHIN A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Third Draft
Version 1.0

Strausberg, 22 October 2010

Final MNE 6 Version

Report Documentation Page		Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.		
1. REPORT DATE 22 OCT 2010	2. REPORT TYPE Final	3. DATES COVERED -
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Framework Concept - Integrated Communication in Multinational Coalition Operations Within a Comprehensive Approach		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
	5e. TASK NUMBER	
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Bundeswehr Transformation Centre (ZTransfBw), Multinational Concept Development (Dez KonzEntw), Proetzeler Chaussee 25, D-15344 Strausberg, Germany		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USJFCOM J9 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation, Suffolk, VA		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Reproduction of this document and unlimited distribution of copies is authorised for personal and non-commercial use only, provided that all copies retain the author attribution as specified below. The use of this work for commercial purposes is prohibited; its translation into other languages and adaptation/modification requires prior written permission. Point of Contact: Bundeswehr Transformation Centre (ZTransfBw), Multinational Concept Development (Dez KonzEntw), Attn: Lt Col Peter E. Westenkirchner, Proetzeler Chaussee 25, D-15344 Strausberg, Germany, The original document contains color images.		
14. ABSTRACT The central purpose of the document is to provide a conceptual framework for integrating communication in international crisis management operations. Based on the acknowledgment that coalitions are challenged with achieving both cohesive and coherent communication in such contexts, a solution-model is proposed, which consists of three characteristics. First, communication must be deeply integrated throughout all processes within a coalition from planning to assessment of activity. Second, leaders should play a key role in the coalition's communication efforts and take this issue very seriously. Third, internal and external communication processes should be harmonised and a clear common identity of the coalition be developed and communicated both within and outside the coalition.		
15. SUBJECT TERMS multinational, experiment, MNE, integrated communications, comprehensive approach, coalition operations, information environment, shared narrative, strategic communication, information activities,		

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 124	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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Country Codes are used in accordance with STANAG 1059 INT (Edition 9; Ratification Draft 1)
(NATO Standardisation Agency: "Codes for Geographical Entities", 06 July 2005)

Throughout the document, pronouns are to be understood gender-neutral; they should neither reveal nor imply the gender or sex of a person.

Any problem, big or small, within a family, always seems to start with bad communication. Someone isn't listening.

Emma Thompson

(http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/e/emma_thompson.html)

One cannot not communicate!

Paul Watzlawick

(Pragmatics of Human Communication, 1967)

The most successful businessman is the man who holds onto the old just as long as it is good, and grabs the new just as soon as it is better.

Robert P. Vanderpoel

(<http://www.memorable-quotes.com/robert+p++vanderpoel,a4665.html>)

We are facing confrontation rather than conflict.
And the currency of confrontation is information, not ball ammunition.

General Sir Rupert Smith

(DSACEUR, Lecture at KFOR 5 Training, Stavanger, 21 February 2001)

You can have brilliant ideas, but if you can't get them across,
your ideas won't get you anywhere.

Lee Iacocca

(<http://www.iwise.com/AsACd>)

The art of communication is the language of leadership.

James Humes

(http://www.freshbusinessstinking.com/articles_print.php?CID=13&AID=1011)

In this hemisphere, we are in the business of ideas, not missiles.
Our main battery, so to speak, is communication.

Admiral James G. Stavridis

(<http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=1547>)

To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate
our actions and much more about what our actions communicate.

We need an Information Order with an Operations Annex!

Admiral Michael G. Mullen

(<http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?ID=142>)

(<http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/archive/index.php/t-6111.html>)

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Executive Summary

The draft at hand is the final product from Concept Development and Experimentation on a multinational communication framework within the Multinational Experiment 6 campaign. Further development and validation is required prior to direct implementation of its propositions. However, the concept addresses relevant issues for Strategic Communication and related disciplines, which require urgent attendance in order to meet current operational challenges.

The central purpose of the document is to provide a conceptual framework for integrating communication in international crisis management operations. Based on the acknowledgment that coalitions are challenged with achieving both cohesive and coherent communication in such contexts, a solution-model is proposed, which consists of three characteristics. First, communication must be deeply integrated throughout all processes within a coalition – from planning to assessment of activity. Second, leaders should play a key role in the coalition's communication efforts and take this issue very seriously. Third, internal and external communication processes should be harmonised and a clear common identity of the coalition be developed and communicated both within and outside the coalition.

Key findings and recommendations include:

- Actors need an appropriate understanding of the information environment and require intercultural competences. An audience-oriented approach to communication will minimise discontinuity of messages and perceptions.
- Actors need to understand communication as a process characterised by the exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages. Understanding communication as a process of exchanging messages by words and deeds will improve effectiveness of operations, and help closing the 'say-do-gap'.
- All members of the coalition need to understand its global, long-term perspective. A shared coalition narrative, implemented by all partners is a requirement for consistent coalition messaging and the achievement of desired effects in the information environment.
- Senior leaders have a pivotal role in communication efforts at all levels. Common guidance for coalition information activities issued by strategic-political authorities will minimise the risk of contradictory messaging by coalition partners. Contradictory messaging would result in a loss of credibility and, subsequently, ineffectiveness of operations. It is a leadership responsibility to guide communication so that it becomes effective throughout all levels of involvement.

- Effectiveness is promoted through cohesion and coherence of the coalition. Internal communication – focusing on the coalition's vision – will promote a common coalition identity. Based on a strong coalition identity, external communication efforts can purposefully assist the achievement of a desired coalition image and credibility.
- All coalition activity must continuously be cross-functionally integrated and incorporate communication aspects throughout. A network of communication experts from all partners, established at the earliest stage of coalition-building (or even before), will enhance consistent integration of communication.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Concept

This document constitutes one of the products¹ from multinational Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E)² within the Multinational Experiment (MNE) 6 theme – *'The Irregular Challenge: A Comprehensive Approach to a Complex Problem'*, and supports transformation goals of the defence establishments participating in MNE 6.

The overall context is described by the MNE 6 problem statement³:

'To establish and ensure a safe and secure environment, coalition forces require the ability to share information, gain situational understanding, synchronize efforts and assess progress in concert with interagency partners, international organisations, and other stakeholders when countering activities of irregular adversaries and other non-compliant actors.'

The MNE 6 is a logical continuation of multinational CD&E to promote a comprehensive approach to crisis management as addressed by the preceding MNE 5 campaign.⁴ The term 'comprehensive approach' is used in a broad generic sense to describe the wide scope of actions undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative manner with the affected nation(s).⁵ Co-ordination and collaboration includes national civilian government agencies and their defence and security forces, international and intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations and the private sector to achieve greater harmonisation in the analysis, planning, management, and evaluation of actions required to prevent, ameliorate, mitigate and/or resolve the conditions precipitating a crisis.

MNE 6 seeks to investigate practical applications of a comprehensive approach where the military assumes an important role amongst other actors, such as national and multinational civilian government agencies, international and intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations and the private sector.

The MNE 6 'Outcome 2' provides a more specific view on the context for a proposed solution in the information environment⁶:

'Coalition forces, interagency and relevant actors possess an improved ability to collaboratively develop and implement a shared information strategy (regional or transnational) during the employment of direct and indirect approaches to countering irregular threats and the activities of non-compliant actors.'

¹ 'Products' are the deliverable solutions and are the outputs and services delivered in support of customer requirements (USJFCOM MNE 6 Project Design, 2008).

² Alberts/Hayes (2002, 2005); TTCP (2006).

³ The 'problem statement' articulates the challenge to be addressed and provides the focus for the project (USJFCOM MNE 6 Project Design, 2008).

⁴ June 2006 (MNE 5 Pre-Concept Development Conference) – March 2009 (MNE 5 Compendium of Solutions).

⁵ USJFCOM Conceptual Framework for MNE 5 (2007).

⁶ An 'outcome' in this context can be considered a sub-project to MNE 6. Outcomes describe changes in behaviour, capacity or capability that we plan to create through experimentation work; this is the "so what" or end state (USJFCOM MNE 6 Project Design, 2008). The short title of Outcome 2 is 'Strategic Communication'.

The objective⁷ of the concept development efforts leading to this document (MNE 6 Objective 2.1) is:

'Develop a framework for integrated communication⁸ in multinational operations within a comprehensive approach, and identify requirements for effective, culturally attuned communication within the coalition and between the coalition and other actors in order to advance coalition interests and objectives, and to promote coalition coherence.'

Objective 2.1 aims at investigating some of the questions listed in Annex C – CD&E Study Issues (Revised) . Annex D – Concept Validation – provides an overview of possible opportunities for experimentation within MNE 6 and beyond.

'Disruptive Innovation'⁹ is one of the key principles of CD&E leading to better results than traditional capability development: we do not attempt to just gradually improve existing (military) practice, but try to offer an alternative capable of replacing extant concepts without being predetermined by established processes and structures. Harmonisation of existing concepts (policy and doctrine) on information activities amongst many partners through multilateral negotiations would be too time-consuming to meet urgent operational requirements. Instead, a common conceptual basis derived from multinational CD&E seems promising.

This concept builds on insights gained from the MNE 5 concept 'Development of a Multinational Information Strategy'¹⁰, which describes an initial view on an interagency and multinational approach across all instruments of power to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It emphasises the requirement for mission-specific strategic and political guidance for coalition¹¹ information activities, and the consideration/integration of communication aspects throughout in support of mission objectives.

There are several 'real-world' lines of concept development for the immediate enhancement of current operations where the international mandate and mission is at stake; these efforts need to be taken into account. The baseline assessment for this framework concept, therefore, incorporates lessons learned from ongoing crisis management initiatives as well as basic deficiencies identified by multinational bodies such as NATO and the European Union.

⁷ An '**objective**' in this context is a sub-set of a MNE 6 Outcome. Objectives are the specific accomplishments that must be completed to achieve the Outcomes (USJFCOM MNE 6 Project Design, 2008). The short title of Objective 2.1 is 'Multinational Communication Framework'.

⁸ Changed from 'Strategic Communication' during the MNE 6 Strategic Communication Workshop 4 (03-07 May 2010, Berlin, Germany). This change resulted from intensive discussions, involving civil and military practitioners of Strategic Communication and Information Operations. With a view on existing national and NATO approaches to Strategic Communication, and current best practice, it was doubted whether a new approach and definition of Strategic Communication really is required. Consequently, a reorientation of Objective 2.1 was suggested. This now better reflects the substance outlined in the Framework Concept with a broader scope, including but not limited to Strategic Communication. It also prevents false expectations of potential customers who currently are reluctant to engage in CD&E on the widely implemented subject of Strategic Communication. See Section 1.3.6 *Relationships to Extant Approaches*.

⁹ Christensen (1997).

¹⁰ MNIOE Analytical Concept (2008).

¹¹ Although this concept is primarily written in support of *coalition* crisis management within a comprehensive approach, its propositions may be applicable to any kind of common engagement, regardless of organisational form.

This concept outlines an approach to integrated communication in a coalition and comprehensive approach context. It builds on the civilian application of Integrated Marketing Communication in commercial business management¹² and international development¹³ in order to promote understanding and co-operation of actors beyond the military. The challenge though is the use of terms and definitions that are mutually understood by stakeholders from relevant communities working together in crisis management¹⁴.

1.2 Potential Customers of the Concept

In general, this concept informs actors involved in multinational crisis management and the Security Sector¹⁵ within a comprehensive approach, not focused on a specific level of involvement. Potential customers include but are not limited to the following:

- Sovereign governmental (civil and military) decision-makers and planners;
- Civil and military decision-makers and planners of mandating and executing international organisations (e.g., UN, OSCE, NATO);
- Diplomats (i.e., practitioners of traditional diplomacy);
- Practitioners of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and other communication disciplines involved in Strategic Communication and/or the military Information Operations function, and civilian equivalents;
- Civil and military key leaders in crisis response missions/operations.

1.3 Description of the Problem Space

*"Across all of our efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. **Aligning our actions with our words** is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a **culture of communication** throughout government. We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job **understanding** the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoples—not just elites—around the world. Doing so allows us to convey credible, **consistent messages** and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how our actions will be perceived. We must also use a **broad range of methods for communicating with foreign publics, including new media.**"*¹⁶

¹² E.g., Schultz (1993, 1998, 2004), Argenti (2005, 2007), and many others.

¹³ E.g., The World Bank – Development Communication Division (<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEVCOMMENG/0,menuPK:34000201~pagePK:34000189~piPK:34000199~theSitePK:423815,00.html>).

¹⁴ An example for this challenge is the use of the terms *effect*, *result*, *output*, *outcome*, *impact*, etc., which basically mean the same thing from different perspectives: they describe system states related to an activity or set of actions in terms of change or consolidation.

¹⁵ The 'Security Sector' encompasses state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. armed forces, police, the intelligence and similar bodies); and the elected and/or duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight of these institutions (e.g., Parliament, the Executive, including the defence ministry, judicial and penal systems). Based on: OSCE MC.GAL/9/07 (2007), p.4.

¹⁶ President Barack Obama: USA National Security Strategy (2010), p.16.

1.3.1 Communication and the term 'Crisis'

*"Crises are by their very nature communicative, and their resolution is fundamentally communicative as well."*¹⁷

The sociological paradigm of Symbolic Interactionism¹⁸ is used as a basis for understanding interpersonal communication and social systems – a perspective which examines how individuals and groups interact, focusing on the creation of personal identity through interaction with others. This perspective examines the idea that subjective meanings are socially constructed through language, that these subjective meanings interrelate with objective actions, and that these subjective meanings are shared and communicated by symbols that represent reality.

COMMUNICATION
is the exchange of
information between
individuals through
a common system of
signs, symbols, or
behaviour.




Figure 1: The Semiotic Triangle - Symbols Represent Reality

Language consists of words, which are symbols for real objects. "A [symbol] is something that we directly encounter, but at the same time it refers to something else. [] Symbols have no natural connection with the things that they describe."¹⁹ I.e., meanings don't reside in words; they reside in people. Words mean different things to different people in different situations. This idea is captured in the so-called 'Semiotic Triangle'²⁰ introduced by linguists to demonstrate the relationship between

¹⁷ Courtright/Hearit (2003), p.212.

¹⁸ Mead (1934); Blumer (1969).

¹⁹ Griffin (1997), p.58.

²⁰ Ogden/Richards (1923).

symbols and their referent²¹. One part of the triangle is the symbol or the word that names an object. An English language example would be 'mouse' (Figure 1). Another peak on the triangle is the subject. This is the thought that one would picture in one's mind when perceiving and interpreting the symbol, such as the little rodent, the Disney character or the computer mouse. The referent, the last part, is the thing or object itself described by the word 'mouse'.

Understanding that meaning comes from individual people can help to clear up confusion and prevent arguments when communicating with others.

Meanings interrelate with objective actions, and are shared and communicated by symbols (information), i.e., through concepts within the mind (mental models) that represent reality. *"Rather than being a vehicle that transfers information from one person to another, communication is the process whereby meaning is created and agreed upon."*²²

When engaged in the process of communication, people act in two distinct roles: producer (or sender) and consumer (or receiver). The producing role is associated with the instantiation of representations of meaning. The consumption role is associated with the interpretation of representations of meaning. Each role has a different relationship to communication, even though both roles are always concurrently associated with the same person ('producer' + 'consumer' = 'prosumer').²³ (Figure 2)




Figure 2: Model of the Communication Process²⁴

²¹ Griffin, I.c., p.60; 'referent' means 'the signified object'.

²² Courtright/Hearit (2003), p.205.

²³ Based on: Foulger (2004), p.3; and Martin-Hannes Giesswein (Country Manager Nokia AUT), cited in: DER STANDARD (07/08 August 2010), p.K1.

²⁴ Foulger, I.c., p.5 (adapted).

This understanding of the communication process underpins the importance of perception in human interaction. All interaction – conscious or unconscious – is communication: *"one cannot not communicate"*.²⁵ Everything that can be perceived by other people includes information content, thus leading to the impossibility of not communicating as a decisive human factor.

Communication may occur verbally and/or non-verbally, consciously or not consciously, but always with the potential to affect change.²⁶

The meaning and value of information depends on the context in which the information is placed by its interpreters, and on their emotional state, which has significant impact on people's susceptibility. Identical information in the same context may be interpreted differently by the receivers (or consumers) of the information; also, information of seemingly lower relevance in one situation can become decisive in another situation, and *vice versa*.

*"Perceived reality, not actual reality, is the key to understanding behaviour. How we perceive others and ourselves is at the root of our actions and intentions. Understanding the perceptual process and being aware of its complexities can help develop insights about ourselves and may help in reading others. The words we use, the way we look and the body language we display communicate our view of the world. The importance of perception and communications in guiding our behaviour needs to be understood for effective relationships with others."*²⁷

COMMUNICATION is the process by which information, meanings and feelings are shared by people through an exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages.

Interpretation of a given situation as a 'crisis' follows the above mechanism: *"Issues become crises because someone makes them crises. [] The act of naming a situation a 'crisis' – whether it be done by crisis managers or the media – results in a context in which a whole host of actors react in identifiable and readily anticipated ways. [] The term crisis is a 'consensually validated symbol'. Only when corporate actors, media, or governmental officials agree to label a problem a 'crisis' [] do they respond to it as such."*²⁸

A CRISIS is a specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organisation's high priority goals.

*"Crisis management is a distinctly communicative phenomenon in which participants construct the meaning crises hold. [] Crises are terminological creations conceived by human agents, and consequently, are managed and resolved terminologically. As such, instead of being one component, communication constitutes the quintessence of crisis management."*²⁹

²⁵ Watzlawick/Beavin/Jackson (1967).

²⁶ Based on: Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary: <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/Communication> and www.regent.edu.

²⁷ Mullins (2010), p.208. For more on perception and understanding the information environment, see: MNE 6 Objective 2.2 Analytical Concept (2010).

²⁸ Courtright/Hearit, I.c., p.206.

²⁹ Courtright/Hearit, I.c., p.205.

1.3.2 The Information Factor

The ability to receive, share and transmit information globally has created societies in which actors and audiences – or 'producers' and 'consumers' in the above sense – have become more and more interchangeable: to observe is to be part.

INFORMATION is understood as an assembly of data in any medium or form capable of communication and use by assigned meaning through known conventions used in symbolic representation.

In modern information societies³⁰ the information factor has evolved to become a decisive element of security-related activities and is paramount in all areas.

Events are reviewed not by what actually occurs but in the appropriate context and by the way in which they are presented, mediated, received and interpreted:

The INFORMATION FACTOR describes the actuality of information pervading societies, such as actors and audiences have become increasingly indistinguishable, and every action sends a message, intended or not.

perception becomes reality and credibility counts more than content. The medium that delivers a message impacts how a message is perceived³¹ (e.g., an advertisement appearing in the *New York Times* may be perceived as more credible than an identical ad in a small local newspaper).

Information is at the heart of modern societies, which are increasingly reliant on technical and social information systems to function effectively. The unlimited availability of information worldwide and the reliability of information systems have created a situation in which no action can be contemplated without considering its potential impact on the information environment.

The development of worldwide information platforms, the steady improvement of personal communications technologies, the rise of special interest groups and related opportunities and endeavours to manipulate information points to the importance of 'third-party credibility'. *"Today's selective receivers of information need more assurance that the source of that information is credible and trustworthy. Obtaining the endorsement of an objective third-party, such as [a] major media outlet or professional trade organisation, gives senders the credibility they need to be better believed by targeted audiences."*³²

In the military, information is meanwhile recognised as a decisive factor *per se* that will increasingly affect the operational factors force, space and time.³³ *"Whereas traditional war-fighting merely precedes and sets the scene for the message-exchanging activity of conflict resolution, [peace support or stability operations] consist in large part of this message-exchanging activity itself. [They] consist of conducting a sequence of confrontations and attempting to resolve them in such a way as to resolve the issues in accordance with our objectives. That is why the*

³⁰ An 'information society' is defined as a society in which the creation, distribution, diffusion, use, and manipulation of information is a significant economic, political, and cultural activity. Based on: Moore (1997); Machlup (1962); Drucker (1968); Bell (1976); and Castells (2000).

³¹ Cf. McLuhan (1964): "The medium is the message"; Stephenson (1995).

³² Drobis (1998), p.7 et seq.

³³ Cf. Vego (2007), p.III-65 et seq.: "Is Information a New Operational Factor?"

*primary function of most actions taken in [international crisis management] is to send a message."*³⁴

Impact, effectiveness, credibility, as well as efficiency and sustainability of effort in crisis management require the continuous consideration of the information factor throughout analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/ evaluation of operations.

1.3.3 Information Environment³⁵

General characteristics of the information environment include:

- The nature of information is global, overarching and multi-faceted in the sense that it cannot be controlled by anyone once in the public domain.
- Despite state-controlled technical and procedural systems to deny access and limit consumption of information to an audience, it is extremely difficult to restrict the worldwide flow of information for an extended period of time.
- Modern information systems comprise an emerging and diverse infrastructure, posing increased challenge to standardisation and interoperability.
- Modern information systems are also subject to rapid technical development, forcing agencies to respond and constantly adapt their capabilities.
- In principle, the means to affect information and/or information systems are available to everybody at low cost.
- The complex interconnectivity of modern information systems makes it increasingly difficult to differentiate between intended and unintended effects, and places the security of own information at risk.
- Modern information systems can be affected anonymously, making it difficult to identify the originators and determine their intent.
- Compliance with legal norms – if such exist at all – is difficult to enforce on modern information systems.
- The complexity and dynamics of modern information systems – sometimes called 'information overflow' – challenges focused retrieval, reliability and timeliness of information.

The INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT is the virtual and physical space in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems.

³⁴ Howard (1999), p.57.

³⁵ As described in the MNIOE Framework Concept (2009) and the MNE 6 Objective 2.2 Analytical Concept (2010).

1.3.4 Information Activities ³⁶

Information activities include direct and indirect communication, and comprise the whole scope of actions and operations conducted to impact the information environment. They may involve kinetic and non-kinetic actions, and include protective measures.

INFORMATION ACTIVITIES are actions designed to have an effect in the information environment, performed by any actor.

Information activities will most often be employed in conjunction with other activities to ideally form a synergetic whole across all activity. These efforts must be closely coordinated in order to portray a consistent image of the actors in multinational crisis management and enhance their effectiveness.

Resources to conduct information activities can be as varied and extensive as the complexity of the information environment. The scope and scale of possible information activities also relates to the basic features of information – development of knowledge, communication, and automation³⁷ – and covers a multitude of actions to create effects on understanding, will and capabilities, including human as well as technical system elements.

1.3.4.1 Socio-technical Information Systems

Today's complex information societies are characterised by the constant interaction between and amongst people and technology. Technology is produced and used by people in multiple social patterns. It is embedded in a complex set of other technologies, physical surroundings, people, procedures, etc., that together make up the socio-technical system.

The complex interconnectedness of modern information systems results in a situation where many of the individual items of a socio-technical system are difficult to distinguish from each other because of their close inter-relationships. Networked elements can be part of different socio-technical systems in different circumstances.

In this context, INFORMATION SYSTEMS are defined as socio-technical systems for the collection, processing and dissemination of information. They comprise personnel, technical components, organisational structures, and processes that create, collect, perceive, analyse, assess, structure, manipulate, store, retrieve, display, share, transmit, and disseminate information.

³⁶ As introduced by the MNIOE Framework Concept (2009).

³⁷ **Basic features of information:** (1) **Development of Knowledge:** Information is data interpreted in a context, and in turn, enables the linkage of data as a basis for the development of knowledge – this function is a prerequisite for developing situational awareness and understanding; (2) **Communication:** Information enables humans to communicate and act in a social environment – this function *inter alia* is a prerequisite for effective leadership; (3) **Automation:** Information enables automated systems to function without direct involvement of human reasoning – this function constitutes a decisive factor for new technological advances, including the whole range of sensors and effectors. (MNIOE Applied Concept (2009), p.10)

1.3.4.2 Information Technology

IT advancements are the driving factor for the so-called 'information revolution' and have proved a precondition for the creation and development of information societies.

IT includes both electronic communications and computer technology. Related organisations and departments will be increasingly concerned with data storage and management, and information security will continue to be at the top of the priority list.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) encompasses all forms of technology used to create, process, display, store, and exchange information in its various forms.

In a crisis management context, *"development of the [IT] infrastructure can make a key contribution to the emergence of rule-of-law structures. Information monopolies can be broken up, dissenting voices can make themselves heard, and political opinion formation processes can be encouraged. [IT] can thus improve the general conditions for civilian crisis prevention"*.³⁸

IT is an inseparable factor of information systems – facilitating and often exclusively enabling certain functions related to communication. Our understanding of information activities must therefore not be limited to human communication or media activities.

1.3.4.3 Media Activities

A medium is a carrier of information. Media content may comprise art, reports of facts, and expressions of ideas or opinions in a form that allows these to be consumed independently (in time or in place) from their creation. In this context 'the media' refers to organisations or persons who gather and disseminate news, and the means by which news is transmitted.³⁹

When thinking of information activities, the most common understanding refers to media activities: the intentional use of information, such as in the news media or for public information or public relations purposes; neglecting the fact that everything that can be perceived by other people bears information content. Consequently, when drafting guidance for information activities one should take into account that actions and behaviour are capable of delivering messages as well – not just the media.

1.3.4.4 Words and Deeds

In addition to (deliberate) information activities, every action will – even though not primarily designed for this impact – inherently cause effect(s) in the information environment (see Figure 3). Therefore, the coherence of words and deeds needs to be considered in order to comprehensively cover informational effects.

³⁸ DEU Action Plan "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building" (2004), pp.71-72.

³⁹ Based on: http://www.reckon.co.uk/open/A_definition_of_the_media_sector, and MC 457/1 – NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs.

Understanding the 'say-do-gap'⁴⁰ is an important prerequisite for further understanding and isolating the causes of crisis and conflict. *"This gap is at the heart of the difficulties that organisations have with generating shared meaning and authenticity across cultures. 'Say' messages create expectations and perceptions. 'Do' messages more directly represent who [an actor] is since they are the messages that directly and tangibly affect others. The say-do-gap exists when deeds and behaviour fail to align with stated intentions, policies, and initiatives. The gap erodes legitimacy, trust and confidence; [it] can result in unplanned, detrimental messages that are as powerful as and much more convincing than our [targeted messaging]. ..."*

⁴¹




Figure 3: Actions and Effects in the Information Environment

There is also a widespread misperception that communicators *"can differentiate who the message will reach and how those audiences react. If we seek to better influence behaviour then we will have to transform both our approach and methodologies for communication."*⁴²

1.3.5 Non-Compliant Actors in Multinational Coalition Operations

*"In [today's irregular crisis situations], the production of information, the easy availability of consumer electronics, the Internet, and the changing culture of consumption have [] a disproportionate impact on insurgent strategy. Information technology empowers the insurgent more than the counterinsurgent in irregular war because it makes political violence more complex. It opens a broader range of militant and political action. The new information [environment] has enhanced armed conflict, and irregular war, as a continuation of policy and political discourse."*⁴³

⁴⁰ Agee (2000), p.54.

⁴¹ SAMS (2010), p.11.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Cassidy (2009-10), p.118.

To secure the success of international stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in complex (post-) conflict/crisis scenarios, focusing on physically fighting regular as well as irregular adversaries has proved to be insufficient and does not solve the problem of resistance in a mission area on a sustained basis. Following that line, the understanding of what and who hampers the success of coalition efforts towards achieving sustainable peace, stability and reconstruction in the operational environment – including the underlying rationale – needs to be broadened. The spectrum of relevant actors is wider than our usual military classification: non-compliance/non-compliant actors pose a challenge to all coalition actors, thus all coalition actors should contribute to mitigate non-compliance.

NON-COMPLIANCE indicates behaviour that negatively affects coalition efforts to achieve goals / objectives in support of the host nation and/or international mandates.

NON-COMPLIANT ACTORS are individuals or groups which exhibit behaviour which negatively affects coalition efforts to achieve goals/objectives in support of the host nation and/or international mandates.

Creating a safe and secure environment requires the orchestration of a multitude of actors. Military aspects constitute only a small part of a comprehensive compliance strategy. The best strategy, however, is still to avoid non-compliance from the beginning.

Whether certain behaviour will be categorised as non-compliant on the basis of the definition above depends much on the perspective:

- First, the definition focuses on the goals of the coalition actors and the host government, but the goals and objectives of other players – external and internal – are not addressed. They might not understand nor accept the coalition's view of non-compliance.
- Second, within the coalition there may exist different opinions on how goals should be reached. Thus, certain behaviour might be non-compliant from the perspective of one actor within the coalition, but not from the perspective of another.
- Third, the complexity of an external intervention towards a different social and cultural background cannot be reduced to a technical consideration of goals and ways to reach (or hamper) them. The different social and cultural backgrounds of the many external and internal actors involved in complex operations might result in value-based interpretations of non-compliance. Therefore, the label of 'non-compliance' should always be accompanied by thorough reflections on one's own perspective, and an in-depth analysis of the driving factors feeding non-compliant activities.

Non-compliant actors are driven by various intentions, cultural attitudes, personal prospects, environmental conditions and other factors. They are embedded in and interact with their cultural environment and social structures. Changes in environment and structures can result in changes in the compliant behaviour of actors, i.e., non-compliant actors may change and develop over time – they are dynamic. This may be true for their motivation, their objectives, their strategies and tactics, their

organisational form, their leadership and membership in groups and organisations. Also, non-compliant actors may not necessarily be non-compliant all the time. This exacerbates analysis as well as devising and implementing strategies for enhanced compliance.

There are many forms of compliance, too. The spectrum reaches from instrumental/tactical compliance over 'neutral' compliance (tolerance/ acceptance) to commitment in the spirit of active support for coalition objectives. Compliance may be a 'moving target' as it is a function of the objectives and the level of ambition/standards of the coalition (in co-operation with the host government) as well as of the development of the operational environment. Commanders/leaders need to carefully think about which form of compliance he is after and how to develop strategies to keep relevant actors compliant (or avoid non-compliance).

Major dividing lines within the very heterogeneous cluster of non-compliant actors consist in whether non-compliance is armed and violent or not (and the intensity of use of force). Another major category for distinguishing between different forms of non-compliance / non-compliant actors is the motivation underlying the respective behaviour. Whether non-compliance / non-compliant actors are actuated by structural conditions such as poverty or whether it is politically motivated makes a big difference with a view to respective compliance enhancement strategies.

Non-compliance is an ongoing and pervasive challenge in today's complex battlefields and missions. It is a cognitive, behavioural and emotional challenge to compliance enhancement strategies. Therefore, the information factor and communication aspects need to be considered in an integrated manner throughout.

1.3.6 Relationships to Extant Approaches

This section presents national and/or multinational definitions for existing concepts or approaches concerning coordinated and guided communication in a crisis management context. The purpose is to enable the identification of commonalities and discrepancies in order to prevent misinterpretation and confusion with terms used for integrated communication in this Framework Concept.

The Framework Concept does not propose another communication discipline, but addresses key aspects relevant for all communication processes and functions and their related capabilities. 'Integrated communication' in this respect is used as a short title for the general approach outlined in the concept, i.e., integrating communication throughout.

Communication is always an indispensable part of crisis management and compliance strategies. Across the spectrum of missions and broadly covering all levels of involvement in a civil-military, comprehensive approach context, the function of Strategic Communication and its military tool for implementation – Information Operations – have evolved and are still under development, in particular concerning their exact delineation of responsibilities and the integration of non-military and non-coalition actors.

For the purpose of this concept three lines of development are acknowledged as state of the art, with practical impact on current crisis management interventions and

multinational interoperability: (1) USA national developments, which one can argue have resulted in the most mature concepts for both Strategic Communication and Information Operations so far; (2) NATO concept development, which for Strategic Communication is very much driven by current mission requirements (such as ISAF in Afghanistan), but also has benefitted much from multinational CD&E for Information Operations; and (3) multinational CD&E projects such as the USA-led MNE series and the Multinational Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE) led by Germany.

1.3.6.1 Strategic Communication

Strategic Communication in the broadest sense refers to the policy-making and guidance dimension. Diplomats often use the term with emphasis on *"the systematic planning of communication activities, [underlining] that communication is not a random act, but one that follows specific objectives."*⁴⁴ Business communicators label 'corporate communication' as 'strategic', when it *"is completely consistent with the firm's overall strategy and [] enhances the strategic positioning of the corporation."*⁴⁵

Strategic Communication probably is the most comprehensive approach to interagency information activities that is currently in effect. Concepts, policy and doctrine for Strategic Communication are presently being developed in the USA and NATO⁴⁶.

Strategic Communication, at present, is best explained in various USA policy documents and government reports. What is missing though is the multinational dimension and the explicit consideration of the information factor, which is inherent in each and every activity. The evolving concept of Strategic Communication focuses on non-kinetic influence to affect the behaviour of targeted audiences in an information-rich environment.⁴⁷

For the purpose of this concept, the USA approach to Strategic Communication⁴⁸ will be used as baseline, understanding that the desired consistency of messaging⁴⁹ – driven by central, highest-level guidance, and employing all available means to serve a common set of interests

(NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION):
The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.

(USA STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION):
Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

⁴⁴ Peters (2010), p.6.

⁴⁵ Argenti (2007), slide 19.

⁴⁶ NATO PO(2009)0141.

⁴⁷ Cf. USA National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (2007); Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Final Report, (2008).

⁴⁸ USA Joint Publication 1-02 (2009).

⁴⁹ **'Messaging'** is the transfer of content or information (text, images, voice) from one person or device to another, by using any medium of communication. (www.businessdictionary.com/definition/messaging.html)

– would require considerably greater effort in a multinational context. The USA approach is still considered insufficient to cover the whole spectrum of options and requirements⁵⁰ in multinational crisis management.⁵¹ However, this national approach currently better reflects the practitioners' basic understanding of Strategic Communication than NATO's policy and directives.

1.3.6.2 Information Operations

The military term Information Operations refers to the implementation of superior guidance for activities and effects in the information environment by military means.

(NATO INFORMATION OPERATIONS):
A military function to provide advice and co-ordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.

(USA INFORMATION OPERATIONS):
The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

For the purpose of this concept, the original CD&E approach⁵² to the Information Operations function will be used as baseline. This approach has widely influenced NATO and EU concept development⁵³ and differs remarkably from the long-standing and comprehensively implemented USA national approach⁵⁴, which is considered too limited in scope, capability focussed, and less suitable for broadly integrating actions and effects in the information environment.

(INFORMATION OPERATIONS, multinational CD&E): *A military function to provide advice and co-ordination regarding activities affecting information and information systems – including system behaviour and capabilities – in order to create desired effects.*

⁵⁰ 'Options' refers to the scope of actions that either can be employed to intentionally create effects in the information environment or that need to be taken into account because they are able to cause such effects; 'requirements' primarily refers to the necessary co-ordination of assessments and interests amongst multinational partners.

⁵¹ Current developments within the Obama Administration indicate that the integration requirements addressed in this Framework Concept are about to be considered and implemented, at least at the national, strategic-political level: (a) "...we describe 'strategic communication' as the synchronization of our words and deeds as well as deliberate efforts to communicate and engage with intended audiences." (USA National Framework for Strategic Communication (2010)); (b) "Strategic communication is the alignment of multiple lines of operation [] that together generate effects to support national objectives. Strategic communication essentially means sharing meaning (i.e., communicating) in support of national objectives (i.e., strategically). This involves listening as much as transmitting, and applies not only to information, but also to physical communication – action that conveys meaning." (DOD Report on Strategic Communication (2009); Strategic Communication JIC (2009)).

⁵² MNIOE Applied Concept (2009).

⁵³ Compare NATO's policy documents for Info Ops and Public Affairs (MC 422/3 and MC 457/1) and its related doctrine (AJP-3.10), and the EU Concept for Military Information Operations of 2008.

⁵⁴ USA Joint Publication 1-02 (2009).

Following the CD&E approach, the Information Operations function orchestrates military information activities in conjunction with other coalition activities to form a synergistic whole. In order to ensure the appropriate implementation of strategic-political guidance as well as the integration of military information activities with those of the other (civil) actors, Information Operations need to relate back to an overall Information Strategy that integrates all coalition capabilities.

2 Baseline Assessment

*"At the heart of future force and capability development are **focused and clearly stated ideas about the challenges we face** and potential ways for dealing with those challenges. In the recent past, concept development has too often lacked the focus and the agility to be relevant to today's rapidly changing global security challenges. We must focus concept development on the **specific problems identified in the joint operating environment or identified gaps in doctrine**. This will be a fundamental shift in the way we currently look at concepts and their value to fielding and sustaining relevant capabilities."*⁵⁵

2.1 References and Context

The following baseline assessment statements originate from the following activities: literature review; academic studies (comparison of extant concepts and general capability analysis); analyses of lessons learned from various crisis response and stability operations (after-action reports); as well as multinational experimentation of related CD&E concepts in the 2003-2008 timeframe. The complete baseline assessment for the MNE 6 campaign is provided with the USJFCOM Baseline Assessment Report MNE 6.⁵⁶

These baseline assessment statements – combined with those identified for MNE 6 Objective 2.2 ('Enhanced Understanding of the Information Environment')⁵⁷ – provide a comprehensive view on challenges for coalition operations from a communication perspective. Although this Framework Concept attempts to at least discuss all of the challenges listed below, it is neither intended nor possible to provide complete solutions for all within one single document. Additional CD&E will be required to deliver analytical and/or applied concepts that address specific aspects in further detail.

2.2 Baseline Assessment Statements

Challenge 1: Coalitions lack a common expression of corporate vision that translates the basic consensus on commonly shared values and principles into unified action in the information environment.

Communication lacks focus at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) – an especially critical series of shortfalls, given the highly astute and sophisticated use of all information media by our competitors/opponents. The problem starts at the top with a lack of consensus on the 'who-what-how' of coalition (collective/common/corporate) communication efforts.

Challenge 2: Partners lack sufficient cohesion and/or comprehension of the coalition as an entity, which is a requirement for achieving desired effects in the information environment in accordance with common objectives.

⁵⁵ General James N. Mattis (2009), p.1.

⁵⁶ See Bibliography for additional references.

⁵⁷ MNE 6 Objective 2.2 Analytical Concept (2010), Chapter 3: 'Baseline Assessment'.

We are unable to communicate to the world effectively who we are and what we stand for, and what our goals and aspirations are. The objective of effective messaging is not at the heart of the operations planning process; it is tangential at best.

Challenge 3: Although the necessity of consciously operating in the information environment is widely acknowledged by the partners, coalitions so far have not been able to develop and implement relevant common strategic-political guidance.

Multinational agreement on a common approach to effects in the information environment seems to be a complicated undertaking. Once an agreement has been reached at the highest levels, emphasis on a persistent, top-down narrative often collides with the reality of timely implementation.

Challenge 4: Coalition actions – words and deeds – are insufficiently integrated for achieving desired effects in the information environment.

From a military perspective, every campaign or engagement is both a physical conflict and a psychological confrontation: the psychological confrontation is won when we succeed in changing the opponent's intent and/or because our physical actions are convincing.⁵⁸ Our metrics of success in kinetic terms are at odds with the metrics for success in media-dominated attempts to win 'hearts and minds': kinetic military options should also be viewed as a message – often even more powerful and credible than words and images alone.⁵⁹

Challenge 5: Coalitions are challenged with overcoming cultural differences and national/organisational caveats concerning internal and external communication.

In a multinational context we are failing to develop effective, culturally attuned communication efforts. At a fundamental level we do not understand local culture. Equally important, however, is the impact of culture on our own coalition decision-making and other internal processes that affect our unified action.

Challenge 6: Coalitions do not sufficiently engage non-coalition actors in a sustainable dialogue to benefit coalition communication efforts within a comprehensive approach.

There is an institutional weakness in coordinating coalition communication efforts across agencies and with external stakeholders. A dialogue amongst coalition and indigenous actors is important for the development of shared objectives and to ensure that actions and messages are synchronised.

The MNE 6 Objective 2.1 baseline assessment can be summarised as follows:

- ***Ineffective top-down approach to communication!***
- ***Insufficient horizontal and vertical integration of communication!***

⁵⁸ Based on: Howard/Smith/Tait (2004), p.1.

⁵⁹ Based on: Crannell/Sheppard (2010), p.4.

3 Approach and Proposed Solution

3.1 Coalition Operations in a Comprehensive Approach

*"Globalisation and the IT revolution have changed our security environment."*⁶⁰
*"Today, [] the world [is] facing new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile and failed states, may also have a negative impact on [] international security. [The] security [of single nations] is increasingly tied to that of other regions."*⁶¹ *"Our security environment is now influenced not just by traditional military powers and nation states, but more and more by non-state actors, individuals, technology and the media."*⁶²

"The chief determinants of future security policy development are not military, but social, economic, ecological and cultural conditions, which can be influenced only through multinational co-operation".⁶³ International crisis management is increasingly complex and interdependent: no single agency, government or organisation is able to resolve a crisis without assistance of partners. Future interventions⁶⁴ are likely to be multinational and interagency /multiagency in character, and require a multidimensional response involving a wide range of interlinked activities.

This multidimensional response requires a 'comprehensive approach' – *"a cross-departmental strategic plan for crises – in which the military might not have the lead, but may be a first responder, creating the conditions for others to operate safely and effectively."*⁶⁵ *"A comprehensive approach is one that fosters co-operation and co-ordination between international organisations, individuals, agencies and [non-governmental organisations], as well as the private sector."*⁶⁶

While actors concerned or already affected by the (potential) crisis express their interest in the situation and their willingness to act, a common approach to crisis management may emerge. Usually a mandating process within the framework of the United Nations or similar bodies will result in an authorisation to take action. This could either refer to an established alliance framework or through the formation of a coalition.

A COALITION is understood as an ad hoc or temporary grouping of nations and/or organisations united for a specific purpose / in a common cause.

⁶⁰ Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Keynote Address at the CD&E Conference 2009.

⁶¹ NATO Declaration on Alliance Security (04 April 2009), p.1.

⁶² Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in: NATO Press Release (23 April 2009), p.1.

⁶³ DEU Federal Ministry of Defence (2006), p.22.

