

**U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT
OF NATIONAL POWER:
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS AND
A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM PHILLIPS
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2011

This SSCFP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements imposed on Senior Service College Fellows. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-05-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Civilian Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2010 - June 2011	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE U.S. Foreign Policy and the Military Instrument of National Power: Important Questions and A Model for Developing Military Engagement Recommendations				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC William Phillips				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) University of Texas at Austin 3925 West Braker Lane, Suite 400 Austin, TX 78759				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) LTG (R) Joe Yakovac, Program Advisor, Senior Service College Fellowship Program University of Texas at Austin 3925 West Braker Lane, Suite 400 Austin, TX 78759				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES None					
14. ABSTRACT Given the condition of today's international environment and U.S. engagements around the world, including military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, military leaders have an inherent responsibility to provide substantial input to the development of U.S. foreign policy and recommendations regarding the application of the military instrument of national power. This input from military senior leaders starts with asking the right questions. Some of those questions must include: What are the U.S. Foreign Policy objectives regarding the foreign policy issue/concern and what is the desired endstate? How will U.S. involvement in the foreign state conflict meet U.S. Foreign Policy goals? What are some of the causes for the conflict within the nation state? And, what hinders the government and military (& security apparatus) of the nation state from managing or resolving the instability? Answers to these and others, along with a new model to examine intrastate conflict, will enable military leaders to provide better recommendations to political decision makers regarding the development of U.S. Foreign Policy and the application of the military instrument of national power.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Foreign Policy, International Relations, Military, Clausewitz, Trinity, Civil War, Civil Conflict, Vietnam, Kuwait, Panama, Somalia, and Military Strategy					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 58	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON LTG (R) Joe Yakovac, Program Advisor
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 512-232-4566

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

1. REPORT DATE. Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g., 30-06-1998; xx-08-1998; xx-xx-1998.

2. REPORT TYPE. State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. DATES COVERED. Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. TITLE. Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33615-86-C-5169.

5b. GRANT NUMBER. Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER. Enter all project numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257; ILIR.

5e. TASK NUMBER. Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. AUTHOR(S). Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, Jr.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Self-explanatory.

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. SPONSORING/MONITORS AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S). Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S). Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/ monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. ABSTRACT. A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT. This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.

USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT

**U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER:
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS AND A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING MILITARY
ENGAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS**

by

Lieutenant Colonel William Phillips
United States Army
Army War College Fellow
University of Texas

Lieutenant General (Retired) Joseph Yakovac
Project Advisor

This CRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Senior Service College fellowship.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: William Phillips, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

TITLE: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Military Instrument of National Power: Important Questions and a Model for Developing Military Engagement Recommendations

FORMAT: Civilian Research Project

DATE: 1 May 2011 **WORD COUNT:** 15,100 **PAGES:** 58

KEY TERMS: Foreign Policy, International Relations, Military, Clausewitz, Trinity, Civil War, Civil Conflict, Vietnam, Kuwait, Panama, Somalia, and Military Strategy

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

There are more than 100 paradigms, approaches, and theories of International Relations (IR) and Politics that demand different approaches to engagement which, if followed, make international engagement difficult for military leaders. Maybe military leaders should just disregard them and merely focus on what they do best— plan and train and, when directed by the civilian leadership, execute and win the nation's wars and conflicts. However, given the condition of today's international environment and U.S. engagement around the world, including military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, military leaders have an inherent responsibility to provide substantial input to the development of U.S. foreign policy and recommendations regarding the application of the military instrument of national power. This input from military senior leaders starts with asking the right questions. Some of those questions must include: What are the U.S. Foreign Policy objectives regarding the foreign policy issue/concern and what is the desired endstate? How will U.S. involvement in the foreign state conflict meet U.S. Foreign Policy goals? What are some of the causes for the conflict within the nation state? And, what hinders the government and military (and security apparatus) of the nation state from managing or resolving the instability? The answer to these and other questions along with the Three Subsystems Temperate Model, a new model for examining intrastate conflict, will no doubt help military leaders provide better support and recommendations to political decision makers in the development of U.S. Foreign Policy and the application of the military instrument of national power.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY	2
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW	3
3.1. Foreign Policy Development Theory	4
3.2. Conflict and War Theory	9
3.3. Summary.....	16
CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FOR EXAMINING STATE BEHAVIOR.....	17
4.1. The Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics.....	17
4.2. The Clausewitizian Trinity	18
4.3. Applicability of The Clausewitizian Trinity	19
4.4. A New Three Subsystems Model.....	20
4.5. Summary.....	22
CHAPTER 5: The THREE SUBSYSTEMS TEMPERATE MODEL: A PARADIGM FOR MAKING MILITARY ENGAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS	23
5.1. Conflict in South Vietnam	24
5.1.1 The Three Subsystems Model-Vietnam	24
5.1.2. U.S. Military Engagement in Vietnam	26
5.1.3. U.S. Actions in Retrospect Through the Lens of the Model	28
5.2. Conflict in Panama	28
5.2.1. The Three Subsystems Model-Panama	31
5.2.2. U.S. Military Engagement in Panama	33
5.2.3. U.S. Actions in Retrospect Through the Lens of the Model	35
5.3. Conflict in Kuwait	36
5.3.1. The Three Subsystems Model-Kuwait	37
5.3.2. U.S. Military Engagement in Kuwait	39

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

5.3.3. U.S. Actions in Retrospect Through the Lens of the Model	40
5.4. Conflict in Somalia	40
5.4.1. The Three Subsystems Model- Somalia	41
5.4.2. U.S. Military Engagement in Somalia	43
5.4.3. U.S. Actions in Retrospect Through the Lens of the Model	44
5.4. Summary	44
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY	48

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Foreign Policy Implications, Actors, and Contributors	9
Figure 2 A Modified Failed States Index	14
Figure 3 Intrastate Conflict and Mitigation Actions	15
Figure 4 The Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics	18
Figure 5 The Clausewitzian Trinity	19
Figure 6 State Stability Diagram	20
Figure 7 The Three Subsystems Temperate Model	21
Figure 8 The Three Subsystems Temperate Model-Vietnam	25
Figure 9 The Three Subsystems Temperate Model-Panama	31
Figure 10 The Three Subsystems Temperate Model-Kuwait	38
Figure 11 The Three Subsystems Temperate Model-Somalia	42

INTRODUCTION

"I think it's a mistake for the Joint Chiefs [of Staff] to say, 'This is not a military matter,' " he added. "It's not that simple. They say, 'War is too complicated to leave to the generals.' Well, the converse is also true."

– General Bruce Palmer Jr.

Balance of Power Theory, Classical Realism, Collective Defense, Collective Security, Complex Interdependence Theory, Constitutive Theory, Constructivism, Democratic Peace Theory, Dependency Theory, Deterrence Theory, Game Theory, Hegemonic Stability Theory, Idealism, Intergovernmentalism, International Political Economy, International Regime Theory, Security Dilemma, Transnationalism, Game theory, and more than 100 other paradigms, approaches, and theories of International Relations (IR) and Politics demand different approaches to engagement. Applying any of them individually, much less attempting to determine the ‘right’ application of a combination, can and does make international engagement difficult for military leaders. Some might suggest that military leaders should disregard these theories and merely focus on what they do best— plan and train and, when directed by the civilian leadership, execute and win the nation’s wars and conflicts. However, given the condition of today’s international security environment and U.S. engagements around the world, including military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, military leaders have an inherent responsibility to provide substantial input to the development of U.S. foreign policy and recommendations regarding the application of the military instrument of national power. The process of developing valid input starts with asking the right questions.

The purpose of this research is to provide a response to the question “What are some primary questions military leaders should ask political decision makers regarding

the use of the military instrument of national power in order to help achieve U.S. Foreign Policy objectives?” This research also seeks to develop a simple model that can be used by military leaders to help political leaders understand and frame the behavior of a nation state in order to identify factors that contribute to intrastate conflict. In theory, information derived from an application of the model answers the primary research question and provides information to military leaders in their effort to provide support to political decision makers in the development of U.S. Foreign Policy and the application of the military instrument of national power.

CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY

Using a deductive research method, this research examines and provides an answer to the primary question, “What are some important questions military leaders should ask political decision makers regarding the use of the military instrument of national power in order to help achieve U.S. Foreign Policy objectives?” To answer this question, three secondary questions are examined: (1) What questions can be deduced from current literature regarding the nature of conflict and war? (2) What model can be developed to examine interstate conflict? (3) Using a model to examine intrastate conflict, what questions can be derived from examining selected states that experienced intrastate conflict in which the U.S. employed the U.S. military to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives?

Chapter 3 presents an analysis of literature pertinent to U.S. Foreign Policy and the military. This is important because it informs the reader of some of the current research in the subject area and related topics. The review of literature also provides a foundational base to understand interstate conflict and creates a linkage for the

development of a model to examine conflict. This analysis also seeks to provide answers to the question, “What questions can be deduced from current literature regarding the nature of conflict and war?” Chapter 4 examines the Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics¹ and Clausewitz’s Trinity² in order to understand behavioral concepts that could be used to develop a theoretical model that can be used as a lens to examine state behavior regarding conflict or war. This action serves to answer the second research question, “What model can be used to examine interstate conflict?” In Chapter 5, specific case studies are examined using the newly developed model to deduce possible lessons-learned about the use of the military power to help achieve the foreign policy objectives for each engagement decision. Most importantly, this chapter answers the primary research question: “What are some essential questions military leaders should ask political decision makers regarding the use of the military instrument of national power in order to help achieve U.S. Foreign Policy objectives?” Chapter 6 concludes the current research, provides recommendations, and a perspective for additional research on the topic.

CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW

For the near future, persistent conflict – protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends – will characterize the global security environment.³

-2010 Army Posture Statement

¹ The Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics states that if two systems are in thermal equilibrium with a third system, they are in thermal equilibrium with each other.

² The Clausewitzian Trinity is comprised of the government, the military (general and his army) and the people.

³ 2010 Army Posture Statement, available at https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2010/aps_pages/strategic_context.asp (accessed on February 15, 2011)

Literature related to the development of U.S. Foreign Policy and conflict theory is broad and extensive. This discussion of the literature is limited to those selected books and articles that introduce fundamental perspectives which could serve as a basis for military leaders to understanding the development and implications of U.S. Foreign Policy and intrastate conflict. The review is divided into two sections: foreign policy development and theory, and war and conflict theory. At the end of each section, questions are deduced from the literature that can assist military leaders in framing and understanding implications of intrastate conflict.

3.1. Foreign Policy Development and Theory

Patrick Morgan, in the book *Contemporary Security Studies*, takes a Westphalian⁴ view of the various actors in the international system and concludes that the state (or nation state) is the primary actor in the system. He also believes that the actions of states in the international system are mostly influenced by realist⁵ and liberalist⁶ views of international politics. According to him, these views serve as the basis for how states respond to security concerns within the international environment.⁷

Charles L. Glaser, in his article, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” suggests that an understanding of the security dilemma is vital to understanding how competition and

⁴ “The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, bringing an end to the Thirty Years' War, which had drowned Europe in blood in battles over religion, defined the principles of sovereignty and equality in numerous sub-contracts, and in this way became the constitution of the new system of states in Europe.” The Schiller Institute, “Treaty of Westphalia, 1648”, http://www.schillerinstitute.org/strategic/treaty_of_westphalia.html, (accessed on March 4, 2011)

⁵ Realist Theory is “a pessimistic theory of world politics that emphasizes irreversible flaws in human nature and the resulting conflicts that occur at all levels of societal interaction, including interstate relations.” Steven W. Hook, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), p. 411

⁶ Liberal Theory is a “prevalent political theory of the Enlightenment era emphasizing the importance of political and economic freedom versus the power of the state.” Steven W. Hook, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), p. 407

⁷ Patrick Morgan, *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York: Oxford University Press) 25.

war evolves in an anarchic international system.⁸ In explaining the term, Glaser states that “the security dilemma exists when the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others.”⁹ The security dilemma is action that is perceived as a threat which fuels competition. Glaser argues in his article that the magnitude and nature of the security dilemma depends on two main variables: “the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differential.”¹⁰ Most importantly, Glaser points out that the Security Dilemma serves as a basis for scholars to explain important facets of international relations theory and security which include deterrence and reassurance, alliance behavior, imperial expansion, resolution and war, ethnic conflict, conventional arms control, nuclear proliferation, and escalatory dangers of conventional war.”¹¹

Steven W. Hook in his book, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*, suggests the United States is in a paradoxical situation as it seeks to sustain its global primacy while being subject to constraints by the “very forces that propelled its rise to global predominance.”¹² He believes that a historical sense of national exceptionalism, the complexities of domestic foreign policy powers within executive and legislative branches of government, and the domestic non-government institutions each are potential sources that create vulnerabilities for the U.S. government.¹³ Throughout the book, Hook examines this paradox and its impact on the nation’s ability to develop U.S. foreign policy. Hook insists that U.S. foreign policy is impacted by institutions of power

⁸ Glaser, Charles L., “1954- The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics*, Volume 50, Number 1, (1997), 171-201

⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Steven W. Hook, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 10.

¹³ *Ibid.*,13.

inside and outside the U.S. government. He believes that those institutions “define the roles of public and private actors; create and reinforce common values, norms, and code of conduct; and define what is possible among contending foreign policy choices.”¹⁴ Hook then explains that as foreign policy issues become closely related to domestic concerns and issues, more individuals and group stakeholders impact the foreign policy making process and complicate the government’s ability to develop and implement foreign policy.

Of particular note, Hook describes external elements such as public opinion, the news media, interest groups, and intergovernmental organizations as key forces within the civil society that constrain the government’s ability to make foreign policy.¹⁵ He also explains how institutional differences between the executive and legislative branches of government and their constitutional responsibilities also impact the development of U.S. foreign policy initiatives and policies. He says, “the central feature of American politics is the fragmentation and dispersion of power and authority creates problems in the conduct of foreign policy.”¹⁶

Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page write in their article, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?”, that there are multiple actors who appear to influence U.S. foreign policy. Those actors include experts and epistemic communities¹⁷, organized interests groups (including business and labor groups), and ordinary citizens (public opinion). The authors examine survey data gathered over three decades to determine

¹⁴ Ibid.,17.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 15.

¹⁷ An epistemic community is a network of experts who are recognized in their field of study. Given their vast knowledge and experience, these experts tend to speak and write authoritatively on various topics related to their areas of expertise.

the foreign policy preferences of policy makers and the preferences of the general public and specific sets of elites within those populations. The authors deduce that U.S. foreign policy is “heavily and consistently influenced by internationally oriented business leaders, followed by experts (who, however, may themselves be influenced by business).”¹⁸ According to their research, Labor has a smaller but significant impact, and the impact of the general public has a lesser effect on foreign policy development (excluding special circumstances).

James D. Fearon, in a research article entitled, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,” presents two structural domestic-policy explanations of foreign policies. First, he introduces an international relations theory in which states are unitary, rational actors that make policy based primarily on the perception of the actions of other states. And, secondly, he suggests that foreign policy is developed primarily based on domestic-political interactions. Fearon further believes that leaders of democratically led states are accountable to their domestic audience whose power to pressure their leaders cause those leaders to act on their behalf. Then, if actions are not favorable to the domestic audience, the leader suffers costs, including voter discontent.¹⁹

Ira Chernus, in an article entitled, "The Theology of American Empire," argues that U.S. foreign policy is built on Christian theological principles. She suggests that theological foundations are ubiquitous and they influence foreign policy makers.²⁰ In the article, Chernus presents examples from the early cold war years when U.S. foreign

¹⁸ Lawrence R Jacobs, & Benjamin I Page., “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” *The American Political Science Review*, 99(1) (2005), 107.

¹⁹ James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations” , *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998), 289-313.

²⁰ Ira Chernus, "The Theology of American Empire" *Foreign Policy In Focus*, (September 26, 2007).

policy was influenced not only by a Social Gospel²¹, but by influential theologians and one in particular named Reinhold Niebuhr. According to Chernus, Niebuhr became a leading public advocate of a movement known as Christian Realism. This realism view was based on the idea that the original sin of man contributes to the realities of societies and, therefore, the U.S. should be more realistic in its interaction with the rest of the world. As a Christian Realist, Niebuhr actively supported U.S. action in World War II, movements against communism, and the development of nuclear weapons.²²

This partial list of literature reveals that there are multiple actors, contributors, and influences that impact the development of foreign policy. An understanding of them enables the military leaders to better understand the philosophy behind U.S. foreign policy and the bureaucracy of the foreign policy development and execution. A partial list of foreign policy influences, actors and contributors is at Figure 1 below.

Also several important questions deduced from this literature review can assist military leaders to help political leaders frame the international crisis problem in basic foreign policy development theory.

Factors Impacting Foreign Policy Development
--

²¹ Dr. Terry Matthews, Professor at the University of Wake Forrest wrote, "The term Social Gospel came to be applied to this way of thinking just before the turn of the century, and was used generally by 1910. Washington Gladden and Josiah Strong were two of its stronger proponents. They urged that the rights of Labor be respected, and that industrial peace be made between Labor and Capital. Proponents of the Social Gospel warned of dire social changes if some steps not taken to alleviate the ills of poverty, overwork, and underpayment. They preached on behalf of just wages, and profit sharing while they denounced the concentration of wealth, unrestrained competition and laissez faire Capitalism." Terry Matthews, Lecture 19 The Social Gospel, <http://www.wfu.edu/~matthetl/perspectives/nineteen.html> (accessed March 10, 2011)

²² Ibid.

<u>Influences</u>	<u>Actors and Contributors</u>
Historical Values Moral and Religious Values Domestic Government Structure Real or Perceived Security Dilemma Citizen and Public Opinion Perception of Other Nation States Realist Views Liberalist Views Ideology	Executive Branch of Government Legislative Branch of Government Domestic Citizens Domestic Non-governmental Organizations/ Institutions News Media International Government Organizations Interest Groups Business and Labor Groups Experts and Domestic Elites

Figure 1 Foreign Policy Implications, Actors, and Contributors

1. What are the U.S. Foreign Policy objectives regarding the foreign policy issue/concern and what is the desired endstate?
2. How will U.S. involvement in the foreign state conflict meet U.S. Foreign Policy goals?
3. What is the position of key domestic stakeholders regarding the foreign policy issue/concern (e.g. executive branch, congress, experts, business leaders, and the citizenry)?
4. What is the basis for the U.S. involvement in the international crisis (security agreement implication, defense agreement implication, humanitarian action, United Nations Resolution, or other)?
5. What is the position of key allies and friendly nations in the region regarding the foreign policy issue/concern?

Although military leaders receive their engagement directions through the Secretary of Defense from the President, it is important that senior military leaders know the dynamics and implications of engagement decisions in order to provide proper recommendations to the senior political decision makers.

