General Matthew B. Ridgway and Army Design Methodology during the Korean War
Abstract
Despite the vast research by Americans on General Matthew B. Ridgway's miraculous transformation of the Eighth Army during the Korean War, few studies have examined his operational approach and contrasted it with that of General Douglas MacArthur's. The constructed reality that emerges from the literature is that General MacArthur's operational desires led to a strained relationship with President Truman and ultimately limited his ability to employ forces in the manner he believed necessary to defeat the Communist Chinese Forces. Similarly, the impression of General Ridgway painted by historical texts is that sheer will stopped and turned around the frantic retreating army, which subsequently halted the CCF advance and pushed the communists beyond the 38th Parallel. Army Design Methodology provides a powerful tool for viewing these actions in a new perspective. This monograph examines the actions of General MacArthur and General Ridgway and their application of critical and creative thinking to the problem created by the entry of Communist Chinese Forces onto the Korean Peninsula in October and November of 1950. The study details the significant reframing that characterized the methods applied by General Ridgway during 1950 and 1951, providing future operational commanders a relevant historical example of Army Design Methodology in action.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA566586
Entities
People
- James T. Outland
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College