



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**RE-INTEGRATION OF FORMER LIBERATION TIGERS OF
TAMIL EELAM COMBATANTS INTO CIVILIAN SOCIETY
IN POST-WAR SRI LANKA**

By

Mada Kalapuge Lakshan Anuruddhika De Silva

March 2012

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Mohammed M. Hafez
Anshu N. Chatterjee

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Lakshan Anuruddhika De Silva, Mada Kalapuge
Lieutenant Colonel, Sri Lanka Army
B.A., General Sir John Kotelawela Defence University,
Ratmalana, Sri Lanka, 1995
M.D.S., University of Kelaniya, Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, 2007
M.Sc., University of Balochistan, Quetta, Pakistan, 2009

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2012**

Author: Lakshan Anuruddhika De Silva, Mada Kalapuge

Approved by: Mohammed M. Hafez
Thesis Advisor

Anshu N. Chatterjee
Second Reader

Moran Daniel
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

The entire nation paid a high price militarily, politically, economically and socially during the twenty-six-year-old conflict in Sri Lanka. However, May 18, 2009, marked a significant milestone in the written history of Sri Lanka. The three-year-long Humanitarian Operation conducted by the Sri Lankan Security Forces to liberate civilians from the cruel clutches of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorists ended, assigning a total military defeat to the LTTE. As a nation, Sri Lanka is now facing the daunting task of a range of challenges in the post-war era. Above all, much effort is needed to heal the scars of the conflict and to build the Sri Lankan identity. Though the war is over, the remnants of the LTTE may pose a considerable security challenge. Amongst them are many surrendered combatants of the LTTE who are being rehabilitated and absorbed into the society. Sacred responsibility lies with the government in rehabilitating ex-combatants is to ensure a long-term, results-oriented process. Considering the highly sensitive status quo of the issue at the aftermath of its conflict, the Sri Lankan government needs to contribute its share to rebuild the nation. Therefore, this thesis dwells on testing the benchmarks expected by the Sri Lankan government in carrying out this process and the outcome so far, in meeting the said contesting national requirement in comparison to other cases in the world.

In this sense, the question arises as to how the programs of reintegration can be successful, and what potential problems could arise in the process of reintegration. Therefore, this thesis attempts to identify the questions of the Sri Lankan case in comparison to other cases, in understanding how de-radicalization and re-integration evolved in these countries, and how they reached the benchmarks by overcoming weaknesses and lapses.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	BACKGROUND TO THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT	1
B.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	4
C.	IMPORTANCE	5
D.	LITERATURE REVIEW.....	5
E.	PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS	22
F.	METHODS AND SOURCES	25
G.	THESIS OVERVIEW	26
II.	THE SAUDI ARABIAN RE-INTEGRATION PROCESS	29
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	29
B.	BACKGROUND TO THE TERRORISM PROBLEM IN SAUDI ARABIA	31
C.	THE SAUDI ARABIAN RE-INTEGRATION PROGRAM 2004	33
1.	Implementation of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Program.....	38
2.	Outcome of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Program.....	40
3.	Summary of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Process.....	46
III.	THE BURUNDIAN REINTEGRATION PROCESS	49
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	49
B.	BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM IN BURUNDI	50
C.	THE ACTION PLAN OF THE BURUNDIAN REINTEGRATION PROCESS.....	53
1.	The implementation of the Burundian Reintegration Process.....	55
2.	The Outcome of the Burundian Reintegration Process	57
3.	Summary of the Burundian Reintegration Process.....	60
IV.	THE YEMENI REINTEGRATION PROCESS	63
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	63
B.	BACKGROUND OF THE YEMEN PROBLEM	65
C.	THE PROPOSED PROGRAM OF THE YEMENI REINTEGRATION PROCESS	68
1.	The Implementation of the Yemen Reintegration Process.....	72
2.	The Outcome.....	74
3.	Summary	76
V.	CONCLUSION	79
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	79
B.	LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLYING THEM TO SRI LANKA.....	80
1.	Comparing Successful and Unsuccessful Re-integration Efforts	80

a.	<i>Why Saudi Arabia's Re-integration Effort Succeeded.....</i>	<i>80</i>
b.	<i>Why Re-integration in Burundi and Yemen Failed... 81</i>	
C.	RE-INTEGRATION BENCHMARKS AND BEST PRACTICES.....	83
D.	APPLYING THE EXAMPLES OF SAUDI ARABIA, BURUNDI, AND YEMEN TO SRI LANKA	85
1.	Overview of Sri Lanka's Re-integration Efforts to Date	85
2.	Limitations of Applying the Saudi Example to the Sri Lankan Context.....	86
3.	A Path to Future Success	88
E.	IN CLOSING	89
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	93
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	103

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
BCGR	Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation
CGR	Commissioner General of Rehabilitation
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Re-integration
ES	Executive Secretariat
FDD	Forces for the Defense of Democracy
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GWOT	Global War On Terror
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAS	Income Generating Activities Support
ILO	International Labor Organization
INCHR	Independent National Commission for Human Rights
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDRP	Multi-country Demobilization and Re-integration Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCDDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration
NGO	Non Governmental Organization(s)
NLF	National Liberation Front
PARC	Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centre
PPO	Provincial Program Office

PRAC	Prevention, Rehabilitation and post-Release Care
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
TID	Terrorist Investigation Division
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar(s)

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND TO THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT

Sri Lanka has 2,500 years of a recorded history. The ethnic consistency of the island nation is comprised of a majority Sinhalese 72 %, Tamils 18% (12% Sri Lankan Tamils and 6% Indian Tamils), Muslims 7%, Malays 1% and others 2%. Sri Lanka is predominantly a Buddhist country; the mass affiliation to religion consists of Buddhists at 70%, Hindus at 16%, Islamists at 7%, Christians at 6%, and others at 1%, respectively. Within modern history, the country was under successive Portuguese, Dutch and British colonization from 1505 until 1948 when it gained independence from the British. The newly independent nation retained the name Ceylon until the 1972 constitution, which renamed it as Sri Lanka.¹ The post-independent Sri Lanka had been very peaceful except for a few minor-scale communal riots. However, the situation changed dramatically after 1983, and Sri Lanka entered into the longest insurgency in South Asia, with an active conflict of 26 years of fighting.

Administratively, Sri Lanka has 25 districts under 9 provinces. The Northern and Eastern provinces are predominantly the minority Tamil living provinces of Sri Lanka; the other seven provinces are dominated by the majority Sinhalese. The basic complaint of the minority Tamils was that they were not given due recognition by the majority Sinhalese governments of Sri Lanka, which they had enjoyed under the British rule. The British administration was very successful in their tactic and shattered the multi-ethnic foundation of the long-standing unitary Sri Lanka through its divide-and-rule concept.² Additionally, the British administration had re-ordered the ethnic composition of Sri Lanka. To address the scarcity of the labor force, they decided to bring Southern Indian

1 Background Note: Sri Lanka (April 6, 2011), US Department of State: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm>.

2 Nira Wickramasinghe (2006), *Sri Lanka in the modern age: a history of contested identities*, University of Hawai'i Press, 27–33.

Tamils to Sri Lanka; as a result, the Tamil representation in the Sri Lankan demographic scene rose to today's 18% (increased by another 6%).

The politicians' shortsighted policies have been the basic factor behind the whole Sri Lankan issue, which dates back to 1956 when the Sinhala language was made the only official language of Sri Lanka.³ Even though they were later rectified by the successive governments that also included the Tamil language as one of the official languages, the mistrust developed was never rectified. Supported by the opportunistic politics, the deprived and politicized Tamil youth—motivated by the radical militant leadership in the Northern and the Eastern Provinces—began to organize and claimed a separate country for Tamils called "Tamil Eelam." The most prominent of these groups was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The responsibility of creating the LTTE lies with Indira Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India. She did this because Sri Lanka adopted a U.S.-biased policy from 1977 onwards after opening its economy under President J. R. Jayawardena, when the India was an ally of Soviet Union.⁴ Gradually, the LTTE was developed under the blessings of Indira Gandhi by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the state intelligence arm of India. When the LTTE was strong enough to operate independently, they went to the extent of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India and Ranasinghe Premadasa, the former President of Sri Lanka. They pioneered the suicide bombing culture that terrorized the whole world and was instrumental in employing women and child soldiers on suicidal missions.

They were the only terrorist organization in the world that had developed to reach the conventional level capabilities. They had their land forces, naval forces called the "Sea Tigers," and the Air Force's "Air Tigers," with fewer light aircraft. July 1983, known as "Black July," marked the formal beginning of civil

³ J. N. Dixit (1998), *Assignment Colombo (The Sabotage Begins)*, Konark Publishers Private Limited, 22–27.

⁴ International Crisis Group, Asia Report no. 206 (June 23, 2011), "India and Sri Lanka after the LTTE," 3.

war in Sri Lanka.⁵ The LTTE launched a deadly attack on the military in the North, killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers, which ultimately turned into island-wide communal riots, fuelled by the opportunists and Sinhalese chauvinists. Some 2,500 to 3,000 Tamils were estimated to have been killed, and many more fled Sinhalese-majority areas. This was the major outbreak of the conflict, and it has internationalized the Sri Lankan civil war.

Many rounds of negotiations between the LTTE and the successive Sri Lankan governments throughout this period produced mixed results. However, towards the end, none of them was fruitful because the LTTE did not give up its demand and was not willing to accept anything short of a separate country. Therefore, all attempts made to resolve the conflict failed, as the LTTE did not accept any solution within the parameters of a unitary state. April 2006 was the beginning of the end of the LTTE. They captured the “Mavil-Aru” reservoir, one of the biggest water resources in the Eastern Province, and closed the sluice gates by disconnecting the water supply for thousands of acres of farming lands. The government was left with no options and finally decided to launch the military operations against the LTTE.⁶ This was continued until May 2009, and was conducted systematically when compared with the early operations. On May 18, 2009, the longest insurgency in the South Asia, the LTTE, was militarily defeated and three decades of terrorism in the island nation came to an end.

With the end of the fighting—26 years after the government began its post-conflict development process in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka—the country now enjoys peace. After 26 years of conflict, Sri Lanka today has embarked on its future. Progress made after two years has produced mixed results. Some areas were highly successful and some areas are lacking the

⁵ Asoka Bandarage (2009), *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, Routledge, 104.

⁶ The President's address to the inaugural session of the Presidential Committee on Development and Reconciliation, Presidential Secretariat, Colombo, Sri Lanka (July 2, 2009), retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_116478.pdf.

potential. Out of 290,000 displaced refugees, the number of persons remaining in IDP camps is less than 7,000.⁷ Another most important area that the Sri Lankan government had to undertake was the responsibility of reintegrating the ex-LTTE combatants into the civilian society. As per the government's records, out of 11,600 ex-combatants who have been either surrendered or captured at the end of the battle, 10,600 of them have already completed their rehabilitation process and have reintegrated into the society.⁸

B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Ex combatants have to be reintegrated into mainstream civilian society because they are also a part of the country, and in accordance with human rights laws, they have to be given with due recognition to enjoy the status of an average citizen of the country. In Sri Lanka, the ex combatants of LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) are being demobilized, de-radicalized and reintegrated into the civilian society. However, a number of difficulties are being faced in terms of complete de-radicalization of these combatants because of some practical problems that need to be overcome. The question that arises in this process is: What are the lessons to be learned from the reintegration efforts carried out by other countries; and, how can the successful strategies used by other countries be applied to post-conflict Sri Lanka? Therefore, this is an important task because the combatants were rebels in their past lives and—once they were defeated—they cannot remain war prisoners forever.

In this study, I made a comparative analysis of the reintegration of rebels as it took place in countries like Burundi, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

⁷ Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka, "Remaining number of IDPs dropped to 7000," retrieved from http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20110829_03.

⁸ *Daily Mirror*, "Govt. to open positions in police for rehabilitated LTTE combatants," retrieved from <http://dailymirror.lk/news/16369-govt-opens-up-positions-in-police-service-for-rehabilitated-ltte-combatants.html>.

This thesis determines whether their successful strategies can be applied to the Sri Lankan society, and how the current standards of reintegration in Sri Lanka are in parity with the benchmarks set by other countries.

C. IMPORTANCE

The phenomenon of reintegration and de-radicalization of former combatants of a particular terrorist or rebellion group becomes extremely important for any government when a civil war ends. When the LTTE in Sri Lanka were defeated after a conflict of almost three decades, eleven thousand ex-combatants belonging to LTTE had to be de-radicalized and re-integrated into the society. The process faces many challenges, as the programs for reintegration takes a lot of effort and resources for its successful implementation and its goals to be achieved. The reintegration of these combatants is a national security question because there are chances that they may revert to their old practices and loyalties, based on the success of the program. Therefore, there is a need for well-planned programs that can help these combatants reintegrate into the society.

The phenomenon is not new; many other countries have already applied this reintegration successfully, while others have faced failure. Considering the implications of the issue on states wherever such incidents have occurred, this research would make important contributions to security studies to understand the phenomenon of de-radicalization and re-integration in a holistic context. It would also be helpful to academics for reference in similar studies.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of literature pertaining to the reintegration and de-radicalization of former combatants of the LTTE reveals that the issue is quite complex. According to the analysis of Jeannie Annan and Ana Cutter Patel, one of the key aspects of the re-integration processes is to encourage social healing and to facilitate social acceptance for those who are re-integrating. According to the ex-combatant focused model, most reintegration programs have been designed with

the prime objective of providing projects (mostly economic) in order to be self-sustainable, while reducing chances of them returning to violence.⁹

The model followed by Sri Lanka seems to be systematic. The President of Sri Lanka has expressed his views on the expected reintegration process to be initiated in Sri Lanka. Addressing the Presidential Committee on Development and Reconciliation, the President said, “After the successful conclusion of the ‘Humanitarian Mission-1,’ to liberate civilians held hostage by a terrorist outfit, it’s time to launch ‘Humanitarian Mission-2,’ to get them back on track with their normal lives.”¹⁰ “The National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka” was initially developed by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights in Sri Lanka, and was aimed at achieving three basic goals:¹¹ Firstly, to safeguard the human rights of ex-combatants, including the responsibility to protect and assist them in accordance with the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the State’s international obligations. Secondly, to contribute towards sustainable peace, reconciliation and social cohesion through the ex-combatant’s reintegration program. And thirdly, to increase the employability of ex-combatants, minimize their risk of socioeconomic marginalization and create opportunities for economic revitalization in post-war Sri Lanka.

Due to anticipation and planning, the government’s mechanism to address the ex-combatants re-integration process, the “National Framework Proposal” went into action less than three months after the end of fighting between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. A high-powered national steering committee has been formed to implement and monitor the

⁹ Jeannie Annan and Ana Cutter Patel (2009), “Critical Issues and lessons in Social Re-integration: Balancing Justice, Psychological Well Being, and Community Reconciliation” (CIDDR, May 2009), retrieved from http://cartagenaddr.org/literature_press/ART_21.pdf, 9–10.

¹⁰ Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka, retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_116478.pdf, inner cover page.

¹¹ Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 1.

process, under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Minister in charge of Disaster Management and Human Rights. Representatives from the Ministry of Defense, Public Security, Law and Order, Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and National Integration and the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare are also included. The International Labor Organization (ILO) provides the technical support and the financial assistance required for proper implementation of the National Framework Proposal.¹² Based on the directions of the national steering committee, along with its guidelines, it has been decided to form three respective working groups, one for each of the three different areas of the process. Accordingly, the three working groups (similar to task forces) on reinsertion, social reintegration, and economic reintegration have been formed to monitor and develop their mechanisms under the master proposal. Members of the working groups consist of government officials, including permanent secretaries of subjected ministries, advisors of planning and policy implementation, and senior officials of the armed forces. It also includes representatives of other national and international organizations, including the United Nations agencies such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Labor Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Resident Coordinator's Office in Sri Lanka, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).¹³ It is important to note that to make the process more meaningful, the National Steering Committee has taken the initiative to invite all relevant national and international actors to join the dialogue in finalizing its framework. The final outcome was that a consensus-based approach was agreed upon between all working groups and with the consultation of the representatives of the Tamil political parties, whose affiliations are with former LTTE combatants in terms of understanding their aspirations and views.

¹² Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 2.

¹³ Ibid., 3.

Subsequent to military operations ending on May 19, 2009, the first-hand government directive, the “National framework proposal on reintegration of ex-combatants,” was launched on July 30, 2009. Ex-combatants were sorted in to three categories, and Sri Lanka undertook the challenge of re-integration based on an approach driven by five core principles: similar levels of reintegration assistance irrespective of former affiliation, equity in gender treatment, demand-driven approach, enabling ex-combatants to choose their reintegration preference to the greatest possible extent, linking ex-combatants with broader community-based economic recovery efforts and avoiding actions that may be perceived as privileging ex-combatants in relation to other war-affected communities.¹⁴ Further, this proposal discusses a homegrown approach, but with best international practices.¹⁵

Accordingly, the National Framework Proposal of Sri Lanka has targeted four basic categories in their reintegration process. They are the ex-combatants of the LTTE who were captured and or arrested, the LTTE activists who surrendered prior to the conclusion of hostilities, members of non-LTTE paramilitary groups who were already normalized (most of them broke from the LTTE and are now working with the government), and the last category, host communities affected by the conflict.¹⁶

While studying the multi-faceted nature of ex-combatants and giving a special categorization to them, G. Harris, N. Lewis and E. Dos Santos have suggests that the reintegrating of child soldiers must in accordance with the identified major issues of concern.¹⁷ Major General Shavendra Silva, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, recently claimed

¹⁴ Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 7.

¹⁵ *Daily News* (July 31, 2009), “National framework proposal on reintegration of ex-combatants,” retrieved from <http://www.dailynews.lk/2009/07/31/news20.asp>.

¹⁶ Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 7.

