

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY AHEAD

BY

COLONEL GARY A. ROSENBERG
United States Army

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**Security Force Assistance and the Brigade Combat Team:
Recommendations for the Way Ahead**

A Civilian Research Project prepared by:

Colonel Gary A. Rosenberg, U.S. Army

B.A., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1989
M.S., Troy University, Troy Alabama, 2000

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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
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A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Matt Rhodes", written over a horizontal line.

Dr. Matt Rhodes
Faculty Advisor

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James Wither", written over a horizontal line.

Professor James Wither
Director, Senior Fellows Program

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Reppert", written over a horizontal line.

Dr. John Reppert
Dean, College of International and Security Studies

ABSTRACT

The US Army is in the process of making choices regarding how to efficiently provide a wide array of options to the US President for dealing with current and future security concerns. A key issues related to this choice concerns the method used to establish and maintain a Security Force Assistance (or train, advise, and assist) capability in Army General Purpose Forces.

The focus of this research was to answer a question. Do modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and the supporting force structure have the capability to effectively cover the full spectrum of operations, specifically SFA missions in both Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase 0 (Shape) environments?

The answer to the primary question indicated that a BCT, with augmentation can be effective in conducting SFA missions in phase IV (Stabilize) environments, however, unless the Army is willing to change its culture and adopt certain recommendations, significant challenges to effectively accomplishing SFA missions in Phase 0 (Shape) environments using the BCT approach are likely to be encountered.

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Colonel Gary A Rosenberg is a U.S. Army War College Fellow assigned to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

He holds a B.A. Degree in Sociology: Law, Criminology, and Deviance from the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota and a M.S. Degree in International Relations from Troy University, Troy, Alabama. COL Rosenberg's master's thesis was titled "Nationalism and Genocide: A Policy makers approach to solving issues".

COL Rosenberg deployed to Afghanistan three times between March 2002 to June 2005 first as a Special Forces Company Commander and then as the Battalion Operations Center Director. In 2005 he deployed to Iraq as the Special Operations Command Central Liaison to the Multi-National Forces-Iraq Headquarters. In 2006 and 2007 he deployed to Afghanistan serving as the Special Operations Command Central Liaison to both Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). More recently, COL Rosenberg was the Commander of the U.S. Army Garrison Bamberg from June 2007 to July 2010.

COL Rosenberg's awards include the Bronze Star Medal (2 OLC), Joint Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (5 OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Joint Service Achievement Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, Afghanistan Campaign Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Special Forces Tab, Ranger Tab, and Senior Parachutist Badge.

COL Rosenberg is married to the former Carol Lynn Hagel. They have two children: Cody and Oden.

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ACRONYMS

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASI	Additional Skill Identifier
ASPG	Army Strategic Planning Guidance
AUSA	Association of the United States Army
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
C2	Command and Control
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CN	Counter narcotics
COCOM	Combatant Command
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CT	Counter Terrorism
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DOTLMPF	Doctrinal, Organizational, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities
EU	European Union
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
FMS	Foreign military Sales
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
GDP	Gross Domestic product
HN	Host Nation
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organizations
IMET	International Military Education and Training

ISF	Indigenous Security Forces
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
IW	Irregular Warfare
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JP	Joint Publication
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
NTM-I	NATO Training Mission – Iraq
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	Other Government Agencies
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RFF	Request for Forces
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SA	Security Assistance
SAO	Security Assistance Organization/Security Assistance Officer
SC	Security Cooperation
SCP	Security Cooperation Plan
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SF	Special Forces
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SOCENT	Special Operations Command Central
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
TSCP	Theater Security Cooperation Plan
UN	United Nations
USASFC	United States Army Special Forces Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Introduction

“...arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key mission for the military as a whole. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 26 November 2007

The increasing importance of Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a relatively recent phenomenon. Increased emphasis on Security Assistance (which includes SFA) began as early as the 2001 Quadrennial Defense review Report (QDR). The 2006 QDR went even further, directing the military services to develop “multipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction activities” (Rumsfeld 2006, 23). Most recently, the 2011 Army Strategic Planning Guidance specified “Adapting the Army for Building Partner Capacity” and “Build Partner Capacity and Contribute to Security Cooperation Activities” as a mid-term (2013-2019) objective and a long-term (2020-2030) capability (McHugh and Casey 2011, 9-14).

Gen Dempsey, the current Chief of Staff of the Army and nominee to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while speaking to the AUSA Land Warfare Symposium breakfast on May 6, 2011 framed the future Army approach to the increasing importance of Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance as a choice: “reform” or “transform” (Dempsey 2011). This ‘choice’ succinctly captures an on-going debate within the Army. Those involved in the debate generally

fall into one of two factions. One faction argues that the Army must remain generalists and that the way to approach SFA is to ensure that Army units are capable of full-spectrum operations. The other faction argues that the Army should develop specialized units for the conduct of counterinsurgency and SFA missions.

The current Army position coincides with the first faction. However, as noted above, this debate is not over. The question is, whether modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and the supporting force structure have the capability to effectively cover the full spectrum of operations, specifically SFA missions in both Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase 0 (Shape) environments?

To adequately address this question, three secondary areas of research should also be explored. First, what is the anticipated level of future demand for SFA missions? Second, what impact does the security environment have on the SFA mission? Third, what capabilities must the Army possess to succeed in SFA missions?

The answer to the primary question based on this research indicates that a BCT with augmentation can be effective in conducting SFA missions in phase IV (Stabilize) environments. However, unless the Army is willing to change its culture and adopt certain recommendations it will likely encounter significant challenges to effectively accomplishing its future SFA missions and therefore find it difficult to achieve success using the BCT approach to SFA missions in Phase 0 (Shape) environments.

Chapter 1

Background and Literature Review

The terrorist attacks on 9/11/01 dramatically changed the U.S. National Security environment and the U.S. Department of Defense. Suddenly, “non-state actors” and “terrorist” were viewed as being capable of significantly threatening the security of a state, more specifically, the United States. This threat was, according to President Bush, different from those of the past as it would be “fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time” (Bush 2002, 5). In President Bush’s words, America was now “threatened less by conquering states” than “failing ones”, “menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few” (Bush 2002, 1). Stated another way, “the greatest threat to our national security comes not in the form of terrorism or ambitious powers, but from fragile states either unable or unwilling to provide for the most basic needs of their people” (Field Manual 3-07 2008, Foreword).

The realization that failed / failing states have been and will likely continue to be¹ the primary (though not exclusive) source of conflict and instability throughout the world, when combined with the concept of fighting an elusive enemy over many fronts, is the genesis for the rising importance of Security Force Assistance. States, one must remember, are sovereign. That sovereignty, in accordance with the international system and law, should – must – be respected.

