United States' Grand Strategy through the Lens of Lebanon in 1983 and Iraq in 2003

Abstract

The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in 2003 to achieve its political objectives. While there are many reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified manner to achieve its goals. This paper outlines four key indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, the paper reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles to implement grand strategies.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 08, 2012
Accession Number
ADA562890

Entities

People

  • Charles P. Bris-bois Iii

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • C4I
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Space

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Civil War
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of State
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • International Organizations
  • Military History
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Second World War
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Strategic Security Studies