

THINKING DIFFERENT ABOUT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

BY

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THINKING DIFFERENT ABOUT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

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We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.

Albert Einstein

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ABSTRACT

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This study challenges the enduring assumption of U.S. National Security Strategy that America is uniquely charged to underwrite global security through maintaining military superiority. Since the beginning of the Cold War the U.S.'s use of military force in pursuit of its vision of global security that includes primacy of U.S. core values and eliminating rivals has cultivated an environment of compliance and created this era of "persistent conflict" to balance power. The diminished decisiveness of force and the evolving global context in which war is undertaken are discussed along with the impact of recent studies of suicide terrorism, lasting peace efforts, and cognitive psychology. A new assumption and a derivative framework for U.S. led global security is advanced; one based on the causative factors of peace and stability rather than those associated with "persistent conflict".

THINKING DIFFERENT ABOUT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

THE ENDURING ASSUMPTION

At the beginning of the Cold War the United States, coming to grips with its super power status and capabilities, made an assumption that the U.S. is uniquely charged to underwrite global security which it pursues through maintaining military superiority. The U.S. developed a strategy to support attainment of its interests, including maintaining global security and stability, by seeking primacy of U.S. core values and first eliminating then later avoiding the rise of future peer rivals. Accepting this assumption, the U.S. created a national security framework based on a military with unmatched capability for precision and massed destructive effects, with forces forward-based throughout the world, with the power to project force into denied territory, and with the national will to intervene on behalf of U.S. interests.¹ As threats evolved the U.S. has added stabilizing internal security environments, reconstruction of infrastructure, and supporting establishment of governance to our military forces' duties to ensure the security framework could continue to support this enduring assumption. This enduring assumption demands re-examination. If we look at the threats which the U.S. has trained and organized its military power to combat since the beginning of the Cold War and the evolved global context, this underlying assumption starts to fall apart. Furthermore, the application of this underlying assumption to secure U.S. interests is the *causative factor* for the era of "persistent conflict" as a way of countering U.S. military power and the environment of *compliance* with U.S. interests it underpins. There is an alternative assumption that may foster global *cooperation* rather than *compliance*, reduce overall tensions between the U.S. and other

powers, and produce a global system for resolving conflicts over interest based on the rule of law.

EVOLVING THREATS TO THE U.S.

Gen (ret) Rupert Smith described a form of war, which evolved from the Napoleonic wars, reached a zenith during WWII, and remains the basis for western ideals of war today; that war is a military campaign waged in support of obtaining a political objective by defeating an opposing military force, this leading to the capture of the opposing government's will, and forcing negotiations. In order to conduct this form of war the nation requires access to a large military force and a plan to mobilize that force along with the nation's industrial complex to support it. Thus the nation must have an enemy to plan against.² The clash between the Soviet Union and the west over the organization of post World War II Europe and their competing political ideologies provided the U.S. the threat to plan against at the start of the Cold War. The threat began as the defense of Western Europe from Soviet invasion and over time evolved into Mutually Assured (Nuclear) Destruction and political expansion, both of which were believed to directly threaten the existence of the U.S. Since the U.S. and Russia had immense geographies and vast human resources, possessed large military forces, and later amassed nuclear weapons neither side could attempt to coerce the other through invading or threatening to invade their landmass. Therefore deterrence and containment became the strategies for dealing with the overall communist threat. When the Soviet Union collapsed the industrial war plans based on this threat became irrelevant; but the nuclear arsenals persisted.

