


Strategy Research Project International Fellow

Civil-Military Relations: The Forgotten Foundation of Security Sector Reform

by

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United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDATION OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

by

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Since World War II many colonized African countries attained self-rule. Some of these new nation-states, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, gained their independence through liberation wars. These newly independent states inherited unprofessional militaries that often aligned themselves with a particular former liberation movement that evolved into a political party. This phenomenon has led to problematic civil-military relations that have contributed to political instability in a particular country and region. Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced some of the most disruptive of this political turmoil; military coups and intra-state conflicts have caused failed states in this troubled region. This SRP discusses the historical background of the problems in the region. It recommends using the principles of stabilization and state-building to enable these struggling states to build good governance. This analysis focuses on the importance of civil-military relations as part of state-building the world over. This SRP concludes with recommendations on how developed nations and international organizations can assist new developing states in establishing positive civil-military relations and reforming their security policies in order to avoid future conflicts.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDATION OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Since the end of the Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa has been plagued by a wave of conflicts and wars. The rampaging violence of liberation wars, military coups, intra- and interstate conflicts has fueled insurgencies and ethnic cleansing. Accordingly, some sub-Saharan states have failed; others are failing. Many of these conflicts began over political differences that prompted military interventions in political affairs. In many of these states, civilian authorities have not exercised effective control of the military. The responsibility for stabilizing these conflicts has fallen to individual states and regional organizations¹ following UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement that the UN "does not have . . . the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures. . . under present conditions, ad hoc member state coalitions offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the escalation or the spread of the ongoing conflict."² Consequently, Africa's regional organizations have taken it upon themselves to address the prevailing security threats in their regions, despite their limited resources.

These regional organizations have tried to quell these conflicts. However, the need to build stable governments in the affected countries still remains a concern. The international community must assist in preventing violent conflicts; it must also engage in building lasting peace. Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs that promote civilian control of the military are a good start in this critical process. SSR programs promote sound security policies, plans, and activities that strengthen civilian control and oversight of the security forces in order to improve these states' development of justice,

safety, and security. SSR promotes good governance, sustainable economic development, and social well-being by providing basic human needs. Reforming civil-military relations is the key to building regional stability.

Historical Background

Achieving these reforms requires an understanding of African countries' histories. Current African culture, politics, and civil-military relations have been greatly influenced by wide-spread colonization of much of the African continent.

The current problems in sub-Saharan Africa include political instability, economic collapse, diverse social and cultural differences, and lack of civilian control of the military. All these problems have evolved from colonization of African states by their European masters, whose primary interest was to benefit from exploitation of Africa's natural resources. During the "Scramble for Africa," European powers claimed large parcels of land on the African continent for strategic purposes. Their avaricious competition for African resources led to the famous Berlin Conference of 1884-85. Participants in the Berlin Conference sought to formalize the division of the continent into European colonies to avoid conflicts among the European powers in Africa. They displayed no concern for indigenous Africans, as recorded by Herbert Howe.³ The boundaries were established simply by drawing lines upon a map or by following natural landmarks like rivers. European colonizers showed no regard for the fact that their arbitrary boundaries often split African ethnic groups.⁴ The colonial powers' partitioning of Africa still impacts global affairs and contributes significantly to the turmoil of Africa's post-colonial states and regions.

The boundaries delineated by the colonialists are essentially those that define today's independent states. Ethnic divisions, colonial resentments, and economic distress have destabilized much of the continent. Secessionist movements and irredentist claims contribute to this instability. Regardless of the arbitrariness of the colonial division of the continent, African leaders are now concerned with upholding and governing these colonies they inherited from the imperialists. Julius Nyerere explained this situation to the World Assembly of Youth in 1961: "There are obvious weaknesses on the African continent. We have artificial 'states' carved out of the Berlin conference. . . we are struggling to build those nations into stable units of human society."⁵

Following World War II, an increasing number of African colonies demanded self-rule, but their colonial masters firmly resisted this independence movement. They feared loss of national prestige if they gave up their colonial holdings. Most of all, they were unwilling to yield the economic and strategic importance of their colonial sources of energy, markets, and raw materials.⁶ In some colonies, African desire for self-rule erupted into violent insurgencies against colonial rulers. However, white supremacists used their military forces and superior technology to quell these African rebels.

