

FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE

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General Studies

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE, by Major Enver Voca, 120 pages.

Sustainable peace in the Western Balkans still remains to be desired. Ethnic impatience and nationalistic extremism are still strong and capable of ruining the peace achieved. Further engagement of the International Community is critical to achieving lasting peace. Further development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is necessary to make Kosovo a fully functional country and society. Further development of the KSF is also the best guarantee to preserve the peace in Kosovo and the Western Balkans and to ensure that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has reliable partnership in the region.

Kosovo's government and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) need to focus more in developing the KSF. The KSF should be engaged immediately in security tasks in particular with the KFOR. The KSF should be developed as a strong defense force which will not threaten any neighboring country, but will have needed capabilities to defend Kosovo and its people.

Key lessons identified are that strong KSF is best solution to preserve peace in the region, and that there is a critical need to speed up development of the KSF and NATO support in this process.

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As author I have the sole responsibility for all errors, wrong interpretation of facts, opinions and ideas expressed in this thesis.

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ACRONYMS

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
COMKFOR	Commander of Kosovo Force
EU	European Union
HQ	Headquarters
ICG	International Crisis Group
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army. Also known by its Albanian name Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK).
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps. Also known by its Albanian name Trupat e Mbrojttese se Kosoves (TMK).
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
LKCK	Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves (The National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova.)
LPK	Levizja Popullore e Kosoves (The Kosova People's Movement.)
MNB	Multinational Brigade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLA	National Liberation Army
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
RFJ	Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
SGA	Small Group Advisor
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nation
UNMIK	United Nation Mission in Kosovo
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

During the collapse of Communism in the beginning of the 1990s, many of the communist countries dissolved peacefully. Unfortunately, this was not the case in the former Yugoslavia. Instead, a combination of nationalist ambitions, myths, and ethnic hatreds drove the region into five conflicts. First, armed conflict started in Slovenia in June 1991, then a few months later, the conflict spread throughout Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In 1998, armed conflict broke out in Kosovo, and conflict in Macedonia in 2001 closed this cycle of ethnic conflicts. Kosovo was the fourth theater of this tragic play. In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched air campaigns against Serbia's forces to stop the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. After NATO won the war in June of 1999, the United Nation (UN) administration and NATO forces were installed in Kosovo to assist with security and rebuilding the country.

After nine years of international protectorate and significant progress made in different spheres of life, Kosovo's institutions, in coordination with the democratic world, on 17 February 2008 declared independence. Almost thirteen years after NATO first deployed troops there, and four years after the declaration of independence, KFOR (NATO) still remains in Kosovo providing security, while indigent forces such as the KSF are developing slowly and currently have no security responsibilities. The current security situation in Kosovo is not a lasting one. This paper will address the issue of who should be responsible for the long-term security in Kosovo.

Thesis

The only legal and logical force to assume NATO's security mission is the KSF. In today's world, with so many conflicts and force demands for NATO countries and, with so many economic crises and financial uncertainties, the level of engagement of NATO in Kosovo is an unnecessary burden to the respective countries. The NATO mission in Kosovo also presents obstacles for these countries to commit more forces in current conflicts, and keeps Kosovo in a state of uncertainty for its future security in the case of unexpected conflicts, or major crises throughout world. In the end, NATO cannot stay forever in Kosovo. So, the planning and gradual transfer of KFOR's roles and responsibilities to the KSF should start as soon as possible.

Purpose

After a devastating war in 1998-1999, Kosovo evolved as a country. Following nine years under UN administration and four years as an independent country, Kosovo constantly developed its governing capabilities with the final goal to be an independent, sovereign, and functional state. In these endeavors, Kosovo walked hand in hand with the International Community. In many spheres, the Republic of Kosovo has reached the desired capabilities and it is no longer a burden of the International Community. Even more these sectors are contributing to the International Community's efforts in dealing with different issues. One area of success is that of the Kosovo Police. In addition to achieving high levels of professional standards, the Kosovo Police contribute a lot to the International Community's efforts to fight drug trafficking, trafficking of people etc. The Republic of Kosovo has already consolidated the judicial system by establishing the Constitutional Court as the roof of the judiciary system in Kosovo, and has established

the financial system by creating the Central Bank of Kosovo as the central authority to supervise and maintain the financial system. Despite these successes, there are some spheres where the Republic of Kosovo remained challenged. The Security sector is a prime example. From the end of the war in June of 1999, the KFOR was the only security force in Kosovo. Through 2008, when Kosovo became independent there has been very little progress in developing an indigenous security force in Kosovo.

The KLA emerged as an indigenous force from the war and was demilitarized according to the Undertaking for Demilitarization.¹ During the war KLA and NATO were close allies.² Through the process of demilitarization, the KPC was established as a civil – emergency organization. Even though the provisions of the Undertaking for Demilitarization by the KLA left enough room to create a force similar to the US National Guard, it did not happen. As a result, the KPC mainly was seen by UNMIK as an emergency response force, and was kept unengaged in security issues for over ten years.

In January of 2009, the KSF was established. KFOR took responsibility to stand-up the KSF starting from the KPC capabilities. To this point, the KSF was kept strictly out of security engagements, which resulted in a gap between the challenges to provide security for Kosovo and its people and the KSF's overall capabilities. Even though the International Community invested a lot in building peace in the Western Balkans, the present peace is still fragile, and any vacuum in security could ruin everything that has been achieved up to now in peace building. Additionally, recent worldwide economic crises have increased pressure for cutting public spending in most of the countries that have troops within KFOR. Blockade of roads by Serbs in Northern Kosovo last eight

months clearly demonstrate that the international force cannot replace indigenous forces in an independent country. It is necessary to engage the KSF in security duties, particularly in conjunction with KFOR, so that the KSF can benefit from KFOR's expertise and begin to deal with the duties which will become its long-term responsibilities. To do this, KFOR should begin shifting security responsibilities to the KSF. At the same time, the KSF should continue developing further into an educated, professional, efficient and affordable force for the Republic of Kosovo.

Scope

The scope of this thesis is to examine the necessity for a mission and role expansion of the KSF. I will do this by giving an overview of the KSF's heritage. I will discuss the KLA and KPC, while trying to highlight the importance of this heritage for the security in Kosovo and the future of the KSF. I will present the current picture of security in Kosovo by describing both the KFOR and the KSF roles and capabilities. I will continue by analyzing how these roles need to shift faster to benefit the KSF, and I will explain the necessity for these shifts, for the long-term solution of sustainable peace in the region. I will cover briefly national relations between the Serbs and the Albanians as the most important premise for peace in the region. I will propose a future concept for development of the KSF, taking into account threats. I will also discuss the Republic of Kosovo's orientation to join the EU and to have a special relationship with the USA, particularly in the security sector.

I will analyze the above issues only to an extent which is necessary for the purpose of this thesis. I will not include a lot of issues and segments of the complex

situation in the Western Balkans and in Kosovo, but I will try to include all those issues which are directly relevant to the future of the KSF.

Assumptions and Limitations

I will write this proposed thesis under the following assumptions and limitations:

NATO will not be able to stay in Kosovo indefinitely; therefore, some force will need to assume the KFOR's role;

Kosovo is an independent state that must eventually take over responsibility for its own security;

Kosovo will remain determined to become a full member of NATO and the EU;

Kosovo's strategic orientation for special relations with the USA will remain the same;

There will not be major combat operations in Kosovo in the near future that will significantly change or alter the security situation.

Relevance

Kosovo represents the most successful story of the International Community's engagement after the end of Cold the War. NATO and the UN invested vast amount of money, efforts, and engaged large numbers of personnel for over 12 years. Beside this, the USA and the EU in particular have invested a lot of political credit to build a democratic and functional state in Kosovo. Now, because of this short support for the KSF and the delays in its development jeopardizes all these investments. Ethnic relations in Kosovo and overall in the Balkans remain fragile. Serbia's nationalistic mindset and its attitude toward Kosovo has changed a little. They do not hide their ambitions to separate

Serbs Republic from BiH, and Northern Kosovo from Kosovo.³ Pan Albanian movements in Balkans (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, South Serbia/Eastern Kosovo and Montenegro) are rising.⁴ Albanian nationalistic political parties in Kosovo are gaining more and more support.⁵

To ensure that all these challenges can be overcome and Kosovo can be a democratic source of stability in the region, it is necessary to immediately build-up the KSF. This thesis will demonstrate the necessity for a faster development of the KSF's security role, including the transfer of responsibilities from the KFOR to the KSF, and explore the future development concept for the KSF.

¹“Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK,” *JURIST: The Law Professors’ Network*, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/peace.htm#KLA> (accessed 4 December 2011).

²Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

³Serbian officials from Republica Srpska, publicly declares that they see Serbia as they state, but not BiH. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo and uses all its means to hinder Kosovo's government to establish control in Northern part of Kosovo. Where Serbs are majority, requesting publicly partition of Kosovo as the only solution that they would agree.

⁴Aleanca KuqeZi, <http://www.aleancakuqezi.al/2012/lajme/zyrtarizohet-partia-aleanca-kuq-zi/> (accessed 23 April 2012).

⁵Report of Central Election Commission of Republic of Kosovo, <http://www.kqz-ks.org/SKQZ-WEB/al/zgjedhjetekosoves/materiale/rezultatet2010/1.%20Rezultatet%20e%20pergjithshme.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2012).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

There are no serious publications that directly address the KSF's future. However, there are enough publications that will provide adequate information for my proposed thesis. I have divided these sources into five categories. The first category includes international documents and agreements; the second group of sources includes legislative documents of Kosovo; the third group includes reports and publications published by different international institutions and Institutes; the fourth category of sources includes historical documents, publications and histories about regional nationalism; and the fifth group includes publications and interviews of key players in Kosovo's recent history and those who are holding offices now. By using these different groups of sources, I intend to design a comprehensive approach to investigating my research question.

International documents and agreements

These sources include the following type of documents: UNSC Resolutions for Kosovo, Contact Group's Statements about Kosovo, EU Parliament Resolutions, EU Council's Statements, and other international organization's codified efforts to preserve peace in Kosovo. Some of the main sources in this group are: the Rambouillet Accords, the Military Technical Agreement, between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, UNSC Resolution 1244, the Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the KLA signed by the KFOR Commander and the KLA Commander in Chief, UNMIK

Regulation 1999/8 and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. These documents and agreement offer information useful to understanding the evolution of the security environment in Kosovo, the impact of the International Community in the development of the KSF, and the KSF's current position from the point of view of International Community.

The Rambouillet Accords are the proposed agreement from the Contact Group on 6 March 1999 in Rambouillet, France. This proposal came after two rounds of negotiations, and in short words, it guaranteed the territorial integrity of the FRJ, granted wide autonomy for Kosovo, and requested an International force deployment in Kosovo, and foresaw to settle the final status of Kosovo after a three year transition period. Kosovo's final status had to be settled by the International Community, taking into account the points of view of international actors with interests in Kosovo, and taking into account the will of the people of Kosovo. The Albanian delegation signed the agreement, but the FRJ refused to sign it. This refusal by the FRJ opened the door to NATO to start the Air Campaign against the FRJ. This document provides information related to how and why NATO started the Air Campaign against FRJ.

The Military Technical Agreement, between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, is the agreement which ended the war in Kosovo. It provides a clear picture of the fighting's outcome. It is called an "Agreement" and legally is treated as such, but in substance, it is a capitulation act of the FRJ in front of NATO Air Campaign. It provides clear provisions which establishes the KFOR as the only security force in Kosovo with the right to use all means to ensure compliance with this agreement. It provides clear and

detailed provisions for the FRJ to withdraw all its forces and equipment from Kosovo and establishes Air and Ground Safety Zones within Serbia. Even though there are provisions that speak about the possibilities of bringing back some of the FRJ forces, this agreement makes it clear that the FRJ or Serbia cannot bring back any security personnel without the KFOR Commander's approval. However, this agreement has no any provision regarding the KLA. Considering that the KLA was an important part of the conflict on the ground, this is a big gap within this agreement. This document provides good information and clarity for KFOR's position in Kosovo.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSC Resolution 1244) basically "codifies" the Rambouillet Accords and the Military Technical Agreement within the UN's legal system, and empowers them with UN legitimacy. UNSC Resolution 1244 provided a basis for the UN protectorate in Kosovo and established UN mission in Kosovo, called UNMIK. It was also the first document of the post war legal system in Kosovo. Because RES 1244 was adopted by the UNSC, it was the document accepted by all states, including Russia and China. UNSC Resolution 1244 called for the demilitarization of the KLA. Even though RES 1244 does not provide a clear vision for Kosovo's final status and subsequently does not provide clear provisions for building indigenous forces in Kosovo, this document legally serves as the starting point for the creation of indigenous security forces in Kosovo because any other document or agreement adopted later had to be in harmony with this resolution.

The Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the KLA was signed by the KFOR Commander and the KLA Commander in Chief. It is the last document which established the KFOR as only legitimate security force in Kosovo. It describes in

detail how the KLA should be demilitarized. It provides a timetable of activities, gathering of weapons, removing checkpoints, withdrawing personnel and the demilitarization process. This document assigns clear responsibility and authorizations for carrying out these activities. The Undertaking calls on the International Community for recognition of the KLA's contribution during the Kosovo crises. One of these provisions which recognizes the KLA's contribution provides the basic provisions for creation of the KPC. This document provides information about the KLA demilitarization and its international recognition of its contribution. It provides a vision of what the KLA successor should look like, and it opens a path for the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) as the head of the UN mission in Kosovo to adopt regulations through which the KPC will be established.

UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 establishes the KPC. It places the SRSG as the highest authority in Kosovo, which was placed under UN Administration on 20 September 1999. REG 1999/8 provides detailed information for the KPC. It defines the KPC as a civilian emergency service agency, prescribes its tasks, strength and composition, and stresses that the KPC should have no role in law enforcement. It makes clear that the KPC shall operate under the authority of the SRSG, while the KFOR shall provide day-to-day operational direction to the KPC. This document provides needed information essential to understanding the International Community's point of view for the KPC. Because this treatment of the KPC by the International Community was a source of tensions in Kosovo's society, this document helps us to better understand the substance of these tensions.

The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, was the proposal of President Marti Ahtisari, the UN envoy for Kosovo, for settling the final status of Kosovo. It proposed Kosovo to become an independent and democratic country, with the intention to preserve peace by doing justice. It is a very detailed proposal and tends to regulate principles of all spheres of life in Kosovo. This proposal contains provisions about the security sector too. It calls for dissolution of the KPC and creation of the KSF. It provides the initial mission for KSF (which was the KPC mission), details the initial limitations for its strength and equipment, including NATO's obligations related to standing up the KSF, and describes the possibility of review of its mission five years after its creation. This document provides information which helps in understanding why we have the KSF now, why it is such as it is, and explains why the KPC was dissolved.

Legislation and documents of the Republic of Kosovo

The second group of sources will be the legislation of the Republic of Kosovo, starting with the Constitution, The Law for the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, The Law for the Kosovo Security Force, The Law on Dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps, Strategy for Development of the KSF and other official documents of the Republic of Kosovo, in particular the MKSF documents and publications. These documents create the necessary legal structure for the dissolution of the KPC and for the creation of the KSF. These documents also codify civil democratic control over the KSF in the newly declared independent Republic of Kosovo.

Strategy for the KSF is the official strategy of Kosovo's Government for the development of the KSF. It provides information for official stand of Government of Kosovo about different issues regarding the security situation in Kosovo. The weak side

of this document is that it is approved by government, which is a political body, and in its production had to take care to not cause any political or diplomatic incident. Considering the complex situation in Kosovo, where are present NATO, EU, UNMIK, and other international organizations and the fact that between states which did not recognize the independence of Kosovo are some of the EU members and Russia, it could have broad political, diplomatic and security consequences.

Reports and publications published by different
international institutions and institutes

The third group of sources will be reports and publications published by different international institutions and Institutes, including: the International Crises Group (ICG), the Human Right Watch, different European Institutes, and the Kosovo Institutes. Individual researchers may also give enough evidence concerning different aspects of life and socio-politic developments in Kosovo. In this group, it is important to emphasize specific ICG Reports including: “What Happened to the KLA,” “Collapse in Kosovo,” and “An army for Kosovo,” “Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA,” published by BICC; and “Under Orders, War Crimes in Kosovo,” published by Human Rights Watch.

The ICG report, “What Happened to the KLA,” analyzes the success of the demilitarization process of the KLA. It analyses methods and tools used in this process and also provides information for determining the success of these methods and tools. It also analyses failures in this process and the consequences for Kosovo’s society. Overall, this report provides analyzes of the KPC’s successes, challenges, and presents a summary of the KPC’s functional problems. This report really answers the questions captured by

its title: what happened to the KLA. Because the KLA was the indigenous security force in Kosovo during the war, and because the KPC was the important security factor in Kosovo later, information from this report is very important to the research base of this thesis.

