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14. ABSTRACT Joint Task Force-Guantanamo [JTF-GTMO] is a classic study of an ill-defined organizational structure among competing stakeholders on all four levels of warfare: National-Strategic, Theater-Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. An analysis of the organizational command and control presents conflicting directives in the form of command, loyalties, economics and execution. JTF-GTMO is not optimized to perform its mission. Specifically it suffers from misalignment throughout the levels of warfare and exhibits shortfalls in the operational art functions of command and control, sustainment, protection, and intelligence. These problems are exacerbated by political scrutiny, the expansion of time and deliberate lack of ownership, absent unity of command and unity of effort. The current situation, simply, is ticking powder keg. If unity of command and unity of effort are not corrected, the JTF may find itself in a political quagmire on an international scale. This paper will present some recommendations on what to do to get back on track.					
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JTF-GTMO: A 10-year Relook

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

4 May 2012

Abstract

Joint Task Force-Guantanamo [JTF-GTMO] is a classic study of an ill-defined organizational structure among competing stakeholders on all four levels of warfare: National-Strategic, Theater-Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. An analysis of the organizational command and control presents conflicting directives in the form of command, loyalties, economics and execution. JTF-GTMO is not optimized to perform its mission. Specifically it suffers from misalignment throughout the levels of warfare and exhibits shortfalls in the operational art functions of command and control, sustainment, protection, and intelligence. These problems are exacerbated by political scrutiny, the expansion of time and deliberate lack of ownership, absent unity of command and unity of effort. The current situation, simply, is ticking powder keg. If unity of command and unity of effort are not corrected, the JTF may find itself in a political quagmire on an international scale. This paper will present some recommendations on what *to* do to get back on track.

Introduction

Joint Task Force-Guantanamo [JTF-GTMO] is a classic study of an ill-defined organizational structure among competing stakeholders on all four levels of warfare: National-Strategic, Theater-Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. An analysis of the organizational command and control presents conflicting directives in the form of command, loyalties, economics and execution. JTF-GTMO is not optimized to perform its mission. Specifically it suffers from misalignment throughout the levels of warfare and exhibits shortfalls in the operational art functions of command and control, sustainment, protection, and intelligence. These problems are exacerbated by political scrutiny, the expansion of time and deliberate lack of ownership, absent unity of command and unity of effort. The current situation, simply, is ticking powder keg. If unity of command and unity of effort are not corrected, the JTF may find itself in a political quagmire on an international scale. JTF-GTMO continues to present a global site picture of what not to do. This paper will present some recommendations on what *to* do to get back on track.

Officially, the mission statement of the JTF is to “conduct safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody of detainees, including those convicted by military commission.”¹ For clarification, the term detainee throughout this paper is an “enemy combatant detained by the Department of Defense at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”²

The JTF operates as a tenant organization on Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, whose official mission statement is: “Naval Station (NAVSTA) Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is on the front lines for regional security in the Caribbean area. The base supports the ability of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships, along with allied nation ships to operate in the Caribbean area

by providing contingency and quality logistical support with superior services and facilities. The base also supports the Department of Homeland Security in U.S. migrant operations to help care for displaced migrants from the surrounding area, effectively helping control the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States.”³ Encompassing just under 45 square miles, NAVSTA Guantanamo is one of the oldest installations under US jurisdiction. Key tenant commands within NAVSTA GTMO include Joint Task Force-GTMO (JTF-GTMO); Marine Corps Security Force Company (MCSFCo); Naval Hospital Guantanamo Bay; Customer Service Desk (CSD) and others.⁴

Background

*Unity of command ensures concentration of effort for every objective under one responsible commander.*⁵

~ Air Force Doctrine Document 1

Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command

JTF-GTMO resulted from merging JTF-160 and JTF-170 in 2002. One focused solely on detaining enemy combatants directly after the 9/11 attacks. The other focused solely on strategic interrogation and intelligence collection.⁶ The merger attempted to leverage common capabilities and streamline command and control for a single operation. The Church Report, published in redacted form in March of 2005 indicated, “The most important development was establishment in November 2002 of a command organization that placed detention and intelligence operations under the command of a single entity, JTF-GTMO, superseding the bifurcated organization which had at times impeded intelligence collection due to lack of proper coordination between interrogators and military police. JTF-GTMO, with its well-developed standard operating procedures and clear lines of authority, enabled effective coordination.”⁷

