


Security Cooperation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Role

by

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United States Army War College
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS' ROLE

by

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ABSTRACT

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The forthcoming reduction of the federal budget will affect U.S. National Security. Policy leaders must make informed decisions on how best to allocate shrinking resources. Resources should be allocated to those programs that have the greatest impact on National Security as compared to the cost of the investment. Security Cooperation is one such program. The Security Cooperation (SC) Program is a critical means by which the Department of Defense can work with other countries to achieve the United State's strategic objectives. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) plays a role in the implementation of this program. The intent of this paper is to illustrate the importance of the SC program and describe how it is developed and implemented. It will show how USACE supports implementation and suggest ways to improve this process. Where possible, this paper will use elements of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Strategic Guidance to place the discussion into context.

SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS' ROLE

....One ignorant of the plans of neighboring states cannot prepare alliances in good time. In focal ground, ally with neighboring states...

—Sun Tzu¹

For almost half a century the United States' foreign and defense policy occurred in the context of the Cold War where the threat to the nation was Soviet led communism. A strong economy enabled the nation to use a wide range of programs and instruments of power to meet this threat. In 1991 the Cold War ended and the United States found itself as the sole superpower in a world of uncertainty but still an economic powerhouse. Twenty years later, in the 21st Century strategic environment, the nature of the threat is an unusual combination of hazards including climate change, trans-national terrorism, weapons of mass destruction the re-emergence of old powers like Russia and the evolving global engagement by rising powers like China and India.² The difference this time is the nation's economy is weakened and the U.S. government's debt is in danger of growing out of control. The combination of a weak (but still dominant) economy and spiraling debt will negatively impact the federal budget for the next few years.

The forthcoming reduction of the federal budget will affect U.S. National Security. Policy leaders must make hard but informed decisions on how best to allocate shrinking resources in a world where the strategic environment grows more complex. Resources should be allocated to those programs and instruments that have the greatest impact on National Security when compared to the cost of the investment. Security cooperation (SC) is a critical program to U.S. defense policy and the Corps of Engineers is an instrument that plays an important role in implementation of the program.

This paper portrays both Security Cooperation as a Department of Defense method of engagement with host nation militaries; and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as an instrument used to implement SC programs using the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Strategic Guidance as context. The paper defines SC, its importance and how it is developed. It goes on to describe USACE, its role and importance in SC. The paper explains ways to improve USACE's role in SC and suggests areas for further research.

What is Security Cooperation?

According to Joint Publication JP 1-02, Security Cooperation is “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”³ Security cooperation, at its core, is the way that the Department of Defense engages with foreign militaries with which a relationship is desired. While the doctrinal definition is all inclusive, these interactions are grouped into fifteen broad categories of activity. These categories are:

- Security Assistance
- Counternarcotics Assistance
- Facilities and Infrastructure Projects
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Multinational Exercises
- Multinational Education
- Multinational Experimentation

- Multinational Training
- Counter /Nonproliferation
- Defense and Military Contacts
- Defense Support to Public Diplomacy
- Intelligence Cooperation
- Information Sharing
- International Armaments Cooperation
- Other Programs and Activities⁴

All activities in this list are paid for by Department of Defense funds accept for Security Assistance. All of these activities are undertaken to support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.

Security assistance is the security related component of the Department of State's foreign assistance program. Security assistance, while a SC activity, is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the Department of Defense. JP1-02 defines Security Assistance (SA) as a "group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives."⁵ Although these programs are approved by Congress we can infer from the wordy definition that these programs are authorized under a complicated combination of laws dating back to 1961. Consequently, while these programs are a critical component of foreign assistance and SC, in practice it is a very difficult and often a very slow process to implement

effectively. It is not uncommon for a SA activity to take three to four years from conception to execution.⁶ For example, in 2010 congress authorized funds for construction of facilities to support the expansion of the Afghanistan Security Forces. Many of these projects will not be complete until 2014.