The ICG report, “Collapse in Kosovo,” analyzes in detail the riots in Kosovo in March of 2004. This report describe the fragile security situation in Kosovo at that time and explains the complexities associated with inter-ethnic hatred. This report also portrays the position of the main institutions in Kosovo’s society and evaluates their responses to the riots. Of course, this report includes the KPC also. Comprehensively, the KPC is portrayed as the most successful institution during the riots. The report also notes the influence of the KPC’s popularity, and Kosovo’s non-Serbian population’s perceptions of the KPC as main reasons for this success.

The ICG report, “An Army for Kosovo,” analyzes the security situation in Kosovo in 2006, and describes the eventual need for an army for Kosovo. This report was published in time for the UN initiated process for determining Kosovo’s future status. It describes the fragility of the security situation, and examines possible sources of the unrest. This report also evaluates the roles of the main institutions in Kosovo and includes a positive evaluation for the KPC and the cooperation between KFOR-KPC. In conclusion, the report recommends that Kosovo should have its army, though one with limitations initially, and presented the KPC as a good base to start the creation of this new security structure in Kosovo. This report provides an objective evaluation of the security situation in Kosovo at that time. It illustrates the KPC’s role in that situation and

stresses the necessity of including the KPC in the creation of the new security structure in Kosovo.

“Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA,” published by BICC, is a publication which analyzes the former KLA segments and individuals influence in Kosovo’s postwar situation. It describes the startup and growth of the KLA, and includes the effects of NATO’s campaign on the KLA. It also describes the demobilization process of the KLA, the integration process of the former KLA combatants into the postwar society, and discusses their eventual implications in illegal activities. One example cited was the eventual engagement of former KLA combatants in ethnic conflicts in South Serbia and Macedonia, and the report links such activities as risks to efforts for building a new multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. Even though the authors’ claims are mostly hypothetical and never proven, these publications provides a lot of valuable information about the KLA and the KPC.

“Human Rights Watch Report: Under Orders, War Crimes in Kosovo,” is a report about war crimes in Kosovo during the war. It presents these crimes with details and accuracy, and the report provides full documentation and information related to the possible units or persons responsible for these crimes. This report has particular value because the research was conducted by a neutral party, in this case, by a credible worldwide organization for the protection of human rights, Human Rights Watch. This report brings light to the brutality of the war in Kosovo, including Serbia’s genocidal intentions against the Albanians, and it aids in understanding the inter-ethnic hatred between the Albanians and the Serbs, as well as the consequences of this hatred for the security situation in the Republic of Kosovo.

Historical documents, publications and histories about Regional nationalism

The fourth category of sources will be historical documents, publications and histories about Regional nationalism as source of conflict. This group includes Albanian sources, Serbian sources and International sources. Some of the main publications of this group are: Memorandum, written by Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Nacertanje written by Ilija Garashanin in 1844, The expulsion of the Albanians. Memorandum prepared in 1937, and The Minority Problem in New Yugoslavia. Memorandum, written in 1944 Vaso Cubrilovic's, Memorandum on Kosovo and the Albanian Question in former Yugoslavia, signed by Isuf Berisha, President of the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo, December 1991, Memorandum on the Albanian Question, This Memorandum of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals was sent on 26 October 1995 to the foreign prime ministers of USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia. A short History, by Noel Malcolm, Albanians: Modern History by Miranda Vickers.

“The expulsion of the Albanians Memorandum,” written in 1937, by Vaso Cubrilovic, is a detailed elaboration related to how to expel the Albanian people for Kosovo. It elaborates why militarily and strategically this is important. Due to the failure of the Yugoslav Government to change the demographic structure in favor of Serbs through the Colonization process in Kosovo, this Memorandum proposes expulsion of the Albanians as the only solution. It provides detailed information related to how and why the Colonization process is failing. It provides detailed instructions about the methods to be used by the Yugoslav Government, which include systematic harassing, killing, taxing, and attacking their religion and women. It provides Albania and Turkey as countries in which Albanians should be expelled.

“The Minority Problem in New Yugoslavia, Memorandum,” written in 1944, by Vaso Cubrilovic. It justifies that Serbs and Croats should use the end of World War II to clean minorities from Yugoslavia. Minorities should be accused of collaboration with occupation forces, and this will justify their expulsion. It provides detailed elaboration related to how Albanians should be expelled primarily from Kosovo, but from Macedonia and other parts too. It also provides detailed elaboration related to how Germans and Hungarians should be expelled from Vojvodina.

“Memorandum,” written by Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986 and signed by more than 200 Serbian intellectuals, prescribes the situation of Serbian people within Yugoslavia and portraying them as victims. They elaborate how Croatia and Slovenia jointly work against Serbia. They claim how Albanians are waging war against Serbs in Kosovo, with the purpose to cleanse it ethnically. Their document gives the vision for the future of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia. As first step, they see is to annul Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s autonomies. In simple terms, this vision says that if Yugoslavia collapses, then all Serbs should live within a state. The Document continues by giving concrete instructions on how Serbian institutions should act, including the methods and tools which they should use to achieve this vision. This document is important because is produced by the highest educational and intellectual institution in Serbia, and it was supported almost unanimously by Serbs as a nation, and furthermore, since then, it has become “National Program” of their state and national orientation.

“Memorandum on Kosova and the Albanian Question in former Yugoslavia,” signed by Isuf Berisha, the President of the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosova, December 1991, was written as a response to the Serbian Memorandum of

Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It is important because primarily it provides information about the attitudes, mindset and values in which Kosovo's Albanians based their vision about their future and how they thought to implement their ambitions. It provides valuable information about the demographic structure in Kosovo, historic facts, evidences for continued repression against Albanians and informs about the Albanian decision to peacefully resist to occupation forces. It also asks for the help of the Democratic World. When you compare the Albanian "Memorandum" and the Serbian "Memorandum," it is easy to distinguish the mindset and values of each of them and contrast these values.

"Memorandum on the Albanian Question," This Memorandum of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals, was sent on 26 October 1995 to the foreign prime ministers of the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. This second Memorandum is a repetition of first one with an up-date on the situation of the Albanian people in Kosovo. This Memorandum was written to actualize the Albanian problem with hope that it could be included in the Dayton peace negotiations which were planned for December 1995. It is addressed to Contact Group countries which were sponsors of Dayton peace negotiations.

Shteti i Kosoves, kontribut i shume brezave [State of Kosovo, contribute of many generations] written by Syle Arifi in 2009, is an excellent book which provides the chronological endeavors of many generations for independence of Kosovo. In particular, it provides valuable information about the peaceful resistance of Albanians in the 1990s, the clashes of peaceful resistance and armed resistance movements in Kosovo, and also it

provide information related to how the KLA established contact with the international community and notes the importance of these contacts.

Kosovo: A Short History, by Noel Malcolm, his work is one of the main international books written about history of Kosovo in particular. This book gives information about the Illyrian origin of the Albanians, and explains the contest of the battle of Kosovo between the Balkan Peoples and the Othman Empire in 1389. In particular, Malcolm explains how the Serbs created myths about this battle and how it became part of the Serbian identity. The greatest value of this book is that it proves that Albanians and Serbs lived in relative peace until recent history. Ethnic problems started in the 1800s, and grew to hatreds in the beginning of 1900s. It does not provide detailed information about Kosovo's history since the start of World War II.

Between Serb and Albanian: History of Kosovo, by Miranda Vickers provides valuable information about Kosovo's history, in particular, the history of the 20th century. It provides very good information about Kosovo's position in Yugoslavia, ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs and explains how these tensions arose, and describes the main sources and causes of these tensions. A weak side of this book is its coverage of the far history of Kosovo. In combination with Malcolm's book, they provide quite completed picture of the history of Kosovo for an International point of view and neutral and objective point of view.

Publications and interviews of key players in Kosovo's recent history
and those who are holding offices now

In this group of sources fall the publications of high international officials, who led international efforts to avoid war in Kosovo, then led the war and the subsequent

efforts to make peace. In this group fall also interviews and statements of present officials who hold offices in the Republic of Kosovo, Serbia, International Organizations, and other states with influence in the region of the Western Balkans. These sources are important because the authors of these sources shaped, and continue to shape policies in the Western Balkans and Kosovo. Some of the main publications in this group include books published by former USA President Bill Clinton, former NATO Commander General Wesley Clark, former UK Minister Denis Macshane and interviews and statements by Kosovo's Officials and Serbia's Officials.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In writing this thesis I am going to use a qualitative research methodology.¹ A qualitative research methodology is one of the main methodologies used in social sciences.² Qualitative research seeks to explore a problem or topic, to understand it and to provide complex textual answers related to the “how”³ and “why” of a research problem.⁴ Understanding more about the how and why of a research problem offers a sense of depth and breadth related to the research topic, but it is important to note also that conclusions drawn from qualitative research methods cannot be measured or easily represented with numbers, graphics or formulas.

The major limitations associated with qualitative methodologies are that of potential bias and subjectivity. However, by using the multi-perspective analysis combined with external sources and my own experiences, I will be able to reduce potential both threats of bias and subjectivity. This multi-perspective approach is called “triangulating” and it is an approach within qualitative methodological frameworks used to strengthen research findings while providing increased levels of objectivity.

This research study includes primary and secondary sources. Primary sources provide uncontested information and data about organizations, processes, events and situations. Secondary sources allow me to present analyses and conclusions of other researchers from different institutions, processes, events, and situations which are important to enlighten and support my thesis. The combination of these sources is necessary to answer my research question and prove my thesis.

Primary sources used in this research includes the following types of documents: international documents and agreements; legislative documents of the Republic of Kosovo; historical documents; publications and interviews of key players in Kosovo's recent history and those who are holding offices now. Considering that the process of developing the KSF is a contemporary topic, the primary sources are important to understanding the vision, plans, intentions and opinions of the main institutions and actors involved in shaping future of the KSF.

Secondary sources include: reports and publications published by different International Institutions and Institutes; and publications and histories about regional nationalism. Secondary sources are important in particular because they portray different perspectives with different goals, and these sources will be very useful for maintaining the objectivity of my thesis.

I will analyze collected information and answer the proposed research questions by observing the KSF from three different points of view: the historic point of view, the international point of view and the regional point of view. This is important because these three factors have a huge impact in the security situation in Kosovo, and by this, they have a huge impact in further developments of the KSF. Developing the KSF by balancing these three factors are keys to building the KSF in manner which will ensure peace in Kosovo and will contribute to lasting peace in the region.

I will draw conclusions and present recommendations based upon results gained through analyses. In drawing conclusions and giving recommendations, I will view gained results by analyses through my experience as an active participant in these processes. This process of drawing conclusions is one of the advantages of the qualitative

research methodology.⁵ By analyzing the research problem from three different points of view, considering the reliability of secondary sources, and through using my own experiences as an active participant in these processes, I will be able to draw reliable, informed conclusions in support of my thesis. I also will be able to present some recommendations that will be useful in the process of building security forces in Kosovo. If not implemented in the process of building security forces in Kosovo, these recommendations will be useful in other academic works.

¹Family Health International, “Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Gield Guide,” <http://www.ccs.neu.edu/course/is4800sp12/resources/qualmethods.pdf> (accessed 2 May 2012).

²Major Egil Daltveit, “The March 2004 Riots in Kosovo: A Failure of the International Community” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2007), 14-16,

³Family Health International, “A Data Collector’s Gield Guide.”

⁴Daltveit, “The March 2004 Riots in Kosovo,” 14-16.

⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Roots of the KSF

Introduction

Creation of the KSF was part of a process of consolidating the security sector in the independent Republic of Kosovo. The KSF is the only indigenous security organization in the Republic of Kosovo. The KSF was created on 21 January 2009.¹ Even though legally the KSF was established on 21 January 2009, its roots and heritage go much further back in history.

Most Albanians view the KSF as the result of the continuous struggles of Kosovo's Albanians for freedom during the 20th century. Since 1912 when Kosovo was divided from Albania and given to Serbia by the London Congress in 1913,² the Albanians never stopped fighting against the Serbian occupation of Kosovo. In fact, Kosovo was the primary issue underlying the "Albanian Cause" in the Balkans.

However, in the sense of ideology, values, personnel and structure, the KSF's roots extend back to the KLA and the KPC. To understand better the nature of the KSF, a brief background is presented detailing how the KSF came to life, the values upon which the KSF is built, and its heritage and the importance of this history for the KSF's future. Next, brief backgrounds of both the KLA and the KPC are presented. Finally, considering that the International Community has also had an important role in all phases of the KSF's history, it is necessary to include an overview of the International Community's engagement in Kosovo.

Emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences published “Memorandum” as a path for the Serbian Nation in attempts to overcome the economic and social crises that captured Yugoslavia at that time.³ The main instruction of the “Memorandum” was that in case of the collapse of Yugoslavia, all Serbs should live in one state. One of the claims in the “Memorandum” was that the Albanians were waging war against the Serbs in Kosovo to clean it ethnically, so Serbia should take radical measures to stop this.⁴ Under this nationalistic platform would rise up a new leader in Serbia. His name was Slobodan Milosevic.⁵ His first step in putting in life great Serbia was to dismiss Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s Autonomies. On 29 March 1989 Serbia stripped Kosovo of its autonomy.⁶ The Albanians started a peaceful resistance against the occupation. The peaceful resistance was organized under the leadership of the historical president of Kosovo, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo.⁷ The peaceful resistance was strongly encouraged by the democratic world at that time. Even though Dr. Rugova at that time had more than 99 percent support of the Albanians in Kosovo,⁸ some small groups started to organize an armed resistance.⁹

The most constant groups in active resistance activities were the LPK (Kosovo’s People Movement), the LKQK (National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo) and also some independent groups.¹⁰ The political and financial activities of these groups were mainly organized in Western Europe, while training and armament took place in Albania, and operations were conducted in Kosovo.¹¹

Serbian forces destroyed most of the operative groups in Kosovo. Some of the main members were killed, some members were arrested, and others left the country and

escaped to Western Europe. Only a small number of these fighters managed to continue operations in Kosovo. The Drenica Group headed by Adem Jashari was the most active and the only constant group of resistance. Since 1991, Adem Jashari and his family openly and actively resisted against Serbia's occupation.¹²

In 1994, the KLA was established as a structure and by name.¹³ Thereafter, all actions executed by operative groups in Kosovo were executed as KLA operations and actions.¹⁴ The KLA in Kosovo operated covertly, (beside Jashari family) wearing masks.

From 26 to 27 November 1997, the KLA, led by Adem Jashari executed an action against Serbian police forces in the village of Rezalla e Re, Drenica Valley in central Kosovo. On 27 November as revenge for the KLA's action Serbia's forces killed an Albanian teacher in the elementary school of Llausha while he was teaching children. His funeral was scheduled for the next day, 28 November.¹⁵

This was a perfect moment for the KLA to appear on the public scene and to win the support of Kosovo's Albanians. The 28 November is a historical date for all Albanians. On 28 November 1443, Historical Albanian Prince Gjergj Kastrioti (Skenderbeu), declared the Independence from Ottoman Empire.¹⁶ On 28 November 1912, the Albanians declared independence of Albania from Ottoman Empire.¹⁷

Even though the Yugoslav/Serbian Government did not allow the Albanians in Kosovo to celebrate 28 November after 1912, they continued to celebrate it illegally. In funeral ceremonies, three armed KLA members showed up in front of the mass and announced that war was the only path to freedom, than asked the people to support the KLA. Suddenly people at the mass started to yell "KLA, KLA!"¹⁸ From that moment forward, the KLA increased rapidly, and Kosovo headed toward total war.

Demilitarization of KLA and creation of KPC

KFOR entered Kosovo on 11 June 2011. One of the first tasks of KFOR was to demilitarize the KLA because of UN resolution 1244 that required demilitarization.¹⁹ According to the Military Technical Agreement and UN resolution 1244, only KFOR was the legitimate security force in Kosovo.²⁰ This was quite a complex task, in part because the International Community's consideration for the KLA evolved from one extreme to another. In the beginning the KLA activities were considered as terrorism,²¹ while later the KLA became a reliable partner of the international community during peace negotiations²² and was later viewed as a trusted partner during NATO's air campaign.²³

By war's end, the KLA had approximately 20,000 members. They had fought actively for almost two years, resulting in approximately 1,800 KLA members killed in the fighting, and many of the KLA members were wounded or had suffered serious health damages.²⁴ The KLA was well-armed with light infantry weapons and its leaders strongly desired to keep the KLA as the Army of Kosovo. Also, for the Albanian people of Kosovo, it was difficult to accept demilitarization of the KLA, as they had managed to maintain an army throughout a troubled history filled with constant sufferings with no external protectors.

However, the KLA leaders knew the importance of maintaining a good relationship with the KFOR. The KLA became reliable partners of the International Community and understood that it was critical to Kosovo's future to support and develop this partnership. In 21 June 1999 in Pristina, the KLA Commander in Chief Mr. Hashim

Thaqi, and the KFOR Commander, Lt. General Mike Jackson, signed the Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the KLA.²⁵

According to this Undertaking, the KLA had the following obligations: to cease fire and disengage from zones of conflict; to demilitarize and integrate into civil society in accordance with UNSCR 1244 and the Rambouillet Accords; to agree that the international security (KFOR) and civil presence will operate without hindrance within Kosovo; to agree that this undertaking has immediate effect for all KLA forces in Kosovo and in neighboring countries. The KLA had to gather weapons in designated storage areas, and after 90 days handover these weapons to the KFOR; and the KLA Chief of Staff had to report to the KFOR about accomplishing these tasks within 90 days.