¹⁷ G. Harris, N. Lewis, and D. Santos (2003), “Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries,” retrieved from <http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=IS65VxexWRgC&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=Recovery+from+Armed+Conflic>, 151–158.

that the government's present re-integration process for ex-combatants is unparalleled. He declared that the rehabilitation and re-integration of all former child combatants has successfully concluded.¹⁸

It is important to discuss how Sri Lanka was organized to undertake the rehabilitation process according to a specific categorization. The new national framework proposal was put in place to function under the newly formed Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR), which comes under the purview of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms in Sri Lanka. The inauguration of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation dates back to September 12, 2006, and was established a few months after the government's firm decision to defeat the LTTE organization militarily. The military operation to defeat LTTE lasted three years, beginning in April 2006. The Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (headed by a serving General Officer) has been fully empowered as the competent authority with a mandate to carry out the task of the reintegration process in post-war Sri Lanka. The mission of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation is "to disengage, de-radicalize, rehabilitate and reintegrate the misguided men, women and children, who were radicalized by the protracted armed conflict, in to the community following a center and community based comprehensive rehabilitation process to be useful citizens and productive members to the country."¹⁹ The bureau coordinates with all relevant local and international agencies over its funding and administration. The ex-combatants' re-integration process was launched accordingly, based in "Rehabilitation Centers," of which there were nine centers at the time of initial establishment.

The bureau had to undertake the responsibility to rehabilitate a total of 11,696 surrendered ex-LTTE combatants. There were nine rehabilitation camps,

¹⁸ The Deputy Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations at the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on "Women, Peace and Security," New York (October 26, 2010), retrieved from <http://www.priu.gov.lk>.

¹⁹ Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, "Vision and the Mission of the BCGR," retrieved from <http://bcgr.gov.lk/vision.php>.

called Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers (PARCs). They were initially established in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the island.²⁰ These centers were established around three major Tamil living areas and based on the policy of conducting rehabilitation for misled young men, women and children within their own community areas for their convenience. In the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, three PARCs were established in the Thrikonamadu, Kandakadu and Senapura areas. Covering the Southern part of the Northern Province, where a majority of Tamils are living, five PARCs were established in the areas of Poonthottam, Pompaimadu, Nellukkulam, Tamil Primary-Vavuniya and Maradamadu. Finally, covering the Northern part of the Northern Province, a PARC was established in the Tellippalai area.

It is important to know what challenges the average rehabilitee—or “beneficiary” as they are more commonly referred to—faces in order to understand the expected role of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation. According to Chamil Prasad, the challenges faced by ex-combatants are multi-faceted, vary in each individual case and range over a huge spectrum. His analysis further identifies the nature of challenges faced by ex-combatants saying, “Most of them may be either hopeless or have no plan for their future. Recognition states also may fade away when compared to their stay with terrorist outfits, where they have to live with little earnings or no earnings, an inability to fulfill social responsibilities towards their families, difficulty receiving required medical assistance due to non-availability of facility or finance difficulties, an inability to continue their studies or acquire any kind of paper qualifications to face future challengers, uncertainties on their behaviors by

²⁰ Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka, retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_116478.pdf, 10.

military or social elements and non-availability of jobs or opportunities for livelihood activities”²¹.

Rehabilitation programs conducted by the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation have targeted three categories of rehabilitees: child rehabilitees, adult female rehabilitees and adult male rehabilitees. According to the official website of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, a range of programs is being conducted for ex combatants according to their categorization. Rehabilitation programs for “child ex-combatants” includes: formal school education programs, vocational training programs, aesthetics and drama therapy programs, spiritual development programs, counseling and positive values cultivation programs, sports activities such as cricket, regional athletic meets, inter-school cricket and netball matches, sports meets, new year festivals, guiding and scouting, educational visits, friendship visits to other parts of the country, and innovative and creative literary child radio programs in collaboration with the Sri Lanka Broad Casting Cooperation (SLBC).²²

According to the bureau, the rehabilitation programs conducted for “adult female ex-combatants” include: classes for General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) and General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) examinations, language training (Sinhala and English), typing shorthand for clerical work, diploma in nursery management, tailoring programs, sewing machine operator training programs with the help of the private sector apparel exporter industries, bridal dressing, hair dressing and make-up, yoga exercises and meditation programs, Buddhist meditation programs, aesthetics and drama therapy programs, lecturing and conducting training workshops in a variety of settings and special abilities in pre-marital, marital, family planning counseling

²¹ Chamil Prasad, “Effective post conflict rehabilitation to prevent future conflicts in order to consolidate democracy through sustainable peace initiatives,” retrieved from <http://www.liberalparty-order.srilanka.org/liberalyouth/news-a-events/85-effective-post-conflict-rehabilitation-to-prevent-future-conflicts-in-to-consolidate-democracy-through-sustainable-peace-initiatives-by-chamil-prasad.html>.

²² Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Ongoing activity,” retrieved from <http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/ongoing.php>.

and career-related issues, computer basic knowledge (with help of private companies), computer aided drafting (CAD) and tri-dimensional drafting (3D), advance modeling and bridal dressing courses, cookery courses, spiritual development programs, counseling and positive values cultivation programs, sports activities (cricket, sports meets, festivals) and certificate programs on psychosocial counseling.²³

Of these programs, the General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) is the cutting edge of basic education, and the General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) examination is the gateway to a university education, and is the prerequisite for entrance to other higher educational institutions. Because Sri Lanka is one of the top-ranking countries in the world for its literacy rate, and the fact that becoming qualified in education is extremely competitive in Sri Lanka, it is important that these ex-combatant female cadres have access to the educational process they missed for so many years due to their forceful conscription to the LTTE organization. Language education is the next most important program available. The Sinhala language is the most widely spoken language in Sri Lanka—a language needed to bridge the long-standing gap between two major communities over ethnic disharmony. Learning the other community's language will provide a solid foundation in the national reconciliation process, which has positive long-term effects. English is treated as a coordinated and international language in Sri Lanka, and the language in which most commercial activities are carried out. Furthermore, learning the English language will be an added advantage, as there are more opportunities in Sri Lanka for those who have a general understanding of it. Training opportunities on the Juki sewing machine can be a golden opportunity. Today's Sri Lanka's economy depends on the export of ready-made garments, and it is the single largest source of income in Sri Lanka.

²³ Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, "Ongoing activity."

Accordingly, the rehabilitation programs conducted for “adult male ex-combatants” include: classes for General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) and General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) examinations, language training (Sinhala and English), typing shorthand, plumbing, aluminum work, house wiring, Juki sewing machine operation, leather work, electrical work, carpentry, masonry, welding, heavy machinery training (dozers and earth movers), driving, tailoring programs, three-wheel and two-wheel repairing programs in collaboration with private sector companies, coconut cultivation, mushroom cultivation, use of chemical fertilizers, yoga exercises and meditation programs, Buddhist meditation programs, aesthetics and drama therapy programs, lecturing and conducting training workshops in variety of settings and special abilities in pre-marital, marital, family planning, counseling and career-related issues, computer basic knowledge (with help of private sector companies), spiritual development programs, counseling and positive values cultivation programs, sports activities (cricket, sports meets, festivals), modeling courses, certificate programs on psychosocial counseling, outboard motorboat courses for fishing.²⁴ As far as the male ex-combatant cadres who are expected to reintegrate to society are concerned, in addition to government examinations and language learning opportunities, there are many opportunities for them to be trained on an employability-driven profession or a trade. In addition, marriages amongst rehabilitated adult male and female ex-combatants have also been arranged. Friendship visits and goodwill exchange visits (such as sports or cultural programs) are organized to other parts of the country to build trust between two ethnic communities have also been included in order to increase harmony among two communities.

In various regions of the world, terrorism and political violence increased after the 1990s because of the rapid proliferation of extreme rightwing factions. Equally crucial is the vehemence on the components and considerations that may assist to constrain militant groups to carry on their violent radical ideas to

²⁴ Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Ongoing activity.”

their decisions.²⁵ According to the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, in Sri Lanka, weapon caches are continuously recovering, and some former LTTE members who were mingled with the general public are known to be at large. Further, they says that the position taken by the Tamil Diaspora are also not clear, after the total defeat of the LTTE, and poses a serious question because the stabilization of Tamil community should not be equated to the pacification of the Tamil population, the possibilities of generating further discontent.²⁶ However, the Sri Lankan bureaucrats have not yet made any decision over recruiting those ex-combatants into armed forces. Strength refers to the behavior changes, such as leaving the group, or changes in its role in the group. This does not necessarily imply a change in values or ideals, but requires the rejection of it to achieve change through violence. De-radicalization, however, involves a cognitive shift, a fundamental change in understanding.²⁷

Kees Kingma's thoughts on reintegration efforts in Africa open another unique dimension of the Sri Lankan situation. According to the writer, most of African reintegration initiatives are backed with United Nations Peace Keeping Forces physical involvements, owing to their complexities beyond borders.²⁸ However, Sri Lanka dealt with a process where they achieved the peace-defeating terrorism without any involvement of a third party, yet it depends on funding from United Nations agencies along with other donors. While paying his tribute to the volunteer experts and the International Organization for Migrants for their support, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka has

²⁵ Tore Bjorgo (1995), *Terror From the Extreme Right*, New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 49–53.

²⁶ USAID: Office of Transition Initiatives (2011), "Lessons Learned on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programming-Annex K," retrieved from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/pubs/lessons_reintegration.pdf.

²⁷ Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Ellie Hearne (2008), *Beyond Terrorism: De-radicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, International Peace Institute, New York: IPI Publications, 3–13.

²⁸ Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (2002), *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development*, New York: Routledge, 90–98.

requested international donor's further assistance to meet desired results of the ongoing reintegration process.²⁹ In a series of a practice notes, the International Alert has been able to identify some ground realities against those practical issues contesting the reintegration process in developing countries, owing to their weak economic status. Their main area of concern is the assurance on employment opportunities for rehabilitees, which is very much applicable in the Sri Lankan issue. The government has to realize that the extremist position was adopted by LTTE because of varying factors such as the discriminatory policies and practices against the Tamil population and the past government's negligence towards the grievances of the Tamil population. Heading to a solution, they suggest that the private sector assistance is the key to counter the issue while developing vocational training and apprenticeship opportunities aiming at the same.³⁰

Currently, Sri Lanka is taking considerable steps to resolve the issue of the reintegration of the ex-combatants of LTTE. As per the official website, some of the programs are being carried out in order to rehabilitate the ex-combatants of LTTE so that they can be further reintegrated as per their respective categories.³¹

Conducting leadership workshops, guidance on micro-business opportunities and self-employment opportunities are a few government-recommended efforts. However, according to Chamil Prasad, some groups are stable enough to step into society on their own feet, thanks to what they gained

²⁹ Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka, "Rehabilitated 'Beneficiaries' Need Further Support, says CGR," retrieved from http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20110203_05.

³⁰ International Alert (2010), Cost of War; Sri Lanka Economy and Peace building, 1–10, retrieved from <http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/library/CostsOfWar.pdf>.

³¹ Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, "Programmes conducted for adults," retrieved from http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/programs_adult.php.

through these types of curriculums.³² Tsjeard Bouta focuses on reintegration over gender-based categorizations. One of Bouta's observations is that the economic integration for female and male combatants is complicated because of the scarcity of resources that Sri Lanka needs to rethink.³³ Muna Ndulo refers to the African situation and discusses the importance of the international contribution on rehabilitation processes.³⁴ Stephan John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens have made it clear: rather than suggesting a model to follow, they say that appropriate processes must be made according to national and local requirements.³⁵

In Burundi, the peace efforts were also characterized by an approach "in stages," said Isaiah Nibizi, head of the National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration. The peace agreement of 2000 committed especially political parties; the majority of insurgent groups, but not all, began to sign this agreement, but not until three years later. Successive socio-political crises have forced thousands of Burundians to flee their land to go into exile outside the country or to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) sites. With the return of Peace, over 460,000 refugees exiled in 1993 were repatriated between January 2002 and December 2008 with assistance from the Government of Burundi and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 2008, some 90,000 refugees were returned, mainly from Tanzania, a large proportion had been in exile since 1972. The Tanzanian government decided in 2007 to solve the problem of all refugees including those from 1972. They gave the choice to them—between repatriation and naturalization. Of the 220,000 refugees, about

³² Prasad, "How to stay on Micro Businesses – Leadership Programme conducted for the Ex-Combatants," retrieved from <http://www.liberalparty-srilanka.org/liberalyouth/eu-parliament-internship-2010/91-how-to-stay-on-micro-businesses-leadership-programme-conducted-for-the-ex-combatants-by-chamil-prasad.html>.

³³ Tsjeard Bouta (2005), "Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," Netherlands Institute of International Relations, "Clingendael," The Hague, 18.

³⁴ Muna Ndulo (2007), *Security, Reconstruction and Reconciliation*, New York: UCL Press, 308.

³⁵ S. J. Stedman, D. Rothchild, and E. M. Cousens (2002), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 159.

55,000 opted for return. Following this, the international community initiated the return of refugees, which was expected to close later in the year 2009 to level of return, but will require several years to strengthen reintegration.

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process officially began in December 2004 with the goal of demobilizing 85,000 soldiers by 2008. In June 2005, about 10,000 men had been demobilized. It is hoped that at least some of the latest non-signatories agree to demobilize now, following the election victory of August 2005, the main former rebel group and the possible accession to the presidency of its leader, Pierre Nkurunziza.³⁶

The number of ex-combatants to be rehabilitated in Sri Lanka was comparatively less than in Burundi. The total number of 11,696 ex-LTTE combatants surrendered in Sri Lanka. Out of 11,696 cadres who surrendered, there are 8,900 former cadres who have been completed their reintegration process and have already reintegrated into society. However, there is a backlog of another 2,800 ex-combatants who have yet to complete their reintegration process. Additionally, a group of ex-combatants is still under the process of interrogation and needs to be dealt with by judicial measures under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) due to the gravity and mass scale of crimes committed. Of them, 703 cadres are under detention orders to be interrogated further by the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) of the Police Department.³⁷ The process is finished for most of the surrendered ex-combatants and the remainder of the ex-LTTE combatants is waiting to be rehabilitated and absorbed into society.

In 2003, some deadly terrorist attacks took place in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This sudden insurgency compelled the Saudi government to launch a

³⁶ Michael J. Gilligan (2011), "Reintegrating rebels into civilian life: Quasi experimental evidence from Burundi," APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, 30–35.

³⁷ Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, Official Information Release, by the Colonel General Staff (Col GS), February 25, 2011.

varied campaign against the militants to counter terrorism.³⁸ Saudi Arabia used a soft strategy to counter terrorism in its land, and used unconventional methods to curb the combatants, because coercion and threatening only worsened the conditions, as revealed in other countries such as Pakistan.³⁹ These soft measures to fight the ideological and intellectual rationale for violent extremism turned out to be quite successful when it came to the reintegration and de-radicalization of the combatants. The main aim of the strategy was to involve and fight an ideology that the Saudi government considered deviant and corrupted from the real principles of Islam. The driving force for this soft advancement to curb radicalization and terrorism sprouted from the identification of violent extremism, which cannot be fought using traditional measures.⁴⁰

In 2004, Saudi Arabia launched its own process of de-radicalization using a soft strategy. Under this version of the country, the militants in the Saudi jails were given classes, and those who opted for the classes received shorter sentences in the prison. The sessions were formulated to convince people with extremist mindsets that Islam is a religion of peace and that it does not condone the use of terror in any circumstances.⁴¹

The strategy used by Saudi Arabia consisted of three programs: prevention, rehabilitation and post-release care (PRAC). Though the program has been in operation for the past four years only, the strategy of the Saudi Arabian government to de-radicalize and rehabilitate the combatants yielded very positive results. To date, repetition and rates of re-arrest are extremely low at

³⁸ Jeffrey Fleishman (2007), "Rehabbing militants in Saudi Arabia-A government center aims to turn accused terrorists away from radicalism. Its inmates have included more than 100 released from Guantanamo," *Los Angeles Times*: December 21, 2007.

³⁹ Christopher Boucek (2008), Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, WDC: Publications Department, 9–22.

⁴⁰ Boucek (2007), "The Saudi Process of Repatriating and Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees," *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 1 (December 15, 2007), 10–11.

⁴¹ John Kurlantzick (2008), "Fighting Terrorism with Terrorists," *Los Angeles Times*: January 6, 2008.

approximately 1 to 2%.⁴² Programs of the same kind have been designed to demobilize the violence and extremism, and supporters of such programs are increasing the world over. Many countries, including Egypt, Yemen, Indonesia, Algeria, Malaysia and Jordan, have already established programs for reintegration, engagement and de-radicalization—just like the U.S. military has done in Iraq in Task Force 134. Thus far, the plan has fashioned results, with the Saudi government arrogating an 80–90 % rate of success.⁴³

The soft reintegration strategy was successful, primarily because of the understanding of the structure of the Saudi Arabian society. Saudis lead their lives in accordance with the teaching of their holy book, the Qur'an, which serves as a behavioral guide for the Muslims, and also serves the spiritual needs of the believers. Even if a Saudi is too liberal and secular, he will surely engage himself in the basic practices of Islam, which also includes the practicing of tolerance and moderation. However, conflicting sermons by radical priests, unclear and confusing interpretation of the holy Qur'an, and other factors such as the education system of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, often misleads the young mind toward adopting extremist and radical approaches.⁴⁴

After these efforts by the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, it is worthwhile to discuss how the benefits for rehabilitees unfolded in Sri Lanka. A total of 400 ex-combatant female cadres who completed training on the juki sewing machine were given juki machine operator appointments by a garment products exporting company, and they have based their living on the commercial capital.⁴⁵ A total of 170 school-aged ex-LTTE

⁴² Boucek (2007), "Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia," *Terrorism Monitor* V, Issue 16 (August 2007), 1–3.

