What Are We Fighting For?: The Center of Gravity in Counterinsurgency
Abstract
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have initiated a flood of scholarly material on irregular warfare, counterinsurgency (COIN), and so-called small wars, and this trend has been furthered within the U.S. military with the revision of several doctrinal publications focusing on irregular warfare. In nearly all literature on COIN, to include tactical directives and other guidance issued by commanders, the population is identified as the center of gravity (COG) for the counterinsurgent. This is incorrect. The proper COG in COIN is government legitimacy. U.S. Joint and service doctrine does not present a unanimous definition of or method for employing the concept of COG except to agree that to achieve victory, a belligerent must protect its COG and defeat the opponent's. An examination of the French-Algerian War and the Hukbalahap Insurrection, in addition to the more current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, reinforces the primacy of government legitimacy in COIN. Understanding this forces the counterinsurgent to address the core grievances which motivate the insurgency, while failure to do so results in the misapplication of the elements of national power and eventual defeat. Because of the way in which the U.S. military uses the concept of COG, and because of the absolute requirement for government legitimacy in COIN, it is only proper that legitimacy be identified as the COG in COIN.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 04, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA563768
Entities
People
- Matthew C. Danner
Organizations
- Naval War College