

IMPROVING GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY IN THE EYES OF ITS PEOPLE

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General Studies

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

IMPROVING GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY IN THE EYES OF ITS PEOPLE, by
Major Khoshhal Sadat, 86 pages

After the 11 September attack, the United States and the international community helped to create an Afghan government that can serve its people. 10 years later there are significant shortfalls in the performance of the Afghan government. As the year 2014 gets closer and the support of the international community will be reduced, it is absolutely vital for Afghanistan to have its three branches functioning as they supposed to be. This study will provide insight into potential deficiencies in the process of checks and balances and how these deficiencies have given an illegitimate face to the government of Afghanistan. This paper examines the successful president Ramon Magsaysay of Philippines during years 1953 – 1957 and president Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia since August 2010 – present. Operational and strategic-level leaders can learn several lessons from the largely successful efforts of Presidents Magsaysay and Santos in institutionalizing systemic reforms and instilling legitimacy into their government systems. Finally, this thesis makes recommendations on how the government of Afghanistan can address these growing and complex problems

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This thesis is encouraged by a belief that I can make a difference by contributing to the wealth of thoughts and ideas already examined with regards to Afghan government improving its legitimacy through the eyes of its people. This subject has been considered and discussed by many, to achieve this in Afghanistan has always seemed just beyond accomplishment. Perhaps one more thought or idea will make a difference.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Afghan student from Kabul University recently told a prominent think-tank that, “Unfortunately the power lies in the hands of those who are deaf to the opinions of the people.”

— International Council on Security and Development

Background

The constitution of Afghanistan was established in 2004. It consists of one hundred sixty articles. It is a framework between the people, their representatives, and the government. Chapter three, Article 60 of the Afghan constitution describes the president’s role, duties and responsibilities. Chapter four, Article 75 describes the roles and functions of the Afghan government ministers and heads of organizations. Chapter five, Article Ninety describes the power of the Afghan National Assembly [congress]. Chapter five describes the roles, functions and powers of the Judiciary system. Each one of these chapters in the constitution has various paragraphs that highlight checks and balances in duties and actions of the President, Cabinet members, Judiciary branch, and members the Afghan National Assembly. However, seven years after the ratification of the Afghan constitution, certain organizations of the government are not complying in accordance with the constitution of the Afghanistan. There are indications of prejudice, corruption and incompetence in the Afghan government. The people of Afghanistan see a hope and change in their life with a continuing support of the international community. But, coming to 2014 and the reduction of the international community’s help will lessen the people’s hope on trusting their government. To this end, this paper will address the

following: The importance of leadership in providing the right to its people, the lack of checks and balances currently existing in the Afghans systems, and propose an institutionalized reform in the Afghan government system in order to restrict the ability of fraud.

Problem Statement

One of the key problems in Afghanistan today is that the government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people and the international community. Some writers claim that the legitimacy problem lies with the credibility of the current president. Other writers claim that because of their society and culture Afghans simply cannot be governed. However, little to no serious study has considered practical ways to improve accountability by improving the system that already exists. This paper seeks feasible and practical ways to import the accountability of the Afghan government to the people. Specifically, this paper will study the successful President Ramon Magsaysay of Philippines during years 1953–1957 and President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia since August 2010–present.

Operational and strategic-level leaders can learn several lessons from the largely successful efforts of Presidents Magsaysay and Santos in institutionalizing systemic reforms and instilling legitimacy into their government systems.

Significance of the Study

The government of Afghanistan has had a significant amount of support from the international community. As 2014 gets closer and the support of the international community will be reduced, it is absolutely vital for Afghanistan to have its three

branches of government functioning as they are supposed to be. This study will provide insight into potential deficiencies in the process of checks and balances and how these deficiencies have given an illegitimate face to the government of Afghanistan.

Delimitation

This study will only focus on the current faults and deficiencies in the government system of Afghanistan. While this study's conclusion may be related to the individuals in the Afghan government, they will not be evaluated in this study.

Scope

This study will look at the Afghan law and constitution performances in the past seven years. Additionally, it will look the current deficiencies currently existing in the Afghan government system. This study will focus on the future role of the three branches of the government.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Many authors have already written about ways to improve legitimacy of government in the eyes of its people and the world. Further, a number of scholars have studied Columbia, Philippines, and separately scholars have written about the importance of legitimacy. Nevertheless, a gap exists, because no literature explores how the experiences of the government of Columbia and Philippines developed accountability measures to improve legitimacy nor have they drawn lessons that might inform current efforts to improve governance in countries like Afghanistan. The following literature review represents the knowledge pertinent to this study; namely, studies build upon existing knowledge, especially, this review will focus on existing studies that consider legitimacy in the governments of Columbia and the Philippines. To understand the pertinent literature, we must examine the theoretical context within which this literature exists.

Theory of government legitimacy through accountability

Government derives its legitimacy in many different ways. In the book titled *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin suggests that if a government can establish mechanisms and institutions to ensure accountability to the people, then a government will enjoy increased legitimacy. This study coins the term “theory of government legitimacy through accountability” and claims that it is the theory that underpins the entire study. Simply put, this theory claims

that if a government can establish a sufficient degree of accountability to its people, then it will enjoy a proportionate amount of legitimacy. Even if citizens are unable to control governments by obliging them to follow mandates, citizens may be able to do so if they can induce the obligations to anticipate that they will have to render accounts for their past actions. Governments are accountable if voters can distinguish whether governments are acting in the voters' interest and can sanction them appropriately¹. In general, the book focuses on the role of elections, the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament, and also between the government and the people.

Other authors recognize the critical link between accountability and legitimacy. In the book titled *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy* by Bruce Gilley, describes the nature of how different countries are seen as legitimate in the eyes of the world and their people. Gilley describes legitimacy, then, is a particular type of political support that is grounded in common good or shared moral evaluations². This book also analyses the various types of legitimacies that exist in the world. Gilley shows the contrast between the most and least legitimate countries in the world and argues the reasons behind it.

Various authors have studied the opposite side of the governments' legitimacy where leaders have gained power through force and brutality. In the book titled *Theories of Tyranny from Plato to Arendt*, Roger Boesche examines the history of tyrannical forms leadership and governance. Boesche studies the various leaders in the history of Europe

¹Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 40.

²Bruce Gilley, *The Right to Rule: How states Win and Lose Legitimacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 5

that ruled with tyranny which was then believed to be a theory of legitimate form of governance. In his book Roger Boesche begins with explaining the theory of tyranny defined by many scholars. The ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, Tacitus of the Roman Empire, French politician de Tocqueville, the German philosophers Karl Marx, Max Weber and Hannah Arendt are all examined. In essence they all defined tyranny as power held by individuals who unhesitatingly break through traditional moral boundaries in an attempt to initiate a new order of governance by extraordinary political action. Aristotle describes tyranny as “the rulers govern only by their own private interest, and then they pervert the proper purpose of government.” Tyranny is a power held by one person without legitimate constitutional authority with no judgment about his quality as a person or ruler. Boesche concludes with discussion on existence of tyranny throughout the history of mankind and points out that from the days of monarchy and absolutism, Hitler, Stalin, Saddam Hussein and genocide in Africa, tyranny is one of the theories that govern people.

The accountability–legitimacy theory does indeed apply to Afghanistan, however, it usually is only seen at the local level. A journal article discussing the history and legal aspects of the tribal system in Afghanistan was written by Bernt Glatzer, published in 2002, New Delhi, India “The Pashtun Tribal System.” The article describes various characteristics and customs of the Afghan tribes that centered on their local leader commonly known as “Khan.” It is generally known that tribes are influenced and controlled by their local leaders. Glatzer believes that the tribal system is not the only

structured principle of a tribal society. In Afghanistan the tribal system is a component within a much more complex social and political network.³

United States policy in Afghanistan relies on installing legitimacy in the Afghan government, in his 2009 speech in United States Military Academy at West Point, concerning the way forward in Afghanistan, American President Barack Obama said “We will support Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. The days of providing a blank check are over. So it can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.”⁴

In summary, scholars such as Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, Bernard Manin, Bruce Gilley, Roger Boesche and Bernt Glatzer have written extensively about legitimacy, government and accountability. It is useful to apply their research for the Afghanistan because in essence, it is one of the major problems currently existing there.

Practical application of theory of government legitimacy through accountability

This theory was previously applied in various countries in the world. In Columbia the government of President Juan Manual Santos practiced the concept of establishing legitimacy in the eyes of its people through accountability. Similarly, during 1950s in the Philippines, President Ramon Magsaysay had successfully practiced and applied this theory.

³Bernt Glatzer, *The Pashtun Tribal System* (New Delhi, India: Concept Publishers, 2002), 265-282.

⁴Jesse Lee, “The New Way Forward-The President's Address,” www.whitehouse.gov (accessed 23 October 2011).

Colombia

An outstanding source that provides an enormous amount of information on the Colombian government initiative against its legitimacy problems is the book titled, *Inside Columbia: Drugs, Democracy and War*, written by Grace Livingstone. In his book Grace Livingstone explains how the government of Colombia confronted the worst economic crisis in its history, which limits its capacity to solve its problems at a time in which violence was being fed by drug trafficking.

This book begins by providing an in-depth history of the catastrophe in Colombia, which has seen more than forty years of unrest, conflict, and civil war. He continues to explain the political climate changes both in Columbia and internationally. Livingstone also describes the population's disappointment with the peace process and the government initiative to crack down on the violence. The majority of the book concentrates on the role of the leadership of the Colombian government, United States support and the planning for the defeat of the guerillas involved in the drugs trade and violence. In his visit to Columbia in 1999, Livingstone examined the situation of the Colombian people and why they are involved growth of cocaine, which ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the government. Finally, Grace Livingstone reviews the role of the United States in supporting the government of Columbia, its armed force, and the operations against the violence and the guerillas.

Livingstone's book, like others about Colombia are good but, lack a focus on most important thing: legitimacy stemming from because of accountability. Like Afghanistan, Colombia has had similar problems with the elements in the government complacent with anti-government drug dealers and rebel groups.

In September 2010, The United States Institute of Peace published a report “*Cautious Optimism for Peace in Colombia*” written by Virginia M. Bouvier, describes the various aspects of internal and regional tensions related to the government of Colombia. The report talks about the existence of Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces-People’s Army (FARC-EP) and their activities inside and outside Colombia mainly in the neighboring country Venezuela where the tensions were heightened between the two governments. The reports main focus is the Colombian government policy after the election of President Juan Manuel Santos, where he moved towards bringing changes in his government, took strong military actions against the government opposing forces and in meant time opened the doors of negotiations. The report also touches upon the Colombian and Venezuelan government relationship, where President Santos moved towards dialogue with Venezuelan President Chaves.

The Peace Report concludes with highlighting a number of spots where the Colombian government has improved and has not improved, however, this report does not relate any Colombian drug trafficking, government corruption and other serious issues that similarly exist in countries like Afghanistan where these lessons can be applied.

Another useful source in regards to current situation and the government of Colombia is an online video of President Juan Manuel Santos conversations with the Council on Foreign relations, recorded on September 2010. President Santos begins with brief explanations of the Colombian government’s efforts against drug traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitaries. He describes the recent past years of bringing changes and his emphasis of his priorities where he concentrated on security, and service to his

people, he also describes his difficulties with bringing changes to policy and government agendas. President Santos refers to his country “in the verge of being a failed state” prior to the visit from US President Bill Clinton. He answers one of the questions regarding corruption in his government with his decisions on bringing to justice hundreds of military and parliament members who were involved in illegal activities. He described the situation as a “hit on the Colombian center of gravity which is legitimacy.” President Santos concluded with confirming the existence of problems with the Colombian government and justice systems that are also witnessed in other countries.