¹ Numerous security forecasts predict that failed / failing states will continue to be the greatest source of conflict and instability and subsequently are the most likely threats to global as well as US national security. The 2001 QDR notes the increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states. The absence of capable or responsible governments in many countries in wide areas of Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere creates a fertile ground for non-state actors engaging in drug trafficking, terrorism, and other activities that spread across borders. In several regions, the inability of some states to govern their societies, safeguard their military armaments, and prevent their territories from serving as sanctuary to terrorists and criminal organizations can also pose a threat to stability and place demands on U.S. forces. Conditions in some states, including some with nuclear weapons, demonstrate that potential threats can grow out of the weakness of governments as much as out of their strength (Rumsfeld 2001, 5)

How then, can the United States deal with potential threats to its security when they are emanating from within states that are not capable of dealing with those threats? One method is through the increased use of Security Force Assistance as a means to build the capacity and capability to deal with these threats.

Background

Security Force Assistance in Context

Security Force Assistance (SFA) is defined as “The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military Terms). Army doctrine states that the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces includes providing assistance in “organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of host-nation security forces” ((FM 3-07 2008, 2-10). Unfortunately, understanding SFA is not that simple and requires context.

First, doctrinally, SFA is a sub-task which is conducted within two of five tasks under the umbrella of Stability Operations. JP 1-02 defines *Stability Operations* as “An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” Army doctrine identifies the five “primary stability tasks” as: Establish Civil Security, Establish Civil Control, Restore Essential Services, Support

to Governance, and Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development (FM 3-07 2008, 3-2 – 3-18). SFA is conducted as a sub-task of the tasks ‘Establish Civil Security’ and ‘Establish Civil Control.’ Be cautious of discounting the importance of SFA based on its ‘sub-task’ status however, as “Developing Host Nation Security Forces” known as SFA “is integral to successful Stability Operations” (FM 3-07 2008, 2-10).

Second, current doctrine regarding Stability Operations and SFA has been, understandably, shaped by the U.S. Military experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result these concepts tend to be significantly skewed toward a Phase IV (Stabilize) environment². However, as noted above, the most likely threats to future U.S. security comes from failed / failing states that we are not at war with, and thus the security environment is more akin to Phase 0 (Shape) or Phase I (Deter). In these environments the authority of the U.S. Military to conduct SFA is significantly different.

It is significantly different because in Phase 0 (Shape) or Phase I (Deter) environments SFA is conducted under the umbrella of *Security Cooperation (SC)* which JP 1-02 defines as “All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.” Being more specific, SFA in a Phase 0 (Shape) or Phase I (Deter) environment is conducted as *Security Assistance (SA)* which JP 1-02 defines as “A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United

² For a more detailed understanding of the *Joint Operational Planning Phasing Model* see JP 3-0 2006, IV27-29. The phasing model consists of six phases: Phase 0 (Shape), Phase I (Deter), Phase II (Seize Initiative), Phase III (Dominate), Phase IV (Stabilize), and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority).

States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.” Note the last sentence in the definition...SFA in a typical peacetime environment is **funded and authorized by the Department of State**, and administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. It is also conducted in support of and with the support of the Host Nation Government.

Army Transformation

Another bit of background information that is useful when examining SFA and the way ahead is a basic understanding of the impact that Army Transformation has had in this debate. In early 2001 President Bush asked the Secretary of Defense to transform the DoD. This was not, however, the beginning of transformation for the Army. The term “transformation” was first mentioned in President Clinton’s 1998 NSS Report on page 23. Prior to this, in the 1995 National Military Strategy, the terms being used were “force enhancements” and “modernization”. The recognition of the need to transform the military to take advantage of what was then called a Revolution in Military Affairs occurred well before President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld began their push for transformation and even before GEN Shinseki used the term.

One could easily argue that to ensure the Department of Defense can continue to fight and win the Nations wars and defend US national interests, the DoD in general, and the Army specifically, has been, to varying degrees, in a near-continuous process of modernization, or

transformation. Nevertheless, the most recent wave of transformation is widely recognized as beginning under General Eric Shinseki (US Army Chief of Staff from Jun 99 – 03). He initiated transformation in an attempt to improve the National Command Authority's ability to rapidly respond to crises and small-scale contingency operations with ground forces (Pyne 2000).

On October 12, 1999 four months after becoming the Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki announced that his vision for the Army was to transform it into a force that was strategically responsive and dominant across the spectrum of operations. Shinseki said the Army must be more deployable, lethal, agile, versatile, survivable and sustainable to meet the needs of the nation. GEN Shinseki's vision was to be able to deploy a combat capable brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a war-fighting division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions within thirty days (Pyne 2000).

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld felt these early Army-transformation concepts did too little to reorganize and upgrade combat forces for expeditionary missions in the near-to-mid term and so they were modified. In 2003 and again in 2004, the Army issued updated transformation plans. These revised plans retained the Stryker brigades and sought to accelerate introduction of Future Combat System (FCS) technologies. Its most important change, however, was an ambitious plan to reorganize how the combat brigades, divisions, and corps of the 'Current Force' were structured (Kugler 2008, 13-14).

The centerpiece of the transformation plan was the creation of modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), which reconfigured how Army combat brigades were structured and employed on the battlefield. By this time, the Army recognized that modularity was required to more effectively support the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process; the concept was that

these transformed BCTs would be “maintained at tiered readiness in order to provide for phased force generation.”

The modularization of BCTs as well as command structures, support assets, and aviation units significantly sped up the process by which Army brigades could be selected, configured, and deployed for expeditionary missions while leaving the rest of the Army intact, capable of responding to other contingencies. Additionally, modular units had greater capabilities and were more effective on the battlefield, individually and collectively; thus improving Army’s ability to meet the Combatant Commander’s needs (Kugler 2008, 13-16).

In addition to the organizational and equipment transformation, emphasis was also placed on learning the lessons of the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were blurring the traditional distinction between combat and Stability Operations (Kugler 2008, 14-15) and thus a doctrinal transformation was occurring nearly simultaneously. Yet, despite the improved capabilities of the brigades to be able to conduct simultaneous Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations, the military commanders on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq found that the brigades were *not* well suited or prepared to do the required capacity building, or more specifically the SFA mission of organizing, training, equipping and advising the Afghani and Iraqi Security Forces.

As a result, Requests For Forces (RFF) were generated in order to requisition the thousands of personnel, with the appropriate skills and knowledge, to be able to effectively and efficiently conduct the mission of organizing, training, equipping and advising the Afghani and Iraqi Security Forces. These requests ultimately resulted in what is now called the NATO Training

Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I)³.

This should come as no surprise. First, the Army’s modular force was intended to be optimized for major combat operations and high-tech missions. Kugler noted that “modular BCTs are not the best organization for advising foreign militaries performing Stability Operations in their own countries—an issue that in 2008, was under review by the Army” (Kugler 2008, 4).