As a result of this complicated set of laws it is no surprise that there are numerous programs associated with SA. The Department of Defense (DoD) Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) describes twelve major types of SA programs. Of these twelve programs seven are administered by the DoD and five are administered by the Department of State (DoS).⁷ For the purposes of this paper only the four programs administered by DoD are discussed. They are Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Construction Services.

Foreign Military Sales are the transfer of defense articles, services and training authorized by the United States government but paid for by the recipient nation.⁸ Depending on the nature of the equipment provided, notification of or authorization by Congress may be required for FMS cases. This notification is made on a case-by-case basis. Often training, repair parts technical services and facilities are included with the equipment. These activities enable the recipient nation to enhance their defense capability while simultaneously expanding ties between both nations' defense establishments.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) like FMS results in the provision of defense articles, services and training to a foreign nation. However, the funding is provided by the United States government usually in the form of a grant.⁹ This activity is undertaken

when the recipient nation cannot afford or finance the equipment or services provided. This program enables nations that otherwise would not be able to afford an improved security capability to acquire it with the assistance of the United States.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a grant basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors.¹⁰ This is an effective program that strengthens the military of a partner nation through U.S training and doctrine resulting in a more capable and apolitical professional military.¹¹ It also builds relationships between service members from both nations enhancing understanding and cooperation.

Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS) are the sale of design and construction services to any eligible foreign country or international organization if such country or international organization agrees to pay the United States the full cost of the services.¹² This program is similar to FMS in that the recipient nation pays for the service. This activity is authorized by the President and is undertaken when the recipient nation lacks the capacity or expertise to construct specific facilities or infrastructure. The provision of design and construction expertise, like in FMS, enables the recipient nation to acquire quality facilities or infrastructure that they otherwise would not be able to easily obtain. In these cases the design and construction services are provided by a DoD construction agent like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which will be described in subsequent sections.

The SA programs described in the previous paragraph accounts for the majority of funding authorized to support SC activities. The Department of Defense direct

contribution to SC activities is less than 15% of funds provided by the Department of State for SA.¹³ Although SA represents the largest portion of the SC effort, its effectiveness has come into question in recent years, because it is perceived to take too long to implement. As a result Congress provided two additional authorities to the Department of Defense in response to these concerns. These are referred to as the Section 1206 and 1207 authorities which are typically focused at the regional level and therefore fall under the purview of the combatant command.¹⁴ Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, grants the Department of Defense the authority to spend funds for the purpose of “global training and equipping” of foreign militaries. These funds and this authority enable the Combatant Commander to more quickly implement projects¹⁵ that were traditionally carried out using a SA program. Similarly, Section 1207 grants the Department of Defense the authority to spend funds for the purpose of stability operations in U.S. led Coalition operations but limit this authority to supporting foreign militaries.¹⁶

Even with the implementation of Sections 1206 and 1207 there are occasional issues when DoD and DoS actions have the unintended consequence of working at cross purposes with each other. For instance, in 2007 the country of Chad received U.S. DoD funding for support to the development of an infantry rapid reaction unit. In the same year the Department of State criticized Chad’s military for committing human rights violations. Thus the situation arose that the DoS admonishes Chad for committing human rights violations while at nearly the same time the DoD is trying to enhance the security capacity of the very military under criticism. Although there were oversight procedures in place for the purpose of preventing this type of situation; steps omitted by

certain parties caused the situation where actions by both department's seemed to conflict with each other thus rendering the policy less effective.¹⁷

If the purpose of the military is to defend the constitution, and win the nation's wars then why focus effort on cooperation activities with host nation militaries? Given the nature of the SC activities and the fact that these activities are implemented by the United States military it is clear that "the [U.S.] military does much more than fight. The military trains, equips, provides humanitarian assistance, disaster relief; and supports other militaries..."¹⁸ These actions, taken by the U.S. military, indicate that SC activities are important to the U.S.

Why are Security Cooperation Activities Important?