The video of Council on Foreign Relations gave a good perspective of how much Colombia is important to the United States foreign policy, President Santos answers to all the questions were fascinatingly detailed and understanding, however, none of the participants, nor president Santos related the Colombian governments initiatives and experiences can be learned and applied to the contemporary problems that exists in Afghanistan.

A good source with regards to studying the case of problems within Colombia and its government initiatives is *Colombia, breaking the grip? Obstacle to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia*. This report is produced by the Human Rights Watch/ Americas. It begins with describing the violent history of paramilitary forces in Colombia and their relevance other South American countries, where the paramilitary forces supported by the drug traffickers undermine the legitimacy and power of the Colombian government, using violence and executions of government officials.

The report mainly focuses on assessing the Colombian government and its Supreme Court’s progress towards breaking the influence and uncovering the truth about

paramilitary's crimes and networks as well as progress in investigating paramilitary infiltration of the Colombian Congress and many serious obstacles towards progress. It goes further in the relationship between the government of United States and Colombia with regard to the justice department in Colombia and involvement of the officials in illegal activities.

The report concludes with highlighting the existing challenges with regard to justice and involvement of Colombian officials, and, recommendations for the US Congress, US Justice Department and international community to explore all possible avenues for holding the paramilitary commanders accountable not only for their drug trafficking crimes but also their human rights abuses in Colombia. However, this report does not link the information that can be compared to the current situation in Afghanistan, where there are numerous cases of Afghan official involved with illegal activities.

An outstanding source of firsthand knowledge and facts about the paramilitary groups, guerrillas, Drugs dealers, political and military catastrophe in Colombia is a book called: *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia*, written by Steven Dudley. This book describes the detailed nature of paramilitaries working closely with Colombian military personnel to bring change to the country which Dudley describes "the longest civil war in western hemisphere."

Dudley highlights his experience whilst embedded with various paramilitary and guerrilla groups who fight the government as well as each other over the drug business. It also highlights the creation of FARC and, the establishments of the Patriotic Union Party

(UP) which was created after decades of civil war, trying to gain the support of the people while thousands of their members get assassinated.

The majority of the book focuses on the history of this heavily violent stories of paramilitary groups and their attempts to force the people to join their groups by assassinating some of the officials and leaders to demonstrate their strength as well as bring the FARC's message to the cities and preparing the path for growing a guerrilla army.

Finally, Dudley reviews the history of US support to Colombia. He highlights the US government aid since 1960s to help fight against the Colombian insurgency and communism. Steven Dudley's firsthand experience book has interesting stories to read however, it does not give any analysis of the situation that lessons from that can be drawn and applied to other countries like Afghanistan's violent experience with extremists groups such as: Taliban, Haqqani, Drug dealer and, Local Warlords.

A research report that studies the Latin American countries written by June S. Beittel, published in March 2011 *Congressional Research Service* titled "Colombia: Issues for Congress," reviews the status of the Colombian government under the leadership of President Juan Manuel Santos. The report begins with a brief history of internal conflict in Colombia; it explains the roots of conflict and the creation of the paramilitary groups such as (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN).

The report continues to explain the detailed global drugs trade within and the external links to Colombia such as Venezuela and Ecuador. It also looks at political relationship between Venezuelan, Ecuadoran and Colombian governments, now and prior to election of President Santos. The reports also highlights the performances of

Colombian government from 2002–2010 with focus on how much development has taken place since the US Policy has been mandated by congress, particularly the Plan-Colombia, US-Colombia Defense agreement and Human rights development programs.

Finally, Beittel discusses a number of remaining concerns and challenges that exist in Colombia, such as the ongoing scandal involving paramilitary ties to Colombian politicians and the allegations of human rights abuses by the FARC and ELN, paramilitary groups, and the Colombian Armed Forces.

Such issues of politicians' involvement with drug dealers also exist in Afghanistan; however Beittel's report does not suggest any experiences that can be applied to Afghanistan where the United States government and military is heavily involved in helping the Afghan government to stand its own.

A good source of information about Colombia is the Country Studies website. This website contains the on-line versions of books previously published in hard copy by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress as part of the Country Studies/Area Handbook Series sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Army between 1986 and 1998. Each study offers a comprehensive description and analysis of the country or region's historical setting, geography, society, economy, political system, and foreign policy.

In the Country Studies, Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, editors of *Colombia: A Country Study*, describes the history of Colombia since the Spanish Conquest in 1200 B.C until, 1998. Important to this thesis is the information provided in the links titled: Collapse of the Democratic System: 1946-58, *The Rojas Pinilla Dictatorship, Administration and Finance, Drugs and Society, Inflation and*

Unemployment, and, finally Political Dynamics, provide useful information about the Colombian political system since mid-nineteenth century.

A useful source on information regarding the human rights in the world is the Human Rights Watch website. This website provides various reports, pictures and audio reports on human rights activities around the world. Important to this thesis, the website provided a comprehensive report about human rights abuse and other similar related events that took place in Colombian during 2011.

The report begins with describing the brutalities and attacks by FARC, paramilitaries and Colombian armed forces against the human rights defenders, journalists, community leaders, trade unionists, indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders, is frequently witnessed. It also highlights the initiatives taken by President Santos in response to such acts, by promoting a legislation to restore land to displaced persons and compensate victims of abuses by state agents, publicly voiced respect for an independent judiciary, and denounced threats against human rights defenders.

The report concludes with highlighting the United States government initiatives with regard to enforcing the human rights condition on the Colombian government's judicial system to take strict actions against individuals involved in human rights abuse.

Philippines

In the book titled *The Ramon Magsaysay Story*, Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray describe how President Ramon Magsaysay tackled the challenges in his country. The book is mostly focused on the life and personality of President Ramon Magsaysay, but it also touches on how he tackled the challenges in his country. The book begins with an in-depth description of President Magsaysay's childhood and teenage life where he

studied at school and also worked in a mechanic shop to earn money for his family. The book examines more details on how President Magsaysay rose from a junior officer to a political career starting as the governor of Zambales province, then a congressman and later appointed as the Secretary of Defense for Comprehensive Strategy and Initiative to defeat the Philippines guerrillas.

The book demonstrates how Ramon Magsaysay took clever steps and became the President of Philippines. Developing the armed forces of his country, gaining respect of his people and, building strong relationship with the United States helped Ramon Magsaysay win elections and become the President of Philippines. Important to this thesis is the facts about President Ramon Magsaysay's actions in reforming his government. He took strong actions against government corruption, implemented a well thought out civil-military strategy against communist guerillas which ultimately created a favorable environment to help the population. It is also important to note the disruption and removal of communism was in the interest of the United States. By helping their strong ally President Ramon Magsaysay, the United States was able to achieve its goal.

Like many other writers, such as Romulo and Gray's book focused on the leadership and life of President Ramon Magsaysay and problems that existed in Philippines. However, one significant shortcoming in the book is a failure to discuss any lessons that can be learned and applied to the problems that currently exist in Afghanistan.

Another source of vital information for this thesis is the paper written by Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, *A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines - 1946-1955*. This thesis discusses the Philippine government on the verge of

collapse by a well-organized, popularly supported, communist insurgency known as the Hukbalahap. The writer explains the Philippine government's anti-Hukbalahap policies failed until the appointment president of Ramon Magsaysay. Philippine people were frustrated by a string of uncaring and corrupt governments that showed little concern for its people while the communist insurgents were growing and taking advantage from that situation. Major Greenberg's paper also discovers what steps were taken by the governments of the Philippines with military and political assistance from the United States.

Major Greenberg's Paper concludes, with highlighting the leadership and guidance of President Ramon Magsaysay achieved victory over the Huk guerrillas, and made Philippines government and military deeply devoted to their nation.

Like many authors, Greenberg describes how important a country's leadership is while faced with crucial internal challenges such as insurgency and corruption. Nonetheless, his analysis can be applied to the current leadership shortcomings that exist in the Afghan government.

Another tremendous resource for this thesis, providing a political insight in the Philippines was a book titled, *Illusion of influence: The Political Policy of United States-Philippines relations* written by Nick Cullather. In the first few chapters Cullather describes the Philippines moving from a colony to a "client state." It begins from the Japanese invasion of the Philippines Islands and the involvement of United States during World War II. Throughout the initial chapter Cullather describes the US government and military plans and activities in Philippines such as building air and naval bases for the US

forces during the World War II, while lesser attention was paid toward building governance.

After the first few chapters, Cullather begins to focus on building a government that will become a long lasting strategic ally in that region, where Ramon Magsaysay, a talented individual and loyal to the United States becomes in the center of attention. Cullather uncovers Magsaysay's previous relationship between the US military and, later with the CIA that helped him win the presidential elections. Cullather argues that President Magsaysay was one of the mostly liked presidents in Washington, due to his good leadership and strong alliance with the United States.

Finally, Cullather continues by stating that the presence of United States military bases in Philippines and making Ramon Magsaysay had helped both sides achieve their goals. Philippines used the American assistance to develop their political and economic systems while the United States kept their military bases.

Like many authors, Nick Cullather described the importance of strategic relationship and having ally country strong with loyal leadership that respects the strategic interests of the United States in the region. However, the book does not discuss any lessons that can be applied for the current situation in Afghanistan where the United States has military bases and, it is faced with insurgency and corruption problems.

An outstanding source of information about the history of the Philippines Huk guerrilla movement is a book called *The Huk Rebellion* written by Benedict J. Kerkvliet. This book describes the history and creation of the Huk guerrillas in the Philippines. It begins with describing the original birthplace of the Huk guerrillas that started in central Luzon province of Philippines and slowly rooted into the various parts of the country.

The book also describes the geographical challenges and complications in Philippines that isolated the central government's reach to its people, and the popularity of the Huk rebels amongst the populace.

Kerkvliet focuses mostly on the Huk's origination and how local peasants began to rebel. He also describes the internal land disputes that involved corruption of the government members and powerful individuals in Philippines. One of the known characters who were known to be abusing his position and breaking the law for their advantage was Former Philippines revolutionary General Manuel Tinio.

The book concludes, in 1930s the government of Philippines adopted various laws that were supposed to resolve the problems of the peasant in order to contain the expansion of the HUK rebel, but it was seen too weak in the eyes of its people and did not have much International Community support due to the existing threats and conflicts in the Pacific.

Benedict J. Kerkvliet like many other authors explains the reasons behind the rise of anti-government movements in Philippines and the shortfalls in the governments system. However, this study has not been compared to the situation in Afghanistan, where lack of the government the rural areas of the country is one of the reasons that insurgents take advantage from and gain the support of the population.

Afghanistan

Mohamed Ali Jalali, highlights Afghanistan's prolonged insecurity, warlordism, and factional infighting results in a widespread Afghan public desire for a strong central

government that can provide security⁵. Establishment of legitimate governance is essential for development of security and economic growth. Traditional legitimacy through a tribal system is what Afghanistan has relied on for centuries to govern itself. But, today the traditional tribal system of government has proven inadequate. For example: a disgruntled group that the traditional system didn't accommodate would take up arms outside the system and oppose the local government, that group was later reconciled or dealt with appropriately by law. Long ago that would have caused only a local level instability. However, today such issue could lead to far broader insurgency and transnational terrorist movement.

