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14. ABSTRACT Military Diplomacy has been in use for decades and has become an essential part of U.S. Foreign Policy. Although not seen as a traditional role of the military, in a period of shrinking budgets and consolidation of various governmental organizations, the military must embrace this transformation. Operational planners are expected to incorporate diplomatic operations into Theater Campaign Plans using doctrine yet an analysis of joint doctrine shows that none exists to clearly address Military Diplomacy. The establishment of Military Diplomacy is an essential next step in the military's future. Its establishment will formalize a type of operation that military forces commonly perform and will lead to a more effective execution of the U.S. National Strategy and further the efforts of peace. This paper will define and discuss the usefulness of Military Diplomacy, give examples of its use, and analyze Joint Doctrine to show where Military Diplomacy is indirectly discussed. Finally, the paper makes recommendations as to what to include in Military Diplomacy Doctrine as well changes to training and procedures.					
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MILITARY DIPLOMACY: A NEED FOR DOCTRINE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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04 May 2012

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Paper Abstract

Military Diplomacy has been in use for decades and has become an essential part of U.S. Foreign Policy. Although not seen as a traditional role of the military, in a period of shrinking budgets and consolidation of various governmental organizations, the military must embrace this transformation. Operational planners are expected to incorporate diplomatic operations into Theater Campaign Plans using doctrine yet an analysis of joint doctrine shows that none exists to clearly address Military Diplomacy. The establishment of Military Diplomacy is an essential next step in the military's future. Its establishment will formalize a type of operation that military forces commonly perform and will lead to a more effective execution of the U.S. National Strategy and further the efforts of peace. This paper will define and discuss the usefulness of Military Diplomacy, give examples of its use, and analyze Joint Doctrine to show where Military Diplomacy is indirectly discussed. Finally, the paper makes recommendations as to what to include in Military Diplomacy doctrine as well changes to training and procedures.

Paper Main Body

INTRODUCTION

Before a sailor sets foot on land, he or she is primed to behave as an ambassador of the United States and the Navy. Their conduct while on liberty - both at home and abroad - directly impacts how the United States is perceived around the world. When visiting foreign ports, a naval ship Captain is expected to pay official calls to local governmental and military leaders and to host and attend events as a formal representative of the United States. The U.S. Navy and other branches of the military have seen this military diplomacy become part of their standard operations. The value of diplomacy is becoming increasingly valuable as the U.S. attempts to strengthen partnerships with nation states and advance U.S. foreign policy.

Although military diplomacy has been in use for well over a century, Joint Doctrine is vague when it comes to diplomacy and fails to clearly articulate its role and value. The lack of a thoughtful, clearly defined diplomatic doctrine represents a lost opportunity to build relationships between the U.S. and its armed forces and communities around the world. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should create a Joint Doctrine Publication to individually address the use of Military Diplomacy during peacetime and with non-conflict nation states in order to support Combatant Commanders planning efforts.

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

Multinational military operations are including more peaceful and diplomatic operations. An increase in globalization and communications means military forces and political leaders must quickly respond to diplomatic situations. As global relationships become more intricate, no one military department, or even the military alone, can

accomplish the positive, forward-looking and highly diplomatic goals set out in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*.

In *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Coast Guard state that “our Nation’s interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.”¹ Furthermore, they “believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars,”² and that “maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an open, multi-polar world.”³

This task must be accomplished in tandem with the State Department and other agencies, while at the same time emphasizing the importance of the use of diplomacy using military assets. Although not seen as a traditional role of the military, in a period of shrinking budgets and consolidation of various governmental organizations, the military must embrace this transformation. Operational planners are expected to incorporate these types of diplomatic operations into Theater Campaign Plans using doctrine yet an analysis of joint doctrine shows that none exists to clearly address military diplomacy.

Military Diplomacy

There is no doctrinal definition of Military Diplomacy but it could be defined as the use of military forces, in any size, as a tool to advance U.S. foreign policy goals via peaceful and diplomatic interaction. For the navy, military diplomacy is commonly seen as an official

¹ U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine Corps, U. S. Coast Guard. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. October 2007.

² Ibid., 4.

