

Blasphemy: How the U.S. Government practiced a type of Operational Art to Defend Latin America during the Cold War

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Two centuries of philosophy and war have informed the latest evolution of the definitions of strategy and operational art defined in the Department of Defense's Joint Publication 1-02. By harmonizing the relationship between strategy and operational art, doctrine logically links the organization and employment of *military forces* to strategy. However, joint doctrine fails to identify where the instruments of diplomacy, information, and economic power are organized, employed, and integrated through ends, ways, and means to achieve national objectives. Although strategy provides a prudent idea or set of ideas for how one might employ the instruments of national power, the actual implementation of strategy occurs through the development and execution of a campaign that deliberately organizes, employs, and integrates *all* the instruments of national power to achieve theater and/or national objectives.

By replacing the term "military forces" with "the instruments of national power" in the current joint definition of operational art, this monograph increases the definition of operational art in scale to demonstrate how the U.S. government practiced a type of operational art to deny communist penetration of the western hemisphere during the Cold War. Although it remains difficult to identify whether the synchronicity between various U.S. governmental agencies during discreet events in Latin America was deliberate or serendipitous, this monograph reveals that when the U.S. government's actions resembled what can be construed as a type of operational art, it was successful in achieving its theater and national objectives. Accordingly, if our government designs to be deliberate in the future it can purposefully harness the power of this concept to preserve U.S. national interests in Latin America and Africa as it attempts to maintain, and potentially expand, American influence in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Background.....	2
Methodology.....	5
Operational Art.....	7
Origin and Evolution	7
Application	17
The Monroe Doctrine	21
Origins	21
Codification as Policy.....	23
Latin America during the Cold War	30
Violence as the Power Relation in Society.....	30
U.S. Strategy: A Geographic Approach	34
Soviet Strategy.....	38
Latin America: A Gallery of Operational Art	40
Inter-American Military Education Programs	40
The Makings of the Guatemalan Military Project	47
Soft Power in Mexico	53
Conclusion.....	61
APPENDICES	68
Appendix A: The Monroe Doctrine.....	68
Appendix B: Monroe Doctrine Interpretations/Corollaries	70
Appendix C: Levels of U.S. Involvement in Latin America	72
Appendix D: Lend Lease Transfers to Central American States, 1941-1945	73
Appendix E: Country Graduates from U.S. Military Schools as of 1989	74
Appendix F: U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Central America, 1953-1979	75
BIBLIOGRAPHY	76

Introduction

The United States has had a propensity to intervene in Latin American affairs since President James Monroe decreed the western hemisphere off-limits to European powers in 1823. In an effort to maintain hemispheric security, U.S. interference in the region increased steadily throughout the twentieth century, reaching its zenith during the Cold War. To prevent the establishment of a Soviet client state in its southern flank, the U.S. Government employed the instruments of national power in creative and non-traditional ways, resulting in an indirect approach that resembled a type of operational art. Defined as the “cognitive approach by commanders and staff... to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means,” recent debate has centered on exactly where operational art occurs and who can practice it.¹

In contrast to those individuals who believe operational art can only occur at a specific echelon or within a military context, this monograph will demonstrate that the U.S. Government practiced a type of operational art in its defense of the western hemisphere during the Cold War. To support this claim, this monograph will accomplish four key tasks. First, it will define how a government, responsible for policy and strategy, can practice a type of operational art. Second, it will determine if a deliberate logic structured U.S. policy towards Latin America up to, and throughout, the Cold War. Third, it will identify how strategists used Latin American geography to define America’s strategic interests and priorities, which in turn guided an operational approach towards the region. Finally, this monograph will use case study analysis to determine whether the U.S. Government did in fact practice a type of operational art through the

¹ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Doctrine Support Division, November 2010 (as amended through 15 January 2012)), 245.

organization, employment, and integration of all the instruments of national power during discreet events in Latin America to fulfill America's strategic interests and priorities. Accordingly, this monograph claims the U.S. Government practiced a type of operational art that integrated *all* the instruments of national power, not just military forces, into an indirect approach that successfully prevented the spread of communism in Latin American during the Cold War. The efficacy of this approach is relevant to military professionals because our military often conducts similar operations that extend operational art beyond the boundaries of military action described by joint doctrine.