An outstanding source of information about the Afghan – Soviet war in Afghanistan is the book titled *Charlie Wilson's War*, written by George Crile. In his book Crile describe the situation of the Afghans who were adamant in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The book begins with the story of American Congressman from Texas Charlie Wilson who provides tremendous amount of supports for the CIA covert teams to arm the Afghan Mujahedeen.

The majority of the book concentrates on Charlie Wilson's character and his relations with the Pakistani leadership President Zia Ul Haq and the providing the resources, arms and finance for the Afghan Mujahedeen.

Goerge Crile concludes with the stories of the Soviets defeat in Afghanistan and also Congressman Charlie Wilson's life in the United States. Although it is a good source

⁵Ali A. Jalali, "Future of Afghanistan," *Parameters* (Spring), <http://www.carlisle.army.mil> (accessed 24 October 2011).

of understanding how the Soviet war and the CIA covert missions that supported the Afghans religious and tribal leaders through the government and Army of Pakistan. However it doesn't provide any insight about results of the conflict that ultimately created further problems for bringing better governance and legitimacy in Afghanistan.

A good source that provides an enormous amount of information about the history of the local government system in Afghanistan is the book titled: *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, written by Hasan Kawun Kakar. In his book Kakar explains how the three past governments operated and ruled the country, while involved internally with the tribal conflicts and also the incursion of two superpowers of the time Britain and Russia.

This book starts by providing an in-depth history of Amir Abdul Rahman, the ruler of Afghanistan's government system in 1880- 1901. He continues to explain the traditional rule of the tribes in central and local government. Throughout the history it has been known that two major tribes, Durani and Ghilzai from southern Afghanistan have ruled the over Afghanistan. These two most important tribal confederations who, more than all other ethnic groups put together in Afghanistan, influence the course of political events⁶. The majority of the book concentrates on various aspects of social and political structures in Afghanistan, such as Ministries, Judicial systems, local governments, military, law enforcement, village policing, taxation, revenue, and the history of Afghan people and their social structures. Finally Kakar reviews the history of Afghan government systems and its effectiveness on people despite external threats.

⁶Hasan Kawun Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan* (Austin: University of Texas Press, October 27 1980).

A beneficial source that provides detailed information about the government and corruption in Afghanistan is the USAID report titled “*Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan*” conducted by Ernest Leonardo and Dr. Lawrence Robertson in March 2009. This report mainly focuses on the analysis of anti-corruption laws, policies and regulations of the government of United States and Afghanistan.

The report’s primary focus is on the organizations and branches of the Afghan government that are tainted in a widespread corruption. For example the extensive involvements of Afghan National Police in taking bribes which is ultimately impacting the lives of the people and therefore not supporting the central government.

The final portion of the USAID report provides a series of recommendations that can assist the anti-corruption initiatives in Afghanistan, for example: Standing up the office of Oversight to partner and coordinate with the government of Afghanistan with regards to anti-corruption issues.

This report gives us a good insight on corruption in Afghanistan; however it does not provide any examples of other countries like Colombia and Philippines that managed to tackle similar issues.

Important to this thesis is an understanding of the current government system and the situation in Afghanistan. As the United States and international community have over a hundred thousand troops fighting against Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, as well as helping to build the capacity of Afghan government and security forces, an excellent examination of this enterprise is found in “*Karzai: the Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan*” written by Boston University professor Nick B. Mills. In the first few chapters of the book professor Mills describes the background, education

and personality of Hamid Karzai. Mills first met with Karzai in 1987 in Peshawar, Pakistan where he was member of the Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF) engaged in the struggle to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.

After the first few chapters Mills begins to focus on the fall of the Taliban regime after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States and the presidency of Hamid Karzai from the day he was appointed as the interim leader of the Afghan government until his second term of presidency. In the chapter “Building a New Afghanistan” Mills shows how the United States and the international community on June 10, 2002, helped president Karzai and other influential tribal leaders gather under a huge tent to form the constitution of Afghanistan. It also highlights the frictions between various tribal leaders. Finally, Mills discusses by stating the progresses, promises and the problems that have been made during the presidency of Hamid Karzai. He highlights the production of poppy, corruption and incapability in the Afghan government, deaths of Afghan civilians by misguided bombing by Coalition forces and insurgents that has created lack of trust between people and government and turned Afghan public opinion against Western governments trying to help the country rebuild.⁷

Both writers Hasan Kawun Karak and Nick Mills have provided helpful information about the history and types of leadership and traditions of governance in Afghanistan, but, they have not talked about the theory of legitimacy that gave the leaders power, how they established accountability and how their governments were seen in the eyes of its people.

⁷Nick B. Mills, *Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan* (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2007).

Summary

While many authors have written about improving government legitimacy in eyes of its people, no literature exists that compared the challenges that existed faced the governments of Colombia and Philippines to the current situation in Afghanistan. This paper builds upon research about government legitimacy in the eyes of its people.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter will discuss the facts and challenges that existed in Colombia prior to the nomination of President Juan Manuel Santos and in the Philippines prior to inauguration of President Ramon Magsaysay. Both Colombia and the Philippines went through long periods of internal strife generated largely by government corruption and inefficiency followed by successful efforts to improve the government that generally eliminated the strife. This chapter will analyze these facts in an attempt to understand and compare those challenges to the current situation in Afghanistan. While attempting to compare the Colombia and Philippines challenges to Afghanistan, this chapter will also describe the strategic importance of these countries for the United States government foreign policy.

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Colombia

The aim of this study is to focus on the challenges that existed between the anti-government guerrilla elements and the government of Colombia, mainly focusing on the recent initiatives taken by the President Juan Manuel Santos with regards to delivering better governance and combating corruption in order to gain its legitimacy in the eyes of its people.

Colombia has been historically known to have challenges in its government and ability to confront corruption, narcotics growth and trafficking. The Colombian government itself was one of the main reasons for the problems of that country. Starting with the violent transfer of power that occurred in 1946 people started to lose trust in the government. A democratically elected administration had become repressive and dictatorial.⁸ The two main political parties, Conservatives and Liberals, gravitated towards violence in order to gain power. This gravitation disrupted the government's job. Instead of serving its people through routine governance it was forced to tackle domestic violence and political clashes. Under the leadership of Rojas Pinilla in 1954, government corruption reached its highest level. Pinilla ran his government in a very dictatorial way. He arrested and jailed those who were struggling to bring freedom or question Pinilla's performance. These techniques became tools that anti-government guerrilla groups could use to their advantage and gain populace support.

In the early 1940s and 1950s communism and socialism had taken root in the Latin America as a voice for the poor landless and working class in their struggle against

⁸Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, "Colombia: A Country Study," <http://countrystudies.us/colombia/21.htm> (accessed 22 January 2012).

the rich land and business owner elite. The 1959 Marxist revolution in Cuba led by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara would fan the flames of discontent over exclusionary politics in Colombia and the rest of Latin America.⁹

There were several guerrilla groups that formed in Colombia during this turbulent time; one of them was the *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia* or FARC which still exists. FARC had become a strong guerrilla group at the beginning of 1960s. As part of the Latin American pro-democracy initiative called “Alliance of Progress” by President John F. Kennedy, the U.S. provided aid and military assistance to Colombia.¹⁰ The Colombian government and armed forces launched operations against these guerrilla groups which ended with success, although most of the Communist rebels and guerrillas escaped. In the 1970s FARC became a larger guerrilla organization and managed to gain a hold and control areas where the Colombian government lacked a presence. In order to continue their operation they generated money by kidnapping government officials and wealthy people, as well as the dealing of narcotics.

During the presidency of Julio Cesar Turbay in Colombia in 1978 – 1982, there were various challenges to the government. The most significant was a lack of accountability in his administration as well as his regime being undermined by the FARC. The government of Colombia’s control in the vast unpopulated areas in the eastern regions of Colombia was weak. Additionally, the government lacked the consent of the people, had a weak system of rule of law and nonexistent social contract between

⁹Steven Dudley, *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 7.

¹⁰Dudley, 10.

the government and the people. Government human rights violations were rampant and every entity in Colombia with even the smallest amount of organization took the law into their own hands. The widely held belief amongst the people of Columbia was that the violent anti-government guerrillas would succeed.¹¹

In 1980s the FARC continued to grow and undermine government strength. A review of FARC operations during the 1990s suggests that the FARC was implementing the strategic plan created at its Seventh Conference.¹² Colombian analysts believe that the strategic objectives of the FARC were to take control of the narcotics growing regions in the southern and eastern parts of Colombia in order to gain resources and enable their operations second, to expand their operations throughout Colombia and challenge the government to spread its military so they wouldn't be able to conduct decisive operations, and finally, isolate the Colombian capital Bogota and sever its communication lines with outside and submit them to surrender. The FARC reached the point where they were able to mass up to 150 guerrillas in one engagement, take over entire towns by force, and challenge the military directly in small scale platoon and company combat operations. This was a significant change from their hit and run and ambush tactics of the previous decade. They continued to try and hold their power through kidnapping and assassinations of many government officials and political party members, but soon

¹¹Marco Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia 1875-2002* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

¹²"Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and all Its Implications for Regional Stability" (Monograph, RAND Corporation, 2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339.html (accessed 22 January 2012).

learned that, the murder lots of people eliminated any legitimate political space that may have become available for them.

In the 1970s Colombia was the biggest drug producer in the world and that was a result of the high demand in the United States. With the arrival of American dollars to the drug markets of Colombia, 50,000 Colombians including farmers, seasonal pickers, transporters, guards, and bankers started to get involved in drugs business.¹³ As the drug business grew bigger and richer, the risk of becoming enmeshed in the drugs trade was increased. Therefore government officials and security forces were hired plus bribed and became further involved in the drugs trade furthering the corruption of the government. The number of kidnappings and assassinations of government officials, wealthy people and violence between the drugs dealers continued to rise in Colombia.

In addition to corrupting the political and economic systems, narcotics trafficking generated a growing domestic drug problem. In the early 1980s, amongst Colombian youths an extensive addiction to a cheap type of drugs called “*basuco*” occurred. It was sold domestically because it was not export quality. It soon became popular in many cities and left hundreds of thousands of addicts in its wake, many suffering from permanent nervous disorders.

The United States had been providing counter-narcotics assistance to Colombia since the 1970s. However, in 1989 former US President H.W. Bush increased the aid to Colombian government for counter-narcotics operations through his “Andean

¹³Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, *Colombia: Drugs and Society* (Washington: The Library of Congress), <http://countrystudies.us/colombia/21.htm> (accessed 22 January 2012).

Initiative.”¹⁴ Still the narcotics production and trafficking was growing at a rapid pace. The United States was the main customer of most of the Colombian produced cocaine and marijuana.

In 1993, when US President Bill Clinton took office, funding for Colombia dropped in the first two years of his Administration’s budgets¹⁵ then began gradually increasing. The 1998 election of a new Colombian president, Andres Pastrana, resulted in the United States reevaluation of its policy and level of cooperation to Colombia. In August, 2000, President Clinton waived six of the seven (human rights) certification criteria on the grounds of U.S. national security and money and aid began to flow into Colombia. This aid was three times greater than before and, also provided assistance mandated by the US Congress to the government and law enforcement agencies of Colombia.¹⁶ That assistance included training and equipping of Colombian counter-narcotics Special Police and military units with organic enabling and helicopter capabilities. Still, with all the military and civilian support from the United States, the narcotics production, trafficking, and most importantly the violence was at a very high level.