Security cooperation activities contribute to the United State's national security objectives by enhancing U.S. force capability and exerting a positive influence on foreign militaries with which a partnership is required. Security cooperation provides U.S. forces access to friendly and allied nations during both peacetime and contingency operations.¹⁹ Security cooperation also reduces the strain on U.S forces. For instance, the U.S. does not provide forces for UN Peace Keeping operations however the U.S. provides more than twenty five percent of the UN Peace Keeping budget and trains and equips foreign contingents for UN peace keeping operations.²⁰ This is accomplished through SC accounts. For example, by January 2009 more than 45,000 foreign military personnel were trained and deployed as peace keepers using the Global Peace Operations Initiative a security assistance program annually funded by Congress.²¹

By enhancing foreign defense capabilities, security cooperation activities impact on foreign militaries. For example, the provision of equipment or training enables the recipient nation to enhance its security and solve their own problems before they

become a crisis. During a crisis, like a natural disaster for example, SC enables the U.S. military to provide humanitarian relief or disaster assistance enhancing the recipient nation's response. For instance, during the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and subsequent Tsunami, U.S. forces assisted Indonesian relief efforts.²² Security cooperation enables partner nations to benefit from mutual defense or security arrangements²³ enhancing the stability of the nation and the region. All of these activities encourage foreign militaries to partner with the U.S. military. All of these activities enhance host nation military capabilities; capabilities that later may be employed by the host nation in a way that secures interests it has in common with the U.S. Going forward, SC will take on even greater importance as the Department of Defense competes for shrinking budget resources and as the United States competes in a world that is becoming more multi-polar.

In a world of shrinking budget resources the Department of Defense must find ways to make the most out of the funds available. Unless policy makers re-balance how resources are allocated, the ability to achieve the national security objectives may be adversely affected. Fewer dollars means less capability, or does it? By increasing funding of SC activities, even at the cost of limited funding to some other capability, it is conceivable that the nation's ability to achieve national security objectives will be enhanced. SC can be a counterbalance to a shrinking budget by achieving more impact at the cost of fewer dollars. The following example illustrates this argument.

How much does it cost to fund SC activities? This is difficult to ascertain since the range of programs involve numerous appropriation bills, authorities across several agencies. For the sake of this argument an extrapolation of information available from

several sources will be used to estimate a rough order of magnitude. The Congressional Research Service shows that Congress appropriated about \$4.7 billion to the Department of State for security assistance.²⁴ The Department of Defense directly funds about \$1 billion annually on SC activities.²⁵ Between the Department of State and the Department of Defense approximately \$5.7 billion was appropriated by Congress for the purpose of SC activities in 2010.

Compare this cost to the funds appropriated by Congress for the procurement of aircraft for the Department of Defense. According to the Defense Appropriation Act, 2010, Congress appropriated approximately \$38 billion for aircraft procurement.²⁶ This amount encompasses procurement, production, modification, and modernization of aircraft across for all Services. The United States fields, by far, the most powerful airpower on Earth.

The importance of airpower to national security is obvious. The question is: does the United States need to maintain these funding levels in order to maintain a suitable level of air supremacy? The same question could be asked regarding funding levels for the nuclear forces or for that matter any line item account in the defense budget. What is the value of maintaining these levels of supremacy for possible employment in defense of national security objectives versus the very real and immediate capability or access that is an outcome of SC activities? I believe that the 45,000 U.S. funded peace keepers on mission world-wide are doing more to maintain security, and by extension securing U.S. interests, than the U.S. ability to employ 5th generation aircraft against much less capable air powers. A modest decrease of 10% in funding levels to a line item like aircraft procurement would nearly double current funding levels of SC activities

by both the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Clearly there is a significant return on investment in SC activities; and this should be compared against a similar return on investment analysis in other areas of defense.

The investment in SC is an investment in the U.S. relationship with host nation militaries. As the National Security Strategy indicates, the world is moving towards multi-polarity with the rise of nations like China, India, and Russia. As nations come to grips with this new paradigm they recognize the importance of developing relationships with partner nations.