Background

Latin America has had a particularly violent history since Hernan Cortes sacked Tenochtitlan in 1521. After suffering centuries of racism and oppression at the hands of the Spanish, the region emerged from colonial dominance in the early 1800s only to fall under the aegis of a new empire: the United States of America. Having realized that U.S. foreign policy interests abroad rested upon a secure and peaceful southern flank at home, U.S. policymakers quickly moved to codify their newfound hegemony over the western hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 laid the foundation for U.S. policy towards the region and continued to provide strategic guidance to senior civilian and military officials up to, and through, the presidency of President George H.W. Bush.²

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the interests of America's political elites, captains of industry, and militarists converged around a shared vision for the world in which the progress of liberal democracy and free market capitalism depended on the expansion of

² David W. Dent, *The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 1-4.

America's economic and military power abroad. Prior to any serious attempt to inject American influence and power in European and Asian markets, U.S. interests used Latin America as a training ground to perfect the use of America's hard and soft power. An examination of U.S. military activity reveals that U.S. armed forces tested and refined their doctrine, organization, training, and materiel in Latin America from the mid-nineteenth century through the early twentieth century. In fact, by 1930 the U.S. had sent gunboats into Latin American ports over 6,000 times, invaded Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras, fought guerilla wars in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, annexed Puerto Rico, and carved out a piece of Colombia to create both the nation of Panama and the Panama Canal.³

Throughout the Cold War, political and military officials feared that Soviet populism would resonate with the poverty-stricken people of Latin America, thereby undermining the security of the region, the monopoly the U.S. held on its raw materials, and its unfettered access to the Panama Canal. Perhaps this dynamic, combined with America's historical propensity to engage throughout the western hemisphere, explains how U.S. policy towards Latin America successfully married a Hobbesian realism with Kantian idealism during the Cold War.⁴ This

³ Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, NY: Holt Paperbacks, 2006), 3.

⁴ Steven M. Cahn, ed. *Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 383-385+731-736; Grandin, 78. Thomas Hobbes was a seventeenth century English philosopher whose landmark work *Leviathan* argued for the absolute sovereignty of the state. Hobbes believed human beings were inherently self-interested and that humanity, if unchecked by law and the state, would devolve into a constant-sum game of all against all. Man's desire for self-preservation would result in life being "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." To avoid these circumstances, Hobbes advocated for people to enter into a social contract with one another to create a sovereign government with absolute power to resolve disputes and regulate society. The eighteenth century Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant stands as the antithesis to Hobbes. His *Critique of Pure Reason* laid a metaphysical and epistemological basis for his concept of "transcendental idealism," which he built upon in his later writings to advocate for the unconditional value of human freedom. In his attempt to reconcile human agency with the coercive nature of the state, Kant argued for a worldwide federation of republican governments connected by free trade under the aegis of cosmopolitan law. However, Kant stopped short of advocating for a global government because he believed such a structure would degenerate from republicanism into despotism.

unlikely union of two seemingly irreconcilable, philosophical concepts justified a duality in U.S. policy that advocated both containment and intervention, enabling policymakers to isolate certain states, such as Cuba, while they engaged in others, such as Guatemala and Mexico. This allowed U.S. policy towards Latin America to become an economy of effort that focused more on the denial of communist penetration in specific, geographically defined sub-regions as opposed to a vision for Latin America's future.⁵

To prevent the emergence of civil strife in America's southern flank, U.S. policymakers, assisted at times by military officials, appear to have designed a comprehensive approach towards hemispheric security that organized, employed, and integrated the instruments of national power with the activities of both non- and inter-governmental organizations and multi-national corporations. Whether deliberate or serendipitous, this approach resulted in a unity of effort that geometrically increased the impact the instruments of national power had upon seemingly unrelated, discreet events throughout the western hemisphere. Historical case study analysis will show that when its actions resemble what can be construed as a type of operational art, the U.S. government achieved its theater and national objectives in support of a desired strategic state.⁶

⁵ Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 310.

⁶ Department of Defense, *Planners Handbook for Operational Design, Version 1: Joint and Coalition Warfighting* (Suffolk, VA: Department of Defense, October 2011), V-6; Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Army Publication Directorate, 2011), 9-10. Chapter 5 of the *Planner's Handbook for Operational Design* states that some individuals prefer the term "desired state" rather than "end state" because the state of any complex interactive environment is transitory. When used in the context of joint doctrine, military end state typically refers to the point in time and circumstances when objectives have been achieved and the military instrument of national power can "disengage" from the operation. Because this monograph focuses on the integration of *all* the instruments of national power, not just the military, it will use the term "desired state" to describe the conditions that contributed to America's continued advantage in Latin America throughout the Cold War.