African natives were not provided with any knowledge or skills in preparation for self-rule by their colonial masters. As a result, most African post-colonial countries lacked the basic foundations of governance. Newly liberated Africans knew little about the administration of a state. However, they had been exposed to the imperialists' military affairs because natives were recruited into the colonial militaries to provide security for their white masters. Of course, the officer corps of all African colonies was monopolized by Europeans until after independence. "The ideal colonial soldier was

supposed to be illiterate, uncontaminated by mission education, from remote areas, physically tough and politically unsophisticated.”⁷ They could fight, but they were preferred to do little else.

The failure of the colonial powers to develop self-governance systems and to build political identities of the colonies contributed to the post-colonial ungovernable situations and corrupt practices in the new independent states. They had no preparation to succeed politically or economically. This lack of statecraft caused dissatisfaction among the African populace, which had high expectations of their new governments. Despite all the natural resources which could have provided economic prosperity and stability, African states continued to squander these opportunities through their corrupt practices and continuing economic dependence on the colonial nations.

The colonial powers also exploited the new states. Beset by their own economic problems following WW II, European powers neglected to invest in the independent states, so they were plagued by unemployment and an inadequate infrastructure. Private investors also hesitated to invest in unstable countries that lacked infrastructure and security. These difficult times in Africa came as the world was gripped by the Cold War; the bipolar rivalry distracted most of the world, which paid little attention to the new post-colonial African states. The world was divided into camps of the USA and USSR; each Cold War superpower tried to spread its influence among the young countries. Most African countries did not like capitalism because they associated it with colonialism, so many opted to align with the communist Soviet Union, a decision that further reduced their chances of luring foreign investors to their countries.

The alignment of African states into the respective Cold War camps brought yet another challenge for new independent states. Their Cold War assistance came mostly in the form of weapons, military training, and funding from the United States and the USSR. The superpowers also sought to impose their ideologies on their African surrogates. This situation led to the growth and development of African militaries in terms of numbers, equipment, and military prestige. During this period, the 1960s and 70s, the African continent started to experience military coups, something that had not happened in the colonial era: “No colonial army in sub-Saharan Africa between 1880 and 1960 staged a military coup.”⁸ These colonial militaries displayed some professionalism; they did not cross the civil-military divide, and they observed the tradition of military acceptance of the civilian authority, which then resided in the colonial powers. However, as Howe notes, it is quite evident that this type of control or professionalism was not transferred to the new states’ armies.⁹

Apart from military coups, there was also a rise in dictatorship among African states. Dictatorship and one-party state governance, which also emerged then, worsened the already bad economic situation in the affected areas. Dictators were mostly sponsored by the superpowers, who exercised control through these surrogates. Enormous aid was poured into these corrupt states, but it ended up in the hands of the few or a dominant ethnic group. At the end of the Cold War some countries whose dictators were victims of this sponsorship—like Somalia, Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), and Liberia—suffered severe intra-state conflicts. Some of them are now regarded as failed states.

The in-flow of military aid into Africa during the Cold War elevated the status of African armed forces above that of the civil authorities. Consequently, many African leaders were inclined to militarize their societies and to associate governance with military force.¹⁰ They used military personnel for personal protection and to control their citizens. For example, Zaire's President Mobutu personally controlled the country's armed forces and most of the police units.¹¹ Native leaders exercised strong executive control over the militaries; they demanded loyalty, not military efficiency, from their armed forces. Loyalty facilitated corruption and granted a privileged status to the leaders' ethnic groups. Recruits were selected on the basis of their ethnicity or region, and sometimes on the basis of their religion. Their allegiance to the country was of little concern. This type of recruitment was also prevalent during colonialism; colonial authorities then deliberately recruited from indigenous minority tribes which were normally based in the rural areas, rather than enlisting urban elites and politicized people.¹² Militarization of selected ethnic groups eventually haunted post-colonial Africa; it contributed to mass atrocities in some states. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, the worst of its kind in the region, has been attributed to Hutu fears of Tutsi dominance. But political chaos, economic disruption, and a colonial legacy that disrupted pre-colonial ethnic relations were also contributing factors.¹³