⁴³ Boucek (2008), "Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy, 9–22.

⁴⁴ Wagner Rob (2010), Rehabilitation and De-radicalization: Saudi Arabia's Counterterrorism Successes and Failures, Peace and Conflict Monitor, University for Peace, 2011, retrieved from, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=735.

⁴⁵ Chandani Jayatilleke, Womensenews.org: July 14, 2010, "Ex-Tamil Fighters Start Factory Life in Sri Lanka," retrieved from <http://womensenews.org/story/peace/100713/ex-tamil-fighters-start-factory-life-in-sri-lanka>.

combatants, who were forcefully conscripted, appeared for the General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) examination in an examination center in Vavuniya, on December 13, 2010. Furthermore, about forty rehabilitees, who sat for the General Certificate of Education examination (Advanced Level) in August 2010, qualified for university entrance for their higher education.⁴⁶ A total of 30 rehabilitated LTTE cadres were given employment opportunities in the public transportation system run by the government-owned depots of the Sri Lanka Transport Board.⁴⁷ According to Chamil Prasad, some rehabilitees are potentially ready to step into society confidently with what they have gained through their rehabilitation process.⁴⁸ In addition to what has been mentioned here, many other initiatives—such as self-employment opportunities and job opportunities in cooperation with private sector entrepreneurs—help to empower rehabilitees who have rejoined society.

Admittedly, it is difficult to quantify the comparative triumph of the counseling agenda, particularly with only a number of years into the plan. Nevertheless, as per the statement of the Saudi confidences, only nine people have been rearrested for security law breakings after their discharge through the counseling program, corresponding to a backslider rank of 1–2%, whereas, in Sri Lanka, no such reports have yet been made.

In 2002, Yemen was gripped by members of Al-Qaeda members, which is one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations of the world.⁴⁹ The government of Yemen initiated a project to use negotiations as a means to change the ways of the distrusted militants who were arrested and held in the prisons of the state. The project was aimed at reintegration of these combatants into civilian life, and

⁴⁶ Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “More Rehabilitees qualify for Universities,” retrieved from <http://bcgr.gov.lk/news.php?id=28>.

⁴⁷ Irangika Range, “SLTB jobs for ex-combatants,” *Daily News*, January 21, 2011, retrieved from <http://www.dailynews.lk/2011/01/21/news13.asp>.

⁴⁸ Prasad, “How to stay on Micro Businesses.”

⁴⁹ Ane Skov Birk (2009), *Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen*, London: ICSR, 9–15.

this program received considerable international attention for its outstanding and bold step to use common references to the laws of Islam as a peaceful means for Yemen to influence the militants.

The people who were detained in Yemen were involved in a project based on dialogue and were not among the prominent ideologues of any kind of movement related to Islam. The detainees were kept under strict surveillance and their identities were never disclosed. The classical use of Islamic law was tried for the terrorists for the legitimacy of the state of Yemen in the eyes of the extremist Islamists. However, the principal trouble in this regard was that there was much unlimited evidence that the detainees were guilty of the crimes.

Several of the detainees claimed that they never attempted to be involved in terrorist activities, but they had turned anti-government because of the unsuccessful strategies used by the government. In Yemen, the attempt to hold dialogues with the detainees failed, unlike in Saudi Arabia. The element of the dialogue seemed not only to have failed, but was also rendered to converting the detainees of terrorism to normal people. At the same time, the Yemeni counterterrorism strategy was greatly weakened because there was no credibility for the state party, which the dialogue committee was representing.

However, the real implementation of the strategy was absorbed in arbitrary arrests, detentions for an indefinite period of time, torture and other violations of human rights. Moreover, it was not clear what charges were leveled against the people who were detained in prisons and what influences the dialogues had on the detained militants. The project ended in 2005 without considerable success, and it was proven that such strategies could be useful to counter terrorism by creating an environment for dialogue, but they have to take wider issues into account in order to ensure success.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Marisa L. Porges (2010), "Deradicalisation, the Yemeni Way," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 52, no. 2 (April–May 2010), 27–33.

The de-radicalization and reintegration of ex-combatants is a crucial constituent of any government's transitional strategy. This is because it is necessary for the enhancement of security across the country in advance of its resettlement. Regarding this, the early stages of the strategies pertaining to disarmament demobilization and reintegration programs will require the need to be quickly developed and enforced.⁵¹ Since the ex-combatants are a part of the society, the need for their reintegration into civilian life is of immense importance; these people have already been through a lot of social stress because of their rebellious attitude. This is especially the case when the war has come to an end and the ex-combatants—men, women and their children—are looked down upon; society deems them unacceptable because of their former affiliation with a terrorist or rebellion organization.

E. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

After a period of 26 years, the civil war in Sri Lanka, which took more than 70,000 lives, is finally over. The military has arrogated complete control and triumph over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), removing the last remainders of the insurrection. However, stability in this region is still far off. This is because eliminating a terrorist organization will not magically bring an end to three decades of bad relations among the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. The president of Sri Lanka has expressed his views on the expected reintegration process to be initiated in Sri Lanka.⁵²

As previously noted Sri Lanka was in a tragic and savage armed conflict in which thousands of innocent civilians lost their lives. As a result, Sri Lanka faced enormous political, cultural and commercial disintegration as well as destruction to property. In spite of the several efforts taken by consecutive governments in

⁵¹ John P. Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (2003), *Contemporary peacemaking: conflict, violence and peace processes*, London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 125.

⁵² The President's address to the inaugural session of the Presidential Committee on Development and Reconciliation, Presidential Secretariat, Colombo, Sri Lanka (July 2, 2009), retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent.

the country, the LTTE or Tamil Tigers proved inexorable in their aim to establish a separate state in the North-East part of the country for the Tamil population. The LTTE used violence and repression against the people of the North-East and deprived them of their basic human rights. Humanitarian operations that were carried out in order to liberate the citizens who were held hostage by the LTTE were successfully completed in May 2009, following the demise of LTTE's high command and the surrender of the remaining cells of LTTE.

This study commenced at a time when no complete account of scholarly work specifically reported on the present re-integration efforts in Sri Lanka. The detainment of thousands of ex-combatants turned out to be a huge responsibility on the government, both politically as well as logistically, as in the case of many other countries.⁵³ Many of these ex-combatants lived their entire lives during the course of war, and even as children, the LTTE conscripted the children together with the opportunity of having education and a normal family life.⁵⁴ Since, the war was over, these ex-combatants de-radicalization and reintegration into civilian lives; so that the social, emotional, and economic needs of this susceptible group of people could be met. In order to curb the growing radicalization, interventions had been necessary so that the rebellions could be reintegrated into the society. In this regard, the European Council holds predominant significance to ensure that a deep cooperation exists between civil society and the concerned authorities toward the radicalization of the ex-combatants.⁵⁵

⁵³ Zachary Abuza (2008), The Disengagement and Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in Southeast Asia: A Preliminary Assessment, Draft paper, 9–16, retrieved from <http://www.abeebooks.com/Leaving-Terrorism-Behind-Individual-Collective-Disengagement/1232047938/bd>.

⁵⁴ Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka, retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_116478.pdf, 2.

⁵⁵ Peria Ramos and Jose Antonio (2008), "Four best practices in cooperation between civil societies and authorities with a view to the prevention of violent radicalization in Spain," *Athena Intelligence Journal* 3, no. 3, Oxford: Oxford University, 57–72.

A first-hand directive amplifying the policy to follow in reintegrating ex-combatants was launched on July 30, 2009. Sri Lanka undertook the challenge based on the principles laid out in the “National framework proposal on reintegration of ex-combatants.” This proposal discusses a homegrown approach, but with best international practices.⁵⁶ However, as of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (CGR), the most demanding challenge he faces is the permanent employment opportunities for the outgoing rehabilitees.⁵⁷

Though the war is over, the remnants of the LTTE may pose a considerable security challenge to the nation. Thousands of people have been displaced. Similar to the devastated infrastructure, the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies calls for immediate attention.⁵⁸ Above all, much effort is needed to heal the scars of the conflict and to build the Sri Lankan identity.

The ex-combatants of the LTTE are the focal point of concern, there are many other armed groups operating in the North and the East of the country; they also have to be de-radicalized and reintegrated, so as to make the process of reconstruction and development of these people more meaningful and comprehensive. For the purpose of bringing complete peace to the region, there is a dire need for understanding the best practices and procedures needed for a permanent de-radicalization of the ex-combatants so that they could lead a normal life.

In this sense, the question arises as to how the programs of reintegration can be made successful and what are the potential problems that could be faced in the process of reintegration. In order to assess the study, I could consider the case study of Burundi, Saudi Arabia and Yemen to understand how de-

⁵⁶ *Daily News* (July 31, 2009), “National framework proposal on reintegration of ex-combatants,” retrieved from <http://www.dailynews.lk/2009/07/31/news20.asp>.

⁵⁷ Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Rehabilitated 'Beneficiaries' Need Further Support, says CGR,” retrieved from <http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/news46.php>.

⁵⁸ Birk (June 2009), *Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen*, London: ICSR, 9–15.

radicalization and re-integration was carried out against terrorism in these regions, and how they reached the benchmarks by overcoming weaknesses and lapses.⁵⁹ In this regard, the following hypotheses are developed for the study:

Hypotheses 1: The process of reintegration in different countries take place as per the benchmarks set for the process of reintegration; therefore, the chances of success are considerably heightened.

Hypotheses 2: Proper planning and implementation of strategies for re-integration with standardized benchmarks can help the governments deal with the process of reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society with considerable success, using soft strategies to de-radicalize the ex-combatants from an extremist ideological stance.

Hypotheses 3: Proper planning covering all aspects of reintegration (economic, social, educational and individual) can help the ex-combatants achieve a sense of belongingness to the community and they would feel it is easier to blend into the civilian society.

F. METHODS AND SOURCES

I would compare the successful and failed cases, of reintegration which took place in different countries and draw lessons from them and make an assessment as to whether some of these lessons and their implications can be applied to the Sri Lankan case.

This research was established and carried out by using the method of qualitative research. The research was based on comparative case study analysis using secondary data. The data was extracted from various journals, articles and books. Secondary research depicts information assembled by literature, broadcast media, publications, and through open-source origins. In this research, I employ the case study methodology. The case study research

⁵⁹ Jane Boulden (2003), *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: the United Nations and regional organizations*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 128–139.

methodology is widely used in the analysis of organizations by the various scientific disciplines, even though many scholars believe that the cases take us away from traditional science, because it tends to identify with the statistical analysis of large samples. The case study methodology is a comprehensive methodology that uses techniques such as observation, fact finding, document analysis, etc., and it can be both qualitative and quantitative data.

G. THESIS OVERVIEW

In this thesis, I study the concept of de-radicalization of ex-LTTE combatants in a holistic context. Among the five chapters, the first looks into the background of the Sri Lankan conflict, the research question, the importance of the study, the literature review and the problems and hypothesis. Chapters II, III and IV are dedicated to studying the cases of reintegration and de-radicalization in different regions of the world. The countries whose DDR campaigns were successful would be deemed appropriate to be applied on the Sri Lankan society as well, and the failed ones would be useful for learning not to make the same mistakes. For this, the case studies of other countries are discussed. Accordingly, in the second chapter, the re-integration process of Saudi Arabia is discussed as a case that was a success, as against the Sri Lankan re-integration process. In the other selected case studies, Burundi and Yemen are discussed in Chapters III and IV, respectively. In comparison, these two cases have produced either the failed results or mixed results, as against that of the Sri Lankan re-integration process.

In the concluding chapter, the analysis and comparison of the selected case studies are conducted. The main focus of Chapter V would be the assessment of benchmarks that the Sri Lankan government can achieve in this regard by considering the case studies of other countries where the process of disarmament, de-radicalization and reintegration has already taken place.

Further, this chapter would declare the overall essence of the research, the lessons learned and the implications on Sri Lankan re-integration process in prescribing the measures for post-war Sri Lankan society.

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II. THE SAUDI ARABIAN RE-INTEGRATION PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

The Saudi Arabian re-integration and rehabilitation program, along with its organizational structure, was started in 2004 and implemented by the Saudi Ministry of Interior. In terms of its organizational structure, the ministry introduced the rehabilitation program and established an advisory committee that had operated under four subcommittees. These subcommittees included the Psychological and Social subcommittee, the Religious subcommittee, the Media subcommittee, and the Security subcommittee. The number of participants rehabilitated and re-integrated so far is exceeding 3,000. At the initial stage, as many as 1,400 renounced their activities and re-integrated with their families after the proceedings of the counseling program. Another group of 1,000 had to undergo the phase-by-phase re-integration process. However, as per official records, only 35 re-arrests were reported by the end of 2007. Comparatively, this presents impressive datum in relevance to recidivism, which is as low as 1–2%.⁶⁰

The rehabilitation campaign was successful; it started with 639 participants and, with the passage of time, more than 3,000 men successfully completed the rehabilitation program, though not all were not hardcore terrorists. The specifics of the Saudi Arabian strategy were based on a decentralized campaign in order to fight terrorism and extremism, and to struggle against support of violent extremism. The specifics during the implementation were based more on conviction than compulsion, and included public information sharing and awareness, a re-education campaign through dialogue and communication, and soft mechanisms based on countering radicalism.

⁶⁰ Boucek (2008), "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, no. 97 (September 2008), 21–23.

The level of resources in the re-integration program includes a number of agencies and governmental ministries that took part in the program. These include Ministries of Islamic Affairs, Da'wah, Endowment, Education and Guidance; Culture and Information; Higher Education and Social Affairs. However, as far as later reported rates of failures (recidivism) are concerned, in January 2009, at least eleven ex-Guantanamo Bay Prison detainees became terrorists again, after graduating from the Saudi DDR program. The strengths of the program are that they are well planned, well resourced, well financed and well implemented. The weaknesses of the program included recidivism of 11 graduates back to al-Qaeda.⁶¹

Like many countries of the world, Saudi Arabia also faced the problem of terrorism on its soil. The Saudi campaign of re-integrating extremists back into society has formed a significant and forward-looking part of Saudi Arabian society in dealing with the radicals. So far, the soft strategy has proven fruitful for the Kingdom in re-integrating extremists back into society. Owing to the sensitivity of the issue, Saudi Arabia was strongly compelled and committed to addressing de-radicalization and re-integration of its radicals into mainstream civil society.

As a result of the September 11, 2001, when New York's Twin Towers were attacked by Muslim extremists, about 3,000 civilians lost their lives. After the attacks, some 19 hijackers were identified; they belonged to the Islamic terrorist organization, al-Qaeda. Out of the 19 terrorists, 15 of the attackers were Saudi Arabian Nationals, including the mastermind behind the attacks, and the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. Because he could not be arrested immediately after the attacks; he had considerable influence over Islamic extremists across the globe. In May 2003, al-Qaeda ran a violent campaign in the Arabian Peninsula, resulting in 300 casualties over an 18-month period.

⁶¹ R. Wagner (2010), "Rehabilitation and Deradicalization: Saudi Arabia's Counterterrorism Successes and Failures," Peace and Conflict Monitor, University for Peace, retrieved from http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=735.

The Saudi Arabian bombings were carried out in May 2003 by active al-Qaeda member Yousuf Al- Ayiri. Many of the militants involved in these activities fought to death, and some even committed suicide rather than be captured by law enforcement authorities.

To this end, the Saudi government got involved with other Islamic states as well as some top-level, Western-educated Saudi scholars with suitable expertise to design a strategy.⁶² The program was coordinated and funded by the Interior Ministry of Saudi Arabia, which was the primary governmental agency responsible for ensuring public security in the Kingdom. The main objective of the Kingdom's efforts was to strengthen the legitimacy of the existing system while countering radicalism and eliminating any further opportunities for terrorism. In this regard, the Saudi government had a lot of pressure from the international community to look into this serious social malaise of Islamic extremism, which was proliferating among Muslims from different parts of the world and was a deadly, emerging threat for the non-Muslim community across the globe. The Saudi government firmly believed that this matter was sensitive and could not be handled through the actions of traditional security measures alone. Further, the structure and specifics of the Saudi soft campaign to fight terrorism and its progress were aimed to dispel the intellectual support of Islamic extremism.

B. BACKGROUND TO THE TERRORISM PROBLEM IN SAUDI ARABIA

The tragic incident of September 11, 2001, created a furor among people across the globe to fight against terrorism and extremism. More importantly, the entire Middle East was shocked to know that 15 out of 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi Arabian citizens.

⁶² Boucek (2008), "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy, 5.

What was more shocking was that the mastermind behind the worst terrorist attack in the history of United States was Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian citizen, born and raised in a rich Saudi Arabian family. Because of this, some reports even suggested that Saudi Arabia had been financing terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. However, the Saudi Arabian government denies such allegations.

This incident put a question mark over the rise of extremism among the Muslim world. By this time, anti-American sentiments had developed among particular factions of Muslims, because of the American agenda of supporting Israel, United States support to dictatorial Arab regimes and the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa against American troops who had come to Saudi Arabia for a conducted operation called Southern Watch. This enraged the Muslims, and they decided to wage war against non-Muslims, considering all of them to be “infidels” largely due to their misinterpretation of Islamic teachings. America was particularly unpopular among the Muslims because of its hegemonic stance and the way it periodically exploited its activities in many countries of the world.

The situation was further aggravated with the succeeding events of 9/11 as United States forces invaded Muslim countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the name of its “Global War on Terror (GWOT).” This background induced more hatred and extremist thinking, in the minds of Muslims, to go to war against the United States; a large number of radical Islamists emerged following the footsteps of Osama bin Laden. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to deal with radicals were triggered by the realization that the Kingdom was facing a threat that stemmed not only from the activities of Osama bin Laden—who was a well-known al-Qaeda leader and the son of a Saudi Arabian construction tycoon—but also that 15 of the 19 hijackers in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi Arabian nationals. Moreover, in May 2003, al-Qaeda launched an 18-month campaign on the Arabian Peninsula when some 300 casualties occurred. The victims of these terrorist attacks included some 90 civilians, some Western expatriates, 40 police officials, and 150 of al-Qaeda’s own militants.