Emerging from the Cold War, the U.S. clung to its underlying assumption to underwrite global security through maintaining its now military preeminence. The threat the U.S. turned its attention on was nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There were a large number of weapons and countries possessing nuclear weapons technology at the end of the Cold War strengthening the argument of a global threat. Also, the aftermath of the Cold War saw failing governments adding to the potential of WMD proliferation issues and creating extreme situations of human suffering in which the U.S. employed its preeminent military forces to intervene.³ Direct threats to the U.S. homeland today are not from the great military powers of the world but from small scale, albeit increasingly lethal, non-state actors. Although these new threats, including the potential use of WMD do not directly endanger the existence of the U.S. they could potentially kill large numbers of people and cause long term damage to U.S. territory. Since there are no credible threats to the U.S.'s existence by force the U.S. has used its military forces to pursue its interests and to defend its population through preemptive action abroad—often based on the simplistic rhetoric of defeating the enemy “over there” rather than waiting for them to arrive “here.” The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Independent Panel illuminated this trend of consistent use of force to pursue interests since 1945, regardless of the political party in control of the executive or legislative branches of government.⁴ Given that the U.S. believes its interests are benign and universally good, the U.S. has maintained its assumed role of underwriting global security through military preeminence and its derivative National Security framework. To combat the threat of WMD proliferation and secure U.S. interests the U.S. has maintained its forces stationed in strategic locations throughout the world, its power projection capability, and its penchant for intervention.

Understanding this nuance of maintaining global military preeminence in the pursuit of interests and preemptive action abroad to defend the homeland is important for two reasons. First this enduring assumption of U.S. responsibility remains foundational to the 2010 National Security Strategy and was appropriately accepted as fact during the 2010 QDR, the congressionally appointed 2010 QDR Independent Panel, and is the basis for the 2011 National Military Strategy, the Army's new Capstone Concept and its Operational Concept.⁵ Second, the issue of the U.S. using its all-volunteer force to pursue its interests and for preemptive action abroad against small but unacceptable threats is relevant to recent concern over the gap between the military and the public they serve and protect. The dichotomy of responsibilities articulated in the 2011 National Military Strategy: the *warfighter*, deterring and defeating aggression against the U.S. and its interests, and the *leader* stabilizing environments, ensuring freedom of movement and action and enabling partners⁶, can present a confusing picture of what the U.S. military does to those who have not served. Americans have lost touch with the political ends the U.S. government actually has in the past and currently commits their military forces to pursue. Often civilians watching the documentary *Restrepo* are thoroughly confused about what the U.S. is trying to accomplish. Many Americans no longer understand the phenomenon of war and the utility of force in general.⁷ When we add the inevitable civilian casualties, either accidentally or due to infrastructure disruption intended to deny the opposition's capability to resist, the resulting human suffering compounds the confusion of an out of touch public. War, for most Americans of the post Cold War era, is undertaken by a government they don't trust, something to watch on the news, and is only a significant concern during elections, an economic recession, or when there is a draft. Furthermore, the U.S.'s

democratic system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches which should limit the use of force abroad has rarely been effective. While congress has retained the constitutional authority to declare war, the authority to commit military forces to action in reality has settled solely in the hands of the executive branch. The U.S. has not declared war since WWII, yet it has committed forces worldwide nearly continuously. Deployment of forces increased significantly after the end of the Cold War in part because the enduring assumption of the U.S. responsibility to underwrite global security persisted and the threats became more amorphous. This is one reason the 2010 QDR Independent Panel recommended “that Congress reconvene the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress...to examine the current organization of Congress, including the committee structure, the structure of national security authorities, appropriations, and oversight, with the intent of recommending changes to make Congress a more effective body in performing its role to —provide for the common defense.”⁸ In other words, American’s are increasingly disassociated from the process of using military force abroad, are confused when they see well armed and armored service men and women interacting with unarmed civilians and civilian deaths, are not fully aware of the political ends the U.S. has sought to achieve with force, and the authority to use force has consolidated into one branch of U.S. government. As the 2010 NSS and the derivative National Security policies have demonstrated, this enduring non-partisan assumption and its derivative National Security framework will continue to endure.

