Moltke's Mission Command Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century: Fallacy or Verity?
Abstract
In the aftermath of World War II, many Western armies studied the German "Blitzkrieg" success. They concluded that the German mission command philosophy was a cornerstone to lead and command troops in fluid and uncertain combat situations. This resulted in the integration of mission command philosophy, or "Auftragstaktik" in several Western armies' doctrines. Among those armies, the U.S. Army defines mission command as a command philosophy and a warfighting function that integrates the other warfighting functions. Historically, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army between 1857 and 1888, was the first military leader to recognize that one commanding officer from a central position on the battlefield could no longer direct military formations. He understood that the operational environment, including new technologies, imposed a different command philosophy on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, based on a clear mission statement and intent. He adopted this command method successfully in his campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-1871. Consequently, the Prussian/German education model became a paradigm for most Western armies. Contemporary operations require the same adaptive and flexible leaders to face the circumstances of the current battle space and to achieve mission success. This thesis researches the historical circumstances that shaped the mission command philosophy, and studies its validity in contemporary doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 08, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA563054
Entities
People
- Gunter Rosseels
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College