In a multi-polar world, nations compete to develop partnerships with other nations, particularly those nations that provide an essential resource. U.S. rivals recognize this and are competing effectively for access to potential U.S. partners. These rivals may undertake this action as an effort to keep the U.S. out. Grygiel advances this argument in his article on failed states when he said: "a state that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting other states to do so, thereby potentially decreasing its own relative power."²⁷ While he was referring to failed states in his article, his argument is applicable to any nation state. An alternative view is that states engage with other states in order to advance their own interests by developing partnerships. The following example illustrates.

Regardless of their reasons, China recognizes the importance of foreign assistance as well as SC and is playing an increasingly significant role worldwide. For instance, China views Africa as critical to their security policy because of their need to secure resources to fuel their economy.²⁸ China uses military assistance to enhance

relationships with those nations that provide raw materials or infrastructure to move those resources.

Tanzania is one such nation. This country does not provide resources but is the location of a significant port and rail terminal that allows resources to transit from across sub-Saharan Africa.²⁹ One of China's most enduring military partnerships is with Tanzania.³⁰ Their most recent military assistance effort in Tanzania occurred when China decided in early 2010 to build a Defense College for the Tanzanian Defense Force. The Chinese People's Liberation Army constructed a Defense College in Dar es Salaam and handed this facility over to the Tanzanian government in October 2011.³¹ China has enhanced its relationship with Tanzania's military and by extension; the Tanzanian government. I believe this contributes to Chinese efforts to secure access to critical transportation hubs on the west coast of Africa. The Chinese move very quickly when it comes to SC as evidenced by how rapidly they completed that project. They also do not have issues working with nations that the West is reluctant to assist as evidenced by Chinese military assistance in Sudan and Zimbabwe.³²

These factors are indicators that China is able to implement SC (military assistance) activities with fewer constraints than the United States. This apparently does not detract from the importance they place on SC but serves to highlight how important SC should be for the United States. Competition with other global powers coupled with the argument that SC is a cost effective way to enable the U.S. to achieve its national security objectives illustrates its importance of this method of engagement.

How does the Department of Defense Implement Security Cooperation?

Clearly China has a process for implementing their equivalent of SC that can be described at a minimum; as efficient - its long term effectiveness remains to be seen.

How does the Department of Defense develop and implement a SC program?

Implementation of the U.S. version of SC activities involves a wide group of actors from national policy makers to officials in the DoS and DoD to the combatant commander and the individual country team led by the Ambassador. It involves a complex grouping of policies, and programs synchronized with plans at the national, regional and country level. A way of understanding how SC is developed is to frame it in the context of Clausewitz's strategy model of "ends and means". The following paragraphs shall illustrate this model using the development of the U.S partnership with India as an example.

Clausewitz points out that the "ends" are the purpose for war and that the "means" are the intermediate stages by which the purpose is achieved.³³ The ends in this model are national policy objectives which typically involve protecting national interests. These objectives are determined at the national level and can be found in many forms from guidance in documents like the National Security Strategy (NSS) or the Quadrennial Defense Review or from speeches by policy leaders like the President or the Secretary of State.

The NSS provides guidance at several points regarding objectives in the Asia-Pacific Region including: "We will work to advance....mutual interests through our alliances, and deepen our relationships with emerging powers."³⁴ Specifically regarding India, the NSS goes on to say that "We will continue to deepen our cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence-including China, India, and Russia-on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect."³⁵ Similarly the QDR provides guidance on the direction U.S. military takes with regard to relationships with countries in the region but

with more of a security focus: “We will work with allies and key partners to ensure a peaceful and secure Asia-Pacific region.”³⁶ More specifically, it stresses the importance of SC activities when it states: “We will augment regional deterrence and rapid response capabilities and seek opportunities to build the capacity of our Asian partners to respond more effectively to contingencies, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters.”³⁷