Second, US Army doctrine recognizes that successful training and advising missions require special knowledge and skills, increased continuity, the establishment of personal relationships, and a focus on the capacity to be built. Specifically Field Manual (FM) 3-07 Stability Operations notes that “practical experience with development activities in Security Sector Reform (SSR) indicate” that (the excerpts below are from FM 3-07 pg 6-15, emphasis added)

- Trainers and advisors must be capable of dealing with challenges inherent in working with poorly trained and equipped forces. To contend with these challenges, **pre-deployment training focuses on the stresses and ambiguity associated with developing host-nation security forces.**
- Continuity of personnel is essential to maintaining relationships on which the success of force development depends. **Tour lengths for advisors must be long enough** to develop these relationships **and staggered enough** to maintain continuity and expertise with the developing host-nation force. Continuity fosters understanding, which is essential to development.
- The **organization, training, and equipping of trainers and advisors should be tailored to support the planned role for the host-nation force** under development.

The reality is, the security force assistance mission is complex⁴; requires specialized organization, training and equipment; and creates challenges for a BCT commander.

³ MNSTC-I merged with United States Forces- Iraq (USF-I) in January 2010 as a part of the US Forces consolidation and withdrawal. There is also a smaller NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NMT-I).

First, BCTs, are doctrinally supposed to be proficient in the full spectrum of operations across the spectrum of conflict; a near impossible task⁵. Based on personal and anecdotal observations, the majority of commanders opt to ensure that their soldiers are trained on the combat tasks at the expense of the Security Force Assistance tasks⁶.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Security Force Assistance generally requires a relatively small number of more senior and experienced Soldiers. When a BCT is given the task to conduct SFA, the result is that a significant number of the key leaders end up being stripped out of the BCT to do the training, leaving the remainder of the unit (the younger Soldiers), under supervised and significantly less capable. This is one of the reasons why the Army moved away from providing units to fill the manning requirements for the training commands in Afghanistan and Iraq and toward individual augmentees.

The individual augmentee approach, however, is not without problems and critics. These problems are worth briefly examining as they illustrate issues related to the two factions. First the individual augmentee solution is not the most efficient and cost-effective approach to a potentially long-term mission to train and advise Iraqi and Afghan — and perhaps other nations’ — security forces. Second, evidence suggests that it takes these teams four to six months to become effective. Third, after completion of their year-long tour, the teams — who have gained

⁴ “Stabilization” or “Phase IV” operations are far more challenging than defeating conventional military forces (Cordesman 2004, iii).

⁵ The Army’s overall intent is to build its leaders into “pentathletes” — leaders who are equally adept at fighting wars, skilled in governance, statecraft, and diplomacy, as well as being culturally aware. While the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and future military operations may indeed require that Army leaders be “pentathletes,” it may prove to be an unrealistic expectation that the majority of Army NCOs and officers will attain this extremely high standard of performance (Feickert 2008, CRS-6).

⁶ This is an example of the impact of the Army’s culture and is exactly what one would expect a commander to do. This cultural aspect is perhaps best illustrated in the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASP) which notes that **“The Army’s ability to conduct combined arms maneuver in order to close with and defeat enemy forces must remain the most important long-term competency** (McHugh and Casey 2011, 13-14).

invaluable training, advisory, and cultural experience — are disbanded and sent on to other Army assignments; essentially losing the opportunity to capitalize on their knowledge and experience. Finally, the Army's Culture leads many soldiers — officers in particular — to conclude that these assignments are detrimental to their careers because it takes them off the 'normal career path' for promotion (Feickert 2008, CRS – 9).

Literature Review

Divided Factions – Alternative Solutions

There is no doubt that increased emphasis has been placed on the importance of SFA. The 2010 National Security Strategy Report, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2011 National Military Strategy and the 2011 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) all place, to varying degrees, special emphasis on SFA. As noted earlier however, the way to go about delivering this capability has been the source of significant debate.

Faction one – Remain Generalists

The Army Position

The Army's position is that full-spectrum capable BCTs are the least risky and most cost effective solution to conducting Stability Operations and SFA missions. The essence of the Army's argument in support of BCTs being able to meet the operational challenges of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advising is shaped by its experiences in Iraq and revolves around two key notions (Feickert 2008, CRS 17-18).

First, it notes that BCTs, particularly in Iraq, have been required to rapidly transition between counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory missions on a frequent and unpredictable basis. There is no predictable linear progression from one type of an operation to another; therefore it is both difficult and risky to replace a BCT with a specialized stabilization unit, particularly when the tactical situation could rapidly and unexpectedly deteriorate back open conflict.

Second, the Army notes that relationships between the indigenous population and security forces are a crucial factor in any sort of operation. It is therefore more effective to leave a BCT in place over a period of time to conduct all missions rather than to transition to specialized units and advisory teams which would require re-establishing these crucial relationships with indigenous population.

Another argument is sometimes made. GEN Chiarelli captured this perspective in a 2007 *Military Review* article. In this article, he was illustrating the two key notions articulated above, however, this article also gets at the notion that, as Iraq and Afghanistan requirements reduce, the level of demand for SFA will reduce, to what some expect will be pre-9/11 levels, thus negating the need for large, specialized units.

I don't believe that it is in the military's best interest to establish a permanent "Training Corps" in the conventional military to develop other countries' indigenous security forces (ISF). The Special Forces do this mission well on the scale that is normally required for theater security cooperation and other routine foreign internal defense missions. Rather, we should ensure our conventional forces have the inherent flexibility to transition to ISF support when the mission becomes too large for the Special Forces. If the requirements exceed Special Forces capabilities, then training and transition teams should be internally resourced from conventional U.S. or coalition units... (Chiarelli 2007, 41-42).

It is difficult to argue with this line of reasoning when viewed from a Phase 4 (Stabilize) or Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) perspective. The weaknesses in this line of reasoning lies in the Phase 0 (Shape) environment.

First, this approach inherently places the burden of meeting competing demands on a BCT Commander – should his limited training time and resources be focused on training primarily for Combat Operations or Stability Operations. As noted above, this approach is Phase 4 (Stability) and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) centric; it addresses the most dangerous environment, but it does little to address the most likely environment – Phase 0 (Shape). In a Phase 0 (Shape) environments, a BCT Commanders is very unlikely, and in fact is prohibited, from transitioning between counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory missions.

Second, as noted in GEN Chiarelli's comments, this approach assumes a pre-9/11 SA/SFA demand level and methodology; something the strategy documents and the SECDEF have made clear, will not be the case and appears at odds with what senior DoD civilian leaders and National Strategic Documents⁷ repeatedly state. The Army Strategic Planning Guidance states that the “primary instrument to meet security cooperation requirements for capacity-building activities” in a Phase 0 (Shape) environment will come from forces that are “prepared and regionally-focused during the Train-Ready phase” of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process (McHugh and Casey 2011, 9-10). Again, this presents the appearance of a business as usual approach by the Army and risks not providing the National Command Authority with sufficient capabilities required to achieve their desired end-state.

⁷ Both Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Gates have made numerous speeches regarding the increasing importance of SFA in the shaping the future security environment. Additionally, several of the US National Strategy Documents have addressed this growing need, including: the 2002, 2006, and 2010 National Security Strategies; the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews; the 2005 and 2008 National Defense Strategies; and the 2004 and 2011 National Military Strategies.

