Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations: A New Paradigm
Abstract
Military intelligence often fails to provide commanders and policymakers with an effective understanding of complex counterinsurgency (COIN) environments. This failure stems in great part from a failure to deliver holistic, fused analysis.2 Most analyses of complex environments are derived from a systems analysis model that artificially deconstructs both the environment and the people and groups within that environment. Treating complex environments, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, as a system that can be broken into simply labeled component parts leads analysts to make unhelpful and logically unsound assumptions regarding human identity. These assumptions, in turn, undermine analytic effectiveness. Instead of fusing available information in a way that accurately reflects the inherently complex shades-of-gray ground truth, military analysts influenced by systems analysis and conventional military doctrine often channel their thinking and efforts into three artificially color-coded categories: red, white, and green.3 These colors represent, respectively, the enemy, the population, and the host nation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA562681
Entities
People
- Ben Connable
Organizations
- RAND Corporation