The merger also brought with it command and control along geographic lines and was placed under the geographic combatant command (GCC) US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). As one of nine combatant commands, USSOUTHCOM clarifies its mission areas into:⁸

- *Countering transnational crime* “to counter and deter illegal activities associated with illicit trafficking, which is a significant threat to security and stability in the Western Hemisphere. Drug trafficking represents the epicenter of illicit trafficking, serving as the predominant means by which Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) obtain money and increased influence in the region”
- *Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief*: “central to efforts to enhance security and stability in the region. Humanitarian assistance focuses on the provision of health care, infrastructure improvements and aid to populations temporarily or chronically underserved. Disaster relief is the response to reduce human suffering associated with natural disasters”
- *Support to peacekeeping operations*: “working with regional partners to enhance peacekeeping capabilities of nations in Central & South America and the Caribbean”
- *Training and exercises*: “multinational exercises to strengthen regional partnerships and collective capabilities that are integral to U.S. national security and the security and stability of the Western Hemisphere”
- *Multinational engagement*: “the ability to engage effectively and transparently with regional militaries, partner nation governments, and interagency partners”
- *Human rights*: “an institutional statement of the Command’s commitment to maintain a robust human rights program. No other unified command has established a separate office to monitor and coordinate human rights issues.”

Subordinate to Commander, JTF-GTMO (CJTf) in 2011 existed four groups, a command staff, and a US Coast Guard Detachment.⁹ The command staff is organized in traditional doctrinal language of J-1 through J-4, J-6 and J-8. It consists of approximately 300 positions, of which the majority (60%) is sourced through whole-unit rotations of reserve/guard units from the Army. The remaining 40% are sourced in an individual

augmentee (IA) capacity from the active components (USA, USN, USAF, and USMC) via the Joint Staff Global Force Management (GFM) processes per Joint Publication 1 and Joint Publication 3. On equal footing, organizationally, and technically reporting directly to CJTF, are groups named the Joint Medical Group, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Detention Group and a Commissions Support Group. An in-depth review of each of these individually will aid to further understand the complexity.

Statement of the Problem

From a macro perspective, multiple organizations are stakeholders for the operations on Guantanamo. For this case study, the reader should particularly analyze the relationships established in and between JTF-GTMO. Evidence of National-Strategic, Theater-Strategic, Operational and Tactical are rampant in the analysis below.

The background presented in the former paragraph indicates to the reader the assumption that placing JTF-GTMO under the GCC is in alignment. According to Norwitz, individuals sent to JTF-GTMO were “deemed an enemy combatant in the Global War on Terrorism.”¹⁰ However, USSOUTHCOM is not the executive agent for the Global War on Terror, US Central Command is. Since inception, then, evidence in incongruence at the National-Strategic level of war exists. Additionally, the second commander of JTF-GTMO highlighted this incongruence and painted an even larger picture. Karen Greenberg’s book, The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo’s First 100 Days highlights the ineptness of clearly defined command and control: “Dunlavey could easily bypass the normal chain of command. When someone suggested that Dunlavey should report to SOUTHCOM, Rumsfeld blurted out: “I don’t care whom he is under, he works for me.” Dunlavey

reportedly claimed his orders came from even higher authority: “I got my marching orders from the President of the United States.”¹¹

At the Theater-Strategic Level, USSOUTHCOM mission sets are not in alignment with its governance over JTF-GTMO. Specifically, USSOUTHCOM “is ready to conduct joint and combined full-spectrum military operations and support whole-of-government efforts to enhance regional security and cooperation.”¹² Nowhere in the SOUTHCOM mission sets is the role of safe, humane, transparent care and custody resident. The value of the object appears, at least in formal documentation, to be very minimal.

Further compounding this relationship between the theater-strategic commander and his operational commander is the blatant disregard for preponderance of forces and allocated time and energy toward the successful execution of the mission. In both the 2010 and 2011 Posture Statements from the Commander, USOUTHCOM to Congress in March and April respectively, JTF-GTMO is not even mentioned.¹³ This is despite the fact that JTF-GTMO’s personnel footprint makes up forty percent of USSOUTHCOM’s total footprint and its overseas contingency operations budget exceeded \$140 million. Total operating cost to include Operations and Maintenance exceeded \$340 million per annum.¹⁴ Lastly, although JTF’s are meant, by doctrine, to be temporary, unfunded organizations, this one has lasted in excess of ten years. One would assume that with Congress defining requirements for indefinite detention, SOUTHCOM would embed a long-term solution set into its command strategy. In fact, similar to recent posture statements, SOUTHCOM’s command strategy 2020 has zero mention of JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba or Cuba proper.¹⁵ At least on the functional level, notwithstanding the geographic positioning, misalignment exists at the

theater-strategic level. At the Operational Level of war, there are also problems for CJTF (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Circa 2011 C2 Structure