In addition to the obligations and restrictions previously described, the Undertaking also provided some benefits for the KLA, which are prescribed in Article 25 of the Undertaking. According to this article, the KLA intends to comply with UNSCR 1244 and the International Community should acknowledge the KLA contributions during the Kosovo crises. Because of these contributions, the International Community gave the KLA individual members the following considerations:

1. Recognition that, while the UCK and its structures are in the process of transformation, it is committed to propose individual current members to participate in the administration and police forces of Kosovo, enjoying special consideration in view of the expertise they have developed, while to the KLA as an organization, the International Community gives following considerations:

2. The formation of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard in due course as part of a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accord.

This was the provision which gave Kosovo the international legitimacy to transfer the KLA command structure, personnel, heritage and values to the upcoming indigenous successor of the KLA. This also made it possible for Kosovo's Albanians to preserve the KLA's sacrifices and values.

In accordance with this Undertaking, on 20 September 1999, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Bernard Kouchner, issued Regulation UNMIK/REG/1999/8, through which he as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with his authority given by UNSCR 1244, established the KPC.

So, exactly 90 days after the Undertaking of demilitarization and transformation by the KLA was signed, on 20 September 1999, the KPC was established. This demonstrated clear compliance of the KLA with the signed Undertaking, and also demonstrated the KLA's willingness to be a reliable partner for the International Community. This also illustrates the satisfaction of the International Community with KLA's demilitarization process. Creation of the KPC was the maximum of what the UNMIK and the KFOR could give the KLA under UN resolution 1244 as recognition for their roles during the crises. The UN resolution called for demilitarization of the KLA.²⁶

International Community Engagement in Kosovo and Cooperation with the KLA

The International Community's engagement in Kosovo began in the late 1980s when massive demonstrations by Albanians occurred and in 1989, Serbia annulled

Kosovo's Autonomy.²⁷ During the 1990s, Kosovo was left aside by the International Community, mainly because the Albanians decided to pursue their goals through peaceful resistance.²⁸ While in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, armed conflicts broke out because these parts of Yugoslavia, the same as Kosovo wanted to separate from Yugoslavia and establish their own independent states, while Serbia started fighting to let them do so, or at least to seize parts of their territories, claiming that these territories must belong to Serbs and Serbia.²⁹

However, in December 1992, US President George Bush issued a so-called "Christmas warning" through which he made clear to Serbian authorities that "in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia in proper."³⁰

The International Community missed a chance to solve Kosovo's problem in the Dayton Peace Agreement, and this vanquished the Albanians' hope for the International Community's help, thus convincing them that ideas of peaceful resistance were utopian. Kosovar Albanians were left believing that the only way to freedom was armed resistance.³¹ However, when conflict occurred in early 1998, by Serbian massacres against the civilian population, under the umbrella of "chasing KLA,"³² the International Community exerted tremendous efforts to stop the conflict in Kosovo and attempt to solve Kosovo's status with an international agreement between the Albanians and Serbia, which was sponsored by the International Community.

After continued incidents throughout February and March of 1998,³³ the International Community was mobilized to prepare and facilitate an agreement which would prevent another armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Under the lead of the

Contact Group,³⁴ the UN Security Council, US, EU, NATO and the OSCE worked diligently to avoid further bloodshed and to solve these conflicts through mutual agreement.

On 9 March 1998, immediately after the massacre of the Jashari family in the village of Prekaz,³⁵ the Contact Group in London adopted a Statement on Kosovo,³⁶ which set a framework for international engagement in Kosovo. In this Statement, the Contact Group made it clear that the International Community would not stand aside in this conflict; it also condemned the use of excessive force by Serbian police against civilians; it reaffirmed their commitment to human rights; and urged the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to begin gathering information related to violence in Kosovo; and supported the new OSCE mission in Kosovo, with mandates to address the problems in Kosovo.³⁷

The Contact Group made it clear that Kosovo's issues should be solved by international agreement, respecting the territorial integrity of the FRJ (Federative Republic of Yugoslavia), and stated also that they supported neither independence nor the status quo. In this statement, the Contact Group took some measures against the FRJ.³⁸ It called for President Milosevic to withdraw forces and cease security operations; to allow access to Kosovo for the humanitarian organizations; and to commit himself publicly to begin dialogue.³⁹

All following engagements of the International Community to avoid war in Kosovo were in line with this statement. Under the US's lead, The UNSC adopted five resolutions for Kosovo,⁴⁰ issued seven Statements of Presidency of the UNSC,⁴¹ the

Contact Group adopted five statements on Kosovo,⁴² and appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrook, Special Envoy for Kosovo issues.

In all these efforts, the International Community needed cooperation, trust, and reliable partners from both parties involved in this conflict. This was the moment when the International Community started to cooperate with the KLA, by recognizing the KLA as its key partner from the Albanian side. It is important to emphasize that the International Community's consideration for the KLA evolved from one extreme to the other over a short period of time. In the beginning, the KLA activities were considered as terrorism,⁴³ while later the KLA became a reliable partner of the International Community in peace negotiations⁴⁴ and a trusted partner during the NATO air campaign.⁴⁵

The first international recognition of the KLA was during a visit of USA Ambassador Holbrook to the KLA's local base in the village of Junik, on 24 June 1998.⁴⁶ The KLA appreciated the International Community's efforts, and respected the law of war, and all gentleman agreements with the international representatives. The KLA accepted their advice and made painful concessions for the sake of peace, by signing the Rambouillet Accords, which did not satisfy many of the Kosovo's Albanians requests and expectations.⁴⁷ As the KLA high official in Albania during this time, and one of founders of the KLA, Xhavit Haliti declared the KLA orientations were clear: 100 percent transparency with the US representatives.⁴⁸ This constructive behavior paid off for the KLA later during negotiations and during the demilitarization phase.

As part of these tremendous efforts, the International Community started a new OSCE mission in Kosovo. In October 1998, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission

deployed in Kosovo with the main task to verify compliance of all parties with UN Security Council Resolution 1199.⁴⁹ The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was supported by NATO using air surveillance.⁵⁰

After reporting the Massacre of Racak on 15 January 1999, Ambassador William Walker,⁵¹ head of the Kosovo Verification Team, was declared “persona non grata” by FRJ authorities⁵² and asked to leave Kosovo. Meanwhile, the International Community organized the Ramboulliet negotiation, hoping that an agreement could be achieved. Prior to this, both parties in conflict made commitments for peace and expressed a readiness to negotiate. The International Community, in particular the USA, assisted the Albanians in building up the negotiation team and supported the KLA in leading the negotiation team.⁵³ Such constructive efforts demonstrated that KLA’s efforts to cooperate, and started to pay off.

Under Contact Group facilitation, two rounds of the Ramboulliet negotiations were held in France, from 6 February to 18 March 1999. The Ramboulet Accords were offered to parties for signature by the Contact Group as a compromise solution. It is important to stress that the Ramboulliet Accords were built in principles of Statement on Kosovo adopted by the Contact Group in 9 March 1998 in London.⁵⁴ It guaranteed the territorial integrity of FRJ and wide self-governance autonomy for Albanians in Kosovo; FRJ would keep some of its forces in Kosovo; and a NATO force would deploy to maintain security. For Albanians, there was hope in the article where it was stated that the will of the people will be taken into consideration when settling the final status of Kosovo.⁵⁵

Kosovo's Albanians signed the Ramboulliet Accords on 18 March 1999, while Serbia refused to sign the agreement. After refusing the Ramboulliet Accords, the OSCE withdrew from Kosovo on 19 March 1999,⁵⁶ and Serbia started a new military offensive in Kosovo. As understood later, this offensive was prepared prior to and during the negotiations in Ramboulliet, using the negotiations as a tool to buy time for preparations for the new offensive. The aim of the Serbian offensive was to change the demographic structure of Kosovo by killing or expelling Albanians before signing any peace agreement.⁵⁷

Once more Serbia attempted to fool the International Community,⁵⁸ while the KLA proved to be a credible partner by accepting an agreement that did not fully accommodate their interests. Because of Serb crimes against civilians and to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, President Bill Clinton authorized NATO to launch air campaigns if Serbia did not withdraw all its forces from Kosovo.⁵⁹ Serbia refused to stop its offensive or to withdraw its forces.

NATO started an air campaign on 24 March 1999. After 78 days of bombing, Serbia surrendered and NATO had won the war. On 11 June 1999, in Macedonia, was signed the Military Technical Agreement which ended the NATO campaign and the conflict in Kosovo. According to the agreement, Serbia had to withdraw all of its personnel and equipment from Kosovo within 12 days, while the KFOR was authorized to enter Kosovo and operate as the only security organization in Kosovo.⁶⁰

Cooperation of key KLA leaders with the International Community continued even after the demilitarization of the KLA. All KLA members accused by the Hague Tribunal immediately responded by going voluntarily to face justice.⁶¹ It was very

difficult for the people in Kosovo to accept these accusations of KLA leaders, especially since they felt Albanians were the victims. In the period between March 1999 and June 1999, Serbs massacred and killed more than 10,500 civilian Albanians.⁶² More than 90 percent of Albanians were displaced, at least 860,000 Albanians were expelled out of Kosovo,⁶³ and over 40 percent of all houses were burned. Albanians were suspected by the Hague Tribunal of killing dozens of Albanian, Serbians and Roma civilians, under the KLA accusations that they collaborated with Serbian forces. There is no single case where the KLA killed civilians as a group, no case where the KLA killed children and no case where the KLA raped Serbian women. Even though all Serbian claims for war crimes against them were investigated by the International Community, the UNMIK/EULEX, or the Hague Tribunal, to this day, no high KLA commander has been sentenced for any major crime committed during the war.⁶⁴ Even though isolated incidents could have happened, this shows that the KLA as organization did not plan, execute or facilitate mass killings.

KPC's Mission, Strength, Structure, Control and its ambiguous nature

Mission. The initial KPC mission was exclusively of civil a nature. KPC tasks were: "Provide disaster response services; Perform search and rescue; Provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; Assist in demining; and Contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities."⁶⁵

Even though the KPC's mission was kept out of classic security engagements, considering that Kosovo was a country coming out of a two-year war during which most of its infrastructure and houses were destroyed following 10 years of occupation during which Serbia stole everything what they could transport in Serbia. In addition to

these constraints, during the occupation, Kosovo had no legitimate government to invest in infrastructure.⁶⁶ This mission opened the opportunity for the KPC to help all people through the strategies of winning their hearts and minds.

The nature of this mission gave the KPC access to all communities in Kosovo. Even though the levels of mistrust throughout Kosovo between Albanians and Serbs were very high, Kosovo's Albanians were determined to start reconciliation by integrating minorities into institutions and public life. The KPC took the lead in these processes to acknowledge minorities in Kosovo and the International Community.⁶⁷

As the situation evolved, in January 2006, the UNMIK adopted Regulation 200/3, which amended regulation 1999/8. Through this regulation, the KPC mission was extended as follows:

1. including monitoring unoccupied reconstructed homes of minority communities; and
2. perform ceremonial duties within its scope as a civilian emergency service agency, in accordance with directives of the KPC Coordinator and KFOR.

The first additional task, "including monitoring unoccupied reconstructed homes of minority communities," was very important and practically enabled the KPC to take over the tasks of a security nature, even though the language of UNMIK was very careful in the formulation of these changes. After these changes, the KPC was engaged to provide a security "Monitor" for the just-returned Roma minority neighborhood in Vushtrri.

With regard to the additional task "to perform ceremonial duties within its scope as a civilian emergency service agency, in accordance with directives of the KPC

Coordinator and KFOR,” this was an attempt to codify and restrict the KPC’s engagement in ceremonial duties because the KPC had been regularly performing military ceremonial duties since 1999.⁶⁸

The KPC’s Ceremonial Guard regularly honored dignitaries from NATO, the US, the EU, and the Kosovo Government who were visitors to the KPC. In addition, the KPC regularly organized ceremonies and parades for the KLA’s anniversaries and for Kosovo Albanian national anniversaries. Very often, the KPC participated in these activities against requests from the UNMIK/KFOR.

Accordingly, the KPC was authorized a limited number of weapons. The KPC owned 2,000 rifles, two hundred of which were in the KPC’s possession to guard its barracks, with 1,800 others kept under the KFOR’s control “in trust.”⁶⁹

Structure. The KPC was organized as follows: the KPC Headquarters with six subordinate regional units named “Protection Zones”. Protection Zone I; II; III; IV; V; and VI, which were regional commands and were commanded by a one-star General Officer; Six central units: Kosovo Guard; Logistic Command; TRADOC; 30th Engineer Brigade; Signal Battalion; Helicopter Escadrille and Medical Battalion.⁷⁰ On 6 June 2005, the Civil Protection Brigade was created.⁷¹ In general, this structure was inherited from the KLA.⁷²

The KPC was authorized 5,052 members, with 3,052 active and 2,000 reserves members.⁷³ Almost all KPC members were former KLA fighters.⁷⁴ The KPC was commanded by a three-star General Officer, and its members wore military uniforms, had ranks, unit patches, and practiced military drills and military courtesies.⁷⁵ Uniforms, signs, patches, and colors were very similar to the KLA.⁷⁶

Control and Supervision of KPC. The KPC was reserved competence of SRGS. In day to day operations, the KPC was under the KFOR's direction.⁷⁷ Besides this, within, UNMIK was established the Office of the KPC Coordinator. The head of this office was always a British two-star General.⁷⁸ The mission of this office was to make policies for the KPC, similar to the role of the Ministry of Defense. However, most of the time at the operational levels, the KPC maintained its autonomy. When the KPC deemed it necessary or its vital interests were at stake they made decisions, which were contrary to the UNMIK/KFOR policies.

Day-to-day activities of the KFOR were primarily intended to provide the KFOR supervision and observation of the KPC. To be more effective, the KFOR had liaison officers in each regional headquarters and in the KPC headquarters. The KFOR established a Joint Implementation Council, and later established the KFOR Inspectorate for the KPC. In the long term, this supervision helped the KPC to increase its levels of discipline and professionalism. It had an added benefit also allowing for the development of personal relationship between the KPC and the KFOR officers.⁷⁹

Ambiguous nature of the KPC. The predicament of the KPC was an issue around which there were constant tensions between parts of the International Community (UNMIK/KFOR), the KPC itself, and Kosovo's Albanians. The starting point of this ambiguity was the name of the KPC. In the Albanian language, there is only one word for the words "Protection" and "Defense," and it is word "Mbrojtje." Literally in Albanian, the KPC name, Trupat e Mbrojtjes se Kosoves, can be understood as the Kosovo Defense Corps.⁸⁰ In English language, however, there is a clear distinction between the words "Protection" and "Defense."

The International Community insisted on the meaning of “Protection,” while Albanians insisted on the meaning of “Defense.” The KPC was established as a new civilian emergency service agency, and the UNMIK/KFOR insisted that its name should treat it as such,⁸¹ but the KPC considered itself the direct successor of the KLA and as a military organization in a transition phase to become the Army of Kosovo.⁸² This view also was shared by most of the international observers in Kosovo,⁸³ while Kosovo’s Albanians considered the KPC as the Army of Kosovo and identified it with the KLA.⁸⁴

For more than nine years, this ambiguity was a source of tensions between the UNMIK/KFOR on one side and the Kosovo Albanians and some Kosovo Political Parties on the other side.⁸⁵ Considerations for the KPC were a source of tensions between Albanian political parties as well.⁸⁶

Relations between UNMIK/KFOR and the KPC worsened over time. In the beginning, relations were good and cooperation was close. The KLA maintained law and order in much of Kosovo for almost two years.⁸⁷ When the Serbian forces withdrew, the KLA moved into the cities and continued to maintain public order all over Kosovo (with the exception of the municipalities where the Serbian population lived as majority). The KPC inherited this situation from the KLA.⁸⁸

In the beginning, UNMIK welcomed these conditions because they lacked the capabilities to address these broad issues, while people desperately needed someone to maintain public order.⁸⁹ At the same time the over one million refugees returned to their homes, they found conditions where most of the houses had been burned; there was no shelter; no central police service were functioning; there was no health service and no economy; a myraid of problems in delivering food and humanitarian aid; and many

people searching relentlessly for missing relatives. For help with all of these issues, the people turned to the KPC, the KPC was the people's first support group.