THE EVOLVING GLOBAL CONTEXT

In terms of the evolving global context, we must first consider the methodological or tactical trends which adversaries are employing to combat U.S. military preeminence. In order to counter U.S. capabilities for precision and mass, its adversaries conceal and disperse their forces, operate increasingly in urban areas amongst civilian populations, provoke the U.S. into overreacting and overstretching in order to negatively affect the cost-benefit analysis of fighting, and to reinforce their position with a global audience through propaganda. The pervasive and accessible worldwide media networks enable this global audience of foreign governments and individual citizens and to be a more effective influence on decisions of policy. These factors tend to diminish the decisiveness of military force. Second, political science studies of lasting peace have shown that exercising military hegemony evokes power balancing behavior; it does not underwrite peaceful relations. The exercise of military force to influence the internal behavior of another government can create friction against that nation's ideals of sovereignty. Participants within a power relationship will contend for a re-distribution of power even when they benefit from the dominant power's protection; especially when reliance on the outside power creates internal public support issues. Exercising military power makes a nation unpredictable decreasing trust and increasing doubt over motives. This study concludes that strategic restraint can create a reciprocal rather than a *compliance* relationship, and is a causative factor that paves the way for lasting stability.⁹ Using preeminent military power to pursue U.S. interests creates an environment of *compliance* in which *cooperation* is only possible when another nation's interests match the U.S.'s. In other words, there is no utopian "new world order" that can be founded on unipolar military superiority.

The Era of “Persistent Conflict”

The current era of “persistent conflict” to defend the U.S. homeland from violent extremists employing suicide terrorism must be understood in the context of this balancing behavior. Political scientists have determined that suicide terrorism has different characteristics and motivational factors than other forms of terrorism. Most of the major religions and spiritual philosophies, including Islam, condemn the act of suicide. Suicide for most of these groups is only justified when the group, not the individual, can accept it as an act of martyrdom. Current studies propose a number of potential motivational factors driving the Jihad Diaspora to employ suicide terrorism as a means of achieving their goals. Some attribute the phenomenon to failure of Arab governmental institutions to respond to the now educated voice of their populace who feel they have no other way to bring about change. Others blame an out of control strategic gambit by Arab governments who allowed extremist voices to gain power and funded their efforts abroad to take attention away from domestic political grievances. Religious based theorists blame the rise in adherence to Jihadi-Salafi Islam and the ascent of al Qaeda as an international actor.¹⁰ Another study concluded that suicide terrorism “is an extreme strategy for national liberation” by a weak actor who recruits individuals to commit acts of martyrdom as part of an organized campaign to coerce a stronger occupying force to leave their identified homeland.¹¹ Still others conclude that suicide terrorist groups today have evolved into individuated cells inspired by a global jihadism, but are “filling the popular political void in Islamic communities left in the wake of discredited Western ideologies co-opted by corrupt local governments.”¹² Osama Bin Laden himself claims he directed 9/11 to coerce the U.S. to abandon its enduring security strategy so that he could pursue his interests of

overthrowing the current governments in the Arab states.¹³ Whatever the true motivational factors for employing suicide terrorism as a means, the studies agree that using military force to secure U.S. interests in the Middle East, is the *causative factor* for the conflict as a way of countering U.S. military power and the environment of *compliance* with U.S. interests it underpins. Coercing the U.S. and other western nations to stop using or threatening military force in Islamic territory is the universal initial objective necessary for achieving their individual ends. These weaker groups are not state actors and do not have the ability to oppose western powers through conventional force. They resort to suicide terrorism specifically because of its strong potential for coercive power and its greater effectiveness at killing people in the target society. Also, that the fight against western power and influence provides the essential justification for martyrdom within their interpretation of Islam. These studies agree that without the fight against the “crusaders” these acts would be illegitimate suicides and would lose their martyr status.

Indeed, some terrorist or insurgent organizations receive crucial external aid from Middle Eastern governments the U.S. supports. This “persistent conflict” is the U.S.’s catch 22: engaged in conflicts on foreign soil with extremists who are attacking the U.S. because it is engaging in conflicts on foreign soil to further its interests. Since 9/11 the U.S. has attacked pockets of militants, destroyed safe havens, and reached out to moderate Muslim communities in attempts to counter-radicalize the minority extremists and dissidents. Military efforts to locate and defeat current militants are a necessary component of the “persistent conflict” but can reinforce the justification for martyrdom. Killing militants is often used as a coercive tool to dissuade individuals from using terrorism or non-conventional tactics in the future. These