Third, this approach does little to address the availability, training, organization, and continuity of personnel required for SFA missions. Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, there is not a Stability Operation or SFA mission in the world that requires anywhere near the manpower of a full BCT. This means that certain Soldiers will be stripped out of the BCT in order to conduct SFA in Phase 0 (Shape) subsequently creating a personnel shortage and a dilemma with regards to prioritization. A worse case might include multiple teams being stripped out of a BCT and sent to differing countries, on differing missions, making this method of supporting the requirement even more challenging for a BCT Commander.

However, the fact is, the future level of demand is unknown; something that will be discussed in more detail later. For now it is sufficient to realize that demand is dependant on multiple factors including US political willingness to commit trainers as well as potential partner nation willingness to accept trainers and assistance. In that these and so many other factors are unknown and are likely to vary over time, perhaps the Army's current approach is a prudent and reasonable starting point.

Variations on the Army's position

Several analysts accept the Army's basic position but have nonetheless proposed a few variations on it.

I - Prioritize Missions

Metz and Hoffman submitted an alternative to the full spectrum approach. Underlying this proposal is the 'jack-of-all-trades and master of none' concern. To address this concern, they recommend a course of action which departs from the current full spectrum focus and instead

prioritizes the various missions. This is not unlike mission prioritization during the Cold War period where conventional war was the preeminent mission for U.S. ground forces and all others took a lower tier in priority. Using this approach, the United States could relegate conventional war fighting to a second-tier priority and elevate counterinsurgency and stabilization to primacy (Metz and Hoffman 2007, 10).

Metz and Hoffman argue that besides providing mission focus for U.S. forces, this approach could have the benefit of prioritizing what will nearly certainly become increasingly scarce funds for defense procurement. They note that since counterinsurgency and stabilization operations tend to be less dependent on large, high-tech weapons systems, the advocates for high-cost major weapons systems (certain politicians and the military industrial complex) could oppose this course of action. The primary risk associated with this approach is in accurately anticipating the security threats that the United States will face in coming decades – a significant risk given the fact that historically, no one has ever been able to correctly identify what the actual future threat to US national security will be (Metz and Hoffman 2007, 10).

II - Augmenting BCTs

Several variations on the theme of augmenting a BCT to more effectively conduct Stability Operations and SFA have been proposed. Metz and Hoffman offered this as an alternative proposal. Under this proposal, a BCT would be tailored for specific contingencies by using ‘add-on’ specialized units – commonly referred to as ‘task organizing’. These BCTs, specifically tailored on the fly for Irregular Warfare (IW)/Stability Security Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) missions, could look very different depending on the mission requirement and the extent to which combat is expected to be a part of the mission.

Under this proposal the BCT would include augmentation from units specially equipped, trained, and organized for these missions with extensive military police, Special Forces, intelligence units, civil affairs, trainers, advisers, and engineers (Metz and Hoffman 2007, 9).

Some of the benefits of this proposal include the fact that the Army is familiar with task organizing units, that it would not require any significant organizational change, and that it is rapidly adaptable to nearly any situation. On the down side, the very nature of this type of organization means it is ad hoc. Therefore the personnel lack familiarity with each other and potentially with the issues of the conflict. Another issue arises from the assumption that there are units “specially equipped, trained, and organized for these types of missions” and that there are “trainer and advisors” available – for the most part, these units and personnel do not exist. Finally, this approach lacks long term continuity, particularly as applied in Phase 0 (Shape) environments.

A similar proposal, this one specifically designed to address counterinsurgency organizational needs but with applicability to SFA, was to create a special staff section within each of the Army’s BCTs. These staff sections would be specifically designed to deal with counterinsurgency and other unconventional activities. This staff section would be responsible for formulating counterinsurgency plans, policies, and doctrine for the BCT. In addition, the section would have funds available to underwrite counterinsurgency and stabilization tasks such as logistics, intelligence, and interpreter support and to provide compensation for local security forces, if required. Theoretically, officers assigned to this staff section would require specialized counterinsurgency (stability) training and experience over and above that of the typical officer (Campbell 2007, 21-22).

A benefit of this course of action is that it is relatively cheap with no equipment or new unit creation cost and without large-scale organizational or cultural changes. Since the staff section would be organic to the BCT you would not have the ad hoc issues associated with the ‘add on’ or ‘task organizing’ approach. Disadvantages to this approach are that it is not clear where the officers assigned to this staff section would get the “specialized counterinsurgency (stability) training and experience over and above that of the typical officer”. Additionally, though this staff section could enhance the BCT’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency (stability) operations, it is unclear what impact it would have on the conduct of SFA in a Phase 0 (Shape) environment. Would this section be pulled to conduct SFA? Would they advise support and train those who are pulled? Finally this approach also lacks long term continuity, particularly as applied in phase 0 (Shape) environments.

III - Multi-functional Stabilization Task Force/Brigades

Another proposal argues that the key to success is to integrate the concept of Progressive stabilization⁸ by integrating multi-functional stabilization force packages into BCTs to begin stabilization and reconstruction activities as soon as combat operations end and then to subsequently transition to Stabilization Brigade based around the Army’s Maneuver Enhancement Brigade with modifications⁹ making it capable of exercising mission command for

⁸ Progressive stabilization is founded on two principles: 1) early integration of emergency stabilization efforts into combat operations at the lower tactical level, and 2) rapid expansion of stabilization efforts to exploit success and set the conditions for reconstruction (Watson 2005, 9).

⁹ Watson argues that the maneuver enhancement brigade offers the greatest potential as a surrogate stabilization brigade. Its mission to execute shaping and sustaining operations to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile action and ensure the freedom of action of forces assigned to a Unit of Employment (UEX) is a close match. Additionally the maneuver enhancement brigade’s ability to exercise mission command over engineering, military police, ordnance disposal, civil affairs, chemical, security forces, and other type units makes it the most capable headquarters for synchronizing the range of stabilization tasks. Still, exercising mission command over stabilization efforts is not its express purpose and the design is not optimized for stabilization thus requiring modification (Watson 2005, 15)

area wide stabilization efforts (Watson 2005, 12).

A benefit of this course of action is that it is relatively cheap as it is essentially a modification of organizations from within the Army's existing modular BCTs and Support Brigades. Little new equipment is required and no new unit creation costs are involved. Additionally there are no large-scale organizational or cultural changes. Since these organizations already exist there would be no ad hoc issues. The principle disadvantages of this approach are that it focuses on the US units performing the Stability Operations and has no provision for conducting the training and advising. Additionally, this approach is Phase IV (Stabilize) focused; it remains unclear what utility this approach would have in a Phase 0 (shape) environment. As before, this approach also lacks long term continuity, particularly as applied in phase 0.

Faction Two – Develop Specialized Units

The other school of thought argues that the Army needs to establish separate units, outside of existing organizations, which are specially organized, trained and equipped to conduct Stability Operations and SFA. The main reasoning behind this line of thought comes down to the concept that a single soldier, or unit, can't reasonably be expected to do everything¹⁰. Essentially, the range of missions is too broad and the skill sets required are too different. "Attempting to field forces that can move quickly and seamlessly from irregular warfare to conventional warfare seems destined to produce an Army that is barely a jack-of-all-trades, and clearly a master of none" (Krepinevich 2009, 3).