Another threat that the Saudi Arabian government faced was the realization of growing radicalization among many young Saudi men to the point that they were ready to embrace death or the culture of nihilism, which is a radical philosophy that advocates demolition of the social system for its own sake. This threat was difficult to quantify and address, but the Saudi government carried out considerable research on the phenomenon of radicalization and extremism to enforce programs pertaining to de-radicalization and counter-radicalization. The Saudi Arabian government acknowledged that, because it is the keeper of the two Holiest places for Muslims across the globe (the places being Mecca and Madina), it is the duty of the Kingdom to exhibit some impressive leadership in changing the perceptions of the Islamic world. This includes the label of extremism, which has come to be recognized as synonymous with Jihad in Islam.

C. THE SAUDI ARABIAN RE-INTEGRATION PROGRAM 2004

In 2003, following this extremist eruption, deadly terrorist attacks took place in Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia established a widely arrayed counterterrorism campaign, centered on an unconventional *soft* scheme. The soft scheme is designed to fight the ideological and intellectual justifications for fierce extremism. The chief objective behind the soft strategy is to engage and fight ideology, which corrupted interpretations of Islam that deviated from the official Saudi interpretation of Islam. The drift toward this soft strategy largely came from the recognition that traditional methods of security and coercion are not enough to combat violent extremism.⁶³

The soft strategy adopted by the kingdom is composed of three programs aimed at: prevention, rehabilitation and the post-release care of detainees—known as the PRAC Strategy.

⁶³ N. Iyer, K. Kshatriya, J. Lerman, and L. Weitzman (March 2009), "Returning Home: Resettlement and Reintegration of Detainees Released from the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba," International Human Rights Law Clinic and Human Rights Centre, University of California, Berkeley, 9–13.

Having been in effect for the past eight years, the Kingdom's soft strategy has produced some appreciable results, particularly in terms of counter-radicalization and rehabilitation.

First, to date, according to the Saudi government, a very small number of released Saudi Guantanamo returnees have reoffended.⁶⁴ However, the rates of recidivism can be deceptive. This is because statistics released by government can be imprecise, reflecting the limited knowledge of the intelligence services and monitoring mechanisms. The Saudi de-radicalization program, for instance, was conceived as a completely successful project; the Saudis had been presenting a very rosy picture to the international world, until, in the end of 2009, 11 graduates from the Saudi reintegration program recidivated to terrorist activities. Moreover, most de-radicalization programs are relatively new, so they cannot be assessed for a lasting behavioral impact.⁶⁵ Second, the results generated by the Saudi re-integration program have led to considerable interest in exploring alternatives to traditional hard security measures. Third, the Saudi Arabian re-integration program has provided an example for other countries to follow. And finally, the extremist face of Islam is revealed to be a deviant version of Islam from that of the Saudi Arabian official Islamic interpretation, and a deviation from the true meaning of Islam.⁶⁶

Similar programs have been formulated to demobilize fierce extremists and anyone who supports such an ideology. Demobilization campaigns are increasingly popular, with many other countries adopting similar strategies to combat terrorism and de-radicalization in their countries. For instance, the United States military Task Force 134 in Iraq, and government-initiated programs in countries such as Algeria, Singapore, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Malaysia and

⁶⁴ Iyer, Kshatriya, Lerman, and Weitzman, "Returning Home, 9–13.

⁶⁵ Marisa L. Porges and Jessica Stern (May/June 2010), "Getting Deradicalization Right," *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66227/marisa-l-porges-jessica-stern/getting-deradicalization-right>.

⁶⁶ Boucek (2007), "The Saudi Process of Repatriating and Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees."

Indonesia have all founded engagement and rehabilitation programs in their countries in the wake of increasing radical thinking among particular segments of the masses. As such, the relevancy of the Kingdom's soft strategy and the efforts of counter-radicalization in general have increased since the start of the struggle against radicalization and Islamic extremism.⁶⁷

As previously mentioned, the Saudi strategy consists of three interrelated programs aimed at prevention, rehabilitation and recovery after the release of detainees. Since its application eight years ago, the results of Saudi strategy have shown positive results, particularly in rehabilitation and the fight against extremism. As a result, understanding the Saudi strategy and its operations in combating extremism has become a hot topic within the Muslim world as well as in other regions with problems of terrorism.⁶⁸

Prior to analyzing the three components of the Prevention, Rehabilitation, After Care (or PRAC) Strategy, it is important to note that the basic organization and structure of the policy lies with the Saudi government. The program was designed and funded by the Saudi Arabian interior ministry, which is the principal government agency responsible for ensuring public security in the Kingdom.⁶⁹ The ministry is responsible for overseeing most of the programs that have been designed to deal with the Guantanamo returnees and any terrorist-minded detainees in general. The ministry also oversees a number of other areas related to safety and security; these include counterterrorism in the country, domestic security, investigations pertaining to criminal activities in the country, civil defense, protection of the infrastructure, counterespionage, administration of the prisons and border and passport security.

The ministry is headed by Prince Naif bin Abdul-Aziz, a brother of the late King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. The counterterrorism strategy of the Kingdom is

⁶⁷ Boucek (2008), "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy," 9–22.

⁶⁸ B. Rubin (2009), *Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East*, New York: Routledge, 81–83.

⁶⁹ Boucek (2008), "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy," 4.

headed by Prince Muhammad bin Naif, who is the assistant minister in the Saudi Interior Ministry for Security Affairs.⁷⁰ The ministry also oversees the PRAC program. Currently, Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, crowned as the First Deputy Prime Minister, holds the office of the Saudi Arabian Interior Minister.⁷¹ The ministry's office has organized several components of the counterterrorism strategy for detainees and terrorists. The Advisory Committee, for example, is responsible for the implementation of the counseling program in the prisons and carrying out dialogues and debates between prisoners and religious scholars to rectify their misconceptions.

This program was designed for Guantanamo Bay returnees, and they were given a free choice to opt for the rehabilitation program. The Saudi government decided not to impose the program on the detainees; hence, the strategy was called *soft* strategy. The detainees were invited to join the rehabilitation program regardless of their individual offenses. However, those who had committed the worst crimes were also invited to the rehabilitation program, but the government decided to retain them for a longer period of time for monitoring their behavior and judging their intentions.

The ministry also oversees the social needs and the rehabilitation program's conditions, the participants' conditions and the conditions of the families of the participants who are requested by the Saudi government to extend maximum cooperation in helping their detained family members as they try to reintegrate into the civilian society while the members are still incarcerated.⁷² The office ensures that everything necessary is available to avoid delays and discrepancies in the program. The ministry also considers the condition of

⁷⁰ Robert Windrem (2005), "Saudi Arabia's ambitious al-Qaida fighter," Dateline NBC, retrieved from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8304825/ns/datetime_nbc/t/saudi-arabias-ambitious-al-qaida-fighter/.

⁷¹ Cabinet of the Ministry of the Interior, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, retrieved from http://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/b1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOJNnQOcPS18jQ3dA0LNDYzczE28nM28LQy8TfSDE4v0C7ldFQFEGsl5/.

⁷² Porges (2010), "The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment," Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/saudi-deradicalization-experiment/p21292>.

extended family member support by providing financial and social support to retain a respectable position in the society, despite their family member being held for terrorist activities.⁷³ The ministry extends financial support and other assistance, and also makes sure that no other members of the detainees' families are engaged in radicalized thinking because of the hardships they have had to suffer as a result of their family member's incarceration.

The ministry's offices also have close coordination with the activities of the anti-radicalization section, which is composed of some Western-educated⁷⁴ psychologists, social scientists, doctors, psychiatrists as well as statisticians who have the ability to understand the reasons and implications of terrorism in a broad way.⁷⁵ The number of people hired and trained to work on the strategy demonstrates the commitment of the Saudi government towards eradicating terrorism from Saudi Arabian soil and the hearts and minds of the people. It also aims to bring about a positive change within the lives of the ex-terrorists and society as a whole, as well as re-establishing the tarnished image of Islam in the eyes of the world. The office operates an ideological security unit (ISU) that is responsible for the promotion of disseminating sound religious information and schemes to undersell extremist beliefs and attitudes.⁷⁶ Moreover, the ministry office works with King Fahd's Security College as well as the Prince Nayef's Arab Academy for Security Studies in the creation of some special curriculum and vocational training for public security officers. With such specialization and expertise, the core aim of the PRAC strategy features a campaign, which is decentralized to fight against terrorism in any form, eradicate religious extremism, and ameliorate the condition of ex-terrorists. Other agencies and ministries, which closely work with the ministry, include Endowment, Da'wah and

⁷³ G. Kepel (2006), *Jihad: the trail of political Islam*, London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 218.

⁷⁴ B. Fishman and A. Moghadam (2011), *Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, Ideological Fissures*, New York: Routledge, 107–109.

⁷⁵ Boucek (2008), Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy, 9–22.

⁷⁶ Boucek (2008), Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy, 9–22.

Guidance; Higher Education, Islamic Affairs, Information and Ministry for Cultural Affairs, Ministry for Social Affairs and the Ministry for Labor Welfare, etc.⁷⁷

1. Implementation of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Program

The Saudi campaign of re-integrating extremists into society has formed a significant and forward-looking aspect of the Saudi Arabian society to deal with radicals. So far, the soft strategy has turned out to be fruitful for the Kingdom in some way. This is because Saudi Arabia had been facing relatively small terrorism-related problems, compared to other Arab countries like Yemen and Iraq. The program was used for people who were not hardcore terrorists themselves, but extended support to terrorist activities. To date, the Kingdom has been engaged in making major arrests throughout the country; therefore, one cannot say that the problem was 100% fruitful for the Kingdom, but it helped to alleviate the problem of hardcore terrorism.

The Saudi government also strives to monitor all extremist websites, which are often a prime source of motivating young Saudi men to take up jihad and adopt violence and extremism in the name of Islam. Nonetheless, the most visible expression of the Saudi government in response to radicalization is the well-resourced rehabilitation and de-radicalization program, which began in 2004. This program was planned to offer opportunities for detained extremists, who are to be re-integrated into the Saudi society.

First, the program aimed to cover some 100 Saudi nationals who were imprisoned by the United States in Guantanamo Bay Prison, Cuba, and were released back to Saudi Arabian custody. Under this program, the radical detainees can volunteer to be re-integrated into society via a rehabilitation facility. Several such facilities have been built throughout the Kingdom, including the cities of Riyadh, Jeddah, Damma, Abha, and Qassim. These are called Care

⁷⁷ R. Meijer (2009), *Global Salafism: Islam's new religious movement*, New York: Columbia University Press, 314–317.

Rehabilitation Centers.⁷⁸ These well-built houses have sufficient supporting staff and can accommodate around 3,000 people. The starting point for rehabilitation is the precondition that those people who have fallen prey to the influence of the radicals are themselves victims, and therefore, they should be helped.

Individuals working toward rehabilitation are given a two-month residential stay, and they undergo a range of programs, encompassing social and economic issues, indoctrination of religious beliefs, and different forms of therapy including sports and art. The victims given a psychological evaluation and their families are allowed to visit them. There are various activities and classes in which victims have to participate, and upon completion of the program, individuals are re-integrated into society. The families of the victims are also provided with financial support from the Saudi state, and they get financial aid even if they have their own consent to enter the rehabilitation program. Once a participant has completed the program successfully, the Saudi government grants financial assistance, a house, a car, a job, and, in some cases, the former detainees are helped with finding a wife so that they can start a family and move toward forward instead of returning to a life in terrorism.⁷⁹

The participants are re-integrated into society after receiving a guarantee from their families and tribal relations,⁸⁰ and they agree to an informal 24/7 surveillance capability that offers the state confidence against the danger of recidivating into terrorist activities. Once released, these ex-combatants are indefinitely banned from traveling abroad. While some detainees take advantage of the rehabilitation program, most hardcore jihadists prefer to remain in high-security prisons, rather than get involved in a re-integration program, because they consider the Saudi government to be a renegade regime.

⁷⁸ Boucek (2008), Saudi Arabia's "soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, No 97 (September 2008), 17–19.

⁷⁹ Boucek (2007), "The Saudi Process of Repatriating and Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point," *CTC Sentinel* 1, Issue 1, 10–11.

⁸⁰ Thomas W. Lippman W (2012), *Saudi Arabia on the Edge: The Uncertain Future of an American Ally*, Virginia: Potomac Books, 201–203.

The Saudi Arabian re-integration program was a re-education camp for the former detainees of Guantanamo Bay Prison. A special re-integration and rehabilitation program was designed specifically for former detainees of Saudi Arabian nationality upon their return home, which aimed to indoctrinate the detainees against violent jihad and the use of terror to enforce their ideologies on others. The Saudi government not only provided them with reeducation, but also with a government stipend, lodging, and food. When the outside world saw this, they misinterpreted the program. They took the entire re-integration process as an attempt by the Saudi government to create a breeding ground for more terrorists by providing the Guantanamo returnees with such VIP (Very Important Persons) treatments. However, the soft re-integration strategy used by the Saudi government worked wonders for the former detainees; the Saudi Arabian re-integration process is now considered one of the prime examples of successful ex-combatant re-integration into civilian society.⁸¹ However, the facilities provided to the ex-combatants require considerable resources, and not every country can provide similar efforts or capacities.

2. Outcome of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Program

This success was achieved because the Saudi government actually handled the terrorists like human beings, understood their emotional and human needs and then designed the strategy for their rehabilitation, accordingly. The terrorists were not viewed as a problem and were not subjected to alien treatments, which often makes them rebel even more and resort to terrorist means once again to achieve their objectives. Critics of the program were concerned that such an arrangement would boost the morale of terrorists and would put them back on the streets.

According to the defense officials of Guantanamo Bay Prison, around 480 detainees were released from the prison and out of them, about 30 have taken up terrorist activities once again. According to a terrorist analyst, Steve Emerson,

⁸¹ Iyer, Kshatriya, Lerman, and Weitzman, "Returning Home, 8–13.

the Saudi Arabian program for the rehabilitation of the detainees was extremely intriguing because it served as an alternative to holding the detainees at the Guantanamo Bay Prison for an indefinite period of time—and often subjecting the detainees to inhuman treatments. A variety of factors resulted in the success of the Saudi Arabian re-integration process, including the social structure of the country, as well as the geographical structure.⁸² For instance, Saudi Arabian society is based on a tribal system, and whenever there is a re-integration process, there is hope for surveillance to be carried out once the former combatants are re-integrated into society. Similarly, geography is important; for instance, in Pakistan, Afghanistan and in Algeria, the mountainous terrain serves as a safe haven for terrorists to hide from the authorities, and their arrests become a problem. Furthermore, their activities, plotting and planning cannot be monitored. Another reason is that Saudi Arabia has a rich government and the re-integration program was well funded by the government to achieve success.

Moreover, about 100 Saudis were held up in Guantanamo Bay Prison, as compared to other countries with a considerable number of citizens detained in the prison. For other countries such as Algeria, Yemen, Burundi, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, etc., it would have been difficult for such a re-integration program to yield success because of the kind of financial funding required in making such programs successful. Moreover, it would be much more difficult for other countries to manage and monitor the ex-combatants once they have been re-integrated into the society because the societal structure, law and order situation, geographical terrain, political stability and religious hold vary greatly from country to country. One strategy that may work in one region cannot be guaranteed to work in another region. Therefore, there is a need to design re-integration strategies by keeping some of the basic success elements in mind, but also incorporating the religious, societal, cultural and other values of each distinct society. For instance, Saudi Arabia is a close-knit society because of the

⁸² J. Braithwaite (1999), *Crime, Shame, and Re-integration*, London: Cambridge University Press, 84–86.

extensive tribal system in the country and strong familial system, by which the society becomes less centrifugal, making it easier to monitor the activities of an individual. The Saudi re-integration process revealed that it depended heavily on societal resources and the familial structure of society that is apparently lacking in countries such as Yemen, Sri Lanka, and Burundi.⁸³

In the Saudi Arabian re-integration process, the detainees of Guantanamo Bay Prison, upon their return to their home country, were first allowed to reunite with their families for a period of one week, after which they were required to enter a rehabilitation program, which extended over a period of six weeks. The program aimed basically at the “correction of their ideas,” instead of merely imposing new ideas on their ideological mindset about the concept of Jihad in Islam and fighting non-Muslims. The program also aimed to remove the al-Qaeda imposed theology from the minds of the ex-combatants by making them interact with some of the well-known Islamic scholars in a one-on-one discussion. The Saudi government gave the combatants a chance to engage in an interactive question and answer session, which helped them clear their concepts about Jihad in the light of scholarly advice. The program also aimed to ameliorate the image of the Saudi government, tarnished by the radical theology of al-Qaeda, which considered the Saudi government to be a string puppet of the West, especially the United States. This aroused negative and rebellious sentiments in the hearts of the people.⁸⁴

After completing the rehabilitation program, the former detainees began the second stage of the rehabilitation program at another facility. This rehabilitation center was specifically designed and built for former detainees. The rehabilitation center was equipped with volleyball courts, a swimming pool, table tennis, video gaming facilities, etc.

⁸³ C. Blanchard (2009), “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, 29–30.

⁸⁴ Thomas Hegghammer (2010), *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*, London: Cambridge University Press, 188–190.