Methodology

To confirm the proposition that the U.S. Government exercised a type of operational art in its integration of the instruments of national power to prevent the spread of communism in Latin America, this monograph will accomplish four key tasks. First, it will define how a government, responsible for policy and strategy, can practice a type of operational art. A challenge arises in maintaining the harmony between particularization and generalization when specifying operational art in terms that can accommodate an appropriate inquiry without succumbing to either conceptual stretching, by conflating strategy and operational art, or an overly tactical, or military, analysis.⁷ To overcome this challenge, this monograph employs a strategy of disaggregation to separate the macro, U.S. policy and strategy towards the region, from the meso, joint doctrine's definitions of, and logical links between, strategy and operational art, and the micro, historical analysis of discreet events in Latin America.⁸

Second, this monograph will determine if a deliberate logic structured U.S. policy towards Latin America up to, and throughout, the Cold War. A documentary review of foreign policy pronouncements from President James Monroe through President Theodore Roosevelt, as well as contemporary academic research combines to satisfy a rigorous inquiry of the evolution of

⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002). Gaddis addressed the inherent tension between particularization and generalization - between literal and abstract representation - when constructing a general narrative that provides a broad overview of the past while allowing for detailed analysis at certain points. Balancing the two allows for the depiction of reality, in this instance operational art, at a certain place and time without succumbing to immersion in that specific place or time, as well as the ability to move from place to place, or point to point, while remaining within the general narrative.

⁸ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10-11. The strategy of disaggregation employed by this monograph closely resembles the methodology Stathis Kalyvas used during his interrogation of violence in civil war. Adopting Kalyvas' approach allows the author to provide context at each separate level of analysis without having to conflate the three levels together or focus on just one. This makes it possible to "zoom in" and "zoom out" while moving from policy to strategy to operational art.

U.S. policy towards Latin America from 1823 through the Presidency of George H.W. Bush. Blending both primary and secondary sources allows for the triangulation of information concerning the origins and codification of the Monroe Doctrine as policy, in addition to highlighting which U.S. Presidents used the document to justify their own foreign policies.

Third, this monograph will identify how strategists used geography to define America's strategic interests and priorities in the region. By analyzing each state's proximity to the continental U.S., its proximity to other areas of security concern, and its political, military, and economic capabilities, research will show how U.S. strategists divided Latin America into three specific sub-regions: the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico, the South Atlantic, and the west coast of South America.

Fourth, case study analysis will demonstrate whether the U.S. Government did in fact practice a type of operational art through the organization, employment, and integration of all the instruments of national power during discreet events in Latin America. Because strategy identified the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico as America's highest security concern during the Cold War, this monograph has purposefully chosen to analyze three historical case studies from this region to support its hypothesis. The three historical case studies are: the formation and expansion of inter-American military education programs from 1946 to the present, the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, and the information and economic reform campaigns in Mexico during the 1960s.

To accomplish these four tasks, this monograph proceeds in the following manner: a literature review explores the origin, evolution, and practice of operational art, to include its application in the defense. The literature review concludes by offering a broadened concept of operational art to define a type of operational art practiced by a national government that differs from the contemporary definitions of both strategy and operational art. Following the literature review, an inquiry into the origin and historical application of the Monroe Doctrine will show that

an explicit logic governed the employment of the U.S. instruments of national power in Latin America up to, and throughout, the Cold War. Next, an analysis of the operational environment will discuss the role of violence in Latin American society, as well as the regional strategies adopted by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, before transitioning to analysis of the three previously mentioned events. This organization builds a logical argument that the U.S. government, whether cognizant of its actions or not, practiced a type of operational art in Latin America to deny Soviet penetration of the western hemisphere during the Cold War. Finally, this monograph concludes with a summary and offers two recommendations, one to the joint force and one to the U.S. government, on how America can capitalize on its lessons learned in Latin American during the Cold War to defend U.S. interests abroad more effectively during the upcoming period of fiscal austerity and budget cuts by purposefully integrating and synchronizing the instruments of national power.

Operational Art

Origin and Evolution

Two centuries of philosophy and war have informed the latest evolution of the concept of operational art defined in the Department of Defense's Joint Publication 1-02. Although the "cognitive approach by commanders and staff – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means" is not new, historians and military professionals have debated the origin and evolution of operational art for decades.⁹ Some claim Napoleon's creation of the General Staff, organization of La Grand Armée into Corps and Divisions, and use of the directed telescope revolutionized warfare, and therefore constitutes the

⁹ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 245.

birth of operational art because his innovation allowed him to concentrate his forces in upper Bavaria to defeat the Prussian Army at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806.¹⁰ However, others claim Napoleon's failure to conduct operations with simultaneity and depth demonstrates his captivity to the traditional strategy of a single point, thereby rendering him the undertaker of classical warfare.¹¹ While scholars will more than likely remain split on Napoleon and his legacy for the near future, perhaps a review of the definition of *strategy* will clarify portions of the debate and identify where in the context of theory, history, and doctrine strategy ends and operational art actually begins.

