

THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM MULTINATIONAL
COAST GUARD UNIT IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2012-01

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 08-06-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2011 – JUNE 2012	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Need for a Regional Security System Multinational Coast Guard Unit in the Eastern Caribbean				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lt Cdr Aquinas J Clarke				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This paper is an academic examination of the need for the formation of a multinational Regional Security System (RSS) Coast Guard Unit. It concludes that among RSS operational level maritime forces leaders, there is a common perception that the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is a necessity and that such an entity would enhance the security of the sub-region. Though over time the nomenclature of the security challenges to the RSS sub-region has not changed, the complexity of those challenges has. This complexity is the result of the sub-region's existence in an inescapable, and uncontrollable, world risk society and forces the sub-region to create new, and modify, existing security risk mitigation systems to preserve its society. The proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is an example of this. This effort at risk mitigation will not succeed, if there is no commonality of perception among policy makers in the RSS, that the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard would enhance the security their individual states and of the sub-region. Funding, political will, and logistics will be the most significant requirements for the formation and sustainment of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard; these also have the greatest potential to hinder its formation.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Regional Security System, Cooperative Security, Risk Management, Risk Society Theory, Systems Theory, Risk Perception Theory, Qualitative Research Methods.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 121	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM MULTINATIONAL COAST GUARD UNIT IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN, by Lieutenant Commander Aquinas J Clarke, 121 pages.

This paper is an academic examination of the need for the formation of a multinational Regional Security System (RSS) Coast Guard Unit. It concludes that among RSS operational level maritime forces leaders, there is a common perception that the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is a necessity and that such an entity would enhance the security of the sub-region.

Though over time the nomenclature of the security challenges to the RSS sub-region has not changed, the complexity of those challenges has. This complexity is the result of the sub-region's existence in an inescapable, and uncontrollable, world risk society and forces the sub-region to create new, and modify, existing security risk mitigation systems to preserve its society. The proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is an example of this.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I thank God for granting me the strength to complete this thesis. I especially thank my Thesis Committee, Ms DeEtte Lombard (Chair), Mr Dave Christie and Dr Edward Robarge for their guidance and encouragement. I also thank my Staff Group Advisor Mr Brian Vorhees, the teaching staff of Staff Group 11 A (Mr Matt Bonnott, Dr Thomas Huber, LTC Andrew McIntyre) and Mr William Knight for officiating, my oral comprehension exam. Thanks to Ms Venita Krueger for ensuring that I got the formatting of the paper correct. To the Force Commanders of the Regional Security System and the Regional Security Coordinator, I thank you for your support. To the coast guard and marine police unit commanders of the individual member states of the RSS, without your participation, I would have never completed this thesis. To the past coast guard commanders of the RSS and to the personnel from the Central Liaison Office of the Regional Security System, I offer each of you my heartfelt thanks for taking time out to assist me on this journey.

Finally, to my wife Vonette, son Isaiah, daughter Makayla, my mother Muriel (this one is for you), and my friends (too numerous to mention). They all had the unenviable task of putting up with me during the scripting of this thesis. Thank you for being a great family and great friends.

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ACRONYMS

CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CLO	Central Liaison Office
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
IMPACS	Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OPCON	Operational Control
RSC	Regional Security Coordinator
RSS	Regional Security System
SGA	Small Group Advisor
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
USACGSC	United States Army Command and General Staff College

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DEFINITION OF TERMS

Anglophone Caribbean. The Anglophone Caribbean encompasses all those Caribbean states in which English is the first language. The Anglophone Caribbean is made up of all the English speaking islands of the Caribbean: Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize (Central America), Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana (South America), Jamaica, , Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands and US Virgin Islands.

CARICOM. Is the acronym for Caribbean Community. The organization was established in 1973 and comprises fifteen full members states: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, five associate member states: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands and eight observer states: Aruba, Colombia, Curacao, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Saint Maarten (Kingdom of the Netherlands) and Venezuela.¹

Ends, Ways and Means. Within the military construct, a security strategy must comprise an aligning of ends, ways and means to create a specific condition or set of conditions. The outlined objectives of the organization are the “ends”. How the

¹See also http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community (accessed 15 December 2011). All the RSS member states are members of CARICOM.

organization will achieve those objectives are the “ways.” The “means” are the capabilities that are required to execute the strategy.²

Force Commanders. The force commanders are the heads of the military and police forces of the RSS. They are: (Antigua and Barbuda) Chief of Defence Staff, Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force, Commissioner of Police, Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda, (Barbados) Chief of Staff Barbados Defence Force, Commissioner of Police Royal Barbados Police Force, (Dominica) Chief of Police Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force, (Grenada) Commissioner of Police Royal Grenada Police Force, (St Kitts and Nevis) Commander, St Kitts and Nevis Defence Force, Commissioner and Police Royal St Kitts and Nevis Police Force, (St Lucia) Commissioner of Police, Royal St Lucia Police Force, and (St Vincent and the Grenadines) Commissioner of Police, Royal St Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force. Force Commanders are also a part of the strategic level leadership of the RSS.

Operational Control. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.³

²Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), xiii.

³Headquarters of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-138.

Operational Level Maritime Forces Leaders. The term “operational level maritime forces leaders,” refers to the current and past coast guard and marine police unit commanders from the individual RSS member states, and personnel employed at the Central Liaison Officer (CLO) of the RSS that are directly assist individual member states in the planning and conduct of maritime operations. This paper also refers to the operational level readers as the “respondents.”

Region. The term “region” refers to all Anglophone Caribbean and CARICOM states.

Regional Security Coordinator. The Regional Security Coordinator is not a force commander. He is the head of the Central Liaison Office of the Regional Security System. In accordance with Article 7 of the RSS Treaty (1996), he is responsible for the general administrative direction of the RSS.⁴

RSS sub-region. Comprises the member states of the RSS: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. This paper also refers to the RSS sub-region as “sub-region” and as “Eastern Caribbean.”

Member States. The member states of the Regional Security System.

⁴RSS Treaty (1996), <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/70686.htm> (accessed 21 September 2011).

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The time is ripe for the nations of the Caribbean to become proactive in expanding cooperative regional security.

— Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach,
Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation

Introduction

The Regional Security System (RSS) is a cooperative security treaty organization that assists its member states to mitigate the security risks to their national security and the security of the sub-region. The member states of the RSS are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.⁵ Figure 1 shows a map of the RSS member states. A star denotes each member state.



Figure 1. Map of the member states of the RSS

Source: Adapted from the RSS website, <http://rss.org.bb/> (accessed 1 March 2012).

⁵Antigua and Barbuda and St Kitts and Nevis are twin island states. St Vincent and the Grenadines is a multi-island state comprising more than four inhabited islands.

The mission of the RSS is to “ensure the stability and well-being of member states through mutual cooperation, in order to maximize regional security in preserving the social and economic development of the people of the member states.”⁶ It is against the backdrop of the maximization of regional security that in 2008, the RSS presented a written proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard to the force commanders from the member states of the RSS. The proposed multinational coast guard unit would operate under the umbrella of the RSS. Like the RSS Air Wing, the proposal recommended that the RSS would equip the coast guard unit and asked that the RSS member states provide the personnel from within their individual coast guard and marine police units. At the time of the preparation of this paper, the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit was still under review.

This paper examines if there is a need for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard in the Eastern Caribbean to mitigate the security risks that affect the sub-region. In the paper the views of current and past coast guard and marine police unit commanders from the individual RSS member states, and personnel employed at the Central Liaison Office (CLO (the secretariat of the RSS)) who work directly with the individual member states coast guard and marine police units (the operational level maritime forces leaders) assist to determine:

1. If the security situation within the RSS sub-region necessitates the establishment of a sub-regional multinational coast guard unit;

⁶The mission is on the RSS website, <http://www.rss.org.bb/> (accessed 21 September 2011).

2. How the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard would enhance the ability of the member states of the RSS to mitigate their national and the sub-regional security risks;
3. If the concept for the establishment of a sub-regional multinational coast guard unit in the RSS is a feasible undertaking; and
4. What issues would prohibit RSS member states from participating in such a venture.

If implemented, the proposed multinational coast guard will expand the existing RSS cooperative security framework in the sub-region. The contents of the proposal are classified and this paper will not go into the details comprised therein. Instead, this paper discusses the proposed formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard, within the context of cooperative security expansion in the Caribbean region from a security risk management perspective. The emphasis of the paper is the RSS sub-region.

Background

In his article, “From Individual Security to International Stability,” Richard Cohen, Professor of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Security Studies at the George C Marshall European Center for Security, argues that cooperative security comprise collective security, collective defense, individual security, and promoting stability. According to him, cooperative security organizations achieve collective security and collective defense through the political and legal obligations of member states to defend the integrity of individual states within a group of treaty signatories, and the commitment of those states to defend each other from outside aggression. These organizations protect the basic freedoms of the peoples of the member

states by enhancing individual security and promoting stability outside the boundaries of the cooperative security system by forming international alliances.⁷ The outer security alliances of the RSS alluded to by this paper encompass, inter alia, the wider Caribbean security alliances such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and western hemispheric alliances such as the Organization of American States (OAS).

Edward P Borodzicz, in his book *Risk, Crisis and Security Management*, argues that one can view security as risk management in practice.⁸ This paper argues that the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is recommendation for the implementation of a new security risk management mechanism to enhance the security of the RSS sub-region. According to Thomas Norman in the book *Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection*, security risk management aims to reduce the possibility or likelihood of undesirable events and their consequences, to protect human life and health, and to improve the quality of life in the environment.⁹ Risk reduction encompasses the implementation, augmentation, and operation of various systems and sub-systems, acting in concert to enhance overall security.¹⁰

⁷Richard Cohen, "From Individual Security to International Stability," in *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*, The Marshall Center Papers no. 3, ed. Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka (George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 2001), 1-12, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/mcPapers/mc-paper_3-en.pdf (accessed 3 February 2012).

⁸Edward P Borodzicz, *Risk, Crisis and Security Management* (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 50.

⁹Thomas L. Norman, *Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection* (New York: CRC Press, 2010), 115.

¹⁰Borodzicz, 98.

Since the end of the Cold War, in the discourse on Caribbean security, cooperation has been the predominant theme.¹¹ In 2000, Tulchin and Espach argued that the time was ripe for cooperative security expansion in the Caribbean.¹² That argument came against the backdrop of what they described as an increase in the complexity of the security risks in the Caribbean region that was beyond the capabilities of nation states to mitigate unilaterally. In 1993, the former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Arthur Robinson stated, “it is becoming increasingly apparent that no single state, large or small can in isolation ensure its own security from subversion or external threat.”¹³ He, like other commentators, political leaders and security experts, acknowledged that there was, at that time, and continues to be, no state in the Anglophone Caribbean that had or has the financial or technical resources to mitigate unilaterally, the security risks to its society.¹⁴ In 2000, Dr Ivelaw Griffith, currently a Professor of Political Science and the Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs at York College, the City University of New York, put this argument in monetary terms. He outlined that the security operations budget of Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines Ltd was larger than the budgets of several

¹¹Tulchin and Espach, 1.

¹²*Ibid.*, 209.

¹³Brigadier General Edmund Dillon is a former Chief of Defence Staff of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. The quotation was cited in his speech “Security Cooperation in the Caribbean,” 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/whs2006/dillonpaper.pdf> (accessed 28 September 2011).

¹⁴Curtis A Ward, “Regional Threats: Security Capacity Imperatives in the Caribbean,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 58 (3rd Quarter 2010): 27, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/regional-threats.html> (accessed 12 November 2011).

Eastern Caribbean states combined.¹⁵ Griffith's observation of the financial resource limitations of the Eastern Caribbean highlighted the vulnerable position of the island states of that sub-region.

Griffith outlines that the security risks to the Caribbean are multidimensional and require military, political, economic, and environmental approaches to mitigate them. Their transnational scope and borderless consequences arise out of an environment that threatens the security not only of the nations of the Caribbean region but also of countries around the world.¹⁶

At the Inaugural Session of the Thirty Second General Assembly Of The Organization of American States in 2002, former Prime Minister of Barbados, Owen Arthur expressed that the security concerns of the sub-region included Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), illegal arms and drug trafficking, trans-national crime, ecological disasters and poverty.¹⁷ His statement was a confirmation that the security concerns identified by Griffith in his 1996 article "Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century," had continued to be problematic to

¹⁵Ivelaw L Griffith, "Drugs and the Emerging Security Agenda in the Caribbean," in *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, ed. Joseph S Tulchin and Ralph H Espach (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 138. Dr. Griffith is a leading scholar of Caribbean security issues. For a full biography visit <http://www.york.cuny.edu/academics/academic-affairs/provost-bio> (accessed 28 January 2012)

¹⁶Ivelaw L Griffith, "U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 2000): 66, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1326.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011).

¹⁷<http://www.oas.org/XXXIIGA/english/speeches/primeministerbarbados1.htm> (accessed 7 September 2011).

the sub-region.¹⁸ Commodore Tellis Bethel, Commander of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force, argues that these security challenges threaten the sovereignty and socio-economic well-being of the Caribbean nations.¹⁹ Mitigating them will continue to require a cooperative approach where security experts have access to a combination of member state resources to enhance the sub-regional capability and safeguard the well-being of the member states. Since its inception, the RSS has provided that cooperative security framework.

Established in 1982, the RSS was originally a collective defensive response by the member states to suppress the attempts at destabilization within the Eastern Caribbean sub-region.²⁰ At that time, the rhetoric of proponents of revolutionary theory in the wider Anglophone Caribbean region, espoused the non-capitalist revolutionary path to development, which created anxiety.²¹ Within the RSS member states, there were threatening activities by Sidney Burnett Alleyne in Barbados in 1976 and in 1980, a coup

¹⁸Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century," *McNair Paper 54* (Washington: National Defense University, 1996): 33, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA316755> (accessed 2 September 2008).

¹⁹Tellis A Bethel, "Caribbean narcotics trafficking: What is to be done?" *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* (1 October 2002): 80-90, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 25 October 2011).

²⁰Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis, "Initiatives for Cooperative Regional Security: The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System," in *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, ed. Joseph S Tulchin and Ralph H Espach (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 178. Brigadier General Lewis is also the former Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defence Force and Regional Security Coordinator of the RSS.

²¹Patrick Emmanuel, "Revolutionary Theory and Political Reality in the Eastern Caribbean," *Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs* 25, no. 2 (1983): 193-227.

d'état that overthrew the legitimate government of Grenada in 1979, and an attempted coup d'état by the Dominica Defence Force in 1981. Those events cemented the fears of sub-regional leaders that instability was imminent in the Eastern Caribbean sub-region and that was the catalyst for the formation of the RSS.²²

The first major RSS operational deployment was Operation Urgent Fury in 1983. Operation Urgent Fury was a United States (US) led intervention into Grenada in October of that year in response to a second coup d'état which overthrew the communist government of the island of Grenada. That deployment was the first proof that the RSS made a difference in the defense of the sub-region. Although Grenada was not a member state of the RSS at the time of the crisis, it was clear that the instability there had the potential to affect the stability of the sub-region and the wider Caribbean. The response by the RSS in conjunction with Jamaica and Guyana in support of the US was a clear message that the Caribbean nations were willing to take action and clean up their proverbial backyards.

Since Operation Urgent Fury, the Eastern Caribbean region has enjoyed relative political stability. The threat of coups d'état has abated to the point where it is insignificant. Why then has the RSS survived? The answer to that question lies in the enduring make-up of the organization and its realized benefits over the twenty-nine years of its existence. Whether as a matter of master political design, or just by chance, the founders never intended a sole military role for the RSS. This was primarily because of

²²US State Department, <http://www.cufon.org/cufon/staterepts.htm> (accessed 19 October 2011); "Ex-Commander Hanged for Dominica Coup Role," *The New York Times* (1986), <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/08/09/world/around-the-world-ex-commander-hanged-for-dominica-coup-role.html> (accessed 17 October 2011).

the five original states that joined the RSS in 1982, only two of them (Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados) had full-time military forces.²³ This led to a reliance on the police forces from the other territories to perform armed forces roles in defeating hostile invasions from outside countries and defeating armed insurgents, in the defense of the member states of the organization. As a result, the RSS developed as a unique cooperative security organization comprising both military and police forces, charged with the mission to defend the sovereignty of the member states.

