

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, INFLUENCE, AND POLITICAL WARFARE:
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE STRATEGIES FOR SHAPING
THE 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, INFLUENCE, AND POLITICAL WARFARE:
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE STRATEGIES FOR SHAPING THE 21ST
CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT by MAJ Michael J. Yeager, 136 pages.

The Arab Spring has demonstrated the power and potential of social mobilization and collective action as a form of political warfare in support of unconventional warfare strategies. This power and potential is not isolated to the Arab Spring or to the Middle East and North Africa. Social mobilization and collective action have shaped the social and political environments through activism for more than a century. While Gandhi's struggle for independence set the stage, it was movements like the American Civil Rights Movement and the fall of the Berlin Wall that provide the best insight into principles related to mobilization, activism, and influence. These two movements highlight principles for radical change it is smaller scale movements like Lead India that bridge the doctrinal and academic gap related to political warfare and unconventional warfare in the 21st century. Although the study does not conclude with a stepped methodology for waging political warfare through social mobilization and collective action it does highlight the three basic principles needed; political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and influence.

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ACRONYMS

SMO	Social Movement Organization
ToI	Times of India
USSOF	United States Special Operations Forces
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As the Arab Spring continues to unfold in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) one might ask what does all this mean? What lessons can be learned from these incredible events? Many have used the Arab Spring as “slam dunk” evidence of the power and potential of the Internet and social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter for revolution. Many have even argued that Twitter “caused” the Tunisian revolution, and that Facebook brought about Egypt’s.¹ But can a few “bloggers” and social media alone really cause revolutions or create a resistance movement?

Let’s assume for one second that it cannot. While it is only mere speculation at this point to the actual role and utility of social websites for revolution and resistance, there are volumes of academic research. This research effectively argues the existence and importance of the very “human dynamic” of social mobilization and social revolutions. While there are many parallels to be found between the contemporary Arab Spring social revolutions and those of past social movements and revolutions that managed to mobilize activism and protest. Many emerged and achieved success without the luxury of modern media and communications technologies let alone the Internet and social media.

Probably the most important lesson that can be learned from the Arab Spring is that revolutionaries and activists were able to achieve significant social and political effects using social mobilization and non-violent collective action. Activists in both Tunisia and Egypt successfully forced the resignation of long time autocratic regimes by mobilizing civil society for collective action and protest. Recognizing this power and

potential leads to the guiding question of this study; “how this strategy can be adapted by the US to pressure adversary and rogue states that threaten US security and interests?”

The aim of unconventional warfare, similar to that of the Arab Spring-like social revolutions, is to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow an occupying power or government.² Typically UW is most often a strategy that involves some form of organized and planned violence.³ But what if the use of violence and war will prove to be more problematic, the negative consequences outweighing the perceived gain? Can another form of UW be waged?

The Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt provide some evidence that political warfare can be an alternative to other violent unconventional warfare strategies. But these events are relatively young. To make this argument more effectively the study will look to the past, at other successful social and political revolutions. It is also important to first define political warfare, unconventional warfare, non-violent resistance, and non-violent resistance tactics. Following the brief conceptual definitions a more detailed definition of social mobilization, influence, and collective action will be provided. The study will primarily use historical examples to explain the theories and concepts involved and use the Arab Spring in Egypt as secondary examples to bridge history with the contemporary.

Background

The relationships between any two individuals or groups can be defined by two behaviors; (1) competition and (2) cooperation. Not a unique characteristic, these same types of behaviors define the relationships between states and societies. This interaction between these actors has had a significant impact on security, stability, and peace in the international system. When states interact with other states they leverage instruments of

power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) either gain cooperation or to gain an edge in competition.⁴ How these instruments are leveraged and to what degree they are leveraged are determined on the national interests at stake.

When the other instruments of power fail or are proven ineffective, military power becomes the primary instrument to compete with adversarial states or to persuade other states to cooperate. The military may be used for peaceful purposes or as a credible deterrence against aggression.⁵ If peace and deterrence fail, the military power can be used for conventional war, waged by state's militaries to achieve the state's ends.⁶ In this instance, the military power is used as a means for war or as Carl Von Clausewitz argues; "as an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will."⁷ Although there is ample historical evidence to support the logic of Clausewitz's argument there are other ways military power can compel adversaries.

Military power can be also used in ways that are "just short of conventional war" to compel adversaries "to do our will." This power can be used to create psychological effects and the conditions necessary coerce adversaries "to do our will." Leveraging persuasion and unconventional influence activities, military power can create the emotions, attitudes, or desired behaviors that support the states achievement of national objectives.⁸ These less than conventional ways can influence the policy, decisions, the ability to govern and command, the will to fight, the will to obey, and the will to support.⁹

The spectacular events that have unfolded in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring highlight the power of society and non-violent civil resistance. But these events are not isolated in time and space; similar occurrences of non-violent resistance have

similarly shaped the social and political environments in numerous nation-states. Not only have non-violent resistance and revolutions occurred, they have also proven as effective as their more violent counterparts. From 1900 to 2006, major nonviolent resistance campaigns seeking to overthrow dictatorships, throw out foreign occupations, or achieve self-determination were more than twice as successful as violent insurgencies seeking the same goals.¹⁰

Much of the success over that period paved the way for the Arab Spring revolutions.¹¹ Events like India's independence from the British Empire after nearly three decades non-violent resistance¹² to the pro-democracy movements in Serbia in 2000, which ended the authoritarian rule of Slobodan Milosevic, and countless others have set examples for the activists in MENA to rise up and mobilize. Similar examples demonstrate how non-violent resistance has been used as a relatively "stand-alone" tactic; powerful and effective enough to topple long-standing dictators is of particular interests.¹³ They also provide insight into the power of human agency and social mobilization to transform and shape environments and challenge the status quo.¹⁴ Human agency represented in informal social networks and other social organizations can be mobilized and transformed into a powerful force for influence. As the US continues to maneuver through the challenges of the 21st century security environment human agency and social mobilization for non-violent political warfare can prove to be an effective tool to advance interests and achieve objectives.

Research Question

The research questions guide the study's attempt at understanding the fundamentals and potential of social mobilization and collective actions for shaping the

socio-political environment. The primary research question, “how can the US effectively harness this potential as a method for waging unconventional warfare?” guides the study and is a tremendous challenge to answer. Coming to a concrete answer is far too complicated for any one volume of work. Instead a more thorough and systematic analysis would be required. This study will merely contribute to this future collective knowledge.

The study’s specific contribution will be a greater understanding of non-violent struggles, activism, social mobilization, and social influence. This will be accomplished by answering the following questions related to the three causal factors; (1) opportunities and environment, (2) mobilization structures, and (3) influence (these will be defined in greater detail in chapter 3). First, what are non-violent struggles and how do they relate to political warfare and unconventional warfare? This question was answered partly in Chapter 1, “Key Terms” and in the Literature Review. The case studies will provide examples to further develop an understanding.

Secondly, how are non-violent resistance movements mobilized and what are the principles of social movements and social mobilization for collective action? The literature review in chapter 2 outlined the key theories and the case studies will highlight many of these with examples of mobilization for collective action. Thirdly, how are activist’s related attitudes, opinions, and behaviors influenced within informal social networks and SMOs. Additionally how is awareness and sympathy of key segments of civil society influenced. Understanding the principles and theories related to non-violent struggles, social movements, social networks, and influence highlight both the micro and macro level processes for mobilization.

Key Terms

While concepts and theories related to mobilization, collective action, and influence will be discussed in greater detail in the literature review there are four definitions of particular importance for framing the study; political warfare, unconventional warfare (UW), non-violent resistance, and non-violence resistance tactics.

Political Warfare

Few foreign policy options are as controversial as secret inventions into the social and political affairs of other nations.¹⁵ The British government first coined the term “political warfare” during World War II.¹⁶ It was a title given to its deliberate effort to overthrow the Nazi government by disseminating propaganda “beyond enemy lines.”¹⁷ After the war the United States attempted to incorporate political warfare into the U.S. national security establishment.¹⁸ At the time political warfare was defined as “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”¹⁹ Some American policymakers like George Kennan advocated the use of this instrument of grand strategy.²⁰

Political warfare is a phrase “used to identify the pursuit of American foreign policy objectives through “quiet options” as opposed to the more noisy options of other US government actions.”²¹ It is can also be considered the “third option between diplomacy and open warfare.”²² Henry Kissinger once argued that the US needed a capability that, “in certain complicated situations, can defend the American national interests in the gray areas where military options are not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate.”²³ This “third option” is conducted inside another designed to influence the

social and political environment as well as the adversarial state's decision making capacity.

Unconventional Warfare

War, as defined by Carl von Clausewitz, is “nothing but a duel on a larger scale.”²⁴ A dual of wills in which two opposing sides attempt “through physical force to compel the other to do his will” and render them “incapable of further resistance.”²⁵ War and the act of compelling “the other to do his will” can manifest itself in a variety of forms. Most often these forms are categorized as either conventional or unconventional warfare (UW). UW is a military phenomenon appropriate to particular internal and international conflict situations.

Defining unconventional warfare has been historically challenging. The term has been used interchangeably with “internal war,” “revolutionary war,” “class war,” and “political war” or as a synonym for “guerrilla warfare.”²⁶ UW deviates from the conventional concept of war, which most often features the confrontation of opposing state's armies of approximate equal strength.²⁷ Conventional warfare is a military confrontation employed to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize (or retain) territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies. This conventional definition and concept of warfare are based on a history of war dominated by violence between nation-states in which each state possessed the ways and means to coerce their adversaries and the ability to nationally mobilize.²⁸

Unconventional warfare is defined as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow an occupying power or

government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.²⁹ The ultimate objective of UW is winning control of the state by winning control of the civil population.³⁰ UW can occur when adversaries have grossly disproportionate capabilities or when one of the participating belligerents possesses an inferior military or no military at all.³¹ While in conventional war where the adversary's military is the COG for defeating the enemy, the strategy of unconventional forces must be to win control of the state by first winning control of the civil population.

This is achieved through asymmetric and indirect strategies designed to undermine and erode the power, influence, legitimacy, and authority of a state, group or ideology over the population.³² To gain the support of civil society, UW relies on understanding and leveraging the social dynamics like tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores.³³ UW strategies may involve varying degrees of violence but success in UW “does not depend on military prowess alone.”³⁴ More important than a robust guerrilla force are the strong relationships and partnerships with the local populace.³⁵

Most often UW is associated with violence. But in an increasingly complex social environment there is greater interdependence between the state and society. Civil resistance, which is considered para-violence, paralyzes the state without the “actual infliction of violence.”³⁶ Civil resistance can disrupt the functioning of the state while minimizing the risk of antagonizing the state's security apparatus. Civil Resistance also serves a psychological function. The state is confronted by a massive show of popular unity that challenges the states authority and legitimacy.³⁷

Non-violent Resistance

It is important to recognize that conflict in society and politics is inevitable, and in many cases desirable for change. This conflict is often in the form of a political struggle between the state and society or the “ruler and the ruled.”³⁸ Contentious political struggles can feature a variety of groups or actors to challenge the state and its authority. Of significance to this study are insurgencies and social movements. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed to overthrow a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict.³⁹ It can also be understood as an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.⁴⁰

While an insurgency is most commonly understood as a violent struggle, a social movement is considered a non-violent struggle. Social movements will be discussed in greater detail in the literature review but it can be understood as a large-scale grouping or individuals and/or organizations focused on achieving some degree of political or social change.⁴¹ It is comprised of elements of civil society that act collectively to challenge the dominant institutional order and purposes an alternative structural arrangement.⁴² Both can be considered a form of resistance movement whose actions and purpose are aimed primarily at the rejection of authority, a key source of power for a government or an occupying power.

As the resistance movement evaluates and assesses the situation an emerging resistance movement faces a significant dilemma. On one hand it may seem that only violent action possesses the power and potential to challenge the state. The use of

violence as a tool to achieve, maintain, and increase political power is the operating principle of many insurgencies and tyrannical regimes. Both leverage a variety of violent activities in a struggle to either mobilize or oppress different segments of society to gain or maintain power and legitimacy.⁴³

The use of violence as a way and means in society and politics is a considerable challenge to security and stability.⁴⁴ Although non-violent resistance may seem weak and insufficient in the face of an organized and resourced opponent, the use of violence by the resistance can also be problematic or have significant consequences. These consequences can severely limit its effectiveness and efficiency for achieving success or creating the desired effects. Non-violent resistance is an effective tool for marginalized communities and politically powerless to address structural imbalances and claim rights to justice or self-determination.⁴⁵ By leveraging non-violent strategies, societies have successfully challenged abuses by states, organized social reforms, and protested tyranny, discrimination, and oppression. Since the turn of the 20th century there have been multiple non-violent movements that have led to significant political and social reforms.

Non-violent Resistance Tactics

In social movement literature success is dependent on tactics related to mobilization for activism, which range from the more active like demonstrations and protests to the more passive like financial donations.⁴⁶ Similarly, military doctrine also identifies certain tactics related to nonviolent resistance. These include but are not limited to demonstrations, denial and deception, hoaxes, infiltration, and strikes.⁴⁷ Two of the more prevalent tactics in non-violent resistance are subversion and propaganda.⁴⁸

Propaganda can be defined as any form of communication in support of the sponsor's objectives and are designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.⁴⁹ Resistance movements will commonly use propaganda to increase their base of support while reducing the support for ruling regime. The term propaganda has more commonly been associated with insurgencies, revolutions, or resistance movements. Because of this association, it has earned a "nefarious" label. Because this label will likely be a distraction, the study will instead substitute the term "influence" in lieu of propaganda. The principles and theories related to influence will be discussed in greater detail later in the literature review.

Like propaganda, subversion is actions or behaviors designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime.⁵⁰ Resistance movements use a variety of subversive techniques in their attempt to convince the civil society to resist the government and support the cause. These techniques include more direct activities like demonstrations, boycotts, and protests.⁵¹ They can also include indirect activities clandestine radio broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets designed to disseminate propaganda.

More relevant to this study is "direct action" activism. Direct action activism is a powerful subversive tactic that creates or threatens disorder and chaos.⁵² Subversive activities often openly challenge, in an organized pattern and just short of violence, the control and legitimacy of the established government.⁵³ One of the most visual and consequently most effective forms of subversion are "demonstrations" and "protests."

The staging of demonstrations and protests are effective in shaping the environment for three reasons; first it can drain the power, presence, and capabilities of the government while simultaneously increasing the power and legitimacy of the resistance.⁵⁴ Second, they are an effective “ways and means” for bargaining, enabling the normally politically powerless to mobilize and apply negative pressure on decision-makers.⁵⁵ The disorder created by demonstrations applies pressure on the ruling regime, which more often than not, are more concerned with removing the disorder.⁵⁶

Besides the direct pressures applied by the physical presence of demonstrations and protests, they also apply pressures indirectly.⁵⁷ The presence of demonstrations attracts the support and sympathy of elites who already have access and bargaining power within the political system. Protests also attract media attention and stimulate public sympathy from previously inactive groups. These groups often have political resources to intervene on behalf of the politically powerless or shape the social and political environment favorable to the resistance.

Scope and Limitations

The academic research will provide a basic understanding of social mobilization, activism, and influence as it relates to resistance movements and political warfare. The three case studies involved feature a mobilized civil society challenging the status quo of the state in a non-violent war of ideas. US Army Special Operations doctrine related to unconventional warfare and psychological operations add insight into the evaluation of the case studies in attempt to make the link between academia and doctrine. The analysis will be summarized and key aspects of social networks and social mobilization will be discussed.

The study faces two primary limitations in determining the potential of social networks, social influence, and social movements to shape the environment. First, the prevailing conceptual understanding of social networks and social movements is counter to this study's primary purpose, which is determining the potential of USSOF to leverage networks, influence, and social mobilization for unconventional warfare. It is a commonly held belief that networks and social movements are successful primarily because the state is not an active participant but is an adversary.⁵⁸ To make this analytical linkage, the logical assumption is made that USSOF, based on current doctrine, can identify and co-opt a social network or other social organization and resource it to influence and mobilize civil society. A second limitation is the variations in the case studies. Using case studies that were from the same geographic region or time period would have an obvious academic appeal. But the intent is to capture more universal aspects of social mobilization and collective actions for shaping the socio-political environment.

Significance

The Arab Spring and the political upheaval in MENA provided a small glimpse at the power and potential of non-violent political warfare for shaping the security environment.⁵⁹ As Tunisians and Egyptians were taking to the streets and challenging the ruling regimes⁶⁰ the world could observe from a distance and watch a society mobilize for collective action. Not limited to the contemporary, these forms of non-violent political warfare have allowed numerous resistance movements to overthrow dictators, throw out foreign occupations, or achieve self-determination.⁶¹ The purpose of this study is to expand on what has been speculated about the Arab Spring and other resistance

movements. Specifically, the study will examine past instances where societies were mobilized to determine key aspects related to non-violent resistance movements, social networks, social influence, and mobilization in order to develop a new method to engage competitors and adversaries. This knowledge can be used for shaping the internal social and political environment and set the conditions favorable to their interests. Given the complexity of the security environment and the risk associated with conventional military strategies new approaches to dealing with adversaries are necessary.

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⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 342.

⁵¹Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, 2-23.

⁵²Ronald J. Terchek, "Protest and Bargaining," *Journal of Peace Research* 11, no. 2 (1974): 135.

⁵³Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, 2-23.

⁵⁴Terchek, "Protest and Bargaining," 133.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

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⁵⁸Sidney Tarrow, "Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article," *The American Political Science Review* 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 874-83.

⁵⁹Daniel Wagner and Daniel Jackman, "The Arabs' Perpetual Spring," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* no. 21 (Fall/Winter), <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2011/21/wagner&jackman.php> (accessed May 22, 2012).

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Critical to understanding and exploiting the potential and power of social mobilization and non-violent political warfare is an understanding of the theories and concepts related to influence, mobilization, and activism. The study will begin by first reviewing the theories, concepts, and literature related to social movements. The focus on social movements and will highlight the necessary structures for mobilization and activism. The literature review will then focus on influence and influence campaigns designed to influence activist behaviors. The focus on social influence will highlight the necessary processes for changing the target audience's internal conditions (values, attitudes, and beliefs).

Social Movement and Mobilization for Collective Action

Social movements and revolutions have emerged as a common feature of the political landscape.¹ In the 1970s Islamic fundamentalists “wrest” power from the Shah of Iran while in the 1980s popular revolutions swept Philippine strongman Ferdinand Marcos from office and ended apartheid in South Africa.² From 1989 through 2005 many of the former Soviet satellite states all experienced some form of social mobilization and protest to challenge the authoritarian state systems.³ These social revolutions along with many other non-violent resistance movements can be categorized as a form of contentious socio-political activity similar to phenomena normally studied in social movements.

Social movements can be defined as “politically or socially directed collectives, often involving multiple organizations and networks, focused on changing one or more elements of the social, political and economic system within which they are located.”⁴ These collective enterprises seek to establish a new order⁵ based on socially shared demands for change in some aspect of the established social order.⁶ Social movements are persistent and ongoing organizations or collectives of activists working to achieve a common political goal.⁷ They can also be viewed as a loose collection of individuals or organizations that challenge some aspect of the status quo.⁸

Theories that explain the emergence and conduct of social movements are closely associated with traditional political sociology, focusing much of their attention on structural preconditions and resources available for mobilizing collective action.⁹ These theoretical traditions emphasize the importance of three broad factors in the analysis of social movements.¹⁰ These factors are; (1) the structure of political opportunities (and constraints) facing the social movement; (2) the forms of organizations (both formal and informal) available to activists and supporters; and (3) the methods for interpretation, attribution, and social construction of attitudes, opinions, and perceptions related to mobilization and collective action commonly referred to as “framing.”¹¹ Each is rooted in the study of revolutionary and popular collective challenges, based on a common purpose and social solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.¹²

Political Opportunity Structures

A fundamental belief in social movement theory is that any collective challenge or social mobilization faces political opportunities and constraints. The opportunities and constraints are fluid and any changes can determine whether a movement emerges.¹³

They also shape the “ebb and flow of movement over time.”¹⁴ Social movements emerge according to changes in institutional structure or informal power relations¹⁵ as well as differences in the political characteristics of the nation-states.¹⁶ All of these impact mobilization and ultimately the success of social movements.

Political opportunity structures are “consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent signals to social or political actors.”¹⁷ These signals either encourage or discourage them” to mobilize for collective action.¹⁸ There are four dimensions of political opportunity structures; (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and 4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.¹⁹ These dimensions are related to the political environment and structures within the state. While these dimensions help to explain the emergence of a particular social movement based on changes to institutional structures or power relations within a given political system²⁰ they do not capture the local opportunities that emerge that allow grassroots movements to form.

These opportunities come from the “free-space” that social networks and other social organizations provide, which are exploited by the emerging movement. Free-space can be physical, as with the Black churches during the American Civil Rights Movement and the Protestant churches during the 1989 East German Revolution.²¹ It can also be virtual. Within this free space, “the actual social behaviors of individuals emerge.”²² These individuals are “in direct contact with other similar” like minded individuals, separated from the structural rules and norms of the political or social environment, can be observed.²³

The free-space provides the necessary “cognitive liberation” for a movement to emerge.²⁴ Ideas can be shared and debated, producing new modified beliefs, attitudes, ideologies, and values. The free space also allows individuals to increase their awareness of socio-political strains.²⁵ Previously private issues become shared and compared against other like individuals.²⁶ Finally the free-space affords the movement the opportunity to organize collective action “out of sight” and reach of the authorities.²⁷

Mobilization Structures

While the opportunities and environment (free-space) created by the political opportunities structures are important, more is needed for a movement to emerge. Mobilization and collective action require structures designed to collect and manage resources and action. In the absence of sufficient organizations and structures, opportunities are unlikely to be exploited.²⁸ Mobilization structures are the “collective vehicles,” through which people mobilize and engage in collective action and form the collective building blocks of social movements and revolutions.²⁹

Resource mobilization theory (RMT), one of the two dominant mobilization theories, attempts to explain movements from an economical or rational perspective. RMT treats social movements as an “industry” and the individual activist and supporter as rational actors and customers. Change to the status quo is the product. In order to maintain a good customer base, social movements establish structures that effectively direct and sustain mobilization and collective action to deliver the product.

The organizational forms available and employed by resistance movements for directing and sustaining collective action are critical in explaining their emergence and success. Resistance movements engage in various forms of “contentious repertoires” with

the state. These repertoires refer to the types of collective behaviors (marches, sit-ins, etc.) employed by activist or movement participants in order to “interact” or “bargain” with the ruling regime.³⁰ These behaviors have inherent risks and challenges, requiring an effective mobilizing structure that can persuade participation and direct the action towards the desired purpose.

There are two mobilizing structures of importance to this study, social movement organizations (SMOs) and informal social networks. Informal social networks are defined as networks of “individuals and/or collectives without formal structures, linked together by one or more social relationships, such as kinship and friendship.”³¹ Besides definitive social relationships, links can also emerge around ideas, beliefs, or values (or all three together) that are shared by individuals or a collective of nodes.³² Lastly, network links can be based on the interdependence between actors.³³ They emerge out of reasoned logic, out of necessity, or based on needs.³⁴ These needs can range from advice to the need for emotional support.³⁵ Informal social networks can also emerge in order to achieve a common purpose or benefit. This allows actors to survive in competitive environments through collaboration and cooperation.³⁶

Informal social networks have become increasingly important in understanding the emergence of a resistance movement, particularly in the early phases of its operation.³⁷ There are several factors that are related to characteristics inherent to networks (many of these will be discussed throughout the study). These include the benefits of relational ties,³⁸ the level of trust and credibility of network actors, and more importantly their ability to socialize socio-political issues and redefine attitudes, values, and beliefs.³⁹ They also (most often) exist prior to the emergence of the movement and

remain after the movement has ended. Other benefits for mobilization and collective action include a reserve of social capital for individual actors and communities to draw from in order to achieve either personal or collective goals.⁴⁰

Informal social networks can also inspire conformity in both thought and action⁴¹ among network actors. Networks can influence actors to make the “right choices;” choosing the appropriate collective behaviors” in support of achieving a common goal.⁴² This ability to shape conformity and unity of thought leads to a basic principle of social networks that is critical for social mobilization and collective action. The principle of “network effects” suggests that network actions and achievements are shaped more by the sum of the relationships (shared ideas and action) than by the characteristics or contributions of any one individual node.⁴³

An individual actor’s significance in a networked environment is not necessarily the result of his or her individual agency. It is from these social ties, either strong or weak, many or few, etc., between that individual actor and other actors in the network.⁴⁴ These ties, which can be based on a variety relationships at work or school, in neighborhood and churches, or other social environments become the foundation for grassroots mobilizations.⁴⁵ The ties also form the communications structures for the process of socialization, framing, and influence. These effects are much more effective under conditions of strong organizations like those of social networks, rather than weak organizations.⁴⁶

Another basic principle of social networks is the voluntary nature of the relationships between actors. Social network structures are constructed around human relationships based on a series of choices made by actors, which either create contacts or

avoid creating contacts.⁴⁷ These choices are based on specific sets of criterion (e.g. liking/necessity or disliking/non-necessity).⁴⁸ These choices are also motivated by logic and reason to organize into supporting or complimentary networks based on real or perceived benefits.⁴⁹ This creates networks of “like-minded” nodes that are more likely to be in “intense regular contact” with each other and also likely emerge as the mobilizing structures⁵⁰ of a social movement in its early stages.

As the movement evolves and matures the informal organizational structures, which are dominated by informal social networks, are replaced by the more efficient SMOs. SMOs provide the core of professional revolutionaries that incorporate the movement into a “social industry” for collective action.⁵¹ They give direction and expression to the movement⁵² and become the formal manifestations of the mobilization process.⁵³ This contributes to the ability of a social movement to become the force for change.

There are several characteristics of SMOs that make them particularly important. First, they are inherently a more formal and hierarchical organization. SMOs also collect and manage critical resources needed by the movement to encourage mobilization of activists.⁵⁴ SMOs leverage organizational relationships and informal social networks to collect and manage financial support, recruiting, special skills, media resources, and other “means” for collective action.

SMOs expand organizationally and structurally to provide the edge of the movement that is in contact with opponents.⁵⁵ This may include branches, cells, informal social networks, clubs, etc., which may be controlled by the SMO or may be loosely affiliated with the movement based on common goals.⁵⁶ The last important characteristic

of SMOs is the formalized connective structures that link the different parts of the movement.⁵⁷ This can include the structural links between leaders and followers or to the different parts of the movement that support a movement.⁵⁸

Influence Campaigns and Persuasion

To understand why an individual mobilizes and participates in collective action requires an understanding of the mechanisms and dynamics that motivate individuals to become involved. Some have attributed the presence of grievances as a motivation. Although their presence is necessary, grievances are a near constant in any society yet resistance movements and activism are not.⁵⁹ To be effective, grievances have to be presented and then compared in a manner that causes a socio-political strain (relative deprivation theory).

By increasing the awareness of the socio-political strain related to the root grievances causes a collective perception of injustice (e.g., income inequality despite comparative education and ability).⁶⁰ The resistance movement is then seen as a collective response to the strain.⁶¹ While opportunities and mobilizing structures afford groups the structural potential for collective action to address socio-political strains, they are not sufficient alone for mobilization. More importantly they are not sufficient for motivating activist's behaviors.⁶²

The motivation for activists' behaviors related to collective action are linked to the internal conditions values, attitudes, beliefs, opinions and perceptions that people bring to their situation.⁶³ Lacking these required internal conditions, it is unlikely the potential for collective action and behaviors can be realized.⁶⁴ Of importance to this study is the ability of informal social networks and SMOs to influence the collective behaviors

related to activism. Adaptive and highly organized movements need to promote growing new ideas and values, harnessing the potential of influence to achieve objectives.⁶⁵

Changing individual and group behaviors before, during, and after a social movement or resistance has emerged is a foremost factor in achieving change and relieving socio-political change. The ability to motivate or change behaviors is often referred to as influence.⁶⁶

Behaviors are overt actions exhibited by individuals, such as committing acts of protest (i.e. strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts), giving money, or other support to the movement, casting votes, etc. Causes of behavior are the conditions that motivate or trigger a behavior.⁶⁷ Influence is defined as “the act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command.”⁶⁸ Influence can be understood as the ability to indirectly affect the actions (behaviors) and thoughts (internal conditions) of others.⁶⁹ Influence is a combination of facts and emotional frames in which, “facts inform; emotions inspire.”⁷⁰ Its role in changing behavior can have a direct impact on the nature of how a social movement is mobilized and sustained and therefore must be regarded as being central to social movement engineering.⁷¹

Leveraging influence to change a behavior requires an understanding of the conditions that affect it.⁷² Conditions are existing elements that affect a behavior and can be either internal or external.⁷³ External conditions are certain situations or events that exist in the environment that affect the behavior. Events are any occurrence that affects the behavior and can be related to economic, political, social, environmental, or security conditions.⁷⁴ Social networks and social movements can either attempt to manipulate

these external conditions or exploit conditions that cause socio-political strains. But these efforts are dependent on the more important internal conditions.

Internal conditions are the internalized cognitions, perceptions, and opinions that are formed by values, beliefs, and attitudes. Attitudes are learned through social interaction with family members, other members of a group, or as a member of society. Attitudes help interpret the social world and define the appropriate behaviors in a consistent and characteristic manner.⁷⁵ They are learned evaluations of an object (person, place, or issue) that influences an individual's thoughts and actions."⁷⁶ Beliefs are convictions about what is true or false based on experiences, perceptions, public opinion, supporting evidence, authorities, or faith.⁷⁷ Values are conceptions of ultimate right and wrong.⁷⁸

These internal conditions can have a decisive effect upon the nature and success of social movement.⁷⁹ They all affect the formation of perceptions and interpretations of reality, which consequently shape individuals choices and behaviors. The preference of social networks and social movement organizations is that activists, supporters, and opponents make the "right" choice.⁸⁰ For social networks and social movement organizations, the primary task is to "nudge" activists and supporters towards that choice.⁸¹ Shaping the internal conditions and giving this "nudge" is accomplished through socialization, framing, and social influence.

Methods for influencing behaviors are influence campaigns. Influence campaigns use deliberate efforts to convey selected information and indicators to target audiences.⁸² In non-violent resistance movements the entire population is a potential target for influence.⁸³ Such campaigns attempt to influence the perceptions, cognitions, and

behavior of individuals, groups, organizations, and the state. The influence campaign will focus primarily on the resistance movement's ability to socialize socio-political strains, frame collective issues and actions, influence behaviors, and translating potential to actual action.

Persuasion, or the ability to persuade activists and supporters, is a critical aspect of an influence campaign. Persuasion is defined as "human communication that is designed to influence others by modifying beliefs, values, or attitudes."⁸⁴ Persuasion can create three different effects on individuals; (1) they shape attitudes towards a specific thing (product, service, person or company), (2) they reinforce a position or attitude they already have, or (3) they can induce change in an attitude.⁸⁵ Persuasion involves a communicator attempting to convince others to change their attitudes or behavior regarding a specific issue through the transmission of a message or action, in an atmosphere of free choice.⁸⁶ This is a back-and-forth interaction where the "persuader" gradually presents a series of arguments until the "persuadee" is either sufficiently convinced or not.⁸⁷

Socialization

Socialization provides three critical functions throughout all stages of any movement. First, informal social networks and SMOs can shape individual's internal conditions that determine future behaviors. When individuals consciously join together to form a group or network, there occurs a modification of elements of their values, attitudes, and beliefs as well as their goal structures in order for the group to accomplish its objective.⁸⁸ New individuals who voluntarily join social networks or SMOs are then exposed to new or modified values, norms, social behavioral patterns, and social skills

needed to integrate into and become a functioning member of their new social order.⁸⁹ Individuals outside the network or SMOs observe and adopt new values, attitudes, and beliefs based on information they either actively seek out or passively accept through social conditioning as they maneuver through the social environment.⁹⁰

Second, informal social networks and SMOs develop and increase awareness of collective socio-political strains through systematic socialization.⁹¹ Even with modified or new values, attitudes, and beliefs, people need to feel aggrieved and recognize the presence of a socio-political strain in some aspect of their life. Lacking information and perspective that others afford, isolated individuals are likely to explain their troubles on the basis of personal rather than system attributions. Only system attributions afford the rationale for collective activity.⁹² Traditional conceptions of socialization view the social ties (especially close ties like friends and family) as principal agents for socializing collective grievances and sociopolitical strains.⁹³ Actors “embedded” within the network links form an interactive process for exchanging ideas and interpreting conditions.⁹⁴

The third function of socialization is the development in a collective belief that opportunities exist and collective action can achieve change. The inherent “trust” and “credibility” within the relationship ties⁹⁵ of social networks and SMOs help persuade individuals that perceived benefits outweigh the perceived cost of action. Collective behaviors are based on the “cuings among groups of people who jointly create meanings they will read into their current and anticipated events.”⁹⁶ Individuals will likely begin socially interpreting conditions that begin to trigger the collective behaviors related to resistance based on awareness, internal conditions, and the collective confidence in action.⁹⁷ The structural role of social networks and SMOs transforms from a socializing

force into a “pulling force,” mobilizing individuals into a collective to participate in some form of collective activity.⁹⁸

Framing

Social movements, political movements, and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge. Mediating between the structural requirements of opportunity and organization are the emergent meanings and definitions, or frames, shared by the devoted participants and supporters of the growing movement.⁹⁹ The framing process, a prominent social movement theory, addresses the social dynamic of realizing the grievance and social-political strain, attributing its cause, and believing that acting collectively can bring relief.¹⁰⁰ While socialization is more focused on shaping the internal conditions within networks and SMOs, framing is focused on both the internal and external audiences.

SMOs are the primary mobilizing structure for the framing process. The absence of a SMO and other well-organized yet diverse network structures would adversely affect the reach of collective action frames to a small number of people.¹⁰¹ More importantly without the required creative resources mobilized by SMOs framings would likely not emerge at all.¹⁰² As discussed in socialization, in order to mobilize activists, potential movement participants require the feelings of both “aggrieved” and “optimistic” that collective action can improve the situation.¹⁰³ This requires the SMOs to frame issues in a way that is appealing and meaningful to target audiences. In this case target audiences are those affected by the issues or grievances and those who are potential movement participants. Framing impacts the SMOs ability to give meaning to the movement among the targeted audiences and generate support for activism.

The framing process is described as the method of presenting specific grievances or other significant issues into “general collective action frames which dignify socio-political strains, create commonly held socio-political strains, and help to produce a collective identity among activists and supporters.”¹⁰⁴ The framing process encourages mobilization, as people seek to organize and act on the growing awareness of the socio-political strains and the belief that acting collectively can bring change and relief.¹⁰⁵

Collective action frames are formed and evolve over time in response to events or to changing internal conditions. Individuals use overarching or “master” frames as the basis for issue-specific frames and as a means of justifying their already existent attitudes.¹⁰⁶ SMOs attempt to create a new frame or adjust existing frames in order to influencing public opinion and events.¹⁰⁷ As opinions, attitudes, and perceptions begin to change, individuals become susceptible to mobilization and motivated to take part in collective action. Activists are drawn to like-minded individuals and organizations; aligning themselves with others according to commonly shared frames. Movements will alter frames to appeal a wide array of individuals and groups and to react to different conditions, goals, tactics, or beliefs.¹⁰⁸

In addition to collective action frames to motivate mobilization, framing also builds coalitions and sympathy with the population and elites.¹⁰⁹ Successful social movements and revolutions often require expansive coalitions of various actors.¹¹⁰ These coalitions are built around more “inclusive” frames that attract activists and supporters from a variety of backgrounds with a variety of interests whose cooperation based on the framed realization that “collective action” is in everyone’s benefit, even if temporarily.¹¹¹

Social Influence

Socialization and framing are broad concepts for influencing and shaping internal conditions. Both are dependent in some form or fashion on the power linked to social influence. Social influence is defined as change in an individual's thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or behaviors that result from interaction with another individual or a group.¹¹² Individuals adapt their beliefs with respect to others to whom they feel similar in accordance with psychological principles such as balance. Social influence is the application of social power from one of five bases: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, expert power, or referent power. A change in reported opinion or attitude (conformity) was considered an instance of social influence whether or not it represented a true private change

Several theories attempt to explain social influence as it relates to social networks. For example, Social Impact Theory suggests that the impact or affect of any information source is a function of three factors: the number of others who make up that source, their immediacy (i.e., network location or closeness), and their strength (i.e., status or power).¹¹³ Social impact is related to the changes that are likely to occur in an individual (physiological, cognitive, emotional, or behavioral) as a consequence of the presence or action of others.¹¹⁴ Dynamic social impact theory builds on the idea social impact to describe and predict the transmission of beliefs, attitudes, and opinions throughout the social network. In social networks, actors actively influence other actors they are linked to.¹¹⁵ In dense social networks this can create tightly knitted groups of who share strong opinions and beliefs.¹¹⁶

Another approach for understanding social influence within informal social networks is related to the structured relationships between network actors. Within social networks the attitudes and opinions of individuals are reflections of the attitudes and opinions of their referent others.¹¹⁷ Interpersonal influence is seen as a basis of individuals' socialization and identity.¹¹⁸ Social influence is seen as the process by which a group of actors will weigh and then integrate the opinions of significant others within the context of social structural constraints.

A similar structural approach for understanding social influence is explained in Social Influence Network Theory. Social Influence Network Theory is a method for understanding how opinions and attitude can change within a network. Actors start out with their own initial opinions on some issue. At each stage of socialization or interaction network actors evaluate the "norms" and shared attitudes and opinions, which is a weighted average of the other actor's norms, attitudes, and opinions in the group.¹¹⁹ Individual actors then begin modify and internalize their own opinion in response to these new norms.¹²⁰

Another key theory for explaining social influence is Expectation States Theory. According to the theory, group members develop expectations about the future task performance of all group members, including themselves.¹²¹ Even when group members are equal in status in the beginning of social interaction, some members end up being more influential than others.¹²² Groups develop a hierarchy based on the expected tasks and behaviors of the group members. Once developed, the assumed roles and the associated expectations guide the group's internal interactions.¹²³

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⁶⁸Merriam-Webster's online dictionary

⁶⁹Gene Klann, "The Application of Power and Influence in Organizational Leadership," CGSC (2010):

⁷⁰Mackay and Tatham, *Behavioural Conflict From General to Strategic Corporal; Complexity, Adaptation and Influence*, 10.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 2-9.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid., 2-13.

⁷⁵Richard M. Perloff, *The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 21st Century*, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003), 41.

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⁷⁸Ibid.

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⁸²Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2005), 14.

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⁸⁴Marianne Dainton and Elaine D. Zelley, *Applying Communication Theory For Professional Life: A Practical Introduction* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2005), 104.

⁸⁵Perloff, *The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 21st Century*, 18.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 8.

⁸⁷Takakazu Honryo, “Dynamic Persuasion” (Lecture, Finance and Economics Division at Columbia Business School, New York, NY, October 10, 2011), <http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/finance/seminars/economictheoryfall11> (accessed April 1, 2012).

⁸⁸Bryan N. Karabaich, *Toward a Working Taxonomy of Groups* (Leavenworth: Karabaich Strategic Information Services, publication date unknown).

⁸⁹Jennifer Glass, Vern L. Bengtson, and Charlotte Chorn Dunham, “Attitude Similarity in Three-Generation Families: Socialization, Status Inheritance, or Reciprocal Influence?” *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 5 (October 1986): 685.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

⁹¹Passy and Giugni, “Social Networks and Individual Perceptions,” 128.

⁹²McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process,” 4, 7, 19.

⁹³Glass, Bengtson, and Dunham, “Attitude Similarity in Three-Generation Families: Socialization, Status Inheritance, or Reciprocal Influence?,” 685.

⁹⁴Passy and Giugni, “Social Networks and Individual Perceptions,” 128.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 129.

⁹⁶Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (Chicago: Markham Pub. Co, 1971), 32.

⁹⁷Darren E. Sherkat and T Jean. Blocker, “The Political Development of Sixties Activists: Identifying the Influence of Class, Gender, and Socialization On Protest Participation,” *Social Forces* 72, no. 3 (March 1994): 821.

⁹⁸Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1999), 65.

⁹⁹McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 5.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 16-17.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*

¹⁰²*Ibid.*

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰⁴McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 41.

¹⁰⁵McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 16-17.

¹⁰⁶Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Process and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000), 619.

¹⁰⁷McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 16.

¹⁰⁸Benford and Snow, "Framing Process and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," 626.

¹⁰⁹Ronald J. Terchek, "Protest and Bargaining," 133.

¹¹⁰Sidney Tarrow, "Global Movements, Complex Internationalism, and North-South Inequality" (prepared for presentation to the Workshop on Contentious Politics, Columbia University, October 27, 2003, and to the Seminar on Inequality and Social Policy, John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, November 17, 2003, New York, NY and Cambridge, MA, October-November 2003).

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¹¹³Jennifer J Argo, Darren W. Dahl, and Rajesh V. Manchanda, "The Influence of a Mere Social Presence in a Retail Context," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 32 (September 2005): 207

¹¹⁴Rashotte, “Social Influence,” 4426.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹¹⁷Noah Friedkin and Eugene Johnsen, “Attitude Change, Affect Control, and Expectation States,” in *Power and Status*, ed. Shane R. Thye and John Skvoretz (London: Emerald Group Publishing, 2003), 23.

¹¹⁸Rashotte, “Social Influence,” 4426.

¹¹⁹Friedkin and Johnsen, “Attitude Change, Affect Control, and Expectation States,” 12.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*

¹²¹*Ibid.*, 7.

¹²²Rashotte, “Social Influence,” 4426.

¹²³*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Purpose

The intent of this study is two-fold. First is to synthesize collected literature in order to attain a definitive understanding of social mobilization, collective action, and social influence for non-violent resistance movements. Second, begin exploring the plausibility of the theory posited by this study, that non-violent resistance and political warfare can effectively shape the environment in support of unconventional warfare strategies and objectives. This exploration will be accomplished by evaluating the three factors required for effective non-violent resistance opportunities and environment, mobilization structures, and influence.

Hypothesis

Non-violent political warfare can shape the social and political environments of an adversarial state in support of unconventional warfare based on the existence, in varying degrees, of three primary causal factors; (1) the existence of political opportunities and a permissive environment, (2) the existence of sufficient mobilizing structures, and (3) and effective influence campaigns.

Methodology

The study proposes the theory of non-violent political warfare, more specifically the belief that social mobilization for non-violent resistance and collective action can effectively shape the social and political environments in support of UW objectives and strategies. Before developing this theory of non-violent political warfare it is important to

understand what a “theory” is. Theories are defined as analytical tools for understanding, explaining, and making predictions about a given subject matter.¹ They are a “coherent group of tested general propositions, commonly regarded as correct, that can be used as principles of explanation and prediction for a class of phenomena i.e. Einstein's “theory of relativity” or Skinners (1950) and Homan’s (1951) “laws of operant behavior.”²

Theory can emerge in one of three forms; (1) set of laws, (2) axiomatic, and (3) causal process. The set of laws that form theory is rooted in the belief that scientific knowledge should be a set of well-supported theoretical statements (empirical generalizations) with overwhelming empirical support.³ Axiomatic forms are sets of theoretical statements, divided into axioms and propositions, which can be derived from the axioms.⁴ Finally, the causal process forms are theories developed by organizing statements in such a fashion that the “causal mechanisms” between two or more concepts are made as explicit as possible.⁵

All three forms of theory provide typology, logical prediction and explanation, and the potential for control of phenomena.⁶ Still, only the causal process form provides a sense of understanding.⁷ For this reason the study will use literature review of key principles and concepts along with the case study analysis to highlight “causal mechanisms” between the different factors that affect mobilization and collective action. These casual mechanisms will begin laying the foundation for the development of a theory of non-violent political warfare.

The literature review established the important base of knowledge related to the causal factors. Expanding on this base of knowledge, are the three case studies. Case study research can involve qualitative data only, quantitative data only, or both.⁸

Quantitative data can be beneficial as a research methodology because they can indicate relationships that may not be salient to the researcher.⁹ Qualitative data can be equally useful, particularly for understanding the rationale or theory of underlying relationships.¹⁰ For this study, qualitative methods enable the examination of the historical, social, and contextual distinctions and relationships of key aspects of social mobilization, activism, and non-violent resistance.

The qualitative method also provides the exploratory opportunity needed for conducting descriptive and inductive research. The intent of this research is to probe deeper into “complexities and processes”¹¹ related to mobilization and activism. By analyzing the three case studies selected will provide the “anecdotal data”¹² needed to gain a better understanding beyond the basic principles of social movements and social influence. It will also set the foundation for developing future theories for external or third party engineered mobilization for collective action and political warfare.

Research Question

The research questions guide the study’s attempt at understanding the fundamentals and potential of social mobilization and collective actions for shaping the sociopolitical environment. The primary research question, “how can the US effectively harness this potential as a method for waging unconventional warfare?” is directly related to the proposed theory of non-violent political warfare. Coming to a concrete answer or proving this theory is far too complicated for any one volume of work. Instead a more thorough and systematic analysis would be required, each building towards establishing the theory. This study will contribute to this future collective knowledge.

The study's specific contribution will be a greater understanding of non-violent struggles, activism, social mobilization, and social influence. This will be accomplished by answering the following questions related to the three causal factors; (1) opportunities and environment, (2) mobilization structures, and (3) influence campaigns (these will be defined in greater detail).¹³ First, what are non-violent struggles and how do they relate to political warfare and unconventional warfare? This question was answered partly in chapter 1 key terms and in the literature review. The case studies will provide examples to further develop an understanding.

Secondly, how are non-violent resistance movements mobilized and what are the principles of social movements and social mobilization for collective action? The literature review in chapter 2 outlined the key theories and the case studies will highlight many of these with examples of mobilization for collective action. Thirdly, how are activist's related attitudes, opinions and behaviors influenced within informal social networks and SMOs? Additionally how is awareness and sympathy of key segments of civil society influenced. An understanding of non-violent struggles, social networks, social influence highlight the micro-mobilization effects and while social movement highlight the process and potential for grand shaping effects needed to coerce an adversary.

Case Study Analysis

The three exploratory case studies include the American Civil Rights Movement 1955-1968, The Fall of the Berlin Wall East Germany 1989, and Lead India 2007. The selected case studies will be analyzed and evaluated in order to provide some insight into the principles and theories related to mobilization and activism. The literature review

highlighted critical theories, structures and principles for explaining the emergence of social movements. These included political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and influence campaigns.¹⁴ These will be synthesized with the five factors common to the emergence of a resistance movement or social revolution; mass frustration, dissident elite political groups, unifying motivations, a severe paralyzing political crisis, and a permissive environment¹⁵ in order to develop the three factors of analysis for each case study. The three factors are, opportunities and environment, mobilization structures, and Influence campaigns (see table 1). Each factor will be analyzed from the micro-level and macro-level perspective. The data collected will be compared to identify cross-case patterns.¹⁶

Table 1. Causal Factors of Analysis

Case Study Factors	American Civil Rights Movement	Fall of the Berlin Wall	Lead India
Factor #1 Opportunities and Environment	Micro-level	Micro-level	Micro-level
	Macro-level	Macro-level	Macro-level
Factor #2 Mobilization Structures	Micro-level	Micro-level	Micro-level
	Macro-level	Macro-level	Macro-level
Factor #3 Influence	Micro-level	Micro-level	Micro-level
	Macro-level	Macro-level	Macro-level

Source: Created by author.

Causal Factor # 1 Opportunities and Environment

The first factor analyzed will be the resistance movement's ability to exploit or shape political opportunities related to a political crisis and permissive environment. A fundamental belief in social movement theory is that any collective challenge or social mobilization faces political opportunities and constraints. The opportunities and constraints are fluid and any changes can determine whether a movement emerges.¹⁷ From a micro-level perspective each case study will be examine and highlight the "free-space" the resistance movement either created or exploited. This can include the "cognitive liberation" needed for a movement to emerge¹⁸ or the opportunity to organize collective action "out of sight" and reach of the authorities.¹⁹

From a macro-level perspective each case study highlights opportunities exploited by the resistance movement. This can include normative process for political participation, legal precedence, or civil rights. It can also include political crisis that presents a window of opportunity to mobilize.²⁰ The crisis can be the opportunity or it can weaken the state, making it vulnerable to a social revolution.²¹ Another macro-level political opportunity is the decision by an external power to intervene.²² External power will be modified for two of the case studies; the American Civil Rights Movement and "Lead India." Because the adversaries of these resistance movements were sub-national, the external power in these case studies will be the national or federal government.

Causal Factor #2 Mobilizing Structures

The second factor of analysis is the presence of mobilizing structures, more specifically the presence of pre-existing informal social networks and the emergence of formal social movement organizations (SMOs). Like political opportunities, a

fundamental theory of social movements is the need for resource mobilization. Resource mobilization theory can be divided into two areas. The first focuses on the belief that activists are rational actors and customers of a social movement industry.²³ The second, and more relevant to this study, is the importance of mobilizing structures.

Mobilizing structures and the principles and concepts related to both informal social networks and formal SMOs were discussed in detail within the literature review. As a causal factor of analysis these two mobilizing structures will be analyzed in order to highlight the roles each played as “collective vehicles” through which activists and supporters mobilize and engage in collective action.²⁴ Preexisting informal networks will be view as micro-level mobilizing structures and SMOs will be viewed as the macro-level mobilizing structures.

Causal Factor #3 Influence Campaigns

The third factor of analysis is influence campaigns. An influence campaign uses planned operations (covert and/or overt) to convey selected information and indicators to target audiences.²⁵ In non-violent resistance movements the entire population can become a target for influence.²⁶ Such campaigns attempt to influence the perceptions, cognitions, and behavior of individuals, groups, organizations, and the state. The influence campaign factor will focus primarily on the resistance movement’s ability to socialize socio-political strains, frame collective issues and actions, and influence behaviors.

The micro-level influence will focus on the socialization of socio-political strains that form of friction or tension (real or perceived) between the state and a portion of civil society or the “ruler” and “ruled.”²⁷ The micro level will also focus on the social influence exerted by pre-existing informal networks and the collective action frames

created by SMOs to mobilize activism and other related behaviors.²⁸ From a macro-level the study will analyze movement's influence efforts designed to attract the sympathy and support of dissident political elites. This sympathy and support is important for resistance movement as a means for bargaining with the state.²⁹

Assumptions

The five factors common to the emergence of a social movement or social revolution to emerge include mass frustration, dissident elite political groups, unifying motivations, a severe paralyzing political crisis, and a permissive environment.³⁰ Three of these factors will be highlighted in the case study. The remaining two will be treated as assumptions. The first assumption is the existence of grievances sufficient to create socio-political strains and mass frustration. The development of social-political strains is closely related to theory of relative deprivation.

Tension and friction are created by a real or perceived gap between the collective's expectations and their ability to satisfy them.³¹ The expectations can be linked to macro-level pressures (i.e. economic depression, urbanization, immigration) and micro-level pressures (i.e. individual isolation, alienation, or psychological disturbances).³² Tension can also be caused by a perceived injustice. This injustice can range from voter disenfranchisement and marginalization to income inequality despite a comparative skill and education levels.³³ The study will assume the grievances and tension exist in a sufficient manner and only briefly define the strains within society. The study will instead focus more on analytical attention on how these strains were manipulated and exploited for social mobilization and collective action.

The second assumption is the existence of dissident elite political groups. These elites are in direct opposition of the state and their institutions.³⁴ They may also be neutral or apathetic yet not fully supportive of the ruling regimes policies. They are a critical piece of the social and political environment because they possess a number of resources and attributes which provide them varying degrees of political power. This can include wealth, education, knowledge, and leadership.³⁵

Like the existence of grievances, the study will assume the existence of dissident political elites in sufficient and who possess sufficient political power to effectively support the emergence of a social movement or revolution. The study will instead focus on highlighting the resistance movement's efforts to attract the sympathy and support of dissident political elites. This sympathy and support is important for resistance movement as a means for bargaining with the state.³⁶ Collective action and protest by the political powerless attracts the attention of sympathetic or supportive elites. These dissident political elites apply pressure on the state, forcing the state to make concessions and relieve socio-political strains.³⁷

Rationale for Case Studies Selected

The three case studies were selected because they each feature varying degrees of the causal factors discussed above. Each featured opportunities and a sufficiently permissive environment, a mix of informal networks and formal SMOs, and creative ways and means for influencing mobilization and activism. For example, the American Civil Rights Movement and the impact of Southern Black Congregations effectively mobilized network actors and social activism to gather resources and leverage human agency emerging into a social movement.³⁸ This social movement eventually challenged

the ideological status quo of racial inequality that existed since the conclusion of the American Civil War.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall was the symbolic result of a short but successful movement for political reform. Like the American Civil Rights Movement, a mix of informal networks and formal network structures created the conditions for a resistance movement to emerge. Similar to the American Civil Rights Movement based out of East German Protestant churches as well as other grassroots political and social networks seized the initiative and mobilized a movement and waged a non-violent ideological conflict against the communist state. This movement included the mobilization of civil society for public protest as well as a variety of efforts to influence sympathizers and adversaries. The Fall of the Berlin Wall provides an excellent example of the importance of network structures as well as multiple aspects of social movement mobilization all within a compressed timeline.

“Lead India” provides an interesting and contemporary perspective to the study. In November 2007, a marketing firm and a newspaper launched a social marketing campaign titled “Lead India.” It quickly became a catalyst for social change in the Indian social and political environments.³⁹ An interesting and unique case study, it was created as an integrated marketing campaign and not as a traditional social movement.

Evaluating “Lead India” as a social movement will provide valuable insight into possible methodologies for creating non-violent resistance by external agencies i.e. the US and USSOF. Another important reason is that “Lead India” provides a bridge for understanding the integration of traditional forms of media and the Internet for collective action and shaping the social and political environment.⁴⁰ All three studies combined will

begin developing the crucial causal mechanisms for understanding mobilization, activism, and non-violent political warfare. This will provide the foundation for an eventual theory of non-violent political warfare.

Chapter Summary

Chapter 3 outlined the methodology the study will use to evaluate the causal factors for each case study in order to begin building a greater body knowledge. This body of knowledge will bring USSOF and the academic community closer to a political warfare theory; “that non-violent resistance and political warfare can effectively shape the environment in support of unconventional warfare strategies and objectives. This will be guided by the following questions related to the three causal factors; (1) opportunities and environment, (2) mobilization structures, and (3) influence campaigns (these will be defined in greater detail).⁴¹

The following chapters will complete the study. Chapter 4 will use select case studies to highlight the role of each causal factor in social mobilization and collective action. This chapter will conclude with cross case analysis. Each case study will be compared to highlight causal similarities. The study will close with chapter 5 conclusions and recommendations. The conclusion will include a short summary of the case study findings followed by recommendations for follow on research.

¹Paul Davidson Reynolds, *A Primer in Theory Construction* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2006), 8-9.

²Ibid., 83, 93, 116.

³Ibid., 83.

⁴Ibid., 93.

- ⁵Ibid., 98.
- ⁶Ibid., 116.
- ⁷Ibid.
- ⁸Kathleen M Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research," *The Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 4 (October 1989): 538.
- ⁹Ibid.
- ¹⁰Ibid.
- ¹¹Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc, 2006), 57.
- ¹²Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research," 538.
- ¹³McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 1-6.
- ¹⁴Ibid.
- ¹⁵James DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 10-11.
- ¹⁶Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research," 540.
- ¹⁷McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 41.
- ¹⁸McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 3.
- ¹⁹Morris, "A Retrospective On the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks," 523.
- ²⁰DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 18.
- ²¹Charles Tilly, *European Revolutions: 1492-1992 (Making of Europe)* (Wiley-Blackwell, 1996), 6.
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- ²⁴Ibid., 32.

²⁵Cragin and Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 14.

²⁶Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals*, 79.

²⁷DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 10-11.

²⁸McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 3-5.

²⁹Terchek, "Protest and Bargaining," 133.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹Brush, "Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences: Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence," 524.

³²*Ibid.*, 527.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, 13.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Terchek, "Protest and Bargaining," 133.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Morris, "A Retrospective On the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks," 523.

³⁹Alessandra Consolaro, "Corporate Democracy: The Times of India 'lead India' Campaign," Jura Gentium, <http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rol/india/en/consolar.htm> (accessed May 25, 2012).

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 1-6.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Purpose

The intent of this study is to synthesize collected literature and begin exploring the plausibility of the theory posited by this study. The literature review in chapter 2 provided an overview of the principles, theories, and concepts related to the causal factors opportunities and environment, mobilization structures, and Influence campaigns. This review is critical for navigating through the case studies. Chapter 4 will include three case studies that provide a unique perspective and continue the exploration by evaluating the three causal factors identified in chapter 3. Chapter 4 will conclude with a comparison of the three case studies in a concluding cross-case analysis.

Case Study # 1 American Civil Rights Movement

The American Civil Rights Movement was an organized collective challenge to the status quo of discrimination and segregation. It was a complex process, featuring individual activists and organizations challenging the status quo and elites with a variety of protest activities. These activities included marches, boycotts, and public refusals to obey segregation laws. It was also a collective attempt to finally realize rights promised under the constitution for all Americans despite race. Besides the remarkable social and political changes, the American Civil Rights Movement is considered a laboratory for exploring the theories and principles of social movements.¹ It is certainly a critical model for understanding the emergence of a resistance movement.

Historical Background

The end of the American Civil War was to be the end of slavery and oppression in the United States. Immediately following the Civil War, legal efforts were made to ensure the equality Black Americans with the passage of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution (1865) which outlawed slavery, the 14th Amendment (1868) which made anyone born in the US a citizen with equal protection under the law, and finally the 15th Amendment (1870) which provided the right to vote to all citizens, regardless of race. During Reconstruction (1865-1877) the US government stationed troops and occupied the South in an attempt to ensure the implementation of these amendments. They were also present to create the social and political conditions necessary to allow the newly freed Black Americans to participate as equal citizens in civil society.²

While there were some successes, the end of Reconstruction and the withdrawal of federal troops from the American South in 1876 created a void that southern white elites quickly filled. Race relations and political participation in the south were once again defined by local social, political, and economic structures and not by the law of the land. Predictably, the reemergence of local control over social and political matters brought an end to any progress of racial equality, reversing much of what had been accomplished during near 12-year period of Reconstruction. Most states in the south quickly supplanted federal laws with more restrictive laws. These laws were designed to separate or segregate the races, reducing Black Americans to second-class citizens.³

Undoubtedly the most significant and psychologically damaging of these discriminatory laws were the Jim Crow Laws (1876-1965).⁴ Jim Crow laws made social and political segregation legal and the norm for civil society. For seven decades, they

were the defining characteristic of Black American society and defined the relationship between southern white elites and subservient Black Americans.⁵ The Jim Crow system extended white domination over Black Americans by controlling them socially, politically and economically.⁶

Under these laws, Black Americans suffered various forms racial discrimination and oppression one-stepped removed from slavery. They created an environment that instilled in Black Americans “that they remained a subordinate and inferior race,” and forced “them to live in a separate inferior society.”⁷ In the South, African Americans were controlled politically through disenfranchisement, barring them from participating in the political process.⁸ Segregation and oppression lead to significant psychological distress and alienation in the Black American population.⁹ This “arrangement,” standing for nearly 70-years and enforced by various forms of intimidation, violence became a significant strain on the socio-political environment in America.

The ability to maintain state sanctioned discrimination began to weaken at the turn of the 20th century. Southern elites soon found the system they created slowly collapsing around them. The collapse began to hasten decades before the American Civil Rights Movement mobilized or took shape. The decline of the Southern US economy in the 1930s sparked a massive migration of Southern Blacks northward.¹⁰ “The mass migration was more than a simple economic move; it was a move, almost literally from no voting to voting.”¹¹

The migration north also provided access to jobs and new economic opportunities, creating a new Black middle class.¹² It also provided access to education to include higher education at colleges and universities, creating a Black educated class. Because

these same economic and educational opportunities were not realized in the south, northern Black Americans became a source of support for southern Blacks.¹³ A northern Black Diaspora emerged, capable of providing crucial resources for mobilization as well as applying political pressure on the federal government to intervene on behalf of southern Blacks. These were combined with other changes to the social and political environments. The relationships between local “rulers” and the “ruled” began to destabilize. All that was needed was a spark.

One of these sparks was the legal victories in the Supreme Court during the 1950s, which set the conditions and legal precedence for the eventual emergence of the American Civil Rights Movement. No case was more critical to the emergence of the movement then was the case of *Brown v. the Board of Education* (1954). In May 1954, the US Supreme Court came to a decision in the case dubbed *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (Kansas), in which the plaintiffs argued that the practice of educating Black children in public schools totally separated from their white counterparts was unconstitutional.¹⁴ In its 9-0 ruling, the Court declared that “*Plessey v. Ferguson*,” which had established the “separate but equal” practice of segregation, was unconstitutional.¹⁵ Although it did not immediately end Jim Crow, it took away the earlier legal argument supporting the system of segregation. It also gave legal precedence for the countless grassroots movements to challenge their local segregation laws.

Another spark was the August 1955 murder of fourteen-year-old Emmett Till. While Till was visiting family in Mississippi from Chicago he was kidnapped, beaten, shot, and then dumped in the Tallahatchie River for allegedly whistling at a white woman.¹⁶ The two white men accused of the crime, J. W. Milam and Roy Bryant, were

arrested for the murder and shortly thereafter acquitted of their crimes. The Jury deciding the case was made of only white males as Black Americans were barred from serving jury duty by the local Jim Crow laws.¹⁷ The two acquitted men would later brag publically about committing the murder in a Look magazine interview.¹⁸

Besides the heinous nature of the crime, given the fact he was fourteen and brutally murdered, the fact that Emmett and his surviving family lived in the north is significant. Had he and his family lived in the south it is unlikely that the story would have reached beyond the local community. Murder and other forms of violence against Black Americans were not uncommon up until the 1950s. They would have likely mourned the tragedy but would remain powerless to do anything. But because Emmett's family was in the north, the national media was able to broadcast the story, along with the horrible details of the crime, to a national and increasingly sympathetic audience.

It was approximated that nearly 50,000 people viewed Emmett's body at the funeral home in Chicago and scores more were able to see the truly horrible nature of the murder when a photograph of his mutilated corpse was published in Jet Magazine.¹⁹ Outrage over the murder and the obvious injustice over the acquittal of the murders spread.²⁰ Soon the perceptions of Black Americans as well as White Americans in the north began to change and the awareness of the socio-political strain began to increase grow. Emmett's open casket for the public to see combined with the media attention of the murder and the case quickly became a catalyst for a "call to action" and a "call for justice."²¹ Emmett's murder became a lightning rod of controversy and national attention

began to focus on the racial segregation in the south. The horribly violent nature of the murder and subsequent acquittal jolted public opinion into supporting an emerging social movement to challenge the status quo of segregation and discrimination.²²

Opportunities and Environment

Several opportunities emerged in the 1950s and before that encouraged the mobilization of a social movement for collective action. One of the first of course was the migration of Black communities from the south to the north. They established neighborhoods, built a middle class, and became a voting constituency. Politicians could no longer ignore the collective grievances of Black America. Another significant opportunity was the Supreme Court's decision that ruled Jim Crow and other forms of segregation laws unconstitutional. This elevated the "fight" from the local to the national. The federal government had no choice but to ensure its authority was not "trumped" by local laws.²³ The case also added the legal precedence for other cases that challenged the other status quo of racial discrimination.

Another important opportunity came in late 1955. December 1, 1955 Rosa Parks was riding on a public bus in Montgomery Alabama when she refused to give up her seat in the front row of the "colored" section to a white passenger. After refusing the order of the bus driver, Mrs. Parks was arrested, tried, and convicted of disorderly conduct and of violating a local ordinance. As word of this spread around Montgomery, Alabama's Black community and prominent leaders gathered to plan an appropriate response.²⁴ The resulting plan was the organized Montgomery Bus Boycott, protesting the practice of segregating Blacks and whites in public transportation.²⁵ The successful boycott lasted for 382 days and the city ordinance that legalized segregation of Blacks and whites on

public buses was reversed. More than a tactical victory, it became a powerful indicator for other potential activists that the system of racial segregation was vulnerable. It also became strong evidence that non-violent collective action is an effective strategy for change.

While the previous opportunities can be considered macro-level, there were also other micro-level opportunities. A critical micro-level opportunity for mobilization was the free-space afforded Black communities in Black churches. Black churches had been a “free space” in the Black community for centuries.²⁶ The Southern Black church, removed from white control and a central aspect to the life of Black communities proved instrumental in the emergence of the movement.²⁷

It provided meeting places to develop strategy and commitment, a network of charismatic movement leaders and activists, and an “idiom that persuasively joined Constitutional ideals with Christian ones.”²⁸ The church also offered an “environment in which people were able to learn a new self-respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills and values of cooperation and civic virtue.”²⁹ It was also from this free space that leaders could be identified. Many would be Black clergymen who could mobilize and leverage their congregations across the American South.³⁰ Lastly, the free space afforded by churches allowed Black Christian leaders and like-minded and sympathetic northern white liberals to form coalitions who could challenge the morally corrupt system of racial segregation.³¹

Mobilizing Structures

The 1950s witnessed a significant increase in politicization within informal social networks across Black communities, much of which would play a crucial role in shaping

the development of the civil rights struggle. The opportunity structures previously discussed certainly played a role in this politicization.³² But the grievances that dominated the political rhetoric of the 1950s were no worse than any other times for Black Americans in US history. Jim Crow Laws, the violation of voting rights, and other forms of political and social oppression Black America experienced had existed for decades. Black Americans' grievances were a constant throughout the pre-civil rights movement history. If it wasn't the grievances that mobilized the movement why did the American Civil Rights Movement emerge?

Resource mobilization theory, one of the principle theories for understanding mobilizing structures, would assert that the discontent was basically constant but not sufficient. The explanation lies in the access and ability to leverage resources. Critical resources, to include people, money, and skills, allowed Black Americans and those sympathetic to their cause to mobilize for a collective challenge to the status quo. The larger American Civil Rights Movement emerged out of a loose connection or network of "local movement centers" that were capable of collecting resources from their communities.³³

Mobilization structures and the mobilization of resources were critical to the emergence of the American Civil Rights Movement. Without the resources provided by informal social networks and social movement organizations the aggrieved Black population would have lacked the capacity to act even when granted an "opportunity" to do so.³⁴ The most significant of these resources for mobilization and activism in support of the civil rights movement was people.³⁵

As the movement mobilized and took shape, the informal social networks became sites for recruitment.³⁶ The movement drew from the pool of networks actors to participate in various forms of collective action and activism.³⁷ Black churches were a significant contributor of informal networks. Their pre-existing networks and structures allowed the movement to gather resources, plan collective action, and communicate. This network structure also made possible the recruitment of activists and other supporters who possessed the critical skill sets in mass mobilization, raising money, public speaking, etc.³⁸

The importance of informal social networks lasted throughout the American Civil Rights Movement, especially in influencing behaviors and recruiting activists. As the types and frequency of activism continued to evolve more activists were required. Marches turned into the more disruptive “sit-ins” and involved thousands of citizens around the South. The sit-ins were quickly followed by the Freedom Ride campaigns in 1961, the SCLC campaigns in Albany in 1961-62, and in Birmingham in 1963.³⁹ The increase in these types of activities had far less to do with common social background or shared ideologies and more to do with the social networks in which activists were embedded.⁴⁰ Informal social networks played a key role in determining who would participate and who would not.⁴¹

Another important mobilizing structure for the American Civil Rights Movement, beyond the initial efforts of informal social networks, was SMOs. Once again Southern Black churches would prove crucial. Their institutionalized role in Black society and culture made for a natural transition to a more formal mobilizing structure.⁴² The church had easy access to resources within their congregations making the task of mobilization

less challenging.⁴³ Their formal structures also enabled them to mobilize and contribute to both local and national collective activities.⁴⁴

Like most non-violent struggles successes in the American Civil Right Movement were dependent on the mobilization of individuals and groups for collective action. Many of these activists bore the financial and physical burden of the movement. The pre-existing structures within the churches provided access to members of the congregation who were inherently more willing to accept this risk when asked from an institution they trusted. Because of this members of the congregation could transform into activists.⁴⁵ They were offered an opportunity to exercise roles most often denied them in the white dominated society knowing they were not alone. From the network of Black churches multiple SMO's would emerge.⁴⁶

There were certainly a variety of other forms of collective action organized outside the immediate realm of the church. Another pivotal SMO was the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA). The MIA set the stage for many of the future American Civil Rights Movement's SMOs and was critical to one of the more iconic moments of the civil rights movement, the Montgomery Bus Boycott.⁴⁷ The Montgomery Bus Boycott began on December 5, 1955 after the arrest of Rosa Parks. The 381-day boycott ended on December 21, 1956, with the desegregation of the Montgomery bus system. The boycott was primarily orchestrated by MIA, which was led by prominent civil rights figures like Martin Luther King, Jr.⁴⁸

The MIA coordinated with other Black community organizations like the Women's' Political Council (WPC) for critical tasks like producing leaflets and organizing teams to distribute them. They also planned activities and maintained the

movement's focus on the boycott until their goal of desegregation was achieved. As the boycott continued and as Montgomery city officials tried to defeat the boycott by fining Black taxi drivers caught supporting the boycott, the MIA coordinated a citywide carpool of 300 cars to replace the taxi force.⁴⁹ The bus boycott demonstrated the potential for nonviolent mass protest to challenge the status quo of racial segregation. This served as an example for other civil rights SMOs that followed.

Once the MIA transformed into the larger SCLC, the SMO took a more national focus for the civil rights movement. The SCLC served as a decentralized political arm representing the growing number of Black churches involved in the Civil Rights Movement.⁵⁰ The SCLC's mandate was to coordinate non-violent direct action activities through churches in the south.⁵¹ The initial leadership included many of the same personalities that led the MIA during the Montgomery Bus Boycott, to include Martin Luther King Jr. The SCLC leadership also included other local leaders from key civil rights centers in Atlanta, Tallahassee, Birmingham and others linking the local protest centers to a national movement.⁵² The SCLC also worked closely with student organizations like the SNCC and Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Together they were able to coordinate successful mass student movements. The SCLC was also able to share experiences and develop capable young movement leaders at the local and regional level.⁵³

Following the lead and inspired by the effectiveness of non-violent protest activity in Montgomery AL, many student organizations around the south began more organized protest activities against segregation in dozens of other communities. Recognizing the potential from mobilizing students into peaceful protest activities, The

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) emerged with financial assistance from the SCLC. Once organized, The SNCC provided a network of student activists who could share experiences and coordinate activities.

This network included student delegates from “sit-in” groups in 12 states, representatives from 19 northern colleges, the SCLC, CORE, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).⁵⁴ The most common tactic of these student groups was organized “sit-ins” at segregated establishments to protest Jim Crow laws and other variations of discrimination.⁵⁵ In addition to sit-ins, the student groups also organized protests at segregated libraries and other public facilities financed by taxpayers. The common response was often to close the facility rather than integrate whites and Blacks.

In 1961, the SNCC joined the efforts of CORE to protest segregation laws in public bus terminals. Known as Freedom Riders, activists would organize and purposely violate segregated seating and facilities rules. When faced with violent opposition, the SNCC was able to continue and maintain the mobilization of activists to take part on Freedom Rides.⁵⁶ Following the Freedom Rides, the SNCC focused on voter registration efforts in McComb, MS in 1961. This became the focus for most of the group’s activities for the last half of the Civil Rights Movement between 1962-1966. The group also continued protest efforts against segregated taxpayer public facilities.⁵⁷ The combined efforts of the SNCC, CORE, and SCLC motivated President Kennedy to provide federal protection to prevent mob violence against the group’s efforts.

By 1965, SNCC arguably had the largest activists corps of any civil rights movement organization in the South.⁵⁸ It had organized nonviolent protests against

segregated public facilities, organized voter-registration efforts in the Southern states of Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland, Missouri, Louisiana, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi, and organized independent political parties, labor unions, and agricultural cooperatives.⁵⁹ The organization also recruited and trained the activists who continued the various protest efforts.⁶⁰

Influence Campaigns

Mobilization structures are undoubtedly critical. It would also be an error to underestimate the advantage the American Civil Rights Movement enjoyed because of the strong ties that formed the mobilizing structures. But any movement requires more than resources.⁶¹ Most social movement theorists assume away persuasion and influence as a constant in the environment, similar to that of grievances, which makes them non-problematic and uninteresting factors in the movement equation.⁶² But in reality the significance attached to grievances as well as the belief that collective action can address them is not a constant; they are socially constructed between individuals and groups.⁶³

Therefore, it is not only resources that informal networks and SMOs manage or the opportunity structures that present themselves that affect mobilization and collective action. There is also a substantial amount of work involved socializing, framing, and influencing the behaviors of the appropriate target audiences for mobilization and collective action. Emerging movements need to redefine values, shape attitudes and beliefs.⁶⁴ They also need to establish define the appropriate contentious behaviors in the appropriate context that will allow them to mobilize the needed activism.⁶⁵

The American Civil Rights Movement provides ample evidence of the power of relationships, either through informal networks or formal SMOS, for socializing issues

influencing activism. The Civil Rights Movement emerged around a variety of relational connections and pre-existing informal social networks primarily within strong communities ties.⁶⁶ In 1950s these ties allowed an increase in socialization and politicization of socio-political strains across informal social networks within Black communities.⁶⁷ These personal and community relationships exposed individuals to important political ideas.

Just as it had done in providing opportunities and mobilizing structures, Southern Black churches again played a prominent role in socializing and influencing. The church proved indispensable in the dissemination of ideas, values, beliefs, and attitudes throughout Black communities. Without the sufficient organizations and relationships the necessary collective awareness of shared socio-political strains could not be recognized.⁶⁸ Lacking the information and perspective, individuals within Black communities would have remained isolated, perceiving issues as personal and private rather than collective.⁶⁹

Church congregations became a driving force for altering individual attitudes about social change.⁷⁰ Within the free space found within the church, members of the congregation and other activist could freely “connect” with other like minded individuals to share and develop new ideas of self-respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills and values of cooperation, and civic virtue.”⁷¹ Importantly, these politicized informal social networks often extended beyond the church, to include family, friends or co-workers.⁷² As the movement mobilized, these increasingly aware and expanding informal social networks became sites for recruitment and facilitated political engagement through the social influence of their peers.⁷³

These networks relationships within the community have become one of the basic explanatory factors for a wide range of political behavior. The social influence of peers was a powerful force for motivating direct political activism like demonstrations and protests. Besides these forms of direct activism, politicized social networks also influenced peers to exercise other forms of activism; their right to participate in the political process.⁷⁴ Membership and relationships within communal organizations shaped individual and groups perceptions of opportunities and threats in exercising their right to voting in local and national elections. Southern Blacks that participated in congregations that were politicized, where religious leaders addressed political issues from the pulpit, were more likely to vote in the 1960 Presidential election than those who did not.⁷⁵

Informal social networks also influenced the evolution of non-violent activism during the peak years of direct action protest between 1961 and 1963.⁷⁶ Marches and mass demonstrations gave way to “sit-in” and “Freedom Ride” campaigns.⁷⁷ This marked a major change in the collective behaviors and involved thousands of additional “activists” beyond the local community.⁷⁸ This evolution and increase in disruptive activist behaviors is attributed to the power of informal social networks in which activist were embedded.⁷⁹ It was the informal social networks that played a key role in determining who would participate and who would not.⁸⁰ The sit-ins began in Greensboro, North Carolina with four students and quickly spread throughout the South and grew to 70,000 Blacks and their white sympathizers had participated in demonstrations through the fall of 1961.⁸¹

While socialization and social influence were critical for micro-level mobilization, the movement’s ability to frame the issues and the environment for

mobilizing mass collective action. The framing process converts the potential for mass mobilization into actual mobilization for collective action. Framing in this manner is not a simple “one-size fit all” process and narrative. Certain framings support the mobilization and creation of particular coalitions. Others vilify the opposing side. Lastly, other frames provide activists possible forms of collective action to take.

The American Civil Rights movement provides clear evidence that the framing process is one of the major avenues through which consistent collective behavior is generated and sustained. It links individuals and organizations and their interests, values, and beliefs to their behaviors and activities.⁸² Critical to the success of the American Civil Rights Movement was framing the collective grievances and constructing arguments in ways that would to resonate with both the intra-group audiences (i.e. Black congregations, communities) and important external audiences (i.e. liberal White Americans in the North).⁸³

The role of the church and Christian dogma was critical. Church and Christian based SMOs like the SCLC had to create collective actions frames to define activism as an appropriate expression of Christian values.⁸⁴ Frames were also created to redefine internal conditions to change behavior and motivate activism. Martin Luther King and other prominent civil rights leaders skillfully crafted rhetoric around Christianity that gave many Black Americans new values and a new collective identity based on “good” and altruism.⁸⁵ Their strategies of non-violent protest and social change also appealed to the moral standards of many other Americans who began to re-evaluate the values that some many held close.⁸⁶ This set the conditions for building coalitions and linking local protest efforts to a larger national movement.

The words and wisdom of many of the civil rights leaders created the energy to mobilize and sustain the movement for over a decade. Most significant was the movement's ability to focus and appeal to a more broad audience; civil rights rhetoric was crafted that helped both White and Black Americans "re-frame" their value in racial equality and seek out peace among all the races of the nation. For example, when framing the issues of segregation and discrimination as "un-American," statements like: "I have a dream . . . that one day this great nation shall live up to its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal." This created a collective "cognitive dissonance" in many Americans. Obviously political rhetoric surrounding the civil rights movement involved countless framed issues and arguments but one of the most significant was rights. Inherently, most if not all Americans frame their demands in terms of "rights."⁸⁷

Rights became the "master frame" for most of the movement sectors during the cycle of contention of the 1960s. It gained credibility after the victories in the US Supreme Court, specifically in regards to equal education rights.⁸⁸ The focus on rights also appealed to a wide audience.⁸⁹ It created a necessary link between the movement's main constituency, the southern Black middle class, and the white liberal "conscience constituency" who could provide the needed external support and sympathy.⁹⁰ For the Black middle class, equal rights were the ultimate objective while white liberals were offended by the contradiction between the values Americans placed on equality and rights.⁹¹

Framing became a necessary function for SMOs.⁹² SMOs depended on creative ideological work, linking and amplifying frames, to recruit and mobilize supporters and

activists.⁹³ Would be activists and supporters were able to observe and determine the situation was unacceptable and that it could only be resolved through a collective effort. Framing provided the motivation for individuals to get involved, but it is the mobilization of resources that made the Civil Rights Movement a successful movement.

Case Study #2 The Fall of the Berlin Wall

As a social movement case study, The Fall of the Berlin Wall is similar to the American Civil Rights Movement in many ways. First, just as in American Civil Rights Movement, the main objective was an end to social and political repression. Like their American counter-parts who were allegedly guaranteed equal rights and the right to vote, East German citizens were also “promised” an opportunity to participate in the political process.⁹⁴ This was just as much a farce in the GDR as it was in the southern United States.

Another striking similarity to the American Civil Rights Movement was the movement’s emergence from “free space” created by churches. The church also provided access to firmly established “networks” within congregations, from which much of the mobilization and collective action would occur. Lastly, the church also provided the guiding values and beliefs of the revolutions. The movement used Christian teachings and doctrine to “frame” the collective action messages of non-violent resistance.⁹⁵

Where the Fall of the Berlin Wall differs from the American Civil Rights Movement first begins with its location. Societies in western democracies commonly have inherent (but unrealized) opportunities for forming opposition groups and challenging the state.⁹⁶ Opposition and the criticism of the ruling government or of the political system can occur without fear of severe repression or sanctions.⁹⁷ These

conditions and circumstances rarely exist in authoritarian communist states like the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

In the GDR opposition networks are targeted and blocked by government agencies under the threat or imprisonment or even death.⁹⁸ This made criticism and opposition risky one's "health" in the GDR. Mobilization and collective action would have been challenging, if not impossible, in these conditions. Under the threat of repression and violence the emergence of a non-violent social movement should have been highly unlikely.⁹⁹ Surprisingly a wave of "protest and revolutionary changes" did emerge.¹⁰⁰ Not only was their emergence a surprise, the movement's rapid "progression was equally bewildering."¹⁰¹ The movement quickly and continuously grew more massive until the GDR collapsed under the pressure. A mere month after the first demonstrations in October of 1989, the wall between East and West Berlin came crashing down.

Historical Background

Initially constructed with barbed wire, tanks, and hundreds of troops, the Berlin Wall was emplaced August 13, 1961 by the Soviet backed East Germany government in an attempt to stop the flow of German refugees fleeing from the communist East to the democratic West.¹⁰² Over the next few weeks the East Germans and Soviets would add more sophisticated structures and systems. Over the next quarter century, the wall would grow to symbolize the very real division between East and West, between totalitarianism and democracy.¹⁰³

On October 6, 1989 the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) was celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the GDR with all the ceremony and regalia expected of a

proud communist state.¹⁰⁴ Erich Honecker, the leader of the GDR and SED party, along with the ruling communist elites sat confident, believing they had guided their state to the “turning point” of German history.¹⁰⁵ What they didn’t know was that in three days the East German people would test this assumption of a “turning point” and that all that had been known since the establishment of this communist state following World War II would be changed forever. What they also did not know or could not have predicted, like the rest of the world, was that the greatest symbol of global division would fall under weight and pressure of peaceful non-violent protests.

The significance of this event could easily be lost on those not familiar with the realities of life during the Cold War. The GDR utilized “despotic” and violent techniques to control of all aspects of society from the very beginning.¹⁰⁶ The Berlin Wall was not built to prevent an invasion from the West. It was built to ensure that East Germans could not ever see what they were missing.”¹⁰⁷ If the purpose and symbolism of the Berlin Wall did not deter opposition to the government, the SED had other means.

The regime, with the support of the Soviet Union, did not hesitate in using repressive measures to uphold its rule. In 1953, spontaneous strikes and mass demonstrations emerged but were immediately crushed under the force of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany.¹⁰⁸ The hint of opposition earned the attention of the dreaded East German Stasi (secret police). If suspected short show trials and long prisons terms ensured ringleaders and supporters would disappear.

A constant barrage of propaganda and indoctrination to perpetuate this fear of repression and the legitimacy of the GDR complemented this very real threat of force. It portrayed the GDR as a multi-party state that allowed “popular participation” in this

utopian state.¹⁰⁹ While on paper (for public consumption) the SED controlled only 25 percent of the seats in the parliament their power was so thoroughly entrenched in the constitution it could not be challenged.¹¹⁰ The parliament was more a facade and most members, despite what party they publically represented, were often simultaneously members of the SED party.¹¹¹

In spite of this efficient and sophisticated system of repression, some various forms of popular opposition to the ruling SED emerged almost immediately. The 1953 labor strikes and mass demonstrations were the more overt forms and were more or less an isolated case. After their crushing defeat the opposition decided to use “less than overt” means. The most common form of protest leading up to the 1989 revolution was a strategy of “escape” and “emigration” to the west.¹¹² This quickly became the most popular (and safest) form of protest as an increasing number of East Germans continued to leaving for the West.¹¹³ That was until the spontaneous eruption in October of 1989.

What made 1989 different than any of the other 40 years prior? This question has perplexed many to include those who were there and watched in unfold. This time and place, as it was summarized by the pastor of the now infamous St. Nikolai Evangelical Lutheran Church,¹¹⁴ Rev. Christian Fuhrer “merited the description of miracle.” It was a “revolution that succeeded, that grew out of the church. It is astonishing that God let us succeed with this revolution.”¹¹⁵ On October 9th the GDR began its descent into collapse when approximately 70,000 people poured out of the Protestant churches and massed on the street to demonstrate on Leipzig’s Karl Marx Platz.¹¹⁶ They demanded social and political reforms.¹¹⁷ They also did this even under the likely assumption that the state and the Stasi would crack down on any opposition or protest against the SED or GDR.¹¹⁸

The motivations behind the East German Revolution and the Fall of the Berlin Wall were a combination of the long-term grievances related to the authoritarian regime and spontaneous events. Externally, the sudden social and political reforms led by Mikail Gorbechav in the Soviet Union had a significant impact in the satellite states. Besides shaking the doctrinal foundations of Soviet style communism, Gorbachev also pledged to not use Soviet military forces to crack down on opposition or enable authoritarian states like East German maintain power.¹¹⁹ Suddenly the Honecker regime and SED found themselves alone in this increasingly unfriendly situation.

Internally, flaws in the economic and political policies began to show through. Leading up to the 1980s the living standards for the average (and majority) East German had worsened. Not only in comparison to their western counter-part but also in the meager standard of living they had come to expect. Many faced shortages of typical consumer goods and necessities.¹²⁰ Beyond the economic strains and the political and social repression suffered by most East Germans, there was a growing awareness of flawed political process.

In May of 1989 East Germans across the country went to the polls to vote in local elections. Although more an illusion of participation than anything, the local elections were a recognized “right” of the East German citizen. But this round of local election was different. Not because they were “abnormalities.”¹²¹ One could confidently speculate that this was not the first year the voting populace became “aware” of the SED manipulation of elections. But for whatever reason, be it the worsening economic conditions or political reforms outside the GDR, this time it did anger the population,¹²² a population who felt that their “rights” had been violated and that an injustice had been done.

The grievances were accompanied by the added pressures of large-scale emigration or “exit.” The “exit” protest strategy had a significant effect on the SED base of power. It strained the local and national economies and constrained critical state services.¹²³ However important the impact of the “exit,” mass emigration in itself was unlikely to have led to the capitulation of an intransigent, orthodox Leninist regime.¹²⁴

Instead, the critical activist behavior was the mass protests or “voice.” East Germans poured from churches into the street nearly every Monday after prayers. It began in October in one or two cities with a few thousand peaceful marchers declaring, “We are the people!” and demanding a host of reforms. But by November peaceful demonstrations would happen in every major city and the number would grow to the hundreds of thousands. It was the public mass demonstrations that dealt the entrenched government a “fatal blow.”¹²⁵ Police authorities in the GDR registered more than 1,500 public events linked to political contention that took place in hundreds of towns and cities between September 1989, when protest movement first appeared, and March 1990, when parliamentary elections voted in a pro-unification government.¹²⁶

The very public and non-violent demonstrations took their toll on the East German government. Without the assurance and help of the Soviet Military the SED party leaders did not have a many options or a plan. The facade of party unity soon cracked.¹²⁷ At a press conference following a Central Committee meeting on November 9, a Politburo member mistakenly announced that the GDR had immediately lifted all travel restrictions with the West.¹²⁸

Thousands of East Berliners began to assemble at border crossings at the Wall, especially in the vicinity of the densely populated and infamous Bornholmer Strasse

crossing.¹²⁹ Border police, unaware of the new regulations, were under orders to maintain security and not to allow any uncontrolled crossings. Despite a real threat of violent confrontations, the authorities relented and the crowds swept into the West. The Berlin Wall, one of the greatest symbols of division, tyrannical repression, and the Cold War, fell and the collapse of the socialist state accelerated.

Opportunities and Environment

There are numerous political opportunities that had presented themselves before the East German revolution erupted. Reforms in the Soviet Union and the change in Soviet foreign policy related to intervention all contributed to changes in the environment.¹³⁰ The right to vote, albeit a mere formality created a structural opportunity for political participation and consequently an internalized belief in self-determination. Even more important were the continuous fumbling's of the ruling SED who could seem not cope with the revolution that erupted around them.¹³¹ The restructuring of the party leadership and the minor concessions granted to the resistance were designed to appease the masses. But in reality it merely widened the "window of opportunity" for the increasingly organized movement to exploit.

Additional opportunities were created by the inaction of the security forces, which provided political space for the movement to emerge and mature. Many expected the GDR to crack down on the growing movement. Most citizens, activists and passive observers alike, expected a bloodbath.¹³² Police and communist militiamen were deployed for a violent confrontation with the "rowdies," "counterrevolutionaries," and other elements blamed for disruptions of public order.¹³³ Managers cautioned their employees "to avoid the city center and shops were closed early."¹³⁴

But on October 9th 70,000 peaceful marchers declared, “We are the people!” and began demanding political reforms.¹³⁵ Unprepared, ill-equipped, or morally unable to “put-down” the demonstrations, the police and militia unwittingly opened the “space” needed a little wider and set the tone for continued non-violent resistance.¹³⁶ While many of these could be considered macro-level opportunities and changes to the environment, there was also a critical micro-level opportunity. The most important was the free-space created by the Protestant church.

The church occupied a unique position in East German society and could offer a protective space for dissent for a number of reasons.¹³⁷ Churches were regularly spied on by the GDR and the Stasi but were allowed to remain open with a certain degree of autonomy.¹³⁸ As a gathering place, it was the only forum in which free speech was allowed (notwithstanding the likely presence of Stasi informers) and was the only alternative source to the state's version of the truth.¹³⁹ Criticism, reform, or revolutionary topics that “could not be discussed in public could be discussed in church, and in this way the church represented a unique spiritual and physical space in which people were free.”¹⁴⁰

This placed the church community at the center of the emergence of the resistance movement leading up to the 1989 revolution.¹⁴¹ Churches, especially in the larger cities regularly held weekly prayers for peace, socializing the ideas of social and political reform, equal rights, and the even the environment.¹⁴² From here “a critical mass grew under the roof of the church; young people, Christians and non-Christians, and later, those who wanted to leave East Germany” sought refuge and joined the resistance and revolution.¹⁴³

Mobilizing Structures

Like the American Civil Rights Movement, the East German resistance benefited from informal social networks within the Protestant churches. The East German church actually comprised of two mobilizing structures. First it included a loose network linking many of the churches throughout East Germany. The “church” network wasn’t limited or confined within the borders of the GDR but also reached into West Germany and by consequence the western world.

Until 1969 both the West and East German denominations still shared one overarching organization. This created a similar religious network that existed prior to the Cold War and the division of Germany.¹⁴⁴ These network ties remained relatively strong even after pressure from the GDR government forced the formal organizational separation of the east and west in 1969.¹⁴⁵ These ties took the form of financial support as well as the emigration of Western pastors to make up for decreasing supply of young pastors.

These network ties were significant for many reasons. First, although the relationship between the east and west was reluctantly accepted by the GDR¹⁴⁶, they accepted it nonetheless. This acceptance of cross-border support and reluctant state acquiesce to the church gave the church enhanced autonomy.¹⁴⁷ Secondly, the network ties also allowed the exchange of information between east and west. This exposed churchgoers and communities to diverse ideas and created a greater awareness of the flaws of the GDR and communism.

While the network of churches and the ties with churches in the west created the structure for the exchange of information and socialization, the informal social networks

within the churches were the critical factor that affected the mobilization of the resistance movement. These informal social networks were especially important in a state where any unauthorized grouping was suspicious and targeted.¹⁴⁸ In June 1989, the GDR suspected approximately 150 grassroots church groups and 10 alliances.¹⁴⁹ It was believed many of these networks were seeking to “dilute and subvert socialism and create political destabilization and fundamental change of the GDR.”¹⁵⁰

The churches involvement as a mobilizing structure began as early 1980.¹⁵¹ A collective discontent with the status quo began to emerge along the informal network ties within the small East German church, building the foundation of what would be a larger collective mobilization.¹⁵² Another key aspect of the Protestant churches for mobilization was its ability to socially integrate communities and neighborhoods.¹⁵³ This integration established the requisite ties to develop common values, attitudes, and beliefs, as well as share ideas and opinions. The structure also provided a coordinating capability that enabled communities and neighborhoods to act collectively toward reforms or in response to threats.”¹⁵⁴

Not only did the church integrate communities, it also integrated into people’s lives and routines. Even beyond the religious dogma that shaped beliefs and values, the church had routine assemblies and meetings that current “networks actors” could remain linked and potential actors could plug in.¹⁵⁵ For example, the Monday services and demonstration pre-existed the movement. The demonstrations rarely if ever focused on political or social reform and, much like the church, were allowed to occur. It wasn’t until the protest in the spring of 1989 over the manipulation of local communal elections did the Monday demonstrations take a more reformist tone.¹⁵⁶

Personal networks in and out of the church were also relevant for mobilizing citizens to protest. A multitude of college students joined the informal social networks to attend vigils in the sanctuary at St. Nikolai and then marched in the streets holding candles and calling for change.¹⁵⁷ “Seeing all these people gather in this place ... from week to week and more and more people gathering, you had the feeling this time really the government had to listen to you.”¹⁵⁸ The size of informal social networks continued to expand leading up to the 1989 revolution. The Leipzig Monday evening peace prayers held by church-based dissidents expanded from silent vigils to public demonstrations.¹⁵⁹ By early October, previously uninvolved citizens were drawn into the informal networks based joined the Monday demonstrations, shouting, “We are staying here!”¹⁶⁰

The role of the informal networks found within Protestant churches was unquestionably important during the early phases of mobilization. The presence of local political entrepreneurs provided the “sub-set of highly interested and/or highly resourceful people who play a crucial role in the early phases of collective action”¹⁶¹ by providing a nucleus around which bandwagons form. As the movement matured formal mobilizing structures were needed to mobilize resource, coordinate, and strategize. Although there were a variety of SMOs that made up the larger resistance movement, few played as a prominent role as the “New Forum” and “Democracy Now.”¹⁶² Both were established in September 1989 and their cadre of “professional revolutionaries” became the political underground that provided strategy and leadership and mobilized resources for collective action and activism.¹⁶³

New Forum and Democracy Now emerged as SMOs along the margins of the churches move towards passive resistance in 1989. The SMOs synchronized the multiple

local movements with the larger resistance strategy during early phases of collective action.¹⁶⁴ Their leadership and guidance systematically expanded the focus of the larger collective resistance strategy to include reform of the political environment. This included the creation of a citizens' socialist-democracy in the GDR.¹⁶⁵ New Forum and Democracy Now also bridged the varied ideological gaps to build stronger networks and coalitions. This propelled the two SMOs to become the largest of the opposition organizations. In early October 1989, New Forum began planning a nationwide mobilization based on small groups of activists in cities and towns throughout the GDR.¹⁶⁶

Influence Campaigns

The Fall of the Berlin Wall shares many similarities to the American Civil Rights movement. Like the American Civil Rights Movement, The East German resistance movement benefited from the church and its informal social networks and community ties. Discussions over grievances and reform began to emerge in many small East German church circles in early 1980s.¹⁶⁷ People were eager to discuss a wide range of causes, from the environment to the right to travel freely free from the threat of sanctions of the state.¹⁶⁸ Discussions ranged from reforming the socialist system to debating the merits of a complete move away from socialism and move towards democracy and capitalism.¹⁶⁹ These discussions increased the awareness of socio-political strains that grew into a “collective” belief and purpose.

Another similarity was the influence of religious dogma on the non-violent activism. The resistance movement’s primary motivations were drawn from such sources as Jesus, the Sermon on the Mount, and the efforts of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.¹⁷⁰

Though these similarities are crucial what makes the Fall of Berlin Wall unique was how it drew needed attention from would be supporters and how it negotiated with the state. The American Civil Rights Movement used influence campaigns primarily for mobilizing activist's for collective action. The East German resistance movement used activism and collective action as a means of persuasion. The resistance used public actions more than words to draw sympathy, mobilize new activists, and to bargain with the ruling regime of the GDR. The actual organized movement mobilized as a consequence of the ongoing protests rather than serving as "its catalyst."¹⁷¹

Monday evening peace prayers held by church-based dissidents in Leipzig began to expand from semi-routine silent vigils to demonstrations. By early October, an increasing number of previously uninvolved citizens joined the Monday demonstrations shouting, "We are staying here!"¹⁷² Aware of the socio-political strains and motivated by visible signs of protests, East Germans were drawn to the church to participate in collective action. The October 9th mass demonstration of 70,000 East Germans "framed" through public action the collective purpose of the movement, the need for change, and confidence that collective action could bring reform.

The peaceful demonstration and the absence of violent sanctions by the state also framed for a wide audience that non-violent collective action could be successful.¹⁷³ One participant of the October 9th mass protest recalled:

it was a cold evening, but you didn't feel cold, not just because you saw all the lights, but also because you saw all these people, and it was, you know, it was really amazing to be a part of that, and you felt so full of energy and hope. For me, it still gives me the shivers thinking of that night. It was great.¹⁷⁴

The demonstrations, prayer vigils, and church services changed people attitudes and beliefs. People learned to “turn fear into courage, to overcome the fear and to hope, to have strength.”¹⁷⁵

Persuasion through collective action was also an effective means of negotiating with GDR. In early October 1989, on the 40th anniversary of the GDR, the government cracked down on the growing (and increasingly politicized) Monday demonstrations.¹⁷⁶ Protesters in Leipzig were beaten and arrested. Two days later, St. Nikolai Church was full to overflowing for the weekly vigil. When it was over, 70,000 people marched through the city as armed soldiers looked on, but did nothing.¹⁷⁷ Despite the lessons of the past and the very public threat of repeat crackdowns from the Honecker regime, East Germans did mobilize in mass. More than 1,500 public events linked to political contention that took place in hundreds of towns and cities between September 1989 and March 1990.¹⁷⁸ This shook the “seemingly unshakable regime as public sentiment turned against them with astonishing rapidity as the opposition mushroomed into crushing majorities.”¹⁷⁹

The facade of GDR party unity soon cracked under the pressure of the demonstrations. An estimated 150,000 pro-reform members of the SED demonstrated on November 10, demanding a special party congress to reform the organization.¹⁸⁰ The demonstrations continued and the state was unsure how to react. East Germans kept arriving at the came to church for services and political discussions and then started walking. Since they did not do anything violent, the police were not allowed to take action. The GDR was “ready for anything, except for candles and prayer.”¹⁸¹ Hoping to

stop the demonstrations and disruptions, while not repeating the same mistake of violent crackdowns, was planning to ease some (but not all) travel restrictions.

At a press conference following a Central Committee meeting on November 9, a Politburo member mistakenly announced that the GDR had immediately lifted all travel restrictions with the West.¹⁸² Thousands of East Berliners began to assemble at border crossings at the Wall, especially in the vicinity of the densely populated Bornholmer Strasse crossing. Border police, unaware of the new regulations, were under orders to maintain security and not to allow any uncontrolled crossings. Despite a real threat of violent confrontations, the authorities relented and the crowds swept into the West.¹⁸³ The collapse of the socialist state accelerated under the weight of mass popular protest.

Case Study #3 Lead India

In November 2007, a television commercial featuring a young boy struggling to push and lift a fallen tree that was blocking traffic along a busy road aired on Indian television and caught the attention of Indian society.¹⁸⁴ The commercial was just one feature in what would be an elaborate media campaign titled “Lead India.” More than a public service announcement, the messages were intended to influence the attitudes and behaviors of civil society. “Lead India” quickly transformed into social mouthpiece and catalyst of social change.¹⁸⁵ The “Lead India” campaign was the brainchild of the Times of India (ToI) and was designed by the Mumbai office of marketing firm JWT India.

Although study uses “Lead India” as an example of a form of political warfare, the campaign is actually a social marketing campaign. Social marketing campaigns are private sector marketing campaigns with social objectives that are usually undertaken for government or non-governmental organization (NGO) clients.¹⁸⁶ These campaigns often

focus on issues of public concern and are designed to either raise awareness or influence the targeted audience to change a specific behavior. The “Lead India” campaign was a combination of both, raising the awareness of Indians of certain social and political issues while also attempting to influence Indian participation (behavior) in society and politics.

The movement is comprised of three phases; “India Poised” (2006-2007), “Lead India” (2007-2008), and “Vote India” (2008-2009).¹⁸⁷ The campaign was designed to challenge the status quo and address the social and political issues that threatened the Indian political environment. The issues, conditions, and problems that created vulnerabilities in the social and political environment were determined and framed from extensive reader feedback collected by the ToI during “India Poised.” From this point the next two phases would use these vulnerabilities to mobilize collective action and activism to shape the environment.

“Lead India” provides an interesting contemporary perspective to the study. In November 2007, marketing firm JWT India and the *Times of India* launched a social marketing campaign titled “Lead India,” which quickly became catalyst of social change in the Indian social and political environments.¹⁸⁸ It is an interesting and unique case study for many reasons. One important reason than it was created as an integrated marketing campaign and not as a traditional social movement. By evaluating “Lead India” the study can begin to provide valuable insight into possible methodologies for creating non-violent resistance by external agencies i.e. the US and USSOF.

Another important reason is “Lead India” provides a bridge for understanding the integration of the media and the Internet for collective action and shaping the social and political environment. The campaign, which was broadcast or published over all forms of

media to include Internet and mobile communications technology, was designed to influence Indians to take part in the cause and interact with the movement through a variety of activities.¹⁸⁹ Dubbed a “unique talent search,” Lead India aimed to find men and women with the vision and ability to guide India with kind of political leadership that the ToI observed was blatantly missing. The ToI was looking to motivate young men and women who would not be discouraged by the Indian political system and social structure and use Lead India as an opportunity to enter public life.

Historical Background

India, one of the oldest civilizations in human history is also one of the youngest democracies in the modern era. It won its independence and created its democratic government following a long and painful non-violent struggle against the British and led by M. Gandhi. India is also home to the world’s second largest population with 1.2B people and is the world’s largest democracy with an electorate of 714M.¹⁹⁰ This Indian democracy is built around an incredibly diverse pluralistic society, with over 30 recognized ethno-linguistic groups¹⁹¹ and wide variety of religions to include 161M Muslims.¹⁹² Complicating this incredibly diverse demography is a powerful caste system, which has placed a firm, virtually unbreakable, barrier on an individual’s social and political upward mobility, which marginalizes and disenfranchises millions of Indians.¹⁹³ This marginalization has left a vulnerable population susceptible to other alternative arguments, to include a long-running Maoist insurgency.

In 2007-2008, the ever-constant threat of Naxalism was declared the greatest threat to internal security by the Indian state.¹⁹⁴ Naxalites, a Maoists insurgency, have waged a protracted people’s war to violently overthrow the state and capture political

power.¹⁹⁵ They work to take advantage of the disaffection and perceived injustices among the marginalized population. Insurgent threats are not limited to the Naxalites. There are several other armed groups that threaten the state, some of which pre-date India's independence.¹⁹⁶ These include groups like the Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF) and the Peoples Democratic Front of India (PDFI).

In addition to its pluralistic society, caste barriers, and internal threats, the ToI and others had observed the presence of a new political variable that would threaten the effectiveness and efficiency of the democracy if left unaddressed. This variable was an ever-growing level of political apathy and perceived disenfranchisement among the urban educated middle class and the urban youth. The legitimacy and future sustainability of any democratic systems is related to opportunities provided to civil society to voice and resolve their concerns as well as leaders who responsibly exercise power to draw in the apathetic.¹⁹⁷ Indian youth participation in civil society and political life is increasingly recognized as important to their personal development as a "good citizen" as well as the as it is to India's future and prosperity.¹⁹⁸ With 65 per cent of India's voters being under the age of 35 (including one hundred million first-time voters), the young make up a sizable part of the electorate. In fact, the Indian electorate of 2009 will be the youngest since 1952.¹⁹⁹

Any contemporary Indian social movement cannot be fully understood without first recognizing its volatile history of challenges to the status quo and of socio-political change. Its independence from the British Empire was the consequence of nearly 40 years of social and political movements. The impact of these nationalists' movements, the efforts Mahatma Gandhi, and the realization of Indian independence have left an

indelible mark on the nation. These continue to influence nearly all aspects of politics and society even today.²⁰⁰ And like most democracies, Indian social movements and contentious politics impacted the development of both the state and civil society and defined the relationship between the two sectors.

In common with most democracies and similar to the American Civil Rights movement, there has not been a shortage of grievances. India, as with many states in Asia, has experienced significant social and political conflict that ran parallel with its rapid economic growth and as a consequence of globalization.²⁰¹ Social movements have been inter-connected to these changes in society and politics.²⁰² Developments in urbanization, industrialization, and other major changes in the political, economic, and cultural environment created the conditions for social movements to arise from within civil society providing the force for positive change for Indians.

As traditional Indian political and social structures grew more powerful and dominant from India's growing economy and increasing power, a great divide grew, excluding some and turning away others. This provided many of the root causes for many of the issues identified during "India Poised" phase. First and foremost many Indians felt abandoned by the political system.²⁰³ They felt the political process had been hijacked and that the system remained under the influence of caste and creed, preventing intelligent and capable people from getting a chance to lead the nation.²⁰⁴ Second but no less important, many believed there was a critical shortage of quality Indian leadership, more specifically in prospects of future leadership. Confounding both of these issues was a growing disdain of politics among the growing number of youth voters (18-35).²⁰⁵ Leading up to the 2009 elections, voters under the age of 35 would make 65 percent of

the electorate and at 456M, it was over three times the size of the US electorate.²⁰⁶

Getting these young voters involved, getting them to take an active role in India's future, and getting them to vote was of the utmost importance.

For India and other democracies, popular participation of the citizenry is a critical aspect of state-building and socio-political cohesion.²⁰⁷ Popular participation is needed to achieve social, economic, and political development and ensure equality across sub-national groups. One of campaign's primary objectives was to 'get Indians to participate' in the process of nation building by changing attitudes and behaviors. The ToI wanted to encourage ordinary Indians, persuade them to help themselves through social and political activism, political participation, and by choosing the right future leaders.²⁰⁸

Opportunities and Environment

India's democracy, like most if not all democracies, provides structural opportunities inherent to the political process. All Indian citizens possess the right to vote as guaranteed by the constitution. This only becomes an opportunity when first individuals realize their social and political issues that need to be resolved through participation secondly individuals need actually participate. Although the opportunities may structurally exist individuals do not exploit them. In order affect their social and political environment individual needed to become aware of socio-political strains and be motivated to address them. This task can be complicated in an environment dominated by an elite minority and populated by a disenfranchised majority. One of the primary objectives of "Lead India" was designed to address these issues.

Besides the inherent structural opportunities, "Lead India" also depended on "free space" to socialize new ideas and increase awareness of socio-political strains. While the

American Civil Rights Movement and the Fall of the Berlin Wall primarily exploited the leveraged physical free-space in churches, Lead India leveraged the Internet to create “virtual” free space. This virtual free space was built around a decentralized community of offline and online activists, seeking information and answers.²⁰⁹ The presence of “Lead India” as an emerging social movement raised awareness of long-term issues, resulting in growing number of would be activists primed for mobilization. The campaign broadcast or published its new ideologies and interpretations of the world across all forms of media to include traditional platforms, the Internet, and mobile communications technology, continuously socializing and increasing awareness.²¹⁰

Much like the right to participate in the political process, the Indian Constitution guaranteed an opportunity for “Lead India” to become a challenging voice. But it was the movement’s use of the Internet created a true free space for the grass-roots activists. The campaign was designed to be interactive. The two-way communications over the Internet allowed activist, supporters, and sympathizers to communicate with each other. The primary communications platforms included blogs, SMS texts, viral videos, and other forms of cyber activism.²¹¹

The online communities and social media allowed for the exchange of diverse ideas and beliefs and which attitudes and opinions and increased a “collective” awareness of socio-political strains. “Lead India” also used social media to sharing persuasive images and stories that resonated across all the classes and castes inspiring the activism need to shape the environment. It was the social media outlets that allowed large numbers of individuals to be aware of both the long-term and immediate developments sympathy for the movement and the activists increased.

Mobilizing Structures

Like the American Civil Rights case study, it could be easily argued that a variety of grievances dominated the political rhetoric. The nation suffered a variety of issues that generated an equal number of grievances. For example, as the Indian economy was growing stronger, the number of people living in poverty was remained high (about one-third or 456M out of population of 1.5 billion).²¹² A significant and threatening number if they had decided to mobilize on grievances alone.

Another challenge, one that is the focus of the case study, was the growing number of young voters, which in 2007, made up more than half of the Indian electorate.²¹³ Hypothetically, if a simple majority decided to not participate in the political process, 230M votes would be missing, allowing political elites to maintain the status quo. As it has been discussed in the literature review and supported in the two previous case study examples, grievances are a constant but not sufficient for mobilization and activism. What is necessary is access to resources and the existence of efficient and capable mobilizing structures, from informal social networks to formal SMOs, which allow the marginalized and perceived politically powerless Indians to mobilize behind “Lead India” for a collective challenge to the status quo.

The mobilizing structures for “Leading India” differed slightly from that of the American Civil Rights Movement the Fall of the Berlin Wall. While the previous two began as a grassroots movement that eventually motivated the emergence of more formal mobilizing structures like SMOs, “Lead India” emerged as a SMO. It was engineered as a cause related marketing campaign and enjoyed the pre-existing formal structures established by the ToI and JWT. This gave “Lead India” distinct advantage when

compared to other social movements, especially when it came to mobilizing financial and communications resources.

Financially, Lead India had access to a variety of resources mobilized by the ToI parent corporation and from ToI print sales. The ToI is only one brand of the much larger Times Group, which is one of India's largest media conglomerate and includes several print, radio, and television divisions. Just looking at the ToI, in 2007 the paper enjoyed a large customer base including more than 7M readers and 1.6M online visitors.²¹⁴ Lead India also enjoyed a highly capable and experienced marketing firm to manage its marketing and communications strategies designed to influence activists, potential participants, and supporters. Between the ToI and JWT Mumbai, "Lead India" was managed by super-enabled SMO, capable of mobilizing resources and developing strategy.

Because the intent of the movement was to mobilize grassroots activism at the local level, the role the two cooperate players was concealed by virtual SMO. The more recognizable Lead India SMO was virtually created in the form of a central website.²¹⁵ Lead India SMOs successfully mobilized participants by providing an interactive communication structure for collecting and sharing information. During the first phase, "India Poised," participants could interact with the campaign through the web site and over SMS text to share issues and ideas to solve problems.²¹⁶ Through this the process, the SMO was able to frame collective problems and collective solution, setting the conditions for collective action.

During the "Lead India" phase participants continued to interact through the virtual SMO. Through the website participants could receive and share information. They

activists could also nominate and vote for potential future leaders and likely candidates to eventually participate in the “Lead India” leadership talent contest.²¹⁷ As the future political leaders and grassroots political networks began to emerge the “Lead India” website quickly amassed more than 1.3 million hits.²¹⁸ Over 37,000 potential leaders and future political candidates were nominated through this process.

The “Lead India” SMO then persuaded the informal network activists and supporters to narrow the field down to 37,000 through active participation in an informal democratic political process. Grassroots political and activist groups mobilized at the local level to support their favorite candidate. These local campaigns featured debates, political rallies, demonstrations, online campaigning, and viral political videos. Through this process of political activism the number was narrowed to eight candidates who best represented the hope of for a better future for the marginalized. The eight candidates moved on to participate in the ToI funded “American Idol like” televised contest. In this contest, viewers and supporters voted for the candidate they believed best represented the next generation of political Indians and challenge the status quo.

The significance of the local informal networks and grassroots activism cannot be overlooked. Like the American Civil Rights, the Fall of the Berlin Wall, “Lead India” was ultimately dependent on these informal network structures. It is hard to deny that “Lead India” had a significant advantage over most movements with its dedicated private sector support. But the activism had to emerge at the local level through the preexisting informal networks that mobilized for collective action around collective issues. These informal networks not only canvassed for the candidate and their issue. Their activism was observable by other segments of civil society. It increased the reach of the movement

beyond the initial mobilization structures and increasing the awareness of socio-political strains.

Influence Campaigns

“Lead India” highlights the importance of influence and framing to motivate participants to mobilize for collective action. It also provides clear evidence that the framing process is one of the critical principles of mobilization and collective behavior for challenging the ruling regime. For “Lead India,” this is related to the movement’s ability to frame the issues in a way that is appealing with potential movement participants. In the case of “Lead India,” the presence resource rich SMOs provided ample opportunities to participate with minimal cost to the participant. But, as with the Civil Rights Movement and the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the existence of grievances and resources are necessary but insufficient for mobilization of a social movement.

It is critical for mobilization and motivating activist behaviors to create awareness of socio-political strains, frame them into collective grievances, and create the belief that only collective action can relieve these strains. It is also important to create the internal conditions that affect behaviors.²¹⁹ “Lead India” SMOs and informal social networks had to commit a substantial amount of effort to influencing and framing to persuade the appropriate audiences based on the campaign phases. To mobilize activists and supporters the appropriate attitudes, values, and beliefs were linked to the appropriate activist’s behavior had to be created or manipulated.

Critical to the success of Lead India was framing the collective grievances and constructing arguments that mobilized behavior for change in ways that would seemed

achievable across a wide spectrum of audiences. Arguably the most intriguing and persuasive of Lead India's framed Arguments was "India vs. India:

There are two India's in this country - One India is straining at the leash, eager to spring forth and live up to all the adjectives that the world has been recently showering upon us. The other India is the leash" "One India says, give me a chance and I'll prove myself. The other India says, prove yourself first and maybe then you'll have a chance. One India lives in the optimism of our hearts. The other India lurks in the skepticism of our minds. One India wants. The other India hopes. One India leads. The other India follows.²²⁰

Published on the front page of the ToI and read aloud as a television commercial, "Two India's" challenged the activists and potential supporters alike to pick one of the two sides one of which had behaviors linked to the belief.

"India vs. India" found a very receptive audience in who would become "Lead India's" primary target audience, the young Indians and educated urban middle-class Indians. Very Quickly, India Poised became a widespread catalyst for participation. Participation in the campaign included a variety of activities, among them a discussion board that solicited from the general public their idea of the greatest problems facing India at the time.²²¹ Other campaigns messages designed to change attitudes and encourage behavioral change resonated in the "Do" and "Vote" media messages. The "Do" media message framed the question to the target audience of would be participants "what they would 'do' if they were the leaders of the country?"²²² The message was an attempt to persuade participants to aggressively "do" something for the nation.²²³ This complemented the consistent messages encouraging Indians to "take charge."

Arguably one of the more powerful and popular of Lead India's framed messages can be found in the television commercial titled "Tree ad." The basic ideology of Lead India can be identified in the "Tree ad." It focuses on a young boy who having

identifying an obstacle to progress, symbolically represented by a fallen tree across the busy and crowded road blocking traffic, stops what he is doing to clear the obstacle. This obstacle has impacted everyone but no one has moved to solve the problem, two include the state, represented by two national police officers.

People, losing hope anything will be done begin leaving their cars to walk assuming it will be sometime before someone if anyone will clear the obstacle. A young boy sits on his way to school, is watching the chaos. The boy, determined to do something, reaches the tree and alone he begins pushing on the tree. The young boy struggles as people, who had been idly standing on the side, notice his efforts. The child's efforts and determination create a micro revolution as the people who had been caught in the traffic jam join in to help him remove the tree. Together they push and their unified effort succeeds. The message concludes with; "Seeking tomorrow's leaders today. Lead India-the search is on."

The objective of the media message was to promote the benefits of integrated national unity that cuts across individual and sub-national differences. The message also aimed at illustrating to the audience that the instrument for change will be a leader, in this case represented by young middle class boy. An additional lesson in the message that is less obvious is the most people in India are aware of the endemic political and social issues, but no one has stepped forward to resolve them.²²⁴

Cross Case Pattern Analysis

This study did not intend provide a thorough historical review of the social movements or revolutions. Instead, the intent is to explore and identify the "causal mechanisms" related to mobilization for non-violent resistance and collective action.²²⁵

Analyzing these mechanisms, USSOF planners and operators can begin to understand, predict, explain, and control these social phenomena.²²⁶ The literature review provided an overview of key principles and concepts. The cross case analysis highlights the common “causal mechanisms” and factors that affect mobilization and collective action (Table 2).

Table 2. Causal Factors of Analysis

Case Study Factors	American Civil Rights Movement	Fall of the Berlin Wall	Lead India
Factor #1 Opportunities and Environment	-Emergence of a voting Black middle class. -Free space found in Black churches.	-Free space found in Protestant churches. -State sanctioned method of protest following Monday services.	-Free space found on the Internet. -Free space found in grassroots and informal networks.
	-US Constitution and the right to participate in the political process. -Supreme Court victories.	-Change in Soviet foreign policy. -Concessions made by the GDR. -Inaction by the Stasi.	- Indian Constitution and the right to participate in the political process.
Factor #2 Mobilization Structures	-Black churches provide pre-existing social structures and informal networks	-Protestant churches provide pre-existing social structures and informal networks	-Informal networks emerge to support local candidates and future leaders.
	-Black churches provide pre-existing social structures for SMOs.	-Protestant churches provide pre-existing social structures for SMOs	-ToI provides the structure for a SMO to facilitate mobilization. -Internet and SMS text allow mass mobilization virtually.
Factor #3 Influence Campaigns	-Social influence over informal networks. -Issues and ideas for conflict resolution are socialized in church.	-Social influence over informal networks. -Issues and ideas for conflict resolution are socialized in church.	-Social influence over informal networks. -Issues and ideas for conflict resolution are socialized virtually
	-Religious, social, and political values influence collective activism.	-Religious, social, and political values influence activism.	-Social and political values influence activism. -”Lead India,” and other slogans use culture norms to influence activism.

Source: Created by author.

The American Civil Rights case study provides many important lessons that can be applicable to engineering future social movements for political warfare and UW. First, and probably most obvious, the right opportunities must be present before any movement can emerge. The legal processes outlined by the Constitution and courtroom victories set the legal precedence for the call for change. More important though were the micro-level opportunities provided by the free space found in Black churches for mobilization and collective action to exploit the macro-opportunities. Away from the eyes and of semi-free of threat from southern white elites, activists could discuss ideas and plan activities that otherwise would have gotten them killed.

The American Civil Rights Movement also provides evidence of the power of micro-mobilization structures. Leveraging preexisting informal social networks to mobilize resources can create the foundations of a movement. The church in particular effectively managed the collection and utilization of resources that existed within the network of their congregations. External resources play a minor role in the initial mobilization of the civil rights movement, making internal resources critical. Black churches and colleges were key southern-based institutions where much of the organization and other important tasks were completed.

Lastly, the American Civil Rights Movement highlights the power of influence through social relationships or framing. This function was critical for motivating and mobilizing collective action. Frames that were both culturally relevant and relatable to preexisting values, for example the American value for “rights,” resonate cognitively and translate thoughts into action or trigger desired behaviors. The Black church was able to mobilize people for non-violent action because “connected” church membership provided

individuals a frame for receiving the message and meaning of non-violence.²²⁷ Black religious culture provided a strong collective frame because the church had been a “free space” in the Black community for centuries.²²⁸ This allowed Black communities a space to develop a collective identity, a sense of community, and instill a sense of dignity.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall was as a significant historical event as the American Civil Rights Movement. It was the symbolic end to the division between the Cold War adversaries. The Fall of the Berlin Wall is also significant in understanding the potential of political warfare for shaping the environment, affecting the state decision making cycle, and coercing the state into concessions. As a case study the Fall of the Berlin Wall highlights the importance of opportunities and mobilizing structures. Similar to the American Civil Rights Movement free space found in the per-existing church structure proved critical for the emergence of a movement. The same church structures were also critical for mobilization. The informal social networks within the church provided the critical resources. The churches institutional structures also made for an easy transition into a formal SMO and local movement center.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall also proved power of direct action activism as a means of persuasion. The mass demonstrations communicated to both would be supporters, sympathizers, and the state. The mass demonstration of 70,000 East Germans on October 9th “framed” through action the collective purpose of the movement, the need for change, and confidence that collective action could bring reform. The peaceful demonstration and the absence of violent sanctions by the state also framed for a wide audience that non-violent collective action could be successful. This belief was only reinforced by October 18th when the East German leader Erich Honecker was forced to

resign his state and party offices by his own Politburo and was replaced by a conservative successor promising change.

This case study is relevant to any effort needed to build socio-political cohesion. It did not require an elaborate structure for resource mobilization since it was able to leverage private sector financial and media support. The most significant lesson comes in the creative framed messages that help motivate and mobilize participants into action. Lead India was able to achieve its mobilizing objectives by leveraging framed media messages that had centripetal effect which contributed to social and political integration, inclusion, and cohesion of the target audiences.²²⁹ The media message also had a positive effect on socio-political cohesion by promoting political participation of Indians who had to date avoided the political process. They could participate as both voters and supporters of change or as leaders and instruments of change.

The “Lead India” campaign provides a quality example of the media’s expanding role in the creation and strengthening of socio-political cohesion within the nation-state. “Lead India” also demonstrated how this cohesion could be leveraged to pressure the social and political environment. This approach would provide the strategic planner an alternative. A non-lethal alternative that can reach and influence the majority of the population to either neutralize or steal the human terrain away from an insurgency.

The social change that resulted of the Lead India campaign can be established to some degree. The campaign generated over 50,000 opinion and editorial column write-ups.²³⁰ Hyderabad had gone up from 30 percent in 2003 to 60 percent in 2008 polls.²³¹ In 2009, the percentage of voter participation remained steady; indicating a majority of the “Lead India” young and educated urban middle class target audiences heard the call to

action.²³² The ToI and the “Lead India” campaign has now become one symbol for social change in India. The campaign also became a testament to the increasing power of media as a catalyst for social change. “Lead India” continues to work to mobilize political participation and has focused attention on education reform in a sister movement titled “Teach India.”²³³

¹Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” *The Journal of American History* 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1-2.

²Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1999), xviii.

³Morris, “A Retrospective On the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks,” 518.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Ibid.*

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The Arab Spring and the political upheaval in MENA provided a small glimpse at the power and potential of non-violent political warfare for shaping the security environment.¹ As Tunisians and Egyptians were taking to the streets and challenging the ruling regimes² the world could observe from a distance and watch a society mobilize for collective action. Not limited to the contemporary, these forms of non-violent political warfare have allowed numerous resistance movements to overthrow dictators, throw out foreign occupations, or achieve self-determination.³ The purpose of this study was to expand on what has been speculated about the Arab Spring and other resistance movements.

The study accomplished its purposes in two steps. The first step was to synthesize the collected literature in order to attain a clear understanding of social mobilization, collective action, and social influence for non-violent resistance movements. The second step was to begin developing a case for the theory of non-violent political warfare. More specifically the research was designed to address the following hypothesis; Non-violent political warfare can shape the social and political environments of an adversarial state in support of unconventional warfare based on the existence, in varying degrees, of three primary causal factors. These causal factors includes: (1) the existence of political opportunities and a permissive environment, (2) the existence of sufficient mobilizing structures, and (3) and effective influence campaigns.

The three exploratory case studies; the American Civil Rights Movement 1955-1968, the Fall of the Berlin Wall East Germany 1989, and Lead India 2007 reinforced the material outlined in the literature review and highlighted the principle concepts and theories “in-action.” Each case study provided an example of the critical free-space needed for a resistance movement to emerge and non-violent strategies to develop. They also highlight the importance of pre-existing informal network structures. These networks provide initial mobilizing structures during the early phases of a resistance and the foundation for more formal social movement organizations to emerge. Lastly, the analysis highlighted the importance of influence by word and deed.

Recommendations

The analysis and data provided by this study does present enough supporting evidence for further research and development of a theory of non-violent political warfare. This study was foundational, highlighting key information and raising awareness of key concepts and supporting theories related to non-violent resistance, mobilization, and activism. No one body of work would suffice in the development of this theory. Fortunately, there is no shortage of data available to analysis.

Future research should accomplish three tasks. First, continue to explore the roles of the causal factors in mobilization and collective action. Future analysis of these causal factors should include social movements and social revolutions that failed to mobilize or achieve their stated goals in order to learn from their mistakes. The analysis of different cases studies should also vary between “tech” heavy movements and the less technical.

The second task, related to one of the limitations of this study, is analyzing more “geo-focused” case studies. Purposely, the three cases studies analyzed did not provide

much insight into the cultural factors. Cultural nuisances and identities definitely played an important role and had “culturally” specific effects. Highlighting these roles and effects of the cultural differences was secondary to the primary purpose of highlighting “cross-cultural” similarities. Future analysis should increase attention on a factor that undoubtedly would affect any resistance movement.

Lastly, future analysis needs to be expanded into case studies that share the similar characteristics of “Lead India.” Lead India provided a mere glimpse of the potential effectiveness of externally engineered cause related movements. It also provided an example of the integration of multiple forms of media to support social mobilization.

The proliferation of electronic media, the Internet, and mobile communication devices along with the more recent rise in democratization movements has created an environment susceptible to non-violent resistance and political warfare

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