In 2002 Alvaro Uribe became the 58th president of Colombia and took many positive steps toward bringing stability to Colombia. He pushed hard to declare the FARC as a terrorist organization in which he succeeded. As a result of that declaration

¹⁴Nina M. Serafino, *Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance FY1989-FY1999* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6573.pdf> (accessed 22 January 2012).

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 2.

US President George W. Bush authorized funds from Plan Colombia to be used against the FARC in counterterrorism initiatives, which included increasing the size of the Colombian military and police forces.¹⁷ In 2003 he launched a plan called the Democratic Security and Defense Policy, the two main objectives were to provide security to the people and eliminate the illegal narcotics trade in Colombia. The plan started to show progress when President Uribe dismissed a number of military officers and soldiers including Colombian Army General Montoya for a scandal in involving misconduct and human rights abuses.¹⁸

It is with the inauguration of President Juan Manuel Santos that reform and change greatly accelerates and marks the point where Colombia makes significant progress. His actions help show how the efforts of one man can result in significant change. The Colombian government and security forces continued dramatic changes when President Juan Manuel Santos was elected in August 2010 shortly after taking office President Juan Manuel Santos took Colombia in a different direction. He pledged to continue the successful security strategies of President Uribe while pursuing democratic, economic and, social reforms. He announced the launch of the National Consolidation Program intended to reduce violence as part of Colombia's security development plans in order to target areas that would be engines of Colombia's overall economic growth. These goals were established as part of a larger plan to create a

¹⁷Connie Veillette, "Colombia: Issues for Congress, The Uribe Administration, Service," <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32774.pdf> (accessed 24 January 2012).

¹⁸Simon Romero, "Colombian Army Commander Resigns in Scandal over Killing of Civilian," *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/world/americas/05colombia.html> (accessed 24 January 2012).

comprehensive government presence in former conflict and rural areas, to deter coca replanting after eradication, improve narcotics interdiction along Colombia's Pacific coastline and, more importantly provide alternative livelihoods for those people who are currently engaged in the drug trade.¹⁹ He focused on economic development, and passed the Employment and Formalization Law which facilitated the opportunity for domestic and international companies to help created 2.5 million jobs, formalized 500,000 informal jobs, and reduced annual unemployment. In order to clean the regime and show improvement to its people, he brought major changes to the system. He secured an anti-corruption law, land restitution law, and labor formalization laws. He has also mandated ministry reorganization and executive branch reform including dismantling the discredited Administrative Department of Security (DAS) intelligence service and, prosecuted the director for cooperating and sympathizing with guerrillas.

Human rights abuse by FARC, paramilitaries, and also some of the Colombian armed forces had also been one of the key challenges for decade. United Nation Human Rights Watch reported that during 2010 the number of attacks by armed actors and paramilitaries against human rights defenders, journalists, community leaders, trade unionists, indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders frequently occurred in Colombia.²⁰ President Santos also targeted these abuses for elimination. In a speech during "Statesman of the year" ceremony in the Canadian Council for the Americas, President Santos reiterated the importance of human rights in Colombia as a matter of personal

¹⁹June S. Beittel, "Colombia: Issues for Congress," <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf> (accessed 24 January 2012).

²⁰Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2011," <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2011.pdf> (accessed 24 January 2012).

interest. He promoted legislation to restore land to displaced persons and compensate victims of abuses by state agents, publicly voiced respect for an independent judiciary, and denounced threats against human rights defenders.²¹

History has shown that the United States foreign policy traditionally has focused on Europe during Cold War, and later with the threats from terrorism and Islamist fundamentalism in the Middle East, United States shown little interest in Latin American countries. In a speech at Brown University pointing out the traditional attitude of the US, President Juan Manuel Santos quoted former US President Richard Nixon, “Latin America doesn’t matter, people don’t give a damn about Latin America now, they don’t give one damn about it.”²² However, recently that has begun to change. After US President Bill Clinton’s visits to South America and creation of “Plan Colombia,” many positive changes occurred. With the help of United States, Colombia strengthened many of its institutions, Colombian Armed forces were trained, equipped, and became successful in the fight against the narcotics industry and challenges. The Colombian government improved its standards of performance in order to deliver to its people and, the justice system has been increasingly improved. President Santos built on these improvements and pursued a comprehensive strategy to build strong relationship with the international community. On August 2011, a free trade agreement was signed between Canada and Colombia, which began to open up markets for businesses in both countries.

²¹President Juan Manuel Santos: Statesman of the Year award from the Canadian Council for the Americas, (10:42), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iD4e9Uo8PwY> (accessed 24 January).

²²President Juan Manuel Santos, “Colombian President Urges U.S. to Look South, Speech at the Brown University,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VeIOrvT7R7o&feature=related> (accessed 17 January 2012).

In October 2011 Colombia and United States signed a free trade agreement intended to expand the two country's economic and developmental relationship. President Santos foreign relations policy has also been successful. He met with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, and discussed future relations with neighboring countries. Chavez agreed with President Santos that personal issues should remain irrelevant and both should agree on peace which is best for their people.

Looking back from today we see that Colombia had been in the verge of becoming a failed state where it could have posed a significant threat to the continent, especially the United States. President Juan Manuel Santos demonstrated strong leadership and honesty in his administration. He dismissed and prosecuted a number of government officials while his security forces have demonstrated how a strong justice system can gain the trust of its people.

In conclusion, Colombian provides a good example of a nation that had decades of problems with a corrupt internal political systems that resulted in a loss of confidence from the populace and consequent insurgency, narcotics production and trafficking. By having a leader like President Juan Manuel Santos, Colombia managed to reform its efforts against narcotics trade, by prosecution of those members the government and security forces who were involved in illegal activities and corruption, he was able to bring stability to his country.

Philippines

The aim of this case study is to discuss Philippine government initiatives against the HUK communist guerrillas, mainly focusing on Philippine president Ramon Magsaysay. In 1946 Philippines was faced with civil war. During that time hundreds of

thousands of Philippine armed forces fought against approximately 25,000 anti-government guerrilla insurgents. These insurgents were supported by the population and lived in Central Luzon which is mostly farms and rice fields. That made it harder for the Philippines forces to fight them easily.²³

The Philippines Communist party was established in November 1930 by Crisanto Evangelista.²⁴ During the Japanese occupation a guerrilla movement known as Hukalahap resistance movement fought against the Japanese. After World War II, the guerrilla insurgents had revived again and titled as the Huk. They conducted the Communist Party's military operation against the government of the Philippines. Like many insurgencies, the main cause of the rise of the rebels in Philippines was the dissatisfaction of the people with corruption in the government that increased support to the rebels. In 1948 the corruption in the Philippines government was so extensive even the national elections that were declared scandalous and fraudulent.

In 1948, the Huk insurgency gained a lot more support from the people resulting in it getting stronger, especially in Central Luzon. A large number of peasants, unhappy with the government system and corruption that did not support their business and facilitate marketing for the farmers products, formed an enormous group of supported for the Huk insurgents in their fight against the governments. The Philippines president

²³William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism and Guerrilla War from the American Revolution to Iraq: The Philippines Insurrection* (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 2007),49.

²⁴Major Rodney S. Azama, "The HUKS and The New People's Army: Comparing two Postwar Filipino Insurgencies" (Thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1985), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/ARS.htm> (accessed 31 January 2012).

Elpidio Quirino declared national amnesty in order to avoid conflict. Although some groups reconciled, it ultimately proved unsuccessful and the insurgency continued. The Communist insurgency seem to grow and gain more influence in the Philippines They adopted various policies in order not to reconcile in an effort to undercut the illegitimacy of President Elpidio Quirino's government.

In 1948 President Elpidio Quirino responded to the insurgents with military action, with a policy of suppression, scorched earth tactics cordon and search operations, and heavy reliance on mortars and artillery. Philippines armed forces were relatively undisciplined. During those operations lots of misconduct took place. Massacres of peasants, theft, rape, burning and looting by government forces helped to expand the anti-government guerilla's recruitment and effectiveness of their propaganda during this period.²⁵

The situation worsened and it was noted that the Philippines government was unable to tackle the insurgency. Based on advice from the Americans, President Elpidio Quirino had appointed Ramon Magsaysay as his Secretary of National Defense. Magsaysay was known to be honest, intelligent and experienced. He was a strong ally of the United States and a former member of the Philippines forces that fought against the Japanese during World War II.²⁶ He found out that the Philippine military was suffering from poor morale, ineffectiveness, weak leadership, and was full of corruption.

²⁵Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, "The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines - 1946-1955" (Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1986), <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/963> (accessed 23 October 2011).

²⁶Bettman Archives, "Ramon Magsaysay 1907-1957," <http://www.angelfire.com/on/philpres/magsaysay.html> (accessed 29 January 2012).

Magsaysay started his job by shaking up the Philippine armed forces from top to bottom, dismissing corrupt, incompetent officers, as well as suspected communists and their sympathizers. He relieved the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Constabulary. He ordered that all Philippines armed forces abandon corrupt practices, and he set the example himself.

When Secretary Magsaysay traveled around the country to visit troops, he usually stopped and spoke to the local people. He told the people that the military forces were there to protect them and, that if they had complaints about his forces, they could tell him and he would take appropriate action. To encourage this communication, Magsaysay authorized free telegrams from villagers and insured that each was answered quickly by himself or his key staff.²⁷

Based on his experience in guerrilla warfare, Ramon Magsaysay stressed the use of intelligence, psychological and precision operations in order to capture or kill the leaders of the enemy. He decided to focus on small-unit operations, relying on large conventional sweeps only when specific circumstances dictated its use. By doing this he was able to put more pressure on the enemy and reduce intelligence leaks that would happen while conducting large scale military operations. In 1950 he visited the United States and met with the American military and civilian leadership to include President Harry Truman. His purpose was to obtain financial aid for operations against the insurgency. The United States gave him money for emergency aid to pay the Philippine military and also funded rewards for information about the insurgents.

²⁷Clifford M. White, *Why Insurgency Was Defeated in the Philippines* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1967), <http://www.history.army.mil/books/coldwar/huk/ch5.htm> (accessed 31 January 2012).

In a relatively short time after becoming the Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay initiatives seemed to be working well, the military was becoming professional and loyal to its country. However, Magsaysay was not happy with the Philippines central government's policies and conduct, He suggested to President Elpidio Quirino to take immediate steps to remove corrupt government officials and bring new reforms. However the Philippine president did not take his advice and suggested that Magsaysay should concentrate his efforts only on the military situation.²⁸

Magsaysay now understood that the only way to bring about significant change in the country, in order to make the lives of the people in the Philippines better, was to become President. He noticed that only the military was getting better and not much was changed in Manila, capital of the Philippines, the government remained full of corruption and President Elpidion Quirino didn't make any effort to change it.²⁹ Magsaysay resigned from his Secretary of Defense position and intended to take part in the Presidential election of 1953. With some financial assistance from the United States and more importantly, due to his popularity amongst the people of the Philippines, he won the presidency by the largest popular margin in Philippine history.³⁰

President Ramon Magsaysay's agenda started with attempting to gain legitimacy and support from the people. With the help of the United States, President Magsaysay concentrated on civil relief operations that benefited the people of the Philippines. During

²⁸Greenberg, 61.