³ Ibid., 5.

visit of a warship to a foreign port. During these visits, the ship's crew participates in community relations projects such as painting schools, orphanage visits, sports matches against local police and military. Official receptions aboard the ship and official calls by the ship's commanding officer to local civilian and military officials are also common diplomatic engagements.

Navy ships bring a unique capability to military diplomacy that few other platforms or other services can offer. When the Navy conducts military diplomacy, its crew is relatively self-reliant. A ship is self-sufficient because it can anchor off a country's coast and requires only minimal host country support while conducting a visit. The ship's crew represents a cross section of the American population with people from various socio-economic levels, cultural backgrounds and nationalities. This varied background provides diverse cultural interaction with the country being visited. Finally, a navy ship is a sovereign piece of U.S. territory that enjoys immunity while pierside in a foreign country.

There are many examples of effective Military Diplomacy, and one such example is from 2006 when the USS Wasp, with a crew of 1,100 Sailors, completed a highly successful visit to Reykjavik, Iceland, "in support of the agreement by the governments of the Republic of Iceland and the United States to maintain and strengthen security cooperation in the wake of the closure of Naval Air Station Keflavik."⁴ Aside from participating in security exercises with the Icelandic Coast Guard and police, the crew enjoyed incident-free liberty, participated in soccer and basketball matches with the local population and interacted with many Icelanders. A U.S. Navy jazz band performed for "residents of the Hrafnista nursing home, and sailors visited the children's ward at the National Hospital, dispensing gifts and

⁴ U.S. Embassy of the United States in Iceland. *U.S.S. Wasp Completes Successful Visit to Reykjavik. Iceland.usembassy.gov*, 2006, accessed 10 March 2012, <http://iceland.usembassy.gov/101706.html>.

cheer.”⁵ These activities had a strong and positive diplomatic impact on US/Iceland relations and could not have been accomplished without the USS Wasp’s crew and their interaction with the local population. This is clear example of what military diplomacy can accomplish.

Military Diplomacy should not be confused with Gunboat Diplomacy. According to Sir James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy is “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.”⁶ Although the title indicates that some diplomacy is involved, Gunboat Diplomacy is coercive in nature and uses the threat of force to achieve its objectives. Although relevant today, Gunboat Diplomacy would not be tolerated and would be counterproductive when dealing with nation states with which the U.S. would like to see as allies. Cooperative relationships can be created using Gunboat Diplomacy but they have a small chance of enduring because it is built not on a truly cooperative playing field but on threat.

Joint Doctrine

Joint Doctrine is the cornerstone of U.S. military operations and engagement. Its fundamental principles “guide the employment of United States military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures.”⁷ It is vital that Joint Doctrine exist in order to guide operational planners and ensure a unified and consistent use of resources, however it falls short of addressing diplomatic initiatives. Although Joint Doctrine does allude to the use of Military Diplomacy

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Sir James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 21.

⁷ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (08 November 2010), 173.

it is either nested within other types of operations or is not applicable given its inclusion in Joint Doctrine that address conflict operations. The following sections will analyze Peace Operations (JP 3.07.3), Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57), Information Operations (JP 3-13), Stability Operations (JP 3-07), and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (JP 3-29) and examine their association or lack thereof with Military Diplomacy.

Peace Operations

At first glance, Military Diplomacy doctrine might be perceived as Peace Operations, but Peace Operations doctrine is based on military and diplomatic actions during or after hostility between nation states. Five types of Peace Operations exist, according to Joint Publication 3-07.3. They are peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, peace building, peacemaking, and conflict prevention. Peacekeeping operations consist of “military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, and are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement or support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.”⁸ Peace enforcement operations “are generally coercive in nature and rely on the threat or use of force”⁹ and “may include the enforcement of sanction and exclusion zones, protection of personnel conducting foreign humanitarian assistance missions, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.”¹⁰ Peace building addresses “post-conflict actions... that support political, social, and military measures aimed at strengthening political settlements and legitimate governance and rebuilding governmental infrastructure and institutions.”¹¹ Peacemaking “is a diplomatic process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an otherwise

⁸ Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Peace Operations* (10 October 2007), I-7.