3.2. Conflict and War Theory

Michel E. Brown, in an article entitled “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and implications,” places the underlying causes of ethnic and internal conflicts in four categories: Structural Factors; Political Factors; Economic/Social Factors; and Cultural/Perceptual Factors. As such, when states become weak a state’s inability to govern and maintain a credible security apparatus allows opposition groups and

criminals to become emboldened and develop their own method for securing group interests. Political factors involve discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary ideologies, intergroup politics and elite politics.²³ Economic and Social Factors include “economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and the trials and tribulations of economic development and modernizations.”²⁴ Finally, Cultural and Perceptual Factors include “inequitable educational opportunities, legal and political constraints on the use and teaching of minority languages, and constraints on religious freedom.”²⁵ Brown goes on to suggest that there are four additional considerations that can trigger a conflict: Internal mass level factors (severe domestic problems); external mass-level factors (bad neighbors); internal, elite level factors (bad neighbors); and internal, elite-level factors (bad leaders).²⁶

Ted Robert Gurr approaches ethnic conflict as an outcome of a state’s inability to satisfy the grievances of a group within the state. In his article, entitled, “Minorities and Nationalist: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century” Gurr claims that there are four general factors that impact a rebellion of distinct groups against the government of a nation state. Those are salience of ethnocultural identity; collective incentives; capacity for action; and availability of opportunities in the political environment.²⁷ Salience of identity involves sharing common descent, cultural traits and historical experiences.²⁸ Collective incentives include resentment about losses suffered in the

²³ Michael Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts” *Turbulent Peace*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace Press, 2006), 216

²⁴ Ibid, 217.

²⁵ Ibid, 218.

²⁶ Ibid, 219.

²⁷ Ted Robert Gurr, “Minorities and Nationalists; Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century” *Turbulent Peace*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace Press, 2006), 167.

²⁸ Ibid, 167.

past, fear of future losses, and hopes for relative gains.²⁹ Capacity for action relates to the structural process and ability to recruit and motivate group members to mobilize into action.³⁰ Availability of opportunities involves the political and societal dynamics external to the group.³¹ Gurr believes that opportunities are durable and transient. Durable factors affect the group's organization and long term strategies while transient factors affect morale, mobilization, and credibility.³² Gurr is also careful to provide five actions that a state can pursue to help ease tensions while addressing the grievances. He suggests the following: Recognizing and promoting group political, cultural and economic rights; recognizing the right of regional minorities to sub state autonomy; instituting democratic institution and power sharing to protect group rights; instituting mutual accommodations; involving the international community to negotiate conflict settlements; and using coercive intervention by the state to suppress human rights violations.³³ Also, according to Gurr, the international community should help address grievances, including providing assistance in mobilization and conducting offensive armed engagements. The international group should appease rebellious groups by enabling group autonomy or regional autonomy (regional elections).

In their article "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin take the position that ethnic rebellion is the result of ethnic discrimination and less about grievances.³⁴ Fearon and Laitin further believe that civil war is enabled by a state's inability to stop rebellions due to factors that enable a resistance, such as rough

²⁹ Ibid, 169.

³⁰ Ibid, 171.

³¹ Ibid, 174.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid, 180 -184.

³⁴ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, Issue 1 (2003), 97: 75-90.

terrain and weak security forces by the state.³⁵ They also believe that wealthy states can defeat rebels, but weak states are incapable of mobilizing to defeat the rebels.³⁶

Rubin Jeffry, in his book *Social Conflict*, suggests sources of conflict involve perceived relative deprivation, mistrust, and 'in' group and 'out' group (e.g. It is human nature for people form themselves into groups which leads to conflict). Jeffry argues factors that foster conflict include: Periods of growth (intuition/perception of fairness – more opportunities- relative deprivation); erosion of hierarchal norms; miscalculation of relative power; communicability within a group (easier to organize a rebellion); and the presence and characteristics of leaders within groups. He also presents actions that could lead to the development of agreements to end conflict which include: Preventing/barriers to communication; segregating to prevent comparison; providing social mobility; co-opting moderates (concessions) and marginalizing extremists (no concessions); and blocking outside support.

Milton Esman, in an article entitled "Ethnic Pluralism: Strategies for Conflict Management," suggests that there are three strategies for ending a conflict: "Depluralization;" reducing political salience; and legitimizing ethnic pluralism. Depluralization includes co-opting membership of the aggressive party into the dominant culture, education, economic life, media, and agencies of the government. Political salience involves allowing disenfranchised group positions in government and allowing direct involvement in the political process. Ethnic pluralism involves a method of recognizing and engaging multiple ethnic groups.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

The Index of Failed States provides a comprehensive list of social, economic and political indicators that the Fund For Peace believes indicate a failing or failed state.³⁷

The Fund for Peace is “an independent, nonpartisan research and educational organization that works to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause conflict.”³⁸

The Index lists 177 countries and their relative rank in terms of stability, with the highest number representing the most failed state. The Index is important because it may help military and political decision makers to understand domestic circumstances (and indicators) that contribute to intrastate conflict. Social indicators include: Demographic pressures; massive movements of refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating complex human emergencies; legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievances or group paranoia; and chronic and sustained human flight. The economic indicators include: uneven economic development along group lines; and sharp and/or severe economic decline. Political indicators include: Criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state; regressive deterioration of public services; suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and wide spread violation of human rights; security apparatus operates as a state within a state; rise of factionalized elites; and intervention of other states or external political actors. Each of the indicators is further subdivided into additional components. The Modified Failed States Index chart, shown in Figure 2, below contains countries in which the U.S. has had some level of military engagement and the country’s relative position on the failed states index.

³⁷ The Fund For Peace Mission Statement, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=435&Itemid=598, (Accessed March 3, 2011).

³⁸ Ibid.

		Social Indicators				Economic Indicators		Political Indicators								
		Demographic Pressures				Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines		Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State								
		Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies				Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline		Regressive Deterioration of Public Services								
		Legacy of Vergengence-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia						Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights								
		Cronic and Sustained Human Flight						Rise of Factionalized Elites								
		People						Government		Military		Outside Actor				
Rank	Country													Total		
1	Somalia	9.6	10	9.7	8	8	9.6	10	9.6	9.9	10	10	9.6	114	49	58.7
6	Afghanistan	9.5	9.2	9.7	7	8.2	8.3	10	8.9	9.2	9.4	9.7	10	109	47	56.7
7	Iraq	8.5	8.7	9.3	9	8.8	7.6	9	8.4	9.1	9.6	9.5	9.5	107	44	53.2
10	Pakistan	8.1	8.9	9.4	8	8.4	6.2	9	7.3	8.9	9.5	9.7	9.3	103	42	51.1
11	Haiti	9.3	5.6	7.3	9	8.3	9.2	9	9.5	8.3	8.4	8.2	9.6	102	44	53.9
12	Ivory Coast	8.4	8	8.9	8	7.9	8	9	8.3	8.3	8.5	8.2	9.5	101	42	51.4
15	Yemen	8.6	8.3	8.2	7	8.6	7.9	9	8.6	8	9.2	8.9	7.8	100	42	49.9
19	North Korea	8.5	5.6	7.2	5	8.8	9.6	10	9.6	9.5	7.8	8.1	8.2	97.8	46	53.8
32	Iran	6.4	8.3	8.1	7	7.3	5.5	9	5.9	9.4	9.5	8.9	6.8	92.2	39	46
40	Rwanda	9.1	7	8.5	7	7.2	7	8	7.4	7.5	8	5	7.5	88.7	36	43.6
60	Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.3	7.1	8.7	6	7.1	5.7	8	5.4	5.9	9.2	7.2	8.3	83.5	32	40.4
77	Cuba	6.7	5.7	5.5	7	6.6	6.3	7	5	7.5	7.1	7.3	7.5	79.4	35	42.3
82	Venezuela	6.3	5.1	6.8	7	7.6	5.8	7	6.1	7.2	7.5	6.7	5.7	78.7	33	38.9
111	Libya	5.7	4.3	5.8	4	6.9	5.3	7	4.2	8.3	7.1	5.2	4.8	69.1	32	36.6
125	Kuwait	5.5	4.1	5.1	4	6.1	3.8	6	3.1	6.5	7.2	4.9	5.1	61.5	27	31.8
157	Germany	3.3	4	4.7	3	4.7	3.6	2	1.7	2.3	2	2.2	2.2	35.4	14	15.7
158	United States	3.1	3.2	3.4	1	5.4	4	3	2.5	3.7	3.3	1.6	1.5	35.3	15	16.4
159	France	3.7	3.1	5.6	2	5.3	3.6	2	1.5	2.7	2	1.6	2.2	34.9	13	15.6
175	Sweden	2.7	2.7	1.3	2	2.1	2.2	1	1.3	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.6	20.9	8.8	10.4
176	Finland	2.3	1.7	1.2	2	1.7	3	1	1.2	1.5	1	1	1.8	19.3	8.5	10.3
177	Norway	1.7	1.6	1.3	1	2.4	2.6	1	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.2	2.1	18.7	7.9	10

Figure 2: A Modified Failed States Index Source: The Fund For Peace

This examination of Conflict and War Theory literature shows multiple causes for interstate conflict and many actions that can be taken to help reduce or manage it. Figure 3 shows a list of the most significant causes and mitigation actions that can be taken by the state in conflict or by other states rendering support to that state. Additional conflict indicators and causes are at Annex 1.