As the UNMIK/KFOR consolidated its capabilities in the beginning of 2000, their attitudes towards the KPC changed, and the UNMIK/KFOR considered KPC's engagement illegal and negative.⁹⁰ The real reason for this change was that according to UNREG/ 1999/8, the KPC had no role in law enforcement, and the UNMIK/KFOR were under pressure to deny the KPC engagement in law enforcement. Still, even within the UNMIK, there were some voices supporting the KPC's continued engagement in maintaining law and order.⁹¹

This enforcement of UNREG 1999/8 started tensions between the UNMIK/KFOR and the KPC. These tensions contributed also to the UNMIK/KFOR's suspicions that the KPC members were involved in armed conflicts in the Preshevo Valley, South Serbia, (or also known to Albanians as "Eastern Kosovo"),⁹² and in war in Macedonia between the Albanian National Army and the Macedonian forces.⁹³

The UNMIK/KOFR also suspected that KPC members were involved in organized crime.⁹⁴ Even though these suspicions were never proved, there are some indications that some KPC members were involved in wars in the Preserve Valley and in Macedonia.⁹⁵

The UNMIK/KFOR did many things to make the KPC look as unprofessional and un-military as possible. When their senior officers were arrested were treated harshly, the KPC appeared powerless.⁹⁶ Yet, the KPC continued to focus on maintaining and increasing its military image and popularity with Albanians by associating itself with the former KLA.⁹⁷ By these means, in spite of the UNMIK/KFOR's attempts to make the

KPC look ridiculous, the KPC still won strategic level recognition. Being composed by former freedom fighters, under the outstanding leadership of General Agim Ceku and with the devotion of all its members, the KPC won the hearts and minds of Kosovo's Albanians. The KPC very quickly became the most popular and most trusted organization for Albanians (who represented more than 92 percent of the people in Kosovo), and the KPC commander Lt. General Agim Ceku became the most popular person in Kosovo.⁹⁸

Tensions continued to climb between the UNMIK/KFOR and the KPC. From 2001 to 2003, KPC members were subjected to daily arrests, detention, and pressures from the UNMIK/KFOR.⁹⁹ It went so far that KFOR commander General Fabio Mini (Italy), considered the KPC as a criminal organization,¹⁰⁰ and compared it to the Italian Mafia and committed to destroy it.¹⁰¹

KPC's reaction to this pressure was to attempt to avoid any further incidents with the KFOR. This treatment of the KPC frustrated the Kosovo Albanians who saw the KPC members as "liberators,"¹⁰² and who viewed the KPC as a vanguard of their aspirations for independence. These tensions continued to rise until the situation exploded in March 2004.

UNMIK/KFOR's persecution of KPC/KLA members was one of the main sources of the tension that led to the riots in March 2004.¹⁰³ On 17 and 18 March 2004, there were riots all over Kosovo, which targeted the Serbian and Roma minorities and everything else that symbolized Serbs. The fuse for these riots was an incident in northern Kosovo in which two Albanian children died in a river. The Albanian media broadcast the statement of a surviving child who said that they were chased by Serbs with dog.¹⁰⁴ However, the actual sources for these riots were the social situations, with

UNMIK/KFOR's privileged treatment for Serbs, and the struggle of these riots was UNMIK/KFOR's persecution of KPC and KLA members.¹⁰⁵

During the riots, 19 people died (11 Albanians and 9 Serbs).¹⁰⁶ Many Serbs and Roma were displaced, and their properties were burned by Albanians. Many Serbian churches and monasteries were burned. In addition, the UNMIK was under attack of Albanian demonstrates and many of their cars were burned. Both the UNMIK and the KFOR, to some degree, failed to protect the Serbs and Roma minorities against the angry Albanians. However, not all of the KFOR units failed. A US KFOR brigade successfully controlled riots. A US KFOR brigade partnered with the KPC to protect churches and patrol together from the first day.¹⁰⁷ On the second day, a German KFOR brigade also partnered with the KPC to assist with controlling the riots and guarding Serbian churches.¹⁰⁸

Results of those partnerships were evident. While hundreds of KFOR soldiers could not stop angry crowds from attacking the Serbs and Roma minorities, destroying their property, and burning Serbian churches, a few KPC members calmed the crowds, stopped them from attacking the Serbs and Roma, and guarded the Serbian churches. These successes came just in time for the KPC.

Only after the March 2004 riots did UNMIK/KFOR leaders understand that their attitudes toward the KPC were wrong and that KPC were an indispensable security factor in Kosovo.¹⁰⁹ After the riots, UNMIK/KFOR developed positive relations with the KPC, and as result of this mutual trust, the KPC was engaged to provide "monitoring" for the just-returned Roma minority neighborhood in the town of Vushtrri. To be able to engage the KPC in this "monitoring," the UNMIK had to adopt Reg. 2006/3 which amended

Reg. 1999/8. Again, the KPC's performance was outstanding. No incidents occurred, the Roma minority was safe, and they continue to live there still.

As the time approached for settlement of Kosovo's final status, the UNMIK/KFOR reports for the KPC were positive and in all assessments done by the International Community, the KPC was seen as a good base to start the creation of a new force in independent Kosovo.¹¹⁰ However, all reports stressed that the new force should be more ethnic neutral.¹¹¹ For the Albanians and KPC, Kosovo's independence was the bottom line.¹¹² As independence came onto the horizon, the Albanians were ready to accept any condition, even to dissolve the KPC.

For the sake of truth and accuracy, it is worth mentioning that US and UK officials and officers never identified themselves with the UNMIK/KFOR policy toward the KPC during 2001 to 2004. So, Kosovo Albanians and the KPC's consideration and attitude toward representatives of these two states was always friendly.¹¹³

Dissolution of the KPC and Creation of the KSF

The process of settling Kosovo's final status was started in 2005, by UN envoys, Kai Aide and then-President Ahtisari. President Ahtisari, after two years of negotiations, prepared his proposal for Kosovo's future status in a plan known as the Ahtisari Plan.¹¹⁴ He proposed "Supervised Independence," but Serbia refused this proposed solution, and because of this, Russia threatened to block the proposal in the UNSC. As a result, the proposal was never sent for voting in the UNSC, consequently, it was not approved by the UNSC.

Kosovo accepted the Ahtisari Plan which was acceptable for the democratic world (USA and EU).¹¹⁵ Because Serbia refused the Ahtisari Plan, Kosovo's Parliament

declared independence on 17 February 2008, and unilaterally anticipated obligations deriving from the Ahtisary Plan.¹¹⁶ The Ahtisari Plan called for the dissolution of the KPC and for the creation of the KSF.¹¹⁷

In accordance with the legislative agenda of the Ahtisary Plan, the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo on 13 March 2008 adopted the Law on Dissolution of the KPC, (No. 03/L-046). According to Article One of the Law on dissolution of the KPC, The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), having accomplished its goal, including the facilitation of Kosovo's post-conflict recovery, shall be dissolved within one year of the conclusion of the transition period. The KPC's dissolution and the KSF's stand-up was a parallel process. The KPC's mission and assets were transferred to the KSF,¹¹⁸ while KPC's personnel had to apply for the KSF.¹¹⁹

Meanwhile, the Parliament of Kosovo adopted the Constitution of Kosovo on 9 April 2008, which entered into force on 15 June of the same year. The Parliament of Kosovo then adopted the Law on Ministry for the KSF (Nr. 03/L-045), and the Law on Service in the KSF (No. 03/L-082), and the Law on the KSF (No. 03/L-083), on 13 June 2008. By adopting these documents, the Parliament of Kosovo created the necessary legal structure for standing up the KSF.¹²⁰

After the creation of the necessary legal structure, the Prime Minister of Kosovo appointed the Minister of the KSF, while the President of Kosovo appointed the KSF commander in December 2008.¹²¹ In accordance with his authorization, the Minister of the KSF on 20 January 2009 ordered the KSF Commander to activate the KSF.¹²² The KSF commander activated the KSF on 21 January 2009, at 00.00h.

Why is this heritage important?

This heritage is very important considering the history of the Balkans which has suffered multiple conflicts, and the fact that future Balkan conflicts could destabilize Europe. This heritage is unique for the KSF and differentiates the KSF from other armed forces in the region. The democratic world is struggling to build sustainable peace in the Balkans, so that Europe can focus on its economic development and eliminate threats to peace in its backyard.

To build this peace, the democratic world needs reliable local partners. This heritage indicates that the KSF and Kosovo are the only reliable partners for the long-term success in Kosovo. The democratic world has an important role in shaping this history and creating these values. The most important heritage that the KSF inherited from this history is characterized by popularity among Albanians, cooperation with the International Community and the KLA/KPC's culture of securing the peace.

The KLA and the KPC were the most popular organizations in Kosovo by far.¹²³ Even though minorities in Kosovo represents only eight percent of the total population,¹²⁴ within that eight percent, the Serbian minority is estimated to represent four percent of total population¹²⁵ generally refused the KLA and the KPC, holding them responsible for the war in Kosovo and for loss of their apartheid regime, Albanians 92 percent of the population in Kosovo and other minorities trust the KLA/KPC more than any other institution in Kosovo, including both the KFOR and the UNMIK.¹²⁶ All of Kosovo's Prime ministers up to present were former KLA combatants. In 2005, KPC Commander Agim Ceku was asked by the governing coalition to take over the Prime Minister's

position in a political situation that needed a person of authority to take leadership of the government in Kosovo.

During the riots in March 2004, the KPC was the only organization that did not fail.¹²⁷ As the successor of the KPC, the KSF inherited this popularity. One indicator of this popularity is the high number of applicants to become KSF members: in the recruiting campaigns of 2010 and 2011, over 8,500 applicants applied for 800 available positions and 228 excellent students applied for 10 available positions as cadets in 2011.¹²⁸

The KLA's and the KPC's cooperation with the International Community is important to note. The KLA cooperated closely with the International Community since the first contact in June 1998. Kosovo Albanian's negotiation team, headed by the KLA also cooperated closely with the International Community during the peace negotiation in Rambouillet.

Even though KLA leaders were confident that they could fight against Serbia, and although the Rambouillet Accords did not satisfy the all of the Albanians requests and expectations, for the sake of cooperation with the International Community and in order to meet the International Community's requests for peace, Kosovo Albanians signed the Rambouillet Accords. As President Clinton will write later "The KLA wanted independence and believed it could actually go toe-to-toe with the Serbian army."¹²⁹ General Clark will recall this issue in his book too, when he describes his meeting with the Albanian negotiation team in an attempts to explain to them a military annex "There was no deal. It was over I felt. The Albanians didn't seem to understand their position

and what international community was offering. . . . They just don't get it. They are uninformed and incredibly stubborn.”¹³⁰

In addition, the KLA, cooperated and provided Allied ground forces during the NATO air campaign against Serbia. In April 1999, the KLA launched operation “Arrow” in Kosovo-Albania border, with the purpose to open a channel of supply for KLA forces within Kosovo. This operation forced Serbs to move their mechanized units and artillery in order to stop KLA from penetrating their lines. This movement of forces made them easy target for NATO aircraft.¹³¹

During the demilitarization process in 1999, the KLA cooperated fully with the International Community and completed demilitarization within 90 days as it was specified in the agreement. Despite the bad experience during the demilitarization of the KLA, it is important to emphasize the KPC's readiness to trust the International Community and to accept the dissolution of the KPC in 2008.

An important aspect of cooperation with the International Community is its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. While the other parties in the former Yugoslavia refused to cooperate and hand over accused persons to the Tribunal, immediately after they were informed that they had been accused by the Tribunal, KLA/KPC members declared voluntary that they would present themselves to the Hague and face justice. This is very important in contrast to current cases when the International Community does not accept violations of human rights and leaves some people unpunished for crimes during wars and armed conflicts.¹³²

Currently, the KSF is an International Community project, and the KFOR was responsible for the initial stand up of the KSF. This cooperation still continues and is very

healthy. It is important for the International Community to have a reliable partner in Kosovo considering the tensions and sensitivities of the region. Considering the experiences in the Balkans over the last 20 years, only the KLA/KPC/KSF demonstrated itself as reliable partner of the International Community, in any circumstance, and will not misuse or abuse this partnership to gain an unfair advantage of any situation.

The KLA and the KPC had very strong command and control at the strategic and operational levels. Signature of the Rambouillet Accords, undertaking the demilitarization of the KLA, and accepting the dissolution of the KPC demonstrates the existence of strong command and control at the strategic level. The KLA's adherence to not attack Serbian forces during their withdrawal from Kosovo, the KPC's adherence to supporting Albanians during the conflict in Preshevo in 2000, and during war in Macedonia in 2000 and 2001 demonstrate strong command and control at the operational level. The KPC consistently demonstrated strong discipline in respecting the rule of law and the authority of the chain of command.

The KLA and NATO won the 1999 war in Kosovo.¹³³ The KPC was successful in all its undertakings. This built up a winning mentality, pride, and honor in the KLA and the KPC, and these values were transferred to the KSF. This differs from the armed forces of Serbia who lost wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo.¹³⁴

This differs also from the armed forces in Macedonia who fought against the Albanian National Army in 2000-2001, and who represented 25 percent of people of Macedonia.¹³⁵ The war ended with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which fulfilled all of the Albanian National Army and Albanian people's requests while radically changing the Macedonian position. It is worth noting also that all Albanian National Army requests

fall under the category of elementary human rights, and for that reason, the International Community supported them entirely.¹³⁶ So, the Macedonian Army fought against 25 percent of its own people, in support of a discrimination policy that was carried out by Macedonian Government at that time.

There is no criminal burden in the history of either the KLA or the KPC. There is no massacre or massive killings by the KLA or the KPC.¹³⁷ The Hague Tribunal accused six former KLA members, but for all these accused suspects for dozens of murdered and tortured people of multiple nationalities in Kosovo, each of them was accused in collaboration with Serbian forces. There is no case where the KLA killed Serbians only because they were Serbians, and there is no case where the KLA killed children, women, elderly, or disabled people.

How should the KSF mission, roles, and responsibilities increase
while the KFOR mission role and responsibilities decrease?

Introduction

The KSF today reflects the results of hard work done jointly by the KFOR and the KSF in a complex environment. The KSF have limitations according to President Marti Ahtisari's Plan.¹³⁸ Besides this, after Kosovo declared independence in 2008, the KFOR continued to stay in Kosovo according to UNRES 1244, which means neutral in status. However, NATO agreed to give new tasks to the KFOR in standing up the KSF.¹³⁹ Furthermore, the financial difficulties of Kosovo as a country contributed to the complicated situation as well.

The KSF Mission

The KFS mission is defined in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, which states, “The Kosovo Security Force shall protect the people and Communities of the Republic of Kosovo based on the competencies provided by law.”¹⁴⁰

Then Article nine of the Law of the KSF codifies further the mission of the KSF: “The Kosovo Security Force will be designed and prepared to fulfill security functions not appropriate for the police or other law enforcement organizations.”¹⁴¹

Article 10 of the Law on the KSF specifies the initial tasks of the KSF:

- a) to participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations. This will include operations outside the territory of the Republic of Kosovo where invited to do so;
- b) to assist civil authorities in responding to natural and other disasters and emergencies, including as part of a regional or international response effort,
- c) to conduct explosive ordnance disposal,
- d) to assist civil authorities through civil protection operations.

The KSF structure

The KSF has all together 3,300 troops, comprised of 2,500 active troops and 800 reserve troops. The KSF is composed of two components: the Integrated Ministry for the KSF and KSF (Land Force Command).

MKSF Structure




Figure 1. MKSF Structure

Source: MKSF official webpage, <http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,9> (accessed 16 February 2012).

The MKSF Mission is to exercise civilian control over the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), including management and administration and to formulate, implement, evaluate and develop the policies and activities of the KSF.¹⁴²

Structure of the Land Force Command

The KSF is composed of the Land Force Command as the headquarters body, with three main units: the Rapid Reaction Brigade, the Operation Support Brigade, and TRADOC, and two central units: Force Police and Crises Response Liaison Team.




Figure 2. Land Force Command Structure

Source: MKSF official webpage, <http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Broshura%20ANGLISHT%20%20-%20finale%207.02.2011.PDF> (accessed 16 February 2012).

Democratic control over the KSF

The Republic of Kosovo is a parliamentary democracy, and the KSF plays its role within the constitutional system. The democratic control upon the KSF is regulated within the Constitution of Kosovo, where the Constitution defines the tasks of Parliament, the President and the Prime minister. However, the same system of democratic control is repeated in Law on the KSF.

Presidential responsibilities over the KSF

“The President is the Commander-in-Chief (the Supreme Commander) of the Kosovo Security Force and appoints the Commander of the Kosovo Security Force upon the recommendation of the Government.”¹⁴³

According to the Law of the KSF, the President must also have the following authorizations:

1. Approve all promotions into the rank of General Officer on the joint recommendation of the Commander of the Kosovo Security Force and the Minister responsible for the Kosovo Security Force;
2. Approve all changes of appointment of General Officers on the joint recommendation of the Commander of the Kosovo Security Force and the Minister for the Kosovo Security Force

Responsibilities of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo upon the KSF

Besides the responsibilities in legislating, approving the budget, investigating funding and approving the deployment of the KSF, the Assembly has established a Parliamentary Committee to oversee the KSF.¹⁴⁴ The KSF Commander is obligated to submit an annual report to the Parliamentary Committee and answers personally the eventual questions of the Parliamentary Committee. The Committee has the right to review the KSF budget before it is sent to the Assembly for approval, and to review all equipment projects with a value higher than €1 million.¹⁴⁵

Government responsibilities upon the KSF

The Prime Minister has the responsibility to employ and exercise effective oversight and control of the KSF through the Minister for the KSF. The Minister for the KSF exercises general control and administration of the KSF, including any powers vested in the Commander of the KSF.¹⁴⁶

The Kosovo Security Council responsibilities upon the KSF

The Security Council has an advisory role regarding all matters relating to the security of the Republic of Kosovo, including the use of the Kosovo Security Force.¹⁴⁷

KSF's legal limitations

According to the Law of the KSF, the KSF cannot have tanks, heavy artillery, or air offensive capabilities. These limitations will be reviewed five years after entry in force of this Law, which means that these limitations will be reviewed in mid-year 2013.