⁹ *Ibid.*, x.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, x.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I-9.

peaceful settlement of a conflict”¹² but doctrine makes it clear that this type of peace operation is not military-led and instead supports conflict or post-conflict diplomatic efforts. Finally, conflict prevention “consists of diplomatic and other actions taken in advance of predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an agreement short of conflict.”¹³

Peace operations doctrine does not address military operations between the U.S. and nation states that are not currently or are emerging from a state of conflict. Peace Operations does discuss coordination between the military and State Department but its focus on hostile nation states does not lend itself to be applied during peaceful situations. Peace Operations cannot include Military Diplomacy, as the objective of Peace Operations is to return to non-hostility while Military Diplomacy assumes non-hostility already exists.

Civil-Military Operations

On the surface it might appear that Civil-Military Operations (CMO) can be used for Military Diplomacy yet it covers too broad a range of operations with differing planning and execution methods. Also, most CMOs are driven by conflict or natural disasters, which is inconsistent with Military Diplomacy. Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, does attempt to address the use of military diplomacy and is what Combatant Commanders have used in the absence of dedicated doctrine. Civil-Military Operations are:

The activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations that are nested in

¹² Ibid., I-9.

¹³ Ibid., I-10.

support of the overall US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government.¹⁴

Some of the Civil-Military Operations within Types of Military Operations are Counterinsurgency Operations, Security Assistance, Peace Operations, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and Stability Operations, and CMO covers all the joint operational phases from Phase 0 (Shape) through Phase V (Enable Civil Authority). Of note is that many of these Civil-Military Operations within Types of Military Operations have a dedicated Joint Doctrine in order to properly address all its nuances and individual requirements.

The role of political advisors is essential in Military Diplomacy and they are discussed in CMO. The political advisor assists the Combatant Commander in translating political objectives into military strategy and coordination with the State Department. Having a political advisory on the Combatant Commander staff is necessary to Military Diplomacy but his/her limitation of authority in the Combatant Commander staff as described in CMO would be a drawback when conducting Military Diplomacy. Instead, the political advisor should have more authority in deliberate planning and possibly in the execution of Military Diplomacy.

Information Operations

There are hints of Military Diplomacy in Information Operations doctrine. Although the diplomatic doctrine needs to be fully developed, it is referenced as Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD). DSPD are “those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the

¹⁴ Joint Publication 3-57. *Civil-Military Operations* (10 October 2007), vii.

United States Government.”¹⁵ Unfortunately, the only reference to DSPD is nested in Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, and there again under strategic communications. There is no reference to command structure, supporting/supported relationships, or how to conduct deliberate planning for DSPD. Instead, JP 3-13 recommends that Combatant Commanders should make sure that DSPD is consistent with U.S. strategic communication objectives and that DSPD should be conducted to achieve Theatre Security Cooperation Plans and to support State Department and other agencies information programs. JP 3-13 mentions that DSPD activities and measures can be applied to operations other than Information Operations, but there is no reference to any other types of activities or measures in JP 3-13 nor is it mentioned in any other Joint Doctrine.

Stability Operations

According to Stability Operations doctrine, stabilization is a whole government responsibility, but the Department of State is responsible for leading it. Stability Operations are “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”¹⁶ The military’s contribution is to “protect and defend the population, facilitate the personal security of the people and, thus, create a platform for political, economic, and human security.”¹⁷ Although Stability Operations does discuss the cooperative application of military and diplomatic power, it narrows the discussion to disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and post conflict nation states that

¹⁵ Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations* (13 February 2006), GL-7.

¹⁶ Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability Operations* (27 September 2011), I-2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, vii.

require assistance in order to stabilize the country and therefore provide a safe environment for its people.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) has some diplomatic principles but does not cover all facets of diplomacy. FHA “consists of Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for international Development (USAID) or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.”¹⁸ Although FHA can be conducted concurrently with Peace and Stability Operations, separate Joint Doctrine was created for FHA due to its complex and unique nature. FHA can be conducted concurrently with military diplomacy but its planning should be done separately. Each has specific goals and methods to achieve them and most importantly, military diplomacy’s goals are farther-reaching than those of FHA. FHA stabilizes, while military diplomacy is a proactive, strategic relationship building and entirely preemptive goodwill operation.

