The Alliance Decides the Mission? Multilateral Decision Making at the UN and NATO on Libya, 2010-2011
Abstract
The United Nations Security Council quickly authorized the use of force, and NATO allies speedily took action in March of 2011 to prevent a potential humanitarian crisis in Libya when it appeared to the international community that civil protest would be met with state-sponsored violence on the level of genocide. How did the multilateral decision making processes in NATO and the United Nations, two separate but related organizations, work in this case? What forces led to a slow or fast decision? What factors contributed to international support for intervention, and what was the character of politics that led to action? The underlying multilateral decision making framework of each organization, a function of structure and original design, will be investigated and compared in light of an historical and in-depth study on multilateralism. Within the contemporary crisis management mindset of the last 20 years, it is easily forgotten that these organizations were created for other purposes. Their raison d'etre was the prevention of catastrophic world war amongst great powers, not the management of small-scale crises or humanitarian interventions. Thus, their decision making in crisis management is blunt. Libya stands out as an exceptional case, with potential future implications on the use of force.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA563626
Entities
People
- David F. Lawrence
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School