Conflict and War Theory	
Causes	Actions to Reduce or Manage Conflict

• Weak State • Weak Security Apparatus/Forces • Hostile/Corrupt Neighbors • Corrupt Political Institution • Ethnic Discrimination • Exclusionary Ideologies • Intergroup politics and Elite Politics • Discriminatory Economic System • Poor Economic Development and Modernizations • Inequitable Educational Opportunities • Corrupt/Ill functioning Legal System • Constraints on Minority Language • Constraints on Religious Freedom • Unmet Grievances • Deprivation • Mistrust • Human Rights Violations • Shortage of food supply and other life-sustaining resources • Skewed population distributions • Authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule which suspends or manipulates constitutional and democratic institutions and processes • Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites • State-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents or civilians • More – See attachment #1 from Failed States Index	• Recognizing and Promoting Group Political, Cultural and Economic Rights • Recognizing Regional Minorities Rights • Recognizing Sub-State Autonomy • Instituting Democratic Institution • Developing Power Sharing Processes • Instituting Mutual Accommodations • Involve the International Community to Help Negotiate Conflict Settlements • Support/Use Coercive Intervention • Strengthen/Augment the Security Apparatus/Force • Remove Communication Barriers • Provide Social Mobility • Co-op Moderates Groups • Marginalize Extremists • Block Outside Support
--	---

Figure 3 Intrastate Conflict and Mitigation Actions

Understanding possible causes and mitigation actions is important in helping the military leader not only to grasp the true nature and depth of a crisis, but also to help determine a feasible course of action to remedy the problem. After examining the literature on conflict and war theory and causes and potential mitigation actions, several important questions that can assist military leaders to help political decision makers to better frame the international crisis problem and to eventually make recommendations regarding the use of military power are:

1. What are some of the causes for the conflict within the nation state?

2. Given the cause(s) of the intrastate conflict and possible mitigation action(s), using a whole of government approach, what resources are required to implement the mitigation action(s).
3. What are the gaps in that nation state's security force capabilities?

3.3. Summary

The literature related to the development of U.S. Foreign Policy and conflict theory is broad and extensive. The limited review of literature presented in this chapter of selected books and articles written by some of the leading theorists in the fields of foreign policy and conflict management, as well as other selected authors, provides valuable insights that can provide military leaders a broader understanding of the development of U.S. Foreign Policy and implications of interstate conflict. Most importantly, analyzing the literature presented in this section reveals that there are multiple causes, many actions actors and contributors, and many implications that impact the development of foreign policy and actions that, if implemented, can potentially help reduce or manage intrastate conflict. Also, this review of the pertinent literature identifies important questions that impact the development of engagement strategy:

1. How will U.S. involvement in the foreign state conflict meet U.S. Foreign Policy goals?
2. What is the position of key domestic stakeholders regarding the foreign policy issue/concern (e.g. executive branch, congress, experts, business leaders, and the citizenry)?
3. What is the basis for the U.S. involvement in the international crisis (security agreement implication, defense agreement implication, humanitarian action, United Nations Resolution, or other)?
4. What is the position of key allies and friendly nations in the region regarding the foreign policy issue/concern?
5. What are the U.S. Foreign Policy objectives regarding the foreign policy issue/concern and what is the desired endstate?
6. What are some of the causes for the conflict within the nation state?

7. Given the cause(s) of the intrastate conflict and possible mitigation action(s), using a whole of government approach, what resources are required to implement the mitigation action(s)?
8. What are the gaps in that nation state's security force capabilities?

CHAPTER 4 DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FOR EXAMINING STATE BEHAVIOR

"....And our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets"³⁹

- Carl Von Clausewitz


This chapter explores an analytical methodology that can be used to examine the interactions of major subsystems within and across nation states, derived from principles within the Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics and the Clausewitzian Trinity. The resultant model should enable military leaders to develop military engagement recommendations regarding the employment of military forces to achieve the goal of foreign policy.

4.1. The Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics

Sir Ralph Howard Fowler, a British physicist, is credited with introducing the Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics (ZLT) into modern science. Upon examination it appears that principles from the ZLT can provide military leaders with better understanding of the interaction of the three major subsystems within a nation state. The ZLT is based on the notion that by balancing the equilibrium of connected subsystems, equilibrium can be gained for the entire system. Specifically, as shown in Figure 4, the Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamic postulates that if system A is in equilibrium with system B, and system B is in equilibrium with system C, then system C must be in equilibrium with System A. Therefore, when heat is applied to a closed

³⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Translated and Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 87-89.

system quasi-evenly over a period of time, the temperature of each sub-system within the system reaches parity resulting in equilibrium across each of the sub-systems. Also, if two subsystems (A and C) within a system are in equilibrium with an outside




system D, then subsystem A and subsystem C within the system are in equilibrium even without a direct physical connection. If either of the two systems (A and C) within the system remains in contact with the third subsystem B within the system, then each system (A, B, and C) within the system is in equilibrium with the outside system D. If neither of the subsystems (A or C) is in equilibrium with the third subsystem B within the system, the entire system (A, B, and C) is not in equilibrium.

4.2. The Clausewitzian Trinity

Clausewitz's concept of warfare as a trinity provides military leaders insight into conflict, warfare and the development of military strategy. The trinity concept suggests that through reason a nation develops policy that directs the employment of the military to extend political policy in the form of a military engagement or war. As shown in Figure 5, Clausewitz stated that there are three components to the trinity: The people⁴⁰, the commander and his army (or the military), and the government. Accordingly, to be successful the people provide support to and must have the will for a sustained military engagement, the military must have the proper leadership and its forces must be trained

⁴⁰ Inclusive in this group are individual voters, owners of domestic businesses, owners of multinational corporations, interest groups, educational organizations and think tanks, and owners of media organizations. These individuals and representative groups have influence that affect public opinion, military support and the ability of elected officials to enact policy.

for the engagement, and the government must appropriately define the overall national objectives and ends which the military will help achieve during its engagement. Clausewitz further suggested that each component of the trinity has




intricate characteristics and inherent fundamental principles that govern its functionality. Clausewitz used the phrase, “deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another”⁴¹. He went on in an almost warning tone to say that a collegial relationship of the elements of the trinity should not be expected during a military engagement or war due to intrinsic shifts and changes. Still, he suggested that the aim should be to develop an engagement strategy that garners the support of the government, military and the people.

4.3. Applicability of The Clausewitzian Trinity

The elements of Clausewitz’s trinity of war are the same core elements that can ensure peace and stability in a nation state (as shown in Figure 6). Internal stability within the state occurs when the government, the people and the military work together for the common good of the nation. Stability is the result of a functional relationship (with checks and balances) between the three elements. The government is able to create policy and govern, the basic needs of the population are met and they have the freedoms that are common to that society, and the military works for common good of the nation to include establishing and maintaining national security for the state. State stability is a result of the government, the people and the military subsystems working

⁴¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Translated and Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 213.

toward those actions that inevitably help create and maintain the stability of the state. However, there remains the same difficulty as stated by Clausewitz regarding his theory for war, “Our task therefore is to



develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”⁴² U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates recently stated that, “In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security -- a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack -- are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory.”⁴³ He also said, “Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.”


4.4. A New Three Subsystems Model

As a derivation of the Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics and the Clausewitzian trinity, a three subsystems temperate model is constructed and shown in Figure 7. From this model, it is postulated that stability within a nation state is the result of a convergence of efforts by the major subsystems of that state: the government, the people, and the military on the common national objective of stability. The government subsystem is comprised of the government leaders and government organizations. Aspects of the security apparatus are also a part of the government, including local police and fire departments. The people subsystem includes: citizens, businesses, private organizations, interests groups, religious organizations, and academia, think

⁴² Ibid, 89.

⁴³ Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Helping Others Defend: Foreign Affairs; Future of U.S. Security Assistance”, *Foreign Affairs* (June July 2010), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves>, (accessed March 5, 2011).

tanks, private and public medical facilities, media services (print and electronic forms) and others. The military subsystem is comprised of the armed forces of the state. For some, it includes: A land force, air force, sea force, and special armed organizations. In most countries the



military is heavily influenced by the government because many of the senior leaders are appointed by the government apparatus.

Instability within a nation state occurs when any one of the subsystems is not in balance with one or both of the other two subsystems. It is therefore incumbent on the government of the nation state to remain in acceptable balance with both the people and military subsystems. For instance, the government can be in acceptable balance with the military, but out of balance with the people, thus creating national instability and an environment where the government and the military unites against the people creating the environment for an oppressive political regime. Also, when the people and the military are in balance and the government is out of balance, the instability within the nation state creates the opportunity for the military to rebel against the government and aids in the installation of new government leaders. Finally, regardless of whether a nation state represents itself as a closed society, nation states within the globalized world interact because of international commerce, treaties, alliances, and intergovernmental organizations. There is also nation-to-nation interaction including subsystems interacting with the subsystems of other nations.

4.5. Summary

Principles derived from the Clausewitzian concept of the trinity and the Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics were used to develop the Three Subsystems Temperate Model. This model can serve as a framework to allow military leaders to examine the key subsystems within a nation state, as well as those impinging external systems, to help identify real or potential areas of instability within a state. The model should also cause military leaders to ask pertinent question about the subsystems within the state associated with the establishment and maintenance of state stability, thereby helping develop thoughtful recommendations regarding the feasibility of applying military force to accomplish the policy goal of state stability. Those questions should include the following:

1. Is the nation state stable? If not, from which subsystem does the instability originate?
2. What is the cause of the instability within the subsystem? Why can't the other two subsystems remedy the instability within the unstable subsystem?
3. Which, if any, external systems are contributing to the instability within the nation state?
4. What is the nature of the power structure within the nation state? What hinders the government and military (& security apparatus) of the nation state from managing or resolving the instability?
5. How does addressing the instability of the nation state serve U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy goals?

