

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION IN A NEW ERA

BY

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USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
IN A NEW ERA**

by

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This CRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Senior Service College fellowship.

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ABSTRACT

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Since our nation's origin, the U.S. government has struggled with the development and implementation of a national security strategy. Throughout the decades, U.S. security policy appears to be shaped by significant global events rather than by forethought on national security concerns. Throughout U.S. history, there have been three significant changes towards national security affairs. The National Security Act of 1947, the Goldwater/Nichols Act in 1986, and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Defense and Director of National Intelligence in 2001. These changes were mandated after catastrophic events in U.S. history, and focus primarily on organization, structure and process. Significant events in the global environment and application of U.S. power in response to those events drove the need for an assessment and eventual change to policy and legislation to better plan and manage a national security strategy. Reflecting on the past 10 years of war it is once again necessary to assess how we are developing and implementing our national security strategy to meet the challenges of the twenty first century.

“To effectively craft and implement a sustainable, results-oriented national security strategy, there must be effective cooperation between the branches of government...”

President Barack Obama, NSS 2010

Introduction. To remain effective, the process of developing a national security strategy must be a continuous and evolutionary process. The development of a strategy must be driven by forethought. Has U.S. leadership improved its understanding of geopolitical affairs, is the development of a U.S. national security strategy addressing security concerns based on the leadership’s views towards geopolitical affairs, and does the current process provide an effective method for assessing U.S. efforts to meet the security challenges facing us in the twenty-first century?

With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse, academic and policy experts came to share a prevailing belief in the absence of security threats to the United States. In this environment, the Clinton administration allowed an illusion of safety to produce a laissez-faire foreign and national security policy.¹ With the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism and the campaign in Iraq, some believed this would inspire expansion of democracy throughout the Middle East.² Today, we witness the populaces’ desire and willingness to fight for change in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya as well as increased internal struggle in Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, and other nations. Does the current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) provide adequate guidance to shape responses to these events, and were these possibilities truly anticipated when developing the strategy? While the development process, policy, and implementation of the national security strategy has evolved over the past two centuries, the U.S. government still

struggles to understand if its strategy is having the desired effect on U.S. national security. Even though the U.S. has been the single global superpower since the collapse of the Soviet Union, its ability to ensure its own security and influence global stability is questionable at best. While the attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated this shortcoming on U.S. soil, U.S. endeavors in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of Southwest Asia and Africa further demonstrate the difficulties the U.S. has in communicating and implementing its strategy.

U.S. difficulties in developing and implementing national strategy are rooted in our nation's origin. While our founding fathers understood the need for security means to protect their new nation's freedoms, they turned to a policy of isolation in their desire to prevent further intrusions by foreign countries into North America and not present themselves as a new colonial power. The belief that continental separation would allow the U.S. to remain outside traditional European conflicts drove the initial strategy of our first government. From 1776 to the U.S. involvement in World War II, the U.S. attempted to maintain a policy of isolation. With our entrance into WWII, the U.S. realized that the global environment was changing and that a policy of isolation could not guarantee U.S. security and protection of U.S. interests, both stateside and abroad.

At the end of WWII, the U.S. made two significant adjustments in its approach to national security. The first change was an effort to correct some of the shortfalls identified during a review of the attacks of Pearl Harbor, leading to the creation of a more integrated approach towards national security; the result was the National Security Act of 1947. The second was an adjustment in national security policy, a shift from isolationism to containment. While the U.S. sustained its desire to not become a colonial power and remain relatively isolated, it realized, with its new found U.S. military strengths, especially its Navy and its technologically advanced

weapons such as the atom bomb, that remaining engaged in global affairs and preventing a misperception of U.S. intent for use of the military in support of national security would be at the center of most global security concerns. What should have been a time for cooperation quickly turned to a race to balance power and the Soviet Union quickly changed from an ally to enemy as the U.S. embraced a new national security policy. The policy of containment was quickly evident in U.S. efforts to support reconstruction in Europe and Japan, in U.S. support of the South during the Korean War, U.S. intervention during the Vietnam War, and in many lesser conflicts in Central America, the Middle East and Southwest Asia. During the five decades following WWII, the policy of containment generally met U.S. security requirements and, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was considered a success.³ Even with a successful policy, the failed U.S. hostage rescue in Iran in 1981 highlighted further shortcomings in the policy process to U.S. leadership and, for the second time, a major change in the National security policy process was directed. At the completion of a review of the events that led to the failed Iran Hostage Rescue, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, the U.S. and the world witnessed events that would lead most to believe we were entering an era of persistent global peace that had not previously existed. With the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, it appeared that the policy of containment was successful, and the U.S. was again in a situation where it had to define its position on national security. Because of the lessons of the past, U.S. leadership realized that remaining globally engaged was important to successful national security. During President George H.W. Bush 1990 State of the Union Address, he stated: “For more than 40 years, America and its allies held communism in check and ensured that democracy would continue to exist. Today, with communism crumbling, our aim must be to ensure democracy's advance, to

take the lead in forging peace and freedom's best hope: a great and growing commonwealth of free nations. And to the Congress and to all Americans, I say it is time to acclaim a new consensus at home and abroad, a common vision of the peaceful world we want to see.”⁴

While the post-Cold-War administrations felt that they had changed US security policies to meet the new challenges facing the U.S. and global community at the end of the twentieth century, in implementation, the U.S. was still executing a form of a containment strategy. U.S response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, followed by over ten years of terrorist attacks against U.S. people and U.S. interests did not demonstrate a strategy of new ideas, but more a strategy of containment. After the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, U.S response to national security threats primarily consisted of no fly zones over Iraq to keep Iraq’s threat contained, and retaliatory strikes against terrorist camps in Afghanistan, in an effort to dissuade further attacks on U.S. interests. Not fully appreciating the significant changes of the technological impact, the global environment, and new threats, the U.S. didn’t truly develop a significant change to its NSS until after the attacks of September 11, 2001. With the realization that global peace was not the reality of the twenty-first century and that stability was at risk in numerous areas, the U.S. made its third adjustment to its national security process based on the 9/11 Commission Report, and created the Department of Homeland Security as well as the National Intelligence Director. The overall purpose for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the National Intelligence Director was improved integration and synchronization of security and intelligence efforts.⁵ Once again the directed change focused more on organization and structure than it did on process, or, more importantly, on assessment of national security activities.

Development of a strategy. The National Security Strategy serves three primary purposes. First, it provides Presidential guidance on priorities and direction for the country during his time

in office. While the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates that the strategy is written yearly and submitted to Congress, the general context remains the same throughout an administration, unless there are significant changes to the global environment. 9/11 is an example where the standing administration felt it necessary to completely revamp the National Security Strategy.⁶ Second, it facilitates the direction of how the various government organizations structure themselves and receive funding to support the strategy. Third, it informs the national and international communities of U.S. intentions in regards to its security.

Strategy refers to “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”⁷ The elements of national power refer to those resources available to a country that can support its national security efforts. While diplomacy, information, military and economics (DIME) are most commonly understood as the instruments of national power, Morgenthau’s elements of national power are more appropriate when developing a holistic national security strategy. By using Morgenthau’s characteristics of national power, a strategy is more likely to be accepted by the whole of government because it would expand the analysis for possible solutions to security concerns, and as part of the process, it takes into consideration the character and morale of the nation. National power, according to Morgenthau, is derived from geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness (consisting of technology, leadership, quantity and quality of armed forces), population, national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy, and quality of government.⁸ The problem with initial U.S. strategies is they were developed primarily on the ideas and communiqués of the President and were not grounded in the fundamentals of what impacts national power or a strategy. These strategies also failed to reflect a holistic view of the roles of all pertinent government organizations. As recent

as the 2002 NSS, military support for the strategy is the predominant focus of the document, rather than the other elements of power.

The U.S. journey in National Security Strategy Development. While the U.S. has improved its process for development of a national security strategy, the U.S. still has a difficult time developing a comprehensive strategy. As in the past, the U.S. still wrestles with whether the strategy should focus more at home or abroad, the nation's role as the global superpower, and the American desire and belief in spreading freedom and democracy across the globe. From its involvement in its fight for freedom from the British, followed by nearly a century of peace from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the U.S. practiced a strategy of isolation.⁹ Even after its involvement in WWI, the U.S. didn't acknowledge the need to remain engaged in global affairs and reverted back to isolation at the completion of WWI. Less than three decades later, with the attack on Pearl Harbor, it became evident that predominance in the Western Hemisphere was no longer sufficient to provide security because an attack could come from well beyond North America.¹⁰ At the conclusion of WWII, a review of the circumstances that led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in a U.S. Government mandate changing the structure and process of national security through the National Security Act of 1947; however, the document still did not address the issue of actually developing a formal national security strategy.