The situation of Zimbabwe also provides a perfect case study of a state in disarray with problematic civil-military relations. Since attaining its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has experienced numerous disturbing incidents attributed to poor governance and its military's involvement in politics. Among these incidents have been human rights violations and atrocities, land grabbing by ex-combatants, and political

violence carried out by security forces and President Mugabe's party followers.¹⁴ The human rights abuses and atrocities started when Mugabe allowed his military to terrorize the opposition Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) party followers in Matebeleland under the pretext that they were subduing dissidents. This campaign of terror left an estimated 8000 people killed, and many more were tortured and left to starve.¹⁵ This campaign signaled the beginning of the political violence and reign of terror that plagued Zimbabwe for several years. The situation took a turn for the worse in the 1990s when Mugabe ignored international advice and implemented his controversial land reform policy. The so-called "independence war" veterans launched a horrific rampage to occupy farms without any interference from law enforcement officers.

This ongoing uncontrollable violence shifted to the political arena during the election period when the Mugabe government felt threatened by the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. All of Zimbabwe's parliamentary elections since 2000 have been marred by political terror instigated by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) followers, believed to have been sanctioned by the ruling party. Following the most recent 2008 elections, Mugabe refused to relinquish power after suffering defeat at the hands of opposition MDC leader Morgan Tsvangarai. This defeat precipitated an unprecedented wave of electoral violence, supposedly orchestrated by Mugabe followers. Mugabe's military generals and some top government officials had earlier voiced their opposition to the MDC rule and vowed not to serve some 'puppet.'¹⁶ In response to this violence and governmental disarray, a sub-regional organization, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), intervened.

SADC proposed that the two parties form a government of national unity with Mugabe as leader and Tsvangirai as his vice. This familiar compromise is ineffective because the leader still remains as the overall authority. The unity government is still in place, but is fully commanded by Mugabe and his generals. Zimbabwe is just one example of an independent country whose post-liberation struggles have resulted from a flawed civil-military relationship in which a despotic executive has used his military to protect his regime, to brutally suppress political opponents, and to control an unruly and dissatisfied population.¹⁷

Diagnosis

After a wave of violence and wars in the post colonial era, African states are trying to re-establish themselves and to assist in the development of new nations. Leaders of these new states are seeking ways for their militaries to contribute positively to stability and democratic norms. Despite this positive approach, African states still lack the knowledge and capacity to achieve their desires. Several sub-Saharan militaries have been associated with the ruling parties ever since the liberation struggle; they have never experienced a change of government. It remains to be seen whether they will suffer the same fate as Zimbabwe, where the military supported a despot, not the country as a whole.

After enjoying self-governance for some time, many African countries are now starting to experience demands for change. Leaders of these countries are rejecting requests for the establishment of oversight committees to maintain checks and balances and to assume transparency. Some countries still deny the media the freedom to perform their reporting tasks. These leaders fear that the press will divulge their

corrupt and unprofessional practices in their cultures of impunity. In certain cases, the role of the police is not well defined, so the military assumes responsibility for domestic security. Ethnic dominance by some groups in certain countries has often resulted in ethnic conflicts, like those in Rwanda and in Zimbabwe.