CHAPTER 5 THE THREE SUBSYSTEMS TEMPERATE MODEL: A PARADIGM FOR MAKING MILITARY ENGAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

*History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy. But as most of the thinking about war has been done by men of the military profession there has been a very natural tendency to lose sight of the basic national object, and identify it with the military aim.*⁴⁴

- B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*

⁴⁴ Hart, B.H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Publisher: Frederick A. Praeger, New York. 1954.

The utility of the Three Subsystems Temperate Model is the model's ability to help military leaders examine a conflict within a nation state in order to determine which subsystem (or systems) should serve as the focal point for synergized engagement decisions, including the employment of the military instrument of national power. The expectation is that by examining the dynamics of intrastate conflict environment through the lens of the model military decision makers are better able to determine the subsystems within the state that are experiencing tensions leading to conflict. The model does not determine causality of the tension; however, the questions deduced from the research and the list of general causes can better help military leaders provide recommendations to political decision makers. The model also is expected to help identify external contributors, if any, which support the continuance of the conflict within a nation state. Evidence supporting the practical utility of the model is derived from examining South Vietnam during the US-Vietnam War, Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm/Shield, Panama during Operation Just Cause, and Somalia during Operation Restore Hope. Recommendations regarding U.S. engagement actions in retrospect are provided at the end of each case study.

5.1. Conflict in South Vietnam


At the end of the World War II, Vietnam (Indochina) was under the influence of the French government. In 1950, the U.S. became heavily involved in Vietnam by providing support to France in its attempt to defeat Ho Chi Minh. Minh was a revolutionary leader who vowed to rid Vietnam of the French and Japanese, who were viewed as occupying nations. With support from groups in North Vietnam, China, the

Soviet Union and other communist countries, Minh vowed to establish an independent Vietnam. What is particularly significant is that after the French agreed to withdraw from Vietnam and a division of the nation into North (communist) and South Vietnam (non-communist), the U.S. and other nations pursued actions to keep Vietnam from becoming a unified communist nation. In South Vietnam the U.S. supported the election of Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was deemed ineffective by the South Vietnamese people. It is reported that he used his power and elements of the defense force to forcefully enforce his policies. However, Diem was eventually assassinated. Much of the ineffectiveness was a result of Diem's alienation of the Vietnamese people and establishments. Many of the South Vietnamese people galvanized with communist sympathizers and then established the National Liberation Front, known as the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong attempted to overthrow the Vietnamese government and military through an armed insurgency.

5.1.1. The Three Subsystems Temperate Model

The diagram in Figure 8 shows a negative push from the people towards stability because they wanted and demanded changes in the government structure and policies.

The people also demonstrated less support for and protested against the South Vietnamese national military and security forces. According to one report, the security forces of South Vietnam showed little concern for the true welfare of the populace and operated in a



repressive and cruel manner towards them.⁴⁵ Also, institutions from within the people subsystem were receptive to and influenced by the interests of other nation states and non-state actors over those of the United States and its allies. Support came from China, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and other supporters. They were also sympathetic to the North Vietnamese government. Additional insight into the conflict is developed as answers are provided to the questions below.

Basic Questions from the Model:

1. Is the nation state stable? If not, from which subsystem does the instability originate?

Answer: South Vietnam was an unstable nation state; the instability resulted from the government subsystem and the influence of several outside systems, namely, North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and other Communist countries, including the Soviet Union.

2. What is the root cause of the instability within the subsystem? Why can't the other two subsystems remedy the instability within the unstable subsystem?

Answer: (A) The root cause of instability was a repressive and corrupt government led by President Ngo Dinh Diem. President Diem's quest to protect the country from the threat of communism led to the implementation of national policies that caused the people system to lose balance with the government and military systems.⁴⁶ This allowed the people subsystem to become influenced by outside systems. (B) The government and the military were too oppressive and weak to repel the discontent of the South Vietnamese people and the incursions by the North Vietnamese Military.

3. Which external systems are contributing to the instability within the nation state?

⁴⁵ Robert K. Brigham, "Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History" <http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/history/>, (accessed February 6, 2011)

⁴⁶ "The outcry against Diem's harsh and oppressive actions was immediate. Buddhist monks and nuns were joined by students, business people, intellectuals, and peasants in opposition to the corrupt rule of Ngo Dinh Diem. The more these forces attacked Diem's troops and secret police, the more Diem complained that the Communists were trying to take South Vietnam by force. This was, in Diem's words, "a hostile act of aggression by North Vietnam against peace-loving and democratic South Vietnam." Robert K. Brigham, "Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History" <http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/history/>, (accessed February 6, 2011).

Answer: North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and other communist countries, including Russia and China, provided training, soldiers, and military support to the North Vietnamese opposition movement.

4. What is the nature of the power structure within the nation state? What hinders the government and military (& security apparatus) of the nation state from managing or resolving the instability?

Answer: The position of president is responsible for controlling the military of the democratic nation state. However, the military was not strong enough to control the influence of the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam within the country.

5. How does addressing the instability of the nation state serve U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy interests?

Answer: The U.S. led the efforts to establish the democratic state and supported the election of the first president, Ngo Dinh Diem. The U.S. wanted to ensure that the new democratic state survived. Also, the U.S. wanted to ensure South Vietnam would remain a democratic state and not to succumb to communism, thereby triggering the Domino Theory collapse of other Southeast Asian nations.

5.1.2. U.S. Military Engagement in South Vietnam

As a final measure to ten years of escalated tensions between North and South Vietnam, President Johnson's strategy was to employ the military instrument of national power to help prevent South Vietnam from becoming communist, which he believed, under the Domino Theory, would lead to the rapid takeover by communists of other Southeast Asian nation states.⁴⁷ Therefore, he issued National Security Action

⁴⁷ "The U.S. became heavily involved in Vietnam in 1950 by providing support to the French government in its attempt to defeat Ho Chi Minh. Minh was a revolutionary leader who vowed to rid Vietnam of the French and Japanese who were viewed as occupying nations. With support from groups in North Vietnam and China, Minh vowed to establish an independent Vietnam. He was determined to bring to fruition a statement he made years earlier. - In September 1945, in the midst of French and Chinese wrangling for control of parts of the country and Britain also displaying influence, on this same day, Ho Chi Minh proclaims the independence of Vietnam and then quotes a passage from American Declaration of Independence "We hold the truth that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, among them life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Perhaps what is significant is that after the French agreed to withdraw from Vietnam and a division of the nation into North (communist) and South Vietnam (non-communist), the U.S. and other nations pursued actions to keep Vietnam from becoming a communist nation. In South Vietnam the U.S. supported the election of Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was deemed ineffective and eventually assassinated. Much of the ineffectiveness was a result of Diem's alienation of the Vietnamese people and establishments. Many of the people galvanized with

Memorandum 52 which outlined U.S. Policy towards Vietnam. Specifically, the policy document stated that “U.S. objectives (and concept of operations) were to prevent communist domination of South Vietnam; create in Vietnam a country that is viable and increasingly democratic society, and to initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective.”⁴⁸

The U.S. strategic plan for engagement in Vietnam was fairly simple in nature, but because of the tenacity of the Viet Cong and the inability of the South Vietnam security forces, operationally and tactically, the plan was complex in application. President Johnson’s plan was to provide U.S. military support to strengthen South Vietnam's defenses until South Vietnam developed the ability and strength to engage without the direct assistance of U.S. forces. President Johnson directed a limited, escalated engagement (war). The U.S. used strategic bombing, naval blockages, and direct combat engagements using army conventional and non-conventional forces. Despite all efforts by the U.S., South Vietnam eventually fell into the hands of the communist North Vietnam.

5.1.3. U.S. Actions in Retrospect Through the Lens of the Model

The Three Subsystems Temperate Model shows that China and Russia were inextricably linked to North Vietnam’s ability to sustain its military capabilities during the war. Knowing that, the U.S. and allied countries should have engaged more with the

communist sympathizers and then established the National Liberation Front, known as the Viet Cong.” Robert K. Brigham, “Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History” <http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/history/>, (accessed February 6, 2011).

⁴⁸ “President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam War Disengagement Strategy”, (June 2006), <http://www.historynet.com/president-lyndon-b-johnsons-vietnam-war-disengagement-strategy.htm> (accessed March 10, 2011).

external nation state actors. The U.S. could have reconsidered its efforts to support the unpopular Ngo Dinh Diem who was the source of resentment from the people. Diem and his repressive administration served as the impetus for escalated tension between the people and the government. This tension helped evolve the crisis into an intrastate war.