While the National Security Act of 1947 directed the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD), the lack of a requirement for the development of a formal strategy would contribute to U.S. involvement in a variety of military excursions throughout the twentieth century. While the U.S. learned from experience that it could no longer isolate itself from global politics, the nation still wrestled with its role and

responsibility as a global superpower and how to integrate elements of national power to achieve national goals. Confronted with the knowledge that the international environment saw a need for a balancing of power and that the Soviet Union was going to take the lead, the Truman administration developed a strategy of containment. The strategy of containment first saw application in U.S. efforts in execution of the Marshall plan and the rebuilding of Japan at the conclusion of WWII. More visible application of the strategy was U.S. support to the South Koreans and South Vietnamese in combat operations against the expansion of Soviet ambitions, the establishment of the Berlin Wall to isolate the Soviet Union and prevent expansion in Europe, and covert operations in Central America, Afghanistan, and other troubled nations. As the geopolitical environment and the domestic environment changed and new technologies emerged, the U.S. was forced to adjust its national security strategy.

The U.S. understood it couldn't continue to maintain its amount of support to international organizations such as NATO or combat operations like Korea and realized that the Soviet Union was now becoming a formidable nuclear power and, therefore, the Eisenhower administration developed a policy of deterrence. This policy was based on the belief that the threat of a massive retaliation by the U.S., if nuclear weapons were used, would deter the Soviet Union and others from attacking U.S. national interests or its allies. By the 1960's it was understood that a strategy reliant on nuclear response was no longer viable, and the Kennedy administration followed a strategy of flexible response. The costs associated with maintaining a large Army and nuclear forces, as well as no discernable ability to determine the difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, were instrumental in Kennedy's decision to change the force structure of the military and implement a strategy of flexible response.¹¹ These factors, as well as an increase of Soviet Union and Chinese use of other means of national power to support

revolutions in unstable countries, required a change in the U.S. national security strategy. The U.S. policy of deterrence could not effectively respond to Soviet Union and Chinese military and economic assistance to unstable countries. Flexible response was intended to give the President the capability to respond effectively to any challenge with the appropriate level of force.

Realizing the need to slow down and even reduce the arms race, while at the same time not allow the Soviet Union to surpass U.S. capabilities, Nixon leaned toward a strategy of détente. Nixon's détente strategy focused on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the future use of U.S. military forces. Nixon's concept for the use of force carried with it three essential principles: Self-help, primary regional responsibility, and residual U.S. responsibility.¹² Simply put, these three principles placed requirements first on the local and regional governments for internal strife and regional issues, and then, if vital U.S. interests were threatened, it allowed for the possible use of U.S. military force. The intent behind détente was to gain control of the arms race and reprioritize U.S. military forces to the greatest threat of the Soviet Union: the European continent. Both the Ford and Carter Administrations continued to endorse this policy.

The Reagan presidency was the first administration required to formally write a national security strategy as directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. While the formal writing of a strategy did not take place until 1987, President Reagan began his strategy of balance and reform from the outset of his administration. Under this strategy, the U.S. witnessed the largest ever peace time build up of the U.S. military and its capabilities.¹³ The U.S. actively participated in supporting the defeat of communist backed insurgencies. Every action taken during the Reagan administration was intended to demonstrate to the Soviets that U.S. military capabilities and willingness to use these capabilities out matched them in every aspect. With the end of the

Reagan era came a change in the global environment that would affect U.S. national security policy for several years to come.

In 1989, with the first Bush administration stepping forward to lead the country, few could have anticipated the changes that would rapidly affect both the U.S. national and the international security environments. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union was the end of the strategy of containment. These two events changed the landscape of the European continent and would lead most to believe that there would be a time of relative peace, but that was not the case. During the 1990s, articles and books proclaimed the end of history, the triumph of democracy, and the obsolescence of war, but the decade will be remembered for peace agreements and the advance of democracy, along with ethnic “cleansings,” civil wars, and terrorism. It was a decade of strides toward peace and order but also stumbles toward anarchy and chaos. For American foreign policy, it was a period of great successes, but also dismal failures.¹⁴ To deal with the significant change in the geopolitical environment and the unknowns created by the changes in Europe and the Soviet Union, the Bush administration developed the strategy of deterrence and defense. The strategy was developed on the premise that U.S. security could be ensured by a reliable early warning system, a modern nuclear force, and a military capability to support a spectrum of operations. While Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait appeared to threaten the U.S. ability to secure its interests and its allies interests, the U.S. response and ability to form a coalition supported by a United Nations mandate demonstrated that the strategy of deter and defend was viable. Towards the end of the Bush administration the strategy would be tested once again in Somalia.