SSR programs have been designed to assist countries in building long-lasting peace and to help prevent further violent conflicts. SSR programs seek to reduce the militaries' roles in African countries and to build more professional militaries that accept civilian leadership. The SSR program is best suited for states like Zimbabwe, which has just experienced political turmoil and is currently governed by a coalition government trying to instill order and stability to the country. Its problems go beyond its civil-military relations; these problems extend to troubled sub-sectors such as intelligence, police, the judicial system, pervasive corruption, and human rights issues.¹⁸ Current interim measures in Zimbabwe do little more than buy time for African leaders to develop and implement more lasting solutions. The SSR program is suitable for Zimbabwe because it addresses problems of all sub-sectors holistically. Most importantly, this nationally-owned program allows external actors with considerable technical expertise to contribute directly to building a stable government and a viable national economy.

Security Sector Reform

The African states have generally failed to provide a range of security needs for their citizens in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance. There is therefore a need to implement reforms that will prevent the recurrence of conflicts and that enhance public safety in the societies as well as support economic and social development. Reforms are unlikely to succeed without a stable

domestic and external security environment. Foreign investors are unwilling to do business in weak states where the governments cannot guarantee the security of their property or provide some public order.¹⁹ New states require some professional expertise to assist in establishing functional public institutions.

SSR provides a process that enables a country to review and enhance the effectiveness and accountability of its security and justice systems. Michael Bizoska points out that SSR enhances the security and the protection of individuals and their property; it helps transform a dysfunctional and violent sector into an instrument of conflict prevention and management; it promotes greater participation of marginalized and disenfranchised people in decision-making related to reforming the sector; and it may also lead to a more effective allocation of resources and better budgetary management.²⁰ The SSR program establishes a holistic process that develops a host of services provided by different domestic and external actors, institutions, and agencies. These services can be grouped into four categories: state security and justice providers; state governance and oversight mechanisms; non-state security and justice providers; and non-state governance and oversight mechanisms. External actors include the states that provide support for the program, international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, universities and research institutes, and non-state security actors such as private companies with technical expertise in SSR and private military and security companies (PMSC).²¹

The SSR concept is best suited for those countries that are in post-conflict situations because ending of a conflict means that all parties are willing to compromise. SSR provisions can then be included as part of the peace agreement. These provisions

bring aboard external actors who may be willing to support the SSR activities. Today, SSR is viewed as a primary instrument for the international community to help prevent violent conflicts and build lasting peace in states as diverse as Afghanistan, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Timor-L'este.²² In some sub-Saharan African countries, the situation might not be as severe as in other places, but lack of capacity and resources has often denied some African states from achieving their intended goals not only in military terms but also in terms of political, social, economic, and environmental security. The great advantage of the SSR concept is that it is widely recognized by many international actors who even place it on their diplomatic agenda through the development of various SSR policies and guidelines.²³

African countries still need militaries for their security, and fear of invasion has traditionally encouraged states to develop professional militaries.²⁴ However, African militaries have often failed to demonstrate military professionalism because of the political and social situations that prevail in their environments. Samuel Huntington has suggested the following prerequisites of military professionalism: an existing nation state, a democratic governance system, and an acceptance of civilian authority over the military.²⁵ African armies have not exhibited the kind of professionalism that Huntington advocates. Authoritarian African regimes have instead employed Howe's five tactics of political survival at the expense of military professionalism.²⁶ However, African militaries must be developed to the required professional standards so they do not threaten the national development of a state. Likewise, Africa's civilian leaders must understand the military's role and allow military leaders to perform appropriate military tasks. When civilians and military leaders of a new state fail to establish a positive working

relationship, tensions inevitably arise regarding political responsibilities and military capabilities.