endeavors are appropriate however for establishing secure environments that can support longer term efforts to change behavior other than through coercion. Destroying safe havens can produce short term gains or result in creating another target of opportunity for the groups employing suicide terrorism. Depending on the methodology, safe haven destruction can also feed the root causes of the conflict. Counter-radicalizing dissident groups is difficult for a cultural outsider to accomplish. The psychological dynamics of power relationships tells us that changing behavior between culturally dissimilar peoples requires a high amount of referent power, “admiration”, or legitimate power, “accepted authority” to make up for the lack in similarity. The historical use of hard power in the Middle East has reduced U.S. soft power appeal diminishing referent power. Furthermore, the actual underlying conditions driving these groups to employ suicide terrorism are the inability to resolve internal political issues in part because of uncontested U.S. military power supporting current regimes, falling or failed governance, and an extreme minority call to generally oppose western power and influence through violence. In other words, these groups contest the legitimacy of their own governments let alone the U.S.’s authority in their affairs. Without similarity, attractiveness, or authority, attempts to counter-radicalize or change behavior are hugely disadvantaged. What current political science studies imply is that a better strategy to combat the use of suicide terrorism may be to delegitimize the martyrdom. Without the public support of martyrdom, future acts of this nature could be reduced to simple suicide affecting both the coercive potential and the draw on volunteers.

As a large consumer market for Middle Eastern oil it is in the U.S.’s interest that the price remains under control. But the U.S. must consider the circular logic that using military

force to protect its interests has created a suicide terrorist threat to its homeland as the only viable response; to which the U.S. has responded with yet more military force. The question the U.S. needs to answer is: will the military objective of destroying al-Qaeda, its leadership, and affiliated groups lead to resolving the “persistent conflict” or does resolution require thinking differently about the underlying assumption and what underpins global security? Sun Tzu said nearly 2500 years ago: attacking the enemy’s strategy is of supreme importance in war followed by, in descending order of effectiveness, disrupting his alliances, attacking his armies, and with the worst policy being attacking his cities.¹⁴ U.S. efforts to date have been focused on destroying forces including in his cities, but have not effectively pursued al Qaeda’s strategy, its alliances, or addressed its grievances. The U.S. should never capitulate to the demands of a terrorist and the leadership of al Qaeda is beyond reconciliation. However, the U.S. has not yet begun to address the underlying causes of this “persistent conflict”; that U.S. use of military preeminence to secure its interests in the Middle East has given rise to a galvanizing ideal of using suicide terrorism to coerce the U.S. to stop.

Other Context Concerns

The U.S. is rightly concerned about failed or failing states that could potentially provide safe haven for lawless or violent groups and in maintaining free access to the global commons. The root cause of failing states is in governance, and, as the U.S. has concluded during the last decade, while military force can provide a measure of security and create an environment in which governance issues can be resolved, governance issues are best solved by other means. The 2010 NSS, 2010 QDR, the 2010 QDR Independent Panel, and the 2011 National Military

Strategy state that problems with governance are best solved by “whole of government” or “comprehensive approaches”; often where the military forces will assume a supporting role to some other agency. Also, supporting repressive governments for the sake of stability or supporting unknown groups engaged in insurgent like activity can be a political quagmire. The global commons generally refers to the international shipping lanes, airspace, and cyberspace. Threats to these are from piracy and state-to-state competition for resources which threaten U.S. *interests*, not necessarily the *homeland*. If U.S. policy makers properly understood the studies of lasting peace, suicide terrorism, the psychological dynamics of power in modifying behavior, and this synthesized vision of the evolved global context, they would readily conclude that military preeminence alone cannot underwrite security in global commons and failing governance any more than in underwriting global security writ large.

Conclusions on the Use of Military Force

Military force is still necessary, useful, and can yet be an effective coercive option. The world has and will continue to have people who view gratifying their own desires as more important than the cost to others and those who believe the end justifies the means and ways. Nor is it always wise to reserve military force for a last resort to secure a more favorable position for achieving a political end. This may sound noble in a “Just War” context but it can place one in the position of having to win the violent exchange in order to salvage one’s interest from the jaws of defeat; fertile ground for escalation and desperation to win. Recent political science work has identified protracted conflict and desperation to win a violent exchange as the leading causative factors for civilian casualties.¹⁵ Taken as a whole, however,

this global context suggests that the coercive power of military force has diminished between the major world powers, when used against failing or failed states especially when governance and law and order infrastructure are missing or ineffective, and against non-state actors. Conflicts are more protracted in these contexts because of the additive effects of reduced decisiveness of force, lack of comprehensive whole of government solutions, the increased impact of the global audience on policy decisions, and the attention to civilian casualties. Moreover, using unipolar military preeminence has elicited a countering strategy of suicide terrorism. In short, the underlying assumption that defines the U.S.'s extremely expensive national security framework – that the U.S. is uniquely charged to underwrite global security through maintaining military preeminence – is in fact incorrect, and the resulting security framework, for all its expense and demonstrable capability, is becoming increasingly less effective.

ALTERNATIVES

As the U.S. searches for alternatives to this enduring assumption and the international order it seeks to underpin, the U.S. should consider the question posed in the 2010 QDR, “Whether and how rising powers fully integrate into the global system will be among this century’s defining questions, and are thus central to America’s interests.”¹⁶ The most current Chinese and Russian defense strategies do not envision preeminence of their core values as necessary for a stable global security environment. Both strategies express determination to protect current territories and if interests abroad are threatened to resolve issues through dialog and international institutions like the UN.¹⁷ Both are at present more focused on their

economies and economic influence. If we accept current estimates that China will be able to project sufficient military power to challenge U.S. military preeminence within the next 20 to 25 years and economically in five, then it becomes more necessary to consider how this shift in relative power will change their view of global order. The next question then is does the U.S. desire rising powers to mimic or usurp U.S. military preeminence and the enduring assumption of U.S. responsibility to underwrite global order according to its interests since the beginning of the Cold War?

Declining relative power and potential rise of peer competitors presents the U.S. with tough choices ahead. Options range from: synchronizing hard and soft power to re-establish the effectiveness of the enduring assumption and its framework, governmental reform relative to the organization, funding, and control over employment of military force to attempt to create a distributed decision making process, to more cooperative, multilateral, or isolationist options. If the U.S. seeks to re-establish the effectiveness or simply hold onto the enduring framework it would have to accept the reality of continued funding of military preeminence and the constant effort to balance against its power in one form or another. At some point the U.S. may have to wrestle with the question of when, as Nietzsche suggested, the U.S. may become the monster it fights. An isolationist policy is also difficult because of the domestic pressure a media connected public can put on the government to take action, the potential for economic backlash of failed states, and that many nations are dependent on this enduring framework for their security. Moreover, the studies that define restraint as the leading causative factor of lasting peace warn that drastic reversals like this are rarely adhered to over time.

THE PROPOSAL: NORMATIVE STATE BEHAVIOR

I propose another solution: replacing U.S. responsibility for underwriting a global security environment with an international framework governed by rule of law; one similar to the United Nation's (UN) Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) effort. RtoP is a peremptory norm, meaning the international community recognizes that it is fundamental to the maintenance of an international legal order from which no derogation is permitted. It is not a law that supersedes sovereignty, the right to self defense, or the right to pursue state interests as long the pursuit of interest adheres to the accepted norm. RtoP establishes the responsibilities for a state to prevent civilian victimization and outlines a vehicle for dealing with states when they fail to meet that responsibility. This change in the international framework of security that the global community took is monumental and could be expanded if the U.S. changes its assumption of what underwrites global security: U.S. military preeminence or normative state behavior.¹⁸

The U.S. could begin with leading a UN agreement on definitions of state authority and responsibilities regarding maintenance of access to global commons, non-state actors operating within one nation's boundaries that use violence as a coercive tool against another nation, and dealing with failing or failed governance. In addition to changing how power is exercised within the global community, this shift in security framework could also relieve the current conflict with violent extremism. Through diffusing arguments of U.S. or western preeminent use of power to secure their interests this strategy could delegitimize martyrdom. This system of cooperative security could balance against unipolar or multi-polar exercising of military power