The President adds to this policy guidance in many forums including speeches to foreign national assemblies. In a recent speech to the Australian Parliament, President Obama very clearly stated how he wants to develop the U.S. role in the Asian-Pacific region when he said: “As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision -- as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.”³⁸ Secretary of State Clinton reinforced this position in a recent article in *Foreign Policy* by emphasizing the important role of U.S. military in the region when she stated: “Asia’s remarkable growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military.”³⁹ Both the President and the Secretary of State further define the U.S. relationship with India in statements and writings. In a speech to the Indian Parliament, the President stated: “As we work to advance our shared prosperity, we can partner to address a second priority -- and that is our shared security.....We need to forge partnerships in high-tech sectors like defense.”⁴⁰ the Secretary of State reinforced this position in her recent *Foreign Policy* article when she reiterated that “President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the

relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century.”⁴¹

Depending on the nature of the relationship with foreign militaries additional documents in the form of agreements between nations serve to amplify the relationship. The amount of SC activity corresponds directly to the strength of the agreement between the nations. For instance, in Bangladesh, where there is no such framework, U.S. SC efforts may initially be limited to humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. Contrast that with the Republic of Korea where the U.S. has entered into a formal Defense Agreement resulting in the availability of the full range of SC options. In the case of India, relationships between the nations improved over the last 20-years and for the first time the U.S. entered into a Framework for Defense Relationship with India. This framework established 13 goals to achieve the shared vision of a wider and stronger U.S.- India strategic relationship including: “..... expand two-way defense trade between our countries....as a means to strengthen our countries' security, reinforce our strategic partnership, achieve greater interaction between our armed forces, and build greater understanding between our defense establishments.”⁴² Framework agreements amplified by policy guidance and statements from national leaders lay out the broad goals for the development for relationships with foreign militaries.

The guidance promulgated by national leaders and the accompanying national level strategic documents inform other organizations and processes. Chief among these organizations in the DoD are the Under Secretary of Defense Policy (USD(P)), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Geographic Combatant

Commands like U.S Pacific Command (USPACOM). The USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on SC matters. OSD(P) develops DoD guidance and disseminates the Secretary of Defense SC goals and priorities.⁴³ This guidance also informs subordinate organizations of the means at its disposal to further that relationship through SC activities.

The DSCA directs, administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance for the execution of DoD SC programs.⁴⁴ This guidance and oversight is directed to the Services, the Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and the Senior Defense Officials (SDO) assigned to the U.S. missions and organizations like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The DSCA publishes a campaign support plan (CSP) which communicates the goals and objectives as well as articulates their capabilities.

The DSCA CSP is directly linked to the Guidance for Employment of Forces (GEF).⁴⁵ The GEF is a classified document published by the DoD and requires the CCDR to develop campaign plans that integrate “steady-state” activities and operations in order to achieve a regional end state specified in the GEF.⁴⁶ The GEF also lists critical partners which are those countries considered essential to achieving one or more of the CCDR’s end-states. These entities are typically the focus of the majority of SC activities because of the importance of the relationship with that foreign military.⁴⁷

Within the CCDR’s campaign plans and strategic guidance are imbedded the structures for the integration of SC activities. This framework and subsequently the SC activities that result from it are usually part of the Phase Zero or “setting the theater” phase of the CCDR campaign plan. For example, the unclassified version of the USPACOM Commander’s strategic guidance regarding the development of the U.S.

India relationship states the objective to: “Deepen military-to-military interaction and interoperability. Encourage military-to-civilian relationships to counter common threats. Support India’s evolution as a leading and stabilizing force in South Asia.”⁴⁸

The policy objectives established at the national level point to the national purpose. Guidance promulgated at multiple echelons serves to refine and prioritize these objectives. Returning to Clausewitz’s construct, if the policy objectives are the “ends”, then the SC activities are the “means”. These are the instruments by which the purpose is achieved. The fifteen activities listed in the second part of this paper along with the activities associated with SA are the instruments used to achieve the objectives.