⁶⁴ The term '**intervention**' is not intended to imply a purely military engagement. It is intended to describe interagency activity by a broad range of civil and military actors in a comprehensive approach context.

⁶⁵ Lane (2006), p.30.

⁶⁶ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, I.c., p.1.

*"In operations of choice, rather than conflicts involving national survival, the level of influence/interest displayed by each nation [] is determined by a multitude of factors, and shapes their objectives."*⁶⁷

Necessary factors for maintaining a coalition are:⁶⁸

- There is a shared incentive to benefit from and, consequently, participate in coalition activity.
- Partners trust in each other and believe that their peers have a credible commitment to the common issues or goals.
- The coalition has mechanisms to manage differences in language, orientation, tactics, culture, ideology, capabilities and resources, etc. between and amongst its members.




Figure 4: Coalition – Grouping of Partners

A coalition is a federation of entities; it is no organic entity itself naturally pursuing a collective goal and firmly controlling the performance of its parts.⁶⁹

Initial negotiations require the coalition to share views and assessments of the (potential) crisis, and reach consensus on interests, contributions, confirmation of unity, and demonstration of benefits. Continuous communication and negotiation amongst the coalition partners is required to facilitate adaptation to changing conditions that are bound to occur. The complexity created by the diversity of actors involved in a comprehensive approach adds to this challenge.

⁶⁷ Lane, I.c., p.30.

⁶⁸ Based on: Tarrow (1994).

⁶⁹ While understanding that individual coalition partners – nations or organisations – are composed of complex parts and are no organic entities themselves, it is not the task of this concept development project to offer solutions for or interfere with national or organisational circumstances.

3.2 The Communication Challenge: Cohesion and Coherence

Although potential coalition partners will assess a collective approach as more productive than the pursuit of individual interests, those interests will remain an important factor for the cohesion of partners. Coalition partners – based on their national assessments, cultural background and political caveats – tend to interpret the purpose of a coalition in their own interest and communicate accordingly.

As the coalition materialises there is a risk of contradictory messaging from partners (Figure 5) and an assumed benefit of common guidance concerning the delivery of effects in the information environment. Without that guidance, uncoordinated and inconsistent messaging is likely to occur, which is undesirable for all partners.




Figure 5: Risk of Contradictory Messaging

It is necessary to have synchronised and mutually supporting activity in order to achieve common mission objectives. Therefore, there is an immediate need to build 'coherence' around a statement of common cause – the coalition's vision⁷⁰ – that expresses the 'cohesion' of the coalition through a consistent description of coalition objectives and its desired image.

⁷⁰ The 'coalition's vision' provides the long-term perspective for the coalition effort, based on consensus on commonly shared values and principles as a prerequisite for unified action.




Figure 6: Cohesion and Coherence ⁷¹

'Cohesion' in this context refers to the internal dimension of communication: *"Who are we (as a coalition) and how do we want to be perceived?"*, which addresses the issue of a 'corporate identity' in marketing terms; 'coherence' refers to the external dimension: *"Do our actions reflect our identity?"* ('corporate image'). Other keywords representing the idea behind the subject of cohesion and coherence are: *Corporate Design, Corporate Reputation, Brand Integrity, Corporate Social Responsibility*; the related approach to communication is discussed in Section 3.3 below.

Coherence implies an overall state of mutual consistency amongst the different policies and actions of coalition partners. It builds around shared values and principles that provide the incentive for other actors to join the coalition. The purpose of the coalition – the accomplishment of the mission provided with the mandate – is a decisive factor but insufficient for the cohesion of the coalition.

Consensus and guidance from the highest strategic-political level is necessary for the development of the coalition's vision. When each actor within the coalition has the same overarching goal and receives consistent guidance, a common perspective of the coalition can be formed.

⁷¹ '**Cohesion**' means 'the act or state of sticking together tightly', which refers to the internal dimension, while '**coherence**' means 'the harmony of parts to one another as a whole' – the external dimension (<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/>).

3.3 A Management and Client-Centred Approach to Communication

"Often, little thought is given to the long-term strategy or the benefit delivered through the messages to the consumer. So, we find advertising people preparing advertising campaigns, public relations people developing PR programs, sales promotion people do the contests and sweepstakes and the direct marketing people do the mailings and so on with little regard for how each fits with the other. As a result, many of the communication programs, which were supposed to influence consumers, emerge from the process as uncoordinated, unrelated and often confusing and contradictory.

The result of all this – a consumer or customer who doesn't really know what to believe or how to respond to the communication programs which the company generates." ⁷²

In international development, communication is 'strategic' when it supports and promotes a management objective.⁷³ *"The ultimate goal of communication is to facilitate a change in behaviour rather than merely to disseminate information. Such change in behaviour amongst specific client ⁷⁴ and stakeholder groups is critical to the achievement of management objectives". ⁷⁵*

Communication in international development takes a client-centred or audience-oriented approach; it involves programs designed to influence the voluntary behaviour of actors to achieve management objectives. This requires *"active solicitation of [the perspectives of relevant actors to help consider options] to shape the formulation of policy, ensuring that the mechanisms are in place for a two-way flow of information and to build consensus amongst stakeholders."*⁷⁶

In multinational crisis management interventions communication should be regarded as a new security imperative, one that compels us to assess the information environment before deciding on action. *"Just like checking the weather before launching an aircraft, and diagnosing the medical condition of a patient before prescribing a treatment, [an] action should never be proposed, let alone instigated in future without first properly considering its informational effect on the wider strategic campaign."*⁷⁷

In commercial business management, Integrated Marketing Communication is considered *the* major communication development of the last decade of the twentieth century. It is a management concept designed to make all aspects of marketing communication such as advertising, sales promotion, public relations, and direct marketing work together as a unified force, rather than permitting each to work in isolation.⁷⁸ (Figure 7) Integrated Marketing Communication requires that *"the entire communication function must be part of the launch of a product, service, campaign or issue from its inception, and communicators must participate in the planning of a*

⁷² Schultz (1993/1), p.1.

⁷³ Klaverweide (2006). The term '**management objective**' simply means an objective of the organisation or mission, such as the United Nations and the achievement of its 'Millennium Development Goals'.

⁷⁴ In this context the term '**client**' is used synonymous for 'customer'/'(target) audience'/'communication partner'.

⁷⁵ UNSSC (2002), p.2.

⁷⁶ Mozammel/Zatlokal (2002), p.3.

⁷⁷ Tatham (2009), p.129.

⁷⁸ See Glossary for a definition of '**marketing**'. In a nutshell, marketing can be understood as the process applied by business corporations for balancing the interests of the organisation and its customers.

*campaign, not just in the implementation of communication vehicles"*⁷⁹. Integrated Marketing Communication – or as it is increasingly being called, Integrated Communication – is *"not an activity or a field or an industry. Instead, it is a coordinated method or way of thinking about the planning, development and implementation of communication programs for now and into the future."*⁸⁰




Figure 7: Integrated Marketing Communication⁸¹

There are a multiplicity of definitions, and hence a multiplicity of understandings, resulting in potential and actual variability in terms of applications of Integrated Marketing Communication. However, it was found that all definitions include at least five elements:⁸²

- To persuade and affect behaviour, not just attitudes;
- The use of all forms of communication and all company contacts as prospective message delivery channels;
- The requirement of approaching communication issues from the customer's perspective;
- The need to build and strengthen positive relationships between the company and various stakeholders;
- The need for synergy and harmonised communication processes to achieve a strong brand image.

⁷⁹ Ibahrine (2005), slide 7.

⁸⁰ Schultz (1998), p.1.

⁸¹ Based on: Afzal (2003), slide 5.

⁸² Based on: Shimp (2000), cited in: Kitchen/Pelsmacker (2004), p.13 et seq.

As marketing can be understood in simple terms as the balancing of the interests of the corporation and its customers, *"Integrated Marketing Communication makes use of all forms of communication which are relevant to the customer or prospect, and to which they might be receptive."*⁸³

*"'Strategic' refers to the overall driving force of the organisation. Integrated Marketing Communication has become part of that driving force according to this definition, or [] it has the potential to become a driving force [itself] if a company takes the steps that lead to its implementation."*⁸⁴

This approach is closely connected with the development of a 'corporate identity' – *"the 'persona' of the corporation – designed to accord with and facilitate the attainment of business objectives."*⁸⁵ A corporate identity, *inter alia*, builds on good relationships amongst the members of an organisation, and between them and their organisation as an entity. All relationships, whether between or amongst groups or organisations, are based on communication: *"Communication is the foundation of all human relationships."*⁸⁶ It involves emotions and system⁸⁷ structures⁸⁸ as key factors, and concerns exchange of information, ideas and feelings. *"Communication is the glue that binds organisations – but the stickiness depends on individual mindset."*⁸⁹ Developing a corporate identity is therefore an education process; its supporting communication programs require leadership, extensive learning and co-ordination of communication networks.

Corporate identity refers to the issue of cohesion and coherence discussed above: a corporate identity or *esprit de corps* is a necessary, but insufficient condition for successfully creating the perception of the corporation as a strong entity, promoting an accepted image of what the company represents. This image can be created by the corporation itself only to a limited degree: it is an image that is partially deliberate and partially accidental, partially self-created and partially exogenous.

The development of a corporate identity and its purposeful utilisation requires a deliberate, coordinated process, actively led by the most senior executives, that employs a broad array of techniques over a significant period of time to inform, educate, and motivate people to perform and behave in ways consistent with management objectives. Internal communication programs become effective when

INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATION is the process of developing and implementing various forms of persuasive communication programs with customers and prospects over time.

INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATION is a strategic business process used to plan, develop, execute, and evaluate coordinated, measurable, persuasive brand communication programs over time with consumers, customers, prospects, and other targeted individuals.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Matson-Knapp/Evans/Dangel-Cullen (2001); quoted from: http://www.answers.com/topic/corporate-identity?gwp=19#cite_note-0 (accessed 12 September 2009, 18:10).

⁸⁶ Duncan (2002), cited in: Kitchen/Pelsmacker, I.c., p.13 et seq.

⁸⁷ The concept of 'systems' used in this context includes both human as well as technical factors.

⁸⁸ Such as reporting relationships, rules and procedures, and command and control structures.

⁸⁹ Sopow (2009) slide 18.

the message is pushed out through ever-widening concentric circles, with successive waves of communication eventually reaching the entire organisation and beyond (Figure 8).




Figure 8: Leadership-Driven Communication⁹⁰

The development of a corporate identity and image needs to be driven by the senior leadership who not only own, but naturally represent their organisation to external actors. If corporate identity constitutes the '*persona*' of a corporation, leaders are the '*face*'.

In multinational crisis management interventions involving a coalition of different partners, a strong coalition '*corporate*' *identity* is also a prerequisite for robust and enduring cohesion. The coalition's vision, unifying all actors in purpose, provides for a well-directed development of the coalition's identity. Building and maintaining this common identity amongst coalition partners requires an *internal communication*⁹¹ process to maximise the support of stakeholders.

Once the coalition manages to express its identity and translate it into unified action and coherent appearance, a desired '*corporate*' *image* can be projected outside the coalition through *external communication*⁹².

⁹⁰ Based on: Oliver Wyman – Delta Organization & Leadership (2003/1), p.16.

⁹¹ '**Internal communication**' – the communication within an organisation, in our case: a coalition – consists of communication processes that foster cohesion or, in other terms, support building a kind of corporate identity amongst the coalition partners.

⁹² '**External communication**' – the communication between organisations, in our case: between the coalition and other actors – consists of communication processes that attempt to influence others' perception of the coalition and assist in promoting a desired corporate image.


Processes involved are quite similar to those used for the 'positioning'⁹³ of a product, brand, or organisation in business management.

Internal and external communication processes need to be closely linked in order to prevent confusion and discrepancies in the outside appearance of an organisation. This is particularly true as the means used for internal and external communication often correlate to a large extent, and the flow of information in modern information societies cannot be regulated.

'Brand equity' refers to what we call the 'narrative'⁹⁴ of an organisation, in this case the coalition, expressing its *raison d'être* and long-term goals in order to improve legitimacy and acceptance amongst audiences. A narrative presents the basic, inspiring and sense-making dimension of corporate messaging.⁹⁵

The identity and desired image of the coalition contribute to its persistent, top-down narrative, which provides the foundation and framework – or 'driving force' in the above sense – for focused implementation of coalition activity, particularly targeted messaging supporting *ad hoc* mission requirements (Figure 9).

INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATION is a dynamic, holistic approach, integrated into all levels of an organisation. It manages and fuses every point of contact between the organisation and its stakeholders. Through its coordinated efforts it supports a targeted, integrated, consistent brand communication strategy for the purpose of building positive lifetime relationships through data-driven techniques, by customer-conscious employees ultimately giving an organisation a competitive advantage and brand equity.



⁹³ Cf. A. Ries / J. Trout (1981).

⁹⁴ Linguistically a '**narrative**' denotes a message that tells the particulars of an act or occurrence or course of events, presented in any format; synonym for an account of events, or a story. See Section 4.7 for further details in the context of integrated communication.

⁹⁵ See Section 4.7 A Coalition Narrative must be Shared and Implemented by all Partners.

Figure 9: Consistent Messaging

A corporate coalition image – reflecting the identity of the coalition – is critical to enhancing legitimacy and accomplishment of common mission objectives. The coalition's promoted image will be compared to its words and deeds by all actors and audiences, whose perceptions may differ from the image intended for the coalition: effects in the information environment must be consistent with the desired image of the coalition; targeted messaging must correlate to the coalition's narrative.

In summary, communication is not an optional add-on to coalition operations. It must be thoroughly integrated at all stages of planning and conduct of operations, and shape both the design and implementation of crisis management activity. Effective communication in multinational coalition operations requires the integration of coalition internal and external communication processes at all levels in order to promote the cohesion and coherence of the coalition, and advance coalition interests and objectives.

3.5 The '3 Layers / 3 Pillars' Model

To summarise the basic propositions of this approach to integrated communication, a "3 Layers / 3 Pillars" model is proposed. In this model, three ground layers represent preconditions for any effective communication, whereas three pillars represent the key tasks to achieve integrated communication (see Figure 10).

Three bottom layers constitute the foundation of this model:

- First, communication must be understood as a process of creating and conveying meaning through symbolic interaction – verbally or non-verbally, intentionally or unintentionally – with perception and interpretation of actions playing a pivotal role.
- Second, communicators need to understand the strategy or vision of their organisation in order to be able to craft adequate messages and advise effective activity to get these messages across in support of mission objectives.
- Third, a systemic⁹⁶ and comprehensive understanding of the information environment is a condition that enables communication practitioners to tailor communication efforts to audiences and design culturally attuned information activities, based on a better comprehension of complex communication situations.

⁹⁶ **'Systemic'** means a holistic approach that draws from systems theory, aimed at understanding and influencing change in an open system. A **'systemic understanding'** means combining components of a system in a context and establishing the nature of their behaviour and relationships. (TRADOC Pam 525-5-500, p.6)




Figure 10: '3 Layers / 3 Pillars' of Integrated Communication

Once these foundations are created, three pillars depict the pro-active process requirements of integrated communication:

- First, communication must be integrated throughout all processes from analysis and planning to execution and assessment of activity. Planners and operators; leaders, managers, supervisors and employees – they all need to consider the information environment and understand the possible information effects of their actions.
- Second, leaders must accept their key role in the organisation's/coalition's communication, assisted by consulting, education and training efforts. *"When senior executives ignore the importance of communication – and the necessity of their own active, personal leadership in it – they seriously undermine the value of major initiatives of their organisation. Ineffective communication can sow dissension, heighten anxiety and confusion, alienate key individuals or groups, and damage management's credibility with critical audiences both inside and outside the organisation."*⁹⁷
- Last but not least, harmonisation of internal and external communication efforts is paramount for the development of both a common identity and a desired image of the organisation/coalition, and is thus a major prerequisite for effectiveness and ultimately for the achievement of objectives and mission accomplishment.

⁹⁷ Oliver Wyman – Delta Organization & Leadership (2003/1), p.4.

On these foundations and pillars builds integrated communication, which incorporates several processes that need to be taken care of by the senior leadership and appropriate assisting functions in order to be implemented consistently and become effective.

3.6 Hypotheses

The following is a list of prospective assumptions that describe the conceptual approach to integrated communication outlined in this concept:

- (H1) *Closing the Say-Do-Gap*: IF communication is thoroughly understood as a process of exchanging messages by words and deeds, THEN consistent and thus more effective activity will be promoted.
- (H2) *Common Guidance*: IF there is common guidance for coalition information activities issued by strategic-political authorities, THEN contradictory messaging by coalition partners will be minimised.
- (H3) *Leadership*: IF communication is leadership-driven, THEN it will become effective throughout all levels of involvement ('vertical dimension').
- (H4) *Understanding the Audience*: IF an audience-oriented approach to communication is applied, THEN discontinuity of messages and perceptions can be minimised.
- (H5) *Network of Experts*: IF there is a network of communication experts⁹⁸ from all partners established at the earliest stage of coalition-building (or even before), THEN consistent integration of communication by all partners will be facilitated ('horizontal dimension').
- (H6) *Common Identity*: IF a common coalition identity is promoted through internal communication along the coalition's vision, THEN coalition external communication efforts can purposefully assist the achievement of a desired image and credibility.
- (H7) *Narrative*: IF a coalition narrative is shared and implemented by all partners, THEN targeted messaging by coalition partners will be consistent.

⁹⁸ The term '**communication expert**' is used to indicate those functional specialists and generalists actively involved in and/or responsible for communication activity in the broader sense of this concept. It must not be confused with the plural use – 'communications expert' – often applied for IT or telecommunications specialists only.

4 Requirements for Integrated Communication

This chapter describes in more detail the roles of various functions and actors in analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of coalition operations based on the conditions suggested for the proposed solution (the *IF* parts of the hypotheses – H1 to H7 – listed in the previous chapter), and related requirements.

Initial organisational considerations are provided at Annex A – Organisational Considerations, looking at a project management approach to organising integrated communication for a combined multinational headquarters at the operational/implementation level. The annex also provides initial proposals for relevant roles and functions, and general qualification and co-ordination requirements for integrated communication.

4.1 Communication must be understood as a Process of Exchanging Messages by Words and Deeds

Actions often convey far more meaning and have an immeasurably greater impact on people's perception than words or imagery alone ever could. All actors are communicators, wittingly or not. Everything the coalition and its partners say, do, or fail to do and say, has intended and unintended consequences. Every action, word, and image sends a message, and every team member is a messenger, from the individual soldier or humanitarian aid worker in the field to the political leadership. Therefore, leaders must consider the many possible communication outcomes as they plan operations.

In order to avoid misperceptions and false expectations, coalition actors in international crisis management must fully understand the depth of their national resources so that they do not promise more than they can deliver. In the end, 'say' is great – but only 'do' matters.

The integrity of any organisation rides on the consistency of doing well what they say and saying well what they do every day at every point of contact with their audiences. Closing the 'say-do gap' will promote credibility and thus effectiveness through an accurate understanding of actions and intentions amongst audiences.

However, actions do not always speak for themselves the way we want them to do and should therefore be accompanied by coherent word messages. If we fail to explain our actions appropriately, somebody else will do it for us. Coalition actors should always strive for maintaining the authority of interpretation.

4.2 Common Guidance for Coalition Information Activities must be issued by Strategic-Political Authorities

Effective communication builds on the understanding and engaging of foreign and domestic audiences within a comprehensive approach. Coalition information activities comprise national, strategic-political initiatives as well as in-theatre,

implementation-level activities. This view originates from the acceptance of the global nature of information and the information environment, and reflects the fact that each and every activity of the coalition and its partners – regardless of the intended purpose and the respective level of involvement – will be perceived indiscriminately and automatically assigned to the combined multinational effort by the concerned local/regional audience(s). Therefore, coalition communication requires high-level guidance in order to be able to generate a series of coordinated, combined and synchronised information activities that assist the achievement of mission objectives.

Strategic-political guidance for information activities must be fully integrated with and supportive of the multinational approach to crisis management. This guidance must also be mission-specific, adaptive to developments in the operational environment, and flexible to meet mission and situation requirements.

High-level guidance must be issued by the political leadership of the coalition ('strategic-political authority') at the earliest stage possible and updated to meet situational requirements throughout the operation/mission. Such guidance must be adaptable and balanced: generic/abstract provisions will guide coalition activity consistently towards the achievement of long-term objectives and provide the vision context; detailed/specific instructions refer to the current situation in the information environment and assist the achievement of outputs and outcomes.

The aim of mission-specific, superior political guidance is to ensure that all coalition information activities related to the situation in the crisis area, and possible responses given to it are:

- *relevant and accessible* to serve as an incentive for local commitment;
- *timely and pro-active* in order to prevent gaps in information and complement other activity for affecting the information environment;
- *consistent and coherent* through a sustained co-ordination effort across activities, which creates synergetic effects;
- *purposeful and beneficial* for the appropriate audiences in order to achieve maximum effectiveness;
- *credible, factual, authentic and transparent* in order to sustain the campaign and create the perception of legitimacy;
- *protected* to minimise distortion or attack, given the vulnerability of information and information systems;
- *sensitive* to non-affiliated actors who share common objectives and whose good will and co-operation will contribute to coalition success.