Secretary of Defense Gates, in October 2007, made a number of remarks while addressing the Association the US Army (AUSA) that seemed to add fuel to the debate (Gates 2007).

¹⁰ Gardner notes that the Army is "good at destroying targets and bad at rebuilding states" (Gardner 2007, 15)

“The U.S. Army today is ... an organization largely organized, trained, and equipped in a different era for a different kind of conflict.”

“One of the principal challenges that the Army faces is to regain its traditional edge at fighting conventional wars while retaining what it has learned — and relearned — about unconventional wars — the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead.”

“Until our government decides to plus up our civilian agencies like the Agency for International Development, Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. All these so-called “nontraditional capabilities” have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy — where they must stay.”

Special Forces

Within the ‘separate’ or ‘specialized’ unit faction there are several differing proposals. First, however, one must recognize that the Army has a specialized unit that is organized, trained and equipped to perform SFA missions: Army Special Forces. But, as we have seen above, the SECDEF and many others have directed that the Army build this capability in the conventional Army and thus this will not be examined further. Proposals for building this capability outside the conventional BCTs or a BCT with augmentation will be examined next.

Dual Surge

Numerous proposals for developing ‘separate’ or ‘specialized’ units within the conventional Army have been made. One of the advocates of this approach is Andrew Krepinevich, who notes that “...the authors of the U.S. defense strategy have wisely chosen to address the gap between the scale of the challenges confronting the nation and the forces available to address them by focusing on building up the military capabilities of threatened states, and of America’s allies and partners” (Krepinevich 2009, 4). He states that the Army lacks forces designed to

surge in the event of a major contingency at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, as well as forces designed to prevent such a contingency from arising in the first place. He advocates a “Dual-Surge” Army...

The Army needs to field two surge forces, one for conventional operations, the other for irregular warfare. Should either form of conflict prove protracted, the other wing of the force could, over the course of the initial twelve- to fifteen-month surge, undergo training and the appropriate force structure modifications to enable it to “swing” in behind the surge force to sustain operations.

...one [wing] oriented operations along the lower end of the conflict spectrum, while the other wing would be oriented on operations along the high end of the conflict spectrum. Structured in this manner, the Army could rightfully claim to be a truly capable “Full-Spectrum” Force (Krepinevich 2009, 4).

To accomplish reorganization Mr. Krepinevich advocates converting fifteen Army Infantry BCTs to the Security Cooperation BCT configuration and additionally converting fifteen Army National Guard (ARNG) Infantry BCTs to a Security Cooperation BCT configuration. These Security Cooperation BCTs would conduct SFA missions in Phase 0 (Shape) environments. In the event that a major Stability Operation arises, this configuration could provide thirty brigades to cover the first twelve to fifteen months of the contingency and allows sufficient time to reorient the rest of the Army, if the needed, to sustain the commitment (Krepinevich 2009, 9).

Three Distinct Forces

This proposal would redesign the majority of ground forces into units specializing in one of three disciplines: conventional war fighting, counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, and homeland defense. The war fighting component would consist of traditional mechanized and armored units and conventional support units (artillery, attack helicopters, etc.) needed for combat operations against conventional forces. The second component would combine Army

Special Forces with additional support units that have been trained specifically for counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Units in this second component would have language and cultural training and would be able to conduct law enforcement, governance, and infrastructure repair operations when U.S. civilian capacity is absent or available only on a limited scale. The third and final component would consist primarily of Reserve units and would be organized, trained, and equipped for homeland security missions (Metz and Hoffman 2007, 9-12).

A benefit of this proposal is increased optimization resulting from force specialization as opposed to the current full-spectrum approach. This specialization would theoretically result in greater expertise across all three areas and subsequently mean that future operations would be conducted more efficiently in terms of time, cost, and casualties. The major drawback to this course of action is the flip-side of its strength. Increased specialization amongst the three forces translates into a decreased capability of each force for conducting missions in the other two areas. A significant drawback, during these times of economic hardship, is the cost associated with maintaining three separate, specialized forces. Additionally, overcoming cultural biases within the Army arising from soldiers being assigned across three different specialties with significantly different responsibilities would be difficult.

Army Advisor Corps

John Nagl is another advocate for the creation of a specialized unit. In his article *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps* he argues that the Army should “establish a permanent, 20,000-member Advisor Corps” which would “develop doctrine and oversee the training and deployment of 750 advisory teams of 25-Soldiers each,

organized into three 250-team divisions” (Nagl 2007, 5). This proposed organization he argues, would “solve the vast majority of problems afflicting embedded combat advisors – providing them with doctrine, training, and a permanent home” (Nagl 2007, 7).

This option is less ambitious than the one proposed by Krepinevich, and would involve the conversion of the equivalent of only 4 BCTs worth of manpower. However, because of the disproportionate number of senior officers and NCOs this is not necessarily an accurate description of the impact.

Chapter 2

Partner Nation Capacity Building Requirements

Building Partner Nation Capacity

The theory behind building partner capacity is two-fold. First, well trained and capable security forces are better able to provide security for their own citizens. This serves to minimize the instability associated with un-governed or under-governed states and also makes it harder for criminals, insurgents, and/or terrorists to operate. The idea here is that if the Government and the security forces are effectively doing their job, then intervention is less likely to be required. Second, well trained and capable partner nation security forces are better able to assist in burden sharing when an intervention is required; which directly reduces the requirement for US forces.

With this in mind, it is useful to understand that the US Army has been involved in Security Force Assistance or partner nation capacity building for a long time. Prior to WWII the Army trained local security forces in numerous places including the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, and China in order to build their capacity to perform security functions. Immediately following WWII the Army found itself needing to rebuild Europe and Japan, including the security structures and once again assisted on building partner nation security forces. During Vietnam, the “conventional Army developed a robust advisory structure to train and mentor the Army of the Republic of Vietnam” (Escondon 2008, 4).

Beginning in 2002, the Army found itself needing the capacity to build partner nation security force capacity once again, this time in Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter the Iraq was added to the

list of those needing assistance. Effectively building partner nation capability or capacity is a difficult process but it is a process that, at one time, was a familiar process to the Army. Nevertheless, in 2002 the US Army found itself ill-prepared for the task of organizing, training, equipping and advising the Afghan National Army (ANA). Why? The answer lies, in part, in the fact that the conventional Army essentially “flushed all advisory related organization, doctrine, and training after the Vietnam war in order to focus on conventional warfare and the Soviet threat” (Escondon 2008, 4). The Army however, did not fully purge this capability; Special Forces maintained the organization, doctrine and training for just such missions. As result, a Special Forces Battalion was the first US Army unit tasked with the mission of training the Afghan National Army (ANA).