Nonetheless, some African countries may have performed exceptionally in developing good governance and building excellent civil-military relations; examples include South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Nigeria. Even so, these countries have not fully established civilian control of their militaries. For example, Mpho Molomo's "Civil-Military Relations in Botswana" cites its military's lack of accountability and transparency and recommends formation of a parliamentary committee to oversee military affairs and security issues.²⁷

Civilian control of the military is usually associated with a constitutional form of government, usually in a democracy where the rule of law prevails. Consequently, a requirement of democratic governance calls for civilian control of the military. At present, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have some kind of democratic rule and certainly will seek to preserve that form of governance. Huntington asserts that objective civilian control requires the following: maximizing military professionalism, minimizing military power or subordination of the military to civilian authority, recognition of professional competence, and autonomy for military authorities while minimizing military intervention in politics and political intervention in military affairs.²⁸ Huntington specifies these conditions as requisites for positive civil military relations. Observance of these conditions, therefore, puts a country on the right track toward establishing objective civilian control and setting the stage for a democratic society in which the rule of law prevails.

During the post-independence period, sub-Saharan African countries enjoyed some type of governance that was well accepted by the local population. Governments of new states should provide security and establish supportive economic, political, and social policies.²⁹ These states are also expected to observe international law and protect human rights. When they fail to do these things, new states struggle to be recognized as legitimate states. Providing security, and little else, does not legitimize a new state; it must also demonstrate its capabilities to administer critical programs and to meet its people's basic needs. Francis Fukuyama assesses the strength of the state according to its "ability to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws clearly and transparently."³⁰ That is, a state's institutional capacity determines the state's viability.

In most newly-independent states, besides lacking the much needed institutions, governments have not yet executed policies and enforced laws transparently, as Fukuyama suggests. These states' reluctance and inability to implement, enforce, and provide the functions of statehood then give rise to corruption, lawlessness, and economic failure. The leadership of the new states is then reluctant to seek or welcome any form assistance from developed nations. They fear a loss of independence and a return to their colonial status. Notwithstanding all the government structures in place, the excitement of being independent provided fertile ground for the rise of corruption and further exploitation of the native people. To prevent these post-independence excesses, leaders of new states are inclined to impose harsh measures. Governments seek to affirm their authority because they are stewards of state resources and held accountable through political and legal processes,³¹ assuming they exist. Leaders offer no illegal appeasement of those who may have contributed to the struggle for freedom

of the country. If they take conciliatory actions, they are made transparent and enacted through statutory provisions. To avoid being held hostage by powerful groups such as “Zimbabwe war veterans,” governments should implement processes of “political settlement” to bring the affected within the framework of objective government control.

Militaries in most sub-Saharan African countries were military components of the movements leading the struggle for independence. These movements produced the governmental leaders of the new states. Most of the leadership of the current ruling parties had been members of the liberation forces; they attained their civilian status only after independence. Consequently, their relationships with their armed forces have never changed since the liberation struggles. Their revolutionary roles were very different from the civilian-military roles in established democracies. Their new systems have not yet been tested by change of government. These independence fighters who have become leaders of new states may be more inclined to be loyal to one another, rather than display loyalty to their new state.

Effective civil-military relations may not be easily achieved in these newly independent countries. All democratic African states have in place legal controls that serve as a guide for the control of the military; however, some leaders have chosen to ignore all these legalities and have taken the military under their full control. These leaders can deploy forces domestically and externally without the consent of their respective parliaments. The Presidents of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, and Uganda neither advised nor sought permission from their parliaments before sending their troops into the Congo conflict in 1997-98.³² This unfettered executive action indicates the lack of institutional restraints. Accountable governments also try to refrain from

employing their militaries domestically. Using the military as a domestic police force can politicize the military, alienate the military from the people, and create internal fissures.³³

Huntington describes civilian control as the distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among members of the officer corps.³⁴ Maximizing military professionalism can to a great extent help stabilize civil-military relations. As a way of cultivating professionalism and subordination to civilian control, militaries of new states must be trained and educated on the role of the military in a democracy. The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) consists of integrated personnel recruited from diverse backgrounds. Its commitment to democratic principles contributed greatly to its positive performance during the 1994 electoral process. For their militaries to regain civilian respect, governments must work aggressively to professionalize their security forces.³⁵ Positive civil-military relations keep military forces away from political interventions, coups, and violations of human rights.

According to Daniel Henk, several sub-Saharan African countries have built competent, professional armed forces, including countries like South Africa, Botswana, Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya.³⁶ However, this is not encouraging because many countries in the region have still failed to build professional armies. This might be a result of inadequate resources. Nonetheless, African states should immediately train and equip their military establishments in order to get a good return on their nations' defense investment. This can be achieved by cooperation with other countries through sub-regional and regional collaboration, such as through the African Union (AU). Judging by the output, investment in professional military training seems to provide a

good return on defense spending by African countries.³⁷ Just as the military must protect the polity from the enemies, civilian leaders must also let the military conduct its own affairs so it does not destroy the society it is intended to protect. Civil authorities should not rely on the military only to address external threats.³⁸

Building National Capacity

As African governments assume the responsibility of administering new states, they encounter challenges in dealing with weak institutions, and an uneducated and unskilled workforce. Unlike in South Africa, most new independent states in the region did not inherit effective functional institutions or a skilled labor force to provide government services. Colonial masters of such countries as Angola and Mozambique quickly abandoned the colonies following their declarations of independence. Other countries—like Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and many others—had to develop their structures from scratch. However, some countries lacked sufficient capacity to build functional formal and informal institutions. Some executive, legislative, and judicial controls seem to be effective in certain countries. But they have not yet been strongly tested. Mpho Molomo raised his concerns about Botswana Defense Force's intervention in the Lesotho conflict in 1998, and protested Botswana's intervention without parliamentary approval.³⁹

Capacity building requires more than building a professional military. It involves transferring technical knowledge and skills to individuals and institutions; it also involves crafting effective policies and effective administration of public services across the economic, social, political, and security realms.⁴⁰ Building capacity in sub-Saharan African countries is more sustainable because it involves reforming existing structures

rather than starting from nothing. Building capacity requires adequate resources; some funds must be used for projects like rehabilitating infrastructure to produce quick and visible results. It is therefore advisable for countries to seek assistance from regional and international organizations and nations who have the capacity to administer reconstruction and stability programs. These international actors can help manage crucial state functions until they are ready for host governments' ownership.⁴¹

Recommended Approaches

In building civil-military relations conducive to democracy and the rule of law, Huntington argued for "objective civilian control." African countries seeking long-lasting peace, democracy, and the rule of law should accept Huntington's guidance as a basis for establishing civil-military relations.⁴² For more than 50 years, Huntington remains the authority on civil-military relations that set the stage for democratic rule by law. The following recommendations for creating positive civil-military relations in African states are based on the theories of Samuel Huntington and aim to achieve sustainable peace and prosperity.

First, distressed governments must accept reforms that have been initiated. Indeed, they must be more than willing to lead and own up to these initiatives in the security sectors. Civil authorities must honor legal statutes that have been put in place; transparency and accountability should prevail. If these legal controls are not enforced, they should be revised to meet the reformed standards. The government should seek assistance from international actors and countries that have expertise in institutional reforms. Civilian leaders must focus on stabilization and good governance; they must

strengthen civil-military relations. A culture of impunity should not be tolerated because it will encourage lawlessness and corruption.

Second, these new governments should focus on developing military professionalism and fostering military subordination to civilian control. Both professional training and systematic development of the military can contribute to creating a professional culture of an efficient armed force. Military personnel should not engage in political activities, and domestic deployment of soldiers should be avoided to maintain respect of the local population. African governments have been forced to reduce funding for their militaries not only because of external pressure but also due to a lack of resources. These countries can benefit from training programs offered by several African institutions and by developed nations such as the United States. Several U.S. programs can support development of African militaries: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Military to Military (Mil-Mil) contact programs. Also, British Department for International Development(DFID) programs are available to assist developing countries that are committed to training governments and militaries that respond to civilian authorities and respect rule of law.