Common guidance should reflect the coalition's vision, which provides the long-term perspective for the coalition effort.

Focused and purposeful activity at all levels requires that all actors understand the purpose of their actions and consider the envisioned outcomes feasible within the scope of their individual and group capability. Coalition leaders cannot accurately articulate a vision for their organisation unless superior political leadership provides them with a political end state and resources to accomplish this end state.

The VISION describes the overall system state of the crisis area in a global context that ideally exists when no further external intervention is required to sustain an acceptable situation and the formal coalition can dissolve.

As the coalition's vision points at circumstances which are desirable but not always feasible within a reasonably acceptable and traceable timeframe, it is often not suitable for directly deriving substance for information activities. The coalition's acceptance and credibility would be at risk, if its objectives could be argued to be promises that cannot be kept. However, the vision needs to be addressed in the guidance in order to complete the strategic context relevant for information activities.

Information objectives⁹⁹ are the centrepiece of strategic-political guidance for coalition information activities and provide the link between the coalition's vision and narrative and information activities. In so doing, information objectives bring about strategic alignment. Together with further details on implementation and assessment, information objectives would be laid down in specific communication plans¹⁰⁰ that convert strategic intent into execution. The communication plan at the highest (strategic-political) level captures the coalition's Information Strategy¹⁰¹.

4.3 Communication must be Leadership-Driven

4.3.1 Leadership Philosophy

*"Leadership [] implies managing subordinates, taking responsibility for them and leading them to reach goals. [] Leaders are 'managers of meaning', influencing groups to achieve their goals. Leaders give their subordinates a sense of what is important in organisational reality or 'sense-making'. [] A leader is seen as someone who defines organisational reality through the articulation of a vision which is a reflection of how he or she defines an organisation's mission and the values which will support it."*¹⁰²

In civilian business management leaders should have at least the following qualities¹⁰³: curiosity, creativity, character, courage, conviction, charisma,

⁹⁹ 'Information objectives' are desired conditions to be created in the information environment. They should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of related actions and effects.

¹⁰⁰ Annex B – Generic Framework for Communication Plans provides a suggested framework for communication plans.

¹⁰¹ The 'Information Strategy' describes the interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and political guidance for information activities across all levers of power in support of mission objectives.

¹⁰² Zerfass/Huck (2007), p.113 et seq.

¹⁰³ Cf. Iacocca/Whitney (2007): "The Nine Cs of Leadership".

competence, common sense, and *communication skills*. *"Being a good communicator is half the battle won. After all, if one speaks and listens well, then there is little or no scope for misunderstanding."*¹⁰⁴

*"In attribute terms, [the leader] must be a powerful analyst, an excellent negotiator with persuasive powers of communication, and who is able to deliver change through force of argument. He must be an active listener, have political acuity, know when to challenge, and be patient. He must be pragmatic, but creative in his methods of trying to surmount the impact of these constraints where they have a negative impact on the success of the mission. He must possess the vision and presence to create the 'buy-in', and possess excellent decision-making skills to know when the level of risk outweighs the benefit. He must be a team-builder, generating a congruence of views in his subordinates on priorities and strategy, so that there is enhanced unity of effort."*¹⁰⁵

A critical leadership requirement in international crisis management is cross-cultural awareness (see Section 4.4.1). *"Stability and support operations demand adept leaders who can work with community, international, and private organisations whose members come from widely divergent cultural backgrounds."*¹⁰⁶ *"Cultural knowledge benefits leaders when integrated into planning [at all levels], especially when the desired outcome is to win the 'hearts and minds' of the local population."*¹⁰⁷

Leaders represent authority: they possess interpretative predominance and are recognised by internal and external actors as responsible for defining ends, ways and means of the coalition. As such, leaders will be held responsible for all coalition activity.

Leaders are role models for the members of their organisation. At the same time, external actors perceive them as main representatives of the organisation. Therefore, integrated communication is a strategic management function to harmonise the internal and external roles of leadership, and positively impact the perception of internal and external audiences.

Senior leaders must be aware of the importance of the information factor and assume direct responsibility.¹⁰⁸ *"To ensure integration of communication efforts, leaders should place communication at the core of everything that they do. Successful [] communication [] begins with clear leadership intent and guidance. Desired objectives and outcomes are then closely tied to major lines of operation outlined in the [] plan. The results are actions and words linked to the plan."*¹⁰⁹

In order to consistently integrate communication at all levels, the risk of misinterpretation of related direction and guidance needs to be minimised. This may require centralised control exercised through hierarchical organisations rather than decentralised decision-making or subsidiarity. Senior leaders and their

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.communicationskills.co.in/definition-of-communication-skills.htm>.

¹⁰⁵ Lane (2006), p.33.

¹⁰⁶ Arcuri (2007), p.2 et seq.

¹⁰⁷ Arcuri, I.c., p.3.

¹⁰⁸ Based on: NATO HQ SACT, Report (2010), p.22.

¹⁰⁹ Hastings (2008), p.1.

communication staffs¹¹⁰ are challenged by applying the right command and control orientation to their specific organisational contexts. In any case, parallel or conflicting lines of command must be avoided; operators and communicators need to work hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder, at all levels.

In multinational crisis management interventions, the Head of Mission should 'own' the coalition's Information Strategy. As it is his responsibility to implement the mandate of the international community through common coalition activity, it is his privilege to define the coalition's vision and translate it into a narrative that reflects the desired perception of the overall mission.

In order to adopt integrated communication as a leadership philosophy, leaders need to acquire and develop *intercultural communicative competence*¹¹¹ through professional development assisted by their communication staffs.

4.3.2 Harmonisation of Internal and External Communication

Internal communication is a main part of leadership: it is the foundation of the interaction between leaders and followers. Good leaders, therefore, are good communicators. Cohesion of coalition actors depends on good leadership, i.e., effective communication amongst leaders and followers.

External communication building on the desired image of the coalition needs to be consistent with its mission and values, and communication themes must be developed in the context of the coalition's vision. Information activities – words and deeds of any coalition actor at all levels – must refer to leadership guidance in order to promote consistency of actions and overall coherence. A top-down approach to communication is a prerequisite for the implementation of strategic-political guidance.

Integrated coalition communication efforts should address a range of dimensions in order to support the achievement of consistency throughout the levels of involvement, and respond to the expectations of the various stakeholders involved:

- The *presentational* dimension takes into account a global expectation that some or all elements of coalition activities must be in the public domain, because of (national) freedom of information rights, public information activities, and the need to inform the public about the coalition's mission, objectives and activities.
- The *targeted* dimension includes agreed elements in the information environment towards which information activities should be directed in order to affect capabilities and influence perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour favourable to own objectives.
- The *protective* dimension refers to existing disclosure policies and operations security requirements. It aims at safeguarding own freedom of manoeuvre in the information environment, minimising the

¹¹⁰ Those functional specialists and generalists actively involved in and/or responsible for communication activity of an organisation.

¹¹¹ See Section 4.4.1.

opportunity for adversaries to exploit coalition vulnerabilities, and protecting individual partners' national interests.

Coalition communication should draw from guidance for in-theatre information activities as well as national initiatives of coalition partners to affect the information environment in support of common objectives. All these together make up a coalition information campaign, which can substantially support the multinational crisis management effort when perceived as a consistent entity of activity.

Strong two-way communication, internal and external, and consistency of message will support more effective decision-making, better feedback to our stakeholders and improved staff efficiency and morale.¹¹² Consistent activity and thus consistent messaging requires integrated communication. Internal and external communication efforts need to build on the same concepts of coalition identity and image.

In today's information societies the use of social media platforms is an ever-growing, emerging aspect affecting all dimensions of life. Web 2.0 applications are frequently employed for marketing purposes and user-generated content becomes a characteristic of new business cultures. Leaders must be aware of the 'digital dream couple' Internet and mobile phones¹¹³ having changed all of our lifestyles dramatically. Some business managers even consider their staff members who actively participate in social networks as 'extended communication channels'.¹¹⁴ The advantages of this enhanced reach-out for spreading information to audiences quickly come along with considerable risks: internal communication programs should therefore promote a corporate culture that emphasises individual responsibilities in a larger communication context.

4.3.3 Integration of Communication throughout All Organisational Processes

In complex crisis management every activity carries with it multidimensional communication implications and messages. In order to avoid confusion, misinformation and speculation about the coalition's intent and capability, these messages must be delivered consistently and often on a global basis. Communication issues can be identified at any step of the coalition's decision making process, and relevant communication strategies should be weaved into a comprehensive plan.

Integrated communication must build on helping the coalition senior leadership achieve their objectives by identifying important audiences, developing strategic and consistent messages and delivering those messages with maximum effectiveness.

Any separation of communicators and operators must be avoided in order to promote a common coalition identity and achieve coherent activity that contributes to a desired image of the coalition as a unified and capable organisation. The

¹¹² Based on: NATO HQ SACT, Strategic Plan 2009-2013 (2008/2), p.9.

¹¹³ Helmut Spudich: "Die digitale Neuvermessung der Welt – Das digitale Traumpaar Internet und Mobilfunk hat unsere Kommunikation und Lebensgewohnheiten rasant verändert"; in: DER STANDARD (07/08 August 2010), p.2.

¹¹⁴ Christian Göttinger (Head of Talent Management and Cultural Change, A1 Telekom Austria); cited in: DER STANDARD (07/08 August 2010), p.K1.

communication staffs must get actively involved in all analysis, planning, execution/management, and assessment/evaluation activity. Communication experts should be key actors in the senior leadership's decision-making process.

4.4 An Audience-Oriented Approach must be applied to Information Activities

In today's new communication environment the most fundamental change that has occurred reveals perhaps that so many audiences need to be addressed on an almost individual basis. *"Proliferation of new media options, the emergence of new mass and personal media technologies, and a general build-up of media clutter have given audiences so many options – and control over the communication process has shifted away from the sender to the receiver."*¹¹⁵

Traditional communication efforts in marketing strategies have often suffered from underachievement, i.e., expectations with regard to the outcome of costly and time-consuming advertising, sales promotion and the like were hardly met. *"The reason for this communication discontinuity is that marketing communication programs [were] generally prepared using a corporate or internal view [and have often been the least responsive to consumer wants and needs]. That is, they have determined internally what the company wanted to say to consumers rather than what the customer might need or want to see or hear. This is compounded when, after having delivered the messages they wanted to impart, which may have been in conflict with consumer needs and wants, the company then tried to defend what had been done, often making the situation worse rather than better. The alternative to this inside-out approach is using an outside-in, proactive, consumer-oriented method of developing meaningful, helpful and responsible marketing communication programs."*¹¹⁶

Only audience-oriented communication can be persuasive communication; true to the motto: 'The bait must attract the fish rather than the fisherman!' This notably involves the understanding of audiences from their various perspectives, including the requirement of 'strategic listening' (*"Seek first to understand, then to be understood!"*¹¹⁷).

Key to an audience-oriented approach to information activities is a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the information environment gauging the most effective ways of reaching the audience, which must be conducted prior to the launch of any operation and carried on throughout its execution. A thorough and continuous assessment of the information environment should involve active engagement of, and listening to relevant actors' and audiences' needs and views.

4.4.1 Understanding the Information Environment and Cross-Cultural Awareness

"The communication sphere has no geographical boundaries and continuously evolves, which produces tangible effects [in the operational environment]. This can

¹¹⁵ Drobis, I.c., p.7.

¹¹⁶ Schultz (1993/1), p.1.

¹¹⁷ Covey (1989), p.235.

*immediately impact human relations and security conditions, thus facilitating or hindering the achievement of mission objectives".*¹¹⁸

International crisis management demands awareness of behaviour patterns of relevant cultural groups, and that we adapt own activity accordingly. Acting in a very fluid and dynamic environment, we inevitably encounter situations that directly challenge us from a cultural perspective. In such cases we have two choices: 'react' or 'respond'. While one invites emotional triggers (react), the other invites logical and resourceful habits (response). Integrated communication should assist in achieving cognisant behaviour in the information environment.

Actors in the information environment and those responsible for planning and directing respective activity first need to understand their area of application. A comprehensive and systemic understanding of the information environment by all decision makers and their staffs, combined with an enhanced cultural literacy, should be the ultimate goal for integrating the information factor throughout analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/ evaluation of operations. *"This requires the matching of message delivery means, communication channels, messengers and audiences, while understanding that true audience segregation is unachievable"*¹¹⁹ in the global information environment.

Details on the subject of understanding the information environment can be found in the MNE 6, Objective 2.2 Analytical Concept "Enhanced Systemic Understanding of the Information Environment in Complex Crisis Management" (see Bibliography).

A coalition's understanding of the information environment begins with the partners' understanding of themselves and the acceptance of the coalition as their organisation. It requires awareness of their own national identity and understanding the rationale for becoming a member of the multinational group forming the coalition, as well as the conditions of this multinational environment.

Cultural awareness is a first step in developing the required intercultural competences for effective cross-cultural communication. This requirement is as relevant for internal communication – between multinational coalition partners within and across organisations and their staffs – as it is for external communication with foreign and domestic audiences.

CULTURAL AWARENESS is the recognition that not all people are from the same cultural background; that people have different values, different behaviours and different approaches to life.

Cultural awareness training would remain inadequate if its focus would primarily be *"intended to avoid embarrassing social offences"*¹²⁰ in situations where members of foreign cultures meet. 'Awareness' must not be mistaken simply as *"to know that it exists without understanding."*¹²¹

¹¹⁸ NATO HQ SACT, Report (2010), p.19.

¹¹⁹ NATO HQ SACT, Concept (2009), Paragraph 6.e.

¹²⁰ Zevenbergen/Lynn (2009), p.2.

¹²¹ Ibid.

Cross-cultural awareness complements cultural awareness by adding the actionable, applied dimension of cultural literacy. The resulting intercultural competences can then be focused for communication efforts and developed into intercultural communicative competence.

CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS is the understanding of the differences between oneself and people from other countries or other backgrounds, especially differences in attitudes and values, based on conscious attention and knowledge of culture.

"With joint markets and global communication, mass tourism and mass migration, [] the need to mediate between languages and cultures increases." Consequently, new notions of transnational and intercultural literacy develop, which "recognise that communication with others who do not share our background, and exposure to and contact with other modes of thinking is becoming essential to our daily lives."¹²²

INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE is the ability of a person to behave adequately and in a flexible manner when confronted with actions, attitudes and expectations of representatives of foreign cultures.

Training in the context of integrated communication should therefore aim at an integrated approach to developing intercultural communicative competence (Figure 11).




Figure 11: Integrated Development of Intercultural Communicative Competence¹²³

¹²² Dieter Buttjes, in: Buttjes/Byram (1991), p.5 et seq.

¹²³ Based on: Michael Byram, in: Buttjes/Byram (1991), p.20 ("The Language and Culture Teaching Process").

All coalition actors should engage in developing intercultural communicative competence. This will be achieved mainly in two areas: cultural knowledge education and foreign language training.

4.4.1.1 Cultural Knowledge Education

Cross-cultural awareness involves the ability of standing back from ourselves and becoming aware of others' values, beliefs, perceptions, and modes or types of communication. It becomes central for communication in a multinational context.

In order to develop intercultural communicative competence throughout the coalition and its individual members, cultural knowledge education should be introduced as a standard training subject. Cultural knowledge education aims at *"becoming competent within a foreign culture. [] A thorough cultural educational background will prevent significant mistakes in cross-cultural interaction"*¹²⁴ and promote the effectiveness of coalition communication efforts. Cross-cultural awareness will support both internal and external communication in a multinational coalition environment.

Details on the subject of cultural knowledge education and cross-cultural awareness training can be found in the MNE 6, Objective 4.3 Analytical Concept "Cross-Cultural Awareness" (see Bibliography).

4.4.1.2 Foreign Language Training

*"If language is not correct, then what is said is not what is meant;
if what is said is not what is meant, then what ought to be done remains undone."*¹²⁵

The knowledge of languages is the gateway to cultural understanding and international communication. There is a significant relationship between foreign language proficiency and the ability to develop a common (or corporate) identity in multinational environments such as a coalition. In particular internal communication and leadership depend on the ability to understand and use the language of the lead nation, which for many is a second language rather than their mother tongue.

Cultural awareness training must also stress language skills which constitute a decisive factor for interaction in a multinational environment¹²⁶ – and for cross-cultural communication.

Experience has shown that there are some observable behaviour patterns in multinational organisations that directly result from the status of being a native or non-native speaker¹²⁷, and which have an effect on intra-organisational co-operation (Figure 12). Generally speaking, group behaviour may range between supportive and destructive concerning the cohesion of an organisation, depending on language proficiency and group interests.

¹²⁴ Zevenbergen/Lynn, l.c., p.5.

¹²⁵ Confucius (http://thinkexist.com/quotation/if_language_is_not_correct-then_what_is_said_is/147447.html).

¹²⁶ Cf. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GOA) Report (2009).

¹²⁷ In this context the labels 'native' and 'non-native' are used in a generic sense and do not refer to a specific language or nationality. Also, the respective behaviour patterns shown in the Figure are illustrative and very much depend on individual attitudes.

Language Skills	Group Behaviour			
Native Speakers	ARROGANCE - neglect multinational integration - consider the organisation as national means with multinational augmentation		INCLUSIVENESS - accept cross-organisational responsibility to facilitate multinational integration	
Non-Native Speakers	PRESERVATION - insist on national discreteness while claiming authority	ISOLATION - back out and establish own niche	SUBSERVIENCE - unconditional fealty for native speakers / lead nation	MULTINATION- NALISATION - suppress national identity to serve the organisation

Figure 12: Language Skills and Group Behaviour

Although interacting linguistic, psychological and sociocultural factors determine individual language proficiency to an extent that makes it almost impossible to predict related group behaviour, it can be considered a valid assumption that good language skills can foster cohesion and facilitate the development of a common identity amongst the members of complex organisations.

Language shapes the way we behave and think: when we learn our mother tongue, we do after all acquire certain habits of thought that determine our experience in significant ways. In other words, the availability of symbols for objects influences our perception of these. Recent studies indicate that different languages influence our minds in different ways and that this it is not because of what our language allows us to think but rather because of what it habitually obliges us to think about.¹²⁸ This distinctive quality of learning languages needs to be considered in cultural knowledge education and the development of intercultural communicative competence.

Intercultural communicative competence in support of communication within an organisation requires remarkably different standards than that in external communication. Whereas for internal communication the skills of 'reading' and 'writing' may often become as important as the oral skills, 'listening' and 'speaking' may become predominant for external communication in international crisis management interventions.

All personnel deploying to a foreign country should acquire minimum standards in speaking and understanding the local language, relative to their prospective tasks. Local populations will not expect accentless command of their language from coalition actors but appreciate their honest endeavours of authentic communication.

The employment of interpreters is another option for cross-cultural communication. However, co-operation with interpreters needs to be trained, *inter alia* with respect to

¹²⁸ Cf. Deutscher (2010).

interpersonal and security aspects. This indirect approach to communication may jeopardise authenticity and negatively affect the credibility of the messenger if there isn't a very close and trusting working relationship.

4.4.2 Participatory Communication

Multinational interventions should be accepted by the host nation(s) or beneficiaries as assistance; any intention of oppression, paternalism or occupation, as well as any such perception, must be avoided. *"This involves devolving control of implementation to local stakeholders, a sustained policy dialogue between civil society organisations, their governments, and coalition representatives within the framework of the mandate, and a commitment to local action."*¹²⁹

'Local ownership'¹³⁰ reflects a reorientation that more highly values the need for home-grown solutions to conflict problems and for partnerships to be locally driven. Communication in international crisis management should encourage the active involvement of key leaders and relevant stakeholders in a similar process of 'participatory communication' that promotes legitimacy and acceptance of the coalition amongst audiences concerned.

PARTICIPATION is the engagement of a local population and, at times, additional stakeholders in the creation, content and conduct of a program or policy designed to change their lives.

Built on a belief that citizens can be trusted to shape their own future, 'participatory development' uses local decision-making and capacities to steer and define the nature of an intervention.¹³¹ For effective crisis management a participatory approach to communication *"means moving from a focus of informing and persuading people to change their behaviour or attitudes, to a focus on facilitating exchanges between different stakeholders to address a common problem."*¹³²

PARTICIPATORY COMMUNICATION is an approach based on dialogue, which allows the sharing of information, perceptions and opinions among the various stakeholders and thereby facilitates their empowerment.

Key results of participatory communication are enhanced mutual awareness amongst actors and their commitment to action. In this respect, participatory communication can facilitate the acceptance of a coalition in crisis interventions and promote the achievement of desired perceptions based on a common understanding of intents, goals and rationales. Participatory communication also contributes to the balancing of interpretations, and help avoiding false expectations towards and amongst stakeholders and audiences.

¹²⁹ Mozammel/Zatlokal, I.c., p.3.

¹³⁰ Cf. Reich (2006), Pouligny (2009).

¹³¹ Cf. Jennings (2000), Bessette (2004).

¹³² Bessette (2004), p.8.

4.5 A Network of Communication Experts must be established at the Earliest Stage of Coalition-Building

Cohesion of partners in a complex comprehensive approach context requires networking, which is important for the harmonisation of communication efforts across organisational boundaries. Moreover, the cultivation of productive relationships for the exchange of information or services amongst individuals, groups, or institutions concerned with communication and related information disciplines provides a mutually beneficial exchange between practitioners, and contributes to their professional development.