5.2. Conflict in Panama

Domestic tensions within Panama were longstanding. According to Richard L. Millett in a research report entitled, "U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force," during the Reagan administration, Panamanian dictator, Omar Torrijos created many problems from the United States. In addition to his oppressive leadership of the country and corruption, the emergence of influential drug cartels posed a threat to U.S. policy towards Central America. Yet, the death of Torrijos, in an unexpected plane crash, opened the door for a greater crisis as Manuel Noreiga rose to power in Panama. Millett states, "The death of Torrijos in a 1981 plane crash removed one problem, but created another. A struggle for power broke out within the ranks of Panama's combined military and police force. In 1984, the most unscrupulous of the contenders, intelligence chief Manuel Antonio Noriega emerged as the nation's new strongman."⁴⁹ Eytan Gilboa, in an article entitled, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era," describes Noriega as a "corrupt dictator heading an efficient narcomilitaristic regime in Panama. He was involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and the ruthless oppression of his people."⁵⁰ Millett goes on to say

⁴⁹ Richard L. Millett, "U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force" RAND http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129.chapter9.html

⁵⁰ Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era," *Political Science Quarterly*, (v110 n4), p539

that Noriega not only continued some of the same dictatorial practices of Torijos, his mentor, but became heavily involved in voter fraud and was suspected of using his influence to have his opposition murdered. These actions not only infuriated U.S. policy makers, but caused a massive uprising from Panama's domestic population.⁵¹ In particular, as articulated by Millett, in September 1985, the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) murdered a leading Noriega critic, Dr. Hugo Spadafora. When the President of Panama, Nicolas Ardito Barletta, pushed for an investigation of the murder, he was eventually forced out of power by Noriega and the PDF.⁵² Domestic tension in Panama increased even more when Noriega supported the presidency of former Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle, who was viewed as a puppet of Noriega and the PDF, and because of Noriega's opposition and retiring of Colonel Diaz Herrera, who was respected by the domestic population and the United States. Noriega's action toward Herrera led him to reveal credible evidence regarding the PDF's involvement in the 1984 electoral fraud and the Spadafora murder.⁵³ According to Millett, the actions by Noriega and Panama's revelations of Herrera led the Panama populace to riot and stand in opposition against the government and the PDF. Gilboa states that "nearly 100,000 people, close to a fourth of the population of Panama City, demonstrated against Noriega and demanded the immediate resignation of Noriega and other individuals named by Diaz Herrera."⁵⁴ Gilboa also affirms that demonstrations and strikes continued for several weeks in both

⁵¹ Richard L. Millett, "U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force" RAND http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129.chapter9.html

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era," *Political Science Quarterly*, (v110 n4), p539

cities and rural areas.⁵⁵ Perhaps, the tipping point came in 1988 after Noriega annulled the results of the national elections in which Guillermo Endara was elected by popular vote. Even after international attention and observation by international dignitaries, Noriega opposed the will of the Panamanian people and rejected the results of election on the grounds of foreign interference. Again, tension grew, the Panamanian people protested, and there was an outcry from many in the international community, including some members of the Organization of American States (OAS). According to Millet, "Panama's Roman Catholic Church joined the rising swell of denunciations of Noriega's actions and, prodded by the United States, the OAS agreed to convene a Meeting of Foreign Ministers to discuss the situation."⁵⁶

In addition to the oppressive action by Manuel Noriega, it is important to note that U.S. policy toward Panama, but targeted at Noriega, had unexpected consequences that negatively affected the Panamanian people and possibly exacerbated tensions between the people and the government. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs Magazine* entitled, "Latin America: The President's Agenda," Sol M. Linowitz describes the conditions in Panama as one that was exacerbated not only by the corruption and dictatorial rule of General Manuel Noriega, but also by U.S. sanctions. According to Linowitz, "the end result is that the Panamanian economy has been devastated, and Noriega has tightened his hold on power."⁵⁷ The intrastate conflict within Panama was intensified by several problems including dictatorial rule and economic deprivation.

5.2.1. The Three Subsystems Temperate Model

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Sol M. Linowitz, "Latin America: The President's Agenda," *U.S. Foreign Policy* (Winter 1988/89) p,12

provide additional insight to military leaders which allow them to provide better recommendations to political decision makers.

Basic Questions from the Model:

1. Is the nation state stable? If not, from which subsystem does the instability originate?

Answer: Panama was an unstable nation state; the instability originated from the military subsystem.

2. What is the root cause of the instability within the subsystem? Why can't the other two subsystems remedy the instability within the unstable subsystem?

Answer: (A) The root cause of instability was due to influence by General Manuel Noriega, leader of the Panamanian Defense Force, into the affairs of the government and the president. (B) The renegade element within the military influences the election of the president and the people lack a mechanism to control the military.

3. Which external systems are contributing to the instability within the nation state?

Answer: Drug cartels in the region connect to and influence the military subsystem, specifically General Manuel Noriega.

4. What is the nature of the power structure within the nation state? What hinders the government and military (& security apparatus) of the nation state from managing or resolving the instability?

Answer: Although Panama had democratically elected presidents, the military historically influenced national elections and the executive branch of government. The military also, on occasions, used its power to eliminate dissent from among the people.

5. How does addressing the instability of the nation state serve U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy interests?

Answer: (A) At the time of the conflict, the U.S. military had several bases in Panama, the U.S. controlled the Panama Canal, and thousands of U.S. citizens were living in Panama. (B) Stability in Panama was important because of communist influence in Latin America which could spread to Panama and other countries.

5.2.2. U.S. Military Engagement in Panama

In 1983, Noriega assumed Torrijos position of commander of the Panamanian Military Forces. And as Torrijos had done earlier, Noriega used his military power to influence the outcome of the 1984 Panamanian presidential elections in which Nicolas Barletta was elected. According to Ronald Ratcliff in an article entitled, "Panama – The Enduring Crisis 1985 – 1989," even though the U.S. was aware of the possible election fraud, the U.S. did not protest the election because Noriega and the newly elected president were sympathetic to American interests.⁵⁸ Ratcliff also stated that "Noriega was long known to the U.S. government as an unsavory character whose excesses included drug trafficking, money laundering, and murder."⁵⁹ Ratcliff further stated that this was primarily due to the fact that "American foreign policy was focused instead on two strategic threats emanating from the region: Communist inspired insurgencies against U.S. backed governments in Central America and drug trafficking that was causing serious domestic concern."⁶⁰ Planning for possible U.S. military engagement in Panama did initially occur during the Reagan Administration, but was never acted upon.

During the subsequent President George H. Bush Administration there were over one thousand reported harassment incidents by Panamanian force against Americans in Panama. However, U.S. military engagement occurred only after four further actions. First, as already noted, Noriega was indicted in the U.S. for drug trafficking. Second, Panamanian operatives attempted a coup against Noriega which failed, followed by accusations that the U.S. had encouraged the coup but not provided the necessary support for it to succeed. Third, Noriega was accused of election fraud and conducting

⁵⁸ Ronald Ratcliff, "Panama – The Enduring Crisis 1985 – 1989," available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/panama.pdf>, accessed on 9 March 2011 p. 79.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 79.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 78.

criminal acts against members of political opposition groups during the campaigning. Fourth, after the election Panamanian Defense Forces and Noriega's paramilitary Dignity battalions were used to suppress voter discontent and opposition candidates were beaten in front of international media as they led protests and demonstrations against the election and Noriega. The final straw was the arrest and mistreatment of several US military personnel and dependents.

In December 1989, President George H. Bush ordered American troops into combat in Panama for Operation Just Cause. The operation employed over 26,000 service men and women. The primary objective of U.S. forces was to seize Panamanian President Manuel Noriega in order to extradite him for trial in the USA, the secondary objective was to develop stability within the Panamanian state. According to President Bush, in a 1989 address to the nation, "The goals of the United States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty."⁶¹ The associated military mission was to seize Noriega. President Bush justified U.S. military engagement in Panama by pointing to the fact that upon assuming office in Panama, Noriega declared his military dictatorship was at war with the United States, which threatened the lives of Americans in Panama.⁶² The President's press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, reiterated the operational objectives by stating, "President Bush asked for options and an action plan to achieve four objectives: Protect American lives, support democracy, bring the fugitive Manuel Noriega to justice, and protect the integrity of the

⁶¹ George Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama" (December 20, 1989), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1356&year=1989&month=12 (accessed March 9, 2011).

⁶² Ibid.

Panama Canal treaty.”⁶³ The U.S. had been at odds with the government of Panama since the Reagan Administration; however, as Noriega moved from being head of the defense force to being appointed President of Panama, his defiance of the United States and domestic opposition to him had now provoked the U.S. to engage in more direct action against Noriega’s acts of defiance.

The manner of U.S. military engagement in Panama was unique and unilateral. It was unique because prior to beginning the engagement the U.S. already had military forces stationed at bases in Panama, and those forces were being reinforced as tension escalated between the U.S. and Noriega. The U.S. engagement was unilateral even though the Organization of American States attempted to coordinate a change of government with Noriega. However, actions by the OAS nations were limited because they feared international involvement in their domestic actions, namely, elections.

5.2.3. U.S. Actions in Retrospect Through the Lens of the Model

An analysis of the crisis using the Three Subsystems Temperate Model shows that the U.S. could have more aggressively attempted to use its influence through the military to separate Manuel Noriega, the main source of instability, from the more moderate leaders in the military. The Panamanian military had several military officers in its ranks who attend U.S. military schools. The U.S. could have also urged the support of Latin American Special Operations military forces that had been trained in U.S. military schools to pursue covert actions against Noriega. Also, the U.S. could have continued to build its relationship with the Panamanian government and people. Finally, the U.S. could have aggressively pursued the media to influence the public’s

⁶³ Marlin Fitzwater, “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on United States Military Action in Panama” http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1358&year=1989&month=12 (access March 9, 2011).

perception of Manuel Noriega in order to influence the support of selected groups within People subsystem that opposed Noriega.