to obtain state interests, including by the U.S., if the U.S. were to value *cooperation* over *compliance*. Under this new normative state behavior security framework, when a state's interests intersect with the failure of another state to adhere to the established norms, the UN Security Council could authorize action against that state. The response tools the UN currently anticipates using under RtoP are: acting early to build capacity to protect where necessary, economic and diplomatic tools, and collective action using existing UN Chapter VI and VII authorities to intervene. The UN has established criteria for choosing the lead country in an RtoP type intervention that include but are not limited to similarities in culture, potential conflicts of interests, capability, willingness, and suitability. These agreements will NOT be easy. However, if we consider the diminished coercive power of U.S. military force relative to the global context and the rise of global powers then the U.S. has about twenty years to reinvigorate the potency of military preeminence, change the global context, or compete within the international security framework it has created.

Criticism of UN solutions center on the perceived ineffectiveness of the Security Council because consensus building and veto power prevent the UN from taking action on the more important issues to the U.S.; and in the UN's relatively weak ability to enforce decisions of the Security Council. To these criticisms I offer two counterarguments. First, that the U.S.'s vision of international order and security based on primacy of U.S. core values and absence of a peer competitor and its underlying assumption of the unique charge to underwrite global security through military preeminence inherently compete with all other external sources of power. When U.S. interests conflict with UN consensus or abstinence, the U.S. has placed its preeminent ability to act above the collective will. China has shown that UN Security Council

members sometimes veto proposals because they disagree with judgment based on U.S. core values or the exercise of U.S. military power to resolve the issue. The U.S.'s vision of world order is not compatible with a distributed power system like it envisioned when it sought to create the UN. If, however, the U.S. changes its vision of international order from requiring primacy of U.S. core values, absence of peer competitors, and military preeminence to underwrite global security, to a vision of the global community cooperatively underwriting normative state behavior, the inherent competitive power aspect could diminish. U.S. leadership can make the UN effective but only by appreciating the value of consensus in the governance of people and changing its view of what makes the world secure.

Second, that these same arguments have been used in the past to describe U.S. constitutional democracy. In fact the foundational ideas of the U.S. constitution were to create a body of government in which power was divided by design; that consensus building and veto authority would provide a system of checks and balances against consolidated power. A system designed to make the hard issues harder to solve but at the same time the solutions more representative of the collective will of the governed than of the will of the government. This system is inherently more cumbersome and less efficient than a governing system where power is consolidated. But, America's founding fathers feared consolidation of power into a small group and chose instead consensus and compromise in the governing of internal and external affairs. How less should the U.S. treat the global community it has assumed unique responsibility to secure? That Americans have become distrustful of their own government in part because of a perceived inability to solve the hard issue is a mirror image of how they view the UN in governing world affairs. If the U.S. looks inward to its foundational ideas rather than

outward to what its preeminent military power can achieve, the institution of the UN might look different in the management of global issues and conflicts.

CONCLUSION

As the sole superpower the U.S. has to lead this change. The hardest part of this new framework for the U.S. will be the strategic practice of restraining military power to secure its interests. It will make decisions for preemptive action more difficult, but replacing the penchant for intervention with strategic restraint is consistent with studies on lasting peace. This new framework would not change the requirement for power projection. Power projection would remain necessary for participation in collective action when states fail to meet their responsibilities and to underwrite the potency of strategic restraint and maintain deterrence against future peer competitors whom do not comply with this UN framework. As this framework matures, the U.S. could potentially realize opportunities to release some facilities abroad, reducing the forward basing of troops. The U.S. would have to balance these decisions against maintaining power projection and deterrence postures. The means of the U.S. military would not have to significantly change. The core missions of *warfighter* and *leader*, collective action as part of an international force, and building security capacity are already key capabilities the U.S. charges its military forces to perform. U.S. Special Operations Forces are particularly adept at these functions. U.S. air and naval forces are unmatched in capability and likewise invaluable in a cooperative security environment. As hard as it may seem, a U.S. vision of global security based normative state behavior underwritten by global cooperation and action, could pose an alternative to a multi-polar military competition for power, continuing to

pay the bill for declining military preeminence, or adopting a more isolationist role in international affairs. Most importantly, it assumes that U.S. leadership in establishing and maintaining a global system based on the rule of law, *cooperation*, and distributed power, underwrites global security, not U.S. core values and military preeminence. Changing this assumption can lead to global *cooperation* rather than *compliance* and serve to mitigate the root grievances driving groups to employ suicide terrorism.