KSF's accomplishments

Since its activation three years ago, the KSF has achieved many successes. In the beginning, the KFOR was the engine which ran the KSF. Initially in 2008, the KFOR ran the selection process for the KPC members. The KPC members selected for the KSF generally were selected in equivalent ranks with those held in the KPC. So, after the initial selection, the KSF had its officers' structure fulfilled.¹⁴⁸ In 2009, the KFOR organized initial training for selected personnel, and organized the first recruiting campaign for recruits from civilian society. The first recruits from civilian society graduated on 24 June 2009.¹⁴⁹ The KFOR provided support for the KSF to build a needed infrastructure, and provided the instructors and means for training. On 15 September 2009, NATO declared the KSF initial capabilities, which included: firefighting, search and rescue, and de-mining.¹⁵⁰ On 18 December 2009, the KSF took over from the KFOR the responsibility to conduct basic training.¹⁵¹ In 2010, the KSF took over responsibility to lead activities, while the KFOR started "Mentoring" the KSF.¹⁵² The KSF continued its development, and on 22 November 2011, the KFOR commander proposed to NATO

HQ to declare the KSF's full operational capabilities. This process is ongoing, and it is expected to be completed in 2012.¹⁵³

The KSF signed a Partnership agreement with the IOWA National Guard on 18 March 2011,¹⁵⁴ and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the following countries: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland–29 May 2009; The Republic of Lithuania–30 November 2009; The Kingdom of the Netherlands–23 December 2009; The Republic of Turkey–24 December 2009; The Republic of Albania–16 February 2010; The Republic of Macedonia–14 April 2010; The Republic of Montenegro–3 November 2010.¹⁵⁵ On 17 February 2012 the Republic of Kosovo signed the Agreement for Status of Forces with the USA.¹⁵⁶

Current KFOR capabilities, missions and tasks

The KFOR's main legal basis is still under UNSCR1244, according to which KFOR's mission is: to maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.¹⁵⁷

After Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, NATO reaffirmed that the KFOR remains in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244,¹⁵⁸ which means that the KFOR should remain status neutral.

On 12 June 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing its new tasks in Kosovo: “to assist in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and in the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and a civilian structure to oversee the KSF.”¹⁵⁹

KFOR structure

The KFOR's total strength today is: 5,790 troops from 29 Contributing Nations. It is organized in its HQ, two Multinational Battle Groups,¹⁶⁰ five Joint Regional Detachments, and the KFOR also has the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) and Tactical Reserve Maneuver Battalion(KTM).¹⁶¹




Figure 3. KFOR Structure

Source: KFOR official webpage, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/docu/docs/pdf/structurez2011.pdf> (accessed 19 February 2012).

Which roles should the KSF assume from the KFOR

The role of “securing freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin” should switch as soon as possible from the KFOR to the KSF. This switch should take effect in all areas of Kosovo except in the northern part where Serbia’s

security forces hinder freedom of movement.¹⁶² In this part of Kosovo, it is not an issue of freedom of movement, but of possible aggression by Serbia, although such action directly violate the Military Technical Agreement and UNSCR 1244¹⁶³ and the KFOR is obligated to deal with it.¹⁶⁴

Presently, the KFOR is securing many of the Serbs religious and cultural sites. This role should shift from the KFOR to the KSF. Additionally, the KFOR is currently securing Serbian minorities by escorting them when they travel in large groups around Kosovo, and by sending patrols in minority and multiethnic municipalities to secure them. These tasks should be also transferred to the KSF as soon as possible. The KFOR have a role in securing a peaceful environment in the case of riots or large scale protests. This role should also shift to the KSF too.

Also, the KFOR should include the KSF as much as possible in all other activities. All of these transfers of the roles from the KFOR to the KSF and the KSF's participation in the KFOR's activities should be integrated in a gradual manner over time, not in one day. For a time it is important that the KFOR and the KSF should overlap in doing these roles. Without such a transition with a period of overlap, there could be dangerous security gap created between the security needs of Kosovo and the security capabilities of the KSF.

Rationale for Role Shifts

Presently, Kosovo is an independent country, the KFOR remains in Kosovo according to UNSCR1244, which means they act as a neutral party regarding Kosovo's status. This dichotomy creates a discrepancy between Kosovo's efforts to develop as an independent country and the KFOR's current mandate concerning managing a neutral

country. The shift of responsibilities for securing minorities, in particular the Serbian minority, will contribute toward reconciliation and the further integration of minorities into Kosovo's society. All minorities (beside the Serbs in northern Kosovo, who live in three municipalities as a majority and represent approximately 30 percent of all Serbs living in Kosovo) have recognized and accepted Kosovo as their country. The government of Kosovo is determined to be a multiethnic society and a homeland to of all its citizens, so the KSF will be an essential institution to promote reconciliation and the coexistence of all peoples.

As elaborated previously, the KPC members played a very positive role in securing Serbian churches and property, and in controlling the riots in March 2004, in those parts of Kosovo where the KFOR engaged them, while in those parts where the KFOR refused to engage the KPC/KSF, they had much worse results in securing Serbian churches and property and in controlling riots. In 2006, the KPC assumed responsibility to monitor (secure) the Roma minority neighborhood in Vushtrri. The Romas were displaced since 1999, and were returning to their former homes. No incidents occurred, and the Romas continue to live peacefully in their resettled homes. As the KPC intensified their engineering works and medical assistance within the Serbian villages of Peja, crimes against Serbian property decreased while the overall security situation also improved significantly.

Significant amounts of snow during the winter of 2012 have caused many problems for Kosovars, but at the same time, the snow situation has also provided a good opportunity for the KSF to assist the population and promote itself in places where minorities live. On 11 February 2012, as a result of excessive snowing and bad weather, a

large amount of snow completely covered a Goran-minority neighborhood Southeast of Kosovo. Fifteen houses were destroyed, and ten people died. The KSF led efforts to search for the missing people, and one five-year-old girl was rescued.¹⁶⁵ The KSF also organized and led efforts to mitigate the consequences of the bad weather, by opening the roads to many villages around Kosovo, by searching and rescuing people blocked by snow in mountainous sites, and by providing medical assistance for people in blocked villages.¹⁶⁶

Accountability

By gradually transferring security responsibilities, the KSF can prove its accountability to the KFOR and the International Community. With the current KFOR restrictions and hesitations, it is difficult for the KSF to cultivate a sense of accountability and to measure the performance of its individual officers. The KFOR engagement is having some positive effects, but keeping the KSF out of security missions is ultimately hindering its abilities to increase internal and external (international) acceptance. Collaborative planning and decision-making between the KFOR and the KSF is critical. A simple example is to establish a joint working group for a given issue. If the KSF senior officer is not happy with the performance of the working group, he cannot take any measures, since he has no authority over any KFOR members. Conversely, high performing KFOR working groups typically marginalize the KSF involvement. The KSF should be allowed to own more responsibilities, and the KSF officers should be given room to execute these responsibilities, and the KFOR should be involved with the desired results, but not in executing or managing the responsibilities.

These roles should shift because such shift will help the KSF to gain experience and to be better prepared when the KFOR redeploys. In these ways, NATO/KFOR can transmit their expertise to the KSF to better fulfill their obligation to stand up the KSF. At the same time, it is critically important to manage the gap between the security capabilities of the KSF and the security needs of Kosovo and its peoples.

The future KSF: mission, roles, responsibilities, capabilities, structure, and relations with NATO

Introduction

Future KSF missions, roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and structure should be determined by considering the following factors: threats, the Republic of Kosovo's orientation to become a full EU and NATO member, Kosovo's orientation to have a closer relationship in security issues with the US, Kosovo's economic capabilities and the population, terrain, and balance of forces with other states in the Western Balkans.

Threats

As a young independent country, Kosovo faces many threats. However, due to the presence of the KFOR since June 1999, these threats have been mitigated, but not eliminated. Kosovo now is in the process of developing its security forces, and should take into consideration the main sources of potential threat. The main threats for Kosovo are Serbian and Albanian Nationalism. Nationalism is a threat that distinguishes Kosovo from other countries, while other threats are more of a criminal nature and are similar to other countries in Europe.

Nationalism as a threat

It is impossible to explain the complexity of the security situation in the Western Balkans without explaining the threat posed by nationalism. Nationalism has been the main source of conflicts since mid-1800s.¹⁶⁷ It is important to emphasize that the main cause of conflict in the Western Balkans is the division between the Slavic peoples and the Albanians. The Slavic peoples migrated to the Balkans during the 6th century,¹⁶⁸ and most of them were Christian Orthodox, with some Catholics and Muslims.¹⁶⁹ The Albanians are the native people of the Balkans.¹⁷⁰ Most Albanians are Muslims, but some of them are Christian Orthodox, and some are Catholics.¹⁷¹ Serbian Nationalism is the core of these threats,¹⁷² while other nationalisms have increased, in particular Albanian Nationalism.¹⁷³

Since the 15th century, most of the Western Balkans was under the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁴ At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, and after the French revolution, many peoples in the Western Balkans started their nationalist movements.¹⁷⁵ After defeating Napoleon in 1812, Russia during the 1800s, launched several wars against the Ottoman Empire and expanded its territories in the Black Sea region.¹⁷⁶ Considering that the Slavic peoples in the Western Balkans were ethnically a kin to the Russians, Russia coordinated these wars with the Serbs and the Montenegrins. This Russian expansion had a huge impact in Serbian nationalism, by raising their territorial ambitions against their neighbors. Serbian nationalism supported by Russia, shaped the fate of the people in the Western Balkans until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.¹⁷⁷ This support continued from Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union,¹⁷⁸ but Russia was no longer superpower, so Serbia's nationalistic entertainments

during the 1990s mostly failed.¹⁷⁹ A further review of nationalism in the Western Balkans follows.

Serbian Nationalism

Serbian nationalism, quickly rose up in the beginning of 1800s, with the Christian Orthodox religion as its main feature.¹⁸⁰ Russia, because of its expansionist aspirations toward the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus, helped the Serbs to earn their freedom from the Ottoman Empire. In 1829, the Serbs earned autonomy within the Ottoman Empire in a peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.¹⁸¹ Then they were granted independence in 1878, again in a peace agreement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (known as the St. Stefan Tractate), which ended the Russian Ottoman war and which was reviewed the same year at the Berlin Congress.¹⁸² Looking toward territorial expansion of their “big brother” Russia, Serbia was not satisfied only with independence. Their intellectuals started to spread ideas of expansion, by portraying the Serbian people as victims and by spreading hate.¹⁸³ Since then, the belief that Serbians are victims with hatred for other peoples in the Balkans has become part of their being.¹⁸⁴ Unfortunately, these beliefs continue still today. As former United Kingdom Minister Mr. Denis MacShane wrote, “The Serbs feel victim of a world conspiracy to do them down.”¹⁸⁵ Under this flag, the Serbs expanded their territories by more than 200 percent until 1918.¹⁸⁶ The Albanians were the first and largest victims of Serbian nationalism.¹⁸⁷ The Serbs succeeded in expelling approximately 150,000 Albanians from Vranje, Leskovac and Prokuplje in 1878.¹⁸⁸ Next, they occupied Kosovo in 1912, claiming that it was the center of their medieval state based upon a myth of the Battle of Kosovo, fought and lost

against the Othman Empire in 1389.¹⁸⁹ Myths about the Battle of Kosovo became part of their being,¹⁹⁰ and they felt the need to expel all Albanians from Kosovo.

The first one who put these plans into action against the Albanians was the Serbian statesman Ilija Garashanin in his document “Nacertanja” in 1844.¹⁹¹ Since then, these basic attitudes toward Albanians have never changed. For example, it continued with Vaso Cubrilovic’s works, “The expulsion of the Albanians. Memorandum,” prepared in 1937, in which when discussing the international reaction on expulsion of the Albanians, he wrote “At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews and Russia can shift millions of people from one part of the continent to another, the evacuation of a few hundred thousand Albanians will not set off a world war.”¹⁹² “The Minority Problem in New Yugoslavia, Memorandum,” was written in 1944,¹⁹³ and “Memorandum,” was written by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986. During the time of the collapse of communist Yugoslavia, Serbian hate and territorial antagonism against the Albanians spread against other peoples in Yugoslavia also. These territorial and genocidal ambitions toward other peoples in Yugoslavia were codified by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the previous mentioned document called “Memorandum,” written in 1986.¹⁹⁴ The Serbian national ambitions codified in this “Memorandum” were the main cause of four wars in Yugoslavia during the 1990s.¹⁹⁵ Crimes against humanity that the Serbs committed against other peoples throughout history, and in particular during these last wars in the 1990s, illustrate their intense hatred toward other peoples.¹⁹⁶ Unfortunately this hate continues still today. As former United Kingdom Minister Mr. Denis Macshane described one of his meetings with Serbia’s

leadership, held on 21 April 2004 in Belgrade: “I tell them all to work with Kosovans to find a solution but they hate them with a deep, passionate and enduring hatred.”¹⁹⁷

What makes Serbian Nationalism especially dangerous is that it is not created and executed only by state institutions and political parties, but by Serbian society and its elite institutions and individuals. A main source of their nationalism is from the Serbian Intellectuals who are gathered in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Serbian Orthodox Church.¹⁹⁸

Unfortunately, Serbian society remains locked in its nationalism. The Serbs masterminds of genocide Ilija Garashanin, Vaso Qubrilovic, Dobrica Qosic, and executors of genocide, Slobodan Milosevic, Ratko Mladic, Radovan Karagjijiq, Arkan, remain their greatest national heroes and individuals with whom they identify themselves.¹⁹⁹ Also, the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts and the Serbian Orthodox Church remain most respected institutions, even though those are the same kitchens where genocide was prepared and still spreads hate for other peoples in the Balkans.²⁰⁰

In November 2011, research conducted by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade, on the views of secondary school students in Serbia shows that they see Albanians as their biggest enemy.²⁰¹

Even though Serbia’s politicians time after time change their official policies and try to sound more human in line with the democratic world, these are only cosmetic changes.

Their way of thinking and values are best portrayed clearly in their behavior and statements. Some examples that illustrate this continuity are: the President of the RFJ Mr. Milosevic, tries to fool Mr. Havier Solana and General Clark, in one of their meetings in

1998, to the point that Mr. Solana says to him: “Yes, you are lying!” Milosevic initially gets angry, but after a few minutes, he admits: “Yes, you are right, I was lying.”²⁰² The current President of Serbia, Tadic, tried to frame (black mail) Germany in December 2011, when Germany was against giving Serbia the status as a Candidate for EU membership. Tadic wrote an authorial article in an German newspaper a few days before the decision was to be made, and he insisted that as Serbia is eager to join the EU, but the EU should be eager to integrate Serbia too, or nationalists can come into power in Serbia and probably they would not want to join the EU.²⁰³ Furthermore, on the 13th anniversary of the NATO air Campaign against Serbia on 24 March 2012, the President of Serbia, Tadic, declared that NATO’s intervention was a crime against Serbia and the Serbian people,²⁰⁴ despite the fact that it was a humanitarian intervention to stop the ongoing genocide against Albanians in Kosovo. The Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Mr. Ivica Dacic, has stated several times since November 2011, even in Washington, that if the EU and the US do not make attractive offers to Serbia, Serbia could move toward Russia, and as he said, the US does not want a Russian Military Base in Serbia.²⁰⁵

Albanian nationalism

Albanian Nationalism started to rise in the mid-1800s as the Albanians saw the threats to their territories and their peoples from their neighbors.²⁰⁶ The core of Albanian Nationalism are issues of the Albanian language and the Albanian tradition known as “Kanun of Lek Dukagjini.” Crystallization of this nationalism took place in the League of Prizren in 1878 as a desperate attempt of the Albanians to save their territories.²⁰⁷ Unfortunately, they could not save them. However, the idea of an all-Albanian national

state was rooted in the mentality of the Albanians, and this idea became part of their being with their dreams of an all-Albanian Nation State. It became an ultimate goal of the Albanians, passed from generation to generation.²⁰⁸ Natural Albania was the cause which kept the insurgency in Kosovo alive from 1912 through 1941, and from 1945 to 1947.²⁰⁹ During World War II, with the help of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the Albanians, to some extent, realized their dreams for the reunification of the Albanian territories.²¹⁰ After World War II, Kosovo again was divided from Albania and attached to Serbia, even though the Kosovo Communist Party and the Yugoslav Communist Party agreed during the war that after the liberation from Nazi Germans Kosovo would be allowed to reunify with Albania.²¹¹

During the last war in Kosovo in 1998-1999, the KLA members' oath was to fight until they liberated all Albanian territories. However, with the independence of Kosovo, the Albanians have two states in the Balkans now, and the official policies of Kosovo and Albania are for keeping these two separate states. This idea is supported by the democratic world too.²¹²

Albanian nationalistic hard line organizations are receiving more and more support. Alliance Red and Black "Kuq e Zi" spread up very fast. Even though primarily it is a fan organization to support the Albania National Soccer Team, it is also a strong advocate of reunification of Albanian territories. This fan organization was transformed into a political party on 21 March 2012.²¹³ The nationalistic oriented political party in Kosovo Self-determination "Vetvendosje" won 13 percent of votes in the last elections in Kosovo.²¹⁴

Throughout history Albanian nationalism did not develop negative feelings for other peoples. This was proved during history, during World War II, when even though the Albanians established their reunified state, they did not commit crimes against other peoples in the Balkans, and they did not expand their territories to areas where Albanians did not live any more.²¹⁵ From Kosovo were expelled only the Serbians brought there during the colonization process from 1912 to 1939, but not Serbs who lived in Kosovo before.²¹⁶ Even though Albania cooperated with the Nazi-Fascist allies, Albania was one of very few countries that did not execute Jewish people and did not hand them over to the Germans. Even more, Albania is one of few countries that had more Jewish people at the end of World War II than before World War II started. Ultimately, all Jewish people who made the escape from other countries to Albania were helped by the Albanians.²¹⁷

However, considering that Albanians beside in Albania and Kosovo lives in Macedonia where they make 25 percent of population²¹⁸ and the Macedonian capital City of Skopje was an Albanian city until 1912;²¹⁹ in Serbia, Presevo Valley Albanians are a majority in the three municipalities which share borders with Kosovo, and Albanians consider it “Eastern Kosovo;”²²⁰ and in Montenegro Albanians are 5 percent of population and Montenegro’s capital city, Podgorica until 1878 was part of Albania, the increase of Albanian nationalism can become very dangerous for peace in the region. The previously-mentioned territories are part of the “Natural Albania” projected from the first Prizren League in 1878 and remains a guiding line for Albanian Nationalism.