Ultimately, the U.S. country team, led by the Ambassador, is the key to determining which instruments can be used and the way they will be used to achieve an objective. The Ambassador relies on the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO), the military personnel assigned to the embassy, for the execution of SC activities in the country assigned; and is the primary interface with the host nation on all SA issues.⁴⁹ The SCO accomplishes this in close coordination with the Service Component security cooperation staff (the G5, A5, N5), the Combatant Command J5 along with DSCA and the USD(P) assistance.

In determining what instrument to use, this collaborative team will make an assessment based on the following questions. What kind of relationship does the country’s military have with the U.S.? What kind of relationship does the U.S. want? What is the state of the host nation military? What are the host nation’s needs? Returning to the Indian example, the relationship between the U.S. and Indian militaries

continues to evolve. As stated earlier the U.S. – Indian Framework for Defense Relationship established many goals including: “..... expand two-way defense trade between our countries....as a means to strengthen our countries' security.” The PACOM Commander’s guidance states the goal of supporting India’s evolution as a leading force in South Asia. The NSS points out that India is evolving from a regional power to a global power. The Indian military’s strategic air and sealift lift capability is very limited and therefore they would like to develop it.⁵⁰ The acquisition of large cargo aircraft to replace their old Soviet made air lifters would improve their strategic lift capability.⁵¹ The conclusion, enable the Indian Defense Force to procure the U.S. made Boeing C-17 Globemaster aircraft through the FMS program, an SA tool. It is probable that the SCO and other DoD agents listed contributed to developing the means to this end but in all likelihood the major effort was undertaken by the Defense Procurement and Production Group. This body was established as part of the U.S. – Indian Framework for Defense Relationship for the purpose of “overseeing defense trade as well as the prospects for co-production and technology collaboration.”⁵² This particular FMS case is still in the implementation process as of the writing of this paper but illustrates the linkage between United States strategic objectives and how SC activities are used to achieve them.

What is the Role of the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers in Support of Security Cooperation?

In order to understand the important role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) plays it is helpful to understand what the organization is and does for the Department of Defense. USACE is a major Army command in the institutional Army.⁵³ It is made up of some 34,000 civilian and military personnel that provide engineering, design and construction management services⁵⁴ to the Army and the DoD. It is not part

of the operational Army and therefore it does not include the tactical engineer formations - sapper, construction or bridging units. USACE is one of only two DoD recognized construction agents⁵⁵ and provides the aforementioned construction agent services on behalf of DoD, as well as for other Federal agencies and foreign governments.

USACE is organized geographically into Engineer Districts and Engineer Divisions worldwide. The boundaries of the Districts in the Continental U.S. generally coincide with the nation's major waterways. This is because one of the USACE primary missions is the development and management of nation's water resources. Multiple Districts are combined into Engineer Divisions. Several of the Engineer Divisions are aligned with the Geographic Combatant Commands. For instance, the Pacific Ocean Division (POD) of USACE is aligned with USPACOM.

USACE carries out a wide range of work including military construction, civil works, environmental remediation and it performs regulatory and real estate functions. Construction is typically performed by contractors with USACE providing the construction contract administration (i.e. they are the construction agent). USACE has design and engineering capability, and operates several centers of expertise each specializing in a unique technical engineering research area.

Given the range of capabilities that USACE possesses, how is it used to assist with achieving SC objectives? To support SC activities, USACE can serve in its construction agent capacity or as a technical engineering advisor. As a construction agent, USACE can administer construction contracts for projects requiring facilities or infrastructure. This is particularly applicable for SA activities like FMS, FMF or FMCS

cases where facilities, or other infrastructure are required to support the equipment transfer to a foreign military. In instances involving either FMS or FMCS cases, this work is being executed at the request of the foreign government on behalf of the foreign military and in close coordination with the U.S. Department of State. For example, India entered into an agreement, authorized by the United States through FMS, with Boeing for the purchase of ten C-17 Globemaster III for an estimated value of \$4.1 billion⁵⁶ for the purpose of enhancing the strategic airlift capacity of the Indian Air Force. A portion of that case is programmed for the construction of C-17 ramps, taxi-ways, hangers, hydrant refueling and other facilities to support the C-17.⁵⁷ USACE will provide the construction agent services through the Alaska Engineer District of the Pacific Ocean Engineer Division.