The center was no less than a luxurious resort and the detainees were treated like outpatients. In the center, the detainees were given vocational training, classes on religious concepts with one-on-one sessions, and they were counseled by psychologists to deal with depression and overcoming the stigma of being associated with a terrorist organization. Some of the detainees had had problems adjusting psychologically after lengthy captivities, so they were provided separate counseling classes to overcome their levels of stress. The detainees were in no way held like prisoners, as they were allowed to spend occasional nights with their families and during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the detainees were given a week's holiday to spend with their families and relatives. Thus, it is evident that strong family units in Saudi Arabian society helped the detainees to re-integrate into society within a short span of time, and with considerable success.⁸⁵

In some societies, where the familial structure is not so close-knit, problems arise because of the force of individualism that greatly affects and undermines the ability of someone who has been involved in terrorist activities to rely on relatives or receive good treatment. They are usually treated as outcasts and relatives generally avoid being associated with kin who have been labeled as a criminal and are usually viewed as a symbol of shame for the family.

Thus, it becomes difficult for ex-combatants to re-integrate as easily into society because the societal structure is generally uninviting and the stigma of being an outcast keeps haunting them, which can result in depression and the feeling of being dejected, sometimes compelling ex-combatants to resort back to their terrorist lives. Since the Saudi Arabian society has a definite set of norms and values, and the private space for individuals is small in comparison with other societies, it is difficult in Saudi Arabia for individuals to deviate from the prevalent norms. If someone tries to maintain dissenting viewpoints, he or she is discouraged by society, and thus, most people prefer to conform to the dominant

⁸⁵ Porges and Stern (May/June 2010), "Getting Deradicalization Right."

averages of the society. For a person who is living in a non-conformist society, it is easier for him to act awkwardly than it is for someone who lives in a conformist tribal society.⁸⁶

Another added advantage for the Saudi Arabian re-integration success was the religious aspect of the program. Saudi Arabian society is a theocratic society, whereas most other countries, with unsuccessful re-integration, have become secular republics. For example, Yemen also has a sizeable Muslim population, but it is largely a secular state and does not have a societal structure like that of the Saudi Arabia.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the rehabilitation program was not superficial and was deeply inculcated into the hearts and minds of the former Guantanamo Bay Prison detainees.⁸⁷ A good example of this is the case of an ex-Guantanamo detainee, Jabr al-Faifi, who volunteered to enter the Saudi Arabian rehabilitation program in 1996.⁸⁸ During his rehabilitation program, he deviated and escaped the rehabilitation center to Yemen and rejoined al-Qaeda. However, he was quite influenced by the rehabilitation program, as he himself felt that his heart had changed; consequently, he did not feel comfortable with the terrorist life again.

Thus, he contacted the rehabilitation center himself and he returned to become a Saudi once again. There were reports that this man helped the Saudi authorities with confidential information on terrorist activities and provided vital information about the plotting of a Yemen cargo bomb that had been mailed to the United States to an address of a Jewish person. The Saudi media well publicized the return of al-Faifi to Saudi Arabian society—and another al-Qaeda

⁸⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman (2009), *Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, London: Library of Congress Cataloguing, 33–34.

⁸⁷ Wikipedia, OARDEC (Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants), retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_for_the_Administrative_Review_of_the_Detention_of_Enemy_Combatants.

⁸⁸ *BBC News: Middle East* (2010), “Bombs tip-off came from former al-Qaeda member,” retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11666272>.

member who had returned to Saudi Arabia with him—as a success of the re-integration and rehabilitation program and its use of soft strategies against the former combatants.⁸⁹

However, while the Saudi government met with the recidivism of released and re-integrated 11 participants from the rehabilitation and re-integration program, the media criticized the Saudi government for babysitting the terrorists.⁹⁰ There have been criticisms of the program wherein the participants of the program are made to meet with a religious scholar to engage in a one-on-one discussion, as previously mentioned, and debate on different interpretations of Islam. If the ex-combatants are seen as conforming to the standards of the rehabilitation program and show deflection in their previous opinions, they are persuaded further, and they graduate from the program.

In 2002, when Guantanamo Bay Prison opened, among the foreign nationals who were detained on charges of terrorism, 136 of them had been identified as Saudi nationals. According to the United States officials at Guantanamo Bay Prison, three of the Saudis committed suicide in prison, while 13 of them were held in prison for long periods of time. The other detainees were returned to the Saudi government in small groups over several years. As against the hostile and inhumane treatment that was given to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay Prison, when the Saudis returned home, they received treatment that they had never expected.

In 2009, the Saudi Arabian government identified and published a list of the 85 most wanted terrorists stationed outside of Saudi Arabian territory. Seven of the listed terrorists had served their sentence in Guantanamo Bay Prison and had been re-integrated into Saudi Arabian civilian society after undertaking the Saudi Arabian rehabilitation program. These seven are suspected to be hiding somewhere in Yemen. While the number seven may seem to be insignificant

⁸⁹ Y. Yehoshua (2006), *Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia*, The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), retrieved from <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/1582.htm>.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

among 85, these were no ordinary terrorists; they were people who had their minds full of hatred and had the potential and past to kill—even with a suicide bomb. The reported mindset in these terrorists spread alarm among the critics of the effectiveness of the Saudi Arabian re-integration program.⁹¹

Although some have criticized the Saudi Arabian government's soft approach in countering extremist ideology in baiting the ex-terrorists with financial support, jobs, lodgings, meals and even organizing and arranging a wedding after completing the rehabilitation program, it has shown a way towards the countries that are continuously suffering due to the effects of the extremism. To many, the whole idea was terrifying, thinking the program serves as a breeding ground for terrorists. According to them, the rehabilitation program cannot guarantee the elimination of deeply rooted terrorist ideology, and there are chances of recidivism. Scholars who oppose this argue that not only Saudi Arabia, but other states as well, will have greater difficulties in countering the extremist ideological appeal of al-Qaeda and other organizations without finding collective and permanent solutions to major regional conflicts.⁹² However, the rate of success of the Saudi Arabian re-integration program has succeeded, and its appreciation outweighs its criticism.

3. Summary of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Process

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the reintegration process was considered a success for several reasons. The most important reason for the success of Saudi Arabia, and in the case of soft strategy, apertures used to address the most dangerous terrorists were v well planned and executed. This is because Saudi Arabia had the advantage of its wealth to be utilized for the program. The state of Saudi Arabia did not depend on foreign aid money to carry out its program of re-

⁹¹ Muhammad al-Milfy and Robert F Worth (2009), "Saudis Issue List of 85 Terrorism Suspects," *The New York Times* (February 4, 2009) A5.

⁹² Abdullah F. Ansary (Summer 2008), "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach," *Middle East Policy Council*, no. 2, 111–142.

integration. The Saudi state fully took the responsibility of the program, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and made a well-developed plan for the re-integration of ex-terrorists.

For the purposes of this program, the government of Saudi Arabia used the soft strategy in which religious scholars, Western-trained Saudi psychologists and other trained foreign experts on terrorism are hired to develop a plan for the success of countering terrorist ideology. Under the strategy of PRAC in Saudi Arabia, the government has built well-resourced and well-equipped rehabilitation centers for prisoners at Guantanamo, and has lectured on religion to guide them to a positive interpretation of Islam and help put an end to a biased interpretation of Islam.

Under this program, the detainees were not only exposed to motivational speeches, they were taught various sports and skills in order to provide some entertainment, which proved valuable for the health of the mind and body. The government's rich material assistance to the families of prisoners, in turn, provided the most support for the government to curb recidivism. However, the rates of recidivism occurred in the year 2009, and it raised a question mark on the constant claim of success that the Saudi government had been pledging. Nonetheless, relatively speaking, the Saudi Arabian re-integration strategy had some reasons to be a considerable success.

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III. THE BURUNDIAN REINTEGRATION PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

The Burundian disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) program began in December 2004. The government administrative body that implemented the Burundian reintegration process was the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). In terms of its organizational structure, the commission (NCDDR) was supported by an Executive Secretariat (ES), who was responsible for taking care of the technical sides of planning, implementation and supervision of the overall program and ensuring proper coordination with external resources and program partners. The functions of the Executive Secretariat (ES) were further decentralized and supported by Provincial Program Offices (PPOs) that were established in the selective localities of the country, considering the convenience of the ex-rebels.

The number of participants rehabilitated and reintegrated into the Burundian civilian society to date exceeds 28,000. However, program officials were unable to meet their initial reintegration timetables, and this process continues even now. The overall program structure places its general emphasis on social and economic reintegration. Within this framework, officials have sought to implement reintegration and rehabilitation through investment in the areas of targeted community-based assistance, opportunities for self-employment, livelihood projects, and income-generation skills development training. Program officials have also generally sought continued education, awareness, and support for entrepreneurship and employment promotion in terms of monetary and infrastructure facilities assistance. A number of prominent organizations have acted as resource benefactors, with aid coming from Germany, the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and the World Bank (WB). This assistance has been centrally coordinated under the entity known as the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), and it has been jointly advocated by the World

Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). In terms of the rates of failures (recidivism), there have been no reports of former rebels returning to ethnicity-based combatant armed units. The strengths of the program include the support and coordination from foreign bodies, such as the World Bank and other international agencies. Conversely, the weaknesses of the program include the lack of efficient resource management and mobilization; the poor planning and coordination of competent Burundian authorities; and the political instability, corruption, and bias at governmental bureaucratic level.

The civil war and the consequent problem of terrorism in Burundi proved to be disastrous for the country's economic, political and social development. The aftermath of the civil war and terrorism undermined economic development activities. Consequently, it continues to affect the improvement of the quality of life for the poorer segments of Burundi society, which in turn acts as an essential pre-requisite for the growing radicalization in the region.

Burundi is a clear example of a country facing extreme poverty in a context of fragility, after decades of ethnic and political rivalries. In order to capitalize on and continue the development efforts of the past, it is necessary to consolidate the peace process and to assist Burundi in achieving future stability. This consolidation is important not only for Burundi, but for the entire region and its various border issues as well. The harmful effects of terrorism are particularly severe in countries and regions which are in conflict and which have weak governance systems and fragile economic stability. Therefore, strengthening of the capacity building measures to include institutional building in post-conflict scenarios to combat terrorism is a crucial component of any comprehensive development strategy that includes its reintegration processes too.

B. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM IN BURUNDI

Civil conflict in Burundi started in mid-1960, after it gained independence from colonial powers. Since then, armed conflict between Tutsis, Hutus, and other ethnic based breakaway groups have erupted in Burundi from time to time,

with conflicts recorded in 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1991. The most recent hostilities began two years later in 1993, when Melchior Ndadaye (a Hutu), the first democratically elected president in Burundi, was assassinated. The last conflict in Burundi continued over a period of nine long years; however, this most recent civil war in Burundi finally came to an official end in 2005, when Pierre Nkurunziza elected as the President.⁹³ Rebel groups in Burundi ultimately reached a ceasefire agreement in 2008, and it has generally remained in effect ever since.

The Burundian reintegration program started from the end of 2004 and was implemented under the patronage of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). Following the start of the program in 2004, an initial 16,000 rebels and soldiers underwent the reintegration process. By 2008, that number increased to some 25,000 ex-combatants who had been reportedly reintegrated into the Burundian civilian society. Although there have been no statistics found in terms of recidivism (returning to the ethnic based combatant armed branches), there have been some reported incidents of violence among the ex-combatants in Bujumbura.⁹⁴ Disturbed by a series of internal conflicts, the reintegration process of Burundi is slow in coming and has not been completed. According to official reports, even as of now in 2012, some 38,500 Burundian returnees have yet to be reintegrated.⁹⁵

Supported by foreign aid and international diplomacy, Burundi has still been able to achieve significant progress since the end of the war. The country has held free and transparent elections since 2005. In 2008-2009 the last active rebel group, the National Liberation Front-NLF (Front de la Liberation Nationale),

⁹³ Antony Otiemo Ongayo (2010), "Migration in Burundi: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects," Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 15–18.

⁹⁴ Jean Marie Gasana and Douma Pyt (2008), "Reintegration in Burundi: Between happy cows and lost investments," Conflict Research Unit, Netherland institute of International Relations, 35.

⁹⁵ UNHCR Global Appeal (2012–2013), "2012 UNHCR country operations profile-Burundi," retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c056>.

also known as the FLN, laid down their arms. Despite all of the pressures imposed by the authorities, the press and civil society in Burundi continued to play their democratic role. The division between Hutus and Tutsis is no longer seen as the leading cause of all evil in Burundi, and the army is no longer an instrument used by one ethnic group to protect its privileges. In sum, considerable progress has been made.

Of course, significant challenges do remain, as was made evident during the 2010 elections. The main opposition parties decided to withdraw their candidates for presidential and legislative elections in June and July 2010, denouncing what they termed as rigged elections.⁹⁶ In the elections that took place in May, the immediate consequence of this withdrawal was a landslide victory of the ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). Since then, there have been increasing political tensions and violence spreading throughout the country, as illustrated by numerous incidents of intimidation and murders of an extrajudicial and political nature. The attack on September 18 in Gatumba, in which 36 people lost their lives, has revived painful memories of the massacres before the 2005 elections. The civil and political liberties that were gradually acquired have been recently damaged by the state services which proceed by intimidation, summonses, untimely questioning, and even imprisonment of members of civil society, human rights workers, journalists, lawyers, activists, anti-corruption observers, and others. In early 2011, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, expressed concern about the “return of a climate of impunity” through intimidation, torture, arrests of members of the opposition, and extrajudicial executions. Thus, while Burundi has made progress, there are still fresh concerns about whether the country will slip back into old patterns.

Despite these setbacks, though, the country continues to move forward. As a positive development, it should be noted that the Burundian government

⁹⁶ *Agence France Presse* (January 1, 2011), “UN downsizes Burundi Office,” retrieved from <http://reliefweb.int/node/379531>.

has recently confirmed its commitment going forward in setting up mechanisms for transitional justice and a Truth and Justice Commission in 2012. As of May 2011, it had already installed the Independent National Commission for Human Rights (INCHR also known as CNIDH), led by activists of civil society who have distinguished themselves in defending human rights, although the Commission has not yet received sufficient means of operation. In short, Burundi has made significant progress towards peace, but the page of the conflict is not yet turned over and loyal support of the external partners are crucial.

As per the head of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), the peace efforts in Burundi were also characterized by an "in stages" approach.⁹⁷ The Civil War is a Burundian ethnic conflict which broke out in Burundi on October 21, 1993, following a coup against Ndadaye. As the genocide took place in Rwanda in 1994, it was marked by the contrast between Hutus and Tutsis and extended over the decade in neighboring countries. Although hostilities largely ended in the 2000s, the sporadic violence still strains the peace agreement of 2005.

C. THE ACTION PLAN OF THE BURUNDIAN REINTEGRATION PROCESS

There has been a commitment to live up to the 2000 peace agreement. This commitment has been particularly apparent among the political parties, whereas most of the insurgent groups—but not all—did not sign this agreement until three years later. The coexistence of the old Burundian armed forces and ex-combatants from former rebels, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) is undoubtedly the main pillar of the new climate of peace in Burundi.⁹⁸ Balances and quotas agreed to at the time of the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement (August 2000) and the ceasefire between the Government and the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of

⁹⁷ Ernest Harsch (October 2005), *Africa Renewal* 19, no. 3, 1.

⁹⁸ Ploughshares, "Research and Action for Peace, Burundi (1988–2010)," retrieved from <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/burundi-1988-2010>.

Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in November 2003 have had an indisputable stabilizing effect. Officials sought the application of ethnic parity in the army and the police while simultaneously trying to avoid a sudden standstill caused by precipitate action. The DDR (Disarmament, De-mobilization and Reintegration) process was formally launched in December 2004 with the aim of the demobilizing 85,000 fighters by 2008. By June 2005, approximately 10,000 men had been demobilized.

Officials had expected that at least some of the latest non-signatory countries would agree to demobilize following the election victory in August 2005; however, this was not the case.⁹⁹ The plan for the demobilization of some 3,387 military personnel in March and June 2008, almost all of whom were Tutsis—including more than half of Tutsi officials—raised serious protests. The end of civil war and the absence of large-scale political violence forced hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons to return home. Because of this, it became necessary for the Burundian government to intervene and help resolve land disputes, as they were inevitably linked to the abrupt changes that had taken place.¹⁰⁰

In Burundi, the reintegration of former combatants was initiated at the end of 2004. The program of reintegration in Burundi was sponsored by the multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). The World Bank assumed supervision of the MDRP on behalf of the countries that were sending their donations for the program. In Burundi, the country's president Nkurunziza founded the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR). In turn, the NCDDR also established the office of Executive Secretariat, the occupant of which would be designated to assume administrative control of the program. To this date, the Executive Secretariat (ES) has been operating under the direction of General Silas Ntigurirwa, the Executive

⁹⁹ Michael J. Gilligan, and Cyrus D. Samii (2011), "Reintegrating rebels into civilian life: Quasi experimental evidence from Burundi," APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, 30–35.

¹⁰⁰ IMF (March 2009), "Burundi: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper-Annual Progress Report," IMF Country Report no. 09/90, 21–32.

Secretary.¹⁰¹ The ES has two divisions, namely the division for demobilization and the unit for reintegration. The ES also has the responsibility of the national Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program.

1. The implementation of the Burundian Reintegration Process

The main results and shortcomings of the Burundian reintegration program are that the MDRP demobilized around 26,000 ex-combatants and rebels. The DDR program in Burundi had different phases and during the first phase of its initiation, the program aimed at reintegrating some 16,000 ex-combatants into the civilian society. Nonetheless, when the second phase of the political process of the country began, wherein power of the government was overtaken by the Hutu parties, the program of reintegration of the ex-combatants was hampered and a number of ex-combatants, both soldiers and the police, were not successfully reintegrated into the society. Throughout the process of demobilization in the region, the imbalance of ethnicity in the army remained a sensitive issue. Though the army had been responsible for ensuring peace in the post-conflict era in Burundi, the negotiations carried out by the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 2008 threatened the stability of the region, with the issue of re-integrating troops into the civilian society. A large number of members from the former force, the Burundian Armed Force (the old Tutsi-dominated army, also called FAB), had not been demobilized for a long time.¹⁰²

The National Commission for DDR set up regional offices for the purpose of ensuring smooth reintegration of the former combatants.¹⁰³ This office had different levels, and at the first level of the office, the volunteers, called the focal points, were promised to receive a stipend for monitoring the on-field activities of

¹⁰¹ Radhika Coomaraswamy, "The UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflicts is visiting Burundi," retrieved from http://binub.turretdev.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23&Itemid=44.