Multinational networks of communication experts may be established in various areas – such as science, economy, politics, military, etc. These networks can be used to facilitate coalition-building and integrate different perspectives in support of a comprehensive approach. Networking can also facilitate favourable relationships between coalition communication officials and the national and international media.

Horizontal and vertical networking opportunities across organisational boundaries, including formal and informal expert networks and forums, should be established with maximum 'freedom of movement' for communication experts to facilitate co-operation of internal and external actors.

Networks of communication experts should be established as early as possible, ideally prior to coalition-building, in order to enable timely contributions to goal-setting and strategic planning. They should comprise functional specialists (such as analysts, media designers or marketers) as well as generalists (such as campaign planners and heads of communication) and subject matter experts from external agencies.

A reachback capability can enhance integrated communication by providing links to subject matter experts, organisations and facilities, in particular in the areas of analysis, assessment (including measurement of effectiveness), and media design, production and dissemination.

4.6 A Common Coalition Identity must be promoted through Internal Communication along the Coalition's Vision

Due to the complex relationship between knowledge and practice, doing and being, identity and action, the coalition needs to embrace its values in order to improve the coalition's credibility, and to be able to project these values accordingly.¹³³ A corporate identity campaign should continuously promote the common understanding of the coalition's vision amongst all coalition partners. *"Successful communication with others, successful and sustaining relationships, are well served by an organisation first understanding its own personality before attempting to build relationships with other personalities."*¹³⁴

¹³³ Based on: IPI, SRSG Meeting Note (2010), p.2.

¹³⁴ Sopow (2004), slide 5 (speaking notes).

A common coalition identity must refer to its mandate and motives, which must be understood and shared as fundamental guidance for all coalition activity by all partners. This fundamental guidance should be expressed in the coalition's vision.

A similar view is expressed in the United Nations' Integrated Missions concept: *"An Integrated Mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level. This strategic objective is the result of a deliberate effort by all elements of the UN system to achieve a shared understanding of the mandates and functions of the various elements [] and to use this understanding to maximize UN effectiveness, efficiency, and impact in all aspects of its work. An Integrated Mission is one in which structure is derived from an in-depth understanding of the specific country setting; of the evolving security, political, humanitarian, human rights and development imperatives in that particular country; and of the particular mix of assets and capacities available and/or required to achieve the desired impact through mutually supportive action. In other words, form (mission structure) should follow function and be tailored to the specific characteristics of each country setting."*¹³⁵

*"A strong corporate identity enhances perceived quality."*¹³⁶ A mission-oriented coalition identity is a prerequisite for the cohesion of coalition partners, which in turn allows the coalition as a whole to perform coherent activity. Once this coherence is linked to the coalition's vision throughout, it will be perceived as robust, capable and credible.

Internal communication programs involving all members of an organisation can support the development of a collective self-image, which can be used in a corporate identity campaign designed to build corporate image and culture through coherent and consistent information activities. Such programs should provide cascading, top-down information on the mission and related self-concept of the coalition, applying a 'push' rather than a 'pull' principle.

4.7 A Coalition Narrative must be Shared and Implemented by all Partners

To achieve sustained outcome, the short-term communication focus of targeted messaging has to be coherent with the long-term goals of an organisation. *"Sustainable support for any institution or campaign is founded on both logic and instinct. [The coalition] therefore needs to ensure that, firstly, it has a core narrative that resonates with its audiences, and, secondly, its operations and actions are consistent with that narrative."*¹³⁷

The NARRATIVE is the translation of the coalition mandate and vision into a fundamental, persistent story of who the coalition is, what its guiding principles are, and what it aspires to achieve. It is the foundation of all coalition communication efforts in building identity and promoting a desired image.

¹³⁵ UN DPKO - IMPP (2006), p.3. For further elaboration on the UN's Integrated Missions concept see Eide et al. (2005): *"An integrated mission should [inter alia] entail: a clearly defined purpose for [] engagement, based on a robust analysis of the situation ... [and] a structure to ensure effective external and internal communication."* (ibid., p.15)

¹³⁶ Plowman/Chiu, l.c., p.5.

¹³⁷ NATO ACO Dir 95-2 (2009), Chapter 4.1.

The narrative is the structured expression of a thematic story about the rationale, intent and aims – the 'why' – of an organisation. It reflects the vision and strategy of the organisation, and, like a script or score, guides its mission conduct – the 'how' of its overall activity.¹³⁸

*"Narratives are more than simply 'stories'. Narratives describe the history, purpose and achievements of a collective entity [], and they contribute in the process towards its unity and facilitate its continuous transformation."*¹³⁹

The coalition's narrative must be *"the compelling foundation of all its communication efforts. [It] is the common reference point that should guide the development of all of the [coalition's kinetic and non-kinetic] plans."*¹⁴⁰ It ultimately portrays the coalition identity and provides an important foundation for achieving a desired image.

A persuasive narrative requires the following components:¹⁴¹

- *Rationale*: the reasonable argument and desired psychological effect.
- *Evidence*: the substantiation of assertions made of the rationale.
- *Comprehensibility*: the adequacy with which it translates into the language and culture of the recipients.
- *Emotional acceptability*: the appropriateness of its tone.
- *Co-ordination*: the extent to which it is delivered through consistent messages by all actors involved.
- *Sustainability*: the basic validity of its substance beyond changing situations and actors.

There are two basic categories of narratives: (1) 'organisational narratives' refer to the fundamental purpose or *raison d'être* of an organisation and are often derived from the organisation's foundation treaties¹⁴²; (2) 'mission narratives' are designed to support concrete operations or undertakings based on a specific mandate or business plan. For international crisis management coalitions both types are relevant and required. However, a mission narrative may be easier to design, agree on, and get across in a temporary coalition context.

Mission narratives must not be confused with master messages, which are usually designed for operations within missions to provide the thread for a limited scope of activity. In multinational coalition operations, mission narratives support consistency over time – beyond single operations and beyond changing personnel contingents.

Aside those narratives designed for a coalition to support its mission accomplishment there exist 'cultural narratives'¹⁴³ that are inherent in every coalition partner's activity. These manifestations of cultural identity may (sometimes decisively) influence the perceptions of other actors and must therefore be carefully considered, in particular

¹³⁸ Based on: Yolles (2007), p.76.

¹³⁹ Flockhart (2010), p.4.

¹⁴⁰ NATO HQ SACT, Concept (2009), Paragraph 6.i.

¹⁴¹ Based on: Crannell/Sheppard (2010), p.1 et seq.

¹⁴² Also: 'memorandum of association' or 'articles of incorporation'.

¹⁴³ Cf. MNE 6 Objective 4.3 Analytical Concept (2010), Section 4.3: "Manifestations and Transmission of Culture".

in planning and assessment of operations. An appropriate degree of intercultural communicative competence may mitigate related undesired and unintended effects.

To promote the alignment of words and deeds, a narrative should address both the external and the internal dimension of an organisation's communication. Externally, narratives reflect the coalition's mission objectives to influence external audiences. Internally, narratives may well be taken as 'corporate principles' or 'codes of conduct' to guide the behaviour of coalition actors.

The narrative must be based on the coalition's vision for an operation or mission. Following a top-down approach, information objectives – providing guidance for all coalition information activities – must be directly linked to the narrative. Inversely, the narrative must also incorporate feedback from the assessment of operations in order to maintain its validity and relevance for targeted messaging.¹⁴⁴

4.8 Principles of Integrated Communication

Principles of integrated communication are:

- Actors need an appropriate understanding of the information environment and require intercultural competences.
- Actors need to understand communication as a process characterised by the exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages.
- All members of the coalition need to understand its global, long-term perspective.
- Senior leaders have a pivotal role in communication efforts at all levels.
- Effectiveness is promoted through cohesion and coherence of the coalition.
- All coalition activity must continuously be cross-functionally integrated and incorporate communication aspects throughout.

¹⁴⁴ "We must recognize that the information warfare, the battle for the hearts and minds of the global audience, is just as heavy a priority as the military operation itself and the tactical events on the battlefield must feed the narrative: that we are living up to our values, that while winning this fight, we are saving the innocent people that we are out there to protect." (Mattis, 2010)

5 Political Considerations

The core of every crisis and conflict as well as the conflict-related root causes – power, resources, security, participation, influence, ideology – are by nature political and driven by political considerations. Communication is the multinational coalition's holistic approach to interaction with

- local and regional audiences (including the media and compliant as well as non-compliant actors);
- the domestic audiences of coalition partner nations (which are often quite heterogeneous); and
- the 'global audience' (which, in general, is only indirectly involved in the particular crisis situation, but whose responses can have an immediate impact on the mission);

and is ultimately an adaption of political processes, which follow specific rules, mechanisms and dilemmas.

In today's largely globalised information society a clear distinction between local, regional and global audiences is sometimes no longer possible, putting additional challenge on the coherence and consistency of the coalition's approach to external communication and making it a crucial precondition for mission success.¹⁴⁵ In particular, bridging the different (sometimes diametrically opposed) expectations of the 'home front' on the one hand and the audiences within the mission area on the other hand, poses a complex and continuous challenge.

This chapter outlines the main political preconditions, obstacles, frictions, and challenges to communication in multinational coalition operations, and presents some guiding questions for further consideration.

5.1 Policy-Making and Strategic-Political Guidance

The process of policy-making within a coalition has to be considered as a complex and iterative process of continuous coordination and negotiation between the contributing nations on the one hand and within the coalition's nations on the other hand. Even if national views on strategic aims and the desired end-state of a particular coalition operation are broadly conterminous, national positions usually vary on a very large scale when it comes to concrete considerations and approaches. Beyond usual differences in the understanding of the role of a multinational coalition within an operational environment in general, threat perceptions, regional and geographic considerations, the assessment of local partners and actors, national traditions, approaches and caveats as well as concrete courses of action and related strategic guidance can lead to considerable heterogeneity and underline the permanent need for consultation, co-ordination and communication within the multinational framework.

¹⁴⁵ See Section: 3.2 The Communication Challenge: Cohesion and Coherence.

Furthermore, there is an increasing necessity in the context of contemporary crisis management to act not only as a multinational military coalition but within a comprehensive civil-military framework – which includes a broad range of heterogeneous actors, forces political decision makers as well as leading military personnel – to spend a considerable amount of time to gather, evaluate and integrate different interests perspectives, approaches and capabilities of all relevant stakeholders on the local, regional and multinational level.

This once more underlines the structural need for a systematic consultation effort at the strategic-political level, within which the development of an overarching coalition narrative can serve as an integrating and (self-)assuring nexus – mainly on the psychological level. This coalition narrative has to be closely linked and derived from the coalition's mandate and vision and has to reflect the values and moral standards of the partners. Beyond strengthening the intra-coalition cohesion, a coherent coalition narrative serves also as a link between the respective coalition's contributors, their domestic audiences and local/regional actors in the operational area. Dominating the narrative of any operation – whether military or otherwise – pays enormous dividends. Failure to do so undermines support for policies and operations, and can actually damage a coalition's reputation, possibly worldwide.

Our adversaries/competitors have already recognized that perception is as important to their successes as their actual performance skills, and they always will develop and spread their own narrative in direct confrontation to those of the coalition. They usually will try to directly and indirectly disrupt our policy-making processes and undermine coalition's credibility by various activities and their efforts will involve deception, sophisticated attempts to spin events, as well as outright lies. Modern conflicts have become unthinkable without this 'battle of narratives' and the political decision makers of the contributing nations have to be prepared for this continuous challenge. They have to plan ahead for situations, in which different interests/perceptions of coalition partners collide or are played-off by the coalition's adversaries. This includes also a better preparation of the general public, which has to realize new ways of conflict and their particular role as political sovereign and media consumer within a coalition country.

It is a requirement for coherent engagement that partner nations coordinate information activities in support of the overall coalition effort at all levels since the early stages of the strategic-political planning process; this will most likely happen under supervision of the foreign ministries. If required, final decisions would be made by the Heads of State or government leaders, respectively.

The conduct of coordinated information activities requires adequate procedures and structures. Official bodies should be employed to establish operational connections between civilian and military organisations, departments and agencies to improve planning and co-ordination of information activities within and between each execution area. Direct liaison between dedicated governmental organisations and agencies across different nations should be authorised and adequate procedures for multinational information sharing outlined in a specific agreement.

5.2 General Political Conditions

5.2.1 Credibility

The foundation of successful communication is the coalition's political credibility, which is a key determinant of its counterparts' willingness to interact. In western societies, credibility comprises two key components: trustworthiness and expertise. Trustworthiness is based more on subjective factors and will be leveraged by established reliability. Expertise may be perceived subjectively, but also includes objective characteristics of the source or message (e.g., credentials, certification or factuality).

Credibility in the context of multinational coalition operations takes a distinct meaning depending on the audiences concerned. The idea can be broken down accordingly:

- Compliant/neutral actors within the host government and population: Political credibility can not only be considered as the precondition for sincere attention and receptivity, but also as the first step towards the build-up of mutual trust and co-operation. Established reliability leads to spill-over effects in various spheres of activity and can support coalition-driven processes of persuasion, diplomacy and reconciliation. The coalition's expertise is a function of its professionalism, and also includes elements of cultural awareness, self-restraint, respect, and the willingness to promote local ownership.
- Non-compliant or hostile actors within the host government and population: Credibility not only opens new lines of political interaction and support confidence-building measures and mutual respect, but is also a decisive factor in deterrence and 'show of force'.
- The coalition's domestic audiences: Especially in the case of larger military operations the donor nations will demand a solid explanation for the costly and potentially dangerous endeavour that could cause a considerable number of casualties. The credibility of the political leadership is essential for the moral and political support, even in the case of temporary setbacks. On the other hand, deliberate falsehood by the political and/or military decision-makers in the context of an operation can cause long-term distrust and produce substantial reluctance when it comes to mandating future missions.
- The heterogeneous 'global audience': This audience, which often has only limited access to background information, can also influence and alter the political circumstances of the mission. It not only shapes the political and strategic environment for the current operation of the multinational coalition, but also the global future landscape in which new conflicts and coalitions may emerge.

A single lie or just a minor contradiction in the coalition's messaging can cause substantial damage to the coalition's credibility and may alter the compliance level of significant actors. In this regard, any attempt of manipulation and misguidance as a strategic instrument of influence must be considered counterproductive. In the long

run, the deliberate 'adjustment of truth' for addressing different audiences can hardly conceal fundamentally dissenting policies and strategies, interests and intentions of the coalition. In virtue of the saying, that 'interest never lies'¹⁴⁶, every communication strategy must build on a clear-cut interest analysis beyond rhetorical disguise.

5.2.2 Comprehensive Approach

Obviously, prevention and resolution of contemporary crises and conflicts require a broad civil-military capability portfolio backboned by enhanced interagency co-operation. Hence, the implementation of a genuine comprehensive approach can be considered as the most significant political challenge of all coalition efforts.

Substantial agreement between all coalition partners on strategic long-term goals of the mission/operation is the first and foremost step towards the realisation of a comprehensive approach and a crucial precondition for achieving and maintaining intra-coalition cohesion and consistency.

A comprehensive approach includes a fair and balanced burden and responsibility sharing, as well as the mutual responsibility for failures and success. The ritualistic 'blame game' in the aftermath of operational setbacks and failures should be replaced by an analytical, systematic and unbiased lessons learned process. Furthermore, the dominance of short-sighted political considerations and particular interests has to be contained and a proactive engagement is greatly demanded to counter the predominant tendency of ministerial bureaucracies and military organisations to do 'okay reporting' (i.e., the interest-driven manipulation of situation reports) instead of precise analyses and necessary self criticism.

Nevertheless, the rudimentary realisation of a comprehensive approach can also complicate intra-coalition decision-making processes and has to be considered costly in terms of time as it requires compromise and/or concessions by the partners.

5.2.3 Long-Term Effects

In contrast to the obvious desire of senior politicians (and also many military commanders), most crisis management operations are protracted and only show slow progress. Moreover, it is not unusual for long-term orientated engagements to have a negative effect on short-term security and stabilisation efforts. Especially the crack-down on illegitimate power structures (clans, guerrillas, organised crime groups) that have sufficient means to pursue their own communication policies within the mission area can cause civil disobedience, protests, and even violent riots. It also threatens to lead (almost conclusively if poorly justified towards the local audience) to a process of alienation between the coalition and local stakeholders. Coalition communication efforts need to address those effects from the onset of any engagement.

5.2.4 Prejudice Management

Most operational areas where multinational coalitions deploy are characterised by the existence of direct or indirect/clandestine opponents interested in staining the

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Dryden (1682), and related discussions in: Sørhaug (2007).

coalition's reputation by various means, which may fuel the population's mistrust and even breed hostility.

Commonly, the following stereotypes are attributed to multinational actors in crisis management interventions:

- crusaders (religion driven);
- (western) imperialists / occupants (power driven);
- post-colonial invaders (resources driven); or
- paper tigers (ineffective, weak, incompetent and/or corrupt).

The management of prejudices within the populations of the mission area can be a proactive countermeasure to avoid the growth of detrimental perceptions and makes it more difficult for the coalition's opponents to seed mistrust.

Prejudice management can only work in connection with a transparent, interest-based, legal and sustainable coalition strategy. It also has to take into consideration that heady promises and an idealistic rhetoric ("We are here to help") can damage the coalition's credibility once the messages of words and deeds don't match.

Prejudice management also has to deal with the coalition itself. In particular, cultivated enemy stereotypes and assumption of perceived ethnic, religious or cultural patterns should be avoided as much as possible at all levels of the coalition's thinking and decision-making processes. This task will prove particularly difficult in the cases where an intervention has been preceded by a significant rhetorical escalation in order to convince the coalition partner nations' own populations of the necessity of an engagement. Nevertheless, zealous views and perceptions are one of the greatest stumbling blocks to understanding non-compliant/hostile behaviour, which is a turning point for all processes of diplomacy, negotiations, peace settlements and reconciliation.

5.3 Structural Frictions and Political Dilemmas

Communication in a multinational context always has to deal with structural challenges and political dilemmas. The following paragraphs give an overview of some of the most important obstacles during implementation of a crisis management mission with the aim of raising awareness of general political processes.

5.3.1 Two-Level Game

Domestic politics and international relations are interconnected to an extent that needs to be considered well in designing coalition communication. *"The politics of [] international negotiations can [] be perceived as a 'two-level game'. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by [*

*] decision-makers, as long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign."*¹⁴⁷

This two-level approach recognises the inevitability of domestic argument about what the national interest requires, and that decision-makers in the context of multinational negotiations must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and international pressures. An *"adequate account of [] domestic determinants of foreign policies and international relations must stress [] parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and non-economic), legislators and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional arrangements."*¹⁴⁸

Democratic governments are unable to conduct longer-range crisis management operations without the political backing and ideological support of their particular constituencies. Hence, the continuous convincing/reassuring of mostly impatient domestic audiences concerning the necessity of an operational engagement has to be considered as important as the concrete work on the ground.

5.3.2 Different Time Horizons

Closely related to the before mentioned two-level dilemma of communication is the choice and application of an appropriate time horizon in which the coalition's activities aim to create visible – and especially sustainable – effects. The well-known Taliban saying *"You have all the watches, but we have all the time"*¹⁴⁹ reflects the widespread understanding that any coalition engagement can only be maintained for a limited timeframe.

On the other hand, if one establishes – and announces – concrete time lines for the coalition engagement, the enemy could be encouraged to out-wait the coalition regarding the coalition's strategy as not enduring.

5.3.3 The "Dance with the Devil" Dilemma

Low-intensity conflicts often work like catalysts for social change. Sooner or later, society becomes dominated by criminals who have gained power by providing decisive military capabilities during the conflict period.¹⁵⁰ The services they offer are always the same: weapons smuggling, human trafficking and illegal drugs trade. They provide warring parties not only with armaments for their forces, but also with a continuous cash flow of foreign currencies. Bit by bit, organized criminals replace the former social elites (which are often already thinned out by the pre-conflict 'brain drain') and progressively take over complete control of the affected society.

After the conflict, these war profiteers are the ones who benefit most from the war not only in terms of money, but also in terms of power and influence, due to the fact that they then possess the strongest social networks within the community. The result is a largely dysfunctional and mobster-driven society with an inverted social pyramid, in which the dregs of society have taken over command.

¹⁴⁷ Putnam (1988), p.434.

¹⁴⁸ Putnam, I.c., p.432.

¹⁴⁹ Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, in: <http://obamareport.blogspot.com/2009/12/taliban-you-have-all-watches-but-we.html> (accessed 31 January 2010, 14:30).

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Genschel/Schlichte (1997) for a basic analysis on these social dynamics.

The ruling parties in such a society are by nature not interested in the implementation and enforcement of the rule of law and good governance. In the long run, a repressed society without prospects emerges, governed by fear, mistrust, corruption and violence. In particular, the well-educated and reliable segments of the population that have often taken refuge abroad during the conflict, will usually not be willing to return to a crime-stricken country. When they are not willing to come back home, the civil society must be built up from scratch and social reconstruction becomes incomparably more difficult.