5.3. Conflict in Kuwait

The conditions within the nation of Kuwait prior to U.S. military engagement there in 1991 show a country in conflict with its neighbor country Iraq. According to David Klein, in his report entitled “Mechanisms of Western Domination: A Short History of Iraq and Kuwait,” tension between the two countries arose after Iraq amassed considerable amounts of debt in the aftermath of an eight year war with Iran.⁶⁴ In order to finance the war, Iraq borrowed billions of dollars from both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Now, at the close of the war, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia demanded repayment of the loans. Iraq was also suffering economically due to falling oil prices. Iraq and other OPEC countries claimed that the reduction in oil prices was due to Kuwait’s increase in oil production. Also, to complicate the issue, while Iraq was engaged in war with Iran, Kuwait moved to gain control of some of Iraq’s boarder land near the Rumaila oil fields. Iran, Libya and some other OPEC countries attempted to mediate the tension between the two countries. However, according to Klein, “Kuwait refused to relinquish Iraqi territory it had acquired during the Iran-Iraq war which Kuwait had helped finance. Kuwait also rejected production quotas and rejected appeals to cease pumping oil from Iraq’s Rumaila oil reserve. Kuwait refused to forgo any of Iraq’s debt.”⁶⁵ According to the U.S. Department of State, Iraq justified its invasion of Kuwait based on a claim that Kuwait belonged to Iraq because it was a part of the original Ottoman Empire which was subject to Iraq’s

⁶⁴ David Klein, “Mechanisms of Western Domination: A Short History of Iraq and Kuwait”, California State University, Northridge, available at <http://www.csun.edu/~vcmth00m/iraqkuwait.html>, accessed on 6 March 2011.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

suzerainty.⁶⁶ However, in the 'Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition, and Related Matters,' Iraq had previously accepted Kuwait as an independent state and had already agreed to the boundaries between the two states".⁶⁷

Prior to its invasion by Iraq, Kuwait maintained a small military force consisting of army, navy, and air force units. Domestically, the population supported the nation's government. Kuwait's government structure was based on a constitutional, hereditary emirate that was ruled by princes (Amirs) from the Al Sabah ruling family since the middle of the 18th century.⁶⁸ The Kuwaiti government provided many benefits to the Kuwaiti people including: Social welfare, public works, and development programs. Also because the country is wealthy, Kuwaiti citizens maintained access to employment, medical services, and educational opportunities.

5.3.1. The Three Subsystems Temperate Model

In viewing Kuwait through the Three Subsystems Model, the country was stable prior to the invasion by Iraqi military forces. The Kuwaiti people supported the government and the small defense force. The Kuwaiti government provided for the people and the military. The small Kuwaiti defense force and security apparatus were loyal to the government and served to protect the country and people. Yet, as shown in Figure 10, instability to the Kuwaiti system originated from outside the nation state. Iraq infringement upon the sovereign territory of Kuwait and subsequently annexing of the

⁶⁶ United States Department of State, Bureau of Eastern Affairs, "Kuwait", <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm> (accessed March 10, 2011)

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

nation rendered Kuwait unstable or non-functioning. More insight is derived from the answers to the following questions.

Basic Questions From the Model:

1. Is the nation state stable? If not, from which subsystem does the instability originate?

Answer: Kuwait became an unstable nation because it was invaded by its neighboring country, Iraq. Iraq was led by the dictator, Saddam Hussein.

2. What is the root cause of the instability within the subsystem? Why can't the other two subsystems remedy the instability within the unstable subsystem?

Answer: The subsystems were unstable because of external forces. The goal of each of the three subsystems was to gain freedom from Iraqi occupation and to destabilize the country.

3. Which external systems are contributing to the instability within the nation state?


Answer: The nation of Iraq created the instability in Kuwait. The military (or security apparatus) subsystem of Kuwait did not possess the capability (size, equipment) to repel Iraq's hostile aggression.

4. What is the nature of the power structure within the nation state? What hinders the government and military (& security apparatus) of the nation state from managing or resolving the instability?

Answer: Kuwaiti government is a constitutional, hereditary emirate. The majority of the power is held by a single Kuwaiti ruling family. The government and the military were rendered powerless as Iraqi military forces invaded and occupied the Kuwait.

5. How does addressing the instability of the nation state serve U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy interests?

Answer: (A) At the time of the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait owned over 10% of the world's oil reserves including oil that was imported by the United States. (B) The international community believed that Iraq also would have continued this aggression and invaded Saudi Arabia which owned the largest single oil reserve in the world.



5.3.2. Operations Desert Shield and Storm - Kuwait

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein annexed Kuwait over disagreements in oil production and Kuwait's alleged defaults on debts. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia perceived this action as intent to eventually invade Saudi Arabia which eventually led to the deployment of U.S. and coalition forces to restore the freedom of Kuwait and to protect the region (especially Saudi Arabia) against Iraqi aggression. The United Nations authorized the use of sanctions and military actions against Iraq.

On 20 August 1990, U.S. President George H.W. Bush published President National Security Directive 45.⁶⁹ In the directive, the president stated that the U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf included maintaining access to oil and the security and stability of key friendly states in the region [including Kuwait]. The directive explicitly stated, "the United States will defend its vital interests in the area, through the use of U.S. military force and if necessary and appropriate, against any power with interests inimical to our own." The military's mission was explicit---deter aggression, expel Iraqi forces, and restore the legitimate government of Kuwait.⁷⁰ Through sanctions and the use of the military instrument of national power by the U.S. and allied nations, Iraqi forces were defeated and the nation of Kuwait regained its freedom and sovereignty.

⁶⁹ George Bush, *National Security Directive 45*, "U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf are vital to the national security. These interests include access to oil and the security and stability of key friendly states in the region. The United States will defend its vital interests in the area, through the use of U.S. military force and if necessary and appropriate, against any power with interests inimical to our own. "The United States also will support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense. The United States will encourage the effective expressions of support and the participation of our allies and other friendly states to promote our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region." – National Security Directive 45 (August 20, 1990).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

5.3.3. U.S. Actions in Retrospect Through the Lens of the Model

Kuwait's instability was caused by an invasion of the country by Iraqi military on behalf of the Iraqi government. The U.S. could have engaged more heavily during the crisis prevention phase to help prevent the crisis from escalating into a war. Based on the research information, the basis for the invasion was not only Iraq's reneging on a previously accepted territorial claim, the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition, and Related Matters, but one that was rooted in economic considerations. The U.S. could have helped both countries settle their debt related grievances.

5.4. Conflict in Somalia

The country of Somalia had been troubled for years prior to the U.S. involvement in the humanitarian concerns with the country. In 1977, Somalia and Ethiopia were engaged in armed conflict over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. What is most significant about this war is that both countries were supported by cold war adversaries. The United States provided support to Somalia and the Soviet Union and Cuba provided aid to Ethiopia. After a year of fighting to gain control of Ogaden, the Somali military forces were exhausted and had lost a considerable number of troops and equipment. In 1978, a cease fire was declared and Ethiopia gained control of Ogaden. Years after the war, violence and confrontations regularly occurred. However, as the U.S. continued to provide support to Somalia, confrontations became infrequent. According to one source, "The support of the American forces subsequently allowed the independence movement to continue to operate, albeit with limited success."⁷¹


⁷¹ Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations, "Ogaden", (January 12, 2010) available at <http://www.unpo.org/article/10714>, accessed on 10 March 2011.

After the Ogaden War, Somalia President Barre continued to build a defense alliance with the United States. In 1978, the United States reopened the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Somalia. Between 1982 and 1990, the United States allowed Somali military officers to train in U.S. military and civilian schools. Many were trained to combat insurgencies since armed groups threatened the government of Somalia. Soon, Somalia was in a severe state of instability as clashes between armed rebel groups and government troops created an economic and humanitarian crisis. Because of the eventual success of the rebel forces, the Somali military essentially became factionalized into two groups, one supporting former commanders of the military and another supporting the local clan-tribal leader. Eventually Somalia itself became fractionalized as Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia. A combination of these actions caused hundreds of thousands of Somalis to flee their homes and become displaced. According to the U.S. Department of State, “in 1992, in response to the political chaos and widespread deaths from civil strife and starvation in Somalia, the United States and other nations launched Operation Restore Hope.”⁷²

5.4.1. The Three Subsystems Temperate Model

⁷² U.S. Department of State, “Somalia”, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm>, (accessed March, 10 2011).

In viewing Somalia through the Three Subsystems Model, the country was unstable prior to the start of Operation Restore Hope. As shown in Figure 11, each of the three subsystems contributed to national instability. The government was corrupt as Somalia President Barre fled the country for a safe haven in Nigeria. The Somali military was fractionalized and incapable of providing security for the nation against internal armed opposition groups and external threats. The Somali



people lost confidence in the government and many faced brutality from those representing the defense force. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced due to a humanitarian crisis that developed as government troops constantly clashed with rebel and tribal groups. The answers to the following questions provide additional insight.

Basic Questions From the Model:

1. Is the nation state stable? If not, from which subsystem does the instability originate?

Answer: Somalia was a failed state. The country was unstable because of government corruption, failed economy, and factions within the military. Some factions supported the government and others supported rebel and tribal groups.

2. What is the root cause of the instability within the subsystem? Why can't the other two subsystems remedy the instability within the unstable subsystem?

Answer: The root cause of instability in Somalia was the failure of the government and a failed economy. Since the government was too weak to exert power over the military, the military exerted dominant power within the state. Armed factions

and tribal groups also exerted influence within the state.

3. Which external systems are contributing to the instability within the nation state?

Answer: Prior to the conflict both the Soviet Union and the United States contributed to regional instability. The Soviet Union provided support including arms to Ethiopia. Many of the arms ended up in the hands of rebel groups. The U.S. provided support and arms to Somalia in order to help strengthen its military against an aggressive and heavily armed Ethiopia. However, immediately prior to 1992, some of the armed rebels and tribal groups maintained ties to rebel groups in Ethiopia.

4. What is the nature of the power structure within the nation state? What hinders the government and military (& security apparatus) of the nation state from managing or resolving the instability?

Answer: The government of Somalia was too weak to exert power. The military and armed opposition (tribal and rebel) groups exerted the preponderance of the influence within Somalia.

5. How does addressing the instability of the nation state serve U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy interests?

Answer: The U.S. interests were based in humanitarian concerns. Hundreds of thousands of Somali citizens were displaced because of the internal conflict and thousands had already died due to starvation.