Third, regional and sub-regional organizations such as the AU, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and East African Community (EAC) should be strengthened so they can fulfill their charters and missions. ECOWAS's organizational weaknesses led to the West African States' Ceasefire Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) failures in Liberia in 1990. It lacked the unified military training needed to achieve a ceasefire; it operated

as no more than a loose coalition of separate military forces—not as an effective joint force.⁴³ These organizations must play an important role in economic development and use preventive diplomacy to promote regional self-policing, to resolve conflicts, and to promote good governance. Sub-regional organizations should ensure that standby brigades are fully functional and well supported by member countries so that they can effectively deter aggression.

However, some pan-Africanist leaders continually fail to condemn wrongdoing by their colleagues. This tolerance for fraud and corruption creates divisions in organizations and regions at large. Open criticism of a neighboring country's government is almost unprecedented in Africa. Accordingly, SADC leaders failed to seriously address the situation in Zimbabwe.⁴⁴ Western nations should play a pivotal role in helping the Africa Union and its sub-regional organizations to be more assertive and influential in African governance. This can be achieved by educating political leaders, expressing strong disapproval of poor governance and corruption, and imposing strong measures against wrongdoers. For example, Western nations should discontinue aid to countries that are acting in bad faith. Such decisions should be based on African Union recommendations to ensure that African leaders support such punitive actions.

Lastly, the various programs offered by the U.S. government can be of great benefit to African governments; however, many African leaders wrongly perceive that western nations have ulterior motives for militarizing Africa.⁴⁵ Africa still relies greatly on foreign assistance for its very survival. This dependence stultifies African development and self-governance. Even so, programs offered by AFRICOM under its Theater

Security Cooperation (TSC) still remain the cornerstone of the U.S. sustained engagement in Africa.⁴⁶ TSC activities include education and training, security, humanitarian assistance, and multinational exercises, executed by programs like IMET, FMF, FMS, and Mil-Mil contact programs. These programs contribute significantly to African stability and help compensate for Africa's insufficient domestic resources.

Similarly, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and Africa Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programs are designed to provide African militaries with the skills needed to participate effectively in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Africans regard the ACOTA concept as a very effective program. It can be integrated into other programs provided by countries like Britain, France, and Belgium. For ACOTA to have a long and effective impact on SSR in African states, it should focus on developing strategic leaders' knowledge of civil-military relations, strategic planning, and security sector budgeting. Another program with great potential is the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies program, designed to educate both military and civilian leaders on national strategy, defense budgeting and management, and civil-military relations.⁴⁷ The U.S. should continue to sponsor this program, as it is one of the few in which civilians and their military counterparts dialogue together and share professional experiences.

Last but not least, the National Guard State Partnership Programs (SPP), offered as part of AFRICOM's TSC, continue to contribute greatly by strengthening the skills of military and civilian personnel. The program should be expanded to more African countries in an effort to educate and build capacity of their institutions. Because SPP

establishes continuing relations between U.S. National Guard and their African hosts, SPP projects can be modified and refined over time to ensure successful outcomes.

Conclusion

Creating a secure, peaceful and a stable environment throughout sub-Saharan Africa is a challenge, but it is not impossible. First and foremost, African leaders must be willing to accept change. African leaders should desist from militarizing their states; they should not use their militaries to strengthen their authoritarian rule, which only delays democratic development. Reforming civil-military relations in Africa will pave the way for democracy and stability. Good governance begins with civilian control of the military.

Colonialism may have created many of Africa's current problems. But the colonial legacy should not keep African leaders from instituting change and needed reforms. African states should strive to develop democratic governance, to foster military professionalism, and to strengthen regional organizations that will assist in curbing conflicts. With the assistance of programs cited in this study, African countries can build their own security programs, pursue their own interests, create democratic institutions, and embrace the rule of law. Reforming civil-military relations is the first step for achieving peaceful and stable democracies in sub Saharan Africa. "As democratic institutions sink firm roots and popular commitment to the constitutional system deepens, the scope for the military to intervene in politics or even to rattle its sabers menacingly diminishes."⁴⁸

Endnotes

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¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 396.

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