Confusion surrounding the definition and use of the word *strategy* likely stems from the numerous ways military philosophers and, more recently, self-proclaimed business strategists have defined and employed the term for their own purposes. Henry Mintzberg, an internationally renowned professor of business and management studies, has noted that various authors, both past and present, have conflated strategy with, or some combination of, planning, patterns, positions, and perspectives.¹² Although justified, his critique of how society defines strategy in one way while often using it in another could not be further removed from how Carl von Clausewitz, the great Prussian war philosopher, defined and employed the term in his landmark work *On War*. Heavily influenced by both the German Enlightenment and the crushing defeats the Napoleonic Wars dealt his beloved Prussia, Clausewitz saw war as a highly complex

¹⁰ David G. Chandler, "Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign," in *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art*, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 2007), 63-66; Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 95-97.

¹¹ James J. Schneider, *Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundations of Operational Art*, Theoretical Paper No. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1992), 22.

¹² Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994), 27-28.

environment where unpredictable elements and events influenced one another through probability and chance.¹³ As a result, Clausewitz viewed strategy as the mechanism to harness the complexity of warfare, as depicted in his statement that, “the original means of strategy is victory - that is, tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace.”¹⁴ Additionally, strategy reflected the use of an engagement for the political purpose of a war, thereby “confer[ring] a special significance on [the] outcome and the engagement: it assigns a particular aim to it.”¹⁵ As such, statecraft provided purpose and direction to tactical actions, creating an intimate bond between the sovereign and his ability to control his forces and achieve concentration at a single point on the battlefield.

Similar to Clausewitz, Antoine Henri de Jomini, the famous French military theorist, arrived at a comparable conclusion regarding strategy. In his historic work titled *The Art of War*, Jomini defined strategy as, “the art of making war upon a map.”¹⁶ For Jomini, strategy determined the most prudent location for action by embracing thirteen separate criteria, most of which relate to tactical actions and the positioning of bases and logistical depots. While scholars have indicted Jomini as a self-promoting egomaniac whose pedantry and overly mathematic discourse on war represents the pinnacle of French Enlightenment arrogance, it is interesting to note that both he and Clausewitz, although influenced by significantly different intellectual environments, professed an overly tactical view of strategy in comparison to contemporary military theorists.¹⁷

¹³ Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 144.

¹⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 143.

¹⁵ Ibid., 143+177.

¹⁶ Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996), 69.

¹⁷ Gat, 121-126.

Perhaps Clausewitz and Jomini's views on strategy result from the fact that they lay on the wrong side of the Industrial Revolution, a period of rapid scientific and technological change during the nineteenth century that radically altered the political, economic, and social conditions of western Europe and the U.S..¹⁸ These sweeping changes affected the quality of military materiel while allowing for the standardization and mass production of weaponry and munitions. As the introduction of rifling replaced the traditional, smoothbore musket, it increased the range and lethality of the average rifleman. This in turn necessitated a change in tactics that dispersed troop formations across the battlefield. While this singular illustration represents a significant shift in the actual tactics of warfare, it pales in comparison to the changes wrought by the introduction of the telegraph and the railroad. These two technological advancements, more than any other, revolutionized both war and warfare through the instantaneous communication and mobility they preferred upon nations. The railroad system precipitated a dramatic increase in the speed of troop movement, allowed for a distributed pattern of deployment into a theater, simplified logistical problems, and, in conjunction with the telegraph, unified geographically dispersed military formations while simultaneously creating a psychological link between the military front and the industrial rear.¹⁹

Taken together, these radical changes stretched the immediate and intimate connections between tactics and statecraft, allowing commanders to seek and preserve their freedom of action as opposed to the classical strategies of positional advantage and annihilation. As a result, the concept of campaigning, introduced to address the widening gap between the pursuit of a war's political objectives and the Napoleonic strategy of the single point, grew in acceptance and

¹⁸ Schneider, 22-24.

¹⁹ Ibid., 33-34.

importance during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.²⁰ By organizing and employing military forces through the integration of ends, ways, and means, campaigning reconnected tactical actions with the political purpose of war.