Usefulness of Military Diplomacy

Military Diplomacy is an important part of national strategy. First, Military Diplomacy helps us understand our partner countries better. Conducting military exercises is an important part of goodwill engagement, but we cannot underestimate the importance of interacting with countries at a personal level, person to person, across a society. When military members participate in sporting events, work on community relation projects, interact with the people at restaurants and in town, it allows our military members to understand our partners’ culture, concerns, strengths, and weaknesses.

¹⁸ Joint Publication 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (17 March 2009), ix.

Military Diplomacy offers a unique opportunity to spread American ideals in a way that print media, movies, and television shows cannot. Having military members interact with a foreign country's civilians allows those countries to put a real face to what they think of Americans. For many, it may change their views of Americans to a positive one, fostering understanding and empathy. For example, the USS Reuben James visited the Republic of Nauru in 2006. Mr. Finch, a New Zealander who had lived in Nauru for over 11 years said that "most of the people of Nauru do not leave the island and have a limited perspective of the outside world, so the time spent with the Sailors of Reuben James will leave a lasting impression and assist in the people of Nauru's perception of the world at large."¹⁹ A Sailor's authentic diplomatic-focused interaction with the people of Nauru left a lasting, positive impression that no other doctrine could.

Military Diplomacy is a powerful tool of good faith. According to Ambassador Gene Christy, a former policy advisor to PACOM, "there's a lot of misappreciation of the United States, and one of the most effective ways to overcome that is through people-to-people contacts."²⁰ Furthermore, he says that soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, "play a very active role in diplomacy by their presence, their behaviors, their openness, their willingness to engage with people and satisfy their curiosity."²¹ This ability of military members to improve the image of the U.S. and show good faith throughout the world is an essential part of foreign policy.

¹⁹ Kim Pham, "*USS Reuben James Delivers Project Handclasp Supplies to the Republic of Nauru*," C7F.navy.mil, 01 February 2010, accessed 02 March 2012, <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2010/02-february/02.htm>.

²⁰ Donna Miles, "*Military-Diplomatic Relationship as Critical in Pacific as Middle East*," Defense.gov, 26 September 2007, accessed 02 March 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47593>.

²¹ Ibid.

SHORT SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

Liberty incidents

The use of Naval Diplomacy carries some risk. A cruiser/destroyer size ship can have a crew of about 200-300 sailors while an aircraft carrier or big deck amphibious ship can have a crew upwards of 1,000 sailors. Most of these sailors are in their early 20's and this poses a risk of a liberty incident while ashore in foreign countries. These liberty incidents can range from simple intoxication and a courtesy turnover of the individual back to the ship all the way to robbery, assault, and even murder. Any one of these incidents can have a detrimental effect on the diplomatic relationship between the two countries as well as serious public relations repercussions.

Although there is risk of liberty incidents while conducting Military Diplomacy, it is an inherent risk no matter which U.S. government agency is interacting with a foreign country. Examples abound of liberty free incidents like the USS Wasp's visit to Iceland in 2006²², USS Vandergrift and USS Patriot's visit to Vladivostok, Russia, in 2006²³, and USS Reuben James' visit to East Timor in 2010²⁴. The risk of liberty incidents exists but is outweighed by the benefits of relationship building with foreign nationals.

Diplomacy is the State Department's role

A very common counterargument to using the military as a tool of diplomacy is that diplomatic initiatives fall under the purview of the State Department. State Department

²² U.S. Embassy of the United States in Iceland. "U.S.S. Wasp Completes Successful Visit to Reykavik." *Iceland.usembassy.gov*, 2006, accessed 10 March 2012, <http://iceland.usembassy.gov/101706.html>.

²³ Amphibious Force 7th Fleet Public Affairs, "U.S. Ships Visit Vladivostok." *Public.navy.mil*, 26 July 2010, accessed 15 March 2012, <http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ffg48/Pages/VisitVladivostok.aspx#.T6LnY-1ch4w>.

²⁴ Kim Pham, "USS Reuben James Brings Goodwill to East Timor," *C7F.navy.mil*, 25 February 2010, accessed 02 March 2012, <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2010/02-february/32.htm>.

personnel receive training and are deployed around the world to interact with foreign countries and are best suited to pursue the U.S. diplomatic agenda.