USACE can also provide similar construction contract oversight for projects that support other SC activities. Activities such as: Counternarcotics Assistance through DoD Counter Drug funding; Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) activities providing construction oversight of facilities and infrastructure projects; Humanitarian Assistance using Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation funds; and Multinational Exercises using Exercise Related Construction (ERC) funds.

USACE's technical engineering capability is available to support various SC activities as well. USACE can provide technical engineer expertise in an advisory role. For example, in support of humanitarian assistance, USACE used its expertise in water resources and hydrology to "help Mozambique channel flood waters to reduce flooding, develop more rational land management practices and move hazardous materials from flood plains."⁵⁸ Another example of technical engineering support occurred during the

Pakistan floods of 2010. USACE was brought in as part of the DoD disaster assistance response in order to assist the Government of Pakistan and the Asian Development Bank with “developing damage assessments, and with planning and design requirements for the construction of temporary base camps and airfield improvements from which the humanitarian missions were staged.”⁵⁹

Leveraging these USACE capabilities either as a construction agent or for its technical engineer expertise requires close cooperation between USACE and the SC stakeholders at all levels. At the enterprise level this relationship is between HQ USACE and DSCA. USACE is given FMS or FMF infrastructure cases by DSCA for case writing and execution.⁶⁰ At the GCC level the coordination occurs between the Engineer Division aligned to the GCC engineer and J5 Security Cooperation team. The principal link occurs through the USACE LNO to the GCC engineer division. At the country level the relationship is between the Engineer District and the U.S. Mission’s SCO.

As shown by the examples, when leveraged correctly, USACE plays a critical role in support of SC. Key to leveraging USACE capability is understanding and communication. This includes USACE understanding of capabilities by the SC community as well as an understanding of the complexity of the authorities, funding lines and nuanced objectives that the U.S. wishes to achieve with each SC activity. Communication at every echelon between the parties discussed in the previous paragraphs is essential to this effort.

Conclusion

The first part of this paper explained what SC is, why it is important and how it was implemented. The latter part of the paper addressed USACE and the important role they can play. Security cooperation is an instrument of the Department of Defense used

to enhance the U.S. relationship with host nation militaries, improve their defense capability and create additional capacity that can assist the U.S. in an ever more complex world. In the rapidly evolving world of globalization, including the rise of new regional and global powers, relationships with host nation militaries enable the U.S. to pursue shared objectives and interests. With the pending tightening of the Federal Budget, policy makers must consider different ways to meet national goals and protect interests. Increased funding of SC with the view of enhancing partner defense capacity may be a more effective way to allocate resources even if it means a modest decrease in funding of other force structure.

There are several actions at different echelons that can be undertaken to improve the synergy between USACE and the SC actors. At the national level Congress should re-visit the possibility of repealing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and its amendments and replace it with legislation that will streamline the process and more clearly define roles and responsibilities. With a more simplified process and authority Federal agencies will be postured to more efficiently if not more effectively cooperate and implement SC and SA activities. At the DoD level the FMS process works well between DSCA and HQ USACE. USACE could better plan its effort if there was a way for DSCA to better forecast the magnitude of the FMS workload in the out years.⁶¹ USACE manning and capability expand and contract with this workload. By knowing in advance the size of the future workload, HQ USACE can better posture the organization to meet the requirement.