²⁹Presidents of the Philippines, "Elpidio R. Quirino, April 17, 1948-November 10, 1953," [http://www.charleskeng.com/president.htm#Elpidio R. Quirino](http://www.charleskeng.com/president.htm#Elpidio%20R.%20Quirino) (accessed 16 February 2012).

³⁰Greenberg, 138.

his first year in office, he dramatically reduced the amount of corruption in government and instituted many social and agricultural reforms. As part of his overall strategy to bring stability to his country, President Magsaysay implemented programs for the peasants and paid particular attention to the demands of the people of Philippines. The most important issues were corruption, neglect, poverty, and land reform. He also implemented a program of resettlement areas for surrendered and captured insurgents that was established under the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) program. If it was proved successful, it might encourage anti-government insurgents to give up their arms and rejoin mainstream society.³¹ The EDCOR program was intended to provide an alternative for those insurgents who were willing to give up the violence and anti-government activities. Once screened by Army intelligence, they received a short re-education program and indoctrination about the benefits of belonging to peaceful society. The Philippine Army transported those selected for the program, with their families, to one of the project sites and there gave them additional education on how to care for the land and advice on what to grow. To provide stability and control, the government allowed a small number of retired soldiers to participate in the EDCOR program as well.³²

In order to educate the younger generation of the country and stop them from joining the insurgency, President Magsaysay insisted that the Philippines Congress pass

³¹Greenberg, 89.

³²Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: US guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism 1940-1990* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), <http://www.statecraft.org/chapter4.html> (accessed 31 January 2012).

the Free Elementary Education Act of 1953.³³ This act was forced upon the people especially on the island of Luzon where most of the support for the insurgents existed. The act mandated that students had to participate in school through seven years of intermediate and secondary education. President Magsaysay concentrated his government's main efforts on helping the lives of the people in Luzon Island. With financial aid from the United States, Magsaysay's government dug thousands of sanitary wells, provided health services and transportation mean for the people.³⁴ President Magsaysay valued the importance of business and free trade agreements with the rest of the world as an important step towards the development of Philippine economy. In his speech at Clark Field, the United States Air Force base in the Philippines, President Ramon Magsaysay stated "I will reach out to free Asian nations as friendly neighbor, sharing experience and seeking mutual benefits through close cooperation, we will expand economic horizon, inciting and fostering greater foreign trade, inviting and welcoming greater foreign investment to help speed the development of our economy toward self-reliance, our people were told under my administration." This was seen as an initiative to improve the economy of the Philippines. A robust economy that could benefit the people of the Philippines would undercut the Huk guerrilla's support. As part of his greater strategy to remove the threat of anti-government guerrillas, President Magsaysay expanded the counter-insurgency program even further. Philippine Army's research and development unit, known affectionately as "The Department of Dirty Tricks" developed

³³Greenberg, 139

³⁴Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray, *The Ramon Magsaysay Story* (New York: Ban Rees Press, 1956), 261

several options and plans in order to defeat the guerrillas, to include psychological and information operation.³⁵

As 1954 began, the anti-government guerrilla forces no longer presented a serious threat to the central government. Their numbers had been reduced to less than 2,000 active guerrillas and their popular support base had all but dried up. By 1955, their leader Luis Taruc surrendered, the organization was destroyed and the old Huk communist guerrilla group became a group of bandits trying to get enough food and support just to live.

Looking back from today we see that the Philippines had been on the verge of becoming a failed state with the potential to endanger the Pacific region and the containment strategy of the United States. President Ramon Magsaysay demonstrated strong leadership and honesty in his administration. He defeated the insurgency through a campaign that combined American aid and assistance, domestic social reforms, and elimination of corruption from both the Philippine military and the central government. He dismissed a number of government officials while his security forces demonstrated how a strong justice system can gain the trust of its people.

In conclusion, the Philippines provides a good example of a nation that had problems with a corrupt internal political system that resulted in a loss of confidence from the populace and consequent insurgency that threatened the government legitimacy and survival. By having a leader like President Ramon Magsaysay, the Philippines managed to reform its operations against the communist guerrillas, most importantly he

³⁵C. T. A. Bohannon, "Unconventional Operations: Counter-Guerrilla," <http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/hukcampaign15june1961V.htm> (accessed 16 February 2012).

gained the support of the people through an aggressive effort to meet the needs of his people such as: access to sanitary water, roads, education, trade, investment and a government that is responsible to its people. Above all, by dismissing those members the government and security forces who were involved in illegal activities and corruption, President Magsaysay was able to bring stability to his country. When we contrast the situation in Philippines with Colombia what we find is that both countries leaders were not tainted by corruption and had clear vision to lead nation towards prosperity.

Afghanistan

This study will discuss the history of Afghan government from 1973 until the current situation, mainly focusing on the causes of instability and the loss of trust between the people and the government of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is made up of various ethnic groups. For thousands of years it had been ruled by kings and monarchs of two strong Pashtun tribes, the Ghilzay and Duranni.³⁶ The traditional government system was decentralized, provinces had governors who reported to the King and the issues were mostly solved within the province with assistance from district chiefs and local Jirga (religious and political council).

In July, 1973, President Sardar Mohamed Daoud Khan came to power in a peaceful coup which ended the royalty government system. He was the first President of Afghanistan and known to most Afghans as their best leader. During his five year presidency he brought significant improvements to his country. He favored a state-

³⁶Hassan Kawun Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).

centered economy and after coming to power he drew up an economic and developmental plan that included major projects such as building hydroelectric power plants, long-distance highways, major civil installations, and improving international relations. He concentrated on building relations with the neighboring countries Iran, Pakistan, India and Soviet Union. In 1977, with support from the United States President Daoud travelled to Islamabad and relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were significantly improved. He also strengthened his relationship with oil-rich nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait.³⁷

After his initial visit to the Soviet Union in 1974, President Daoud decided to distance Afghanistan from the Soviet Union, in order to lessen their interference in the Afghan military and economic affairs. He decided to remove the Soviet advisers from Afghan military and civilian organizations. These actions demonstrated his anticommunist mentality and alarmed the Soviet Union leadership. The Soviets had already organized an Afghan communist party and trained numerous Afghan military and political apparatuses in the Soviet Union. On April 27, 1978, the Afghan Communists supported by their Soviet advisors launched a coup. They began with troop movements at the military base at Kabul International Airport, gained ground and battled units loyal to President Daoud in and around the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul. President Daoud and most of his family were killed in the presidential palace the following day.³⁸

³⁷Peter R. Blood, "A Country Study, Daoud's Republic, July 1973-April 1978," 2001, <http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/28.htm> (accessed 9 January 2012).

³⁸Wahid Momand, "Republic of Afghanistan," <http://www.afghanland.com/history/republic.html> (accessed 9 January 2012).

The Afghan communist regime was called the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. (P.D.P.A) and was divided into two groups, the Khalq and Parcham. The government was ruled by the Khalq party leader Noor Mohamed Taraki. His regime had scientific socialism ideas that were forcefully imposed on the Afghan people while relying on the revolutionary spirit of young communist cadres and ranks that cleared obstacles and difficulties from the regimes path.³⁹ Changes were happening so rapidly that people of Afghanistan were not willing to accept them. More importantly, much of the changes being imposed were against the beliefs and culture of the Afghan people. The famous motto of the communist regime was "*The government provides you home, clothes and food*. Practicing religion was not permitted, traditional clothes were not permitted to be worn at work, and women were to remove their head cover. These changes were in contrast with traditional Afghan culture and beliefs and eventually led to the Afghan people's dissatisfaction and conflict.

As Afghanistan became politically unstable, the Afghan people increased protests and criticism against the government's leftwing communist reforms, many of which had already undermined Afghanistan's traditional Islamic culture. These protests created mistrust and rivalries amongst the two groups of Afghan communist party's. In 1979 President Noor Mohamed Taraki was assassinated and his death was announced as a serious illness. He was succeeded by his assistant Hafizullah Amin, a graduate of

³⁹Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq* (Stanford University: Hoover Press, 1983).

Colombia University in New York.⁴⁰ He immediately began attempts to improve relations with Pakistan and the United States. His actions seriously angered the Soviet Union. After three months of presidency, on 24 December 1979, Soviet forces assaulted the Presidential palace killing him and his family. Babrak Karmal was installed as the president of Afghanistan which marked the official invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet invasion brought various disasters to Afghanistan while widespread resistance began throughout Afghanistan. Among the millions of rural refugees were tens of thousands of educated, urban expatriates, some of whom eventually found opportunities to emigrate to Europe and the United States.⁴¹ The majority of them joined the resistance movement known as the Mujahedeen (holy fighters) groups in their fight against the Soviet forces and the Afghan communist regime.

Islam is the most powerful common denominator shared by Afghans who live in isolated town and villages throughout the country. The best way to organize and motivate them was under Islamic formations. The groups were organized under various religious and local leaders from different Afghan ethnicities and tribes such as Hez-e-Islami (Islamic Party) of southern Pashtun tribes, Jamiyat-e-Islami (Islamic group) of Tajik tribes, Harakat-e-Islami (Islamic Movement) Hazara tribes, and Ittehad-e-Islami

⁴⁰The Robinson Library, "Hafizullah Amin: Second President of the Republic of Afghanistan," <http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/history/asia/afghanistan/amin.htm> (accessed February 2012).

⁴¹Peter R. Blood, Afghanistan: "A Country Study, Daoud's Republic, July 1973-April 1978," 2001, <http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/28.htm> (accessed 9 January 2012).

(Islamic Union). These groups drew the attention of the United States and a number of other nations to include the Arabs who began to contribute resources to the Mujahedeen.

The United States was the biggest supporter of the Mujahedeen groups. Soon after the invasion the CIA had flown a big shipment of arms and ammunitions to Pakistan to be handed to the Afghan fighters under the supervision of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).⁴² Soon after that other countries such as China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia also begun to provide weapons, finance and men to assist the Afghan resistance. However, the biggest game change in the war against the Soviets was the United States delivery of anti-aircraft Stinger missiles to the Afghan fighters. According to CIA estimates, seven out of every ten times the Mujahedin fired a Stinger missile, a helicopter or a plane came down.⁴³

In 1989, after ten years of war and loss of 13,310 killed, 35,478 wounded and 311 missing troops, the Soviet Union, under the terms of an international agreement signed in Geneva, agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan.⁴⁴ At the same time, the Afghan communist government under the leadership of newly appointed President Najibullah requested the United States and the international community to end the military support to the Afghan Mujahedeen and also an agreement for Pakistan to stop any interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, even though the Soviet Union continued supporting

⁴²George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of Largest Covert Operation in History* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).

⁴³*Ibid.*, 437.

⁴⁴Philip Taubman, "Soviet Lists Afghan War Toll," <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/0526/world/soviet-lists-afghan-war-toll-13310-dead-35478-wounded.html?src=pm> (accessed 9 February 2012).

Afghanistan military equipment and advisory teams. Although President Najibullah had been trying to make a compromise in order to end the conflict, reconciliation proved unsuccessful and the fighting continued in villages and towns until 1992 when the communist regime was completely ended.

The ultimate success of the Mujahidin was largely the result of a vacuum created after the collapse of Communism in both the Soviet Union and Kabul. Now, with the Kabul regime gone, the various ethnic Mujahedeen forces could not find a common approach to government or a formula for sharing power among themselves. Their experience of jihad against the Soviets resulted in them attempting to create a government for Afghanistan of an Islamic Republic, inspired by the revolution in Iran and the fall of the Shah's regime, the envisioned government was clearly to be different in structure and religious ideology.⁴⁵ The Iranian Muslim revolution under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini was led by Shiite Muslims, while Afghans were mostly Sunni Muslims.