Unfortunately, the State Department is not manned to accomplish U.S. foreign policy without support. The State Department operates 271 embassies, consulates, and other posts with approximately 13,500 Foreign Service officers.²⁵ Although not equally distributed across all the embassies, consulates, and posts, that equates to approximately 50 Foreign Service Officers per country. Such a small group of people spread across so many countries makes it difficult to accomplish the level of interaction with the local population that the U.S. would like.

Furthermore, the military has already taken steps to integrate diplomatic efforts with the State Department. The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program is one such example and the program has sought to standardize training and improve the quality of FAOs assigned to countries. FAOs go through extensive language and cultural training and once assigned, work integrally with the State Department to coordinate the Combatant Commander's security cooperation plan with the State Department and the foreign country itself. In the article *Transforming Military Diplomacy*, Timothy Shea discusses the importance of FAOs and attaches, who he refers to as soldier-diplomats, and how continuing to improve their manning and realigning their mission priorities will improve military diplomacy and provide greater returns.²⁶

²⁵ U.S. Department of State. "*Fiscal Year 2011 Agency Financial Report*." (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011).

²⁶ Timothy C. Shea, "*Transforming Military Diplomacy*." Joint Forces Quarterly (3rd Quarter 2005), <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-38/JFQ-38.pdf>.

CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

Military Diplomacy is an essential part of U.S. Foreign Policy and articulating a diplomatic doctrine should be a military priority. During the past decades, the military has embraced a transformation from a single-vision use of the military to one where the military is integrated with other governmental and non-governmental organizations. Joint Doctrine has adapted by addressing operations like Humanitarian Assistance, Civil-Military Operations, and Peace Operations. The next step is to create Joint Doctrine to address Military Diplomacy.

In creating a Joint Doctrine publication that specifically discusses Military Diplomacy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider incorporating the following ideas. First and foremost, a clear definition of Military Diplomacy needs to be developed to codify its scope and distinguish it from other operations like Peace Operations, Civil-Military Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance. Next, special consideration and thorough coordination needs to occur when developing the command structure for Military Diplomacy. A simple coordination relationship between Department of State and Defense will not be enough. A supporting and supported command structure should be developed in order to ensure that unity of effort is clear and that all groups involved follow a common approach. This does not mean that the State Department will be the lead in all situations, in fact, in many instances, the Combatant Commander might be better suited to lead diplomatic efforts due to the comparable presence of State Department personnel.

Planning guidance needs to be addressed when drafting a Military Diplomacy doctrine. Diplomacy in practice is quite different from traditional military operations. The planning section should address deliberate planning, key personnel involved and their roles.

State Department personnel should be an integral part and not be represented solely by a liaison. Doctrine should also direct planning and execution below the operational level so that tactical commanders receive specific guidance and objectives during diplomatic missions. Finally, the planning section should address Military Diplomacy's relationship to Theatre Security Cooperation and the Combatant Commander's Strategic Guidance, thereby allowing planners to use assets efficiently.

In addition to Joint Doctrine changes, the role of the Foreign Area Officer and Attaches should be addressed to include their responsibility and level of authority as it relates to Military Diplomacy. Although an FAO community exists in each of the military services, diplomatic training needs to become part of mainstream military training. Commanding Officers and Executive Officers of ships and other units need to undergo basic diplomatic training to ensure they are equipped with the skills to appropriately interact with all levels of a foreign government. Advance country briefs should become a standard part of a unit's execution of Military Diplomacy so that all ranks understand the mission and are adequately prepared to interact with the local population.

According to Ambassador Christy, "U.S. military power adds another dimension to the diplomatic equations... and is often the major catalyst in building partnerships, alliances and coalitions."²⁷ The establishment of Military Diplomacy is an essential next step in the military's future. Its establishment will formalize a type of operation that military forces have been conducting for decades and will lead to a more effective execution of the U.S. National Strategy and further the efforts of peace.

²⁷ Donna Miles, "*Military-Diplomatic Relationship as Critical in Pacific as Middle East*," Defense.gov, 26 September 2007, accessed 02 March 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47593>.

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