Development of Albanian Nationalism can be abused by different actors that do not want peace in Western Balkans and also it can be abused by individual politicians to build their

political careers. Radicalization of Albanian Nationalism will threaten peace in Western Balkans.

Kosovo's orientation for closer relations with the USA

Due to the US's determination for freedom and democracy, different countries have developed close relationships with the US throughout history. Since the US took a leading role in saving the Albanians in Kosovo from genocide during the war in 1998-1999, Kosovo's Albanians have developed close emotional relations to the US. Building a country that will be closely linked to the US became a vision of Kosovo's main Albanian Political Parties and key leaders. The US's support for Albanians in Macedonia to become equal citizens further strengthened this relationship. In addition, the US's support for Albania to become a NATO member spread further strong pro-US feelings to all Albanians throughout the world. The US's support continued, and Kosovo became an independent country.²²¹ The US supported Kosovo prior independence, militarily, financially and with experts to develop Kosovo as society and prepare for independence. During the settlement of the final status the US supported Kosovo diplomatically and was the main advocate of Kosovo's independence. The US support continues in developing Kosovo as an independent country. US support is comprehensive and includes all aspects of life. On 29 March 2012, the US and Kosovo signed a Bilateral Agreement for Comprehensive Cooperation.²²² This agreement creates a unique legal framework for continuing US support for Kosovo in all sectors. Kosovo is developing close relations with the US in the security sector too. The KSF signed a Partnership agreement with the IOWA National Guard and an Agreement for Status of Forces with the US. Therefore,

the KSF needs to develop capabilities compatible with the US's security structure to be able to further develop this cooperation.

Integration of Kosovo in the EU and NATO

One of Kosovo's priorities is to become a full member of the EU and NATO. In March 2012, the EU started a "study of feasibility" in Kosovo as the first step of EU integration.²²³ Since 1999, different EU missions have assisted Kosovo in developing institutions and legislation which are compatible with the EU. Therefore, the process of integrating Kosovo into the EU is expected to be much shorter than for previous states. Part of this integration is that Kosovo needs to develop security forces that are compatible with the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The EU integration in CSDP has grown significantly since its creation twelve years ago.²²⁴ The CSDP now consists of EU battle groups, EU Military Staff, and the European Defense Agency.²²⁵ Since its first security mission in BiH in 2003, the EU has remained continually engaged in different security missions around the globe.²²⁶

NATO is the largest security organization in the world with a robust military structure. Since its first mission in BiH in 1992,²²⁷ it has continually engaged in different peacemaking, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.²²⁸ The KSF was stood-up by NATO/KFOR, and NATO support for the KSF continues.

To achieve membership in these two organizations, Kosovo needs to fulfill specific criteria regarding security forces. The KSF needs to have a stated level of professionalism, equipment, capabilities, and full democratic control over its security forces. In addition to benefits, membership in these organizations also means obligations. For example, membership would mean that Kosovo should participate in NATO missions

around the globe. To do so, Kosovo must have a professional and fully developed security force capable of deploying and operating with allies around the globe.

Economic capabilities

Even though the economy in Kosovo is increasing, Kosovo is still a poor country now. Kosovo's GDP for 2011, was only 4,480 million euros 1,980 euros per capita.²²⁹ This figures shows that the economic capabilities of Kosovo are very small and limited. So, Kosovo should have affordable security forces. It is difficult to have cheap and capable force, but I believe that for Kosovo it is possible. Currently Kosovo has a very small force, comprised of only 3,300 troops, but all of them are professional troops and are well paid, well educated, well trained, and efficiently engaged within the current mission, and rewarded with a good retirement package.²³⁰ To meet all its needs and challenges, probably Kosovo will have to triple the number of its forces. However, this increase of the number of forces should not negatively affect the current personal benefits of the troops, including educational and professional training, equipment, supplies, engagements, or retirement package.

Population, terrain and balance of forces with other states in Western Balkans

Albania has territory of 28,748km², with 3,002,859 people,²³¹ and an army of 14,295 troops;²³² Montenegro has territory of 13,812km², with 657,394 people,²³³ and an army of 3,100 troops;²³⁴ BiH has territory of 51,197 km², with 4,622,292 people,²³⁵ and an army of 10,557 troops;²³⁶ Croatia has territory of 56,594km², with 4,480,043 people,²³⁷ and an army of 18,021 troops;²³⁸ Slovenia has territory of 20,273km², with 1,996,617 peoples²³⁹ and an army of 9,199 troops;²⁴⁰ Serbia has territory of 77,474km²,

with 7,276,604 people,²⁴¹ and an army of 29,125 troops,²⁴² and Macedonia has territory of 25,713km², with 2,082,370 people,²⁴³ and an army of 12,000 troops.²⁴⁴ The size of the Kosovo Security Forces should be in line with the size of forces of the countries of the region considering the size of the territory and numbers of the population.

The KSF of the future

Introduction

The concept of the KSF should be a force that will be able to defend Kosovo and its people, in a manner which would guarantee to protect the life of the people and enable Kosovo to function as a state and a society all the times. Kosovo's people suffered too much under occupation and should be ready to defend its freedom at any cost at any time; the KSF should be the leading institution in the reconciliation process between the Albanians and the Serbs, just as the US Army was the leading institution in integrating different races and ethnic groups into American society in the US. Because of its heritage, only the KSF has the needed legitimacy and popularity in front of Kosovo's people to conduct these processes successfully and effectively. The KSF should also maintain capabilities which enables the KSF to remain constantly engaged in assisting Kosovo's people because this has been viewed as successful way to stay connected to the people, and to save and enhance levels of trust and popularity. This is also important to make the KSF a useful institution on a day-to-day basis for Kosovo's society and make more efficient investments which Kosovo puts in the KSF. The KSF should have capability of deploying and operating around the globe with NATO. Kosovo's people know the best value of NATO interventions because they represent one of the nations that have enjoyed freedom based upon previous NATO intervention. Now the independent

Kosovo should be ready to pay back to International Community for this help by actively supporting NATO interventions and other endeavors to ensure freedom and secure peace around the globe.

Strong KSF to mitigate the threat of nationalism

A strong KSF is the best way to deal with nationalism in the Balkans. The KPC was the vanguard of integrating minorities into the public and institutional lives in post-war Kosovo. A strong KSF will prevent the nationalists in Serbia from undertaking any openly conventional actions against Kosovo. It would also discourage Serbian nationalistic extreme organizations from continuing their paramilitary activities in Kosovo. A strong KSF will make it more difficult for Serbian nationalistic organizations which hinder Serbs in Kosovo by blackmailing and threatening them from integrating into public life.²⁴⁵ A strong KSF will be attractive to all young people, including the Serbs, and this will lead to a fully multiethnic KSF and Kosovo. A strong KSF will be a reason for Kosovo's Albanians to feel secure and to not support national extremist organizations. A strong KSF will be able to control Kosovo's territory and to prevent activities of Albanian extremist nationalistic organizations. The only way to defeat nationalism in the Western Balkans is to ensure a lasting peace, which would give society enough time to promote change from within. A strong KSF is the best way to achieve all this goals. Finally, a strong KSF will leave no illusion for nationalists that they can achieve something with violence in Kosovo or use Kosovo to destabilize other countries.

Size and Capabilities of the KSF

Kosovo forces should reflect a capability balance of forces in the Western Balkans. Kosovo should develop defensive capabilities that are sufficient to defend its people and territory, but at the same time are not viewed as offensive capabilities that might threaten its neighbors. Additionally, joint engagement in NATO and regional cooperation will increase mutual trust and help to prevent a possible armament race.

Any increase in the number of forces which would decrease personal benefits, education, training, and career opportunities will have a negative impact in the discipline and efficiency of the security forces. For these reasons, Kosovo should be mindful to increase the percentage of its forces in parallel with increases of the budget and capabilities for all previously-noted components. If Kosovo needs to increase the number before it can afford to finance it properly, Kosovo should seek ways to combine the current number of active professional forces with a given number of reservists.

The Structure of the KSF

The KSF should develop a structure similar to the NATO countries which would make it possible to be interoperable with other NATO countries. This similarity should be consistent in vertical organization starting from the basic unit (squad) up to the highest headquarters and in horizontal organization starting from the G1 to G9 and also in the branch organization.

Capabilities of the KSF

The KSF should be a strong defense orientated force.

The KSF should have a very strong infantry force. Considering the mountainous terrain in particular on all of its borders, the KSF should develop ISR capabilities which would make it possible to gather information and to detect possible threats in a timely and accurate manner;

The KSF should develop strong air defense capabilities which would make it possible to defend its air space from any air attack;

The KSF should develop a strong anti-armor element which would give the KSF capabilities to defend Kosovo from eventual land invasion;

The KSF should maintain strong civil protection capabilities (search and rescue, de-mining, EOD response, and firefighting);

The KSF should develop a small armored element which would be primarily oriented to participate in missions abroad;

The KSF should develop a small aviation element with the primary mission to support search and rescue operations and transportation;

The KSF should not develop an air force;

The KSF should not intend to obtain or develop any WMD;

The KSF should develop an institute for research and development. This institute should serve as a think-tank for important issues for the KSF. This institute should focus in studying Kosovo's strategic environment, force generation, force modernization, technological development, and other ad hoc topics over time. This Institute should have a very small number of permanent personnel, and it should have contracting authorities to contract domestic or international institutes or experts to assist, help, or conduct research or study for the KSF.

¹Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, “Stand-up, Challenges and Success,” <http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Broshura%20ANGLISHT%20%20-%20finale%207.02.2011.PDF> (accessed 4 December 2011).

²KTV, “Review of History,” 2010, <http://www.kohavision.net/video/rubikon/104/> (accessed 28 January 2012). Interview given by Mr. Rexhep Selimi (one of founders of KLA) to journalist Adriatik Kelmedi in his famous show “RUBIKON.”

³Memorandum, Srpske Akademije Znanosti i Umetnosti [Serbian Academy of Arts and Science], Belgrade: 24 September 1986.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 342.

⁶Ibid., 344.

⁷Ibid., 346-349.

⁸Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA, BICC, 20 August 2001, Skopje, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=16177> (accessed 4 December 2011), 12.

⁹Ibid., 11.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²KTV, “Review of History.”

¹³Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA, 12.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Daltveit, 65.

¹⁶Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, Instituti i Historisë, *Historia e popullit shqiptar I*, Tirana 2002, 392.

¹⁷Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html> (accessed 28 January 2012).

¹⁸Arifi Syle, *Shteti i Kosoves Kontribut i shume brezave*, Prishtine, 2009, 50 (State of Kosovo contribute of many generations).

¹⁹UN Security Council, UNSC Resolution 1244 (S/RES/1244), paragraph 15, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 4 December 2011).

²⁰UN Security Council, UNSC Resolution 1244, paragraph 9; Military technical Agreement paragraphs 1 and 2, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm> (accessed 4 December 2011).

²¹UN Security Council, S/1998/223, Statement on Kosovo adopted by the members of the Contact Group, <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-1998-223.pdf> (accessed 4 December 2011).

²²KLA Political leader Hashim Thaqi led Kosovo Albanian Negotiation Team.

²³Clark, *Waging Modern War*.

²⁴Fenikset e Lirise, Dëshmorët e Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës, Monografi [Freedom Fenikis, KLA Martyrs, Monography], Prishtine 2001.

²⁵Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/peace.htm#KLA> (accessed 4 December 2011).

²⁶UN Security Council, UNSC Resolution 1244.

²⁷Malcolm, *Kosovo: A short history*, 344.

²⁸Arifi Syle, Shteti i Kosoves Kontribut i shume brezave, Prishtine, 2009, 46,47, (State of Kosovo contribute of many generations)

²⁹Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/si.html>; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hr.html>.

³⁰Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 108,

³¹Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA, 12.

³²Human Rights Watch, "Under Orders, War Crimes in Kosovo," 2001, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Under_Orders_En_Combined.pdf (accessed 4 December 2011).

³³*Ibid.*, 65.

³⁴Contact Group was the 65, six-nation established by the 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia met on 29 January, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#2>.

- ³⁵Under Orders, War Crimes in Kosovo, 65.
- ³⁶Statement on Kosovo, Contact Group, S/1998/223, <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-1998-223.pdf> (accessed 4 December 2011).
- ³⁷Ibid.
- ³⁸Ibid.
- ³⁹Ibid.
- ⁴⁰UN Security Council, UNSC Resolutions, S/RES/1199, S/RES/1160, S/RES/1203, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm> (accessed 4 December 2011); UN Security Council, S/RES/1239, S/RES/1244, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm> (accessed 4 December 2011).
- ⁴¹UN Security Council Presidency statements, S/RPST/1998/25, S/RPST/1999/5, S/RPST/1999/5, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/1999/sprst99.htm> (accessed 4 December 2011).
- ⁴²Statement on Kosovo, Contact Group, S/1998/223, S/1998/272, S/1998/657, S/1998/959.
- ⁴³Statement on Kosovo, Contact Group, S/1998/223, <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-1998-223.pdf> (accessed 4 December 2011).
- ⁴⁴KLA Political Leader Hashim Thaqi headed Kosovo Albanian Negotiation Team and Albanian Negotiation Team signed proposed agreement.
- ⁴⁵Clark, *Waging Modern War*, Chapter 13.
- ⁴⁶Arifi Syle, Shteti i Kosoves Kontribut i shume brezave, 78, (State of Kosovo contribute of many generations).
- ⁴⁷Daltveit, "The March 2004 Riots in Kosovo," 74.
- ⁴⁸KTV, Interview given by Mr.Xhavit Haliti to journalist Adriatik Kelmedi in his famous show "RUBIKON" on KTV in February 2011. Interview is called Xhavit Haliti: My truth, part 2, minutes 20 to 25, <http://www.kohavision.net/video/rubikon/1678/> (accessed 28 January 2012).
- ⁴⁹Agreement on Kosovo Verification Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe S/1998/978, <http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:EERN9cUa6g0J:www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s98978.pdf+S/1998/978&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi1gqAh2G21Y-MEl3terBmJfPlxCCQKwoCyJtRY-290GmQIJ1krK53-RGiiiMkyHehxBoJRNs9ISzVpfyHgC69-zUxH6fZS25dCu0L9D->

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MA (accessed 4 December 2011).

⁵⁰Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement between NATO and RFJ, S/1998/991,
<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s98991.pdf> (accessed 27 January 2012).

⁵¹Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 158.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 160.

⁵³Even Though Dr.Ibrahim Rugova was uncontested leader of Albanians in Kosovo, winning elections before the war, and as it will be proved later he won several elections after the war and we was known as soft man who would do more concessions to International Community. But, up to this point KLA gained enough trust to International Community that they agreed with decision of Albanian delegation that KLA chief Mr.Hashim Thaqi lead negotiation team, even though he at that time was only 31 years old.

⁵⁴Rambouliet Accords, S/1998/959, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/99648_1.pdf. (accessed 4 December 2011).

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶Kosovo: Background and Chronology, April 1999, 5, http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy-ab&hl=en&site=&source=hp&q=Kosovo%3A%20Background%26Chronology&pbx=1&oq=&aq=&aqi=&aql=&gs_sm=&gs_upl=&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.,cf.osb&fp=6352d3b7dd778f98&biw=911&bih=367&pf=p&pdl=3000. (accessed 4 December 2011).