¹⁰² OECD (2011), *Conflict and Fragility: Investing in Security (A Global Assessment of Armed violence Reduction Initiatives)*, OECD Publication, 50–54.

¹⁰³ "Resource Center-UNDDR, Country Program: Burundi," retrieved from <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=17>.

the ex-combatants. However, a 15-month delay in the start of the program from June 2005 to September 2006 caused complications and severely weakened the entire concept of the Burundian reintegration. One major problem was the proper disbursement of funds, as a total \$41.8 (USD) million appropriated for the Burundian reintegration program by the MDRP was not fully utilized in the program—only \$20 million was actually disbursed. The main focus of the reintegration program was the reintegration of individual ex-combatants into the civilian society and it had nothing to do with involving the host community. Since there were a huge number of ex-combatants and rebels of the former national army who had an urgent need to be reintegrated into the society, the government of Burundi gave preference to an individual approach, and it appropriated around \$600 per person (equal to 600,000 Burundian Francs) for the purpose of reintegration.

The Burundian government was compelled to observe the planning of the Arusha Peace Agreement, according to which the army had to be balanced in terms of the ethnicity of the members (50% Tutsi and 50% Hutu). The process of reintegration was divided into two parts, which consisted of a transitory period of 18 months, during which the ex-combatants were provided quarters and given their salaries. This phase was followed by a reintegration flight, in which the ex-combatants were given a five-option reintegration package to choose from. The five options included the following:¹⁰⁴

- Re-employment
- Reception of skills development/vocational training
- Reception of entrepreneurial support, training and funds for already established credible businesses (Economic Reintegration Support)

¹⁰⁴ Executive Secretariat-NCDDR (2008), Report on misappropriation of funds within the Executive Secretariat of the NCDDR, following the general inspection of the state and the civil service, Bujumbura, September 2008.

- Reception of an income generating support by participating in certain activities (Income Generating Activities Support-IGAS) to start a self-employment opportunity, cash for public work programs and livelihood support etc; and
- Reception of formal school education

The majority of the ex-combatants, around 25,000 of them opted for the AGR, but the process had been very lengthy which led to a one-year gap between the process of demobilization and reintegration into the society.¹⁰⁵ The process of reintegration did not initiate until September 2006 and, by this time, a huge majority of ex-combatants had already been waiting for their reintegration. In the initial stages, the civilian organizations had shown some reluctance to get involved in the program, but as the entire procedure of the DDR remained politically influenced, they moved in. During the first phase of the DDR process, some NGOs were selected to implement the process of integration. The National Commission for DDR provided a list of ex-combatants with badge numbers so that the agencies involved could easily trace the ex-combatants.¹⁰⁶

2. The Outcome of the Burundian Reintegration Process

The Burundi reintegration did not succeed because of various reasons. For instance, according to an estimate, some 19,000 ex-combatants belonging to National Liberation Front were still left to be reintegrated in to the civilian society. The Burundian government entered into an agreement with the South African government and the NLF agreed to integrate some 2,500 rebels into the police force and the national army. The problem is worse in the rural areas of Bujumbura, where displacements are repetitive. Some of the armed groups in the region have not yet signed the ceasefire agreement and the DDR process for the ex-combatants is taking place slowly.

¹⁰⁵ Sarah Michael (2006), "Reintegration Assistance for Ex-Combatants, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank," 2–17.

¹⁰⁶ S. Leckie (ed.) (2007), *Housing, Land, and Property Restitution Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20–44.

However, there is an urgent need for the integration of ex-combatants into the national army, as it is one of the more important precautions to counter radicalization and to prevent any future conflict.¹⁰⁷

A typical reintegration flight for the income generating activities support (IGAS) was based on a proposal that invited the ex-combatants to opt for their reintegration package. The process was lengthy as the reintegration trajectory was passed onto the NCDDR office for an approval before the program began. Once the initial process was complete, the involved NGOs gave basic skills training to the ex-combatants which included writing receipts, stock-keeping, client dealing skills, and other forms of training. For this purpose, the NGO would first get approval from the NCDDR offices and collect the required material from them and then proceed. Many of the ex-combatants were indignant about the fact that the money was not given to them and start-up kit materials were provided instead. The main problem area was the coordination between the implementing agencies and the national mechanism (the NCDDR offices). The National commission was supposed to ensure that the project had local ownership; however, it turned out that the NCDDR was incapable of handling the program. Problem areas such as the lack of local ownership, the lack of political stability, and the time-consuming ill-planning and mismanagement of the entire program contributed to the failure of the reintegration program in Burundi.¹⁰⁸

As for the reintegration in the urban areas in Burundi, the reintegration failed miserably; it did not take place because the target population to be integrated lacked the skills to successfully reintegrate into the civilian society. The ex-combatants had joined the army when they were young, and most of them had dropped out of school. Another faction of the ex-combatants was the members of the ex-FAB army, who had been highly dependent on the money

¹⁰⁷ FMR Editorial Board (2004), "Reintegration Challenges for Burundi," *Forced Migration Review*, no. 21, 26–27, retrieved from <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR21/FMR2109.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ A. Carames, and E. Sanz (2009), Burundi: PNDDR, 2004–2008, "DDR 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in the World During 2008," Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 31–38.

they received under the reintegration program. Those ex-combatants who decided to opt for the income generating activities support (IGAS) package lacked the skills and were proved incompetent with small existing traders and they did not have access to wholesale traders or credited facilities.¹⁰⁹

The reintegration process became a one-off dose of resources in a societal context where the post-war conflict had led to serious deprivation for the people. As for the reintegration in the rural areas, it was slightly more successful as compared to the urban reintegration. This is due to the fact that these ex-combatants were able to return to their former livelihood and started working on their lands with their families, which enabled them to more easily reintegrate into their communities. This group of ex-combatants was in a position to buy a small land with some cattle and therefore had an income boost. As for other groups of ex-combatants, especially those who had been in exile for more than 25 years had lost family contacts and land and they were compelled to start a livelihood from a scratch. Moreover, as for the other groups who opted for the income generating activities support package, the rural areas had to face similar problems which their urban counterparts had to face. Since the cost of living in the rural areas was comparatively low, the people in rural areas could subsist for a little longer on the reintegration package before becoming destitute once again.¹¹⁰

According to the 2007 data collected by Gillian, Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010), the World Bank program for the reintegration of the ex-combatants after the Burundian civil war led to significant economic reintegration; however, this economic reintegration failed to lead to greater social and political reintegration. The survey found that the reintegration program in Burundi provided a considerable boost in the income of the ex-combatants, which resulted in a 20-35% reduction in the incidence of poverty among the ex-combatants. There also

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 31–38.

¹¹⁰ Human Rights Watch (December 2003), "Everyday Victims: Civilians in the Burundian War," (A), 9–15.

have been moderate improvements in the prospects of livelihood of the ex-combatants. However, these economical effects did not translate into political integration in Burundi. Further, there is no strong evidence to prove that the Burundian program led to a satisfactory peace process or a more positive tendency towards the functions of the good governance that essentially eliminates the opportunities for growing radicalism. The reintegration programs are central in ensuring permanent peace in the troubled entity and to meet the desired objectives, provided that considerable resources are committed to them. The social and political integration turned out to be a failure in the Burundian reintegration process because, unlike the economic reintegration process that targets individuals to economically assist them, it was not possible in case of social and political integration.¹¹¹

3. Summary of the Burundian Reintegration Process

The Burundian reintegration failed because of various reasons like the lack of resources, the corrupt practices of the governmental officials, and mismanagement on the part of the authorities. The reintegration program offered lengthy processes, and participants had to go through many painstaking steps before choosing the 'right' reintegration package for themselves. Also, the main reason for the failure was lack of coordination between the implementing agencies and the national mechanism (the NCDDR offices and the NGOs). In the Burundian reintegration case, the plan failed because of a variety of reasons. Burundi is a poor African country and it could not mobilize its resources on the same level as Saudi Arabia did. There was political corruption prevalent in the country and the reintegration plan, which was largely supported by foreign agencies, was not properly handled by the local authorities. Since there was an acute dearth of proper planning and lack of monetary and other resources, the Burundian government could not handle the huge chunk of population of ex-

¹¹¹ Michael Gilligan, Eric Mvukiyehe, and Cyrus Samii (2010), "Reintegrating rebels into civilian life: Quasi-experimental evidence from Burundi," retrieved from http://andrewgelman.com/2010/08/reintegrating_r/.

combatants and could not successfully reintegrate them into civilian life. Those who were reintegrated had to live a life of unemployment and poverty, which forced them to reconsider their decision of enrolling themselves into the reintegration plan. The biggest reason was political corruption, which led to the failure of Burundian reintegration program.

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IV. THE YEMENI REINTEGRATION PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

The Yemeni reintegration program started in September 2002. The authority that implemented the Yemeni Reintegration Process was the Yemeni Committee for Dialogue and this program was launched by the Yemeni government, under the leadership of Judge Hamoud al-Hitar.

In terms of its organizational structure, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh summoned five senior clerics who formed the nucleus of this initiating endeavor. The committee expanded to 24 members, under the purview of four relevant ministries. The number of participants rehabilitated and reintegrated so far is nearly 400. The program was in progress until 2005, when it came to a halt because of pressures from political parties in Yemen who had never been in favor of the program from the outset. Therefore, the program could not be fully developed, as per its initial schedule.

In terms of the specifics of the program structure, it includes the art of dialogue itself, topics for dialogue, and guidance on sharing of information to the relevant authorities. In terms of the specifics of the implementation of the program, it includes building trust of the leadership in the government and the committee; effective interaction among the detainees and the intelligence cadres; and the eagerness of the detainees to search for truth and to seek equal treatments from the dialogue participants. The program's human resources are comprised of 24 main members and 58 other clerics. The Yemeni government says that 4% are engaged in terrorist activity. The strengths of the program include the firm conviction of the founders of the committees of the dialogue program, which was weakened by internal political pressures in the country. Concerning the weaknesses of the program, the biggest hurdle, as aforementioned, was the pressure from political parties.

Radical and extremist Islamism has been one of the most talked-about phenomena since the attacks of 9/11. Despite the ongoing war on terror, and despite the fact that most nations of the world condemn terrorism, most of the interventions designed to counter Islamist terrorism focus on limiting the actions of the extremists. Rather, they should be focusing on rectifying the terrorist ideologies that compel the extremist mindset to carry out violent actions. In 2002, observers saw changes in the way Yemen dealt with the terrorist elements in the country. Since the 9/11 attacks, there had been 116 Yemenis detained at the Guantanamo Bay Prison in Cuba on charges of being involved in the 9/11 attacks and belonging to the chapter of al-Qaeda's Yemeni terrorist organization.¹¹² The Yemeni state decided to initiate a project to negotiate with the returnees from the Guantanamo Bay Prison, including some who were identified as hardcore terrorists. The Yemeni government planned to convert the radical militants to a give up on their extremist ideology and resort to a moderate and peaceful understanding and comprehension of Islam. The Yemeni government established the Committee for Dialogue, as previously noted, to hold dialogues with the detainees, grounded on common acknowledgment of Islamic laws and Islam as the eventual source of legitimacy and truth. Between 2002 and 2005, some 364 Yemenis underwent the de-radicalization program and were reintegrated to civilian lives. The government claimed at the time that the graduates of the program had sworn allegiance to change their radical beliefs, and had decided to renounce violent extremism and lead a peaceful life.

The approach of the Yemeni pattern of de-radicalization and reintegration had been similar to that of Saudi Arabia, but there were major differences in terms of results. Although the Yemeni dialogue process received an initial endorsement from the international community and the leader of the program, Judge Hamoud al-Hitar, had been repeatedly invited to present his views on counterterrorism at various international workshops and seminars, the Yemeni-

¹¹² Andrei Scheinkman, Margot Williams, Alan McLean, Jeremy Ashkenas, and Archie Tse, "Countries of Citizenship, The Guantanamo Docket," *The New York Times*, retrieved from <http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/by-country>.

sponsored program ultimately failed. As a result, the Yemeni dialogue project was stopped in 2005, when it was discovered that two of the graduates had recidivated to terrorism and were involved in fighting against the United States-led NATO forces in Iraq. The incident of recidivism gravely sabotaged the dialogue program and the claims of the program were subjected to overwhelming suspicion. Moreover, some of the detainees released after graduating from the much-publicized program had expressed that they did not, in reality, change their ideology and that they had not genuinely exchanged in a dialogue.¹¹³ Adding fuel to the fire, the Yemeni government had witnessed a fresh wave of violent attacks, carried out by the former detainees. Thus, the Yemeni dialogue program ended in failure, and the views of the terrorists (with their radicalized ideology) were hardly changed.

B. BACKGROUND OF THE YEMEN PROBLEM

In Yemen, the problem of Islamic extremism was triggered as an outcome of a long and intricate history. In the 1980s, a large number of Yemeni citizens had enthusiastically participated in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. These people were thoroughly prepared to wage war against the 'Soviet infidels' and were radicalized accordingly. When the Afghan war was over, the Yemeni government called its citizens back home to reintegrate them into civilian life. The Yemeni government also allowed the foreign veteran soldiers to settle in Yemen.¹¹⁴ Many of these Arab Afghans were appointed by the Yemeni regime then and were given a chance to work for the state-owned security organization in Yemen.¹¹⁵ This kind of co-optation was also used for Yemeni detainees after the attacks of 9/11. In 1993, the Department of State of the United States declassified information about Yemen that the country was fast

¹¹³ Gregory Johnson (2006), "Yemen's Passive Role in the War on Terrorism," *Terrorism Monitor* 4, Issue 4, 7–9.

¹¹⁴ Eric Watkins (April 7, 2004), "Landscape of Shifting Alliances," *Terrorism Monitor* 2, Issue 7, 12.

¹¹⁵ Michael Knights (2006), "Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism in Yemen," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 2006, 16.

turning into an important stop for many of the ex-combatants who fought in Afghanistan.¹¹⁶ According to the report, the Yemen government was either unable to control the activities of the militants or the Yemen government was not willing to curb the growing militancy in the country. The regime used Islamism throughout the 80s and 90s against domestic opponents, and during the civil war that erupted in Yemen in 1994, the Islamists battled against the forces in the south. Owing to internal disputes, the Islamists were also alleged to have fought against the southern and northwestern separatists as well.¹¹⁷ After some deadly attacks that were carried out in the year 2002, including the attacks on the French oil tanker Limburg and the United States Ship-Cole (USS-Cole), there was a brief temporary calm in Yemen. During the relative calm between the extremists and the Yemen government, the United States increased its pressure on the Yemen government to develop a long-term counterterrorism strategy. However, after several years of a short-lived calm, young Yemeni insurgents emerged. This new wave of insurgents rejected a dialogue with the Yemeni government, considering the government to be illegitimate and its members as traitors for being supportive of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which was a key foreign policy objective of the United States. This young faction of rebels was further trained and energized by dangerous prison escapees. These young terrorists took the country on a rampage and launched a new violent campaign against tourists, foreign residents, oil facilities, and government security targets.¹¹⁸

Yemen was one of the first to launch a de-radicalization program following the return of jihadists who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the late 1980s. Upon returning to their homeland, jihadists represented a great

¹¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1993), "The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous," *Weekend Edition*, August 21–22, 3.

¹¹⁷ "Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism" (April 2006), A Report of the CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism, Center for Strategic and International Studies, retrieved from, www.csis.org.

¹¹⁸ Marc Sageman (2008), *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 125–146.

destabilizing factor due to the radical extremist views they had adopted while in Afghanistan. Disengagement in the Yemeni de-radicalization program included apprehending returnees from Afghanistan as well as other potentially violent extremists

In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the process of de-radicalization had an almost cosmetic character to it. Terrorism was confronted with various degrees of effectiveness on a military level, but it did little to undermine the ideological appeal of the terrorists. While the dominant idea at the time was that the capture of terrorists would remove the threat of further attacks, over time, policy makers began to realize that this approach could only be so effective until it was coupled with programs to address the ideological underpinnings that foment and foster violence. The use of force alone could not wipe out the threat of terrorism so long as its radical ideology remained intact. With extremist jihadist ideologies, militants seek to inspire new generations of terrorists to perpetuate the terrorism cycle. Moreover, al Qaeda in Yemen has become an increasingly decentralized and loose organization held together by strong ideological bonds. What is more, even the capture and imprisonment of terrorists and their supporters gave rise to another concern, which is that these prisoners could be further radicalized or recruit more supporters while in a prison environment. In light of this concern, it is worth noting that before its closure, half of the remaining detainees in the Guantanamo Bay Prison were Yemeni citizens.

More than forty of these former inmates were released into the custody of the Yemeni government. As soon as the United States government decided to send the Guantanamo Bay Prison detainees of Yemen origin back to their home country, the Yemeni government decided to establish a Yemeni rehabilitation and reintegration program for these Guantanamo returnees. The Yemenis agreed in principle to the establishment of a reintegration and rehabilitation centre for the Guantanamo detainees as a risk reduction initiative and to contain growing Islamic radicalism and terrorism in the region. Therefore, when the Yemeni government realized that something had to be done about the violent ideology

that many Yemenis were rapidly adopting and the international pressure that Yemen had been receiving to counter terrorism, the Yemeni government initiated a dialogue committee to counsel, de-radicalize and reintegrate the terrorist detainees.¹¹⁹ The aim of the plan was to rectify the extremist ideology of the terrorists and not merely to hold them in prison.

C. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM OF THE YEMENI REINTEGRATION PROCESS

After the attacks of 9/11, a large number of Yemeni nationals were arrested by the Yemeni government on the suspicion of being involved in the attacks. Those detainees were accused of carrying out bombings on the USS Cole, as well as other terrorist activities. Most of the detainees had also been involved in the Afghan war against Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Others had associations with the terrorists. As the Yemeni government was pressured to release the detainees, Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh deliberated the legal means of releasing some of the individuals who had not broken any laws of the land. Therefore, the Yemen government launched its dialogue program. This program was indented to make sure that the detainees would not revert to terrorist activities upon their release from custody. Ironically, President Saleh, who greatly relied on jihadists in 1990s, was set to announce the establishment of a dialogue committee on August 24, 2002, during a conference of Yemen's ruling General People's Congress.¹²⁰ Eventually, the president convened over a private meeting with some of the country's renowned senior religious leaders; they had a detailed discussion on the establishment of the dialogue program to de-radicalize and reintegrate the detainees into civilian life. In September 2002, the dialogue committee met with the detainees for the first time. The committee included Judge Hamoud al-Hitar, three other sheikhs, and five detainees. The detainees questioned the credibility of the *ulemas* by

¹¹⁹ AI Index: MDE 31/06/2003, "Yemen – The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security," report published by Amnesty International, 2–28.

¹²⁰ Gerges Fawaz A. (2010), "Al Qaeda Has Bounced Back in Yemen," retrieved from CNN.com.

asking if they were legitimate clerics and charging that had they been righteous Islamic scholars, they would not have allowed the detainees to be imprisoned. The detainees accused the committee members of being government's stooges. In reply, al- Hitar accepted that the ulemas in Yemen had not been doing their job in a proper manner and that they were instructed to hold a meaningful dialogue. The detainees were made aware that the dialogue was an all-or-nothing attempt by the Yemen government and that the detainees were also given a chance to convince the ulemas of their stance, if they thought they were right—and vice versa. The detainees were given two options: direct or indirect dialogue. In the direct dialogue, the detainees had to engage in an oral, back-and-forth discussion, while the indirect dialogue would be written, thus requiring a longer period of time.

The detainees chose direct dialogue.¹²¹ The detainees were presented with an agenda, including the established rules for the dialogue and the topics to be discussed. The rules stressed mutual respect of opinion.¹²² After the dialogue, some 364 detainees were released. These detainees were from different backgrounds and were representing many different organizations. The participants were between 18 and 40 years of age. According to the statement of the Yemeni government, 90% of the program participants were not born in Yemen; rather, they were born outside to Yemeni parents in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The detainees were required to sign a document declaring their renunciation of terrorist activities. Further, after the release, the detainees were on a compulsory probation period of one year.

¹²¹ Boucek (2008), "The Losing Bet and Unconventional Counter-Radicalization in Yemen," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, press release, November 6, 2008.

¹²² Letta Tayler and Joanne Mariner (2009), "No Direction Home: Returns from Guantanamo to Yemen," *Human Rights Watch*, New York, 24–29.

The family and tribal members of the detainees had to vouch for the detainees upon release to monitor their activities carefully. Some of the released individuals were reported to have died in the Yemeni attacks and in Iraq.¹²³

The government of Yemen decided to ask the international community to fund the program and the government agreed to monitor the program locally. The program first sought the amelioration of the terrorists, but more than that, it also sought to confront the fast-spreading radicalized mindset that was posing a risk not only for Yemeni society, but for the entire world as well. The program was designed to help the detainee terrorists in Guantanamo Bay to return home, enter the rehabilitation program, and become reintegrated into the society as normal, civilian citizens leading productive lives. As the detainees from other regions of the world continued to leave the Guantanamo Bay Prison for their homes, the remaining 75% of the detainees left in the Prison were Yemeni citizens. The detainees who were involved in the Yemeni dialogue project were, in general, not hardcore terrorists like the LTTE terrorists in Sri Lanka, and were not among the more prominent ideologues of Islamist movements.¹²⁴ According to some human rights activists, some of the detainees were detained because they merely belonged to the family of hardcore terrorists, being used as a bait to compel the terrorists to hand themselves over to the authorities.¹²⁵

The United States government decided that indefinite detention of the terrorists was not a solution to contain terrorism. The Yemeni government agreed to rehabilitate terror suspects and subsequently to reintegrate them into the society.

¹²³ Brian Whitaker (August 2005), "Yemen Overview 2003-4," British-Yemeni Society, retrieved from, <http://www.al-bab.com/bys/articles/whitaker04.htm>.

¹²⁴ Jessica Stern (2010), "Mind Over Martyr," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 1, 95–108.

¹²⁵ Skov (2009), "Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen," The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), 8.

The United States government decided to support the Yemeni government in the endeavor, as the United States government itself was inclined to prevent the terror suspects from returning to terrorist activities once the United States government decided to close the Guantanamo Bay Prison and contain the militant fold from proliferating.

A psychological factor often identified in disengagement process is the detachment from the ideology of the organization. In the Yemeni case, the successes of the psychological aspect of the disengagement process resulted in some participants being influenced enough to change their rhetoric, and it inspired others not to participate in criminal actions. Some minimal effort was also made to provide employment to the former prisoners. However, due to scarce resources, Yemen was not proactive in setting up aftercare programs to rehabilitate detainees into mainstream society, nor did the government provide social support or other services to detainees upon their release as the Saudi Arabian reintegration program did. Similarly, no surveillance mechanism was put in place to monitor detainees after their release, allowing for a greater likelihood of recidivism. The program did not track recidivism rates regularly among released detainees.¹²⁶

In terms of the application of de-radicalization factors, Yemen's central approach was heavily religious, using clerics to debate with prisoners about their understanding of Islam, and it tried to impose its will on rehabilitees. The exchange between detainees and clerics (often one cleric for three to seven detainees) occurred both within prison and outside of prison, creating an environment more conducive to building mutual trust and respect. The debate revolved around the legitimacy of jihad and its correct interpretation according to the Qur'an. It is significant to note that clerics found that the most zealous terrorists who had fought in Afghanistan were more challenging to engage with in

¹²⁶ Alice Fordham (2010), "To close Guantanamo, stability needed in Yemen," *Global Post*, August 6, 2010, retrieved from, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/middle-east/100805/close-guantanamo-stability-needed-yemen>.

terms of creating an open dialogue. This is a critical point that will be common to all programs analyzed, which suggests that de-radicalization programs, as currently designed, fail somehow to appropriately address hardened terrorists.

1. The Implementation of the Yemen Reintegration Process

As per the original plan, the Yemen and the United States had agreed to establish a center in Sana'a for the rehabilitation of returning Yemenis from Guantanamo Bay Prison, with funding from the United States government. The center was to include a program that would coordinate the preparation of technical workshops that would facilitate professional and academic training. These programs were intended to allow for the reintegration of returnees in Yemeni society, and to provide them with the skills needed to participate in community development programs, and to ultimately correct their path of thought from wrong to right. Yemen's rehabilitation center was to be based on a foundation of providing adequate intellectual and cultural rehabilitation and psychological support to the returnees, with the United States administration financing the establishment of the center and the processing of various other related installations.¹²⁷ Officials in Sana'a submitted this rehabilitation program plan to the United States, and Washington accepted the proposals, a set of developments, which contributed to a gradual overcoming of differences about how to address the fate of Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo. The government's plan of building the terrorist rehabilitation center with an estimated \$11 million grant from the United States was made with the understanding that the terrorist rehabilitation center would house Yemeni detainees coming from the Guantanamo Bay Prison.

When discussing the implementation of the dialogue project, several goals were mentioned, including those of the founder of the program, Judge al-Hitar. He said the goal of the project was facilitating the release and reintegration of the

¹²⁷ Skov (2009), *Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen*, London: ICSR, 9–15.

detainees into the civilian society. According to al-Hitar, the project was based on the perception that “ideas can be fought back by ideas.” Therefore, conviction-oriented negotiation is the best way to solve problems that are based on an ideology. The project was promoted by the Yemeni president, who said the Yemeni government intends to challenge the extremist beliefs and ideology of the detainees by making them interact with moderates, instead of desolating the suspects behind bars.

The Al-Hitar-led Dialogue Committee continually focused and laid emphasis on the essentiality of acceptance and mutual respect between the detainees and the dialogue participants in order to ascertain the conditions necessary for the existence of a fruitful dialogue. According to the founder, the dialogue was a success and he mentioned that the detainees had been successfully convinced that their ideologies were deviant from the Yemeni state interpretation of Islam.¹²⁸ This depicts that the extremist element in the country was due to an ideological assumption and that only counter ideas can be used to counter terrorist ideology. However, the designated timing of the program indicated that the reasons behind the terrorist actions were more than just their own radical ideas; in fact, the Yemeni state had previously promoted jihadist Islamism.

The dialogue was conducted in three phases. The first phase was based on surveillance that included the intellectual flow of ideas and the implementation of security. The second phase included the establishment of human development training, with the intention of reintegrating them into the society over the long term. In the third phase, the Yemeni government decided to take the initiative of providing employment opportunities and helping returnees to address the everyday problems that they were enduring, along with their families and other affected parties. The program proposed that all the dialogues would be substantiated in the light of the Qur'an and *Sunnah* (based on fundamentals of

¹²⁸ Gregory D. Johnson (2007), “Tracking Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadi Operatives,” Part 1 and 2, *Terrorism Monitor* 5, no. 18–19.

the Islamic law), as well as opinions of authenticated Islamic scholars. The participants of the dialogue program had been given a lot of time to research and develop a thought-provoking process.

The dialogue had three important factors: the art of dialogue, topics within this dialogue, and the sharing of developmental know-how among the relevant authorities.¹²⁹ The committee functioned intimately with the infrastructure of Yemeni security forces in organizing channels of information gathering and sharing in their battle against radical ideology. The Dialogue Committee accorded that their chief sources for the negotiation are the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah.

2. The Outcome

The de-radicalization programs vary from country to country depending on the preference and political context of the state concerned; some are nascent while others are mature and well developed. Typically, a religious cleric engages the inmate in a religious debate but some states favor repentant terrorists. In the case of Yemen, no aftercare programs or surveillance mechanisms were put in place to monitor fresh graduates, thereby raising the question and even the likelihood of recidivism. In contrast, successful reintegration models focused on mechanisms that were in place. These included the incorporation of families, tribes, and the security apparatus into the program, and developing a relationship with program staff who remain involved in the life of the released graduates, to help reduce the chance that they will return to terrorist activity.

As the Yemeni government lacked financial support and an integrated plan for supporting the de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of terrorists, the Yemeni DDR process failed primarily because the Yemeni government tried to impose its own terms on the detainees, though it was trying

¹²⁹ "ICPVTR Visit To Yemen (2010), Combating Terrorism In Yemen Through The Committee For Religious Dialogue," The International Centre For Political Violence and Terrorism Research and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 5–8.

to portray their efforts as a success. In order for the Yemeni dialogue to succeed, there was a need for the government to understand the aforementioned three-point head to evaluate the strategy properly and to determine its usefulness. Further, the United States and the Yemeni governmental strategy did not confirm its success fully in spite of the large number of confrontations and battles with groups that are described as extremist such as al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in various countries around the world. As observers have repeatedly noted, the goal of the strategy is not only the fight against extremism and terrorism, but to prevent extremist groups to allow its growth.

Perhaps the most prominent cause of extremism is the general sense of injustice among radicals, whether it is real or merely perceived. With respect to the general radicalism that prevailed in Yemen, the United States' reputation was marred among the Yemeni people with its continued operation of prisons, especially Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons, along with its continuous occupation in the Middle East, which increased the hostility of the young toward United States of America. This also has gravely affected the changing of mindset of Yemeni-based radicals and weakened the program.

As far as the necessity of a good understanding of extremist ideology is concerned, both the causes and desires of preventing the tendency towards extremism and terrorism are needed in building successful reintegration programs for the returning extremists. In this context, the providing of transitional services designed to release the detainees and after-release care was not properly met by the Yemeni ex-combatants. Educating the former Yemeni terrorists on Islamic teaching based values was successfully met by the program; however, the requirement of converting these understandings into behavioral changes among the radicals, which is one of the pre-requisites of successful reintegration, was hardly satisfied.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (ed.) (2009), *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, New York: Routledge, 181–192.

Enhancing the capacity building required in attracting ex-rebels into a moderate state-supported process needs opening of political mainstream into to a greater societal dialogue among them.¹³¹ This aspect was not seen its desired respect in the Yemen reintegration process. Moreover, the Yemeni program had to deal with constrained resources. As for the Yemen reintegration case, the Yemeni government initially planned to carry out a reintegration plan for the terrorists along the same lines as those which were later carried out by Saudi Arabia; however, Yemen failed to carry out a successful reintegration program for the terrorists like the latter did in year 2004 because it lacked financial resources and, as a result, it could not plan and design a strong rehabilitation facility, the way that other countries did. Moreover, the country was politically unstable, and because of deeply rooted political corruption in the governmental hierarchy, the plan was almost destined not to be successful in Yemen. Most importantly, unlike in Saudi Arabia, Yemen did not try to employ a comprehensive soft strategy for its terrorists. Instead, they tried to impose their will on the detainees which, instead of bringing the terrorists toward positivity, made them rebel even more. Owing to this, the recidivism rate in Yemen was high. Furthermore, the Yemen example also failed because, unlike Saudi Arabia, there was no strong tribal system in Yemen, and terrorists took advantage of the mountainous terrains of the region to build their hideouts and the terrain turned out to be a safe haven for the terrorists which were not the case of Saudi Arabian reintegration process. These were some of the core reasons why the reintegration process in Yemen failed to succeed.

3. Summary

One of the biggest challenges that the Yemeni government faced in terms of the Dialogue project appears to have been because of the lack of genuineness of the committee and the position that it exemplified. One of the underlying defects observed in the Yemen reintegration program was with the structure of

¹³¹ Jillian Schwedler (2006), *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–7.

the program, which never aspired to authentically employ mutual dialogue but to construct a proposal for the state's monologue, which was to be used to convert and persuade the detainees who had "incorrect views." According to al-Hitar, the head of the Dialogue Committee, the dialogue was meant to be based on mutual respect of opinion. In other words, the dialogists and the detainees were to have an equal position, and they were to be permitted involvement in a genuine exchange of opinions and ideas, and try to work with each other. However, in practice, this did not happen; there was no such equality, because the detainees were still at the mercy of the securities and were not fully free to express themselves. Under these circumstances, the probability of a genuine negotiation and mutual exchange of ideas was sabotaged from the outset.

The Yemeni state was directing a particular result from the dialogue, wherein the detainees would understand and accept a certain moderate interpretation of Islam. However, this was in contrary to the original spirit of the dialogue, which was based on the principle that "if you are right we will follow you and if we are right you must follow us."¹³² Therefore, this rhetoric paved the way for the likelihood of failure in achieving the desired outcome from the dialogue project. However, the government could not accept the failure of not being able to convert the terrorists; therefore, the Yemen Dialogue never intended to allow mutual respect and free flow of opinion from the detainees. Instead, it was continuously encapsulated in a wide-ranging plan for hard security procedures that would provide more protection more tangibly.

Therefore, the dialogue approach that was promoted by the government on the surface was not implemented by the government in the truest sense of the word. Rather, the negotiation concept was co-accepted into a wide-ranging strategy of repressing activities. The inclusion of the Yemeni dialogue not only failed to genuinely convert the detainees, but also contributed to the division and

¹³² ICPVTR Visit To Yemen (2010), Combating Terrorism In Yemen Through The Committee for Religious Dialogue, The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 5–8.

weakening of the entire Yemen counterterrorism plan and we can witness its outcome even today. This was because of a lack of credibility, internal political pressures, and a lack of follow-up programs that led to recidivism. As a result, the program in Yemen ended in December 2005, considered a failure due to graduates returning to violence after their release. From the Yemeni case, it is apparent that a sustained effort by the state to track and influence detainees both inside and outside of prison is needed; otherwise, former detainees may rapidly return to their old organization and radical beliefs.

V. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s, disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) has been considered a crucial phase in the transition from conflict to peace. One of the pre-requisites for post-conflict stability is the re-integration process of former combatants. Re-integration is a somewhat general term that is generally associated with rehabilitation. In the context of national and global security, the term “re-integration” typically refers to the process by which governments plan and orchestrate efforts to neutralize insurgents, and gradually implement a series of efforts and programs to assist them in their transition from insurgency to civilian life while minimizing recidivism.

As this research has documented, the examples of re-integration in Saudi Arabia, Burundi, and Yemen have provided counter-insurgency stakeholders with examples of both successes and failures in the global effort to transform militants into productive civilians. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia was able to provide the world an example of a mostly successful re-integration process. Conversely, the examples of Burundi and Yemen remind counter-insurgency observers and stakeholders how challenging the process of re-integration can be; officials in these societies have not been as successful in convincing militants to give up their arms. In this section, the author revisits these examples to explain why the Saudi re-integration process succeeded, and why similar programs in Burundi and Yemen did not. The discussion continues by proposing benchmarks and lessons learned from these aforementioned examples, and revisiting the hypotheses mentioned from the outset. Lastly, the author concludes by applying these lessons to the process taking place in Sri Lanka.

B. LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLYING THEM TO SRI LANKA

1. Comparing Successful and Unsuccessful Re-integration Efforts

a. *Why Saudi Arabia's Re-integration Effort Succeeded*

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided the world with a model of successful re-integration, and its efforts succeeded for several reasons. The foremost of these is the fact that in its move to transform hardcore terrorists, the Saudi regime and interior ministry officials carefully planned and implemented a soft strategy. The Saudi government did not have to rely on foreign monetary assistance in order to carry out its re-integration program. Rather, their program was funded domestically, and the government saw to it that their support was more than adequate and that it was well utilized. For the purpose of the program, the Saudi Arabian state used their resources to implement a soft strategy wherein religious scholars, foreign-trained psychologists, and counterterrorism experts were hired to design a successful plan to rehabilitate the terrorists. Under the PRAC strategy (prevention, rehabilitation, and after-release care) of Saudi Arabia, the government built well-equipped and well-facilitated rehabilitation centers for the returning detainees of the Guantanamo Bay Prison. Former militants were given religious lectures that directed them toward a conventional interpretation of Islam over the more extremist elements. Under the program, the detainees were not only exposed to motivational discourse, they were also given opportunities to learn new skills and take part in athletics and other recreational activities, which proved to be healthy for their emotional and overall wellbeing. Further, the wealthy Saudi government granted monetary help to the families of the detainees who, in return, extended maximum support to the government in order to prevent recidivism. Last but no less important, the Saudi approach emphasized negotiations and a somewhat open dialogue between the ex-combatants and the government. These were the major reasons that the Saudi case was successful.

It is true that Saudi Arabia benefited from its inherent advantages. Saudi Arabia is a nation that is rich in natural resources and the wealth they generate. The Kingdom also benefited from the fact that it was able to concentrate its efforts on a relatively small group of hardcore radicals who were not necessarily regarded as much of a direct threat to the regime as they were to Western nations, particularly the United States. Even so, the government of Saudi Arabia recognized these advantages and capitalized on them. They saw to it that their rehabilitation programs were well planned, well coordinated, and well funded, all in an attempt to counter the spread of extremist ideology. In doing so, Saudi Arabia set an example for other countries to follow in terms of re-integration and de-radicalization efforts.

b. Why Re-integration in Burundi and Yemen Failed

As the Burundian example illustrated, the process of re-integration is fraught with challenges. The obstacles to re-integration of militants are particularly high when a country lacks the sort of inherent advantages that are enjoyed by Saudi Arabia and other resource-rich nations. Burundi is a poor African country and, therefore, it could not mobilize resources to the same level as Saudi Arabia did. Moreover, the problem of limited resources was compounded by the huge problem of political corruption, which undermined its program's initial successes. Thus, the re-integration plan, which was largely supported by foreign agencies, was not administered properly by the local authorities. Consequently, the lack of monetary and other resources, the acute dearth of competent administrative planning, and the political corruption all acted together against the re-integration process; the Burundian government could not handle the huge population of ex-combatants and, therefore, could not successfully re-integrate them into civilian life. Those who were re-integrated returned to a life of poverty and faced a lack of employment, which forced them to reconsider their decision to enroll themselves into the re-integration plan.

The re-integration process in Yemen was similarly doomed by a combination of economic and political problems. The national government there initially planned to carry out a re-integration plan with much novelty for the rehabilitating terrorists under their program (similar to what Saudi Arabia carried out later, in 2004), but it too failed to carry out a successful re-integration program for these former terrorists. As was the case with Burundi, Yemen lacked adequate financial resources and, therefore, Yemeni officials could not plan and design a rehabilitation facility as Saudi Arabia did. Another similarity with Burundi was that Yemen was politically unstable and suffered from deeply rooted political corruption within the governmental hierarchy, which meant that their plan struggled to find success from the start. Yemen's program also failed, however, due to reasons that were unique to the situation in that country. Another problem they had, for example, was that whereas Saudi Arabia had largely succeeded due to its use of soft power, the Yemeni leadership tried to impose their will on the detainees. The Yemen government did not seem interested in negotiating and hearing the grievances of the detained combatants, and the government quickly lost credibility in the eyes of militants there. As a result, instead of bringing the terrorists more in line with the government's position, they typically resisted cooperation even more. Owing to this, the recidivism rate in Yemen was high.

Moreover, despite sharing borders and some common cultural aspects with Saudi Arabia, Yemen found it difficult to replicate the Kingdom's success for two additional reasons. Firstly, whereas Saudi Arabia was able to make use of its strong familial-based tribal systems to resolve issues, no such system existed in Yemen. A second problem for Yemen was that geography made security difficult, as terrorists took advantage of the mountainous terrain of the region to build their hideouts and safe havens, which was not easy to do in the case of Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Yemen failed to capitalize on the United States assistance to its re-integration process to the optimum. These were some of the core reasons why the re-integration process in Yemen failed to succeed.

C. RE-INTEGRATION BENCHMARKS AND BEST PRACTICES

As the previous section illustrates, although we do not necessarily have a perfect model for re-integration, we do have real-world examples of successful and unsuccessful processes to draw from. We can therefore tentatively begin to establish benchmarks and best practices for the re-integration process, wherever it may take place. Using the examples discussed in this paper, observers can gain a better understanding of both the factors that characterize effective re-integration programs, as well as the forces that may contribute to the failure of these systems. In sum, the lessons learned from these examples can be applied to other areas of conflict going forward.

As hypothesized in the beginning of this paper, benchmarks and standards of the re-integration process do, in fact, exist; we have seen that when applied, they can greatly increase the chances for extended periods of peace and internal stability, as this paper has discussed in reference to Saudi Arabia. The re-integration program in that country serves as a strong model for other national governments around the world. The Saudi example demonstrates that when national economic resources are appropriated in adequate amounts and administered responsibly, militants may feel more enticed (at least initially) to give up armed resistance.

This paper secondly proposed that competent planning and implementation are essential to the process of re-integration, and that efforts be largely devoted to the use of governmental soft power that address quality of life issues of the rehabilitating militants. Conceptualizing a program is not enough; governments must plan thoroughly and allocate sufficient financial resources to address the large numbers of ex-combatants who will need immediate assistance. The government should see to it that these programs adequately support correctional staff, counselors, and other transitional team members so that they are properly equipped and trained to help ex-combatants back into society. Accordingly, transitional program counselors should teach ex-

combatants how to begin a new life and should endow them with essential life skills such as education, financial management, and how to develop their livelihood.

In addition to these broad areas, transitional programs should also focus on daily essentials. These include taking steps such as helping former militants in obtaining identification documents, social beneficiary tokens, and vocational skill certificates, so that they will have the confidence of furthering their education and obtaining employment. Transitional programs should similarly focus on improving the quality of life for ex-combatants, such as access to health facilities, as well as other facilities that may promote their literary, educational, economic, social, and even their spiritual development. The Saudi case makes it clear that when these steps are taken, the results can be effective. Saudi Arabia committed vast financial resources to the cause of re-integrating former al-Qaeda militants, and its interior ministry ably administered their transitional programs, with a broad focus on improving their quality of life. Burundi and Yemen, on the other hand, exemplify the potential consequences when states fail to consider these steps. Both countries had only limited resources; beyond these limitations, however, it is clear that poor implementation in both countries was largely to blame for the failure of their respective programs. In short, embracing a re-integration program is not a guarantee that re-integration will work; planning and administration of programs must also be effective in order for such efforts to be successful.

A third prediction made in this paper was that a complete re-integration process can indeed help former militants develop stronger bonds and ties to their communities, thereby making it easier for them to reintegrate within their societies. The evidence in this paper seems to document that this prediction is largely true. On the one hand, it is true that ex-combatants face many economic, social, and emotional challenges upon their reentry into society. They face obstacles such as finding lost family members, land disputes in their ancestral territories, safe and affordable housing, unmet educational and employment needs, undiagnosed past memories, and family reunification issues. It is,

therefore, necessary for re-integration programs to include economic, social, and emotional needs of a satisfactory magnitude so that they can break the cycle of recidivism. Fortunately, as the example of Saudi Arabia demonstrates, a complete program of re-integration can go far in alleviating the pressures that ex-combatants face. The rate of recidivism has been low in the Kingdom because the Saudi government provided for the economic, social, educational, and other individual needs of the ex-combatants who were returned to society.

D. APPLYING THE EXAMPLES OF SAUDI ARABIA, BURUNDI, AND YEMEN TO SRI LANKA

1. Overview of Sri Lanka's Re-integration Efforts to Date

The ongoing re-integration in Sri Lanka began in May 2009. Despite the comparative lack of resources, the Sri Lankan government has enjoyed successes in re-integrating former combatants of LTTE. It began the mammoth task by accepting some 11,000 ex-LTTE militants into its re-integration process; present records indicate that fewer than 1,000 of these former combatants remaining in the rehabilitation centers.

During the remaining phase of the program, officials should be careful not to repeat the mistakes made by Burundi and Yemen. The case of Saudi Arabia differs from that of Sri Lanka in that Sri Lankan officials have fewer financial and other resources at their disposal. However, as discussed, money alone was not the sole reason the Saudi re-integration process succeeded, nor was the lack of money the only reason that Burundi and Yemen failed. The Saudi Arabian re-integration strategy was not only well funded but also well planned and implemented, and the government made considerable attempts to address the larger quality-of-life issues, which Burundi and Yemen largely failed to address. Accordingly, during the remaining phases of its re-integration program, Sri Lanka would probably be well advised to consider what it can take from the experiences of these countries and adapt them to suit its own context.

2. Limitations of Applying the Saudi Example to the Sri Lankan Context

As tempting as it might be to advocate using the Saudi strategy, it may not be possible. To begin with, it is fair to say that the soft strategy used by Saudi Arabia is difficult to implement in a country like Sri Lanka for more than one reason. This clearly depicts that every country has to design a unique strategy for re-integration, considering its own social and cultural structure of the society. One strategy that works fine in another country may not necessarily be successful in another country.

One major difference that complicates any analogy between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka lies in the nature of the insurgencies in each country. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the majority of the people who underwent rehabilitation were low-level threats to security, chiefly those who used to raise funds for jihad.¹³³ Moreover, although there may have been intentions by some of the al-Qaeda operatives to attack the Saudi regime, much of their attention seems to have been diverted to targets outside of the Kingdom. These people did not face much difficulty re-integrating into the society, and Saudi Arabia generally experienced far less trouble in the re-integration militants.

By contrast, Sri Lanka has recently emerged from a long, tragic, and savage armed conflict in which thousands of innocent civilians lost their lives. As a result, Sri Lanka faced enormous political, cultural, and commercial disintegration, as well as massive destruction to property. In spite of the several efforts taken by consecutive governments in the country, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) proved inexorable in their aim to establish a separate state in the North and East parts of the country for the Tamil population there. In its effort to do so, the LTTE waged a violent separatist insurgency against the government and people of Sri Lanka, and they additionally took hostages and deprived them of their basic human rights as well. In response, the Sri Lankan

¹³³ Thomas Hegghammer (2010), *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*, Cambridge University Press: New York, 102–107.

government launched and sustained a bloody counterinsurgency campaign against the LTTE to liberate the citizens who were held hostage by the LTTE. The campaign against the LTTE was successfully completed in May 2009, following the demise of LTTE's high command and consequently, the surrender of the remaining cells of the LTTE.¹³⁴ When comparing the re-integration processes of Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, the differences in terms of the domestic objectives of the insurgents and the intensity of the confrontations in these countries make clear the need for caution in using the Saudi Arabian case as a benchmark and basis for expectations in Sri Lanka. In fact, Sri Lanka's situation mirrors that of re-integrating the ex-combatants in Burundi. As in the Burundi conflicts, many of these former LTTE combatants had lived their entire lives during the course of war, and the LTTE had even made attempts at child conscription. Since the end of the conflict, the Sri Lankan government has been left with the responsibility of re-integrating many former LTTE combatants back into their communities. Thus, it is clear that duration and brutality of the conflict in Sri Lanka obviously makes re-integration a more complicated process than it was for militants in Saudi Arabia.

Complicating these efforts, a second difference that this paper documents repeatedly is that there are economic differences to consider. Saudi Arabia is a resource-rich country, and it offered financial assistance to the ex-combatants, which turned out to be a huge motivating factor. The Kingdom helped the detainees by providing material support to them after their release, thus contributing to the re-integration into society. The precursors of this strategy suggest a high degree of success, as it was able to re-integrate some of the detainees in the community. By contrast, Sri Lanka is a third-world developing country that cannot rely solely on this type of strategy; it has limited resources. In

¹³⁴ Human Rights Unit, Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka, retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_116478.pdf. 2.

sum, whereas the Saudi Arabian government is very rich and can afford to help the detainees financially; such facilities and resources are not available to the Sri Lankan government.

3. A Path to Future Success

Despite the formidable challenges, Sri Lanka is making a strong effort to avoid the mistakes of its counterparts in Burundi and Yemen, and it is making an earnest effort to reintegrate the former LTTE combatants in the society. Although it lacks the resources available to Saudi Arabia, the Sri Lankan process of re-integration appears to be more successful than those in Burundi and Yemen. Recall that the Burundian authorities greatly lacked the expertise, planning, and commitment to carry out the re-integration process. Yemeni officials had planned to develop facilities and institutions to rehabilitate extremist militants, but failed because of similar problems, and also due to a failure to establish trust with these radical factions. Results in Sri Lanka, though, suggest that the government's progress is comparatively further along in terms of re-integrating the former LTTE combatants into society. A recent report revealed that out of some 1,800 children reported missing and recruited by the LTTE during the civil war; almost 600 have since been found and are reunited with their families.¹³⁵ Further, reports last year revealed that the Sri Lankan government had planned to release more than 1,800 ex-combatants, after helping them to enroll into and successfully complete their rehabilitation program in September 2011. According to the same report, some 1,717 male members of LTTE and some 99 female ex-combatants were reintegrated into the civilian society at a state ceremony held at Temple Trees, the official residence of the Sri Lankan President.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ *Daily Mirror* (August 30, 2011), "1000 children still missing since war," retrieved from <http://dailymirror.lk/news/13286-1000-children-still-missing-since-war.html>.

¹³⁶ Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka (September 29, 2011), "Gov. to release over 1800 Ex-combatants," retrieved from http://defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20110929_02.

In less than three years, Sri Lanka has set an example for the world in terms of re-integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants by helping the re-integration of nearly 12,000 former LTTE cadres, which is commendable.¹³⁷

E. IN CLOSING

Multiple countries worldwide are forced to deal with civil conflicts and answer questions about how to deal with ex-combatants. A longstanding controversy is over the role that economic and social re-integration plays in an ex-offender's propensity to return to arms. This controversy has recently assumed new importance after the 9/11 attacks in United States. The immediacy of this issue has forced not only the victimized nations but also others to contribute in countering the radical ideologies that culminated in the types of attacks seen on September 11. Therefore, the nation states are taking extreme measures to fight the ideologies that propagate extremism around the globe. Policy makers in various terror-hit countries of the world are attempting to halt the recidivism cycle, primarily by building new prisons and developing facilities. The motivation behind this solution is the belief that incarceration is an effective deterrent to further extremist activity. However, overreliance on this and other methods that seek containment of political extremists have largely failed; undoubtedly, the failure of this strategy stems from the fact that building new facilities addresses only the symptoms, rather than the root causes of the problem.

A much less used alternative strategy for breaking the recidivism cycle is to re-integrate ex-offenders into the community by providing them with a range of programs designed either to increase their ability to obtain a job or to actually place them in a job. This approach is based on the assumption that employment is a viable alternative to crime—so much so that employed prison returnees will be less likely to recidivate. However, evaluations of these employment-oriented

¹³⁷ *Daily Mirror* (September 30, 2011), "SL has shown the way," retrieved from <http://dailymirror.lk/news/13865-sl-has-shown-the-way.html>.

programs have found them to be rather ineffective in reducing recidivism as well. Thus, an extensive debate continues over the efficacy of using this approach to prevent ex-combatants from being re-incarcerated, particularly in light of the fact that funding for such programs is usually quite limited.

Even in light of the results, these employment programs still receive support from observers. Those who favor this strategy acknowledge, on one hand, that employment alone is not a sufficient deterrent to the issue, and that there is little reason to expect a program exclusively oriented towards employment to reduce recidivism. Rather, they view employment as only one of many forms of assistance that ex-combatants need upon their release, and it is only by addressing all such needs that recidivism will be reduced. Indeed, the example of Saudi Arabia shows that success probably comes as a result of a multi-faceted approach. It is imperative for policy makers to have an understanding of the fundamental reasons why individuals recidivate either by committing again or by violating the terms of their probation or parole. Furthermore, because a great deal of the literature points to economic status as an important factor in involvement in terrorism, an understanding of the association between employment and recidivism is crucial. It is also important to identify factors other than employment that may affect recidivism, such as family and friendship relationships, ability to access community services, educational background, and other unlawful means of dependency.

Ultimately, Sri Lanka will adopt its own approach to dealing with questions about long-term stability and how best to re-integrate ex-combatants into their society. The government there has examples that can be helpful. Even if the Sri Lankan government cannot copy the Saudi example exactly, it can still learn from its successes. Moreover, it can use the lessons of failed re-integration in Burundi and Yemen to avoid similar errors. Sri Lanka's best strategy is to reintroduce former LTTE combatants into society and to re-integrate them more fully through counseling, job training, and education programs. Fortunately, Sri Lanka's re-integration process is already well underway and on the right track, with a group

of 1,000 former LTTE cadres having been re-integrated into society in September¹³⁸ and another group of 350 ex-combatants in October of last year.¹³⁹ Interestingly, only 931 ex-LTTE cadres remain to be reunited with their families; this marks the completion of the Sri Lankan re-integration process, before the end of this year (2012).¹⁴⁰ All of these are positive developments and evidence of how far Sri Lanka has come within the past three years.

¹³⁸ Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka (September 7, 2011), "1000 rehabilitated ex-combatants to be released," retrieved from http://defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20110907_02.

¹³⁹ Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka (October 18, 2011), "350 more ex-combatants to be reintegrated," retrieved from http://defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20111018_02.

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka (February 26, 2012), "931 ex-LTTE cadres to be reunited soon," retrieved from http://defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20120226_01.

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