NOTES

- i. Andrew J. Bacevich identifies global military presence, power projection, and a penchant for intervention as the enduring sacred trinity of U.S. National Security Policy since the beginning of the Cold War in *Washington Rules*, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2010, pg. 14.
- ii. General Rupert Smith. *Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York, Vintage Books, 2007.
- iii. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) has added to the list of threats: wars over religious, ethnic, and tribal identity, inequality and economic instability, damage to the environment, food insecurity, and dangers to public health. Barak Obama, *National Security Strategy*, Washington, D.C., The White House, May 2010, 1.
- iv. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel. *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs In the 21st Century*, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, D.C., United States Institute for Peace, 2010, pg. 25.
- v. Barak Obama. *National Security Strategy*, Washington, D.C., The White House, May 2010. Department of Defense. *National Military Strategy*, Washington, D.C., The Pentagon, 2011; and *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, D.C., The Pentagon, February 2010. Department of the Army, *The Army Capstone Concept*, December 2010, *The United States Army Operating Concept*, August 2010. Also see 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel. *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs In the 21st Century*, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, D.C., United States Institute for Peace, 2010.
- vi. Department of Defense. *National Military Strategy*, Washington, D.C., The Pentagon, 2011, 1.
- vii. General (ret) Rupert Smith gives a comprehensive description of the lost understanding of the use of force by both governments and the people they protect in *Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York, Vintage Books, 2007. It must also be stated that U.S. service men and women have performed the roles of warrior and leader well in the last decade; but leading communities to accept new conditions while U.S. service members protect themselves AND simultaneously seek to kill those who threaten the condition they are trying to create is a difficult role for the young sons and daughters of America.

- viii. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel. *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs In the 21st Century*, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, D.C., United States Institute for Peace, 2010, pg. 40-43.
- ix. Charles A. Kupchan. *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2010, pg. 394.
- x. Assaf Moghadam. *Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 707-729.
- xi. Robert A Pape studied all documented suicide terrorist incidents from 1980 to 2005 not just from Islamic extremist groups in *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, New York, Random House Trade Paperback, 2006. Pape claims that two thirds of the successful al-Qaeda suicide terrorists were recruited from the populations of the predominantly Islamic countries in which the U.S. and other western powers have intervened in the last thirty years. The remaining third were individuals who are motivated by grievance against the western occupation of the territory of those in the first group. Pape concludes that suicide terrorism is a coercive means to combat an occupying force but notes that coercion is only effective against limited or moderate interests; therefore the more vital the interest the harder the resolve of the occupying force or nation.
- xii. Scott Atran. *The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism*, *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 127-147.
- xiii. Osama Bin Laden. *Letter to the American People*, London, UK, Observer, 24 November 2002.
- xiv. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, 77-78.
- xv. Alexander B. Downes. *Targeting Civilians in War*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 2008.
- xvi. Department of Defense. *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, D.C., The Pentagon, 2010, pg. 7.
- xvii. The Russian and Chinese strategies are most concerned about internal state affairs remaining internal, in other words without outside judgments based on differing core values and pressure to change. They recognize the U.S. call for them to participate in global leadership but express reluctance to support US-led military intervention. These concepts are discussed in the Russian Federation, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, approved by presidential edict, Feb 2010, and Paul J. Bolt and Adam K. Gray, *China's National Security Strategy*, 2007, Internet accessed on 5 January 2011. Some would say it is

because Russia and China are not capable of foreign military intervention and they must therefore adopt this strategy by necessity. Both however have intervened in countries they border upon in the past and maintain primacy of influence with many countries under their respective security umbrellas.

- xviii. RtoP. Under the RtoP framework the UN Security Council could authorize a range of actions if the members agree that the actions of any party to a conflict constitute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing. Evans, Gareth, and Mohamed Sahnoun. *The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Ontario: International Development Research Centre, 2001

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