Crisis management operations usually take place in lawless areas and frequently it is inevitable to deal with local actors who do not meet specific political and/or moral standards. Especially in the aftermath of long-term conflicts and related social processes (brain drain, inversion of the social pyramid, learning pathologies) the usual power vacuum obliges the coalition to cooperate even with ill-disposed spoilers with well-known hidden agendas. Co-operation with local power brokers that cannot be considered trustworthy, could cause distrust, particularly within those communities that are the most likeminded or the ones that suffer most under the situation, and thus, has the potential to cause substantial damage to the coalition's credibility and a decline of trust within the population.

5.3.4 Security-Saturated Reluctance to Engage

At least since the end of the Cold War, western societies have undergone a fundamental political transformation process, in which the main driver for their security and defence policy – the existential struggle for survival resulting from the imminent threat of mutual assured destruction – dramatically changed. This has led to a new collective understanding of security beyond clear and present dangers, and rather focused on risks.

In parallel, largely security-saturated post-heroic societies have emerged, in which large majorities of the population do not share (neither intellectually nor emotionally) the willingness and support for international crisis management engagements of their country. This phenomenon has in past stability operations led to different negative attitudes and effects that at the worst can hinder the achievement of operational goals.

5.3.5 Patronizing and Biased Mission Performance

In crisis management interventions representatives of participating nations tend to idealise their own political system and culture, and thereby run the high risk of being perceived as provocative 'know-it-all's', which can cause enormous friction in contacts with local stakeholders.

Promoting the principles of local ownership and applying an audience-oriented approach to participatory communication is paramount in order to balance national identities and interests in international crisis management.

5.4 Building a Corporate Identity amongst Multinational Partners

A major effort to counter a coalition's structural dilemma of creeping erosion as a result of

- unavoidable operational/political frictions and flaws,
- adversaries' continuous attempts to disrupt the coalition's cohesion and unity,
- as well as the permanent change in demands, perceptions and necessities within and between coalition's nations and other stakeholders within the operational area,

is the building and sustaining of a common coalition identity amongst the multinational contributors, which has to be considered as key to mission success.

A corporate coalition identity may support the commitment and responsibility of every single member of the coalition and reduce the inherent risk of abandonment, internal turf wars, blame games and unbalanced burden-sharing.

The coalition's identity, which has a clear inward orientation, must be complementary with the particular coalition narrative, which especially addresses external audiences and will require a time consuming process to create political consent amongst partners. Based on general guidelines from the political level of the coalition, addressing coalition-internal audiences in the area of operations is the primary responsibility of the senior leadership.

As a matter of principle, all organisations and agencies of coalition partners participate to a certain extent in the coalition's communication effort – either pro-actively/intentionally or unintentionally, just because of their affiliation to a perceived coalition partner. The implementation of national/organisational caveats should therefore be reduced to a minimum that is acceptable and controllable in a multinational context in order not to compromise agreed information objectives of the coalition.

Coalition communication programs are collectively owned by the coalition partners. Ownership in this context refers to responsibility in multinational crisis interventions: no single nation (or partner organisation) – not even the designated lead nation/organisation – should be held responsible alone for the aims and contents of the campaign. However, perception may contradict this principle in practice: effects of multinational activity will be attributed to the coalition as a whole, including all individual partners, and *vice versa*.

Consequently, co-ordination of information activities by authorised multinational bodies is essential. This co-ordination requirement, however, must not be limited to information activities; integration of the information factor demands to consider inherent informational effects of conventional actions and political decisions as well.

5.5 Guiding Questions for Further Analysis

The following set of questions should help to structure the ongoing analytical process in the context of CD&E for integrated communication by introducing political considerations:

- How to cope with sometimes detrimental expectations of domestic audiences and target audiences in the crisis area through integrated communication?
- What are the requirements for achieving a comprehensive approach to coalition communication?
- How should a coalition cope with communicating own insufficiencies related to a politically reasonable level of ambition?
- How could a multinational coalition prevent the risk of a potentially 'harmful embrace' by local power brokers that do not conform to the coalition's strategic goals?
- What are the main political drivers of inconsistency and incoherence in coalition activity, and how could they be mitigated?
- How to design a communication strategy for intended setbacks in the name of long-term success?
- What is the role of integrated communication in coalition transition and exit strategies?

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Lexicon Part 1 – Abbreviations

AAP	(NATO) Allied Administrative Publication
AJP	(NATO) Allied Joint Publication
ACO	(NATO) Allied Command Operations
ACT	(NATO) Allied Command Transformation
BMVg	(DEU) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defence)
CASSP	(USA) Child and Adolescent Service System Program
CCRP	Command and Control Research Program
CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
cf.	<i>confer</i> (compare, consult)
CIP-CIME	Collaborative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation
CJCSI	(USA) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CPG	(NATO) Comprehensive Political Guidance
CPM	Consumer Product Management
DCDC	(GBR) Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
Dez	(DEU) Dezernat (Staff Section)
Dir	(NATO) Directive
DOD	(USA) Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, Facilities (Lines of Development)
DPKO	(United Nations) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EBAO	Effects-Based Approach to (Multinational) Operations
ECHA	(United Nations) Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ed.	Editor
et al.	<i>et alii</i> (and others)
et seq.	<i>et sequentia</i> (and the following)
FM	Field Manual
GOA	(United States) Government Accountability Office
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HQ	Headquarters
ibid.	<i>ibidem</i> (at the same place)
IMPP	(United Nations) Integrated Missions Planning Process
Info Ops	Information Operations

INFOSEC	Information Security
ISAF	(NATO) International Security Assistance Force
IT	Information Technology
JIC	Joint Integrating Concept
JP	Joint Publication
KD	Knowledge Development
KonzEntw	(DEU) Konzeptentwicklung (Concept Development)
I.c.	<i>loco citato</i> (in the place cited)
LoD	Line of Development
LOE	Limited Objective Experiment
MC	(NATO) Military Committee
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MNE	Multinational Experiment
MNIOE	Multinational Information Operations Experiment
MOD	Ministry of Defence
M&S	Modelling and Simulation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHS	(GBR) National Health Service
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OR	Operations Research
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSD	(USA) Office of the Secretary of Defense
p.	Page
PCC	(USA Department of State) Policy Coordinating Committee
PMBOK	Project Management Body of Knowledge
PMI	Project Management Institute
PO	(NATO) Private Office (of the Secretary General)
pp.	Pages
PPT	Microsoft PowerPoint
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Project / Paper(s)
QDR	(USA) Quadrennial Defense Review
ROE	Rule(s) of Engagement
ROMINS	(AUS) Repertoire of Missions
SACT	Supreme Allied Command(er) Transformation
SAMS	(United States Army) School of Advanced Military Studies
SC	Strategic Communication
SGIR	(European) Standing Group on International Relations
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

STANAG	(NATO) Standardisation Agreement
TRADOC	(United States Army) Training and Doctrine Command
TTCP	The Technical Cooperation Program
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNSSC	United Nations System Staff College
USACAC	United States Army Combined Arms Center
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
UTAS	University of Tasmania
ZTransfBw	(DEU) Zentrum für Transformation der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Transformation Centre)

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Lexicon Part 2 – Glossary of Terms and Definitions

Action

- (1) The process of doing things.
- (2) The bringing about of an alteration by force or through a natural agency.
- (3) The manner or method of performing.
- (4) An act of will.
- (5) A thing done (deed, behaviour, conduct).

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Activity

- (1) Thing (to be) done.
 - (2) Vigorous or energetic action.
 - (3) A pursuit in which a person is active.
- [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]*
- (4) An element of work performed during the course of a project. An activity normally has an expected duration, an expected cost, and expected resource requirements. Activities can be subdivided into tasks. *[PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]*

Asset

- (1) Valuable or useful quality or skill.
- (2) Advantage; resource.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Capability

- (1) The entirety of a system that delivers an output or effect. It will most likely be a complex combination of Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership development, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI) to deliver the required output. *[NATO MC 0550 (Final) (2006)]*
- (2) A combination of ways and means to perform tasks or create an effect under specified conditions. *[NATO HQ SACT – EBAO CONOPS (2008)]*
- (3) The ability to achieve a desired effect in a specific operating environment. Capabilities can be people, assets, means and methods, as well as structures, systems and specific characteristics of these. *[Based on: Hinge (2000)]*

Capacity

- (1) Position or character assigned or assumed.
- (2) Qualification, competency, power, or fitness.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Coalition

An *ad hoc* or temporary grouping of nations and/or organisations united for a specific purpose / in a common cause. [MNE 6 Objective 2.1]

Coherence

The harmony of parts to one another as a whole. (Synonyms: *consistency, correspondence*) [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Cohesion

The act or state of sticking together tightly. (Synonyms: *unity, accord*) [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Communication

(1) The exchange of information between individuals through a common system of signs, symbols, or behaviour. [The American Heritage® Stedman's Medical Dictionary]

(2) The process by which information, meanings and feelings are shared by people through an exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages. [Singh (2005)]

Comprehensive Approach

The wide scope of actions in international crisis management, undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative manner with the affected nation(s). Co-ordination and collaboration includes national civilian government agencies and their defence and security forces, international and intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations and the private sector to achieve greater harmonisation in the analysis, planning, management, and evaluation of actions required to prevent, ameliorate, mitigate and/or resolve the conditions precipitating a crisis. [USJFCOM: Conceptual Framework MNE 5 (2007)]

Coordinating Authority

The assigned responsibility for coordinating specific capabilities, functions or activities involving two or more agencies (organisations or commands). The individual with assigned Coordinating Authority has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he/she should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he/she is unable to obtain essential agreement he/she shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. [Based on: NATO AAP-6]

Co-ordination

Consultation in order to forge common action or harmonisation in a concerted manner. Co-ordination activities can involve both subordinates as well as those organisations over which the commander has no authority. Co-ordination results in carefully planned and executed activity in which the various elements involved in an operation – military and civil – are harmonised in such a manner as to provide the greatest advantage to the overall mission. Co-ordination does not require command

relationships (subordination) but active participation of all involved. The co-ordination process usually is organised by the assignment of Coordinating Authority. *[Based on: USJFCOM EBAO CONOPS (2005)]*

Corporate

Of, relating to, or formed into a unified body of individuals. *[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]*

Corporate Identity

The way how an organisation describes itself and wishes to be perceived. *[Based on: Simões et al. (2005)]*

Corporate Image

(1) The manner in which a company, its activities, and its products or services are perceived by outsiders.

(2) The perception or reputation of an organisation.

[Based on: www.answers.com/topic/corporate-image]

Crisis

A specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organisation's high priority goals. *[Seeger/Sellnow/Ulmer (1998)]*

Cross-Cultural Awareness

The understanding of the differences between oneself and people from other countries or other backgrounds, especially differences in attitudes and values, based on conscious attention and knowledge of culture. *[Based on: <http://dictionary.reverso.net/english-cobuild/cultural%20awareness>]*

Cultural Awareness

The recognition that not all people are from the same cultural background, that people have different values, different behaviours and different approaches to life. *[Based on: http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_would_you_define_cultural_awareness]*

Culture

(1) The integrated pattern of human behaviour that includes thoughts, communication, actions, customs, beliefs, values and institutions of a racial, ethnic, religious or social group. It reflects the norms and values of a given society. *[Cross et al. (1989)]*

(2) The cumulative deposit of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving. *[Hofstede (1997)]*

(3) A pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valuable and therefore to

be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to these problems. *[Schein 1992]*

Discipline

- (1) Branch of knowledge; subject of instruction.
- (2) A field of study.
- (3) A rule or system of rules governing conduct.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Effect

- (1) The cumulative consequence of one or more actions across the operational environment that leads to a change in the situation. Aggregation of intended effects leads to the achievement of objectives. *[NATO HQ SACT / SHAPE – EBAO Handbook (2007)]*
- (2) The physical and/or behavioural state of a system that results from an action or a set of actions. *[NATO HQ SACT – EBAO CONOPS (2008)]*

Effort

- (1) Use of strength and energy (to do sth.); vigorous attempt.
- (2) Conscious exertion of power.
- (3) A serious attempt.
- (4) Effective force as distinguished from the possible resistance called into action by such a force.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

End State

The political and/or military situation, which needs to exist before an operation can be terminated on favourable terms. *[Based on: NATO HQ SACT – EBAO CONOPS (2008)]*

External Communication

Communication between organisations or different sets of capabilities, and/or other actors. *[Based on: MNIOE Framework Concept (2009)]*

Function

- (1) Special activity or purpose of a person or thing.
- (2) Professional or official position.
- (3) The action for which a person or thing is specially fitted or used or for which a thing exists.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

- (4) A staff activity to orchestrate available capabilities for achieving mission objectives. *[MNIOE Applied Concept (2009)]*

Functional Manager

A manager responsible for activities in a specialised department or function. [PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]

Functional Organisation

An organisation structure in which staff are grouped hierarchically by speciality. [PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]

General Management

The planning, organising, staffing, executing, and controlling of the operations of an ongoing enterprise. [PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]

Identity

The sameness in all that constitutes objective reality established by psychological identification. [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Image

A mental picture or impression of something. [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Information

An assembly of data in any medium or form capable of communication and use by assigned meaning through known conventions used in symbolic representation. [Based on: NATO HQ SACT – EBAO CONOPS (2008)]

Information Activity

An action designed to have an effect in the information environment, performed by any actor. [MNIOE Applied Concept (2009); NATO MC 457/1]

Information Environment

The virtual and physical space in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. [MNIOE Applied Concept (2009); NATO MC 422/3]

Information Factor

The actuality of information pervading societies, such as actors and audiences have become increasingly indistinguishable, and every action sends a message, intended or not. (In the military, information is meanwhile recognised as a decisive factor *per se* that will increasingly affect the operational factors force, space and time.) [MNIOE Framework Concept (2009)]

Information Objective

A desired condition to be created in the information environment. It should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment /evaluation of related actions and effects. [Based on: MNIOE Applied Concept (2009)]

Information Operations

A military function to provide advice and co-ordination regarding activities affecting information and/or information systems – including system behaviour and capabilities – in order to create desired effects. *[MNIOE Applied Concept (2009)]*

Information Security

Safe-guarding an organisation's data from unauthorized access or modification to ensure its availability, confidentiality and integrity. *[www.businessdictionary.com/definition/information-security.html]*

Information Society

A society in which the creation, distribution, diffusion, use, and manipulation of information is a significant economic, political, and cultural activity. *[Based on: Moore (1997); Machlup (1962); Drucker (1968); Bell (1976); and Castells (2000)]*

Information Strategy

The interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and political guidance for information activities across all levers of power in support of mission objectives. *[Based on: MNIOE Analytical Concept (2008)]*

Information System

A socio-technical system for the collection, processing and dissemination of information. It comprises personnel¹⁵¹, technical components, organisational structures, and processes that create, collect, perceive, analyse, assess, structure, manipulate, store, retrieve, display, share, transmit and disseminate information. *[MNIOE Analytical Concept (2008)]*

Information Technology

All forms of technology used to create, process, display, store, and exchange information in its various forms. *[Based on: <http://searchdatacenter.techtarget.com/>]*

Instrument of Power

A national or organisational means to enforce political will or exert influence on others. Broad categories of actions taken to influence a security environment include politics/diplomacy, economy, information and security services (civil and military), as well as cultural/developmental activities, humanitarian assistance, and civil administration support. *[MNIOE Analytical Concept (2008)]*

Integrated Marketing Communication

(1) The process of developing and implementing various forms of persuasive communication programs with customers and prospects over time. *[Schultz (1993)]*

¹⁵¹ The 'personnel' component of information systems comprises those key individuals or groups that use and/or act on information.

(2) A strategic business process used to plan, develop, execute, and evaluate coordinated, measurable, persuasive brand communication programs over time with consumers, customers, prospects, and other targeted individuals. *[Schultz/Kitchen (2000)]*

(3) A dynamic, holistic approach, integrated into all levels of an organisation. It manages and fuses every point of contact between the organisation and its stakeholders. Through its coordinated efforts it supports a targeted, integrated, consistent brand communication strategy for the purpose of building positive lifetime relationships through data-driven techniques, by customer-conscious employees ultimately giving an organisation a competitive advantage and brand equity. *[Mulder (2007)]*

Intercultural Communicative Competence

The ability of a person to behave adequately in a flexible manner when confronted with actions, attitudes and expectations of representatives of foreign cultures. *[Meyer, in: Buttjes/Byram (1991)]*

Internal Communication

Communication within an organisation or set of capabilities. *[MNIOE Framework Concept (2009)]*

International Organisation

(1) An organisation with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments.

(2) An organisation established by intergovernmental agreements, which operates at the international level.

[MNIOE White Paper (2007)]

Intervention

(1) To come in or between by way of hindrance or modification.

(2) To interfere with the outcome or course especially of a condition or process.

(3) To interfere usually by force or threat of force in another nation's internal affairs especially to compel or prevent an action.

(4) Any interference in the affairs of others, especially by one country in the affairs of another.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

(5) (In a comprehensive approach context:) Interagency activity by a broad range of multinational, civil and military actors in support of crisis management abroad. *[Based on: MNE 5 CIP-CIME Outline Concept (2008)]*

Knowledge Development

(1) The integration of isolated data into a useable body of information and relationships. Knowledge Development is a function of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations that supports planning, execution, and assessment by providing a holistic view of the engagement space. *[NATO EBAO Handbook (2007)]*

(2) A proactive process that covers the collection, analysis, storage and distribution of information that helps to contribute to a common and shared understanding of the operational environment. It provides commanders and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including the relationships and interactions between systems and actors within the engagement space. *[NATO KD Handbook (2010)]*

Leadership Development

Training and education activities to promote leaders realize their potential and have the necessary core competencies (skills, knowledge and experience) needed to carry out their responsibilities effectively towards people around them. *[MNE 6 Objective 2.1]*

Marketing

The process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, and services to create exchanges that satisfy individual (customer) and organisational objectives. *[McDaniel/Gates (1998)]*

Matrix Management

A type of organisational management in which people with similar skills are pooled for work assignments. *[PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]*

Matrix Organisation

Any organisational structure in which the project manager shares responsibility with the functional managers for assigning priorities and for directing the work of individuals assigned to the project. *[PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]*

Media

- (1) Organisations or persons who gather and disseminate news.
- (2) The means by which news is transmitted.
- (3) Art, reports of facts, and expressions of ideas or opinions in a form that allows these to be consumed independently (in time or place) from their creation.

[Based on: www.reckon.co.uk/open/A_definition_of_the_media_sector; NATO MC 457/1]

Medium

- (1) A carrier of information.
- (2) A means of affecting or conveying information.

[Based on: www.reckon.co.uk/open/A_definition_of_the_media_sector; NATO MC 457/1]

Message

- (1) An underlying theme or idea.
- (2) The substance (object and/or result) of communication: the intended and/or perceived content of information exchange.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

(3) A thought or idea expressed briefly in plain, coded, or secret language¹⁵², prepared in a suitable form for transmission by any means of communication. [NATO AAP-6]

Messaging

Transferring content or information (text, images, voice) from one person or device to another, by using any medium of communication. [www.businessdictionary.com]

Meta-Planning

A process that expresses knowledge about how to plan in terms of a set of goals for the planning process (called 'meta-goals'), and a set of plans to achieve them ('meta-plans'). Meta-goals and meta-plans are fodder to the same planning mechanism that is used to produce a plan of action (or explanation) from ordinary plans. [Wilensky (1980)]

Narrative

The translation of the coalition mandate and vision into a fundamental, persistent story of who the coalition is, what its guiding principles are, and what it aspires to achieve. It is the foundation of all coalition communication efforts in building identity and promoting a desired image. [MNE 6 Objective 2.1]

Non-Compliance

Behaviour that negatively affects coalition efforts to achieve goals/objectives in support of the host nation and/or international mandates. [MNE 6 Objective 1.1 Guidelines (2010)]

Non-Compliant Actors

Individuals or groups which exhibit behaviour which negatively affects coalition efforts to achieve goals/objectives in support of the host nation and/or international mandates. [MNE 6 Objective 1.1 Guidelines (2010)]

Non-Governmental Organisation

'Non-Governmental Organisation' (NGO) is an official term used in Article 71 of the UN charter. As the term implies, NGOs are private (primarily non-commercial) organisations generally motivated by humanitarian or religious values. [NATO AJP-3.4.1]

Objective

(1) A clearly defined and attainable goal in the operational environment that is essential to military commanders' plans and towards which the operation is directed. Objectives are achieved by the outcome of an aggregation of intended effects and are derived from the end-state. Their completion should lead to the achievement of the end state. [Based on: NATO HQ SACT / SHAPE – EBAO Handbook (2007)]

¹⁵² As it is recognised that actions and behaviour are capable of delivering messages as well as words and images, the term 'language' should be understood in the utmost broadest sense.

(2) Description of the situation as key obstacle(s) in the achievement of the transition state are overcome. *[Based on: MNE 5 CIP-CIME Outline Concept (2008)]*

Operation

(1) Working; way in which something works.

(2) Piece of work; something (to be) done.

