Relevance of Armor in Counterinsurgency Operations
Abstract
Since the end of the Second World War most modern armies have been conventionally structured and equipped to fight high-intensity conflicts against like-armed nations. There also have been many low-intensity conflicts in which similarly equipped nations found themselves engaged. In response to these low-intensity conflicts, nations employed the forces available to them, which were generally armored and mechanized in nature. The result of these conflicts have made the relevance of heavy armor, specifically the tank on the asymmetric battlefield, a point of contention for the last half century. This prompts the following question: How were conventionally equipped, heavy tank forces employed in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and why were they successful or unsuccessful? Specific examples are French COIN operations in Indochina; the United States' involvement in Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq; Canadian operations in Afghanistan; and the Russian Federation's combat in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Each case study will discuss the situation and threat faced, the tactics used by the COIN force, modifications to either vehicles or doctrine to better respond to the threat, and the ultimate determination of either success or failure of the tank in the conflict. The results of this study are that the combined arms team provides the commander with a lethal and capable force. The initiative is gained by commanders who seek the nonconventional employment of armor despite the situation or terrain. Task organized units or units that train with different branches enjoy greater success with less friction than units task organized under fire. Lastly, units possessing a more deployable package have a greater initial effect on the battlefield.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 08, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA562878
Entities
People
- Douglas F. Baker
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College