⁵⁷Clark, *Waging Modern War*, Chapter 13.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 165.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 189.

⁶⁰Military Technical Agreement, 9 June 1999, signed in Kumanovo, Macedonia,
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm> (accessed 4 December 2011).

⁶¹Denis Macshane, *Why Kosovo Still Matters* (London 2011), 88, Hague Tribunal accused for war crimes six former KLA members. Two of them high ranking commanders. In 2003 Tribunal accused Fatmir Limaj and two other KLA members, all of them turned themselves in voluntarily, immediately after being informed that they have been accused. At this time Limaj was member of Kosovo Parliament and one of most voted persons in Kosovo. He was found innocent. In 2005 Tribunal accused Ramush Haradinaj and two other KLA members, all of them turned themselves in voluntarily, immediately after being informed that they have been accused. At this time Haradinaj

was Prime minister of Kosovo.. He was found innocent in first degree. After complaints from prosecutor in second degree issue was brought back in retrial. Trial is ongoing.

⁶²http://shr.aaas.org/kosovo/pk/p1_2.html.

⁶³Under Orders, War Crimes in Kosovo, 31.

⁶⁴Until now there was not any evidence that KLA did not respect Low of war. Even though Serbia was very active in fabricating stories regarding crimes upon Serbs in Kosovo.

⁶⁵UNMIR Regulation 1999/8 page 1, http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/re99_08.pdf. (accessed 4 December 2011).

⁶⁶Memorandum on the Albanian Question. This Memorandum of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals was sent on 26 October 1995 to the foreign prime ministers of USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia, <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/Kosovo-Background25.htm>.

⁶⁷I was KPC member all this time and whenever high official from USA, NATO, or EU visited KPC, ceremonial guard performed for them. (a lot of videos on youtube).

⁶⁸I was KPC member all this time ceremonial guard performed regularly, even though International Community was not happy sometimes, in particular when we honor KLA martyrs and celebrated KLA battles or important dates.

⁶⁹Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA, 22.

⁷⁰As KPC member, I know its structure and through most of my career I had to deal with it. In 2002 to 2004 as NCO working in recruiting minorities I had to watch minority positions through entire structure. In 2004 to 2009 as Engineer Officer in J3 HQ, I had to deal with all units.

⁷¹I was member of working group to project its structure, personnel, equipment.

⁷²International Crisis Group, ICG Balkans Report No. 88, *What happened to the KLA?*, 3 March 2000, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/Kosovo%2019.pdf>. (accessed 4 December 2011); Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA, 23.

⁷³UNMIR Regulation 1999/8, 1. http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/re99_08.pdf. (accessed 4 December 2011).

⁷⁴International Crisis Group, *What happened to the KLA?*, 7.

⁷⁵International Crisis Group, ICG Balkans Report No. 174, *An Army for Kosovo*, 28 July 2006.

⁷⁶Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA.

⁷⁷UNMIR Regulation 1999/8, 1, http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/re99_08.pdf (accessed 4 December 2011).

⁷⁸Ade Clewlow, Lieutenant Colonel, MBE, Former KFOR Liaison Officer to the KPC, *The Kosovo Protection Corps: A Critical Study of its De-activation as a Transition* (Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010), <http://www.nupi.no/content/download/11787/117305/version/10/file/SIP-04-10-Clewlow-NUPI+Report.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2012).

⁷⁹With establishing regular meetings and closer cooperation, we had opportunity to know each other better, to explain our point of view and to understand better each other. This helped us to establish personal relations and KPC benefited from this contacts. It is interesting that most of KFOR officers that I had chance to speak with, they found Kosovo and KPC much better than they were informed before their deployment in Kosovo.

⁸⁰International Crisis Group, *What happened to the KLA?*,

⁸¹UNMIK regularly used each opportunity to stress out publicly that KPC is not Army. Through equipment which they gave to KPC they tried to convince everyone that KPC is just civil emergency organization (firefight, Search and Rescue equipment). UNMIK kept this stand in legislation also see UNMIK regulation 1999/8.

⁸²International Crisis Group, *What happened to the KLA?*

⁸³Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA, 22.

⁸⁴International Crisis Group, ICG Balkans Report No. 155, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 22 April 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/155_collapse_in_kosovo_revised.pdf. (accessed 4 December 2011), 8.

⁸⁵Kosovo Democratic Party (PDK) and Alliance for Future of Kosovo (AAK), both led by former KLS Leaders and supported from former KLA combatants intended to treat KPC as Army, while Kosovo Democratic League (LDK) led by Dr.Ibrahim Rugova, as party that won elections after the war intended to ignore KPC, be in line with International Community policy to treat KPC as civil organization. LDK often publicly implied that KPC is politically engaged and it pro PDK and AAK, it tried to contest and minimize its role.

⁸⁶International Crisis Group, *An army for Kosovo*.

⁸⁷As soon as KLA took over a territory, then they would exercise all power. KLS would control traffic, keep law and order, solve disputes. KLA was people's address where they would go for any need or complain. This continued for while after the war, because people had a lot of urgent needs (wounded, clean villages from animal corps,

shelter, etc.) and KLA could not say: We do not work anymore!? Wait few months until UNMIK establishes administration!

⁸⁸International Crisis Group, *What happened to the KLA?*; Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA, 17.

⁸⁹Everyday hundreds of people came to KPC barracks and asked for help for their contests, problems, medical treatment, they asked for everything. I was KPC member at that time and witnessed this situation.

⁹⁰International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*, 24.

⁹¹International Crisis Group, *What happened to the KLA?*, 13; Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA.

⁹²International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*.

⁹³*Ibid.*

⁹⁴Wag the Dog, The Mobilization and Demobilization of the KLA, 17; International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*, 22.

⁹⁵International Crisis Group, *What happened to the KLA?*; International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*, 23.

⁹⁶International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*, 23, 24.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*

⁹⁸*Ibid.*

⁹⁹International Crisis Group, ICG Balkans Report No 155, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 22 April 2004, 8; International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*, 23.

¹⁰⁰International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 8.

¹⁰¹Daltveit, "The March 2004 Riots in Kosovo," 98.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 104.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 109.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, 122.

¹⁰⁶Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Kosovo 1999–2009, Kosovo Center for Security Studies, Pristina 2011, <http://qkss.org/new/index.php?section=news&cmd=details&newsid=198&teaserId=11> (accessed 6 May 2012).

¹⁰⁷International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 23.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*, 24.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹¹*Ibid.*

¹¹²After collapse of Yugoslavia, Albanians in Kosovo struggled for independence. Independence became starting point for Albanians to solve problems with Serbia.

¹¹³I was part of all these developments, Albanian and KPC member same time. You could see these differentiations everywhere, in streets, shops, restaurants, media, institutions. It is differentiations which even children demonstrate when they salute KFOR members on the streets.

¹¹⁴Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf (accessed 29 December 2012).

¹¹⁵Parliament of Kosovo, *Declaration of Independence*, 17 February 2008, Pristina, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/Dek_Pav_e.pdf (accessed 28 January 2012).

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹¹⁷Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 51.

¹¹⁸Law on dissolution of KPC (No. 03/L-046), article 4.2 and 5.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*

¹²⁰Legal Structure is precondition for organizing and function of Security Forces in Democratic Countries. By adopting the Constitution and these Laws, Kosovo's Parliament created necessary legal framework for stand-up KSF.

¹²¹Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, "Stand-up, Challenges and Success," 8.

¹²²*Ibid.*

¹²³International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*, 20.

¹²⁴<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html>.

¹²⁵Serbs boycotted registration of population in 2011, but it is estimated from different sources that they represent about four percent of population. ICG estimates that there are five percent of total population. International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, 14.

¹²⁶International Crisis Group, *An Army for Kosovo*, 20.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 24.

¹²⁸At this time I was Recruiting Officer in KSF/Head of Recruiting Section and I managed technically this process.

¹²⁹Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 784.

¹³⁰Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 170.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, 328.

¹³²In the past many high ranking military officers and high officials left unpunished for various crimes. During World War II, allied forces did some important steps to punish those responsible for war crimes. Since then, democratic world continued its efforts to close the gap and to make impossible for war criminals to avoid justice. In 1993 the formed Hague Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, in 1994 Hague Tribunal for Rwanda and finally in 1998 international community created Permanent Hague Tribunal with authority to judge all persons for war crimes, if there are no conditions or possibilities to sue them in country where crimes were made.

¹³³Military technical Agreement.

¹³⁴Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia Death of Nation* (New York: TV Books Inc., 1996), 366, 367, 368. Military technical Agreement.

¹³⁵<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html>.

¹³⁶See changes made to Preamble of Constitution of Macedonia as result of implementation of Ohrid Agreement. Constitution of Macedonia, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/mk00000_.html; Amendments of Constitution <http://www.courtmodernization.com/pubs/MCMPlaw44.pdf> (accessed 28 January 2012).

¹³⁷Until now, 12 years after the war is finished, no one presented any indication, for any massacre or mass killing done from KLA, even though Hague Tribunal, UNMIK, and EULEX authorities investigated all Serbian claims for war crimes.

¹³⁸Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Annex VIII, Article 5, http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf (accessed 29 December 2012).

¹³⁹http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁴⁰Constitution of Republic of Kosovo, http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications/kosovo_constitution_08_en.pdf (accessed 16 February 2012).

¹⁴¹Law on the Kosovo Security Force, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-L046_en.pdf (accessed 16 February 2012).

¹⁴²Official webpage of MKSF, <http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,7> (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁴³Article 48 of Constitution of Republic of Kosovo and Article 5 of the Law on the KSF.

¹⁴⁴Law on the Kosovo Security Force.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸From KPC to KSF were recruited 1382 members, http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Letra_e_Ministrit_Agim_Ceku_per_pjestaret_e_FSK-se__19.01.2012.pdf, these were first KSF members. Very first KSF member was appointed KSF Commander, LtG Sylejman Selimi, who until this appointment was serving as KPC Commander. Most of KSF officers come from former KPC.

¹⁴⁹Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces, “Stand up, Challenges and Successes.”

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁵¹<http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=1,24&cdate=2009-12-18> (accessed 24 April 2012).

¹⁵²<http://www.nato.int/kfor/docu/inside/2010/12/i101214b.htm> (accessed 24 April 2012).

¹⁵³Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces, “Achievements of the MKSF for 2011,” http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/raporti_anglisht_final.pdf (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁵⁴MKSF official webpage, <http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,24,322> (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁵⁵Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces, “Stand up, Challenges and Successes.”

¹⁵⁶<http://www.koha.net/?page=1,13,88464> (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁵⁷http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁵⁸http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁵⁹http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁶⁰<http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/units/hq.html> (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁶¹http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2011/chronicle_08/chronicle_08.pdf (accessed 19 February 2012).

¹⁶²Since 25 July 2011 when Kosovo Police took control of two official border points with Serbia, Serbs who lives in this part of Kosovo under organization of Serbia’s Security forces blocked the roads and do not allow freedom of movement, requesting that Kosovo Police and Kosovo Customs officers leave these two boarder points.

¹⁶³According to these two documents KFOR should operate in Kosovo without hindrance. UNSC Resolution 1244 paragraph 9 (S/RES/1244), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 4 December 2011); Military technical Agreement paragraphs 1 and 2, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm> (accessed 4 December 2011).

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵<http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,24,476>.

¹⁶⁶<http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,24,474>; <http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,24,476>.

¹⁶⁷Serbs and Montenegrins in conjunction with Russia started war against Ottoman Empire. It resulted with expansion of Serbs and Montenegrins territories in areas where Albanians lived and expelled all Albanians. Expulsion was followed with killings and brutality. Malcolm, *Kosovo a short history*, 199-200; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 42-43.

¹⁶⁸Malcolm, *Kosovo A Short History*, 22-24.

¹⁶⁹Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians are predominantly Orthodox, Croats are predominantly Catholics and Bosnians are predominantly Muslims.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html>;
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mj.html>;
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html>;
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hr.html>;
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>.

¹⁷⁰Malcolm, *Kosovo A Short History*, 22-40; Vickers. Between Serb and Albanian, 1-6.

¹⁷¹Vast majority of Albanians in Kosovo are Muslims, Albanians in Albania are Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html#top>, while Albanians in Macedonia are Muslims, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html>.

¹⁷²Serbs Expanded their territories and expelled non Serbian population since they created their independent state, They spread hate, portraying themselves as victims, who now need to revenge to their neighbors, MMAS, 21, 23, 31; Memorandum 1986. Ratko Mladic statement when Serbs captured Srebrenica, on 11 July 1995, when he says “In the end after uprising against the Turks (Dahija) the time has come to revenge Turks in these areas”. The Serbs executed more than 8,000 civilians within few days in Srebrenica during July 1995. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edFQTZpf8yM>.

¹⁷³International Crisis Group, Europe Report no. 212, *Macedonia: Ten Years After The Conflict*, 11 August 2011, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/balkans/macedonia/212%20Macedonia%20---%20Ten%20Years%20after%20the%20Conflict.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/macedonia/212%20Macedonia%20---%20Ten%20Years%20after%20the%20Conflict.pdf), Alliance Red and Black (Kuç e Zi), increased from soccer fan organization to political party with members from all Albanian territories, <http://www.aleancakuqezi.al/2012/lajme/zyrtarizohet-partia-aleanca-kuq-zi/>; Albanian Nationalistic Political party in Kosovo Self-determination (Vetvendosje) became third most voted party in Kosovo; Report of Central Election Commission of Republic of Kosovo, <http://www.kqz-ks.org/SKQZ-WEB/al/zgjedhjetekosoves/materiale/rezultatet2010/1.%20Rezultatet%20e%20pergjithshme.pdf>.

¹⁷⁴Malcolm, *Kosovo A Short History*, 93-94.

¹⁷⁵Daltveit, “The March 2004 Riots in Kosovo,” 25-26.

¹⁷⁶Russian-Ottoman war 1806-1812; Russian-Ottoman war 1828-1829; Russian-Ottoman war 1877-1878; Russia did several other wars in between against rebellions in newly occupied territories.

¹⁷⁷With Russian support Serbia won autonomy in Russian-Ottoman war 1928-1929, than again with Russian support in Russian-Ottoman war in 1877-1878, Serbia and Montenegro won independence and expanded their territories in Albanian inhabited

areas. In 1913 after Balkan Wars, in Congress of London with support of Russia, Kosovo was given to Serbia, in 1914 Russia joined to war to protect Serbia, in 1945 because of influence of USSR in the region Kosovo was left attached to Serbia.

¹⁷⁸Russia supported Serbia during wars in former Yugoslavia, by using “veto power” in UNSC.

¹⁷⁹Serbia lost war with Slovenia in 1991, lost war with Croatia in 1991-1995, NATO bombed Serbs in Bosnia in 1995 and Serbia lost war in Kosovo in 1999, after NATO air campaign. Russia could not stop NATO from bombing Serbs.

¹⁸⁰Daltveit, “ The March 2004 Riots in Kosovo,” 25.

¹⁸¹Charles Jevlavic and Barbara Jevlavic, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920: A History of East and Central Europe vol 7* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 55, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm#history> (accessed 23 April 2012).

¹⁸²<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm#history> (accessed 23 April 2012).

¹⁸³Daltveit, “ The March 2004 Riots in Kosovo,” 21-23. Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 58-80; Malcolm, 139-162.

¹⁸⁴Serbs Expanded their territories and expelled non Serbian population since they created their independent state, They spread hate, portraying themselves as victims, who now need to revenge to their neighbors, MMAS,p21, 23, 31, Memorandum 1986. Ratko Mladic statement when Serbs captured Srebrenica, on 11 July 1995, when he says “. In the end after uprising against the Turks (Dahija) the time has come to revenge Turks in these areas”. The Serbs executed more than 8,000 civilians within few days in Srebrenica during July 1995. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edFQTZpf8yM>.

¹⁸⁵Macshane, *Why Kosovo Still Matters*, 74.

¹⁸⁶Memorandum on the Albanian Question, This Memorandum of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals was sent on 26 October 1995 to the foreign prime ministers of USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia, <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/Kosovo-Background25.htm> (accessed 23 April 2012); Jevlavic and Jevlavic, 221.

¹⁸⁷In 1878 The Serbs occupied, Vranje, Prokuplje, Leskovac, Motenegrans occupied Podgorica, Plava, Gucia, and Ulqin. Albanians were largely expelled from newly occupied territories. In 1912 Serbia Occupied Kosovo and Sanxhak. Serbs and Montengrians occupied most of northern Albanian in 1912 but were forced to withdraw from European Powers.

¹⁸⁸Macshane, *Why Kosovo Still Matters*, 19.

¹⁸⁹Daltveit, “ The March 2004 Riots in Kosovo,” 20.

¹⁹⁰Ibid.

¹⁹¹Nacertanje-Translated in English by Batakovic, Dushan T.
http://www.batakovic.com/en/full-story/21/2012/02/22/ilija-garasanins-nacertanije_-a-reassessment.html (accessed 23 April 2012). Dr Vaso Cubrilovic, *Iseljavanje Arnauta*. Belgrade, 7 March 1937, retranslated from the Serbo-Croatian by Robert Elsie, on the basis of an existing English version, in *Gathering Clouds: the Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia*, ed. R. Elsie, Memorandum, Srpske Akademije Znanosti i Umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Arts and Science), Belgrade: 24 September 1986.

¹⁹²Cubrilovic, *Iseljavanje Arnauta*.

¹⁹³Vaso Cubrilovic, "Minority Problem in New Yugoslavia. Memorandum," November 1944, Belgrade, in *Gathering Clouds: the Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia*, ed. R. Elsie.

¹⁹⁴Memorandum, Srpske Akademije Znanosti i Umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Arts and Science), Belgrade: 24 September 1986.

¹⁹⁵In this memorandum Serbian Academy of Arts and Science portrays Serbs as victim and oppressed people in Yugoslavia, how other Republics join against them and how Albanians in Kosovo are conducting war against Serbs, and how existence of Serbian Nation is endangered. It calls that it is last chance for Serbs to protect their national being.

¹⁹⁶Serbs attacked Slovenia, Croatia in 1991, Bosnia in 1992 and Kosovo 1989 to 1999. Many crimes were committed during these wars. Serbs were those who committed most monstrous crimes: Bombing Dubrovnik, Massacre in Vukovar, 43 Months Siege of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Hundreds of massacres in Kosovo in which over 13000 Albanians were killed and expulsion of over 860,000 Albanians out of Kosovo and displacing another 600,000.

¹⁹⁷Macshane, *Why Kosovo Still Matters*, 80.

¹⁹⁸Serbian Academy of Arts and Science wrote Memorandum in 1986, while Serbian Orthodox Church supported Memorandum as National Policy and supported Milosevic in executing this policy. It means in committing crimes against other peoples in Yugoslavia in the name of National Interests.

¹⁹⁹They respect these people as their heroes and are proud of them because of what they did to other peoples in the name of Serbian National Interests. They are respected glorified by Serbian Intellectuals, Serbian Church, most of Serbian Political Parties and most of Serbian population. Even though Ratko Mladic executed more than 8000 civilians in Srebrenica, Serbia did not handover him to International Justice until 2011, 16 years after he committed this crime. When the handover him, he was in very

bad health condition, what lead to believe that they were afraid that he could die any moment, then Serbia will have to live with this burden forever.

²⁰⁰Serbian Academy of Arts and Science wrote Memorandum in 1986, while Serbian Orthodox Church supported Memorandum as National Policy and supported Milosevic in executing this policy. It means in committing crimes against other peoples in Yugoslavia in the name of National Interests. OSCE did an opinion poll in January 2012 and according to results Serbs trust mostly Church than Police, <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/303680/Istrazivanje-Gradjani-najvise-veruju-crkvi-i-policiji> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²⁰¹<http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/serbet-urrejne-shqiptaret-e-kroatet-2-17908.html> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²⁰²Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 111.

²⁰³Tadic Boris, Current President of Serbia, an authorial text written for German newspaper “Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung” one day before EU had to decide if Serbia’s should be given status of Candidate for EU. Germany was strongly against giving Serbia Status of Candidate and EU did not give Serbia Status of Candidate on 9 December 2011. <http://srb.time.mk/read/ae5ea2ead4/4d83fc9c16/index.html> (accessed 21 April 2012).

²⁰⁴Tadic Boris, Current President of Serbia, Declaration given on 24 March 2012, in 13th anniversary of NATO Air Campaign against Serbia, http://www.pressonline.rs/sr/vesti/vesti_dana/story/210893/+Boris+Tadi%C4%87%3A+Bombardovanje+bilo+zlo%C4%8Din+protiv+naroda.html (accessed 25 March 2012).

²⁰⁵Dacic Ivica, Current Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, Interviews given on 2 February in Washington, <http://www.koha.net/?page=1,15,86700> (accessed 2 February 2012), and 14 February 2012, <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.289.html:366490-Dacic-Guraju-nas-u-ruski-zagrljaj> (accessed 14 February 2012).

²⁰⁶Malcolm, *Kosovo A Short History*, 220-222; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 43-45.

²⁰⁷*Ibid.*

²⁰⁸Even though Requests of Prizren League in 1878, were ignored and their armed resistance badly oppressed, idea of Unified Albanian State kept alive and became part of Albanian beings.

²⁰⁹After Kosovo was given to Serbia in 1912, insurgency against them started and in different intensity continued until 1941 when Yugoslavia was occupied by Germany and Kosovo Reunited with Albania again. In 1945 part of Kosovo Communist party

started uprising against Yugoslav Communist Party, feeling betrayed of what they agreed earlier for future of Kosovo.

²¹⁰Malcolm, *Kosovo A Short History*, 304-305; Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 132-133.

²¹¹Esat Stavileci, "Short history of the albanian people, especially of their ethnogenesis and indigenusness," <http://esat.stavileci.com/index.php/testimony-for-kosova/118-short-history-of-the-albanian-people-especially-of-their-ethnogenesis-and-indigenusness> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²¹²Kosovo sanctioned in its Constitution that Kosovo will remain independent. Article 1 states: The Republic of Kosovo shall have no territorial claims against, and shall seek no union with, any State or part of any State. (This means: no territorial claims . . . Macedonia, South Serbia or Montenegro), and will not union . . . with Albania). Constitution of Kosovo was drafted with support of International Community and was sent to vote after International Community agreed with its content. <http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²¹³<http://www.aleancakuqezi.al/2012/lajme/zyrtarizohet-partia-aleanca-kuq-zi/> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²¹⁴Report of Central Election Commission of Republic of Kosovo, <http://www.kqz-ks.org/SKQZ-WEB/al/zgjedhjetekosoves/materiale/rezultatet2010/1.%20Rezultatet%20e%20pergjithshme.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²¹⁵Albania did not expelled Serbs from Toplica, Leskovac and did not annexed Sanxhak.

²¹⁶Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 122.

²¹⁷Interview given to Voice of America, service in Albanian by Johanna Jutta Neumann, 27 January 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/albanian/news/Alb-Johanna-Neumann-Shqiperia-Holokausti-2012-01-27-138200874.html> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²¹⁸<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²¹⁹Reka, Blerim, Një shekull pavarësi: përplasja e historisë me gjeografinë; <http://www.koha.mk/mobile/opinion/13385.html>; Në vitin 1912 Shkupi ka qenë me 80 për qind shqiptarë, <http://lajmpress.com/lajme/11634.html> (accessed 23 April 2012).

²²⁰Presevo Valley is situated in Serbia- east of Kosovo and includes three municipalities (Presevo, Bujanoc and Medvegja) which are inhabited with Albanians. Until 1956 these municipalities were part of Kosovo, but Communist regime of Yugoslavia arbitrarily shifted these three municipalities from Kosovo to Serbia.

- ²²¹USA were main sponsor for Kosovo's Independence.
- ²²²http://www.koha.net/arkiva/index.php?page=1,13,93489&s=bilaterale&f_d=2012-02-01&t_d=2012-04-21&ch=13,31,14,15,16,3,4,5,10,9,18,19,20,21,6,7,8 (accessed 23 April 2012).
- ²²³http://www.koha.net/arkiva/index.php?page=1,13,93102&s=fizibiliteti&f_d=2012-02-01&t_d=2012-04-21&ch=13,31,14,15,16,3,4,5,10,9,18,19,20,21,6,7,8 (accessed 23 April 2012).
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Even though peace is now achieved and the region is developing slowly toward democratic societies, peace in the Western Balkans remains fragile. Nationalistic ambitions and ethnic divides are still high and are the main threat to peace. Economic and social problems increase the impatience of the people and make them easier targets for nationalistic extremists.

The International Community is bringing to a successful end their engagement in Kosovo¹ by building it into a new independent democratic state and society. Despite tremendous investments of the International Community in Kosovo and the successes arrived, the back bone of the state-security forces were not developed coherently with the other branches of state institutions. This incompleteness in the security sector endangers peace in Kosovo and threatens to destabilize the entire Western Balkans.

The International Community missed a chance to use the KPC in the early years after the war as an opportunity to build up a strong and legitimate security force in Kosovo.² This would have led to a coherent development of the security sector with other branches of society in Kosovo and now security would have not been an issue. To make matters more difficult, part of the International Community, intentionally tried to dismantle the KPC. It produced disagreement among the International Community which in turn diminished trust in the eyes of Albanians in Kosovo. It also weakened the KPC and the careers of many good officers were destroyed. It had negative consequences for

Kosovo too, because it shifted the focus from essential problems, like economy, health care, and education.

After Kosovo declared independence in 2008, the KPC was dissolved, and the KSF was created. The KSF was projected to be a small force for the first five years, with only 2,500 active troops. These limitations will be reviewed in first part of next year. The first 1,400 KSF active troops were recruited from the KPC, including the entire officer corps and most of the senior NCOs. The remaining 1,000 members were recruited from all ethnic groups of the society gradually over a period of three years.³

NATO had the leading role in standing up the KSF, but again due to the hesitation of the International Community, the KSF is developing slowly. In particular, in being engaged in security tasks and earning experience in executing security responsibilities. In addition, KFOR reduced troops from its initial strength of around 39,000 troops in 1999 to 5900 troops now in 2012, and this decreases their capabilities to address properly all security challenges that fall under its mission.

Slow development of the KSF has created a gap between the security needs of Kosovo and the security capabilities of the KSF. KFOR will not stay forever in Kosovo. In case of further troop reduction or eventual total withdrawal of the KFOR, this would create a vacuum in Kosovo. Kosovo would be in a difficult security situation and the KSF would still require time to achieve the necessary capabilities and expertise to properly fill this vacuum. Different nationalistic extremists would exploit such an opportunity.

Considering numerous NATO engagements and the pressures of continuing world economic crises in NATO countries to cut their military budget, prolonged engagement in Kosovo makes an additional burden for NATO. Development of the KSF will release

the KFOR from most of its tasks, and in this way, NATO can further reduce its troops in Kosovo. Besides this, the KSF will eventually be able to contribute to NATO missions around the globe.

KFOR should transfer some of its possibilities to the KSF and enable the KSF to execute security tasks. The KSF could then gain experience, develop its capabilities and learn from KFORs expertise while KFOR is still there. This would also enable the KSF to be more in contact with people and to contribute in the reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs. Most importantly, joint execution of some security tasks between the KFOR and the KSF would send the right message to all nationalist extremists that the KSF has NATO support.

The KSF should be developed as a force capable of defending Kosovo and its people. It should be a force compatible with NATO countries with capabilities to participate in NATO and EU missions around the globe. The KSF should maintain and enhance its Civil Protection capabilities, because this makes it possible for the KSF to be in service of Kosovo and its people on a daily basis, and it represents the best way to keep in touch with people and promote reconciliation.

The concept of the future KSF should be a strong defense force based upon real threats to Kosovo. Kosovo aspires to become an EU and NATO member and to maintain a special relationship with the USA. The future concept of the KSF should also take into consideration the economic capabilities of Kosovo so it may remain an economically affordable force. The KSF also should be developed in balance with other armed forces in the region.

Since the collapse of Yugoslavia, Kosovo has proved itself to be a most reliable partner to the Democratic World in the Western Balkans, yet the threat to sustained peace in the Western Balkans is still real. Nationalism is at the core of these threats, and a stabile Kosovo is key to ensuring continued peace in the Western Balkan, in particular in Kosovo and Macedonia. A strong KSF is a pre-condition for a stable Kosovo. A strong KSF will be assure that a reliable and irreplaceable partner for the EU and NATO to impact in destabilizing endeavors, events and organizations in the Western Balkans. A strong KSF will take the lead in the reconciliation process between Albanians and Serbs, and this will have spillover effect in relations between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia. The KSF must develop into a strong defense force that will reflect stability wider than in Kosovo alone. Increasing the speed of the build-up of the KSF is a necessity for Kosovo's Government, but it is also a most safe investment to ensuring peace in the Western Balkans for the EU and NATO. Ultimately, NATO's support is critical for developing a strong, healthy KSF.

Analysis of the collected data revealed additional concerns related to Kosovo's future. Further research is needed to examine the role of organized crime in irritating ethnic relations by setting up or facilitating ethnic incidents. Because this region was ruled by communist system that functioned based on connections and conspiracy over the last twenty years with constant wars and economic difficulties, organized crime and corruption penetrated deep in these societies. As long as there are security problems organized crime will flourish. People who lead organized crime have an interest in maintaining security problems, so that they can continue to benefit. Unfortunately

political parties in the region are often linked to suspicious people and suspect companies who subsequently sponsor donations to political candidates.

Another issue which requires further research relates to the tempo and the modality with which the KSF should increase its personnel. Will the KSF continue to be a fully professional force? If so, which will be the modality of financing this force? Or will the KSF be a force comprised of two sub-forces: a small, elite, professional force to participate in NATO and EU missions abroad, and a larger conscript force which would serve as a base to enable the professional component to function in full capabilities.

Regional cooperation between the security forces in the service of building mutual trust and promoting reconciliation between peoples is another issue for further research. Because of past memories, the presence of a given security force in a given country in the region is a very sensitive issue and can cause negative reactions; consequently, any type of regional security cooperation should be preceded by serious research. Different modalities should be investigated and identified to design the most appropriate security force likely to develop the right types of cooperation.

Recommendations

Strong KSF. The KSF should be developed as very professional defense force. It should be designed and equipped as a capable force. A strong KSF is critical to preserving peace in the Western Balkans. It is the best response to mitigating extreme nationalism, which remains the main threat for the region. A strong KSF will preserve the successes achieved up to now by the International Community in Kosovo. A strong KSF will enable the International Community to successfully conclude their engagement in Kosovo.

International Community support. The International Community should be determined to support the KSF. Hesitation on the part of the International Community regarding the KSF as a security force sends the wrong message to extreme nationalists and decreases the legitimacy of the KSF in the eyes of the Serbian Community in Kosovo. Joint execution of some security tasks from the KFOR and the KSF would be the best way to demonstrate that the KSF has NATO support and that the KSF's road to join NATO is a joint venture. This support should also include support with equipment and training.

The KSF should be included in security tasks. This should start as soon as possible and be the primary focus of the KSF. The KSF should be engaged in security tasks, with the KFOR and with the Kosovo Police. This engagement is critical for the KSF to keep momentum of development, to keep in touch with Kosovo's people, and to build further its legitimacy within the Serbian Community. Further denial of the security engagements to the KSF will have negative consequences both for the KFOR and the KSF. KFOR would have to commit more resources for a longer time, while the KSF would lose momentum in development.

Interagency cooperation. Interagency cooperation should be institutionalized and enforced. Kosovo's government agencies should share their capabilities as much as possible and should avoid duplication. Kosovo is a very small country and needs rational use of its resources. The KSF should help lead interagency cooperation in Kosovo. This would make possible a comprehensive approach to each and every important issue in Kosovo. Unity of effort will increase the effectiveness of government efforts to better serve Kosovo's people. Primarily the KSF should coordinate with the Kosovo Police, and

cooperation between these agencies should be the rule rather than the exception. The MOU signed in December 2011, between the MKSF and the Ministry of Internal Affairs should be empowered.

Accountability. To be able to develop as disciplined and professional force, the KSF should increase accountability. This should be done by augmenting the Disciplinary Code with more disciplinary measures, and by empowering Force Police, junior officers and senior NCOs in enforcing discipline.

Education of personnel. Education of personnel should also be a focus of the future development of the professionalism of the KSF. Education of the KSF personnel should be a continuous process, done in coordination with other agencies and international partners. As much as possible, the KSF should include experts from other agencies in training its personnel, establish exchange programs with other agencies, and where suitable establish joint courses with other agencies. Enhanced education of NCOs and officers should be done abroad, primarily in the US. This is very important to keep our future leaders connected with the most developed armed forces and future leaders of our allies. In this context, the Partnership Program with the IOWA National Guard is an excellent example.

Establish an institute for Research. The KSF should develop an institute for research and development. This institute should also include other agencies. This institute should continuously study the KSF's need for changes in order to keep the KSF development on track with changes of the strategic environment, technological developments and education of personnel. This Institute should include contracting

authorities to contract domestic or international institutes for experts to conduct research or study for the KSF.

Increase of personnel. The number of personnel should be increased carefully. Any increase in number should be done parallel with an increase of all support needed to keep current personal benefits, personal perspective, and opportunities for education and professional development and increase of budget for adequate equipment with personal and collective equipment. It is better to keep a smaller but motivated and disciplined force, instead of creating a larger force, but one with less perspective and opportunities for its personnel that might lead to a decrease of motivation and discipline.

Start military industry. The KSF should start the basics for a military industry. It should start with very basic items, such as ammunition and uniforms. It should be done with public-private partnership. In this way, the KSF would facilitate the start of a military industry by private companies, while private companies would develop these industries by making profit.

¹It is announced by International Community and R.Kosovo Government that supervised independence will end in September 2012.

²Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK, provided legal basis to create force similar to National Guard of the US, but International Community did nothing in this direction.

³The focus of these recruiting campaigns were, minorities and females. These campaigns were very successful. I was Head of the KSF Recruiting Office at this period of time.

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