Despite a Herculean effort to get the ANA training program up and effectively running it quickly became apparent that there was absolutely no way that a small group of less than 150 Special Forces Soldiers could build a five-Corps, 70,000-Soldier Army from scratch and meet the desired timeline. Significantly more US and international resources were required; the question was how?

The solution was to get the conventional Army and US allies involved. In about September of 2002, working with then MG Karl Eikenberry out of the US Embassy¹¹ in Kabul, the author, who was the Director of Operations for 1/3 SFG (A) at the time, assisted in the development of a Request for Forces for what eventually became known as Task Force Phoenix – a Task Force of

¹¹ At that time, in the author’s recollection, then MG Eikenberry was the United States Security Coordinator for Afghanistan and later became the Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A). Much of the input regarding the proposed organization, training, and equipping of the ANA came from 1/3 SFG(A) recommendations for the establishment of a conventional Army staffed Training Mission including the organization and composition of the Embedded Training Teams who took over the training responsibility from the SF detachments.

nearly 1000 conventional Army Soldiers that assumed the training mission from 1/3 SFG (A) during the summer of 2003, a little over a year after it first began. Once again, the Army was in the business of training partner nation security forces.

The Afghan National Army Training mission has come a long way from those humble beginnings. Currently there are thousands of people from numerous nations under the banner of the NATO Training Mission- Afghanistan (NTM-A) conducting the Training of not only the Afghan Army, but the Afghan Police as well. The training and assistance spans the entire strategic to tactical spectrum and involves the ministries of defense and interior, high-level staffs within these organizations, as well as various training institutions where the training of small units and individual Soldiers and Police is conducted. Building partner nation capability is complex. To be truly effective it must encompass a holistic approach and address comprehensive Doctrinal, Organizational, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTLMPF) concerns.

The current focus on providing partner nation capacity building tends, understandably so, to be focused on the Afghanistan and Iraqi experience. However, Secretary of Defense Gates has long spoken and written about the need for a broader approach to partner nation capacity building. Given this fact, and the fact that the large requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan will eventually decrease, an attempt should be made to determine what the future demand levels might be in a Phase 0 (Shape) environment.

Determining the Future Level of Demand for US Trainers

The Challenge in determining the demand or requirement for US trainers to conduct Security Force Assistance is that there is very little open source information available that addresses the level of demand. From an Army perspective one of the traditional pre-9/11 sources used for determining the level of demand for Security Force Assistance was the Army Security Cooperation Strategy; this does not appear to have changed. The 2011 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, states that

“Army support to Combatant Commanders will be in accordance with the prioritization guidelines outlined in the *Army Security Cooperation Strategy, 2011-2017*. COCOMs and Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) will be able to program requests for forces through the Global Force Management (GFM) process in accordance with priorities and available forces that are prepared and regionally-focused during the Train-Ready phase of ARFORGEN. This process will serve as the primary instrument to meet security cooperation requirements for capacity-building activities” (McHugh and Casey 2011, 9-10).

The *Army Security Cooperation Strategy* document is classified and so will not be discussed in this paper. It is worth noting however, that in an interview in 2008, Celeste Ward, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities and currently the associate director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at The University of Texas at Austin, stated that she believed that “there was suppressed demand¹² from the Combatant Commanders.” She went on to state that “We don’t know, but we believe that the demand signal will be higher than pre-OEF levels; it’s part of our strategy to work with and through others and to help our partners to secure their own territories.” (Escandon 2008, 38).

¹² Here the suppressed demand is a result of the prioritization of resources (manpower) in support of Afghanistan and Iraq. The demand is so high that there is very little manpower available to the other Combatant Commanders or for other non-Afghanistan/Iraq missions. Knowing this coupled with history of prior requests for forces being denied, results in the COCOMs no longer asking for the forces they need for their operations.

This view is consistent with the author's personal experiences, while working at SOCCENT, a sub-unified command of CENTCOM from 2005-2007, as well as the author's experiences prior to 9-11. The demand for training and equipment often out-stripped US capability to provide it both in terms of man-power and resources. If this suppressed demand remains, then the demand level arising from this process is not an accurate picture of the true demand.

There are a few sources which are not classified that provide an indication of what the demand might be. Robert Martinage, then a Senior Fellow and vice president at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and currently the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Plans, Policy, Oversight and Integration; testified before the House Armed Services Committee in March 2009 and addressed this issue. He was examining this not from a general perspective, but rather from a very limited combating terrorism perspective. He came at this from the perspective of the number of countries that could need assistance.

Developing and maintaining a network for combating terrorism globally will likely require the capacity to conduct training and advisory operations on a steady-state basis in at least a score of high-priority countries and carry out more episodic training operations on a rotational basis in another twenty to forty countries. Meeting this challenge will require changes in the capabilities, capacities and postures of both SOF—especially within SF battalions and the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group—and ground general purpose forces (Martinage 2009, 6).

Sebastian Sprenger (2007) notes that according to a study by the Institute for Defense Analyses “the US military will have an enduring requirement for 5000 land-based trainers of foreign security forces.” However it is unclear exactly what this 5000 land-based trainer requirement encompasses or where they are needed. Another study, conducted by Michele Flournoy, then the President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and currently the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Tammy Schultz, then a fellow at CNAS and

currently the Director of the National Security and Joint Warfare and an Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at the United States Marine Corps War College, approached the question of demand from another perspective. They did not try to determine what the demand level will be; instead they noted that the nature of future challenges¹³ will drive the demand for ground forces. In response to these challenges they state that “assisting partner governments to combat terrorism and insurgency and to enhance their own security capabilities will be a core mission of US ground forces in the years to come (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 18). Regarding the demand, they note that

...even after the Iraq-driven demand signal is significantly reduced, US ground forces must be prepared to conduct a more demanding set of steady state and surge missions that they did pre-September 11, 2001. Day to day, the overwhelming demand for US ground forces will likely fall on the irregular warfare end of the spectrum, and operations lasting years rather than months will be the norm. ...More importantly, they will require substantial change in US ground forces’ orientation, training, and mix of capabilities to be better prepared to deal with the demands of a much broader range of operations (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 18).

Seeking to determine the level of demand is useful, but difficult. Regardless of the level of demand, it seems clear that the demand will exceed the US’ ability to provide in terms of both man-power and financial resources. As a result, prioritization of the demand is a must.

Factors that should play into that prioritization include the ‘strategic importance’ of the partner nation, the partner nation’s political willingness to make changes, the partner nation’s economic ability to make the changes, and finally the impact of pride and interests on the partner nation’s desires. These issues are not unique to partner nations. One must also consider these same factors from a US perspective in addition to realizing that the authority and funding for

¹³ These challenges are: 1) Deterring and responding to traditional military threats, 2) Combating violent Islamist terrorists, 3) combating the proliferation of WMD, 4) Addressing conflict and instability arising from weak and failing states, and 5) responding to humanitarian crises (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 16)

these types of capacity building programs, as noted earlier, resides not within the Department of Defense, but with the Department of State (DoS) under 10 US Code Title 22 and thus requires a coordinated interagency approach.

