Role Conflict: The Impediment to Joint Theater Logistics Management
Abstract
Operational logistics (OpLog) remains an evolving aspect of the operational level of war and operational art. Over the years, attempts to define applicable concepts to this crucial link between tactical requirements and strategic resources have produced an ever-expanding number of functions without a solid theoretical and practical analytical framework of logistics at the operational level of war. The absence of distinct roles and core competencies to execute OpLog impedes the identification of critical capability gaps, and detracts operational level staffs from focusing on value-added tasks required to manage joint OpLog efficiently and effectively. For the same reason, service components apply concepts based on their expectations of what OpLog is, and what it should deliver, resulting in service-centric capabilities and processes that hinder the full integration of logistics capabilities from all the military services, and limit the ability of the combatant commander to establish Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM). Analysis of logistics support during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrates that the lack of JTLM created inefficiencies in OpLog that resulted in less-than optimal support to the joint force. To avoid repeating the same mistake in future operations, enable service component integration, facilitate JTLM, and capitalize on the advantages provided by distribution-based logistics, it is imperative to define and codify, in joint doctrine, the distinct role and core competencies of logistics at the operational level of war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 04, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA564039
Entities
People
- Bruce L. Morales
Organizations
- Naval War College