5.4.2. Operation Restore Hope -Somalia

The U.S. had been engaged in the nation state of Somalia for decades.⁷³ By 1992, the stability of the country had severely deteriorated. The government was corrupt and several strong factions were vying for power. In the middle of this, the people of Somalia were suffering from starvation and were deprived of basic health-related necessities, all of which resulted in a real humanitarian crisis. The Somali government

⁷³ "Somalia had been troubled for almost two decades. In 1992, the U.S. Government recognized the instability in the country that was caused by a fractured corrupt government and the leaders of strong factions. The U.S. Government also recognized the need to provide humanitarian support to the people of Somalia who were suffering as a result of the government's inability to provide security and support to the populace. Then, on 3 December 1992, U.S. President George W. Bush ordered the U.S. military to deploy and lead the United Nation's humanitarian and peace keeping mission in Somalia called Operation Restore Hope. The operation was largely unsuccessful."

and security forces were unable to provide security against the factions or to provide humanitarian support to its citizens. Finally, on 3 December 1992, President George H.W. Bush approved the use of U.S. military power to lead a United Nation's humanitarian and peace keeping mission in Somalia. The U.S. deployed military forces but later withdrew after actions to disarm and suppress Somali warlords led to U.S. casualties.

5.4.3. U.S. Actions in Retrospect Through the Lens of the Model

Based on the model, Somalia was already a failed state before the U.S. decided to embark upon the humanitarian mission to help relieve the suffering of thousands of Somalis affected by the intrastate conflict. Each of the three subsystems was virtually in conflict with the other two. In addition to supporting the United Nations humanitarian effort in Somalia, the U.S. could have pressed for a more responsible government within the country. The current Somali president was viewed as corrupt leader and the people of Somalia did not have confidence in his leadership. Also, the U.S. could have led an effort to help train and equip selected elements within Somali defense force. However, this action would have to have been accompanied with diplomatic action towards Russia, Ethiopia, and the Union of African States. Finally, the U.S. could have urged the Union of African States to take a more proactive role in pursuing stability and proper governance in Somalia.

5.5. Summary

This chapter provided an examination of the potential utility of the Three Subsystems Temperate Model in an effort to determine its ability to help military leaders examine a conflict within a nation state in order to determine which subsystem (or subsystems) should serve as the focal point for a synergized engagement decision,

including the employment of the military instrument of national power. Evidence fulfilling the expectations of the model was derived presenting the utility from model as it was used to examine several nation states that had internal conflicts and a subsequent deployment of U.S. forces to the troubled area. Those states were: South Vietnam during the US-Vietnam War, Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm/Shield, Panama during Operation Just Cause, and Somalia during Operation Restore Hope.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

This research effort resulted in a list of primary questions military leaders should ask prior to advising political decision makers regarding the use of the military instrument of national power to help achieve U.S. Foreign Policy objectives. In developing the list, previous research on foreign policy and conflict theory was examined. Important questions regarding the employment of military force to achieve policy objectives were deduced from that literature. As part of their search effort, a new model for examining the dynamics of interstate conflict was proposed and tested. The model is called the Three Subsystems Temperate Model. The model was derived from considerations of the Zeroeth Law of Thermodynamics and the Clausewitzian trinity. The model prescribes that stability within any nation state is the result of a convergence of efforts by the three major subsystems of that state: the government, the people and the military. Inter- or intra-state conflict occurs when one of the three subsystems experiences tension with one or the other two subsystems, whether due to external or internal factors. The utility of the model was tested and proven through examination of the conflict dynamics that led to U.S. military interventions in South Vietnam during the US-Vietnam War, Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm/Shield, Panama during

Operation Just Cause, and Somalia during Operation Restore Hope. Recommendations regarding U.S. engagement actions in retrospect were provided at the end of each case study. Those actions included: withholding support for unpopular leaders; engaging in crisis prevention actions; pursuing mediation efforts; engaging the domestic population and moderate groups within states in crisis; and engaging broader coalitions of states to help circumvent, manage, and end interstate conflict.

As a result of this research the following questions are provided to assist military leaders in framing an interstate state crisis problem and providing better recommendations to political decision makers.

Questions Derived from the Literature

1. How will U.S. involvement in the foreign state conflict meet U.S. Foreign Policy goals?
2. What is the position of key domestic stakeholders regarding the foreign policy issue/concern (e.g. executive branch, congress, experts, business leaders, and the citizenry)?
3. What is the basis for the U.S. involvement in the international crisis (security agreement implication, defense agreement implication, humanitarian action, United Nations Resolution, or other)?
4. What is the position of key allies and friendly nations in the region regarding the foreign policy issue/concern?
5. What are the U.S. Foreign Policy objectives regarding the foreign policy issue/concern and what is the desired endstate?
6. What are some of the causes for the conflict within the nation state?
7. Given the cause(s) of the intrastate conflict and possible mitigation action(s), using a whole of government approach, what resources are required to implement the mitigation action(s)?
8. What are the gaps in that nation state's security force capabilities?

Questions Derived from the Three Subsystems Temperate Model

1. Is the nation state stable? If not, from which subsystem does the instability originate?
2. What is the cause of the instability within the subsystem? Why can't the other two subsystems remedy the instability within the unstable subsystem?
3. Which, if any, external systems are contributing to the instability within the nation state?

4. What is the nature of the power structure within the nation state? What hinders the government and military (& security apparatus) of the nation state from managing or resolving the instability?
5. How does addressing the instability of the nation state serve U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy goals?

If further research is desirable, the Three Subsystems Temperate Model could be used as a lens to examine additional past intrastate conflicts such as Rwanda during Operation Restore Support Hope, Bosnia during Operation Joint Endeavor, Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, and Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. It could also be used to examine the current armed conflict in Libya during Operation Odyssey Dawn.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brigham, Robert K., "Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History," <http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/history/>, (accessed February 6, 2011).
- Brown, Michael, "Ethnic and Internal Conflicts" *Turbulent Peace*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace Press, 2006).
- Bush, George H.W., "Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama" (December 20, 1989), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1356&year=1989&month=12 (accessed March 9, 2011).
- Chernus, Ira., "The Theology of American Empire," *Foreign Policy In Focus*, (September 26, 2007).
- Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*. Translated and Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993
- Fearon, James D., and Laitin, David D., "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97 Issue 1, 2003, 97: 75-90.
- Fearon, James D., "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1, 1998, 289-313.
- Fitzwater, Marlin, "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on United States Military Action in Panama," http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1358&year=1989&month=12.
- Gates, Robert M., U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Helping Others Defend: Foreign Affairs; Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* (June July 2010), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves>.
- George H.W. Bush, *National Security Directive 45* (August 20, 1990).
- Gilboa, Eytan, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era," *Political Science Quarterly*, (v110 n4).
- Glaser, Charles L., "1954- The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics*, Volume 50, Number 1, (1997).
- Gurr, Ted Robert, "Minorities and Nationalists; Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century," *Turbulent Peace*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace Press, 2006.,
- Hart, B.H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Publisher: Frederick A. Praeger, New York. 1954.
- Hook, Steven W., *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*, Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005.
- Jacobs, Lawrence R. & Page, Benjamin I. (2005). "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *The American Political Science Review*, 99(1), 107-123.
- Johnson, Lyndon B., "Vietnam War Disengagement Strategy," (June 2006), <http://www.historynet.com/president-lyndon-b-johnsons-vietnam-war-disengagement-strategy.htm>.
- Klein, David, "Mechanisms of Western Domination: A Short History of Iraq and Kuwait," California State University, Northridge, <http://www.csun.edu/~vcmth00m/iraqkuwait.html>. (Accessed February 5, 2011).
- Lawrence R Jacobs, & Benjamin I Page., "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *The American Political Science Review*, 99(1) (2005).

Linowitz, Sol M., *Latin America: The President's Agenda*, U.S. Foreign Policy (Winter 1988/89).

Matthews, Terry, Professor at the University of Wake Forrest, Lecture 19 The Social Gospel. <http://www.wfu.edu/~matthetl/perspectives/nineteen.html> (Accessed February 6, 2011).

Millett, Richard L., "U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force," RAND http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129.chapter9.html

Morgan, Patrick, *Contemporary Security Studies*, New York: Oxford University Press. 2009.

Ratcliff, Ronald, "Panama – The Enduring Crisis 1985 – 1989," available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/panama.pdf> (Accessed February 3, 2011).

The Fund For Peace "Mission Statement," available at http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=435&Itemid=598 (Accessed February 3, 2011).

The Schiller Institute, "Treaty of Westphalia, 1648", available at http://www.schillerinstitute.org/strategic/treaty_of_westphalia.html

The White House, *National Security Directive 45*, The White House, 20 August 1990.

U.S. Department of State, Somalia, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm> (Accessed 3 February 2011).

United States Department of State, Bureau of Eastern Affairs, "Kuwait", <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm> (Accessed April 12, 2011).

Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations, "Ogaden", February 10, 2010, <http://www.unpo.org/article/10714> (Accessed April 12, 2011).

ANNEX 1

Selected Social, Economic and Political Indicators- Index of Failed States

Demographic Pressures

- Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards
- Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a "youth or age bulge," or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups

Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievances or group paranoia

- History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries
- Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups
- Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression
- Institutionalized political exclusion
- Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric

Sharp and/or severe economic decline

- A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic measures
- Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments
- Collapse or devaluation of the national currency
- Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs
- Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight
- Increase in levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace
- Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments

Criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state

- Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
- Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation

- Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies
- Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

Suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and wide spread violation of human rights

- Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated
- Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians
- Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices
- Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)

Security apparatus operates as a state within a state

- Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity
- Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition
- Emergence of an "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique
- Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces

Intervention of other states or external political actors

- Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict
- Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions

