Orde Wingate and the British Internal Security Strategy during the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939
Abstract
The Arab Rebellion and British Counter-rebellion campaign of 1936 to 1939 in Palestine exhibited many features of modern insurgency and counterinsurgency. This thesis traces British military thought and practice for countering rebellion as influenced by their Small Wars' experiences, and then presents the Arab rebellion and counter-rebellion campaign as a case study in their military and political contexts. The thesis focuses on the evolution of Britain's internal security strategy, and it examines the actions of Captain Orde Wingate both within the campaign and in his attempts to influence it at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The research is intended to inform military practitioners about the campaign while highlighting the issues that are encountered when they seek to do the following: (1) apply the contemporary wisdom of military thought and practice to a specific operational environment, (2) negotiate the policy constraints on the possible military "solutions" to the security problems incurred by insurgency, (3) influence various facets of the greater campaign when outside the hierarchy of responsibility and authority to do so, and (4) expose some of the issues involved with a counterinsurgent force's utilization of portions of the indigenous population towards converging interests. The study finds that Wingate sought to shape the evolving internal security strategy through both military and political channels, and that he utilized a variety of mechanisms to do so. Despite tactical successes in his validation of proofs of concept through the Special Night Squads, his determined efforts failed to achieve his stated goals at the operational and strategic levels.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 08, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA563007
Entities
People
- Mark D. Lehenbauer
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College