Previously mentioned, JTF's, by design, are “temporary, unfunded operations.”¹⁶ As a tenant unit on NAVSTA Guantanamo, the JTF is ineligible for military construction, program objective memorandum and future year defense program submissions. This essentially means that any and all additions in infrastructure and support to the JTF must come from NAVSTA Guantanamo. However, NAVSTA Guantanamo organizationally falls neither under the JTF, nor within the auspices of SOUTHCOM. Instead, NAVSTA Guantanamo reports to Naval Region Southeast, which is completely outside the purview of the military components of the GCC. This relationship is important on two fronts. First, logistical support must be sequestered from multiple avenues for the JTF because the NAVSTA is unable to provide. An example is that the JTF must deploy an Army contracting officer to NAVSTA to sit next to a NAVSTA contracting officer because the monies and

contracts cannot “touch.” Coincidentally, this is required because the Army is the Executive Agent for contracting to the GCC, and since NAVSTA is not within the purview of the GCC, immediate disconnects are evident. This logistical support also includes the provision of quality of life initiatives, sustainment, food and housing. The JTF must accomplish Inter-Service Support Agreements for all of its operations, and because it is geographically separated from all its headquarters [SOUTHCOM, US Army South (USARSO)], redundancy is rampant. Second in consideration is force protection. The NAVSTA is responsible for securing its borders and accomplishes this via the MCSFCo and harbor patrol boats. However, because the original order for the JTF required counter-terrorism defense, a unit of the Coast Guard was requested known as the Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST).

A small contingent of rotational forces from the US Coast Guard (USCG) continues to support the JTF. According to the 2012 Coast Guard Posture Statement to Congress; “Coast Guard Personnel Security Units and Maritime Safety and Security Team detachments continued port security operations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for harbor security and to provide force protection.”¹⁷ This is further validated by RDML D.R. May in his 2008 article *Modernizing the Force*, where he writes; “Coast Guard assets, including PSUs, marine safety and security teams, and other elements, have supported primarily waterside anti-terrorism and force protection security at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.”¹⁸ While USCG assets may have been pertinent at JTF-GTMO’s inception, evidence of any terror plot or capability has not matriculated. Further, in an interview with the MSST commander in 2011, “the unique nature of being geographically separated and the ancillary tasks asked of my unit make us unable to remain proficient in our MSST tasks. Besides, we are providing augmented, redundant tasks to the NAS Guantanamo harbor patrol.”¹⁹ This is an example of a unit

funded out of stimulus dollars, assigned to the JTF, but doing garrison work augmenting the NAVSTA. There are other examples as well.

The Joint Medical Group (JMG) is commanded by an O-6 who also serves as the NAVSTA Guantanamo Hospital Commander. In such, he exercises command and control of an expeditionary medical capability that provides humane and transparent medical care for the law of war detainees inside the JTF compound. Externally, the Hospital does not organizationally work for the NAVSTA-GTMO commander, but instead reports directly to Navy Bureau of Medicine East (a Navy 2-star). Members working at the NAVSTA hospital cannot be directed to provide involuntary care (per medical ethics and legal regulations) whereas those who work inside the compound can be forced to exercise care to involuntary or unwilling participants. This has lent itself to the possibility of losing one's medical licensure status in the state by which it was granted and continues to be a contested practice. "It is a violation of medical ethics for military physicians to treat competent patients against their will solely for military or political purposes or for punishment. The Department of Defense seems to understand this, and so it has publicly relied on two basic rationales for ordering military physicians to force-feed prisoners: it is in the best medical interest of prisoners and it is done in accordance with regulations issued by the Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons regarding hunger strikes in federal prisons."²⁰ The New England Journal of Medicine also identifies the ambivalence of the command structure in an interview in 2005: "when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was asked, "Do you approve of the force-feeding of detainees [at Guantanamo] who are on hunger strike?" He replied, "I'm not a doctor and I'm not the kind of a person who would be in a position to approve or disapprove. The responsible people are the combatant commanders." In short, the policy of the