Similarly, the synergy between the GCC, the country team SCO and the aligned USACE Engineer Division would benefit from measures taken to improve cooperation.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) implemented the Joint Civil-Military Engineer Board in 2009 “to ensure unity of effort and synchronization of resources for construction initiatives in the area of responsibility.”⁶² It is a forum where members of the CENTCOM staff, the country’s SC team and USACE meet to “align projects with theater strategy and provide oversight to the coordination of construction related resources.”⁶³ It is a great forum to validate project requirements; confirm that they are consistent with the security cooperation goals; and prevent possible obstacles to successful project completion because it encourages dialogue between key stakeholders very early in the project development process. The supporting USACE engineer division or perhaps even the supporting engineer district should participate in combatant command annual staff talks with host nation militaries in which USACE support may be required.

The most critical area of communication also happens to be the most challenging to effectively implement. This is the relationship between the Country Team SCO and the USACE element on the ground in the country. Unlike the other echelons, USACE presence in any particular country only lasts as long as there is a construction or engineering requirement. For this reason both parties are more challenged when it comes to understanding roles and responsibilities. This is particularly true in countries where USACE has had very little presence in the past. Often the SCO staffs do not understand the role of USACE is or the rules that apply when it comes to construction contracting. USACE must engage and communicate with the SCO early and often. USACE must clearly articulate the nature and scope of work they are undertaking in the host nation. The communication continues with the education of the SCO staffs about USACE, about contracting rules that USACE must comply with, and what "project

funded" staff implies".⁶⁴ This should be followed by a confirmation brief. As the CENTCOM Engineer pointed out "USACE should give a brief that confirms they understand the mission in country and cross walk their project to the mission"⁶⁵ with the SCO staff.

The SCO are instrumental in enabling USACE to gain an appreciation about the country and environment in which they operate. The SCO understands the country, the U.S strategic goals, knows the key host nation players and how to operate effectively inside the host nation. The SCO is positioned to ensure that USACE efforts are in concert with other U.S. government efforts in the host nation. USACE must understand the objectives of security cooperation in the country in order to ensure that its actions are consistent with the objectives. USACE personnel on the ground must be cognizant of the fact that while they are "working on behalf of the customer funding the project", which is not typically the U.S. embassy or not necessarily in the country, "they must work with the customer's surrogates on the embassy staff" and strive to "accommodate their ideas."⁶⁶

In countries where USACE presence is not common, steps should be taken to formalize the roles and responsibilities. For example, USCENTCOM takes the additional step of codifying the requirements in a Program Management Plan signed by the USACE Engineer District, key [Combatant Command] Directorates and Embassy personnel including the Ambassador.⁶⁷ The plan "establishes USACE's requirements and incorporates U.S. Embassy requirements to meet its foreign policy objectives."⁶⁸

Having gained a shared understanding of USACE capabilities and limitations it is important to sustain the relationship. This is best accomplished by ensuring all parties

maintain a common understanding of project status and the current host nation situation. USACE must ensure they keep key personnel on the SCO staff informed.

Improved communication between stakeholders contributes to cooperation and the comprehensive approach to SC. A coordinated approach is difficult to achieve because of the complexities associated with the applicable authorities. Given that it is not likely that Congress will re-vamp the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, there must be a way to improve the process and further research should explore this possibility. As pointed out in this paper, Congress enacted Section 1206 and 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act which grants the Department of Defense the authority to spend funds for the purpose of “global training and equipping” of foreign militaries and stability operations in support of foreign militaries. This was done to enable the Department of Defense to more rapidly execute some SC activities. Research should be done to determine if it is practical to expand the authority thus expanding the streamlined capability of the DoD, or move the funding over to the Department of State. At issue is whether or not this expanded authority undermines the Secretary of State’s legal responsibility for foreign policy⁶⁹ and contributes occasionally to uncoordinated conflicting actions between DoS and DoD (see Chad example above). This research could serve to expand awareness of the complexities surrounding the implementation of SC and spur efforts to simplify the process. Regardless, SC will continue to be a critical instrument of the DoD in the changing strategic environment and era of shrinking resources. Its key stakeholders, including USACE, will strive to use this tool to advance U.S. national security objectives.

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