The Clinton administration maintained the deter and defend strategy with the addition of a precursor: prevent. The Clinton administration, in an attempt to gain control of the complexities

of the global environment, developed a strategy to first prevent possible threats destabilizing a country and/or region. If prevention failed, the U.S. had to deter threats that emerged through its proven capability to project U.S. force globally. Finally, if deterrence failed, the U.S. had to have the military capacity and technological advantage to ensure its victory in defense of its national interests.¹⁵ Under the Clinton administration, the national security strategy was exercised in support of operations in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. After eight years of wrestling with the complexities of the new global environment, and with the end of twentieth century, the second Bush administration assumed the presidency and its national security role from the Clinton administration. In a situation similar to the first Bush administration, unforeseen events would dictate adjustments to the second Bush administration's focus on national security.

As the world entered the twenty first century, the events of September 11, 2001, transformed the international security environment. It became clear to U.S. leadership and the nation that distant and hypothetical threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction had become a dominant reality.¹⁶ Like the two previous administrations, upon entering office, the second Bush administration had difficulty articulating its national security strategy in a post-Cold-War environment, but the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 quickly resolved this issue. Facing a threat that had already attacked the U.S. on its own soil, the Bush administration developed a strategy of preemption to prevent any further attacks against the U.S. and its national interests.

Soon after the Obama administration published its strategy of renewed global leadership and engagement it is being challenged with significant changes in the geopolitical environment, especially in North Africa and the Middle East. The premise of the strategy is that through strengthening the foundation of American leadership at home there will be a direct correlation to American influence abroad and therefore improved security at home and global stability through

international institutions.¹⁷ With an evolutionary process and improved understanding on the development of a national security strategy, is the U.S. better prepared to address its national security concerns in the twenty-first century?

Shaping the National Security Strategy. The most difficult aspects of shaping a national security strategy for the U.S. are its position towards international affairs and its lack of appreciation for all the elements of national power. As a result, the U.S. has a difficult time, at best, sending a clear message about its position on international affairs. If the U.S. is going to better integrate the elements of national power into a national security strategy, it must first look at the aspects of international politics. A primary reason why the U.S. followed this path in national security affairs is because of its historical foundation. Since inception, the U.S. based its national security strategy on two fundamental, yet divergent, desires. First, the U.S. prefers to not get involved in international affairs unless it is in the vital interests of the nation, and second, the U.S. believes it has a responsibility to spread the freedoms declared universal in the Constitution.

Strategists must understand the realm of international politics and the various theories associated with international politics that shape a feasible strategy. At the heart of this is an understanding of the role that a nation's character plays in effectively shaping a strategy that is understood and supported by the administration, the whole of government and the populace. While nations interact in a geopolitical environment based on the theory they believe, for example realists believe that security is far from guaranteed because each nation state will seek power to protect their interests, most don't use their beliefs as the foundation for their security strategy. In the realm of realism, Stephen Walt further adds that states respond not just to power, but to threat, with threat defined as aggregate power as well as geographic proximity, offensive

power, and aggressive intentions.¹⁸ Liberalism is another theory that argues that states act primarily based on the desires of the people and, as such, its strongest argument is that democratic societies won't go to war with each other, a concept known as democratic peace theory.¹⁹ Neo-conservatism blends the realist and liberal theories. While they believe that the environment is dangerous, they further believe it's the responsibility of great powers to manage global stability.²⁰ No matter the theory a state subscribes to, having a national position towards international affairs directly impacts the components and effectiveness of a national security strategy.

While having a position on international politics is important to shaping a national security strategy, not having a holistic and integrated plan to properly capitalize on all the elements of national power dilutes the overall effect of a national security strategy. Power for its own sake can be likened to money in the hands of a miser: it may delight its owner, but it is of little consequence to the world because it is applied to no useful purpose.²¹

The U.S. lacks an appreciation for the elements of national power and how to maximize their use in support of a national security strategy. While this lack of appreciation may not affect the development of a feasible national security strategy, it can affect the efficient execution of the strategy. For example, immediately after securing its freedom, the U.S. reduced the size of its standing military in an effort to not sustain an organization that may eventually threaten its own populace. The U.S. quickly learned that some military forces were necessary to maintain security for its new found freedoms. The U.S. then established a policy where geography would be a cornerstone of security, but again events that drove the U.S. involvement in WWI and WWII demonstrated that geography alone couldn't ensure national security. Then, in WWII, and to a lesser extent, throughout the Cold War, the world witnessed the capacity of the U.S. natural

resources, industrial complex, and quality of armed forces to ensure the nation's security as well as protect vital interests and its allies. Probably the most difficult aspects of national power for the U.S. are national character, national morale, and leadership. The world has witnessed the U.S. strength in these areas and, at times, has capitalized on its weakness. The most memorable example in recent history of how character, morale, and leadership affect an overall strategy was the U.S. involvement in Somalia during the Clinton administration. While the U.S. decided to get involved in Somalia for humanitarian reasons, enemy attacks that focused on the character of the nation as well as U.S. popular support led to the decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia and raised questions about the use of U.S. forces for less than vital interests.²²

Evaluating the National Security Strategy. As previously stated, the early national security strategies were primarily based on the individual thoughts and communiqués of the President. With the introduction of the Goldwater/Nichols Act, a formal process was developed to write and submit an official strategy to Congress. It is not clear if this process has met its purpose and actually improves the development and implementation of national security strategy. In analyzing the effectiveness of the national security strategy, the purpose of the strategy must be first considered. First, it is the President's guidance on priorities and direction for the country during his time in office. Second, it impacts the direction of how the various government organizations may structure themselves and how funding may be distributed to support the strategy. Third, it informs the national and international communities of U.S. intentions in regards to its security.

In regards to the national security strategy influencing diplomacy and engagement, it is difficult to link a Combatant Commander's Theater Security Strategy or an Embassy's Mission Performance Plan to objectives within the US National Security Strategy. Because of the way

the strategies have been written, it is difficult to determine which agencies are supposed to support specific requirements. While the current National Security Strategy addresses the elements of national power more inclusively than any previous strategy, it, like its predecessors, is a useable reference document, but fails to influence decisions as intended. For example, the May 2010 National Security Strategy addresses the need to improve education at all levels: “we are working to provide a complete and competitive education for all Americans, to include supporting high standards for early learning, reforming public schools;”²³ yet across the country one of the most controversial concerns is directly associated with education budget and program cuts. Another example, associated with international partners and supporting U.S. security needs, deals with the priorities of engagement and strengthening alliances. “Engagement begins with our closest friends and allies- from Europe to Asia; from North America to the Middle East. These nations share a common history of struggle on behalf of security, prosperity, and democracy... America’s national security depends on these vibrant alliances...”²⁴ “The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will remain America’s relations with our allies, and our commitment to their security is unshakable.”²⁵ In the first test since the national security strategy was written, does the international community believe that the U.S. lived up to these statements in supporting Egypt? Regardless of President Hosni Mubarak’s domestic policies, he has been a staunch ally in maintaining stability in that region and has been cooperative in supporting international objectives. At the first sign of turbulence who was there to possibly mediate other alternatives and who was there demanding that he remove himself from office? Assuming other allied nations are familiar with current U.S. policies, what might their concerns be in regards to how the U.S. would respond to similar events in their country?

How the government organizes and plans its budget in support of the objectives of the strategy is one of the weakest aspects of the National Security Strategy. The only organization that comes close to supporting this objective is the Department of Defense, with its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Most recently the Department of State (DoS) has attempted to improve its process for organization and budgeting by developing a similar product to the QDR. Under the leadership of Secretary Clinton, the DoS published its first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Even if all government agencies developed a process similar to the QDR and QDDR to ensure agency objectives supported national objectives, there are other factors that also affect structure and budgeting. Since mandated in 1986, the national security strategy has been written about 60 percent of the time. When national security strategies were written they weren't necessarily submitted in a timely manner. In the absence of an updated national security strategy, government agencies still have to develop their structure and budget to support U.S. objectives. How can a QDR, or now a QDDR be effective at anticipating needs if there aren't clear requirements?

Establishment of a national budget also affects how government agencies can support the strategy. As is occurring with the current (2011) budget crisis, how does an organization develop their plan without clear budgeting guidance to shape structure and organization, or even possibly more detrimental, what occurs when they are directed to execute specific requirements by Congress that are directly counter to organizational plans? Recently, Secretary Gates addressed this issue with the F35 Joint Strike Fighter. While the previous and current administrations and the Department of Defense have disputed the need to purchase a second jet engine for the F35, Congress continued to mandate it and tied budget decisions to this requirement.²⁶

Finally, the U.S. is challenged to effectively communicate its strategy to its allies and enemies. Current events taking place in the Middle East illustrate this issue: are U.S. allies looking at America in confidence or concern? Are key leaders, like the King of Bahrain, where the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet is stationed, or the King of Jordan, confident that if events like those in Egypt take place in their country the U.S. will continue to support their governments? While stability is partly about ensuring the physical aspects of security, it is also affected by the psychological aspects of security. If U.S. staunch allies aren't confident on where the U.S. stands in regards to events taking place throughout the international environment, then any effort, diplomatic or otherwise, will have minimal effect on relations and long term security.

Improving the process. The U.S. is a young nation that is still growing and learning how to remain relevant and influential in the global environment. The events of 9/11 and the past 10 years of change in the global environment mandate that the U.S. relook at how it develops and implements a national security strategy. Today, with the collapse of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, U.S. allies must know what resources America is willing to commit to stability and national security and where the U.S. stands in global affairs. The U.S. has demonstrated the capacity to learn from past history and make changes in its pursuit for national survival. To take the next step in national security affairs, the U.S. should consider the following in regards to development and implementation of a national security strategy: the national security strategy must become a relevant document, the U.S. must capitalize on all of its elements of national power, and there must be improved communications to inform the global community on where U.S. stands in regards to issues affecting global stability. For these changes to take place, the U.S. must consider legislative change like it did with the 1947 National Security Act and the 1986

Goldwater/Nichols Act, and with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Defense and National Intelligence Agency in 2002.

Making the National Security Strategy a relevant document is probably the single most important aspect to impacting the effectiveness of the strategy. Understanding that, at a minimum, a president will set the direction for national security interests and provide guidance for the development of a national security strategy every 4 years, there are two immediate changes that could help make the document more relevant. First, develop a common format for the national security strategy document. Having a common format will assist in establishing some continuity between administrations as well as help the various government organizations and the House and Senate Committees sustain a common practice of establishing and accounting for organizational structure and budgeting requirements. Additionally, since part of the intended audience is our foreign allies, having a standard format would assist in ensuring our message in regards to security is understood.

Reviewing past national security strategies and attempting to identify national goals, national interests for U.S. involvement, and the use of the elements of national power are difficult to discern at best. The following charts capture these three elements in President Clinton's 1995 NSS, President Bush's 2002 NSS, and President Obama's current NSS.

National Goals

1995 (Clinton Administration)	2002 (Bush Administration)	2010 (Obama Administration)
Sustain our Security with military forces that are ready to fight	Champion aspirations for human dignity	The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners
Bolster America's economic revitalization	Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends	A strong innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity
Promote democracy abroad	Work with others to defuse regional conflicts	Respect for universal values at home and around the world
	Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction	An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges
	Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade	
	Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy	
	Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power	
	Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century	

National Interests for U.S. involvement

1995 (Clinton Administration)	2002 (Bush Administration)	2010 (Obama Administration)
<i>Vital-</i> overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of our national entity; the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and economic well-being	The U.S. should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge	
<i>Important-</i> interests do not affect our national survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live	The U.S. should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.	
<i>Humanitarian-</i>		

Elements of National Power addressed in NSS

Elements of National Power	1995 (Clinton Administration)	2002 (Bush Administration)	2010 (Obama Administration)
Diplomacy	X	X	X
Information		X	X
Economics	X	X	X
Geography	X		X
Natural resources			X
Industrial capacity	X	X	X
Military preparedness	X		X
Technology and innovations			X
Leadership	X	X	X
Quantity and quality of armed forces	X	X	X
Population	X		X
National character			X
National morale	X		X
Quality of diplomacy	X	X	X
Quality of government		X	X

While the above charts capture the goals, interests and elements of power in a simple way, finding them in the three strategies is not easy or clear. For example, you might find the definitions for goals were different in various portions of a strategy. Another tendency was guidance was not followed with requirements. The 2002 NSS states, “we will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power.”²⁷ Despite this strong statement, further requirements to specific government agencies on how this is to be accomplished are not evident elsewhere in the NSS. In all three documents, how the elements of national power were being used was also not clear. The three examples emphasize the difficulty of using past and current NSSs as the primary tool for planning, organizing, funding and monitoring activities in support of national security affairs.

Second, legislation should mandate a process that requires the various government agencies to develop a support plan, similar to the QDR and QDDR. These plans would serve three purposes: improve integration and synchronization of agency efforts allowing for a more holistic approach towards national security, inform the House and Senate Committees of government efforts in

national security affairs, and facilitate committee dialogue and assess merits of the impact of our activities on meeting our national security goals. For example, if we look at the current NSS and the requirement to build our foundation, which government agencies have supporting roles in this effort and what are their plans to execute their support strategy? Education, energy, science, health, and leadership are all mentioned as part of this effort, but what is actually being done? Directing the various government agencies to develop plans, more importantly, integrated plans will assist them in seeing their roles in support of the NSS and possibly finding solutions to problems not previously identified. Even with a common document, if agencies don't understand how to use and integrate all the elements of national power, national security efforts may still fall short.

The 2010 NSS establishes a laudable goal for integration of all elements of national power: "To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all the tools of American power... This requires close cooperation with Congress and a deliberate and inclusive interagency process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies..."²⁸ While the current strategy addresses the use of the elements of national power better than previous strategies, the government agencies lack an understanding of their roles in support of the strategy. "Today, national security involves a much wider array of issues that can only be addressed with a broader set of capabilities that are highly synchronized and carefully calibrated. Unfortunately, many federal agencies are not conscious of, or prepared to act in their national security roles. Indeed many departments and agencies do not understand these roles. Some do not believe that they even have a role in the national security process."²⁹

The DoS has taken the first step with the QDDR, but the remaining agencies need to take similar steps. Agencies such as the Department of Education, the Department of Health

Services, or the Department of Agriculture need to examine their participation in national security affairs. Increasing the understanding of the elements of national power in all agencies will provide for a greater variety of possible solutions to the numerous security concerns and help shape a more holistic approach towards our security and the security of our allies.

Finally, after these two changes are implemented, there must be a concerted effort to inform the national and international communities about the U.S. national security strategy.

“Across all of our efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims.

Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout our government.”

President Barack Obama, NSS 2010

Security is affected by the physical and psychological impact of actual or perceived threats. In the past, the lack of information caused concern, uncertainty, and fear at home and abroad. Today, technology allows for an overload of information, and that too can impact decisions and have negative impact. Recent examples where access to immediate information affected the outcome of policy decisions were seen in the publicized U.N. Security Council meetings in regards to why a coalition should invade Iraq and more recently with the publicized events unfolding in Libya. The world’s view of perceived atrocities on the news, Facebook, YouTube, and other Internet venues impacted the immediacy of a response by the U.N. and the U.S. willingness to lead that response.

Diplomacy and engagement should build an environment of confidence, but when that engagement sends mixed signals, it can have an unintended consequence. If abroad, the primary means for maintaining a stable environment is through the use of military force, then no matter

what U.S. leaders say, U.S. actions are seen as reality, and at times, as a threat. Solving stability issues through a more innovative and holistic approach would match our words more with our actions.

“Power and diplomacy are not alternatives.

They must go together, or we will accomplish very little in this world.”

Secretary of State George Shultz

Throughout the centuries, national rulers and leaders have attempted to create an environment of security for their people. The creation of Nation States, the Industrial Age, and now the Information Age have made the art of national security more complex. Theorists have tried to define and capture the critical aspects for successful diplomacy and security affairs. Even through all this change, the global community has found itself in near constant conflict. Today, Americans watch with hope and anticipation as the events in North Africa unfold, as U.S. operations in Iraq come to a close and operations in Afghanistan progress, as Eurasia continues in its pursuit of freedom and democracy, and as China becomes stronger and more influential. In this complicated environment, the U.S. can maintain the national security strategy process followed since 1986 and earlier, or the nation can again recognize the shortfalls of current processes and make necessary changes to further improve the development and execution of a national security strategy. Making the national security strategy a more relevant document, continuing to improve on a holistic approach towards national security affairs by capitalizing on all the elements of national power and improving our ability to communicate our strategy are simple changes that should be implemented to further improve national security strategy development and implementation to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Endnotes

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