Figure 2 shows the structure of the RSS.²⁴ A Council of Ministers, comprising ministers responsible for national security in their respective states, heads the RSS.²⁵ The Council of Ministers provides policy direction by outlining the organization's ends, and ensures that RSS activities align with the stated ways by which the RSS intends to achieve its mission. Article 4 of the RSS Treaty, outlines the ways of the organization. That article states that, the RSS will

Promote co-operation among the Member States in the prevention and interdiction of trafficking in illegal narcotic drugs, in national emergencies, search and rescue, immigration control, fisheries protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, natural and other disasters, pollution control, combating threats to national security, the prevention of smuggling, and in the protection of offshore installations and exclusive economic zone.

²³Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines were the first five signatories to the RSS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1982. St Kitts and Nevis signed after becoming an independent nation in 1983 and Grenada joined the RSS in 1985. Antigua and Barbuda and St Kitts and Nevis are twin island nations (two islands make up one state). St Vincent and the Grenadines is a multi-island nation (comprises more than two states within the sovereign nation).

²⁴On 5 March 1996, the member states upgraded the RSS MOU to the RSS Treaty.

²⁵Articles 6 and 7 of the RSS Treaty (1996) outline the structure of the organization.

The RSS comprises three military and seven police forces. The force commanders (heads of the military and police forces) provide the means (personnel and equipment) for the RSS to fulfill its purposes and functions.²⁶




Figure 2. Structure of the Regional Security System

Source: Created by author.

The Regional Security Coordinator (RSC) heads the Central Liaison Office (CLO), which is the secretariat of the RSS. The CLO is responsible for the administration of the RSS and the coordination of operations, training, and administrative activities on behalf of the organization. The CLO coordinates movement of personnel and materiel into operational and training areas when required. The CLO also facilitates cooperative

²⁶As outlined in Article 3 of the RSS Treaty (1996).

and collaborative planning in the best interests of the member states. Such facilitation is especially important where a member state requires expertise to assist it in planning or executing an action or both.²⁷

The RSS provides a platform with the juridical and operational structures that can facilitate its cooperative security expansion, through the strengthening of its internal systems, to conduct operations using a multinational force from within its member states. Such an undertaking would not be new. The RSS Air Wing is an organization within the RSS that provides support to all the member states. While its personnel are primarily from Barbados, the air wing works directly under the RSS.²⁸ It conducts air surveillance missions to support RSS member states land and maritime counter-narcotic, and maritime search and rescue operations. The air wing also provides logistics support to the member states through the movement of personnel and materiel for operational, administrative, and/or training purposes. A report published in the *Jane's Intelligence Review* in December 2004, described the RSS Air Wing as one of the busiest counter-drug air operations in the world.²⁹ Between 2001 and 2011, RSS Air Wing missions averaged 219

²⁷See Article 7 of the RSS Treaty (1996).

²⁸Employment at the RSS Air Wing is open to nationals of all member states of the RSS. The primary employment of Barbadians is a matter of expediency not restriction or exclusivity.

²⁹Ann Rogers, "Confronting cocaine smuggling in the eastern Caribbean," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (December 2004), [http://www4.janes.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2004/jir01129.htm@current&Prod_Name=JIR&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28%28\[80\]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%2C+%28\[100\]+%28\[100\]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+title%29+%3CAND%3E+%28\[100\]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%29%29%29](http://www4.janes.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2004/jir01129.htm@current&Prod_Name=JIR&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28%28[80]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%2C+%28[100]+%28[100]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+title%29+%3CAND%3E+%28[100]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%29%29%29) (accessed 14 December 2011).

per year with total seizures of 36,971.4 kilograms of cannabis and 14,026.6 kilograms of cocaine.³⁰ There is no way to compare accurately, the number of seizures against the number of evasions by drug traffickers in the sub-region. What the statistics, allow, is an opportunity to conceptualize the possible security risk mitigation successes that can result from an expansion in the cooperative security architecture of the RSS. It is against the backdrop of the success of the RSS Air Wing, that one can conclude that the establishment of a multi-national coast guard unit by the RSS is possible.

The paper argues that the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is a recommendation for the adoption of a new security risk management system to mitigate the security risks to the sub-region. In the book *Metrics and Methods for Security Risk Management*, Carl Young explains, that while threats and risks are interrelated, they are not identical. He outlines that,

Threats are often narrowly considered to be forces or actions that cause harm. When pursuing a general analytic approach to risk, it is useful to think more broadly and consider a threat to be anything that has the potential to cause damage, loss, or worsening conditions. . . . All security threats are characterized by a fundamental attribute called “risk,” . . . In the absence of a threat there is no risk and there would be no need for security professionals. . . . A threat cannot exist without the presence of individual risk components that in their totality characterize that threat. If . . . these components are missing, then by definition there is no threat. The security risk associated with a threat equals the product of the likelihood of threat occurrence, the vulnerability to the threat occurring, and the impact should the threat occur.³¹

Risk management allows an organization to focus on a specific risk or set of risks, and determine a way or ways to mitigate it or them. A single initiative cannot unilaterally

³⁰Information provided by the RSS Air Wing as at 1 October 2011.

³¹Carl S. Young, *Metrics and Methods for Security Risk Management* (Amsterdam: Syngress, 2010), 9-11.

reduce the security threats to the RSS sub-region, to argue such would be to ignore the complexity and multidimensionality of the security risks. Within a greater sub-regional threat reduction framework, risk management initiatives can position the member states to mitigate the effects of those threats through the management of specific security risks. The RSS is one of the risk management systems developed to mitigate security risks to the member states and the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard, is a proposed security risk management sub-system within the Regional Security System.

Paul Hopkin posits in his book *Fundamentals of Risk Management: Understanding, Evaluating and Implementing Effective Risk Management*, that risk management provides a framework dealing with and reacting to uncertainty.³² Borodzicz opines that managing uncertainty is not a new problem. He argues that in contemporary society, the context in which uncertainty takes place has become more complex.³³ This paper applies risk management theory to explain, why the security challenges to the RSS sub-region, though unchanged, have become more complex.

First the paper posits, that the complexity and uncertainty that the sub-region is forced to deal with, is because the member states of the RSS exist in a world risk society. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck developed risk society theory. Quoted in Anthony Elliot's article entitled *Beck's Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment*, Beck argues that, "the risk society is not an option which could be chosen or rejected in the course of political debate. It arises through the automatic operation of autonomous modernization

³²Paul Hopkin, *Fundamentals of Risk Management: Understanding, Evaluating and Implementing Effective Risk Management* (London: Koganpage, 2010), xxiii.

³³Borodzicz, 155.

processes which are blind and deaf to consequences and dangers.”³⁴ Risk society theory is concerned with uncertainty and man’s constant struggle to make the right decision to mitigate the risks of the evolving society. In the article “Living in the World Risk Society,” Beck argues, “the theory of world risk society addresses the increasing realization of the irrepressible ubiquity of radical uncertainty in the modern world.”³⁵ That uncertainty forces man to develop and expand systems in an attempt to control society and ensure its survival.

Borodzicz argued, to prevent and manage its risks, contemporary society has developed many sophisticated systems.³⁶ Jens Zinn, in *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction*, postulates that the study of systems theory interprets the risk that decision-making constitutes and the ascribing of those decisions to the society.³⁷ The establishment of the RSS in 1982 was the creation of a system to mitigate the security risks of its member states. This paper argues that the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is an example of systems theory at work, as it is an attempt to create a sub-system within the RSS to mitigate the contemporary security risks of the RSS sub-region.

³⁴Anthony Elliot, “Beck's Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment,” *Sociology* 36, no. 2 (May 2002): 297, <http://soc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/293> (accessed 12 December 2011).

³⁵Ulrich Beck, “Living in the World Risk Society,” *Economy and Society* 35, no. 3 (2006): 338.

³⁶Borodzicz, 155.

³⁷Jens O Zinn, *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction* (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 7.

When considered theoretically, the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard aligns with Lars Skyttner's theoretical argument in *General Systems Theory: Problems, Perspectives, Practice*. In that book he posits that systems theory assumes that, whether they are concrete, conceptual, abstract, natural or man-made, all systems have common characteristics that cut across disciplines and link closely to assist in describing existence.³⁸ The common characteristic that links the RSS and the proposal for the formation of a multinational coast guard is the attempt to safeguard the sub-regional society. The proposal is conceptual and seeks to create a manmade sub-system within the RSS. If implemented its operations should complement the maritime, aeronautical, and terrestrial operations of the RSS and its individual member states. If managed effectively, a multinational RSS Coast Guard should enhance the security of the sub-region. Systems theory links to risk society theory because man develops systems to mitigate the effects of an uncertain risk society.

Decisions to establish risk mitigation systems follow a perception that a risk or threat is sufficient to warrant a course of action. In an environment of scarcity, risk perception is a very important factor because it drives the decision-making, taking into account the competing interests within the society. The Oxford Dictionary defines "risk" as, "a situation involving exposure to danger . . . the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen."³⁹ The word "possibility" within that definition is critical, because the level of risk mitigation is dependent on man's perception that an undesirable

³⁸Lars Skyttner, *General Systems Theory: Problems, Perspectives, Practice*, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: World Scientific, 2005), 40.

³⁹See <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/risk?q=risk> (accessed 12 March 2012).

event will occur and its consequences will be sufficiently harmful to warrant the allocation of resources. According to Nick Fox in “Postmodern Reflections on Risk, Hazards and Life Choices,” “risk is in the eye of the beholder.”⁴⁰ Risk perception is associated with the need for risk reducing mechanisms to safeguard the society. Knowledge of the characteristics risk source is critical because risk perception is subjective and influences the judgments of those who are responsible for implementing actions to reduce risk.⁴¹

Since the RSS comprises seven member states, one can expect that how the policy makers in each member state of the RSS perceive security risks to their societies would vary. This is not a unique scholastic discovery; it occurs when people of different backgrounds and cultures coalesce. What this paper assesses is if there is common ground among operational level maritime forces leaders from the member states of the RSS that supports the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard.

The operational level maritime forces leaders comprise current and past coast guard and marine police commanders of the individual RSS member states and those personnel employed at the RSS CLO who work directly with those coast guards to plan and execute maritime operations. That purposive sample of maritime security experts from the RSS member states comprises persons that have experience in mitigating similar

⁴⁰Nick J. Fox, “Postmodern Reflections On ‘Risk’, ‘Hazards’ And Life Choices,” in *Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions And Perspectives*, ed. Deborah Lupton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13.

⁴¹Sigve Olteidal, Bjorg-Elin Moen, Hroar Klempe, and Torbjorn Rundmo, “Explaining Risk Perception: An Evaluation of Cultural Theory,” *Rotunde* 85 (2004): 12. http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/Torbjorn.Rundmo/Cultural_theory.pdf (accessed 8 December 2011).

and in some cases identical security risks. Their views, on the proposed formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard, provide an entry point for exploring and determining its feasibility.

One may question why a coast guard unit instead of a navy? The simple answer to that question is that it is cost effective to build on a platform that is already in place. In each RSS member state, the coast guard infrastructure comprising military and/or police coast guard/ marine police units has been in place for over thirty years. A navy is an armed force and, therefore, within the current structure of the RSS, which comprises military (armed forces) and police forces, a navy is not workable. The major difference between a coast guard and a navy is that while a coast guard can be an armed force or a civilian law enforcement entity, a navy is and can only be an armed force. A navy would not be suited for the RSS because unlike NATO, the RSS is not an armed force cooperative security framework. Of the security organizations that make up the RSS, only three are armed forces, the other seven are police forces. The structure of the RSS is therefore better suited for the formation of a coast guard. In addition, the security challenges that affect the RSS sub-region require law enforcement solutions. Finally, armed forces applications may enhance the law enforcement requirements, but those applications must conform to law enforcement standards.

The findings of the study indicate that the operational level maritime forces leaders and personnel employed at the CLO, who work directly with the coast guard and marine police units of the RSS member states, agree that there is a need for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard. The paper shows that though terms of the security concerns of the sub-regions have not changed in nomenclature, they have become more

complex and significantly challenge the abilities of security forces in the sub-region to mitigate them. The operational level maritime forces leaders view the proposed multinational RSS Coast as a feasible security risk mitigation option that, if implemented and properly sustained, will enhance the security of the individual member states of the RSS and that of the entire RSS sub-region.

Assumptions

For the purposes of this thesis, the author made the following assumptions:

1. The RSS will continue to exist and will remain relevant among the members states and within the wider Caribbean region;
2. The establishment of a RSS Coast Guard will be possible at some point in time;
3. The security threats to the RSS sub-region will increase in the future and an expanded sub-regional response will be necessary; and
4. The RSS member states will continue to cooperate and collaborate to mitigate existing and emerging security risks.

Limitations

This paper is limited to the study of maritime responses to the sub-regional security threats to the member states of the RSS. The geographical layout of the RSS member states presents a unique situation for which this study is very relevant. These are all small island nations that are responsible for security mitigation in maritime areas, which are in some cases over one hundred times the size of their land areas (see table 1). The specificity of the focus resulted in a small but focused sample population. This is critical to understand because, though the member states of the RSS are island nations,

the maritime security operations expertise within the national forces is limited because of the small sizes of the national coast guard and marine police units.⁴²

Table 1. Cumulative land and maritime area sizes for the member states of the RSS

Island	Land Area	Maritime Area including Exclusive Economic Zone
Antigua and Barbuda	442 Km ²	109,914 Km ²
Barbados	430 Km ²	186107 Km ²
Dominica	751 Km ²	28, 626 Km ²
Grenada	334 Km ²	26, 158 Km ²
St Kitts and Nevis	261 Km ²	10, 201 Km ²
St Lucia	616 Km ²	15, 484 Km ²
St Vincent and the Grenadines	389 Km ²	36, 314 Km ²

Source: Created by author. Land Area shows cumulative land size as outlined in *CIA The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed 7 October 2011); The Exclusive Economic Zone extends 200 nautical miles (370.4 km) from the shoreline out to sea. The areas shown in this diagram were adapted from <http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/308.aspx> (accessed 7 September 2011).

While the area of focus is the RSS sub-region, the paper does not, and cannot, discount the security issues of the wider Caribbean region. To do such would be to ignore the inescapable and inextricable links that exist among the shared security concerns of the region. Within the context of the Caribbean however, the study is limited to the CARICOM member states of the Anglophone Caribbean.

⁴²In the RSS, the Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and St Kitts and Nevis Coast Guards are military units. For the remainder of the sub-region, the coast guards are part of the national police forces and are in some cases called marine police units. In Barbados, there is a coast guard and a marine police unit.

Scope and Delimitations

The paper focuses on mitigating the security risks associated with illegal drug trafficking in the Regional Security System sub-region over the period 2000 to 2011. The emphasis on this area does not ignore other security issues such as human trafficking, illegal firearms trafficking or money laundering. Instead, it acknowledges that the sub-region is most vulnerable in mitigating the security risks associated with illegal drug trafficking, and links this vulnerability to the need for the development of additional cooperative security risk management mechanisms to safeguard the future of the sub-region.

This paper does not focus on the costs involved in establishing a RSS Coast Guard. It is an academic discussion of the proposal for the formation of a multinational coast guard under the RSS structure. Additionally, this paper does not advance a policy position.

Significance of the Study

The intent of this paper is to add to the discussion on cooperative security expansion within the Caribbean region by conducting a qualitative study to examine how the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit could enhance security within the RSS sub-region of the Anglophone Caribbean. The paper will provide a contemporary understanding of the security environment within the RSS sub-region and the thoughts among security experts concerning the feasibility of a proposed way to mitigate the sub-region's existing and emerging security risks. This paper will provide a reference, in the area of the establishment of maritime related solutions for review when considering

security cooperation expansion and security risk management within the Anglophone Caribbean region and, more specifically, within the Regional Security System sub-region.

Summary

Mitigating the existing and emerging security challenges to the RSS sub-region will require innovative security risk management approaches. Expanding cooperative security arrangements is a way for the RSS member states to enhance their individual and collective defense and security. What needs to be done and how it is done will be a matter of policy. This paper focuses on the feasibility of a proposed way of expanding the existing RSS cooperative security arrangement, and how the proposal, if implemented, can enhance the security of the RSS member states. Curtis Ward highlights in the article “Regional Threats Security Capacity Imperatives in the Caribbean,” that none of the islands of the sub-region have the financial or technical resources to mitigate individually the security risks to their societies.⁴³ Acting individually within the context of the existing and emerging environment would not posture the island nations to mitigate effectively their security risks. By pooling resources to achieve the common goal of sub-regional security, the islands of the RSS sub-region have given and can give themselves in the future, a fighting chance to achieve significant security threat mitigation. A multinational RSS Coast Guard unit is a way to pool sub-regional resources to create a sub-system within a system to mitigate the security risks within the sub-regional risk society. Its establishment will be dependent on the risk perception of the policy makers,

⁴³Curtis Ward, “Regional Threats: Security Capacity Imperatives in the Caribbean,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 58 (3rd Quarter 2010): 26, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/regional-threats.html> (accessed 12 November 2011).

based on competing national interests, and the perceived benefits such an arrangement can bring.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

To assess the need for a multinational RSS Coast Guard in the Eastern Caribbean, this literature review is in two sections. The first section sets the scene with a discussion on the security situation in the RSS sub-region. The information will show that over time, the main security concern for Caribbean leaders, academics and security experts remained illegal drug trafficking and its associated activities such as illegal firearms trafficking, illegal immigration and crime inter alia. The second section applies risk management theory to explain the increased complexity of the security risks to the RSS sub-region, the steps taken to mitigate those risks and the obstacles to the implementation of security risk management initiatives.

In the discussion on the sub-regional security environment, the literature review makes many references to the Caribbean region. In their book *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, Tulchin and Espach argue that national security in the Caribbean is inseparable from regional security.⁴⁴ This observation applies also to discussions on sub-regional security within the Caribbean region. In as much as national security and Caribbean security are inseparable, the same is true for any discussion on security within any sub-region of the Caribbean. One cannot properly highlight the magnitude of the security challenges to the RSS sub-region without doing so in the context of the wider Caribbean.

⁴⁴Tulchin and Espach, 5.

While the literature on Caribbean security extensively discusses the elements of the security risks, the review of literature for this paper did not reveal any discourse on Caribbean security within the context of security risk management. This paper fills that gap by applying risk management theory to the discussion on sub-regional security in relation to the proposed formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard. The paper applies three elements of risk management theory to the body of knowledge on cooperative security in the Caribbean: risk society theory, systems theory and risk perception theory.

Risk society theory helps to explain why the security environment in the sub-region, continues to become more complex. Systems theory discusses the academic concept behind the creation of systems to mitigate risks. Finally, risk perception theory puts into perspective that element of the human psyche that can impede the ability of the sub-region to implement policies to mitigate its security risks. In the final analysis, human decision-making affects the implementation of any initiative and risk perception is an inseparable aspect of decision-making.

The Security Risk Environment

We recognize . . . the importance of close cooperation to combat new and emerging transnational threats that endanger the very fabric of our societies. By virtue of their small size and geographic configuration and lack of technical and financial resources, Caribbean States are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to these risks and threats, especially those posed by illicit trafficking in persons, drugs, and firearms, terrorism, and other transnational crimes.⁴⁵

⁴⁵This quotation is a part of a joint press statement that was made by the United States of America, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Dominican Republic on the Third Border Initiative on 13 January 2004. It is quoted in Curtis A Ward, "Regional Threats: Security Capacity Imperatives in the Caribbean," 27.

At a time when there is much discourse on cooperative security expansion in the Caribbean region, the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit was timely. At the regional level, CARICOM established the Task Force on Crime and Security in 2001, the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) in 2006, and introduced numerous protocols in the decade 2000 to 2011. These actions demonstrated the importance regional leaders attach to developing cooperative security mechanisms to mitigate the existing and emerging security risks to the region.⁴⁶

CARICOM established the Task Force on Crime and Security out of a concern over the new forms of crime and violence that had implications for individual safety and the social and economic well-being of the Region. The RSS was a part of that task force. Its focus was three fold. First, it identified issues relating to the underlying causes and sources of crime. Second, it recommended actions to counter activities that pose a direct security threat to the region. Finally, it recommended initiatives to build capacity through institutional strengthening, shared surveillance, and other forms of cooperation among member states, and between CARICOM, the wider Caribbean, and the international community.⁴⁷

IMPACS is the implementation agency for the multilateral crime and security infrastructure that the Task Force on Crime and Security recommended. It comprises five

⁴⁶A list of CARICOM Treaties and Protocols that show the intent to expand security cooperation in the region can be found at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments_index.jsp?menu=secretariat (accessed 17 January 2012). Further information on IMPACS is at <http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs/> (accessed 17 January 2012).

⁴⁷Further information on the Task Force on Crime can be found at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/regional_issues/crime_and_security.jsp?menu=community (accessed 13 March 2012).

sub-committees and two organizations. The sub-committees are the Standing Committees of Military Heads, Commissioners of Police, Chiefs of Immigration, Chiefs of Customs and Heads of Intelligence and Financial Investigative Units. The organizations are the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center (RIFC), which provides intelligence information and strategic threat analyses to member states of CARICOM and the Joint Regional Communications Center (JRCC), which supports border control by providing advanced passenger information and pre-screening for all persons who travel by air or by sea through the CARICOM region. These organizations promote multilateral information and intelligence sharing throughout CARICOM and partner with international organizations to share information in an attempt to reduce the security risks to the CARICOM member states.⁴⁸

The RSS member states benefit from the work of IMPACS. In a sub-region where financial and technical resources are scarce, the regional cooperative security expansionist approach helps to strengthen the capacity of sub-regional collective security organizations to mitigate security risks. The information provided by IMPACS, however, though critical, would be useless if at the operational level, there was not a concomitant effort to build capacity. The proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit is timely because it seeks to build on a sub-regional structure within the framework of wider regional cooperative security.

At the Organization of American States (OAS) Third Defense Ministerial in November 1998, Henderson Simon, a former minister in the RSS member state of

⁴⁸For in depth information on the functions of IMPACS visit http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=105 (accessed 13 March 2012).

Antigua and Barbuda stated that, “the very large and the very small states of this hemisphere have found that security, in an age of globalization, is rather complex. . . . Today, security must now be extended, in the case of the small-island state, to encompass several non-traditional aspects.”⁴⁹ Gail Verasammy also offers an interesting analysis of the evolution of Caribbean security issues. She argues in her article, “Toward a Reconceptualisation of Caribbean Basin Security,” that contemporary Caribbean security strategies are not focused on traditional military threats such as an invasion from a foreign country. Instead, the concentration has been on issues such as illegal drug trafficking, money laundering, disasters from natural phenomenon, epidemics and illegal migration.⁵⁰

Verasammy’s argument agrees with that of Ivelaw Griffith who posited in 1997 in an article entitled, “Caribbean Regional Security,” that drug trafficking and its derivative activities were the most significant threats to the security of the Caribbean region at that time.⁵¹ Like Verasammy, the derivative activities he referred to, included illegal firearms trafficking, money laundering and other forms of crime. In 2008, José Perales, of the Woodrow Wilson International Center of Scholars outlined in his article, “Crime, Violence, and Security in the Caribbean,” that the situation had not changed. He noted, that drug trafficking had been consistently cited as the underlying cause of much of the

⁴⁹Henderson Simon’s full speech can be read online at <http://www.oas.org/csh/portuguese/docministinterv.asp> (accessed 15 October 2011).

⁵⁰Gail D. Verasammy, “Toward a Reconceptualisation of Caribbean Basin Security,” *In-Spire Journal of Law, Politics and Societies* 4, no. 1 (2009): 61-82.

⁵¹Ivelaw L. Griffith, “Caribbean Regional Security,” *Strategic Forum*, no.102 (1997): 1, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA394380> (accessed 23 December 2011).

criminal activity in the Caribbean region and had been a major security concern in the CARICOM given its social, institutional, and economic ramifications.⁵²

Senator Errol Cort, Minister of National Security and Labor, Antigua and Barbuda, later outlined the complexity of the illegal drug trafficking phenomenon and the difficulty faced by sub-regional governments to mitigate the risks associated with it. In a statement at the closing of the “Strengthening of the Regional Intelligence Management Framework Standardized Tools and Operating Procedures Training Course” in May 2010, he expressed that,

Individual Caribbean countries realized that they simply did not have the resources to match the vast capacity of the drug traffickers. It was not that governments had not tried, several of them had diverted scarce resources from social and economic programs to fight drug trafficking and the range of criminal activity that it had spawned. They had stepped up their arrests of drug offenders and the seizure of their illicit cargoes, but despite their best efforts, they could not stem the tide of illicit drugs. . . . The attendant movement of firearms and personnel with the capacity and willingness to engage in violence, that inevitably accompanies the illicit drug trade, has the potential to amplify crime and security issues that threaten the stability of CARICOM Member States.⁵³

More recently, in 2011, while delivering a lecture entitled “Drugs and Crime as Problems without Passports in the Caribbean: How Secure is Security, and How Sovereign is Sovereignty?” Griffith reiterated that the problem of drug trafficking continued to be a major concern for the Caribbean region, and highlighted that the transnational magnitude

⁵²José Raul Perales, “Crime, Violence, and Security in the Caribbean,” *Latin American Program*, no. 29 (2008): 1, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/lap.cc.29.pdf> (accessed 7 October 2011).

⁵³Statement by Senator Dr The Hon. Errol Cort, Chair of the Council for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE), Minister of National Security and Labour, Antigua and Barbuda, at the Closing of the *Strengthening of the Regional Intelligence Management Framework Standardised Tools and Operating Procedures Training Course*, 6 May 2010, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/intelligence_management_framework_consle_cort.jsp?null&prnf=1 (accessed 1 March 2012).

of illegal drug trafficking had led to the conceptualization of a number of regional and extra-regional initiatives aimed at alleviating the problem. He stated that,

The subject of drugs and crime also has been prominent at all CARICOM summits for the last decade, and it has been the centerpiece of various bilateral and multilateral meetings and initiatives involving the United States and other extra-regional stakeholders. For instance, within two months in 2010 two visits were made to the region by top Cabinet officials: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in April and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in June. A year earlier, in May 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder visited. Drugs, crime, and arms trafficking were the *raison d'être* for all three visits.⁵⁴

According to Griffith, the drug phenomenon comprises four dimensions: production, consumption, trafficking, and money laundering. In the article “U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security,” he categorizes those characteristics as geonarcotics. Griffith argues that the geonarcotic nature of illegal drug trafficking threatens the security not only of the nations of the Caribbean region but also of countries around the world.⁵⁵ Griffith goes on to argue in his book *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, that the concept of geonarcotics comprises three factors: geography, power, and politics. The geographical concept highlights that the transnational nature of illegal drug trafficking feeds on the unique geographical features of the islands. The ability of individuals, groups, and non-state actors to secure compliant action from within the society or a collection of societies to support illegal drug trafficking demonstrates the

⁵⁴Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, “Drugs and Crime as Problems without Passports in the Caribbean: How Secure is Security, and How Sovereign is Sovereignty?” *Thirteenth Annual Eric E. Williams Memorial Lecture African and African Diaspora Studies Program School of Public and International Affairs Florida International University* (2011), 13, <http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/griffith-2011-eric-williams-lecture.pdf> (accessed 12 January 2012).

⁵⁵Ivelaw L Griffith, “U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 2000): 66, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1326.pdf (accessed 23 September 2011).

power aspects of the geonarcotic phenomenon. Illegal drug trafficking power brokers exercise the political characteristic of geonarcotics by affecting resource distribution and corrupting the legitimate political system.⁵⁶

In the context of the RSS sub-region, one can clearly see the geonarcotic phenomenon at work. Seelke, Wyler and Beittel, in the article “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and US Counterdrug Programs,” outline that because of their geographical location, the island states of the RSS sub-region are critical transit territories for illegal drugs from Central and South America, and from within the Caribbean that are destined for the North American and European markets.⁵⁷ One of the other contributing factors to these island nations that is critical to the transport of illegal drugs is their geographical make up. Melissa Beale highlights in her article “The CARICOM Blueprint for Illicit Drug Trafficking,” that the natural landscapes and diffuse geographical locations of the sub-region make these island states appealing to drug traffickers who take advantage of terrain that comprises a large number of uncontrolled coastlines and mountainous interiors that easily facilitate the growth, processing and distribution of illegal drugs.⁵⁸ To put the geography of the Eastern Caribbean into

⁵⁶Ivelaw L Griffith, “Probing Security Challenge and Change in the Caribbean,” in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, ed. Ivelaw L Griffith (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 31-32.

⁵⁷Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, and June S. Beittel, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and US Counterdrug Programs,” *Congressional Research Service* (2010), 16, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf> (accessed 23 September 2011).

⁵⁸Melissa Beale, “The CARICOM Blueprint for Illicit Drug Trafficking,” *Council on Hemispheric Affairs* (December 2011), <http://www.coha.org/the-caricom-blueprint-for-illicit-drug-trafficking/> (accessed 23 January 2012).

perspective, the *Shipwreck Expo* website highlights that St Vincent and the Grenadines comprises “over 100 islands and cays . . . St Vincent, which is the largest island in the group, is a volcanic island with amazingly steep mountains.”⁵⁹ With the exception of Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados, all the other member states of the RSS, like St Vincent, are mountainous volcanic islands.

The geographical composition of the islands of the RSS does not allow for the construction of clandestine airstrips to support illegal drug and other forms of illegal trafficking. In Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados, there is simply nowhere to construct them. In the remainder of the RSS member states, the areas where illegal traffickers can construct airstrips are heavily populated. The porous coastlines of the RSS member states, however, easily facilitate the movement of maritime traffic and by extension the maritime movement of illegal drugs, illegal firearms, and illegal immigrants. Ann Rogers acknowledges this method of movement in her article “Confronting Cocaine Smuggling in the Eastern Caribbean,” where she outlines, that 80 percent of the drug traffic in the region involves the use of boats.⁶⁰ Like legitimate businesspersons, illegal drug traffickers know their products and markets intimately, so they position themselves to exploit many downstream opportunities or more succinctly, to take advantage of the paths of least resistance.⁶¹

⁵⁹<http://www.shipwreckexpo.com/tsstvincentshipwrecks.htm> (accessed 14 March 2012).

⁶⁰Rogers.

⁶¹Richard Wise and Peter Baumgartner, “Go Downstream: The New Profit Imperative in Manufacturing,” *Harvard Business Review* 7, no. 5 (1999): 137.

In the article, “The End of Green Gold? Comparative Development Options and Strategies in the Eastern Caribbean Banana Producing Islands,” Anthony Payne explained that the problem of marijuana cultivation in the Eastern Caribbean was a direct result of the collapse of the banana industry, which was due to international trade pressures applied by the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁶² In a case study report entitled *Public Sector Modernisation in St Vincent and the Grenadines*, the Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD) reported that the multi-island nation of St Vincent and the Grenadines, a RSS member state, ranked as the largest marijuana producer in the Eastern Caribbean and the second largest in the entire Caribbean region.⁶³ Payne highlighted that farmers, who had gone out of business, used the arable land for the cultivation of marijuana and he postulated that, “St. Vincent will be well placed, should this drug ever be legalized in the future in any of the rich societies of the west.”⁶⁴

The current situation is, however, that marijuana cultivation in the RSS sub-region and its consumption within the RSS sub-region and in many of the rich societies like the US and Europe, is still illegal. The island states of the RSS sub-region do not benefit financially from illegal drug trafficking but individual non-state actors do. What the island states are required to do, while not benefiting, is to allocate resources to

⁶²Anthony Payne “The End of Green Gold? Comparative Development Options and Strategies in the Eastern Caribbean Banana Producing Islands,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 41, no. 3 (2006): 40.

⁶³Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD), *Public Sector Modernisation in St Vincent and the Grenadines*, 3, <http://www.caricad.net/UserFiles/File/casestudysvg.pdf> (accessed 3 January 2012).

⁶⁴Payne, 40.

alleviate and/or stop cultivation and trafficking. In 2000, when Griffith revealed that the security budget of a single cruise ship company was more than a combination of the security budgets of several of the RSS member states, his observation highlighted the challenge these states face in financially resourcing counter-drug security risk mitigation.⁶⁵

There is an old adage that money is power, and within the RSS sub-region, the disparity of power between state actors and drug traffickers lies in the amount of money available to mitigate the security risks associated with drug trafficking and that available to the illegal drug traffickers to carry out their activities. Rojas-Aravena in his chapter “Cooperation in the Caribbean: The Cultural Dimension,” in *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, argued that in the region, drug production and trafficking was indigenous, sub-regional, regional, intra-hemispheric and an extremely profitable business.⁶⁶ In a 2002 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) article entitled “Crime Trends in the Caribbean and Responses,” Professor Anthony Harriott of the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus outlined that the illegal drugs market in the Caribbean generated an estimated \$US 3.3 billion in income. This amounted to 3.1 percent of the registered gross domestic product (GDP) in the

⁶⁵Ivelaw L Griffith, “Drugs and the Emerging Security Agenda in the Caribbean,” in *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, ed. Joseph S Tulchin and Ralph H Espach (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 138. Dr. Griffith is a leading scholar of Caribbean security issues. For a full biography visit <http://www.york.cuny.edu/academics/academic-affairs/provost-bio> (accessed 28 January 2012).

⁶⁶Rojas-Aravena “Cooperation in the Caribbean: The Cultural Dimension,” in *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, ed. Joseph S Tulchin and Ralph H Espach (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 51.

Caribbean region.⁶⁷ The control of money enables drug traffickers and those involved in organized criminal activity to exercise the power of the purse to influence actions to defeat states' security risk mitigation mechanisms. According to Griffith in his article "Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century," the disparity between the money controlled by drug traffickers and that available to the regional governments to invest in security risk mitigation presents a clear danger to the region.⁶⁸

In the Caribbean region, drug trafficking is not only a multi-billion dollar industry, Bethel, in his article, "Caribbean narcotics trafficking: What is to be done?" describes illegal drug trafficking, as the center of gravity for many of the problems associated with crime.⁶⁹ Drug trafficking activity links with organized crime in the Caribbean region and acts as a catalyst for several other forms of violence and crime. This directly and indirectly affects all sectors of the society and affects the linkages between governments and the citizenry. These effects on relationships between governments and the citizenry illustrate the political aspect of geonarcotics.

Two examples, a decade apart, outline the political aspect of the geonarcotic phenomenon in the Caribbean. The first example was highlighted in an Associated Press

⁶⁷Anthony Harriott, "Crime Trends in the Caribbean and Responses," *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* (November 2002), 6, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/barbados/caribbean_report_crime-trends.pdf (accessed 18 September 2011).

⁶⁸Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century," *McNair Paper* 54, (Washington: National Defense University, 1996): 87, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA316755> (accessed 2 September 2008).

⁶⁹Tellis A Bethel. "Caribbean narcotics trafficking: What is to be done?" *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* (2002): 80, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 25 October 2011).

article in 2000. Commenting on the elections in St Kitts and Nevis in an article entitled, “Crime, Corruption, Drugs: St. Kitts Ends Lively Election Campaign,” the Associated Press reported that the incumbent government’s general election cause, “was bolstered by the February 19 (2000) deportation to Miami of Charles ‘Little Nut’ Miller, for years the bane of many St. Kittitians and a man who for four years defied US attempts to extradite him.”⁷⁰ Ten years later, in 2010, a similar situation occurred in Jamaica where the government of that island and the government of the US were at a standoff in relation to the deportation of a Jamaican citizen to stand trial in the US for criminal offences. In an article entitled “PM (Prime Minister of Jamaica): I Sanctioned the Manatt Initiative,” the *Jamaica Observer*, a national periodical in Jamaica, reported that the “Prime Minister . . . addressing the Parliament . . . admitted that he sanctioned the engagement of US law firm Manatt, Phelps and Phillips to lobby the United States Government to drop its extradition request for Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke to face drug- and gun-running charges there.”⁷¹ Those two incidents highlight the political dimensions of illegal drug trafficking in the Caribbean, where non-state actors within the illegal drug trade can affect state actors and state-to-state relations.

In an address at the Organization of American States (OAS) Conference in 2007 entitled “Organized Crime: A Threat to the Caribbean,” Albert Ramdin, Assistant Secretary General of the OAS highlighted that, the link between drug trafficking and the

⁷⁰A copy of the full article can be found at <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/caribbean/campaign.htm> (accessed 11 March 2012).

⁷¹The full text of the address by the Jamaican Prime Minister to the Parliament can be found online at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/PM-I-sanctioned-the-Manatt-initiative_7611577#ixzz1pNfVNJF3 (accessed 12 March 2012).

illicit arms trade has been a disturbing manifestation in the Caribbean region and is increasing. This situation he outlined, afforded criminal organizations, in many cases, firepower superior to that of law enforcement officials.⁷² Seelke, Wyler and Beittel reported that criminality directly associated with illegal drug trafficking over the decade from 2000 to 2010 increased the prevalence of related crimes, including kidnapping, murder, money laundering, and firearms trafficking.⁷³

While it would be incorrect to imply that all violent crimes in the Caribbean are linked to drug trafficking, it would be accurate to conclude that drug trafficking is a key factor in the increasing levels of violent crime in the region. Griffith, in a statement on the "Caribbean Basin Security Initiative," to the Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in 2009, outlined that drug trafficking presented a threat to the security of the Anglophone Caribbean for four reasons. First, drug trafficking and its associated activities had multiple consequences and implications such as increases in crime, corruption and arms trafficking inter alia. Second, the operations and their consequences had increased in scope and gravity over the last few decades. Third, they affected agents and agencies of national security and good governance, in military, political, and economic ways. Fourth, drug trafficking and its associated activities infringed on the sovereignty of some countries.⁷⁴ He outlined that

⁷²Albert Ramdin, *Address at Organization of American States Conference on Organized Crime: a threat to the Caribbean* (2007): http://www.oas.org/en/about/speech_assistant_secretary_general.asp?sCodigo=07-0028 (accessed 27 October 2011).

⁷³Seelke, Wyler, and Beittel, 6.

⁷⁴Ivelaw L Griffith, "Caribbean Basin Security Initiative: Statement of Dr. Ivelaw L Griffith, Professor, Political Science Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs York College of The City University of New York," *FDCH Congressional*

that at one time, many Caribbean leaders refused to acknowledge that their countries were facing a drug threat. Instead, they assumed away the problem and preferred to consider it as being either South or North American. Griffith stated that over the period 2000 to 2009, the scope and severity of the problem had forced the region not only to take notice and seek assistance from outside, it also forced the region to work in closer collaboration to address the problem of illegal drug trafficking.⁷⁵

Collaboration to mitigate security risk to the region did not come without its challenges. In his article entitled “Crime, Violence, and Security in the Caribbean,” Perales observed that, over the years, two fundamental problems plagued efforts to deal with the issues of drug trafficking and the related crime and violence that have emanated from it. First, was the gap between conceptualizing solutions and putting them into operation. He outlined that the security experts were adept in identifying the problems but the efforts at identification seldom resulted in the implementation of recommended solutions. Second, was the breach between collective expectations (perceptions) about what was required and the local conditions, which were affected by social, economic, and cultural dimensions. Sometimes those factors did not align to provide an environment that was supportive of implementing cooperative security initiatives. Perales went on to argue that in spite of the attempts to identify cooperative mechanisms to tackle crime in the Caribbean, authorities had been unable to articulate a security community in the

Testimony Military & Government Collection (2009): EBSCOhost (accessed 27 October 2011).

⁷⁵Ibid.

region, much less build effective links to the non-English-speaking Caribbean.⁷⁶ Francis Forbes, the Interim Director of IMPACS, stated in Perales' article "Crime, Violence, and Security in the Caribbean," that gaps between recommended regional solutions and implementation at the national level, as well as regional expectations versus national priorities, had hampered the effectiveness of crime fighting efforts in the Caribbean. He like others pointed out that the lack of financial, technical, and operational capacity as well as differences in the national security priorities of the island nations of the Anglophone Caribbean, present serious challenges to collective and collaborative efforts to mitigate security risks to the region.⁷⁷

The issues of alignment of concepts, cultures, finances and practices on how to deal with social, political and economic issues, are not unique to the Caribbean and therefore should not, and have not, caused a shift away from integrationist ideas to strengthen cooperative security efforts to safeguard the region. The global environment is one of rapid changes and keeping up is a challenge for even the wealthiest nations of the world. What is important is that initiatives are developed and implemented in part or in whole, through a process of negotiation and collective understanding. Change is constant, uncertainty is inevitable, but corrective action is achievable.

⁷⁶Perales, 1.

⁷⁷Ibid., 5. Frances Forbes is a former Commissioner of Police of the Jamaica Constabulary Force and at the time of the scripting of this thesis he was the Interim Director of the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security. The agency administering a collective response to crime and security in the member states of CARICOM. See also http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=105 (accessed 14 December 2011).

Risk Management Theory Applied

This section of the literature review applies the social aspect of risk management theory to the discourse on the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard. Social risk management theory helps to highlight why there has been a perceived need for a multinational RSS Coast Guard, how that entity can fit into existing security risk management systems, and what may prevent the implementation of that initiative. In the book *Human Safety and Risk Management*, Glendon, Clarke, and McKenna express that, at the societal level, risk management is concerned with distributing certain risks, calculating probabilities of certain types of harm, and comparing alternative strategies for managing those risks for particular groups within the population.⁷⁸ Zinn and Taylor-Gooby in *Risk in Social Science*, argue that, “the first priority of risk management is the application of precautionary measures and the development of substitutes.”⁷⁹

Risk management is not a single act. It is a process comprising a combination of mitigation actions targeted at a specific risk or set of risks. Hopkin points out in the book *Fundamentals of Risk Management: Understanding, Evaluating and Implementing Effective Risk Management*, that, “the risk management process cannot take place in isolation. It needs to be supported by a framework within the organization.”⁸⁰ As shown in figure 3 (adapted from JP 3-0), the risk management process involves the continuous identification, assessment and mitigation of risks/hazards. Organizations do not conduct

⁷⁸A Ian Glendon, Sharon G Clarke, and Eugene F McKenna, *Human Safety and Risk Management* (Florida: Taylor and Francis, 2006), 46.

⁷⁹Peter Taylor-Gooby and Jens O Zinn, *Risk in Social Science* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 57.

⁸⁰Hopkin, 3.

this activity in a vacuum. The mission of the organization drives the process and this is critical to ensure that the organization identifies, assesses, and mitigates the correct or salient risks.⁸¹ After risk mitigation measures are developed and implemented, organizations continuously supervise, evaluate, and modify them based on their relevance, effectiveness, and performance.




Figure 3. The Risk Management Process

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), III-16.

The organization, in this case for this paper, is the RSS. The mission of the RSS is to ensure the stability and well-being of member states through mutual cooperation, in order to maximize regional security in preserving the social and economic development

⁸¹Ibid., 55.

of the people of the member states.”⁸² The proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is a risk management mechanism that the RSS is seeking to create within its organizational framework to assist in achieving its mission. This paper does not advance that a multinational coast guard in the RSS is the answer to the security issues that the sub-region faces neither does it argue that through the formation of a multinational coast guard that the RSS will fully achieve its mission. The paper argues that a multinational RSS Coast Guard is a way, a risk management mechanism to consider, when seeking to mitigate the unavoidable security risks to the RSS sub-region and achieve the RSS mission.

The security risks to the RSS member states are unavoidable because they exist in a global risk society. Though risks are inescapable, the sub-region must continue to develop systems to mitigate the security risks created by virtue of the sub-region’s existence in the world risk society. The efficacy and efficiency of sub-regional risk mitigation systems will depend on the amount of resources allocated to them and the management of those resources. Finally, the paper posits that resource allocation will depend on how decision-makers perceive the risks to their individual societies and to the sub-region. In the chapter “Risk Society Revisited,” in *The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*, Beck argues that, “the concept of risk . . . characterizes a peculiar, intermediate state between security and destruction, where the *perception* of threatening risks determines thought and action.”⁸³ The RSS comprises seven member

⁸²<http://www.rss.org.bb/> (accessed 21 September 2011).

⁸³Ulrich Beck, “Risk Society Revisited,” in *The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*, ed. Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck, and Joost van Loon (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 213.

states, and each of them has peculiar social, political, economic, and cultural factors that affect how policy-makers perceive the security risks to their individual member states and to the sub-region. With this in mind, one must accept that a key component to the implementation of the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is the risk perception of those who have the political and economic power to make it a reality.

The security risk mitigation strategies conceptualized and implemented throughout the Anglophone Caribbean, though challenged by political, social, cultural, and financial dimensions, are risk management processes aimed at mitigating the security risks to the area. In the chapter, “All Hazards Risk Framework: An Architecture Model,” in *Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications*, Simona Verga outlines, that risk management is a structural approach by which individuals, organizations and governments develop processes and strategies to mitigate risks to their societies.⁸⁴ All societies face choices and decisions about how to confront risk and security. In each action or inaction, there is a degree of uncertainty and therefore this too is a risk. Borodzicz, in his book, *Risk, Crisis and Security Management*, argues that every choice plays-off risks against each other.⁸⁵

Decisions on development are necessary to exploit advantages to support national social and economic development. As outlined by Crouhy, Galai and Mark in their book,

⁸⁴Simona Verga, “All Hazards Risk Framework: An Architecture Model,” in *Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications*. ed. Sebastián Martorell, C. Guedes Soares, and Julie Barnett (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), 319.

⁸⁵Borodzicz, 14.

The Essentials of Risk Management, risk management and risk taking, are not opposite in nature; instead, together they drive modern economies and fuel development.⁸⁶ Carl Roper posits in, *Risk Management for Security Professionals*, that in contrast with risk avoidance, which is doing everything possible to prevent loss without reference to the degree of risk present, risk management offers a rational and defensible method for making decisions about the expenditure of scarce resources and the selection of cost-effective measures to protect valued assets or societies.⁸⁷ Implementing the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard, in any form, will require the use of scarce financial and personnel resources from the RSS member states. Diverting resources from one area to another is a process of risk management because it requires the acceptance of risks in one area to mitigate risks in another. This is why applying risk management theory is relevant to the discourse on the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard.

Risk Society Theory

The valued assets of the RSS sub-region are its people. The security risks that threaten the people of the sub-region, as outlined by Griffith in his chapter, “Drugs and the Emerging Security Agenda in the Caribbean,” in *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, are transnational in nature and borderless in

⁸⁶Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai, and Robert Mark, *The Essentials of Risk Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 1.

⁸⁷Carl A. Roper, *Risk Management for Security Professionals* (Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1999), ix.

their effects.⁸⁸ These risks are the result of the world risk society, which is a product of globalization. Beck, cited in Darryl Jarvis' article, "*Theorizing Risk: Ulrich Beck, Globalization and the Rise of the Risk Society*," argued that,

The advent of globalization challenges the territoriality and sovereignty of the nation-state, reduces the authority of the state and its citizens to act unilaterally or independently, and compromises economic sovereignty by forcing states to act in ways and adopt policies broadly commensurate with the whims of highly mobile capital.⁸⁹

There has been much academic debate on the positives and negatives of globalization. This paper will not enter into that argument. Globalization is here to stay and it is incumbent on the member states of the RSS sub-region to continue to adapt to this reality. The island nations of the RSS sub-region exist in a world risk society characterized by global risks that have no regard for national borders. According to Beck in his article, "Living in the World Risk Society," it is a society in which, "ignorance of the globalization of risks, increases the globalization of risks."⁹⁰

When applied, to the RSS sub-regional security environment, risk society theory helps, as outlined by Dirk Matten in his article "The Impact Of The Risk Society Thesis On Environmental Politics And Management In A Globalizing Economy: Principles, Proficiency, Perspectives," to explore in detail, the rise in the influence of non-state actors. Those non-state actors include grassroots sub-politics and act as new forces in and

⁸⁸Griffith, "Drugs and the Emerging Security Agenda in the Caribbean," 137.

⁸⁹Darryl S. L. Jarvis, *Theorizing Risk: Ulrich Beck, Globalization and the Rise of the Risk Society* (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy: National University of Singapore, 2010), 5.

⁹⁰Ulrich Beck, "Living in the World Risk Society," *Economy and Society* 35, no. 3 (2006): 330-331.

influence society.⁹¹ Illegal drug trafficking and its attendant activities are non-state actors that have social, economic, and political influence. If left unattended to, or unopposed, these activities can undermine the security and stability of a state.

Rasmussen, in his book *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*, argued that, the emergence of the risk society has had profound consequences for how societies measure security and how they shape security risk mitigation strategies.⁹² He postulates that the aim of those policies is not to achieve perfect security, to believe so would be unrealistic. Instead, the best one can hope for is to manage or pre-empt a risk because as one mitigates a risk, another will arise.⁹³ He, like Adam and van Loon, in their chapter “Repositioning Risk; The Challenge for Social Theory,” in *The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*, acknowledges that in the risk society, man is preoccupied with preparing for a future that is open, multiple, contested and undefinable, a future that never exists in general, and one which is dynamic.⁹⁴

As outlined in Chapter 1, Beck quoted in Anthony Elliot’s article entitled *Beck’s Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment* argued that, the risk society was not an option

⁹¹Dirk Matten, “The Impact of the Risk Society Thesis on Environmental Politics and Management in a Globalizing Economy: Principles, Proficiency, Perspectives,” *Journal of Risk Research* 7, no. 4 (2004): 382.

⁹²Mikkel V Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Barbara Adam and Joost van Loon, “Repositioning Risk; The Challenge for Social Theory,” in *The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*, ed. Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck, and Joost van Loon (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 27.

that one could choose or reject in the course of political debate.⁹⁵ No society can choose to avoid risk, and to be risk averse in an era of globalization, can be just as damaging to the development of the society as to completely ignore the presence of risks.⁹⁶ Applying Beck's summation as outlined in his article "Living in the World Risk Society," the modern RSS sub-regional society, has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it has produced.⁹⁷ Those produced risks, are a direct result of the decisions taken to ensure the sub-region's survival in the global environment. Globalization, according to Beck, has resulted in societies being open to risks that originate from the need to maintain one's position within the world system. The advent of globalization has challenged the sovereignty of the nation-state, has reduced its authority to act unilaterally, and forces the nation state to respond to the international rather than the purely domestic community.⁹⁸ Sociologist Anthony Giddens agrees. In the Chapter "Risk Society," in the book *The Politics of Risk Society*, Giddens refers to produced risks as manufactured risks. He

⁹⁵Anthony Elliot, "Beck's Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment," 297, <http://soc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/293> (accessed 12 December 2011).

⁹⁶Aquinas J Clarke, "The Impact of Risk Education on the Perception of Middle Management and Lower Level Employees in the Public and Private Sector Who Work in the Area of Disaster Management in Barbados" (Master's thesis, University of Leicester, 2008), 16.

⁹⁷Ulrich Beck, "Living in the World Risk Society," 332.

⁹⁸Darryl S. Jarvis, "Theorizing Risk: Ulrich Beck, Globalization and the Rise of the Risk Society," <http://www.risk-and-regulation.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/RR3-Beck.pdf> (accessed 25 December 2011).

argues that manufactured risks are the result of the progression of human development.⁹⁹

Giddens continues this argument in his article “Risk and Responsibility,” where he states that,

A good deal of political decision-making is now about managing risks—risks which do not originate in the political sphere, yet have to be politically manage . . . There is no way out of this situation—we are all caught up in it even if we choose to proceed ‘as if in ignorance’. . . . Risk is always related to security and safety. . . . Risk only exists when there are decisions to be taken.¹⁰⁰

Both of these scholars outline a truth that the RSS member states must grapple with. They highlight the link between the risk society and development that is rapidly evolving in an era of globalization and demands the making of decisions in relation to and in response to political, social, and economic developments over which, in many instances, the island nations of the RSS sub-region have little or no control.¹⁰¹ As Verasammy highlights, development consequences arising out of globalization, liberalization, regionalization, information technology and an expanding, and active, transnational civil society, have severe consequences for the region’s security.¹⁰² The RSS sub-region, like other regions of the world, as Matten outlines, must be reflexive and constantly reform its practices to respond to the changing environment. That reflexivity must not only be concerned with developing new processes, as with the proposal for the formation of a multinational coast

⁹⁹Anthony Giddens, “Risk Society: In the Context of British Politics,” in *Politics of the Risk Society*, ed. Jane Franklyn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 28.

¹⁰⁰Anthony Giddens, “Risk and Responsibility,” *The Modern Law Review* 62, no. 1 (1999): 5-7.

¹⁰¹Beck, “Living in the World Risk Society,” 330-331.

¹⁰²Verasammy, 69.

guard in the RSS, it must be also about re-evaluating those processes that already exist and modifying or upgrading them to mitigate the evolving risks.¹⁰³

The experience of the global economic crisis provides a good example of the risk society at work in the RSS sub-region. The crisis did not originate from within the RSS sub-region, but its effects forced sub-regional governments to make decisions to manage the risks created by the global network of inter-connected financial systems—of which the states of the RSS sub-region are a part. In a plenary speech on the Caribbean and the Global Crisis at the Conference of Montreal in 2009, Dr Compton Bourne, President of the Caribbean Development Bank stated that, “the global crisis was transmitted to the Caribbean through international trade in goods and services, capital flows and remittances. The Caribbean is particularly vulnerable to external economic shocks because of several economic features.”¹⁰⁴ The economic debates within and among the islands have been dominated by determinations of the best ways to manage the current crisis and ways to prevent social and economic collapse.¹⁰⁵ Bourne outlined that the Caribbean nations undertook various policy initiatives to mitigate the risks and warned

¹⁰³Dirk Matten, “The Impact Of The Risk Society Thesis On Environmental Politics And Management In A Globalizing Economy: Principles, Proficiency, Perspectives,” *Journal of Risk Research* 7, no. 4 (2004): 377-398.

¹⁰⁴Dr Compton Bourne, “Global Financial Crisis: Uncertain Recovery” (Plenary Speech Delivered at the International Economic Forum of the Americas, *The Caribbean and the Global Crisis: Conference of Montreal*, June 2009), 3, [http://www.caribank.org/titanweb/cdb/webcms.nsf/AllDoc/D196A4F776CB0D54042575D9004D22DC/\\$File/Conference_of_Montreal_Speech_June_2009.pdf](http://www.caribank.org/titanweb/cdb/webcms.nsf/AllDoc/D196A4F776CB0D54042575D9004D22DC/$File/Conference_of_Montreal_Speech_June_2009.pdf) (accessed 7 February 2012).

¹⁰⁵See report at http://caricomnewsnetwork.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1799&Itemid=396 (accessed 17 January 2012).

that the economic status quo should prevent them from succeeding.¹⁰⁶ While the debate continues, the desired end state is the social and economic survival of the region. Though the crisis did not emerge from there, its uncertainty and negative socio-economic impact highlight the vulnerability of sub-regional states within the world risk society.

Like the global economic crisis, the global interconnectedness of criminal networks and activities create security risks that the island nations of the RSS sub-region are forced to mitigate. Risk society theory acknowledges that the RSS sub-region is in the web of inescapability from the globalized risks that as Hopkin points out, every society needs to take action to manage.¹⁰⁷ This paper argues that security risk mitigation is a function of securing a society's future, by learning from the past, acting in the present and planning for the uncertainty of the future. Resource limitations do not absolve the RSS sub-region of this responsibility and while present systems seek to mitigate the current security risks to the member states of the RSS, preparing for the future and unknown risks will continue to be a significant challenge. The proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard Unit demonstrates that the RSS is an organization that is thinking about and preparing for the perceived future.

Systems Theory

Preparation for the future requires the creation of and re-evaluation of systems to mitigate the unavoidable risks to the RSS sub-region. Daellenbach and McNickle, in *Management Science: Decision Making Through Systems Thinking*, define a system as an

¹⁰⁶Bourne, 5.

¹⁰⁷Hopkin, 47.

assembly of inter-related and dependent sub-systems, that is affected by controllable and uncontrollable inputs from the society, which cause it to exhibit unique behaviors.¹⁰⁸ It comprises natural or manmade entities, that are interconnected and organized in clearly defined relationships to each other and directly affect the decision making process.¹⁰⁹ In the chapter , “Systems Theory and Risk,” in the book *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction*, Japp and Kusche outline that, “the way systems theory deals with the topic of risk derives from various general assumptions about the structure and processes of modern society.”¹¹⁰ According to them, systems theory implies that modern society depends on decision-making and therefore on risk as a fundamental fact.¹¹¹

While man has no control over the evolution of the risk society, how man responds to it is within his control. Zinn argues in the book *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction*, that the systems theory approach interprets risks to the society as constituted and mitigated by the decisions of social actors.¹¹² Gharajedaghi outlines in his book *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity A Platform for Designing Business Architecture*, that systems theory comprises two dimensions. First, it

¹⁰⁸Hans G. Daellenbach and Donald C. McNickle *Management Science Decision Making Through Systems Thinking* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 27.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 21-22.

¹¹⁰Klaus P. Japp and Isabel Kusche, “Systems Theory and Risk,” in *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction*, ed. Jens O. Zinn (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 76.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 83.

¹¹²Jens O. Zinn, *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction* (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 7.

provides a framework for understanding the problem and its behavioral characteristics. Second, it helps to develop an operational methodology to solve the problem through decision-making.¹¹³

Originally, the Regional Security System was a system created to mitigate the risks posed by a specific threat in the 1980s. A threat that was the result of revolutionary thought and the risks associated with it being coups d'état, political, social and economic instability. As the threat changed, so too did the focus of the organization. Within the RSS, combined operational planning and training have become sub-systems which work to allow the organization to achieve its mission as it constantly refocuses to mitigate the existing and emerging security risks to the sub-region.

The operations of the RSS, and the sub-systems contained therein, are an example of systems theory at work. They conform to Daellenbach and McNickle's definition in *Management Science Decision Making Through Systems Thinking*, that a system is a collection of things, entities, or people that relate to and affect each other in specific ways.¹¹⁴ The establishment of the RSS Air Wing in 2001 and the current proposal to establish a multinational RSS Coast Guard show an attempt to make the RSS a more sophisticated and responsive entity. Such developments in cooperative security are laudable. Gharajedaghi argues, that as systems become more and more sophisticated, the reality of interdependency becomes more and more pronounced. Understanding this

¹¹³Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity A Platform for Designing Business Architecture*, 3rd ed. (Massachusetts: Morgan Kaufmann, 2011), 26.

¹¹⁴Daellenbach and McNickle, 6.

interdependency requires a way of thinking that is different from analysis.¹¹⁵ Systems thinking rather than analysis put the system in the context of the larger environment of which it is a part and studies the role it plays in the larger whole.¹¹⁶ It tries to explain, according to Daellenbach and McNickle, the role or behavior of the parts of the system in terms of the environment and as a result, it strives for effectiveness in terms of the system as a whole instead of looking at the narrow efficiency of its components.¹¹⁷

The proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard unit, if adopted, will be a sub-system of the RSS. As Borodzicz advises in *Risk, Crisis and Security Management*, understanding this relationship is critical because organizational systems typically contain a number of sub-systems to enable vital processes to mitigate risks.¹¹⁸ It is important as Zinn outlines in *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction*, that those systems work in harmony to avoid conflicts that result from incompatibility and inoperability.¹¹⁹ In the RSS, the functioning of the air wing demonstrates how a compatible sub-system can complement a system. Since its establishment, the RSS Air Wing has complemented the operational and logistical functions of the RSS to the benefit of its member states. As Rogers outlined in her article “Confronting cocaine smuggling in the eastern Caribbean,” the RSS Air Wing has been one of the busiest air counter-drug

¹¹⁵Gharajedaghi, 15.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 16.

¹¹⁷Daellenbach and McNickle, 19.

¹¹⁸Borodzicz, 131.

¹¹⁹Zinn, 185.

operations in the world.¹²⁰ Even though the air wing is a different operational platform, from that required for a coast guard unit, the fact that the aeronautical program has been successful heightens the perception that a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit is a workable option.

Zinn notes that systems theory accepts that systems will exhibit planned and desired outputs, as well as unplanned and undesirable ones. This is why organizations must avoid conflicts from the incompatibility of functional systems.¹²¹ Systems theorists argue that in a complex system where there are multiple decision makers, like the RSS, there must be compromise among the proponents of that system because each view will the world differently and conflicting objectives will arise. Daellenbach and McNickle, and Gharajedaghi outline that, in such situations, compromise is the only solution.¹²² Challenges are a feature of multinational cooperative security organizations worldwide. Resolving them requires collaboration, negotiation, and understanding.

The application of systems theory adds to the analysis of RSS functions as a risk mitigating mechanism within the RSS sub-region and the sensitivity to constraints

¹²⁰Ann Rogers, "Confronting cocaine smuggling in the eastern Caribbean," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (December 2004): [http://www4.janes.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2004/jir01129.htm@current&Prod_Name=JIR&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28%28\[80\]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%2C+%28\[100\]+%28\[100\]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+title%29+%3CAND%3E+%28\[100\]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%29%29%29](http://www4.janes.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2004/jir01129.htm@current&Prod_Name=JIR&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28%28[80]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%2C+%28[100]+%28[100]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+title%29+%3CAND%3E+%28[100]%28+RSS+%3CAND%3E+Air+%3CAND%3E+Wing%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%29%29%29) (accessed 14 December 2011).

¹²¹Zinn, 185.

¹²²Daellenbach and McNickle, 56; Gharajedaghi, 38.

imposed on them by the political, social, economic, and cultural realms of the society.¹²³ The proposal for the formation of a RSS Coast Guard unit fits into those realms and policy-makers must consider movement towards its implementation against the backdrop of competing social, political, economic, and cultural dimensions. Like the security threats to the sub-region, initiative acceptance and policy implementation must undergo a multidimensional consideration process, which the perception of consequences of the risks that the sub-region is seeking to mitigate affects.

Risk Perception Theory

Japp and Kusche argue that systems theory research deals with the perception and mitigation of risks within the society and the settlement of potential conflicts.¹²⁴ Originally, risk perception focused on the identification and measurement of a variety of features in the human decision-making process. In the world of social science, these concepts focus more on the social and cultural contexts that affect risk perception and ultimately risk management.¹²⁵ In *Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection*, Thomas Norman posits, that where people perceive that their situation will improve by taking a particular course of action, acceptance will follow. Where they perceive that there will be no benefit, then there will be no buy-in.¹²⁶

¹²³Japp and Kusche, 79.

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Ibid., 14.

¹²⁶Thomas L. Norman, *Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection* (CRC Press, 2010), 81.

In his book, *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century Decisions*, Rasmussen posits that risk mitigation strategy conceptualization and the prosecuting of action may open rifts by pointing to differences in perceptions that would otherwise have not become apparent.¹²⁷ This is because as Adam and van Loon highlight in the chapter “Repositioning Risk; The Challenge for Social Theory,” in *The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*, perceptions of risk link intimately to understandings of what constitutes dangers and for whom.¹²⁸ Zinn argues that the selection, perception, and response to risks are an inherently cultural process, which depends on different worldviews that relate to decisions.¹²⁹ When applied to the RSS sub-region, risk perception theory assists in understanding why, as Perales and Forbes outline, there is some difficulty in implementing security risk management initiatives. The policy-makers in the seven member states of the RSS may agree on the security risks, however their perceptions of the consequences of those risks on their individual societies will be different.

Chauvin, Hermand and Mullet note in the article “Risk Perception and Personality Facets,” that risk perception studies over the years aimed at determining why people consider some risks to be riskier than others and why there is a difference in how

¹²⁷Rasmussen, 40.

¹²⁸Barbara Adam and Joost van Loon, “Repositioning Risk; The Challenge for Social Theory,” in *The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*, ed. Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck, and Joost van Loon (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 3.

¹²⁹Zinn, 181.

individuals perceive them.¹³⁰ Baruch Fischhof in his article “Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged: Twenty Years of Process,” observed that one of the earliest results in risk perception research was the discovery that experts and laypeople might agree about the presence of risk, but still disagree about its degree.¹³¹ These observations are important because without the perception that a proposed mitigating mechanism will be beneficial to the society, one will not be able to advance any idea to manage risks. In the face of competing interests, security risk mitigation strategies will require approval of the decision-makers and the public; the very people that security experts created them to protect. There is no guarantee that because there are concerns about the security risks in the region, that there will be unopposed agreement on how they will affect the society or on the method of mitigation.

Zinn argues that understanding the effect of risk perception on decision-making is critical to technical experts. Often, experts believe that by presenting technically sound data, they can influence laypersons, who in many cases are non-technical managers, to make a decision in favor of a particular course of action. These conflicts arise because experts present risk problems primarily as knowledge problems while laypeople perhaps frame risk differently.¹³² Norman argues that perception is everything. Where people perceive that the implementation of risk mitigation strategies will result in their situation remaining the same or improving, acceptance will follow. Where however they can see

¹³⁰Bruno Chauvin, Daniele Hermand, and Etienne Mullet, “Risk Perception and Personality Facets,” *Risk Analysis* 27, no. 1 (2007): 171.

¹³¹Baruch Fischhof, “Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged: Twenty Years of Process,” *Risk Analysis* 15, no. 2 (1995): 139.

¹³²Zinn, 185.

no inherent benefit or they perceive that the change will harm them there will be discontent and conflict.¹³³ According to Adam and van Loon, the perception risk consists of a particular relationship to an essentially unknown future and is a calculated socio-cultural response to potential anticipated happenings.¹³⁴

In his article “Risk Perception Is Not What It Seems: The Psychometric Paradigm Revisited,” Sjöberg posited that risk perception came to be seen as a potential obstacle to decision making, because people see risks differently. The different ways of seeing the risks results in conflicts between expert and layperson risk perception and is the foundation for social dilemmas in risk management.¹³⁵ In an environment of competing needs and interests, it is incumbent on security experts to remember that their perceptions of an unknown reality of risks that has been constructed and reconstructed as they have learnt and gained insight overtime is not in many instances, shared by those who are responsible for making policy decisions.¹³⁶ What is necessary in the context of the RSS sub-region is that the security experts continue to find ways to broaden the situational awareness of policy-makers and the public of the consequences of the security risks that confront the sub-region. They also need to continue to seek new ways to expand cooperation and collaboration to mitigate those risks and preserve the sub-regional

¹³³Norman, 81.

¹³⁴Adam and van Loon, 7.

¹³⁵Lennart Sjöberg, *Risk Perception Is Not What It Seems: The Psychometric Paradigm Revisited* (2003), <http://www.dynam-it.com/lennart/pdf/valdor3.pdf> (accessed 3 January 2012).

¹³⁶Daellenbach and McNickle, 26.

society while at the same time, taking into account its competing social and economic interests.

Summary

The threat of drug trafficking and its associated risks such as organized crime, illegal arms trafficking, illegal immigration and money laundering inter alia, have created significant risks that threaten to undermine the stability of the sub-region. These risks are transnational in scope and comprise military, political, economic, and environmental dimensions. They generate billions of dollars in revenue and affect the island states socially, politically, and economically. The capability to mitigate these risks is far beyond the budget capacities not only of the individual member states of the RSS, but also the existing combined collective security systems.

A single security risk mitigation initiative will not address the security challenges presented by the borderless risks that affect the RSS sub-region. As the RSS searches to find new ways to mitigate the security risks to the sub-region, it must continue to use an adaptive risk management process. The RSS must continuously introduce new risk mitigation systems initiatives and modify existing ones to mitigate existing and emerging security risks to the sub-region. The proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard unit is an example of that adaptive risk management process. If implemented, the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard unit will be a new system that will be a sub-system of the RSS. Its proposal is an example of the desire of the member states of the RSS to find ways to control their collective security environment.

While prima facie, the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is desirable, its implementation will be the result of how the decision-makers

perceive that it will benefit first, their individual states and second, the sub-region. Resource scarcity and differing worldviews affect the perception of those who are responsible for making decisions to implement policies such as the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit. To the security expert, this may be an essential undertaking. The layperson however, may see it as important, but not consider the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard as essential. The challenge to security experts therefore is to clearly define the problem, explain why there is a problem, and suggest ways to fix it. The proposal for the formation of a RSS Coast Guard is one such way. Finally, the social, economic, political, and cultural environments in the RSS member states, will affect their ability to act to move the process from proposal to implementation.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Regional Security System comprises seven island states and along with the sub-regional challenges they face, each of them has their individual challenges. While the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard offers an opportunity to enhance the ability of the member states of the RSS to mitigate the security risks that affect each individual member state and the sub-region, its implementation will result from a common perception among the member states on how the security risks affect them individually and collectively. That commonality in perception would assist in determining if there is general agreement at the operational level of the need for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard in the Eastern Caribbean. The operational level referred to in this paper encompasses current and past coast guard and marine police commanders of the individual RSS member states and those personnel employed at the RSS CLO who work directly with those coast guards to plan and execute maritime operations.

The target population for this research was the coast guard and marine police units of the individual member states of the RSS and personnel who work in support of member states' individual and collective maritime operations in the Central Liaison Office of the RSS. The surveyed sample of that population comprised the current and past coast guard and marine police commanders of the individual RSS member states and those personnel employed at the RSS CLO who work directly with those coast guards to plan and execute maritime operations.

Glaser and Strauss argued in *The Discovery of Grounded Theory Strategies for Qualitative Research*, that the basic question in sampling is for the researcher to

determine what groups or subgroups are necessary for data collection and for what purpose.¹³⁷ To gain the participation of the current coast guard and marine police commanders, and the respondents employed at the CLO, the researcher sent a survey questionnaire, by airmail and by electronic mail, to the force commanders of the member states of the RSS and to the Regional Security Coordinator. Questionnaires were also sent by electronic mail to past coast guard commanders. The Quality Assurance Office (QAO) of the United States Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) reviewed and approved the research questionnaire for distribution. The QAO determined the research exempt from human subjects protections and assigned Control Number CGSC/QAO 12-02-050 to the questionnaire.

The sample size was small. This was because, the operational level maritime forces leaders within the RSS possess the knowledge and insight that is required to assist in determining if there is a need for a multinational coast guard in the RSS. These leaders have access to critical information on the security situations within their individual member states, and the successes and challenges of their individual coast guard operations. They have also had experience working within a combined operational environment that comprised the individual coast guards working together against a specific threat or set of threats. Because of this expertise, they collectively provide an informed source for data collection in relation to thoughts on the national and sub-regional security situation in the RSS, and if there is a need for a multinational RSS Coast Guard to assist in mitigating the security risks.

¹³⁷Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory Strategies for Qualitative Research* (New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction, 2006), 47.

Because of the number of respondents, the study results are from a non-probability purposive sample. Walliman, in *Research Methods: The Basics Non-probability* outlines that, non-probability sampling involves the selection of respondents by non-random means.¹³⁸ In *Qualitative Research Methods for The Social Sciences*, Berg theorizes that researchers use purposive sampling when they have special knowledge or expertise about a group and they use that knowledge to select subjects to represent the population.¹³⁹ The researcher used his knowledge to select the target population of the coast guard and marine police units of the RSS and used a non-random sample comprising the current and past coast guard and marine police unit commanders from the RSS member states, and personnel employed at the CLO who work directly with those coast guard and marine police units.

While probability-sampling techniques tend to give the more reliable representation of the whole population, Walliman argues that the results of probability samples do not typically show generalized findings.¹⁴⁰ A critical component of this research was a generalization of the analysis of the views of a cross section of experts, who, though they work in similar areas, operate within different political, economic, and cultural constraints. It was necessary to utilize a research technique that allowed the researcher to generalize. By design therefore, the research was qualitative.

¹³⁸Nicholas Walliman, *Research Methods: The Basics* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 96.

¹³⁹Bruce L Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 32.

¹⁴⁰Walliman, 96.

In the book, *Research Methods for Social Work*, Rubin and Babbie posit that, qualitative research allows the researcher to make sense of an ongoing process that one cannot predict in advance by making initial observations and developing general conclusions.¹⁴¹ They conclude that the chief strength of qualitative research is the depth of understanding it permits.¹⁴² Walliman argues that qualitative research encompasses data expressed mostly in words and gives descriptions, accounts, opinions, feelings.¹⁴³ The researcher used the qualitative research method for two reasons. First, it allowed, as Berg argued, for a detailed examination of the concepts and characteristics underlying the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit.¹⁴⁴ The paper explained those concepts and characteristics in chapter 2, by outlining the security environment and applying risk management theory to show that the challenges existed because the RSS sub-region was a part of the world risk society and needed to continue to develop systems to mitigate its security risks. The perception of the severity of the consequences of the risks could hamper mitigation efforts. Second, as posited by Rubin and Babbie, the qualitative research method allowed the researcher to understand the idiographic concerns of the coast guard experts from the RSS member states by tapping into deeper meanings of unique island state circumstances that are not easily reduced to

¹⁴¹Allen Rubin and Earl R Babbie, *Research Methods for Social Work*, 7th ed. (California: Brooks/Cole, 2011), 437.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 448.

¹⁴³Walliman, 130.

¹⁴⁴Berg, 3.

numbers or determinable by probability conclusions.¹⁴⁵ Cooperative security expansion, because of its social, political, cultural, and economic dimensions, has different meanings for those who are responsible for its implementation. Such factors are not easily quantifiable and require qualitative analysis to better assist in understanding them.

Walliman argued that in order to be able to apply the results of research broadly beyond the confines of the experiment itself, the research should reflect the situation in the real world.¹⁴⁶ The group of current and past coast guard and marine police commanders and the personnel from the CLO, provided the sample that the researcher believed would afford a real world understanding of the feasibility of the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard for two reasons. First, their experience in the strategic and operational planning and execution of coast guard operations at the national and sub-levels allowed them to highlight areas of strength and weakness within the sub-regional cooperative security framework. Second, they provided the primary data used to determine if there was a need for a multinational RSS Coast Guard and their views on the feasibility of the implementation of the proposal.

Participation in the research was voluntary. The researcher assured the respondents that all answers would be confidential and used solely for the purposes of completing the research paper. Anonymity was also a guaranteed condition, and therefore in the research, no mention is made of individuals, island states, coast guard or marine police units. To safeguard the data, the researcher asked all respondents to forward their responses to a private email address. The researcher placed the responses in a secured

¹⁴⁵Rubin and Babbie, 67.

¹⁴⁶Walliman, 104.

folder, and then he alone retrieved and analyzed them. These ethical considerations were necessary because as Berg warned, when conducting policy-laden research what investigators learn can change the subjects' lives and not necessarily for the better.¹⁴⁷ This is not to suggest that the researcher expected that there would be negative consequences for the respondents, they were however entitled to the necessary safeguards of confidentiality, protocol –by informing their superiors, and anonymity.

Cooper and White in *Qualitative Research in the Post-Modern Era: Contexts of Qualitative Research* argue that a set of logically related assumptions, concepts, or principles, tend to guide a researcher's thinking.¹⁴⁸ According to them, "only by questioning one's own assumptions, knowing full well that no one can ever really fully understand the depths of one's own prejudices, opinions, and frames of mind, can a researcher come to an understanding relative to the quality of qualitative research, rather than to its external and objective veracity."¹⁴⁹ The researcher was aware that personal assumptions can lead to decreased objectivity. To safeguard against perceptions of bias on the part of the researcher, members of the researcher's Thesis Committee, questionnaire design experts from the USACGSC, and personnel from the Quality Assurance Office of the USACGSC, reviewed the questionnaire. This step was important because it helped the researcher to remove questions, which might have skewed the research to achieve a particular outcome. In the end, the distributed questionnaire was the

¹⁴⁷Berg, 62.

¹⁴⁸Karyn Cooper and Robert E White, *Qualitative Research in the Post-Modern Era: Contexts of Qualitative Research* (London: Springer, 2006), 15.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 7.

result of a collaborative effort that involved the use and guidance of academic experts to ensure objectivity.

The secondary sources of data collection included first, books on Caribbean security issues, academic journals, periodicals, and publications from international organizations. These sources allowed the researcher to outline the path of cooperative security development in the RSS sub-region and incorporated, where relevant the wider Anglophone Caribbean approach. The data showed the evolution of security risk concern from a concentration on coups d'état to that of illegal drugs and its attendant activities. It also showed a shift in focus from terrestrially focused security risk mitigation—as a result of the threat of coups d'état—to a focus on maritime focused mitigation to interdict sea lines of communication that are used for illegal drugs, illegal firearms and human trafficking.

The second category of secondary sources comprised works of risk management theorists. This helped the researcher to explain that the challenges to the RSS sub-region were because of its existence in a world risk society. Withdrawal from the world risk society is not an option; therefore, the academic writings on systems theory assisted the researcher to explain why societies create systems like the RSS organization. The aim of those systems is to assist man in gaining control of an uncertain future because of his existence in the world risk society. Finally, the researcher used risk perception theory to explain, that the critical factor that affects the decision-making process is how policy makers perceive the consequences of the risk. In a society of small economies and competing socio-economic needs, risk perception presents a “go” or “no go” criteria for

the implementation of the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit.

The researcher used a collaborative social research approach to analyze the research data. Berg posits that researchers use this form of analysis when they use subjects that one can consider as stakeholders in a situation in the research. According to Berg, the analysis of the collected data is reflexive, and helps the researcher to understand a situation, resolve a problem, or satisfy some field of experiment.¹⁵⁰ In this instance, the stakeholder is the RSS sub-region, which can benefit if the proposal is feasible. The current and past coast guard and marine police commanders of the RSS member states and those personnel employed at the RSS CLO who are directly involved in the planning and conduct of maritime operations, provide the level of expertise that can help policy-makers to accept or reject the proposal. The individual force commanders and the Regional Security Coordinator, operating on the expert opinions of those operational level personnel, can assist in steering a policy direction in favor or against the implementation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard.

The study uses a coding frame to organize the data and articulate the findings.¹⁵¹ Walliman defines coding as, the application of labels or tags to allocate units of meaning to collected data.¹⁵² He argues that coding helps to achieve objectivity, reliability, and generalizability.¹⁵³ In this paper, the coding frame allowed the researcher to identify the

¹⁵⁰Berg, 240.

¹⁵¹Ibid., 253.

¹⁵²Walliman, 169.

¹⁵³Ibid., 86.

commonalities and differences in perception among the respondents in relation to the security risks to the sub-region and if a multinational RSS Coast Guard is a viable option to mitigate them. Finally, the coding frame helped to identify the barriers that could prevent the implementation of the proposed formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit.

Summary

In this paper, the research methodology involved the use of a non-probability purposive sample of experts to assist the researcher to arrive at a conclusion. That group of experts comprised current and past coast guard and marine police commanders and personnel employed at the Central Liaison who work directly with the coast guard units of the RSS member states. What this sample provided, was an opportunity for a real world understanding of the security risks to the RSS sub-region and based on that, a critical evaluation of how the proposed formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard could help to mitigate those risks and the feasibility of the proposal being implemented.

The researcher observed the ethical rules regarding to protocol, confidentiality, and anonymity. He did this first, by requesting permission from the force commanders for the current coast guard and marine police unit commanders to participate in the research. Second, the researcher guaranteed the confidentiality of the responses and anonymity to the respondents. Third, Quality Assurance Office of the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) vetted the distributed questionnaire to ensure compliance with the institution's rules of ethics.

The group of current and past coast guard and marine police commanders and personnel employed at the CLO who work directly with the coast guard units of the RSS

member states were the primary data source. Secondary data sources included scholastic works on Caribbean security and risk management theory. The secondary sources provided the background information to highlight the problem, why there is a problem, how the sub-region can address the problem, and the possible impediments to implementing the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard. The primary sources allowed for an understanding of the current situation and an analysis of how the proposed multinational coast guard in the RSS would assist in risk mitigation efforts and whether that proposal was feasible.

The researcher used the collaborative social research approach and code framing to analyze the data. This allowed the researcher to identify commonalities and differences in the perceptions of the experts in relation to the security risk environment and the proposal to mitigate those risks. The proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit is a way of mitigating the security risks to the RSS sub-region. What this research sought to determine was if the proposal was one that the security experts viewed as relevant (could enhance security in the sub-region), as feasible, or both.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the responses of the current and past coast guard and marine police unit commanders from the individual RSS member states, and personnel employed at the CLO that directly assist individual member states in the planning and conduct of maritime operations. As outlined in chapter 3, the implementation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard will be dependent on a perception among the decision makers of the member states of the RSS, that not to do so, would have severe consequences for their individual states and for the sub-region. There must be, as Hopkin argues, a common language of risk among the policy makers, and a belief that they will derive maximum gains from their contributions to this risk management effort.¹⁵⁴

To assist them in determining if the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard would meet the needs of their individual states, policy makers are reliant on force commanders and operational level maritime forces leaders, to provide the necessary information that would enable them to make a sound and an informed decision. The implementation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard unit is a large financial undertaking and therefore policy makers will need to know that their states will realize maximum social, political, and economic benefits from investing in the establishment of this entity.

By virtue of their day-to-day involvement in the directing of national risk mitigation operations and their participation in sub-regional risk mitigation activities,

¹⁵⁴Hopkin, 29.

operational level maritime forces leaders in the RSS have the technical and practical knowledge and understanding that are necessary to provide sound advice to the policy makers. It was clear, therefore, that it was imperative to establish if a common perception existed among operational level maritime forces leaders that there was a need for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard in the Eastern Caribbean. To achieve this, operational level maritime leaders expressed their thoughts on:

1. If the security situation within the RSS sub-region necessitates the establishment of a sub-regional multinational coast guard unit;
2. How the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard would enhance the ability of the member states of the RSS to mitigate their national and the sub-regional security risks;
3. If the concept for the establishment of a sub-regional multinational coast guard unit in the RSS is a feasible undertaking; and
4. What issues would prohibit RSS member states from participating in such a venture.

The findings of the research show, that at the operational level, there is a common perception that there is a need for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard Unit. This was important because, if implemented, the operations of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard will directly affect the maritime forces of the individual member states at the operational level. Additionally, a multinational RSS Coast Guard will require operational level maritime forces commanders to provide the manpower to support the organization. It is at the operational level also that a great deal of coordination and

interaction will take place to ensure that the operations of the multinational RSS Coast Guard provide the maximum gains that the policy makers will desire it to deliver.

There was unanimous agreement that the security situation in the sub-region was such that it necessitated the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard. Some respondents added that not only would they welcome the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard, they also wished that the RSS would be expanded to include the nations of Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica. Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, have the largest military forces, and within them the largest coast guards, in the Anglophone Caribbean.

The calls for Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago to join the RSS are not new. There has been much discourse within CARICOM, at the political, strategic, and operational levels, on the benefits of Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago becoming a part of the RSS. Even outside that official arena, there has been an acknowledgement that a stronger cooperative security alliance between Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago is necessary to mitigate the security risks to the Caribbean. In an editorial published in the *Jamaica Gleaner* on 13 June 2010, the editor argued, following an operation in Tivoli Gardens, Kingston, Jamaica that later resulted in the apprehension of wanted felon Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, that Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname needed to seriously consider becoming members of the RSS.¹⁵⁵ In that article, the editor discussed that the security benefits to those nations and the Caribbean region, far outweighed the issues outlined in the continuing political

¹⁵⁵This paper does not discuss the country of Suriname beyond its mention in the *Jamaica Gleaner* quote.

rhetoric that prevented meaningful advances towards having a stronger cooperative security alliance in the Caribbean region.

Many issues, which this paper will not go into in detail, surround the decisions of the governments of Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago not to join the RSS. Colvin Bishop, in his thesis *Caribbean Regional Security: The Challenges To Creating Formal Military Relationships In The English-Speaking Caribbean*, while acknowledging that cooperative security actions had benefited the CARICOM region, explained that differing security risk perceptions and political level dilemmas, underscored by an anticipated asymmetrical financial resource contribution relationship, prevent Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago from joining the RSS.¹⁵⁶ Ninety percent of the respondents expressed their concern that it would take a disaster, or a crisis more significant than the coup d'état that occurred in Grenada in 1983, or the attempted coup d'état in Trinidad in 1990, to force political will in the direction of Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago joining the RSS. The RSS continues to comprise seven small states and, despite its limitations, demonstrates a resolve, through its actions, to work to mitigate member state and sub-regional security.¹⁵⁷

Figure 4 shows why the operational level maritime forces leaders from the RSS member states believe that cooperative security expansion is necessary. The respondents agree that illegal drug trafficking, as pointed out by Griffith, Verasammy, Beckles,

¹⁵⁶Colvin W Bishop, "Caribbean Regional Security: The Challenges to Creating Formal Military Relationships in the English-Speaking Caribbean" (Master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2002).

¹⁵⁷A full copy of the editorial can be viewed online at <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20100613/cleisure/cleisure1.html> (accessed 19 March 2012).

Perales, and other writers on Caribbean security, continues to be the most significant security concern for the sub-region. At the sub-regional level, the respondents believe that organized crime is the second most significant security area of concern, while at the national level they pointed to the proliferation of illegal firearms trafficking as being a the second most significant security concern. There was an equal level of concern, at the national and sub-regional levels, that money laundering, trafficking in persons, damage to the marine environment and the effects of severe weather systems were significant security threats.




Figure 4. Security Risk Concerns in the RSS During the period 2001-2011

Source: Created by author.

The responses indicate that the nomenclature of the security concerns for the RSS sub-region have not changed over time. What has changed is the complexity associated

with mitigating those security risks. This increase in the complexity of the security risks to the RSS sub-region has resulted in a concomitant increase in the challenges to the small island developing RSS member states and the requirement to find ways to mitigate the negative effects of those challenges.

Drug trafficking and its attendant activities continue to challenge the ability of member state national authorities and the RSS, to mitigate them. This is because as Diana Kendall, Professor at Baylor University, outlined in her book *Sociology In Our Times: The Essentials*, the globalization of the economy and the introduction of better communications technology have made it possible for groups around the world - of which illegal drug traffickers are a sub set - to operate.¹⁵⁸ Advances in technology theoretically make the world a smaller place as they enhance and facilitate the swift transfer of information, goods, and services. While enabling greater social, political, economic, and cultural interaction and exchange, those technologies also facilitate increased criminal activities and the transnational expansion of criminal networks.

Transnational criminal networks can comprise linkages involving groups or individuals from as small as state-to-state to as large as intercontinental/inter-hemispheric networks that operate across the globe. For the SIDS of the RSS sub-region, mitigation continues to be a game where the availability of resources at the national and sub-region levels, trails and in many cases pales, in comparison to those available to these transnational criminal networks. Technological, financial, institutional, and technical resource challenges as referred to by Perales, limit the island states from, individually and

¹⁵⁸Diana Kendall, *Sociology in Our Times: The Essentials*, 8th ed. (California: Wadsworth, 2010), 185.

in some cases collectively, having the capacity to detect, deter and interdict transnational criminal systems. Illegal drug trafficking, illegal firearms trafficking, human trafficking, and money laundering are, in the parlance of the Caribbean “big money businesses.” The cash available to those who control the criminal networks, far outmatches that available to the governments of the individual RSS member states and even the collective framework of the RSS, to mitigate them. One way for the sub-region to enhance its ability to mitigate its security challenges, is by the pooling of resources within a collective security risk mitigation framework. Operational level maritime forces leaders identified the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard as a way that RSS member states can pool resources, to enhance national and sub-regional capacities, to mitigate security risks.

Another critical security concern outlined by the operational level leaders is the risk associated with the passage of severe weather systems in the sub-region. The island states of the RSS lie within the Atlantic hurricane belt. From 1 June to 30 November each year, they are subject to the effects of severe weather systems, the most dangerous of which are hurricanes. In 2004, the island of Grenada recorded USD \$889 million in damage and thirty-nine deaths following the passing of Hurricane Ivan.¹⁵⁹ In 2010, the island of St Lucia recorded total damage of USD \$336.2 million in damage and fourteen deaths.¹⁶⁰ In both instances, the RSS played an integral role in the disaster response and recovery efforts in those member states.

¹⁵⁹Information from the EM-DAT International Disaster Management Database at <http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile> (accessed 14 March 2012).

¹⁶⁰Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Saint Lucia Macro Socio-Economic and Environmental Assessment of the Damage and Losses

The economic costs of both of those disasters were significant. What this paper cannot show, are the intangible and incalculable human and social costs. Severe weather systems thwart national development by disrupting economic activity and affecting the social structures of a society. For the small island developing RSS member states, the social suffering that can and has occurred in the aftermath of a severe weather system creates resulted in increased security challenges. In his article “Security, Spatiality, and Social Suffering,” Philip Darby outlines that, “social suffering cuts across disciplinary boundaries, and it therefore destabilizes established categories.”¹⁶¹ The relationship between social suffering and security will vary from state to state and within states. It is dependent not only on the state of development of a nation, but also the local security and disaster response infrastructure. For the RSS sub-region, the reality is that the island nations depend on the security forces to aid in recovery. As a result, disasters that result in the aftermath of severe weather systems, force states to redirect security forces from performing security tasks, to conducting disaster relief operations. When this happens, it creates gaps in already challenged security systems.

Ninety-two percent of the operational level maritime forces leaders stated that their island states benefited from being members of the RSS. The benefit referred to, is enhanced national security or the enabling thereof. According to the operational level maritime forces leaders, the RSS continues to provide a vital opportunity for law

Caused by Hurricane Tomas: A Geo-Environmental Disaster Towards Resilience,” *United Nations* (2011): <http://www.stlucia.gov.lc/docs/Hurricane-Tomas-Geo-Environmental-Disaster.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2012).

¹⁶¹Philip Darby, “Security, Spatiality, and Social Suffering,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 31, no. 4 (October-December 2006): 467.

enforcement and military forces to build stronger force-to-force networks to assist in mitigating the risks associated with illegal drug trafficking and its attendant activities. They expressed that over the years, the RSS has provided a platform that facilitates information and intelligence sharing which is critical to the conduct of national security risk mitigation operations. Combined operations coordinated by the RSS have allowed the collection of member states or the requesting member state to benefit from the employment of pooled resources to mitigate security risks that member states may not have been able to cope with on their own. Joint training activities, conferences, seminars, and workshops have provided forums that support the building of interpersonal relationships, strengthen networks, and deepen understanding among operational and tactical level leaders within the member states (see figure 5).




Figure 5. Respondents' perception on the benefit of being a member state of the RSS to their island states

Source: Created by author.

To date, 8 percent of the respondents said they would not argue that their island states have benefited from being members of the RSS. They leveled criticism at the lack of a routine system to assist states to develop national strategies to meet emerging threats. According to those respondents, seminars and training programs needed to be more frequent. The respondents outlined that continuity in the provision of training, operations support, and coordination activities were critical so that the benefits received from the RSS would be continuous and not based on one or a series of isolated activities.

All respondents agreed that the RSS member states should pursue the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard. They pointed out that a multinational RSS Coast Guard would be a force multiplier and would provide a way to fill the capacity gaps that exist in the RSS member states. The respondents were cautious to add, that if implemented, the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard would absolve national coast guards from their responsibilities to provide for the maritime security of their individual states. Instead, the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard would be a sub-regional level entity that would enable and complement the work of national coast guards to mitigate the national and sub-regional security risks. In effect, the proposed RSS Coast Guard would become a new sub-system of the RSS and would be integrated into the work of the other security risk management systems like the RSS Air Wing. As Daellenbach and McNickle argue, respondents hope that the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard would be an effective part of the assembly of risk mitigating systems,

interconnected or acting alone in clearly defined relationships to enhance the security of the RSS sub-region.¹⁶²

All the respondents agreed that the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is a feasible option to enhance the security of the RSS sub-region. They explained that the member states of the RSS, through their individual national coast guards, have the base experience and skills that the RSS could leverage to assist to set up and operate a multinational coast guard. The fact that member states comprise leaders at all levels who have participated in maritime training organized by the RSS, and who attended institutions in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US, among others, provides a significant boost that will assist in the startup of the multinational RSS Coast Guard. Another positive, is the fact that because of combined RSS operations and training exercises, many of those personnel who would be responsible for the management of the multinational RSS Coast Guard would have worked or trained together at some stage in their careers. In theory, that previous interaction should assist in the integration and development of operating procedures for the multinational RSS Coast Guard and should also translate into a relatively seamless commencement and sustainment of multinational RSS Coast Guard operations.

The agreement among operational level maritime forces leaders from the RSS member states that the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is a feasible option to enhance the security of the sub-region does not provide a stand-alone criterion for the implementation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard. If this entity is to become a reality, operational level maritime forces leaders from the RSS agreed that its

¹⁶²Daellenbach and McNickle, 21-22.

implementation will depend on other criteria such as funding, logistics, the availability of personnel, consensus on command and control, the presence of political will, and consensus on jurisdiction being met. The absence of those criteria will hinder the formation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard (see in figure 6).

The operational level maritime forces leaders stated that they believed that funding was possibly the most significant hindrance to the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard. This, according to them, was so for two reasons. First, under the current framework, there are RSS member states that find difficulty honoring their financial treaty obligations. The formation of a RSS Coast Guard will require increased levels of funding, and it not advisable to believe that the sub-region could depend on international donor support to finance the operations and maintenance of the multinational RSS Coast Guard. To this end, member states must be prepared to meet their financial obligations if the multinational RSS Coast Guard is to be effective and sustainable. Second, individual national financial constraints derived from competing socio-economic challenges force member states to look inwards to provide for the immediate needs of their populations. When this occurs, it detracts states' attention from allocating limited financial resources to sub-regional and regional efforts. Such situations will hinder the formation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard unless other RSS member states or international donors can, or are willing to, fill the void or voids left by financially challenged member states.




Figure 6. Respondents' thoughts on issues that can hinder the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard

Source: Created by author.

The second most significant hindrance to the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard, according to the respondents, was political will. The general sentiment among respondents was that within the RSS, there were pockets of nationalism, which hamper cooperative security efforts to mitigate risks to the sub-region. If the multinational RSS Coast Guard is to become a reality, cooperative action must replace nationalistic rhetoric. It is incumbent on policy makers to realize, as Tulchin and Espach argued, that efforts at national security cannot be divorced from regional or in this case sub-regional security. The commitment of national resources to support sub-regional initiatives requires a willingness at the political level to provide, according to their treaty obligations, for the benefit of the many. Nationalistic or isolationist approaches to

security may satisfy sentiments of political accomplishment but they will not provide the level of security risk mitigation that is necessary to safeguard a society.

The operations of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard will require sound logistical support. The provision of logistical support to the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard will require policy makers to have the political will to provide the funding and other necessary resources. Respondents expressed that not only will logistics be a hindrance to the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard, should the proposal be accepted and implemented, ineffective, and inefficient logistical support will result in the demise of the unit. Field Manual 4-0 defines logistics as,

Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes . . . acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services.¹⁶³

Logistics is a process that integrates complex personnel and materiel functions. It requires constant monitoring, upgrading, and resourcing. RSS member states must be prepared to provide financial and human resources to the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard continuously and consistently. These two components are inseparable in the logistics process and decision makers should neither sacrifice nor reduce them. To do so would be to secure the demise of the unit. The operations of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard will hinge on the willingness of decision makers within member states to provide the financial and human resource support that is necessary for it to carry out its tasks effectively.

¹⁶³Headquarters of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 4-0, *Sustainment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 1-4.

Once there is the political will to make the proposed RSS Coast Guard work, the member states would be in a better position to solve the issue of jurisdiction. One of the inescapable functions of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard will be the enforcing of the laws of individual member states within their territorial maritime spaces. To carry out this function, personnel operating onboard RSS Coast Guard vessels will be required to have law enforcement powers to act within member states. One can view this as a requirement for each individual serving onboard a RSS Coast Guard vessel to have sub-regional law enforcement powers, which is akin to RSS Coast Guard personnel becoming “federal” law enforcement agents. To facilitate this, there will be a requirement to enact legislative instruments to authorize foreign personnel assigned to the multinational RSS Coast Guard to carry out law enforcement functions within the maritime boundaries of member states. If not addressed, the lack of proper jurisdiction would hinder the work of the multinational RSS Coast Guard. Each of the RSS member states has its unique national statutes and it is imperative that they address issues of jurisdiction to include rules of engagement and powers of arrest, among others. Member states must identify and resolve existing and potential legal differences prior to the commencement of multinational RSS Coast Guard operations. They must also ensure that they provide the legal backing that will enable personnel, assigned to carryout RSS Coast Guard operations, the necessary legal protection and direction.

Tied to the discussion on jurisdiction is that of command and control. The operating of a multinational RSS Coast Guard will require a command structure that will allow it to interdict targets of opportunity. Because of the dynamism of maritime operations, the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard must be capable of carrying out

unilateral actions within the maritime boundaries of each RSS member state. One should not confuse this requirement for a command and control structure with the existing arrangement as outlined in Article 10 (1) of the RSS Treaty. Under the current agreement, the article states that,

For the purposes of this Treaty, the requesting state shall have operational control (OPCON) over all service personnel participating in operations in that State . . . the senior officer of a sending state shall exercise tactical command over his service personnel; and the officer commanding service personnel of a sending State shall be responsible for the conduct and discipline of subordinate service personnel of that State.

In the arrangement for the multinational RSS Coast Guard, there will be no requesting or sending state. The multinational RSS Coast Guard will be a full-time operational entity, which the RSS CLO will control. To place it under the operational control (OPCON) of a specific force commander within the RSS would open the operations of the unit to the nationalistic and isolationist rhetoric and criticisms, whether true or perceived, that so often affect the ability to implement initiatives in the Caribbean region.

The command and control structure of the multinational RSS Coast Guard should be an independent one and should operate from within the CLO. The RSS Treaty provides for the establishment of a command and control structure for the purposes of conducting RSS operations. Article 10 (2) of the RSS Treaty states that,

Service personnel of member States seconded for duty at the CLO or mobilized for operations or training under joint RSS command shall be subject to the authority of service personnel of superior rank without regard to the Member State of origin.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴RSS Treaty (1996).

Should the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard become a reality, personnel from the member states who serve onboard the RSS Coast Guard vessels will fall under the category of “service personnel being mobilized for operations.” Legal consultation will be necessary prior to the formation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard to determine if the command and control of the unit will require an amendment or set of amendments to the existing treaty provisions. In this regard, Article 10 (2) of the RSS Treaty provides a good start point for the development of additional legal instruments, if necessary.

Organizations can acquire the best equipment and develop the best systems, but if there are no people to operate that equipment or work within those systems, then there is nothing. The reality of the RSS is that the coast guard and marine police units are small. Detaching personnel from within those small units and assigning them to a multinational RSS Coast Guard will create strain on the coast guard and marine police units of the individual member states. If implemented, the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard will have personnel implications for the national coast guard and marine police units of the member states. Respondents expressed that while a member state may be willing to support and participate in the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard, the inability to provide personnel may hinder its ability to do so.

Following the assessment of the operational level maritime forces leaders’ thoughts on the hindrances to the formation of the proposed, the survey sought to ascertain what issues, in their opinions, would policy makers need to address if the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard were to become a reality (see figure 7). The respondents agreed that the two main issues were funding and logistics. These two factors

are inter-related. Funding involves the allocation of money for the acquisition of equipment and the financing of the day-to-day operations of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard. Logistics is the process used to manage the expenditure of those funds effectively and involves the maintenance of equipment and the provision of personnel services to those assigned to serve in the RSS Coast Guard. Any compromising of one or both of these factors, would not only render the multinational RSS Coast Guard ineffective, it will become unsustainable and eventually defunct.

Figure 7 shows sustainability as the least in the level of necessity. This is so because if funding and logistics are consistent and adequate, then the multinational RSS Coast Guard will be sustainable. There is a direct link between sustainability, funding, and logistics because with all the best intentions in the world, without proper funding and logistical support, the RSS cannot sustain a multinational RSS Coast Guard.




Figure 7. Respondents' thoughts on what would be necessary to form a multinational RSS Coast Guard

Source: Created by author.

The provision of funding is a function of sub-regional governments under the provisions of the RSS Treaty. Though operational level maritime forces leaders see the need for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard, there is no guarantee that the policy makers or political masters of their island states will hold the same view. Tulchin and Espach eloquently make this point while emphasizing the importance of political will to the cooperative security enhancement process. They argue that,

Cooperation at the operational level—however helpful it can be in laying the groundwork for mutual confidence—cannot go far without support from above. Building cooperative regional security will require leadership, creativity, and determination at both ends of the policy process from the policy makers who determine the priorities, strategies, and perceptions of national and international institutions as well as from the actual police and government agents, military personnel, civilian actors and others involved with the implementation of cooperative initiatives.¹⁶⁵

The policy makers must perceive that their security situation will improve by the implementation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard or they will not accept having to expend financial resources. Even if they see the need to expend those resources, and agree that the formation of the multinational RSS Coast Guard is necessary, that does not mean that they will have the political will to divert the necessary financial resources based on their island states' socio-economic and political circumstances. In the final analysis, if the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is to move from the proposal to the implementation stage, sub-regional policy makers must have the political will to make the necessary adjustments to move the process forward.

It is incumbent upon the security experts in the RSS (the strategic level military and police leaders) to assure the policy makers that, should they divert limited resources

¹⁶⁵Tulchin and Espach, 20.

to support the formation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard, there would be a management structure in place to manage the unit effectively. One way to do so is to show that the command and control structure for the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is such, that it will provide the level of leadership and direction necessary to ensure the effective use and management of the unit's resources. The issue of command and control must not become a victim of nationalistic rhetoric; such behavior is counterproductive. As pointed out earlier, it may be prudent to use Article 10 of the RSS Treaty as the start point for the setting up of the command and control architecture for the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guards.

One of the first major tasks of the command and control of the multinational RSS Coast Guard would be the development of rules of engagement that apply across the sub-region. Each RSS member state has its unique rules of engagement to guide the use of force by its security forces. There will be a requirement for an appropriate set of rules of engagement to be developed, accepted, and legislated in the RSS member states, to support the operations of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard.

Summary

From the points of view of the operational level maritime forces leaders of the member states of the RSS, there is a need for a multinational RSS Coast Guard. They agree that the security situation is such that it requires not only an expansion within the RSS but also outside of the RSS to include the full time entry of Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

In the opinion of the operational level maritime forces leaders of the RSS member states, illegal drug trafficking and its attendant activities continue to be the most

significant security risks to the RSS sub-region. They agree that mitigating those security risks, will require that member states have greater access to available resources and that those states and the sub-region, through the RSS, implement new initiatives to assist the sub-region to mitigate its existing and emerging security risks.

While the majority of operational level maritime forces leaders believe that their island states had benefited from membership in the RSS, there were those who cited that the overall benefits to their island states fell short of expectations. The RSS provides opportunities for law enforcement networking, the pooling of resources and information sharing through its coordination of training events including exercises, training programs, seminars, and workshops and assists member states through the coordination of combined operations. Member state criticisms of the RSS identified what they deemed as a lack of sufficiency in providing training and assistance to assist member states to be in a position to mitigate emerging risks.

Despite its shortcomings, the RSS is a critical part of the security infrastructure of the sub-region. Based on the success of the RSS Air Wing, the respondents agreed that the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard was a feasible option to enhance the security of the RSS sub-region. They warned that a lack of funding, the absence of political will, poor logistics, a lack of consensus on jurisdiction, personnel constraints, and issues of command and control could hinder the formation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard. Conversely, if policy makers were to make a decision to move the process from proposal to implementation, they highlighted that funding, logistics, political will, command and control, rules of engagement, and sustainability will be necessary.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In 2008, the Central Liaison Office of the Regional Security System presented a proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard to the force commanders of the RSS. This paper explored if the operational level maritime forces commanders of the RSS and personnel employed at the CLO who work directly with the individual member states coast guard and marine police units agreed that there was a need for the formation of a multinational Regional Security System Coast Guard in the Eastern Caribbean.

At a time when the states of the RSS sub-region face significant socio-economic challenges, in many cases the origins of which are out of their control, one must examine the proposal for the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard within the context of the competing needs of the member states of the RSS. The implementation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is one that must be out of necessity and with a commitment to sustain it. To ascertain if the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard was necessary and feasible the paper queried:

1. If the security situation within the RSS sub-region necessitates the establishment of a sub-regional multinational coast guard unit;
2. How the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard would enhance the ability of the member states of the RSS to mitigate their national and the sub-regional security risks;
3. If the concept for the establishment of a sub-regional multinational coast guard unit in the RSS is a feasible undertaking; and

4. What issues would prohibit RSS member states from participating in such a venture.

There was unanimous agreement among the operational level maritime forces leaders and the personnel employed at the CLO who work with the individual coast guards and marine police units from the RSS member states that the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard was necessary. They opined that issues such as funding, sustainability, command and control, logistics and political will have the potential to hinder the implementation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard. When asked what was necessary to establish the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard, at the operational level, maritime forces commanders argued that of all the factors logistics, funding, and political will were the most critical. They also outlined that command and control and rules of engagement were key issues that policy makers from the member states of the RSS would need to resolve prior to implementing the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard.

Over the past twenty-nine years, the Regional Security System cooperative security framework has assisted in mitigating the security risks to the individual member states, to the sub-region, and to the wider Caribbean region. The RSS was created in 1982 to mitigate the risks from potential coups d'état that threatened the stability of the sub-region and over the years has evolved to address the security needs of the member states. The paper showed that the main security concern for the RSS member states continued to be illegal drug trafficking and its attendant activities. The operational level maritime forces leaders view the proliferation of illegal firearms as the second greatest threat to national security, and organized crime as the second greatest threat to the sub-region.

They also expressed concern regarding the sub-region's vulnerability to the disaster causing effects of severe weather systems.

Geonarcotics has become the term used to describe the illegal drug trafficking risk phenomenon and its attendant activities. The geographical and political dimensions of illegal drug trafficking and its attendant activities have had socio-economic and political implications for the RSS sub-region and the wider Caribbean region. The reach of these activities are national, sub-regional, regional, hemispheric, and global in nature and effect. Their complexity and scope go far beyond the boundaries of the RSS member states, as collectively and individually the states of the sub-region seem powerless to mitigate them.

The paper posited that risk management theory assists in explaining the security issues that affect the sub-region. First, the paper argued that the security risks of the sub-region have become more complex because of its existence in a world risk society. These security risks force sub-regional states to react and adapt to technological changes over which they have no control. In the world risk society, advances in technology not only favor legitimate entities, they also favor illegitimate ones that have the means to purchase such technology and use it to defeat national risk mitigation efforts. The island states of the RSS sub-region cannot close themselves off or withdraw from the global risk society. It is inescapable and like the forces of nature, it is all around. The RSS member states must accept that. To deny the evolution of risks from the global risk society or to be risk averse in the global environment is to thwart development and resign a state to failure.

Second, the paper argues that adapting to the world risk society forces the member states of the RSS to collectively and individually develop new and modify

existing systems. When the governments of the member states created the RSS, the intent was to mitigate the risks of the early 1980s. As the organization matured, it adapted to the changing security risk environment. The RSS Air Wing was a symbol of that maturity and adaptability and that sub-system continues to provide operational and logistical support to the member states. The proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is an attempt to create another sub-system within the RSS, as that organization seeks once again to adapt to the changing and complex security environment in the sub-region. Critical to the process is the necessity for the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard, like the RSS Air Wing, to complement the existing systems. This paper applied systems theory to argue that the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is a recommended way to enhance the security of the RSS sub-region and theorizes it as a proposal to create a new sub-system within the RSS.

Finally, paper argued that implementation of the proposal to form a multinational RSS Coast Guard will not be an automatic process. When weighed against the competing socio-economic needs of the member states of the RSS, policy makers must be convinced that their member states will benefit from the investment in the entity. The policy makers in the member states are aware of the security risks, but they perceive the consequences of those risks differently. Risk perception is the “make or break” criteria for the implementation of the proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard. It is incumbent on the force commanders in the RSS to seek to create a common perception among sub-regional policy makers that the formation of a multinational RSS Coast Guard is a sound way to mitigate the security risks to their individual island states and enhance the security of the sub-region.

What this paper has established is that operational level maritime forces leaders have a common perception that there is a need for a multinational RSS Coast Guard. The next step is for the policy makers, as Tulchin and Espach outlined and as identified by the operational level maritime forces leaders, to overcome sentiments of nationalist division, isolationism, long held attitudes of dominance and dependence, and natural fears of mistrust, not only in their minds but among the public as well.¹⁶⁶

The security issues to the sub-region are here to stay and if not mitigated will multiply, to a point where they threaten or disrupt the stability of the RSS sub-region. As Tulchin and Espach lamented over a decade ago, the time is ripe for cooperative security expansion in the interest of the well-being of the peoples of the RSS sub-region. The proposed multinational RSS Coast Guard is a way to expand the cooperative security framework of the sub-region and can enhance the security of the individual island states and the collective RSS sub-region.

¹⁶⁶Tulchin and Espach, 22.

APPENDIX A

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

The creator of this questionnaire is conducting research to determine if the proposed multinational sub-regional coast guard in the Regional Security System (RSS) is a risk management mechanism that could be considered to enhance the security of the member states RSS sub-region. The intent of this research is to provide an academic approach to examine a way to expand collective security cooperation in the RSS. This paper is purely an academic work and is intended to add to the discourse on collective security expansion in the Caribbean region and to explore the feasibility and suitability of an expansion of the RSS organization through the formation of a multinational coast guard within the RSS. The information given in this questionnaire is for research purposes only and will only be used as a part of the author's thesis for the award of a Masters of Military Arts and Science at the United States Army Command and General Staff College. The thesis is unclassified and will be available for public reading when it is completed. The creator gives his assurance that the information given in this questionnaire will be strictly confidential and will not be promulgated beyond the research document. Participation in this research, by answering this questionnaire is voluntary. Answering should take approximately 20 minutes of your time. Should you have any questions, please contact me at aquinas.clarke@us.army.mil or aqui_clarke@hotmail.com.

The Quality Assurance Office of the United States Army Command and General Staff College reviewed and approved this research questionnaire for distribution. The research is determined exempt from human subjects protections and has been assigned Control Number CGSC/QAO 12-02-050. Should you have questions or concerns regarding the conduct of the research, please contact Ms. Maria Clark, Human Protections Administrator with the US Army Command and General College, maria.clark1@us.army.mil.

Please provide responses to the following questions:

1. Based on your experience with the coast guard or marine police in your island, what do you believe, within the last ten years (2001-2011), have been the dominant threats to the security of:

a. Your island?

b. The RSS sub-region?

2. What in your opinion are the emerging threats to:

a. Your island?

b. The RSS sub-region?

3. Has being a member state of the RSS benefited your island in addressing those security concerns?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Don't know ☐

3a. Please elaborate.

4. Do you believe that mitigating the existing security concerns in the RSS sub-region would benefit from an expanded sub-regional (RSS) approach to addressing the challenges?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Don't know ☐

4a. Please elaborate.

5. Do you believe that an expansion of the sub-regional (RSS) approach would enhance your island's ability to mitigate its existing and emerging security risks?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Don't know ☐

5a. Please elaborate.

6. Do you believe that a multinational RSS Coast Guard Unit is a feasible option to enhance the security of your island nation?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Don't know ☐

6a. Please elaborate.

7. Do you believe that a multinational RSS Coast Guard Unit is a feasible option to enhance the security of the RSS sub-region?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Don't know ☐

7a. Please elaborate.

8. What would hinder your organization from participating in a multinational RSS Coast Guard unit?

9. From your perspective, what would be necessary to make the establishment of a RSS Coast Guard Unit a reality?

Thank you for taking time to answer this questionnaire and assisting in the compilation of data to support this research.

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