Not everyone, however, believes that the demand will be greater than in the past. Some, particularly in the Army, feel that, while there will be an enduring requirement for Security Force Assistance, the level of this demand will not be much higher than it was prior to 9/11. The essence of this argument can perhaps be best summed up by the comments of MG(R) Geoffrey Lambert a Special Forces Officer who commanded Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC). Lambert argued that the “US should take a more sophisticated approach to handling combat advisors in the future because large numbers of advisors would NOT be needed.” His contention was that the number of countries that will allow the US to do combat advising on their soil after Iraq and Afghanistan “is about zero” (Escandon 2008, 37). While I personally agree with MG(R) Lambert’s assessment as it relates to *combat advisors*, there is an inherent flaw with this perspective. That flaw directly relates to the fact that the nature of Security Force Assistance is extremely different depending on the security environment that the mission is being performed in. The fact is, very little Security Force Assistance involves combat advising. Historically most Security Force Assistance is conducted in a permissive and usually a peaceful environment.

Security Environment Considerations

Determining the demand for Security Force Assistance missions is one part of the equation involved in determining the types of forces and capabilities that those forces need to conduct the mission. However, there are other factors that complicate this determination. One of those

complicating factors is the variability of the security environment in which SFA missions are conducted in. It is a fact that these missions can be executed across the entire spectrum of conflict. Most notably however, SFA missions tend to be most heavily emphasized during Phase 0 (Shape), Phase I (Deter), Phase IV (Stabilize), and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) of the Joint Operational Planning Phasing Model.

The most important thing to understand with regard to the impact of these varying security environments is the impact the security environment has on 1) the number of US personnel required, 2) the capabilities of the US Personnel, and 3) the level of risk associated with these different environments.

That the requirements vary significantly depending on the security environment seems self evident, however a brief discussion may be in order to ensure a common understanding. SFA missions in Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase I (Deter) environments are conducted in permissive environments with the consent and support of the selected host nation; the threat to the US capacity building forces is minimal.

SFA missions in Phase IV (Stabilize) environments, however, are conducted in, at best, a semi-permissive environment and, at worst, an outright hostile environment. This fact is well illustrated by US experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. This phase can be, depending on the situation, as dangerous, and one could easily argue, more dangerous than the Phase III (Dominate) phase which involves major combat operations. As a result of this more hostile security environment, the threat to the US capacity building forces is correspondingly much higher. This increased threat translates into a requirement for additional US forces in order to ensure the security of the US trainers. Additionally, as has been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq

where no capable security forces existed, these additional US forces may be required to provide security for both the host nation population at large as well as the Host Nation Security Forces themselves. Furthermore, the capabilities of the trainers in this type of an environment greatly expand as it includes the need to conduct advising in combat.

As the operation transitions into Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) and host nation security forces become more capable, they will of course begin taking responsibility for these the security functions, potentially reducing the threat that the US trainers face as well as potentially reducing the need for the additional US security forces mentioned above. The idea here is to “work yourself out of a job.” If success has been achieved in Phase IV and momentum maintained through Phase V then the need for the support of the BCTs diminishes over time. Ultimately this environment will return to Phase 0 (shape) and ‘normal’ relations.

Required Capabilities

Determining the capabilities of the forces required to conduct SFA is difficult and situation specific, therefore there is no set template that can be applied. As we have seen above, partner nation requirements and the security environment that the assistance will be provided in will significantly shape these requirements and would seem to lend support to the specialized unit faction’s argument. With this in mind, determining the generic capabilities required to conduct SFA becomes important. If the future turns out as Secretary of Defense Gates and many other senior Department of Defense Officials have predicted, SFA missions and Irregular Warfare then in a Phase 0 (Shape) environment will be the most common type of operations the Army will conduct. The successful execution of this type of mission requires more capacity in a “number of critical capability areas that have proven to be in high demand (and often short supply) in

post-Cold War and post-9/11 operations” (Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 21). Below is a list of military capabilities that Flournoy and Schultz argue will continue to be in demand in the future security environment.

Figure 1: Key Military Capabilities

Key Military Capabilities for the Future*	
Capability	The Ability To:
Psychological Operations	Convey information to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately behavior.
Information Operations	Influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp a foreign adversary’s decision making processes, while protecting U.S. decision-making processes.
Public Affairs	Disseminate public information and conduct community relations activities that provide truthful, timely, and factual unclassified information about U.S. activities in a given area.
Civil Affairs	Establish, maintain, and influence relations between military forces, governmental, and nongovernmental civilian organizations and the civilian population in order to facilitate military operations. This may include performing (or helping to build another nation’s capacity to perform) activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government.
Military Police	Conduct protection, enforcement, and detainment operations primarily for U.S. forces, but also for a host nation population.
Construction Engineers	Construct and/or maintain infrastructure necessary for sustaining military operations or the strategic mission, to include host nation support.
Trainers and Advisors	Train host nation security forces in simulated conditions and mentor them during actual operations.
Special Forces Teams	Conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare (a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted by, with, or through indigenous or surrogate forces).
Medical Units	Provide health-related activities to the military and a host nation populace, ranging from dental care to emergency medicine.
Legal Affairs	Provide expertise to the military and/or a host nation government on administrative, civil, claims, international, and operational law, and military justice.
Intelligence (especially Human Intelligence, HUMINT)	Collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, and interpret information concerning foreign countries or areas. HU MINT is information collected and provided by human sources.
Counterintelligence	Collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, and interpret information to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign entities.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal.	Disable munitions containing explosives, nuclear materials, and biological and chemical agents
Foreign Affairs Officers	Apply area, foreign language, cultural, political-military, economic, and social expertise.
Linguists	Use language proficiency to assist many other critical capability areas.
* It should be noted that civilians have the comparative advantage in many irregular warfare capability areas, but currently lack the capacity and expeditionary culture.	

(This table is a recreation of one found in Flournoy and Schultz 2007, 22)

Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq have validated the need for these capabilities. The army has recognized this and as a part of its transformation is working on ‘rebalancing’ approximately 100,000 personnel spaces in order to increase these very types of capabilities (McHugh and Casey, 2007, A-2).

Flournoy and Schultz’s list of capabilities is fairly comprehensive. However, it does not address how all of these capabilities work together to produce the desired endstate. Ultimately, it is the appropriate synchronization of a number of capabilities that produces the desired result. Furthermore, some tasks require different knowledge and skills and even more specialized experience, at a level that most Soldiers do not possess. As an example, helping a host nation conduct major security sector reform of not only its security forces but also its ministerial level policies and programs would require personnel with experience in these types of positions. Another example might include assisting a host country establish an equivalent of a “Training and Doctrine Command”. The point is, as noted earlier, effectively building partner nation capability or capacity is a difficult process that requires a comprehensive DOTLMPF approach and which also likely requires simultaneous efforts at the strategic, operational/institutional, and tactical levels.