After entering the Afghan capital the most deadly civil war in the history of Afghanistan was initiated between the various Islamic parties struggling for power. By 1994 most of Afghanistan had been turned into a shambles. City structure, neighborhoods, schools, mosques, and government buildings had been destroyed and

⁴⁵Peter R. Blood, Afghanistan: "A Country Study, The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, since 1992," 2001, <http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/28.htm> (accessed 9 January 2012).

approximately 500,000 innocent civilians were killed. Over 5 million people had fled the country and ended up in the refugee camps.⁴⁶

In early 1995, this situation was changed. A new political/military force, the Taliban, began to emerge. This movement was identified as a group of religious students who were from the Pashtun tribes. The movement took control of Kandahar in November 1994. Soon they were advancing towards the capital Kabul to establish a government. The Taliban were students or recent graduates of a network of traditional *madrasas* in Pakistan. They were advertised as the end to Afghanistan's suffering, a message which won widespread support and soon resulted in their conquest of nearly entire Afghanistan. The Taliban, under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar, implemented a very strict form of Muslim religious Sharia law. They had no concept of modern governance, democratic or participatory rule, human rights, or women rights.⁴⁷ Under this law public executions and punishments became regular events in Afghanistan. In order to root out western influence television, music, and the internet were banned. Men were required to grow beards, and subjected to strict punishment if they disobeyed. Most extreme was their treatment of women. When the Taliban took control of Kabul, they immediately forbade girls education. Furthermore, women were barred from working outside the home, even to include being barred from healthcare and education service. Women were

⁴⁶Peter R. Blood, Afghanistan: "A Country Study, The Struggle for Kabul," <http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/28.htm> (accessed 9 January 2012).

⁴⁷Susan Hawthorne and Bronwyn Winter, *September 11, 2001: Feminist Perspectives* (North Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 2002).

also prohibited from leaving their home without a male relative. Those that violated this edict were subject to physical punishment.⁴⁸

The Taliban regime began to become a concern for the United States when it became known that they were providing a safe haven to the Al-Qaeda terrorist group under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaeda, an international terrorist organization, had declared war against the United States and carried out attacks against US embassies in Africa and the Middle East. Most significantly, Al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 in New York. The result of attack forced the United States to overthrow the Taliban regime and begin hunting down the Al-Qaeda terrorist group in Afghanistan.

After the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001, the United Nations and international community held a conference in Bonn, Germany to decide on a plan for the future of Afghanistan government. The Bonn agreement had provided Afghanistan with a temporary governing body, headed by Hamid Karzai.⁴⁹ Six months after the Bonn Conference the members of a Loya Jirga (grand assembly) made up of known academics, political and religious leaders decided to reelect Hamid Karzai as the transitional president of Afghanistan for two years.

⁴⁸Laura Hayes, Borgna Brunner, and Beth Rowen, "Who are the Taliban? Their History and their Resurgence, Pearson Education," <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/taliban.html> (accessed 13 February 2012).

⁴⁹Nick B. Mills, *Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan* (New Jersey, 2007), 185.

Afghanistan Today

Since 2001 the government of Afghanistan has had many achievements as well as significant challenges. Over the past decade Afghanistan has passed a national constitution, elected a President, created three branches of the government, established diplomatic and foreign relations, and relatively equipped their national security forces.⁵⁰ However, there have also been significant challenges over the last decade still facing the current Afghan regime headed by President Hamid Karzai. This section will discuss three main challenges that negatively impact the future of Afghanistan; corruption at all ranks of the Afghan government and security forces, an increase in the drug trade, and finally a shortage of competent leadership. These challenges undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of its people. Even worse, it drives the people towards support for the insurgency.

The first challenge that undermines the Afghan government's legitimacy in the eyes of its people is the overwhelming corruption in all levels of the government. Corruption undermines the effectiveness of the government of Afghanistan's security, legitimacy, development and democracy. A United Nation survey measuring public perceptions of the prevalence of corruption in various aspects of life and at different levels of government in Afghanistan reported those entrusted with upholding the law are seen as most guilty of violating it. Approximately twenty five percent of Afghans had to pay at least one bribe to police and local officials during the survey period. Between ten and twenty percent had to pay bribes either to judges, prosecutors or members of the

⁵⁰ Afghan Government, "Afghan Bonn Agreement 2001," <http://www.afghan.gov/government.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm> (accessed 16 February 2012).

government.⁵¹ In recent years, corruption in Afghanistan has become commonplace with clear rules to be followed. A 2010 United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC) report titled “Corruption in Afghanistan” points out that bribery in Afghanistan equals one quarter of its GDP. And supplemented their claims with specific examples, for example; This report identified certain passengers who need to get to the airport quickly without any bothersome security checks were forced to pay \$20. To receive a driver’s license without passing any test costs \$180, and if a family wants to release their son from prison for drug smuggling, a return home will cost \$60,000.⁵²

Perhaps the most concerning feature of corruption in Afghanistan are the networks of individuals connected with parties and key people within the branches of the government. These networks ensure that guilty are not brought to justice. Consequently, Afghan court system routinely fails to detect, prosecutes, judge, and punish corruption across all levels of society and government. A 2009 USAID report titled “Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan” indicated that widespread corruption is causing harmful effects on business in Afghanistan. This report reiterates that corruption and irrational regulations in the Afghan government deter the advance of business activities.⁵³

⁵¹UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa's Presentation, “Corruption widespread in Afghanistan,” <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/January/corruption-widespread-in-afghanistan-unodc-survey-says.html> (accessed 9 February 2012).

⁵²Matthias Gebauer and Carsten Volkery, “Corruption in Afghanistan,” *Speigal Online International*, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,672828,00.html> (accessed 9 February 2012).

⁵³Ernest Leonardo and Dr. Lawrence Robertson. “USAID Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan,” http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO248.pdf (accessed 10 February 2012).

The second challenge that undermines Afghan government legitimacy in the eyes of its people is the narcotics trade. Growth and production of heroin in Afghanistan has significantly increased in the past ten years due to the lack of an alternative crop for local farmers, active support of Afghan government officials, and encouragement of Taliban and Al-Qaeda groups that gain financial support for their terrorist activities in the world from drug trade profits. In 2005, Afghanistan was the producer of 90 percent of the world's opium, most of which is processed into heroin and sold in Europe, Russia and the United States, killing 100,000 people every year worldwide.⁵⁴ The United States and international community intended to combat the drug trade in rural areas of Afghanistan. Their efforts were focused on growth, refinement, and distribution networks. However, these efforts were hampered by the fact that many suspected drug traffickers are now top officials in the government.⁵⁵

The freedom to conduct drug dealing and trade it outside Afghanistan is facilitated by various groups and organizations of the Afghan government. Most suspect are the Afghan National Police. Rapid recruitment without thorough background checks, lack of appropriate training, insufficient salary, and above all, lack of competent leaders are the factors that encouraged the Afghan National Police to be involved in the drug trade. Although the United States has provided various resources to the Afghan National Police to provide security for the people but, it has not curtailed the ANPs involvement in

⁵⁴Saylor Foundation, "War in Afghanistan from: 2001-Present," <http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/War-in-Afghanistan-2001-Present.pdf> (accessed 11 February 2012).

⁵⁵Scott Baldauf, "Afghanistan Riddled with Drug Ties," <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0513/p01s04-wosc.html> (accessed 11 February 2012).

the drug trade. As Tom Lasseter writes, “The Afghan police arrive in Ford Ranger pickups bought with U.S. aid money and demand their cut of the cash in exchange for promises to skip the farms during annual poppy eradication.”⁵⁶ As long as the Afghan National Police continue to operate outside the law, the loyalty of the Afghan people will be biased towards insurgents and not the Government of Afghanistan.

The final challenge that undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of its people is a lack of competent leadership. It is a significant shortfall in bringing stability to Afghanistan. History has shown that, to evolve from a tribal and ethnic structure into a national structure and create solidarity and loyalty from the people, it is vital that the government consider the needs of the people first. By all measures this is not the case in Afghanistan.

The Afghan National Security Forces have shouldered significant challenges over the past few years of intense fighting with insurgents. After the fall of the Taliban, local warlords moved rapidly and occupied the higher positions of the newly created security forces in the country; they individually titled themselves police commanders, generals and colonels.⁵⁷ The important task of national security forces to provide protection for the people has been poorly implemented. In many cases their misbehavior and unprofessionalism has been counter-productive. For example, illegal collecting of taxes from drivers, taking goods from shops, pressing charges without legal court hearing,

⁵⁶Tom Lasseter, “Afghan Drug Trade Thrives with Help, and Neglect of Officials,” <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/05/10/67723/afghan-drug-trade-thrives-with.html> (accessed 11 February 2012).

⁵⁷Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), “Reforming the Afghan National Police,” <http://www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/afghanpolice/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2012).

abuse of human rights, have all been cited as contributing to the failure to create a stronger bond with the people. Similarly, in opium poppy-growing areas, police have ignored drug-traffickers for a portion of the profits.⁵⁸ A report by the Royal United Service Institute titled “Reforming the Afghan National Police” notes that corruption among the Afghan National Police includes both petty bribery and complicity in insurgency and narcotics trafficking.⁵⁹

All of these actions have given the Taliban advantages in gaining support from the population and weakening the Afghan government capabilities. In 2009, NATO forces commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal reported the situation “more serious than he anticipated.” This prompted the United States and international community to increase their support for Afghanistan. In his speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Barak Obama stated “Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan. As Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.”⁶⁰

⁵⁸Matthieu Aikins, “The master of Spin Boldak: Undercover with Afghanistan's Drug-Trafficking Border Police,” *Harper's Magazine*, <http://harpers.org/archive/2009/12/0082754> (accessed 14 February 2012).

⁵⁹Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), “Reforming the Afghan National Police,” <http://www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/afghanpolice/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2012).

⁶⁰Barak Obama, “The way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 09:21, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan> (accessed 9 February 2012).

The Afghan people are frustrated with the actions being conducted by the Afghan government and security forces. Representatives of the Afghan people in the Parliament have raised many concerns about the misconduct and incompetence of the government leadership but, it has not attracted any attention.⁶¹ Military and civilian officials from troop contributing countries and the international community and have shown dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Afghan government. In a newspaper interview, US Army Major General Peter Fuller commented, “Afghan leaders are corrupt and incompetent; they fail to understand their own ability to sustain their armed forces; they don’t see the economic problems roiling the U.S. and our European allies.”⁶²

Conclusion

In hindsight, three main issues that have been discussed with regards to government corruption, drug trade, and shortage of competent leadership, are significantly hindering the ability of the Afghan government to move forward. Ultimately this has helped to the success of the insurgency and continued violence in the country. When we contrast the situation in Afghanistan with Colombia and Philippines, what we find is that all three countries suffered from same problems, but the difference was that Colombia and Philippines had leaders arise who were not tainted by corruption, had clear vision for helping their country, and worked hard to lead their countries towards prosperity.

⁶¹Muhib Habibi, “Parliament anger over Karzai Cabinet choices,” http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-19/world/afghanistan.parliament_1_karzai-cabinet-cabinet-nominees-parliament?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 16 February 2012).

⁶²Carl Prine, “Fuller Brushed Away,” <http://www.lineofdeparture.com/2011/11/06/fuller-brushed-away/> (accessed 11 February 2012).