(3) A doing or performing of a practical work or of something involving practical application of principles or processes.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

(4) A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. *[NATO AAP-6]*

Operational Environment

(1) That part of the environment in which the coalition decides to engage and where the interaction of different actors creates conditions that may be acceptable or unacceptable to the coalition in terms of its end state. *[MNE 6 Objective 2.1]*

(2) A composite of elements, conditions, and influences that affect the employment of resources and capabilities, and that bear on operational decisions. *[NATO HQ SACT – EBAO CONOPS (2008)]*

Outcome

(1) All possible demonstrable results that stem from casual factors or activities. *[www.iime.org/glossary.htm]*

(2) The intended or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs, usually requiring the collective effort of partners. *[MNE 5 CIP-CIME Outline Concept (2008)]*

Output

The immediate result, product, goods or services that result from an activity. The output may be physical or more cognitive affecting attitudes and behaviour. (The actual outcome of the activity may however not be as intended due to inaccurate information, false assumptions and the impact of external influences.) *[Based on: MNE 5 CIP-CIME Outline Concept (2008)]*

Participation

Engagement of a local population and, at times, additional stakeholders in the creation, content and conduct of a program or policy designed to change their lives. *[Based on: Jennings (2000)]*

Participatory Communication

An approach [to communication] based on dialogue, which allows the sharing of information, perceptions and opinions among the various stakeholders and thereby facilitates their empowerment. *[Tufte/Mefalopoulos (2009)]*

Process

- (1) Something going on.
- (2) A natural phenomenon marked by gradual changes that lead toward a particular result.
- (3) Connected series of actions, changes, etc. esp. such as are involuntary or unconscious.
- (4) Series of actions or operations deliberately undertaken / conducting to an end.

[www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary]

Project

A temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product or service. [PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]

Project Management

The application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities to meet project requirements. [PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]

Project Manager

The individual responsible for managing a project. [PMI: PMBOK Guide (2000)]

Public Affairs

(1) The function responsible to promote NATO's military aims and objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the Alliance. This includes planning and conducting media relations, internal communications, and community relations. [NATO MC 457/1]

(2) Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. [USA Joint Publication 3-61]

Public Relations

A broad set of communication activities used to create and maintain favourable relations between the organisation and its publics. These publics include customers, employees, stockholders, government officials, and society in general. [Lee/Johnson (2005)]

Reachback

A process that employs communications and transportation assets to identify and bring to bear resources (products, services, applications; personnel, equipment or material) from organisations not present at the site. [Based on: www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/army/fm/3-11-22/appg.htm]

Rules of Engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. [NATO AAP-6]

Security Environment

A complex political-military web of regional, cultural, and political competitions and conflicts, involving threats to vital interests posed by a variety of actors.

[Schmidt/Steinbrecher/Westenkirchner (2007)]

Security Sector

State institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. armed forces, police, intelligence agencies, and similar bodies); and the elected and/or duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight of these institutions (e.g., Parliament, the Executive, including the defence ministry, judicial and penal systems). *[Based on: OSCE MC, GAL/9/07 (2007)]*

Strategic Communication

Focused coalition efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favourable for the advancement of coalition interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all coalition partners. *[Based on: USA Joint Publication 1-02 (2009)]*

System

(1) Instrumentality that combines independent but interrelated elements/components designed to work as a coherent entity/unified whole; a series of interdependent and interacting parts wherein a change in one part brings about changes in all parts.

[www.dict.die.net]

(2) A functionally, physically, or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements, which forms a unified whole. Systems associated with (national) security include *inter alia* political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information. *[NATO HQ SACT / SHAPE – EBAO Handbook (2007)]*

Systemic

A holistic approach that draws from systems theory, aimed at understanding and influencing change in an open system. *[USA TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500]*

Systemic Understanding

Combining components of a system in a context and establishing the nature of their behaviour and relationships. *[USA TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500]*

Theme

The unifying subject or idea of a message or set of messages. *[Based on: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theme>]*

Transition State

Threshold where the situation is sustainable enough to autonomously evolve toward the coalition's vision. *[Based on: MNE 5 CIP-CIME Outline Concept (2008)]*

Vision

The overall system state of the crisis area in a global context that ideally exists when no further external intervention is required to sustain an acceptable situation and the formal coalition can dissolve. *[Based on: MNE 5 CIP-CIME Outline Concept (2008)]*

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Annex A – Organisational Considerations

A.1 General Deductions

Implementation of the approach to integrated communication presented in this concept may require cultural and organisational change that affects traditional command and control arrangements. Integration of the information factor throughout means turning away from functional orientation in favour of *process orientation*.

Only changing the mindset of leaders is insufficient: integrated communication must be considered a continuous process, which involves each and every member of an organisation at any stage of activity. This process may require that it be addressed by a focused staff assisting the senior leadership and thus helping implement their intent throughout the organisation.

The temporary nature of a coalition in the context of international crisis management and the cross-functional integration requirement of internal and external communication suggest a similar approach to organising communication as that taken in business management for organising projects¹⁵³.

*"Projects are critical to the realisation of the performing organisation's business strategy because projects are a means by which strategy is implemented. Examples of projects include: developing a new product or service; effecting a change in structure, staffing, or style of an organisation; [] developing or acquiring a new or modified information system; [] running a campaign for political office; implementing a new business procedure or process."*¹⁵⁴

Integrated communication in coalition operations may require a combination of general (operational) and project management.¹⁵⁵ An organisational approach to the management and integration of internal and external communication could consider the establishment of a centralised responsibility for communication – in order to promote the leadership-driven, top-down principle – and the application of a matrix organisation to integrate communication processes across the functional organisation.

A.2 Head of Communication

The central responsibility for managing the communication efforts of an organisation should rest with a Head of Communication.¹⁵⁶

The Head of Communication *assists* the senior leadership in all aspects of integrated communication. He *directs* all internal and external communication processes of the organisation on behalf of the leader/commander, and *guides* respective communication efforts of subordinate organisations.

¹⁵³ A 'project' is a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product or service. (PMI (2000): "PMBOK Guide")

¹⁵⁴ PMI (2000), l.c., p.4.

¹⁵⁵ See Glossary for definitions.

¹⁵⁶ Similar to the 'Vice President and Head of Communication' of large business corporations. Job titles may vary.

The Head of Communication is the project manager for the integration of internal and external communication processes at all levels of an organisation. He should be positioned within the senior team or command group.

A.2.1 General Qualification Requirements¹⁵⁷

The one who manages the integrated communication process should be experienced in helping to preserve and protect the organisation's reputation on a number of levels. The individual should have a clear understanding that as important as it is to send messages, how the organisation responds to incoming information and inquiries may do more harm (or good) for the organisation's reputation than all the controlled communication efforts the organisation does. He must appreciate the value of creating dialogue to build strong relationships with important stakeholders and should fully understand the value and role that third-party endorsements play in managing perceptions of an organisation or in perpetuating misperceptions.

In a sense, the driver of the integrated communication process must be a generalist, with enough experience in several disciplines and able to manage them effectively when the need arises. Equally, the one who manages integrated communication must be rooted in at least one specialty that will serve him well when the best-laid plans are interrupted by an unexpected crisis.

The driver of the integrated communication process has to be a counsellor to senior management, as proficient at playing the role of management consultant in certain situations as being the organisation's spokesperson – the voice of the organisation – when necessary.

The individual who drives truly integrated communication has to be a communication expert, a smart consumer of consulting services and a problem-solver. There must be a comfort level with a range of subject matter, from marketing and media relations issues to human resources or legal matters. And no matter what, the individual must be flexible. The best person to drive that integration process is someone with the largest possible view of how that process should work.

Public affairs (or public relations)¹⁵⁸ practitioners are in the best position to manage the integrated communication process because within the scope of their task they should be involved in every facet of the organisation: it is their job to listen and respond to the full range of important stakeholders.

For their part, public affairs practitioners themselves will have to rise to the occasion. They will have to recognise opportunities when they are presented and use the process of integration to advance other communication disciplines.

To do so, they will have to become better listeners, and that means increasing their commitment to research and measurement. They will have to place the highest value on consistency and quality, for the end result of all integrated communication efforts must achieve consistency of message. And above all, the drivers of integrated communication are going to have to make the commitment to providing complete

¹⁵⁷ Based on: Drobis, I.c., p.8 et seq.

¹⁵⁸ See Glossary for definitions.

communication solutions to operations problems, regardless of whether those problems are rooted in the direct communication arena or not.

A.2.2 Generic Job Description

This description focuses on the highest organisational level of a coalition body. Roles and responsibilities of Heads of Communication at subordinate levels should mirror these functions respectively.

The Head of Communication is appointed by the Head of Mission, on behalf of the coalition member states, to act as the coalition's principal advisor on all information issues. He oversees and guides all coalition information activities at his level and advises planning, execution/management and assessment/ evaluation of coalition activity as a permanent member of the strategic-political decision-making body. He also directs and guides the coalition's spokesperson at the operational/in-theatre level.

The role of the Head of Communication is multinational by nature: he is representing the coordinated functional expertise on the information environment of participating organisations – not any national perspective, be it that of his own country or that of the lead nation.

He is granted the authority to assign tasks and require consultation between the agencies involved (organisations or commands and their representatives) for all issues related to the coalition's communication plans.

Within his responsibility for integrating internal and external communication processes the Head of Communication is also authorised to directly address all members of the coalition.

Detailed tasks of the Head of Communication include:

- integrating expert advice in the operational/in-theatre decision-making process;
- providing recommendations to the strategic-political level, and coordinating operational/in-theatre issues with the Heads of Communication at subordinate levels;
- integration of functional expertise and harmonisation of information activities in planning, management and evaluation of coalition operations;
- facilitating/directing the development of coalition communication plans;
- assimilating assessment/evaluation data relative to the communication plans and making recommendations to the Head of Mission;
- providing guidance to functional/organisational representatives and Heads of Communication at subordinate levels on the implementation of information objectives and the development of subordinate plans;
- managing coalition corporate identity campaigns.

In order to cope with these functions, the Head of Communication should be supported by a team of assistants and a capable Communication Staff.

A.3 Communication Staff

The composition of the Communication Staff should be adapted to requirements at different organisational levels, as appropriate. The number of individuals necessary to perform each function depends on detailed mission requirements.




Figure 13: Generic Communication Staff

A.3.1 Generic Description of Roles/Functions

A01. Director Communication Plans & Co-ordination:

is the permanent representative of the Head of Communication, primarily concerning advice to the planning process and coordinating current operations.

A02. Assistant Director Internal Communication:

plans and oversees leadership and staff development programs concerning the coalition's/organisation's corporate identity and image.

A03. Information Planner(s):

assist the planning process and provide advice based on the assessment of the information environment.

A04. Director Communication Assessment & Evaluation:

leads the measurement of communication effectiveness and integrates communication aspects with the overall campaign assessment.

A05. Information Analyst(s):

assist the analysis & assessment / Knowledge Development (KD) process from an information and communication perspective.

A06. Director Public Affairs / Spokesperson:

is 'the voice' of the coalition/organisation at the operational/in-theatre level, acting on behalf of the Head of Mission or commander/senior executive officer at subordinate levels; chairs press conferences and leads media opportunities.

A07. Deputy Spokesperson:

is the permanent representative of the Spokesperson, and the primary point of contact for all requests and inquiries of the press/media.

A08. Chief, Liaison Staff:

leads the Head of Communication's liaison staff and is the primary point of contact for all communication representatives of coalition participating and affiliated organisations.

A09. Liaison Officers:

maintain close contacts with communication representatives of coalition participating and affiliated organisations in order to facilitate co-ordination.

A10. Media Policy Assistant(s):

assist in drafting and supervising the coalition's/organisation's media policy, keep track of all media releases by the coalition/organisation, and produce regular news summaries, as required.

A11. Secretariat:

provides support to the Head of Communication in all administrative matters.

A12. Visitors' Bureau Staff Assistant(s):

arrange and host visits by press/media representatives and journalists, and support the liaison staff in all administrative and organisational matters.

A13. Chief, Media Production Staff:

leads the organic media/journalistic capability, in close co-ordination with the Spokesperson, and based on guidance provided by the Head of Communication.

A14. Editor-in-Chief:

leads the editorial work of the media capability, across the presentational formats.

A15. Audio-visual Journalist(s):

create reports for audio and audio-visual media products.

A16. Audio-visual Production Assistant(s):

produce audio and audio-visual media products; they include various types of editors and visual journalists, such as sound operators and video designers.

A17. Print Journalist(s): create reports for print media products.

A18. Print Editor(s):

produce print media products; they include various types of editors and visual journalists, such as photographers and graphic artists.

A19. Internet Journalist(s):

create reports for posting on the Internet, be it the coalition's/organisation's own homepage or contributions to partner sites.

A20. Web Designer(s):

develop, design and update the Internet homepage; develop and design Web contributions for posting on partner sites.

A21. Social Electronic Media Engineer(s):

develop, design and update own platforms, and contributions to other platforms and applications for networking, referencing, blogging, review, and content sharing¹⁵⁹.

A22. Budget & Finance Manager:

administrates the central communication media budget.

A23. Head Contracting Office: controls the outsourcing of media production.

A24. Contracting Officers: manage media production outsourcing.

A25. IT System Administrator:

supervises the Communication Staff IT network and supports Information Security (INFOSEC) in close cooperation with the responsible system administrators of the organisation.

A26. IT Assistant(s):

set up and maintain the Communication Staff IT network, and provide user support; support Web Designers and Social Electronic Media Engineers.

A.3.2 Matrix Organisation

Integrating internal and external communication processes, and integrating communication throughout analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of operations requires an adjustment of traditional structures.

Traditional management structures are organised around departments set up to specialise in given tasks, applying fixed principles of general management rather than flexible, process oriented project management. *"Within this system, companies and organisations build fences around their duties. They become territorial in nature and*

¹⁵⁹ Such as Interactive Television (iTV), Google Groups, Wikipedia, MySpace, Facebook, Yelp, Youmeo, YouTube, Delicious, Digg, Mixx, Reddit, StumbleUpon, Issuu, Flickr, Twitter, LinkedIn, Plaxo, Web 2.0 and smartphone applications.

want no part of corporate overlapping.”¹⁶⁰ Such an approach to command and control and staff organisation is often called 'stove piping', with organisational elements structured in 'functional silos' with little or no interaction. "In this structure, internal management is vertical, and cross-functional co-ordination is restricted. While this structure is easy for senior managers to install and control, it necessarily separates the organisation into managerial fiefdoms rather than coherent, customer-serving systems.”¹⁶¹

Organising integrated communication by project management principles will contribute to cohesion and coherence of an organisation and facilitate overall consistency of coalition activity. The Communication Staff, therefore, should integrate within the organisation through a matrix approach.

A matrix organisation for integrated communication should foresee centralised and decentralised elements (see Figure 14):

A MATRIX ORGANISATION is any organisational structure in which the project manager shares responsibility with the functional managers for assigning priorities and for directing the work of individuals assigned to the project.

- Centralised functions include the spokesperson, media production, internal communication, liaison, IT administration, visitors' bureau and secretariat;
- Decentralised functions include analysis & assessment, planning, and media policy assistance; these communication specialists would be temporarily assigned to other staff departments to advise and assist the responsible functional managers in the accomplishment of their tasks.




Figure 14: Matrix Organisation of the Communication Staff¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Ogden (1998), quoted in: Harte (2009), p.2.

¹⁶¹ Schultz (2004), p.117.

¹⁶² Based on: PMI (2000) and Schultz (2004).

A.3.3 Skills and Competencies

Communication Staffs should be experts in intercultural communicative competence¹⁶³, able to advise and assist general training as well as leadership development programs.

Specific skills and competencies required for integrated communication planning, co-ordination, analysis & assessment, and media policy assistance include:

- a. A comprehensive and systemic understanding of the information environment, which includes:
 - (1) Understanding basic principles of Knowledge Development (KD), Operations Research (OR), and Modelling and Simulation (M&S).
 - (2) Understanding the information factor in modern information societies (relevant aspects of the operational environment for information and information systems):
 - (a) recognition of system structures and dynamics;
 - (b) balancing complexity reduction vs. complexity management;
 - (c) selection of assessment criteria for factors that determine system behaviour.
 - (3) Understanding procedures and structures for the collaboration with personnel/agencies with assigned analysis and assessment functions:
 - (a) roles and responsibilities of advisors and analysts vs. planners and operators;
 - (b) significance of the information environment for the planning and conduct of operations.
- b. Basic knowledge about own and others' capabilities for creating effects in the information environment:
 - (1) Options for providing specific direction and guidance (e.g., Information Strategy, communication plans).
 - (2) Available and relevant capabilities, including their capacity and employment principles, considering:
 - (a) assets, means and methods for conducting information activities;
 - (b) possible effects of mainstream activity¹⁶⁴ in the information environment;
 - (c) interfaces and starting-points for synergetic effects and trade-offs.
 - (3) Basic methods and techniques for measuring success.
 - (4) Legal aspects involved in the employment of capabilities, including Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- c. Process/project management skills, including components of information management and visualisation techniques:

¹⁶³ See Section 4.4.1 Understanding the Information Environment and Cross-Cultural Awareness.

¹⁶⁴ I.e., those actions not deliberately designed to affect the information environment (Examples: delivery of humanitarian goods for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief purposes; blowing up a road bridge to disable adversary use of this line of communication; embargo measures to prevent smuggling or arms proliferation).

- (1) Deepened knowledge and skills for staff duty:
 - (a) possible organisation and staff structures;
 - (b) basic staff processes and work proceedings.
 - (2) Recognition of the importance of the establishment and development of expert networks, and the collaboration with subject matter experts.
 - (3) Ability to prepare, conduct and evaluate co-ordination processes (incl. the application of relevant methods and tools).
- d. Furthermore, Communication Staffs should have gained enhanced literacy and/or experience in the areas of consulting, negotiation, and moderation.

Skills and competencies of specialised functions such as media production, IT system administration and liaison equal those of the respective existing capabilities. Those functions and capabilities could be held available by pooling and/or process oriented reorganisation.

A.4 Co-ordination

It is a requirement for coherent engagement that partners coordinate information activities at all levels beginning at the early stages of the strategic-political planning process; this will most likely happen under supervision of the foreign ministries. If required, final decisions would be made by the Heads of State or government leaders, as appropriate.

The conduct of coordinated information activities requires adequate procedures and structures. Official bodies should be employed to establish operational connections between civilian and military organisations, departments and agencies to improve planning and co-ordination of information activities. Direct liaison between dedicated governmental organisations and agencies across different nations should be authorised and have adequate procedures for multinational information sharing outlined in a special agreement.

Partners should also coordinate information activities with international organisations, host nations and their agencies, and international missions operating in theatre at the appropriate levels. This co-ordination should be conducted through appropriate co-ordination procedures by national authorities of the partners and their representation in these organisations, under supervision of the appropriate ministries. The heads of national delegations/ contingents should establish a dedicated liaison organisation to ensure proper co-ordination of national activity, including information activities.

Of particular relevance for the definition of the relationship between actors involved in crisis prevention and resolution and those working in the humanitarian space is the fundamental UN provision that Humanitarian Assistance (HA) *"must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality."*¹⁶⁵ However, *"dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid*

¹⁶⁵ UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, Annex, No. I / 2.

competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals; basic strategies range from coexistence to co-operation." ¹⁶⁶

In order to protect the above principles, non-governmental organisations most likely would not formally engage in binding arrangements with state actors. However, concerning information activities in support of disaster relief and HA, co-ordination of information (i.e., the tracking of each others' activity rather than co-ordination of the conduct of activities) could be acceptable and mutually beneficial. This co-ordination should be conducted through appropriate co-ordination procedures outside official bodies by designated communication representatives of respective organisations and agencies.

¹⁶⁶ UN OCHA (2008), p.8.

Annex B – Generic Framework for Communication Plans ¹⁶⁷

B.1 Purpose

A communication plan is the vehicle that converts strategic intent into execution. It is a detailed, written document spelling out the information objectives that are derived from, and aligned with the organisation's¹⁶⁸ vision and narrative. The communication plan tells the story of how specific information objectives will be put into action. It translates the narrative into specific, measurable objectives; stakeholders into audiences; and communication themes into messages tailored for these audiences.

A communication plan is a living and working document and is updated periodically as audience needs change. It explains how to convey the right message, from the right communicator, to the right audience, through the right channel, at the right time, and addresses the basic elements of communication: sender/communicator, message, communication channel, feedback mechanism, receiver/audience, time frame, and assessment/evaluation.

In a coalition context, the communication plan developed at the highest strategic-political level is called the Information Strategy.

B.2 Planning Process ¹⁶⁹

As a plan type, the communication plan provides a series of logical planning steps that can be used to develop any kind of communication intervention, be it a communication project, program, or campaign.¹⁷⁰

B.2.1 Analyse the Situation

The situation analysis is an in-depth examination of the situation that motivates the communication plan. This analysis must be linked to the strategic issues or key organisational priorities identified in the strategic planning process.

The analysis should be used as a logical framework guiding systematic discussion of the organisation's specific situation with regards to the information activities to be planned, integrated, and implemented. All aspects of the specific situation must be studied thoroughly to discover which specific attitudes, opinions and behaviour should be changed, amongst which specific stakeholders, and what kind of activity will be required to achieve these ends.