Despite the complicated nature of SFA it is important to remember, this is not something that is new. Additionally, given that the Army’s position that BCTs are full spectrum capable and will be used to conduct SFA as required, it may be useful to reflect on capacity building from a more recent historical perspective. The scale which SFA has been conducted at for the last eight years is certainly larger than normal, as is the scope of the assistance, which spans the entire strategic to tactical spectrum, but it is not new. The Army has provided security assistance to

many countries. In addition to the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2007 the Army deployed 65 separate teams logged over 80,000 workdays in 39 countries in support of security assistance missions. That same year, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, a traditional security assistance venue, were used to train over 7,700 foreign students at 15 different locations in the United States (Escandon 2008, 44). The Foreign Military Sales Program, as well as the Counter Narcotics Program and the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program have all also been very active and effective.

All of this has been accomplished without creating new organizations and without making significant efforts to provide specialized training. This then, brings us back to the original question. Do modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and the supporting force structure have the capability to effectively cover the full spectrum of operations, specifically SFA missions in both Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase 0 (Shape) environments?

Chapter 3

Recommendations and Conclusion

Recommendations

There are of course limits to the Army's SFA capability resulting from finite resources in terms of personnel, funds and equipment which leads to the first recommendation. The Army must work closely with the various Geographic Combatant Commanders to gather and prioritize the SFA missions as well as integrate the existing Security Assistance venues with the available resources. It is unlikely that the total demand will ever be met, but with appropriate prioritization, the most important national interests can be achieved.

Related to the intent of keeping units, and in particular BCTs, full spectrum capable, the Army must recognize the importance of exposing the largest possible number of leaders and Soldiers to SFA. This should include continued emphasis on this mission in formal military education but must be expanded through experience and assignments outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The exposure and use of the larger numbers of leaders and Soldiers with Afghanistan and Iraq SFA experience is particularly important as that SFA experience can be useful in, and is transferable to, other locations. Understanding the "transferability" is critical as it goes to increasing SFA mission efficiency. Establishing credibility and gaining the trust of foreign soldiers is difficult; prior experience in training and advising foreign forces is often help in establishing this credibility. Additionally, experience with cultural differences, the use of

interpreters, and numerous other aspects associated with training and advising foreign forces creates a base of knowledge that can be drawn from when doing SFA mission. Each SFA mission is unique; however a Soldier with a broad base of SFA knowledge and experience can more efficiently identify challenges and solution to those challenges. The Army should capitalize on the existing base of experience to maximum extent possible by getting these Soldiers and units more engaged in Theater Security Cooperation activities designed to build partner nation capabilities.

Given the unpredictable nature of future requirements, the Army should accelerate the adoption of an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) to better enable identification of those Soldiers who have experience and who have excelled at SFA missions. This identifier should provide sufficient differentiation as to be useful when searching for people with a particular skill. As an example, the ASI should differentiate between the level that a soldier has performed at; Strategic (i.e. ministerial level training, advising, and development), Operational (i.e. development of training institutions and doctrine), or tactical and also address the type of assistance the Soldier has performed (i.e. distinguish between Training, Advising, Partnering or some combination of these).

The Army must continue to expand and simplify the authorities pertaining to the SA and SFA missions. The 2006 and 2010 QDRs identified several recommended changes to various authorities. There is one area however, that should be expanded which has not been identified thus far. That area is in Title 10 US Code, specifically relating to what is sometimes called the “SOF Exception” or section 2011 - Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces. This exception should be expanded to include conventional Army Forces as they too

now have the doctrinal mission to conduct SFA. This exception enables title 10 funds to be used to pay for the following types of expenses:

- (1) Expenses of training US forces assigned to a command in conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country.
- (2) Expenses of deploying such US forces for that training.
- (3) In the case of training in conjunction with a friendly developing country, the incremental expenses incurred by that country as the direct result of such training.

The Army must also recognize that SFA mission in a Phase 0 (Shape) or Phase I (Deter) environment requires a “cultural change” which must be acknowledged and encouraged from the highest levels. The organizational makeup and skills required for each SFA mission in a Phase 0 (Shape) environment are going to be unique. The function of a BCT in this type of environment is as a ‘force provider.’ The mission is to ‘support’ the SFA teams and not to ‘fight’ them (Escandon 2008, 104). Commanders must understand that these types of missions require the very best people, and if the people that are sent don’t ‘hurt’ the sending organization, then the ‘wrong’ people were selected.

The key to cultural change is institutionalization. One aspect of this institutionalization involves promotion and selection and the use of promotion and selection board instructions. These instructions identify why particular attributes, education, and experience are important and direct board members to “provide appropriate consideration in the overall evaluation of each officer.” This is, on its own however, not enough. Another aspect of this institutionalization should include the use of an ASI, as mentioned above. An ASI allows the monitoring of promotion and selection rates for Soldiers with SFA experience which in turn helps ensure that Soldiers with successful SFA experience are getting promoted and selected at a rate equal to or

higher than their peers. This technique has precedent; as seen in the legislative mandate regarding joint qualified officer promotion and selection.

The Army should also initiate a comprehensive doctrinal review of both Army and Joint Doctrine as they relate to SFA, Stability Operations, Irregular Warfare, Security Assistance, Security Cooperation, and Foreign Internal Defense. These terms are often used interchangeably yet each has differing definitions and connotations. Doctrine has been attempting to catch up to the fast pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The doctrine now exists; it is time to clean up the discrepancies.

Finally, the Army must also recognize two aspects of SFA missions which run counter to the ARFORGEN concept with regard to meeting SFA requirements.

First, as noted above, Phase 0 (Shape) requirements tend to be much less manpower intensive, requiring the stripping of potentially key personnel from the BCT and leaving a potentially significant capability gap in the BCT that remains behind. This means that if a BCT is conducting a SFA mission (or missions) it will probably not be available to respond to an emerging crisis or a combat operation.

Second, SFA success in Phase 0 (Shape) requirements are often dependant on establishing personal relationships. In many countries, establishing these relationships requires a long term commitment and continuity of personnel.

- A long-term commitment is likely to exceed the “trained and ready” phase of the ARFORGEN process and in reality could require years of focused effort. There are no hard and fast rules of thumb, but building personal relationships and gaining a detailed

understanding of the issues associated with a specific SFA mission can require several months¹⁴ to establish. Then, and only then can progress take place.

- Similarly, continuity of personnel generally mandates a phased approach to personnel replacements as opposed to a unit rotation approach. As a rule of thumb, during any given period, no more than a third of the personnel involved in a specific SFA mission should be replaced.

Conclusion

The Army has the capabilities required for the conduct of SFA, including in a Phase 0 (Shape) environment. These capabilities exist primarily because the Soldiers assigned to BCTs and many other units across the Army have deployed to either Afghanistan or Iraq and have, at one level or another, have actively participated in SFA mission in Phase IV (Stabilize) environments. These Soldiers and units thus form a capable and experienced group to draw from. If the Army is willing to adapt to these realities and change its culture then it will likely be successful in accomplishing its future SFA missions. If the Army does not, then the full spectrum methodology will not be particularly efficient or successful.

¹⁴ Recall that Feickert (2008, CRS-9) suggested that it can take between four to six months to become effective.

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