Department of Defense is that the decision whether or not to force-feed a prisoner at Guantanamo is a military one to be made by the base commander; the decision about how to actually force-feed a prisoner is a medical one to be made by military physicians.”²¹ The contrast is certainly stark. “There seems to be real tension between the physicians at Guantanamo, most of whom are under the command of the Navy at the hospital, and the Army commanders who are in charge of the prisoners and their interrogations. It is often argued that a physician in the military should rarely have to decide whether to be a military officer first and a physician second or a physician first and a military officer second.”²² Organizationally, however, it is important to understand that the senior medical officer works for neither the JTF commander nor the NAVSTA-GTMO commanding officer, although he provides a level of service to each organization. His organizational chain of command resides in Jacksonville, Florida. Historically, the health care providers under his charge are sourced individually via the Navy as IAs for six-month or nine-month tours and these IAs report to the senior medical officer. The latter example identifies a breakdown in command and professional skills, as does the detention mission.

The Joint Detention Group (JDG) traditionally has been an Army brigade commander selected off the Command Select List (CSL). This authorization is part of USSOUTHCOM’s staff with duty at JTF-GTMO. The rest of the command staff is sourced annually as an Army brigade-minus staff-package made up of traditional reserve or National Guard members. Three subordinate units carry out the tactical detention operation at JTF-GTMO. The first is a permanently assigned Army unit (525 Military Police Battalion (525 MP Bn)). 525 MP Bn is a subordinate unit to USARSO headquartered out of Ft. Sam Houston, Texas. Each member of the 525 MP Bn is trained, equipped and organized to execute provost marshal and

detention operations as part of the military occupational specialty. The second unit was added in 2005 and is called the Naval Expeditionary Guard Battalion (NEGB). The NEGB consists of predominately Navy active duty sailors in other occupational specialties that volunteered to serve an IA tour of up to one year at JTF-GTMO taking them away from their core missions at home station or at sea. NEGB sailors receive five weeks of training in detention operations before arrival and another two weeks once on station. Compared to the 525 MP Bn, a potential skill gap exists in the successful execution of the JTF mission statement. The last tactical unit supporting the JDG is a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that is sourced via National Guard and Reserve forces to respond to emergencies or transfers of detainees both inside and outside the JTF compound. An example of conflicting loyalties occurred during SOUTHCOM disaster response measures for Hurricane Tomas that impacted Haiti. Since USARSO had a close presence in its permanent station of the 525 MP Bn, it directed members of 525MP Bn to prepare to deploy to Haiti. This direction, administrative in nature, came without the JTF commander's knowledge. An additional consideration for the reader to consider is the utilization of active duty sailors to deploy to mission sets they are neither trained, nor equipped for. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy West remarked in a visit to JTF-GTMO in late 2010 that the work done by NEGB "was arduous, to be commended, but comes at a direct expense to the sustainment of the Fleet." The intelligence community also exhibits mission creep at JTF-GTMO.

The Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) is a remnant organization of almost the same size as its predecessor, JTF-170. The individuals assigned to the JIG continue to conduct strategic interrogations at the request of external stakeholders from partner intelligence organizations both inside and outside the Department of Defense.²³ Evidence of the JIG

leadership conducting operations outside his span of control without the Commander JTF having awareness is available in Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility.²⁴ The inner working relationships of the JIG are monumental enough to have specific reference in doctrine. “The JIG works in concert with the detention mission, an effort managed by the joint detention group (JDG). **It is imperative that the detention mission is conducted in a manner that supports interrogation efforts in the long-term exploitation facility** (bolded in Pub). The JIG and JDG should constantly synchronize efforts. The JIG is managed by an element from DIA DHS.”²⁵ Loyalties to external organizations, closely de-linked with military leadership are evident here and also in the commissions mission.

The Commissions Support Group (CSG) is a blend of the rest of the JTF focused solely on supporting the Office of Military Commissions (OMC). OMC is a Department of Defense entity composed of “five organizations with separate functions and responsibilities for achieving the overarching goal of a just resolution to all cases referred to a military commission.”²⁶ Since OMC works directly for the Secretary of Defense, it bypasses the organizational chain of command for CJTF and SOUTHCOM and also produces its own funding stream. OMC regularly tasks the CSG (absent CJTF) for support including admin, logistics, vehicles, lodging, security and communications. The organization has even created its own, divested funding stream, not associated with stimulus funds for the JTF. Of particular note, the CSG and its thirty plus assets absorbed from the staff of the JTF have executed less than four military commissions trials since 2005, however, they are directed by OMC to be readily available at all times and are thus unavailable to CJTF. The CSG presents

yet another example of redundant overhead with competing stakeholders that limit unity of effort for CJTF.