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter will answer the research question: What are the most important things that the government of Afghanistan can do to ensure its accountability and, in-turn, enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people and the world? This analysis will focus on comparing the Afghanistan's current problems with Colombia prior to appointment of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Philippines prior to appointment of President Ramon Magsaysay. This chapter will also highlight the differences that exist between Afghanistan, Colombia and the Philippines.

Colombia

The problems in Colombia expanded when the FARC continued to grow and undermine government strength. Although the government in the Colombian capital Bogota remained in power, there were three significant problems that kept it isolated from its people and undercut its ability to gain legitimacy and ultimately, gain the support of its people. These problems were: Corruption in the Colombian armed forces and government, narcotics trade, and lack of competent leadership.

Corruption in Colombia had been on the rise since President Rojas Pinilla's administration in 1954. President Pinilla was not only a dictatorial leader; he also nominated corrupt individuals in his administration. In order to provide a legal facade for

his dictatorship, he abolished the county's 1886 constitution.⁶³ Pinilla's performance and his government's corruption became tools guerrilla groups could use to their advantage and gained population support. Corruption in the Colombian government and security forces reached at a level that made FARC an alternative to the government. Analysts believe that in 1980s the FARC made an eight year plan with the objective of building enough military power and control throughout Colombia to win against the security forces and take control of the government.⁶⁴

However, strong action beginning in 2010 against corruption was taken by Juan Manuel Santos. During his time as the Colombian Minister of Defense, Santos relieved 458 members of the armed forces for corruption. As part of his strategic goal of achieving greater efficiency, Santos increased scrutiny of misuse of authority and resources to uncover cases of corruption.⁶⁵ After signing the international anti-corruption convention, president Juan Manuel Santos began removing and arresting significant government official and leaders who were involved in corruption such as the governor of West Colombia Jose Patrocinio Sanchez Montes de Oca who was involved in corruption, also

⁶³Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, "Colombia: The Rojas Pinilla's Dictatorship," <http://countrystudies.us/colombia/23.htm> (accessed 26 March 2012).

⁶⁴James F. Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

⁶⁵Bureau of Democracy U.S. Department of State, "Colombia: Human Rights, and Labor," <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721.htm> (accessed 26 March 2012).

he and his brother, former Representative Odin Sanchez Montes de Oca, were accused of having used ties to the guerrilla group for their political gains.⁶⁶

Another significant initiative against corruption in Colombia was the strong support for the *Transparencia por* organization whose mission is to lead, from within civil society, systematic efforts against corruption targeted towards transforming, concentrating on public and private institutions.⁶⁷ It was hoped that this would ultimately help give the world and the Colombian people the confidence in trusting their government.

The second problem in Colombia that undercut the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of its people and the world was narcotics production and trade. Since the 1970s Colombia had been the biggest drug producer in the world. According to the US National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), cocaine production in Colombia constituted at least 55 percent of annual worldwide cocaine production, in 2006 pure cocaine production was 535 metric tons and in 2007 it was increased to 550 metric tons.⁶⁸ Colombian produced narcotics have been hugely affecting the streets of United States and Europe. The capabilities of the Colombian drug traffickers had been elevated to a level that they were able to hire engineering experts from Russia and the United States to help with the design

⁶⁶Adriaan Alsema, "Ex-Governor in West Colombia Arrested," <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/19268-former-governor-arrested-on-corruption-charges.html> (accessed 26 March 2012).

⁶⁷Global Corruption Report, "Climate Change," <http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr> (accessed 26 March 2012).

⁶⁸National Drug Intelligence Center, "National Drug Threat Assessment," <http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/cocaine.htm> (accessed 26 March 2012).

of submarines, which have been used to secretly ship large quantities of cocaine to the United States.⁶⁹

With military and professional assistance from the United States, Colombian military and law enforcement agencies have come together in sharing intelligence and experiences in order to combat narcotics trade and production. Significant cooperation and collaboration between each other has led to success. Colombian forces have struck the key leadership of the drug dealers inside and outside Colombia. Recent operations has shown success in capturing and killing key leaders of FARC such as Guillermo León Sáenz, better known by his alias, Alfonso Cano, killed by Colombian forces in his camp near the city of Cali. Also the Colombian forces killed Raul Reyes, who became the public face of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia as the group's spokesman, who died amid fighting and air strikes just across the border in neighbouring Ecuador.⁷⁰ These successes came as the results of the intelligence sharing and cooperation between the Colombian army, air force, navy and the police forces working together.⁷¹

The last problem in Colombia that undercut the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of its people and the world was lack of competent leadership. Since declaring its independence from Spain in 1810, Colombia has had ten constitutions, the last of which

⁶⁹Frontline, "Drug War: The Colombian Cartels, 1995–2011," <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html> (accessed 26 March 2012).

⁷⁰Colombia Reports, "Colombia say it killed FARC Commander Raul Reyes," *Colombia News*, <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/273-colombia-says-it-killed-farc-commander.html> (accessed 26 March 2012).

⁷¹Council on Foreign Relations, "A Conversation with Juan Manuel Santos Calderon," 1:04:05, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=esuhrmaOUiA&feature=related> (accessed 26 March 2012).

was adopted in 1886 and established the present-day republic of Colombia.⁷² It has three main branches, legislative, executive and judicial, the head of state is the president, and all member of the cabinet are appointed by the president. This requires the president to show great leadership in making decisions with regards to appointing the right individuals to serve the country. During the mid-1990s presidency of Ernesto Samper, the Colombian people raised their voices against the country's weak leadership in order to tackle the fundamental challenges of the county such as corruption, and joblessness which ultimately brought insecurity and encouraged the people of Colombia to support the FARC and participate in the drug trade.⁷³

President Juan Manuel Santos have shown great leadership in managing the support from the United States which has been initiated by President John F. Kennedy, followed by then President Clinton and lately George Bush who added anti- terrorism training and support for the Colombian infrastructure.⁷⁴ Since then the Colombian people and the world has witnessed significant success. President Santos focused on economic development, and passed the Employment and Formalization Law which created 2.5 million jobs, formalized 500,000 informal jobs, and reduced annual unemployment.

Besides showing his leadership resilience, President Santos has strongly supported the campaign of cleaning corruption out of Colombia's government and

⁷²Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, "Colombia: The Governmental System," <http://countrystudies.us/colombia/79.htm> (accessed 26 March 2012).

⁷³Sentinel Sun, "Samper Must End Country's Ordeal By Leaving Presidency Immediately," http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1996-02-20/news/9602190146_1_ernesto-samper-colombia-ambassadors-and-cabinet (accessed 26 March 2012).

⁷⁴Phillip McLean, "Colombia: Failed, Failing or Just Weak," <http://www.twq.com/02summer/mclean.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2012).

political system. Many top leaders in Colombia including congressmen and Senators such as Rafael Castillo and Ivan Moreno have been imprisoned for involvement in the public works corruption scandal that has marred the integrity of Bogota's local government.⁷⁵

Today we see that Colombia is becoming more stable and a democratic country that has a growing economy and international support especially the United States. Three main problems which were; leadership, corruption and drug production were successfully reversed in a way that no longer poses a threat. Currently in Afghanistan similar problems exist, however, there are major differences. First, Afghanistan has gone through many years of war against the Soviet Union, subsequently civil war and the Taliban regime. During this time the majority of educated and loyal Afghans sought to refuge abroad, whereas Colombia had only experienced internal conflicts between indigenous forces and guerrilla fighting groups, not foreign invading military with large combat forces. Secondly, due to the lack of alternative legal crop, combined with bad transportation system compels the farmers to grow poppy, whereas Colombia had always access to public transportation. Finally, Afghanistan is rich in tribal customs and throughout its history there have been many power agreements between different tribes. This custom of tribal governance makes it significantly different to Colombia where not many local tribes are given a share in power. Colombian government is largely run by certain political party nominees. The concluding chapter will discuss the way ahead for Afghanistan.

⁷⁵Tom Heyden, "Former Congressman Arrested in Bogota on Return from Miami," <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/15965-former-congressman-arrested-in-bogota-on-return-from-miami.html> (accessed 27 March 2012).

Philippines

The problems in Philippines expanded when Huk insurgency continued to grow and undermine the government's strength. There were three significant reasons that fueled the insurgency and undercut the Philippines government's ability to gain legitimacy and ultimately, gain the support of its people. These problems were: Corruption in the Philippines government, lack of strategy against Huk guerrillas and, lack of competent leadership.

After World War II, the Philippines had to go through a huge recovery. The United States assisted the Philippines with technical, financial and reconstruction support. Thereby it made the government officials and the public servants vulnerable to corruption. By late 1940s through early 1950s, one of the most outrageous issues that contributed to rapid expansionism of Huk guerrillas in the countryside was erosion of the people's trust in government due to extensive corruption.⁷⁶ In 1948 president Elpidio Quirino, had shown too much weakness in tolerating the extensive corruption in his government. During his time in office, bribery increased, lack of professionalism in the armed forces was evident, and above all neglecting the difficulties of the majority of the poor people made him very unpopular.

⁷⁶Edna A CO, "Minimizing corruption: Philippine democracy assessment," <http://books.google.com/books?id=oB0hxAx2Ye0C&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&dq=corruption+in+philippines+during+1950s&source=bl&ots=SWLdOJXBy1&sig=GPmm0EcHqCY1lsSkiMG6yA8QrQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=IEB3T7rdGY7rgQeauKD3Dg&ved=0CEwQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=corruption%20in%20philippines%20during%201950s&f=false> (accessed 31 March 2012).

In 1946, as part of war damage payments and rebuilding, United States Congress allocated \$520 to the Philippines. President Osmena requested \$ 1.2 Billion⁷⁷ however, by the end of 1950 only \$388 million were spent in the right place. Slowness, inefficiency, and overt corruption within the President Elpidio Quirino's government upset the public feelings. Therefore the Huk propagandists combined these feelings of neglect and corruption of the government and gained more support.

However, strong action beginning in 1950 against corruption was taken by Ramon Magsaysay. During his time as the Philippines secretary of Defense, Magsaysay relieved several high ranking officers, including the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Constabulary as well as those reluctant to leave the safety of Manila, or implicated in graft and corruption.⁷⁸ As part of the anti- corruption strategy, President Magsaysay spoke with the troops and civilians; he then decides to increase the military and law enforcement forces pay in order to remove the need for bribery.

The second problem in the Philippines that undercut the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of its people and the world was lack of strategy against the insurgency. By 1950, the Huks had 15,000 organized strength, and about 13,000 firearms, as well as the support from over 100,000 peasants in Luzon province located in the outskirts of Manila. The Huks conducted numerous terror attacks, killing government

⁷⁷Robert R. Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Military Factors," <http://www.scribd.com/doc/28666185/The-Hukbalahap-Insurrection> (accessed 31 March 2012).

⁷⁸Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, "The Hukbalahap Insurrection, A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines-1946-1955," <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/963> (accessed 31 March 2012).

officials, intimidating the population, also conducting large military style raids in order to undermine the government capacity. The most famous Huks attack was conducted in Laur, Nueva Ecija that resulted \$600.00 robbed, killed and kidnapped policemen and looted the town.⁷⁹

President Elpidio Quirino responded with a large conventional force of two thousand government troops which waded slowly into the Huk stronghold. The intent of the operation was Huk suppression, scorched earth tactics, cordon and search operations, with heavy reliance on mortars and artillery.⁸⁰ However, there wasn't a comprehensive strategy to understand the causes and the broader intent of the insurgency. As the Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay decided to use the strategy of integrating civilian and military activities employing all instrument of national power.⁸¹ In less than two months in office, Magsaysay achieved his first big success in a daring raid conducted in Manila by the Military and Intelligence Service under his supervision.