¹⁶⁷ See Appendix B-3 Generic Format for Communication Plans

¹⁶⁸ 'Organisation' in this context may either mean the coalition as a whole or a certain part of it, such as a military component or civilian partner organisation. Contents may have to be adapted accordingly.

¹⁶⁹ Based on: Magyar Public Relations Szövetség (Hungarian Public Relations Association) – Global Alliance / Digital Management: Public Relations Strategy Development (<http://www.mprsz.hu/ContentShow.aspx?ContentID=156>; accessed 09 May 2010, 21:32).

¹⁷⁰ At the highest (strategic-political) level, a similar process and format may be applied for the development of the Information Strategy.

A 'SWOT Analysis' (internal Strengths and Weaknesses of an organisation, as well as its external Opportunities and Threats) is often considered a useful tool in conducting a situation analysis.

Initial emphasis should be laid on an analysis of the internal strengths and weaknesses of the organisation and its communication function. Strength is a resource, skill, or distinctive competence that gives the organisation a comparative advantage, e.g., financial resources, a good reputation or an open communication climate. A weakness is a limitation or deficiency in resource, skills or capabilities that seriously impede effective performance, e.g., inadequate facilities, a lack of management capabilities or communication skills.

Within the situation analysis a research-communication audit should be conducted to evaluate current communication efforts. The purpose is to find out what members of the organisation are currently doing in the way of communication, what each ongoing communication activity is designed to achieve, and how effective each activity is.

Furthermore, it is required to determine opportunities to favourably influence stakeholder attitude, opinion or behaviour towards the organisation (i.e., a pro-active plan) or to determine whether action is required in response to the development of unfavourable attitudes, opinion or behaviour towards the organisation (i.e., a reactive plan).

Whatever the situation that prompted the communication plan, the latter should always fit the organisational culture. Formative research (studying internal or external target audiences and their behaviour, or even organisational documentation) is thus important at this stage of planning.

Details on the analysis of the situation regarding the information environment can be found in the MNE 6, Objective 2.2 Analytical Concept "Enhanced Systemic Understanding of the Information Environment in Complex Crisis Management" (see Bibliography).

B.2.2 Reconfirm or Set (New) Information Objectives ¹⁷¹

Derived from the organisation's vision and narrative, information objectives provide the basis and framework for the organisation's Information Strategy, and guide targeted messaging. They integrate the information factor in strategic and implementation planning by describing the inherent dynamics of desired changes in the information environment from a strategic-political perspective, and focussing the required conditions for achieving agreed aims on information aspects.

INFORMATION OBJECTIVES are desired conditions to be created in the information environment. They should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of related actions and effects.

As planning is an ongoing activity throughout the conduct of operations, provisions of superior guidance need to be reviewed continuously and cross-checked for validity and relevance. Feedback from the assessment of operations and developments in the

¹⁷¹ See Appendix B-1 Illustrative Examples for Information Objectives.

information environment needs to be provided to the authorities holding the Information Strategy and to information planners at subordinate levels in an iterative process. If necessary, this may lead to the proposal of new information objectives, providing consistency with the narrative. It is self-evident that any change in an organisation's mandate or mission will require this review as well.

As the information factor is pervasive across instruments of power and the information environment forms an integral part of the operational environment, information objectives cannot be isolated from strategic objectives. Information objectives propose a different layer for looking at desired system states and are fully integrated and supportive to strategic objectives, describing specific outcomes focused on the information environment.

Information objectives must describe the desired system states in the information environment relevant to the Transition State and overall mission objectives – as *required conditions for achieving strategic objectives*.

Because information objectives provide the centrepiece of strategic guidance for effects in the information environment, the *links to the supported strategic objectives and other relevant outcomes* must be well-defined and clearly stated. An information objective may not necessarily be exclusively linked to one specific strategic objective; rather it may address issues contained in several strategic objectives in a cross-functional/interdisciplinary manner.

There is no formal sequence of contributing to the development of strategic objectives and outcomes, and developing information objectives. However, throughout the process the link between information objectives and strategic planning products must be ensured. This will be supported by an appropriate mapping and content analysis of the resulting relationships.

Information objectives should help to *define the purpose of activity in the information environment*. Because of the pervasive character of the information factor, they should demonstrate the relevance of related actions and effects to most (if not all) actors involved in mission accomplishment instead of being perceived as singular guidance for some indefinite 'information actors' or communication specialists.

Information objectives should be phrased in a concise statement that identifies who or what is to be affected in what way, and conclude with a comprehensible justification.

To impart the explicit meaning, each information objective should:

- state the *subject focus*, i.e., clearly address the relevant system element or sub-system that should be affected, reference to the assessment of the information environment (Part 1);
- indicate the *quality of change* of a system state, i.e., describe the direction and aspired modality towards which a relevant system element or sub-system of the information environment should be changed (Part 2);

- provide a *conclusion* that details the rationale for changing a system state, linking the information objective to strategic objectives or outcomes (Part 3).

In order to be measurable, information objectives should focus on observable systemic and attribute changes compared to an agreed baseline, i.e., the overall analysis of the situation and assessment of the information environment.

The level of detail to be applied is driven by the strategic perspective: information objectives should guide the development of effects/outputs rather than pre-empt results from functional implementation and activity planning.

B.2.3 Set Themes and Craft Master Messages ¹⁷²

Themes express the context for messages to be conveyed to audiences and activities to affect targets. Themes should be phrased as 'headlines' that indicate the issue of concern for associated master messages. They may include qualitative elements if that can be done concisely within a phrase rather than a full sentence.

THEMES provide the unifying subject or idea of a message or set of messages

Messages express a thought or idea as the object of communication. Master messages listed in communication plans provide guidance for information activities at the respective levels. In order to meet specific requirements for targeted messaging, these messages will need to be permanently reviewed, adjusted and amended throughout the campaign/mission. Based on the fact that every action or behaviour may bear informational content, messages provided with an Information Strategy and/or communication plans also guide conventional activity.

MASTER MESSAGES are cross-theme, top-level messages approved for use as principle content of an organisation's communication efforts.

Master messages in support of one theme or to one audience may be counter-productive when considered in the context of another theme, or when coincidentally received and misinterpreted by another audience. Such contradictions should be sought out during the development process and appropriate guidance given in relevant communication plans to de-conflict or manage the contradiction.

Some Master Messages may be directly used as messages by actors at lower levels while others will have to be tailored by them to their specific requirements. All messages developed at subsequent levels need to be consistent with the master messages provided by the Information Strategy and communication plans, and pass an appropriate approval process.

B.2.4 Establish Responsibilities

The communication plan should place a focus on central management (e.g., strategic alignment, meta-planning¹⁷³, financial/resource allocation, continued learning and

¹⁷² See Appendix B-2 Illustrative Examples for Themes and Master Messages.

¹⁷³ **'Meta-planning'** means "that knowledge about how to plan should itself be expressed in terms of a set of goals for the planning process (called 'meta-goals'), and a set of plans to achieve them ('meta-plans'). Meta-

improvement, and information system deployment). The emphasis in communication planning should therefore be on project management (utilisation of resources, workflow, supplier management, client satisfaction), and in planning information activities, it should be inputs and throughputs that count (e.g., process quality, task time, cycle time, activity cost).

The overall responsibility to manage the implementation of a communication plan should be assigned to an individual communication practitioner, even if a number of team members will assume responsibility for activities or tasks.

B.2.5 Decide on Implementation Strategy

At the core of the communication plan is the implementation strategy (in other words, a program of work for each information objective) – a clear articulation of the kind and combination of activities, tactics and tools to be used in getting the right messages to the right audiences with the right effects.

Strategy selection should be made within the context of the situation, the profile of the target audience and the messages.

An implementation strategy at least requires an engagement plan (including a framework for stakeholders and audiences, timelines, and desired outputs and outcomes linked to information objectives and messages), and a plan for risk mitigation.

B.2.6 Determine and Specify the Information Activities

After selecting the implementation strategy, the operational detail that turns the implementation strategy into action is developed. In this step all information activities are listed that will, in combination, turn the implementation strategy into reality. The chosen activities can either be frequently used communication products or events, or it can be a new activity devised to cater specifically for the context and situation.

In this step of the communication plan, each activity is only briefly scoped. Scoping an information activity entails setting the high-level parameters (e.g., person with overall responsibility, capabilities, timelines and budget) for the detailed planning to follow.

The detail for each activity is planned separately by the functions/capabilities responsible for execution/employment of assets. They make provision for all the tasks needed to execute an activity and specify the resource implications per task. Activity plans must be consistently linked to the communication plan at all stages of execution and assessment.

B.2.7 Set Budgets

goals and meta-plans are fodder to the same planning mechanism (or plan understander) that is used to produce a plan of action (or explanation) from ordinary plans." (Wilensky (1980), p.334)

B.2.8 Set Evaluation Methodology

Details on the assessment of effects in the information environment can be found in the MNE 6, Objective 2.2 Analytical Concept "Enhanced Systemic Understanding of the Information Environment in Complex Crisis Management" (see Bibliography).

Appendix B-1 Illustrative Examples for Information Objectives

CODE	Part 1: SUBJECT FOCUS	Part 2: QUALITY OF CHANGE	Part 3: CONCLUSION
	SYSTEM ELEMENT, SUB-SYSTEM	DIRECTION AND MODALITY	RATIONALE
InfoObj XX	<i>"All national and domestic actors..."</i>	<i>...understand coalition aims, objectives, and intent...</i>	<i>...in order to ensure the continued willingness for member partners to continue their participation and maintain coalition cohesion."</i> Supports all strategic objectives.
InfoObj XX	<i>"Communications and information infrastructure in XYZ and the region..."</i>	<i>...is functioning and reliable...</i>	<i>...to enable wide-ranging and reliable communication between all actors and the populations in the region."</i> Supports strategic objective: <i>"Conditions that improve the economy, social welfare and humanitarian affairs of country XYZ."</i>
InfoObj XX	<i>"Relevant actors in the region..."</i>	<i>...are convinced to promote a positive vision of the future through dialogue, cooperation and education...</i>	<i>...in order to gain active participation and support for the stabilization and sustainable development of the region."</i> Supports strategic objective: <i>"Political process agreed among XYZ institutions and civil society, to allow for free and fair elections that will result in the full and equal participation of all stakeholders in the political future of XYZ, initiated within the constitutional framework."</i>
InfoObj XX	<i>"Telecommunication and C2 lines of communication of the L.M. Gang..."</i>	<i>...are disrupted...</i>	<i>...in order to reduce their insurgent capability and contribute to local security in the ABC region."</i> Supports strategic objective: <i>"Establishment of a safe and secure environment in which the government of XYZ exercises effective control of its entire territory and the security forces refrain from human rights violations."</i>

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Appendix B-2 Illustrative Examples for Themes and Master Messages

THEME:	<i>"Acceptance of the Coalition" (Understanding of coalition aims is a prerequisite for achieving enhanced security and building an environment that is favourable for coalition activity.)</i>	
MASTER MESSAGES:	- We support the XYZ government and people and will leave XYZ as soon as our mandate is complete. - We are actively generating support within the International Community for the benefit of the XYZ people. - The XYZ government has requested us to support the development of the infrastructure, economy and social services. - The coalition will respond in an even handed manner to situations regardless of the affiliation of individuals or groups involved. (...)	
THEME:	<i>"Favourable Conditions for Development" (There are certain conditions that have to be met as a prerequisite for effective coalition activity. Most of these require collective effort.)</i>	
MASTER MESSAGES:	- The military component is in XYZ to provide security and logistics for the coalition and humanitarian organisations to allow them to make their job. - Violence is the wrong way to solve your problems and might lead to reduced international support. - We will support the development of an open and accessible information environment which will allow a constructive dialogue between all sides. - We are encouraging the local communities to accept refugees/IDPs on a temporary basis. We will support their return as soon as the situation allows. (...)	
THEME:	<i>"Local Initiative, Involvement, Commitment & Self-confidence" (The people of XYZ and the ABC region should perceive their future being as achievable and within reach of own initiatives. Coalition assistance must not be mistaken as dependence.)</i>	
MASTER MESSAGES:	- Substantial improvements in life conditions can only be achieved if the XYZ people mobilise and utilise their resources, capabilities, and abilities. - The XYZ government and people are capable to substantially contribute to overcoming present problems and creating better conditions. (...)	

THEME:	<i>"Local and Regional Dialogue and Cooperation" (The coalition should empower self-help. An important factor to enable this ambition is a sense of commonality and interdependence.)</i>	
MASTER MESSAGES:	- All actors are called upon to cooperate with relevant institutions that comply with the XYZ constitution. - We will support the development of an open and accessible information environment which will allow a constructive dialogue between all sides. - We encourage all sides of the conflict to start and continue a dialogue concerning the reconciliation process. (...)	

Appendix B-3 Generic Format for Communication Plans ¹⁷⁴

SECTION	SUGGESTED CONTENT	QUESTIONS TO ASK
Executive Summary		
Function and Scope	- The organisation's fundamental purpose, mandate and mission - The strategic vision - The narrative	Is the stated purpose consistent with the organisation's strategic plan?
Information Objectives	- Identification of the key issues the organisation is facing - A clear assessment of where the organisation is now, and where it wants to get to, based on its strategic objectives - Information objectives to effect behaviour change and influence opinions, based on research and insight	- Are the key issues consistent with the strategic plan? - Do information objectives seek to effect behaviour change in a way consistent with the strategic vision and narrative?
Audiences	- Identification of core and subsidiary audiences and related key insights, including staff - Identification of communication challenges - Understanding of which communication tools will work best for these audiences - Organisational stakeholder map	- Does the organisation have a sound grasp of its audiences, their behaviour, attitudes and communication preferences? - Does the organisation understand the challenges to communicating with key audiences, and which channels and approaches best suit them?
(Master) Messages	- A set of high level messages, core to all communication - Evidence of message tailoring for specific audiences	- Does the organisation have a high-level set of master messages / script that is incorporated into all communication? - Does the organisation tailor messages based on audience insight?

¹⁷⁴ Based on: NHS London (2008): "Suggested Framework for Communication Strategy" (<http://www.london.nhs.uk/webfiles/tools%20and%20resources/Comms%20strategy%20guide%20framework.doc>; accessed 10 May 2010, 07:56).

SECTION	SUGGESTED CONTENT	QUESTIONS TO ASK
Implementation Plan	• A public, staff and stakeholder engagement plan, including timetable, outputs and outcomes • Plan for responding to short-term crises • Summary of communication risks and mitigating actions	• Does the communication plan support the strategic vision and narrative? • Does the organisation have a plan for short-term crises with clear staff roles and responsibilities? (Or is this evidenced in wider continuity plans?) • Does the organisation have a good understanding of the communication risks and how these might be mitigated? • Is the organisation clear about when and why it needs to consult and engage with stakeholders and the public? Does it have appropriate plans to do so?
Evaluation	• A range of evaluation measures to assess communication outputs and outcomes, against the objectives	• Does the organisation have a clear evaluation plan for its communication and engagement activity? • What research does the organisation need to do / commission at the outset of the communication plan?
Financial Analysis / Resource Implication	• Summary of budget plan • Anticipated resource gap and mitigation plan	• Is the communication and engagement budget plan consistent with the overall financial plan? • Does the organisation have a good understanding of any resource gap, and how to mitigate it?

Annex C – CD&E Study Issues (Revised) ¹⁷⁵

The following study issues describe the epistemological interest of this work.

They guide concept development and assist the analysis of related experimentation.

1 Context, Reference and Definition

- (2.1) 1.1 How should we define and describe internal and external communication?
- (2.1) 1.2 What levels of involvement are suitable for applying integrated communication?
- (2.1) 1.3 How should we design a comprehensive, whole-of-government, and interagency consensus with regard to coalition communication?
- (2.1) 1.4 How can we focus coalition communication top-down, through all levels of involvement?
- (2.1) 1.5 To what extent are civilian approaches to integrated communication ('Integrated Marketing Communication', 'Organisational Communication', 'Institutional Communication', etc.) transferable to coalition operations in a multinational and interagency context?

2 Political Pre-requisites

- (2.1) 2.1 How do national interests, caveats, and political expedience affect coalition communication efforts?
- (2.1) 2.2 How do coalition common goals affect coalition partners' communication efforts?
- (2.1) 2.3 Who is responsible for providing coalition communication guidance and leading related efforts?
- (2.1) 2.4 What are critical issues and limitations for the implementation of coalition communication guidance?
- (2.1) 2.5 What is the legal framework relevant to coalition partners' co-operation in an integrated communication framework?
- (2.1) 2.6 Who may be actors and audiences for coalition integrated communication?

3 Requirements for Effective Internal and External Communication

- (2.1) 3.1 What are requirements for effective, culturally attuned communication within a coalition for promoting coalition coherence?

¹⁷⁵ The revision of study issues for MNE 6 Objective 2.1 reflects the re-focussing of this Framework Concept since its Draft v1.0 (29 January 2010) with a new emphasis on the broader scope of "integrated communication".

- (2.1) 3.2 What are requirements for effective, culturally attuned communication between a coalition and other actors for promoting coalition interests and objectives?
- (2.1) 3.3 How can we ensure credibility, consistency, and coherence in coalition communication efforts?
- (2.1) 3.4 How can we balance coalition communication efforts between a persistent, top-down narrative (long-term goals) and focused implementation (ad hoc mission requirements)?
- (2.1) 3.5 How can we coordinate 'words and deeds' amongst coalition actors to promote and present consistency and coherence towards a common goal?
- (2.1) 3.6 What is the scope of capabilities, tools and techniques contributing to the implementation of superior communication guidance?
- (2.1) 3.7 How can we best exploit the full range of capabilities to achieve coalition objectives in the information environment?
- (2.1) 3.8 Are there requirements for new/additional capabilities, tools and techniques for integrated communication?

4 Implementation of Integrated Communication

- (2.1) 4.1 How can we develop mandate-/mission-specific strategic guidance for coalition internal and external communication?
- (2.1) 4.2 How should we express appropriate political direction and policy guidance for coalition communication?
- (2.1) 4.3 How can we best coordinate coalition communication efforts to achieve a faster, pro-active stance, and improved, coherent messaging?
- (2.1) 4.4 How can we link up coalition, interagency, non-governmental and indigenous organisations to share objectives and synchronise actions and messages?
- (2.1) 4.5 How should we construct standardised processes and structures for communication across civil and military actors to enhance co-ordination, enable long-term planning and accelerate decision-making?
- (2.1) 4.6 How should we integrate various capability contributions to the implementation of communication guidance at various levels?
- (2.1) 4.7 What degree of authority is required for actors implementing communication guidance?
- (2.1) 4.8 How can we create appropriate dialogue and mechanisms amongst actors involved in coalition integrated communication?
- (2.1) 4.9 How should we describe and delineate roles and responsibilities within the framework of integrated communication?
- (2.1) 4.10 What is the role of the military within coalition integrated communication?

Annex D – Concept Validation

The propositions of this concept are (to be) validated through the following experimentation events:

Empirical/Field Study:

Definition: Any study that is conducted on individuals acting in their routine working environment, which does not involve an invasive procedure (i.e., the deliberate or purposeful manipulation of independent variables to establish cause-and-effect relationships), and which does not alter the behaviour of the individuals under study.

No event scheduled to-date.

Seminar:

Definition: A meeting (of experts) for giving and discussing information, often using brain-storming techniques.

Seminar "Non-Compliance and Strategic Communication" (SC-LOE 1), integrating MNE 6 Objectives 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2
(19/20 October 2009, Garmisch/DEU)

Workshop:

Definition: A usually brief intensive program for a relatively small group of people that focuses especially on techniques and skills in a particular field. Workshops may be conducted as a structured discussion between experts to elicit opinions and judgments from them, and to increase understanding. It is more structured than brainstorming, but is not normally supported by any kind of simulation.

Strategic Communication Workshop 1 (SCWS 1), combined with the Multinational Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE) Workshop 19
(09-13 March 2009, Florence/ITA)

SCWS 2, combined with the MNIOE Workshop 20
(11-15 May 2009, Ottawa/CAN)

CD&E Conference 2009 (16-19 November 2009, Rome/ITA), co-sponsored by NATO HQ SACT and USJFCOM – Strategic Communication Workshop, Sub-Session "Strategic Communication Experimentation Program",
(18 November 2009)

SCWS 3, conducted as MNE 6 Objective 2.1 concept development workshop
(13-16 December 2009, Warsaw/POL)

SCWS 4, integrating MNE 6 Objectives 2.1 and 2.2 with Objectives 1.1, 1.3, 3.1 and 4.3
(03-07 May 2010, Berlin/DEU)

Integrating Workshop MNE 6 Objectives 2.2 and 3.1, with Objective 2.1 in a SME / observer role
(18-20 May 2010, Helsinki/FIN)

SCWS 5, integrating MNE 6 Objectives 2.1 and 2.2 (final co-ordination)
(11-15 October 2010, Ottobrunn/DEU)

Analytical Wargame:

<i>Definition:</i> An experiment, which typically employs lead and staff functions to plan and execute an operation, often with some form of constructive simulation adjudicating outcomes between turns (sometimes overnight).
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No event scheduled to-date.

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MNE 6 Framework Concept, Third Draft Version 1.0

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