Other agencies have also played great roles in the daily operations of JTF-GTMO further blurring the lines of command and control absent the Combatant Commander and military operations. “FBI director Mueller told the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) that he visited GTMO in early 2002. He said he then decided to reorganize how the FBI managed its operations at GTMO because it appeared that a much larger FBI component would be participating the FBI’s mission there than previously anticipated. He also stated that to better manage GTMO staffing and oversight, the FBI’s activities should be handled, not from the Miami field office, but instead from FBI headquarters.”²⁷ From 2002 through present, more than 400 field agents have done tours throughout JTF-GTMO. A former case agent told the OIG that “FBI’s chain of command was not as clear cut on GTMO as it would be back in the United States. He said there was a high turnover of agents and temporary supervisors at GTMO, and that personnel worked long days on many different tasks.”²⁸

Perhaps Commander Daniel Jones, in his article to the Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) Journal, expressed the convoluted nature of the JTF best when he asked the question: “Any idea what OMC, CSRT, ARB, CITF, ELC, DMO, ISN, JDG, JMG, JIG, HHC, ICRC, JOC, DOC, and JVB mean?”²⁹ “Each day we deal with international law, operational law, military justice, FOIA, intelligence law, detainee medical treatment, the law relating to hunger strikers, enteral feeding, detainee abuse allegation investigations, and habeas litigation... We also liaise with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Migrant Operations, and Detainee Movement Operations. Some SJA offices dabble in these areas of the law, but we are engaged in these issues on a daily basis. Our office supports litigation

pending in the U.S. District, U.S. Circuit, and U.S. Supreme Courts.”³⁰ “We could not do our job nearly as well without the support of Region Legal Service Office Southeast (RLSO SE).”³¹ Imagine onboarding for a yearlong tour at the JTF. Would it be clear to you *who* you work for and *who* they work for and *how* the mission gets done? On the other hand, maybe the way it has been organized, works.

Counter-Argument

According to an article printed in the JTF’s homegrown newspaper this year, “Over the last 10 years, vast changes have occurred. The camp population has decreased through both military commissions and detainee transfers and the living conditions have steadily improved for the remaining 171 detainees.”³² Five make-shift camps have been placed in moth-ball status and the remaining detainees are now housed in state-of-the-art facilities that exceed Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons standards. Of the remaining guests, “more than 86% are communally living in Camp 6.”³³ In an assessment for the President’s Executive Order to close GTMO, “interviews with JMG personnel confirmed that they work independently from the JDG and JIG and the medical staff is aware of requirements to report instances of observed or suspected violations of applicable standards for the protection of detainees to the chain of command.”³⁴ The JDG and JIG have standard operating procedures that ensure compliance of both their regulations and prohibit mission creep by either side. Two individual task force reports have indicated full compliance under the Geneva Conventions. At the tactical level, the JTF works despite being segregated. However, disorientation and conflicting loyalties affects accountability, execution of orders, span of control, logistical procurement and mission accomplishment, and it is certainly not optimized for long-term.

Looking Forward

*Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single commander with the authority and the capability to direct all force employment in pursuit of a common objective.*³⁵

~ Air Force Doctrine Document 1

Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command

This paper has highlighted some complexities since creation in 2001 that continue today and the value of the object is too great to do nothing. The challenge of detainee operations—an already ill-defined problem—has suffered increasing complexity and decentralized command when it truly needs simplicity and unified command. Despite SOUTHCOM’s ambivalence to the mission, “the administration has avoided acknowledging Guantanamo’s ongoing role”³⁶ yet at the National Strategic level “He (the President) remains committed to closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay, which endangers our security.”³⁷

The answer is less organization, less manpower, and more sound structure culminating in a transition from the Department of Defense to the Department of Justice for long term detention. A five-phase model could maximize the transition and optimize command and control at the same time. These five phases consist of 1) elimination of tasks without quantifiable benefit, 2) consolidation of subordinate command organizations under the JTF command structure to eliminate redundancy, 3) conversion of the JTF to a Joint Interagency Task Force, 4) reduction of the detention mission to a permanent Army mission stationed at NAS Guantanamo, and 5) permanent transition of detention operations from the Department of Defense to the Department of Justice.

First, understanding that the average detainee has resided at JTF-GTMO for eight years, an assumption can be made that actionable intelligence affecting current events is and will continue to be on the decline. If the reader accepts this notion, the elimination of an entire subgroup, the JIG, should be eliminated from the command organization. Further, as a tenant unit, NAS Guantanamo can and should provide force protection for the land and maritime areas surrounding the Naval Station. Readily available assets currently exist at NAS Guantanamo and those assets are augmented by the presence of the MSST. However, as previously identified, the MSST is unable to accomplish its current training requirements. Additionally, the required escorts and supporting cast of other government agencies can also be eliminated from the overall footprint at JTF-GTMO, further reducing the required logistical structures and overall fiscal expenditure.

Second, eliminate the sub organizations that exist under a common JTF structure and empower the JTF-J3 to coordinate and direct all operations in a synchronized manner. This minor organizational shift puts the situational awareness completely under control of the JTF commander via the J3 and eliminates external stakeholders and sub organizations speaking on behalf of JTF-GTMO without the commander's knowledge. Further, a rewrite to the Operations Order (last accomplished in 2005) allows for common lexicon and accountability under the Universal Joint Task Listing (UJTL). This also reduces duplication of support organizations organic to the Commissions Support Group, Joint Detention Group and the Joint Intelligence Group such as admin, communications, and logistics functions. The greatest benefit gained from this phase is prioritization within the a common operational site picture in accordance with the commander's vision.

Third, with the ongoing military commissions and an assumption that those commissions will most likely result in confinement for the accused, additional presence of US Marshals under the Department of Justice are likely. This phase would be ideal for transitioning to a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). Conveniently, this is also an area where USSOUTHCOM possesses resident expertise and could yield dividends in the development and sustainment to the fifth phase.

Fourth, should detention be indefinite as identified by Congress, it is feasible that the JTF could be disbanded and replaced with a single Army Military Police Brigade. This is a logical step as the Army is the executive agent for detention operations. Further, little cost is associated with this phase as USARSO maintains a permanently stationed battalion on NAVSTA Guantanamo. In phase three above, the JIATF could still maintain command and control, and the mission sets could change from multiple to singular: detention.

Fifth, DoD could begin permanent redeployment of its detention personnel to the continental United States and the Department of Justice (DoJ) could assume the permanent role for detention. This phase removes the DoD from further involvement other than remaining a host installation for the DoJ. An immeasurable benefit under this transition to phase five would be a complete handoff among interagencies that could set the conditions for replication in other areas of the world in the future.




Figure 2: Army BDE Proposed Structure

The Brookings Institution says of GTMO on the next 10 years: “America needs principles for Guantanamo’s next decade — principles that might form the basis for a national policy that commands support from a wide swath of our political system.”³⁸

Notes

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- ¹ JTF-GTMO Mission Fact Sheet, accessible at:
http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/xWEBSITE/fact_sheets/jtf_mission.pdf
- ² Military Commissions Counsel Memo accessible at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2_Enclosure-1-Buzby-Memo.pdf
- ³ Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, <http://www.cnic.navy.mil/Guantanamo/index.htm> (accessed May 2, 2012).
- ⁴ Tenant Command,
<http://www.cnic.navy.mil/guantanamo/About/TenantCommands/index.htm> (accessed May 2, 2012).
- ⁵ AFDD 1 Air Force Basic Doctrine, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/afdc/afdd1-chap3.pdf> (accessed May 2, 2012).
- ⁶ Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility
<http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf>,
- ⁷ Albert T. Church, III, “Executive Summary to Donald Rumsfeld,” accessed at:
<http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf>, Page 9, identified in remainder of document as Church Report
- ⁸ US Southern Command Mission Fact Sheet, accessible at
<http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Our-Missions.aspx>
- ⁹ JTF-GTMO Mission Fact Sheet
- ¹⁰ Jeffrey H. Norwitz, “Defining Success at Guantanamo: By What Measure,” *Military Review*, July-August 2005, P. 79
- ¹¹ Karen Greenberg, *The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo’s First 100 Days*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009
- ¹² USSOUTHCOM Mission Statement accessible at
<http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Our-Missions.aspx>
- ¹³ USSOUTHCOM Posture Statement to Congress, 2010-2011.
- ¹⁴ Presidents Budget (2013)
- ¹⁵ USSOUTHCOM 2020 Strategy
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