After assuming the presidency, Magsaysay was able to concentrate on civil relief operations and devoted less of his time to purely military matters. He drew a strategy to improve Philippine living conditions and remove the base of insurgency strength and popular support. He changed the basic tactics used by the Philippine military and fostered unconventional operations, while concurrently developing a more professional and competent armed forces. Part of the success in the Philippines forces had been the

⁷⁹Ismael D. Lapus, "Counter-Guerrilla," <http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/hukcampaign15june1961II.htm> (accessed 31 March 2012).

⁸⁰Greenberg, 6.1

⁸¹Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).

Research and development unit, known affectionately as "The Department of Dirty Tricks" which developed several options and plans in order to defeat the guerrillas, to include psychological and information operation.⁸²

The last problem in the Philippines that undercut the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of its people and the world was lack of competent leadership. After taking its independence from the United States on the 4th of July 1946, the Philippines has a democratic constitution. Its government has three main branches, legislative, executive and judicial, and powers are based on the theory of checks and balances. The head of state and commander in chief is the president. He nominates the heads of executive departments and ambassadors which are confirmed by a Commission on Appointments, consisting of twelve senators and twelve representatives.⁸³

Philippines had many leadership challenges prior to President Ramon Magsaysay. Joblessness and the lack of governments' ability to serve its people grew the insurgency bigger. President Elpidio Quirino launched the amnesty and reconciliation program, but, with a weaker position and untrusted team he was unable to achieve its goals. On the other hand President Magsaysay showed tremendous leadership skills that reversed the momentum of insurgency, cleaned his administration from corrupt and incompetent leaders, served its people and improved the economy throughout the islands of Philippines. As president, Magsaysay continued his practice of traveling and speaking

⁸²C. T. A. Bohannon, "Unconventional Operations: Counter-Guerrilla," <http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/hukcampaign15june1961V.htm> (accessed 16 February 2012).

⁸³Ronald E. Dolan, "Philippines: A Country Study, National Government," <http://countrystudies.us/philippines/80.htm> (accessed 31 March 2012).

with the people while on the road and at his home in Manila. Each morning, people formed outside his home to discuss problems or suggestions they had with the president while he ate his breakfast. Magsaysay seemed everywhere at once with troops on campaign, checking local officials, and talking with the people.⁸⁴

By 1954, the insurgency had suffered defeats on the battlefield and the erosion of popular support after Magsaysay's successful counterinsurgency campaign. The leader of the Huk Luis Taruc had surrendered, his organization was destroyed and his men were nothing more than roving bands of thieves and bandits trying to get enough food and support to simply survive.

Looking back at the Philippines, corruption, leadership and a lack of a clear strategy were problems posing a greater threat to the government of Philippines as well as the strategic interests of the United States in that region. President Ramon Magsaysay had successfully tackled those problems to a greater extent. Currently in Afghanistan similar problems exist, however, there are major differences. First, the insurgency in Afghanistan is largely fueled from outside has links to a broader terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda that have wider and international goals of militant fundamentalist ideology, whereas in Philippines the insurgents were commonly local Filipino peasant farmers with little foreign support. Secondly, due to the Afghanistan's geography, a large number of the population lives in mountainous areas and the enemy has always taken advantage of the terrain and influenced them, whereas in Philippines, populations centers are small isolated villages and islands, therefore making it much easier for the counterinsurgency forces to isolate the enemy and destroy them. Finally, Afghanistan is rich in tribal

⁸⁴Greenberg, 138.

customs and throughout its history there have been many power agreements between different tribes. This custom of tribal governance makes it significantly different to the Philippines political system and constitution, Philippines government is not based on power sharing between tribes and clans where each tribe will have certain number of seats in the government's executive branches. The concluding chapter will discuss the way ahead for Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate and analyze the root causes of lack of legitimacy of the Afghan government. The previous chapters of this thesis investigated the answer to the primary research question: What are the most important things that the government of Afghanistan can do to ensure its accountability and, in-turn, enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people and the world? Finally, this chapter will recommend further research that is beyond the scope of this study.

In answering the primary research question, this thesis used the information to compare the existing problems in Afghanistan to Colombia and Philippines while simultaneously using various other sources to reveal why the situation in Afghanistan is important in the future for the United States. This chapter presents conclusion about the government legitimacy in the eyes of its people and makes recommendations on how the government of Afghanistan can address these growing complex problems. However, it is important for the Afghan government to prioritize its activities with regards to tackling its problems that results in the lack of legitimacy in the eyes of its people. In reference to corruption, the Afghan government will not be able to completely eliminate widespread corruption in Afghan society; however, it will be able to demonstrate its will and power by taking a few substantial steps against obvious corrupt individuals within the government and security forces of Afghanistan. A good example was offered in Colombia by President Juan Manuel Santos by signing the international anti-corruption convention that served as a written law of the country and according to that law many senior corrupt official including Congressmen and senators were brought to justice for

their actions, these steps have given respect and support from its people. Another significant initiative against corruption in Colombia was the strong support for the *Transparencia por* organization whose mission is to lead, from within civil society, systematic efforts against corruption targeted towards transforming, concentrating on public and private institutions. Similarly, anti-corruption efforts in Philippines also provides us good lesson. President Ramon Magsaysay's initiatives to increase the salaries of Philippines armed forces which helped reduce the level of corruption amongst security forces. Some may argue that Santos and Magsaysay could only do this because they had strong support from the United States. There is probably variety of reasons why they were successful however; the key has been their leadership and steadfastness.

The Afghan anti-corruption commission has investigated a number of cases linked to corrupt officials that delegitimizes the government; however, due to the lack of support there has not been any specific prosecutions that indicate positive steps. This paper recommends that the anti-corruption commission should publicly identify the corrupt officials and rally national and international support in order to encourage the Afghan government to take positive actions. The international community has an obligation to seriously cooperate in this matter instead of providing reports to the Afghan government that are deemed baseless. A number of corrupt Afghan officials have properties and investments outside Afghanistan that will require the international community to take serious steps against them.

Lower level corruption in the ranks of Afghan Security Forces is mostly due to lack of payment and administrative problems. Currently an Afghan policeman is paid approximately \$200, most of them have large families, this salary is not sufficient to

provide the necessary food and shelter to a family. Therefore a gradual increase and promotions within the ranks of Afghan armed forces will reduce the need for taking bribes and also encourage them to serve the country better. However, pay raises must be tied to elimination of practices seen as corrupt.

Secondly, narcotics production in Afghanistan has been frequently reported as the highest in the world. There is a large portion of the Afghan workforce and farmers involved in production and trafficking of narcotics. The Afghan ministry of anti-narcotics strategy is mostly focused on poppy eradication and a small anti-narcotics police unit has been created to arrest low and medium level drug traffickers, however, this has not been satisfactory because there is not a full governmental approach to remove the narcotics production. Colombia provides us a good example, Colombian military, law enforcement agencies and rural rehabilitation branches have been working together. Joint Colombian police, army and air force have struck the senior narcotics dealers, the judicial system ensured the prosecution and their success has been exploited by providing an alternative support for the population.

It is recommended that the Afghan government needs to change its attitude with regards to narcotics industry. The government of Afghanistan must create a comprehensive strategy to address various levels of involvement in narcotics trade. Farmers and lower level peasants should be encouraged and organized into programs that encourage growth of legal crops and marketing. Concurrently, a joint counter-narcotics task force should be established, involving Afghan police, army, air corps and judicial system, supported by publicity campaigns by Afghan ministry of religious affairs, media and international community. The joint task force mission should be to: find, fix, finish,

exploit and finally prosecute mid- high level narcotics dealers. Due to the known financial links between terrorism and narcotics, the task force will also require coordination and sharing of information between anti-corruption and counter terrorist task forces, it will require full support from the parliament and President of Afghanistan, as well as the international community, should there will be a links to some high ranking officials in the government.

Lastly, lack of competent leaders at various levels of military and civilian branches in Afghanistan have been a significant challenge. Lack of education, decades of Soviet and civil wars, and the Afghan tribal traditions have affected the rise of competent leaders. Many scholars have argued that, the government of Afghanistan should be blamed for negligence in appointing loyal leaders. However, this paper recommends that the focus should be in identifying the talents and investment in leader development. Colombia is a good example that shows us the sound leadership of President Juan Manuel Santos. President Santos had come up from the ranks of military, he was educated at Brown University in the United States and his leadership as the Minister of Defense paved the way to becoming the country's respected leaders. His achievements as a good leader were noticed when he brought the people of Colombia together, and instilled a unity amongst the people, government and armed forces. Finally, his strong leadership showed the capturing and killing of many FARC leaders.

Philippines president Ramon Magsaysay gives another good example of a leader in a war-torn country. President Magsaysay showed a robust leadership in tackling the most important problems in his county which dramatically reduced the level of frustration which existed amongst its people. Magsaysay took very systematic and important steps in

order to be successful; he removed the incompetent and corrupt individuals from his office, then his cabinet, and armed forces. After creating a strong team he managed to defeat the enemy of his country.

Currently in Afghanistan there are similar problems exist within the government, cabinet and Afghan National Security Forces. There is a sense of widening frictions amongst various branches of Afghan government, various groups of people are dissatisfied with the current leadership's performance. In some case the government is seen as a fair and just for all tribes, but a greater challenge remains in the future, after the Coalition forces withdrawal, there will be more reliance on Afghan institution to serve its people. This paper recommends a number of steps to address these challenges. First, there is a significant number of Afghans studying abroad, upon return, regardless of their ethnicity, they should be encouraged and appointed in key government positions so their experience and knowledge can be transferred to those organizations. Secondly, the international community donor nations that are part of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams should provide opportunities for provincial and sub-district governors to be sent to short educational and informative trips outside Afghanistan. For example: If district governor and police chief of Helmand province can visit New York City, they will find a lot of useful insights about the duties and relationship between the civilian and law enforcement authorities. Also, if the head of agriculture department of Kandahar province visit University of Kanas, he/she will gain helpful information about farming. These tours will not only help the Afghan leaders learn about their jobs, but also enlighten their views and prospective about the United States. Finally, looking at fragile and volatile situation in Afghanistan, country's leadership should make serious and hard decisions when it

comes to military affairs, national sovereignty and anti- corruption issues. Since 2001 the Afghan government has been compromising to many tribal and local warlords in order to dampen the violence. However, coming to 2014 the nation and international community will look up to the Afghan leadership for bold decisions against those who break the law and yet still hold positions in the government.

Based on what we have looked at and given the similarities and differences between Afghanistan, Colombian and the Philippines, this paper draws the conclusion that a government can enjoy legitimacy only when its people are satisfied with its performances.

Recommended Further Research

This research was conducted to answer one specific question. However, there are other sources of information and ways to investigate and analyze the causes of ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and in order to truly understand it is recommended to review and study the nineteenth century history of Afghanistan's conflicts with British Empire and lately the Soviets invasion.

One of the aims of this study was not only to show the current problems in the Afghan government and identify its basis and contributing factors but also to initiate further discussion about the topic. To improve on this study it would help to analyze the specific US policies in the region the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policy toward Pakistan, India, China, Russia and the impact of Iranian nuclear issues on Afghanistan.

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