As campaigning evolved from the American Civil War through World War II, so too did the meaning of strategy. Writing in 1954, Basil Henry Liddell Hart, an English military historian and theorist, recognized the profound influence mechanization, airpower, and seapower would have on the military aims and the choice of objectives in future war.²¹ Aware of the complexities associated with these new dimensions of warfare, Hart offered a more familiar definition of strategy than either Clausewitz or Jomini. He defined strategy as, “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy,” and its purpose, “[was] to diminish the possibility of resistance [which it] seeks to fulfill by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise.”²² Hart also realized the need for the political objective of a war to govern its military objectives; otherwise, the military aim could supplant policy and become the end in and of itself. These prescient words stand as the precursor to the contemporary definition of strategy in Joint Publication 1-02, which identifies strategy as, “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”²³

Although JP 1-02’s definition of strategy does not provide an answer to whether or not Napoleon fathered operational art, it does provide a common definition of strategy for those military leaders and practitioners of operational art who have the charge of translating either

²⁰ Ibid., 32-37.

²¹ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1954), 359.

²² Ibid., 337.

²³ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 317.

national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operational plan for a campaign. Therefore, the campaign, currently defined as a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space, continues to connect tactics to strategy, just as it did during the American Civil War.²⁴ However, in the decade that followed the Vietnam War the complexities of campaigning led to a growing skepticism within an Army fundamentally concerned with tactical questions about the ability of the abstract and mechanistic approaches to warfare to respond to, and solve, the challenges posed by modern science and technology.²⁵

The fact that the military, particularly the U.S. Army, had not created a concept, let alone any sort of doctrine, to fill the void science and technology had created between tactics and strategy concerned a handful of our nation's most brilliant military minds. These men, located at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS and the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA, served as the vanguard of an intellectual revolution that created a governing concept for military activities that purposefully employed military forces through the integration of ends, ways, and means.²⁶ Originally defined as the "operational level" of war, this concept reconciled AirLand Battle, an idea introduced in 1976 to address the integration of close air support in ground operations, with the concept of campaigning by integrating aerial and artillery fires into Soviet deep attack theory for the express purpose of "using military resources

²⁴ Schneider, 39-41; United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 41.

²⁵ Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (Portland, OR: Frank Class, 1997), 4.

²⁶ Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army," in *Operational Art: Developments in the Theory of War*, ed. B.J.C. McKercher and Michael Hennessy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 161.

to attain strategic goals.”²⁷ Although received with hesitancy, the notion of the operational level of war grew in stages concomitant with the codification of AirLand Battle into doctrine in 1982, and again in 1986, and fully matured into the concept of operational art during Operation Desert Storm when a U.S.-led, multinational force translated its stunning tactical success into strategic victory.²⁸

This proves that the evolution of theory, history, and doctrine supports the contemporary definitions of both strategy and operational art defined in Joint Publication 1-02 and establishes a hierarchical relationship between the two. Guided by a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion, commanders and staffs support the achievement of strategic objectives by translating those prudent ideas into campaigns and operations that organize and employ military forces through the integration of ends, ways, and means.²⁹ By harmonizing the relationship between strategy and operational art, doctrine logically links the organization and employment of *military forces* to strategy. While this relationship does provide strategic guidance to theater and joint force commanders, it fails to address the organization, employment, and integration of the remaining instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, and economic. Therefore, the current definitions of strategy and operational art in joint doctrine fail to identify where and how *all* the instruments of national power are organized, employed, and integrated according to the same strategic logic that governs the organization and employment of military force.

²⁷ Ibid., 157-160.

²⁸ John S. Brown, "The Maturation of Operational Art: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," in *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art*, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 2007), 473-475; Swain, 163.

²⁹ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 245+317.

This gap only widens when one looks to the U.S. Army's definition of operational art in Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*. By defining operational art as, "the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose," the Army also fails to account for the remaining instruments of national power.³⁰ Unlike joint doctrine, which does account for the organization and employment of all military forces, Army doctrine focuses solely on tactical actions. Furthermore, both definitions fail to account for the execution of discreet, national events that leverage America's diplomatic, informational, and economic power. For example, the decision to remove Jacobo Arbenz from power in Guatemala in 1954 may have been a policy decision, but the actual implementation and execution of that policy occurred through a campaign that organized, employed, and integrated all the instruments of national power during discreet events according to the prudent ideas set forth by strategy.

Although logical inquiry does validate the joint and Army definitions of operational art, as well as their relationship to one another, a material inquiry suggests they may only enjoy universal validity in an abstract fashion as operational art in practice often encompasses more than military force or tactics, even when wielded by military commanders. Because the employment and integration of the instruments of national power during discreet, national events more closely resembles the construction and execution of campaigns at the theater level, perhaps replacing the term "military forces" with "the instruments of national power" in the current joint definition of operational art can describe a type of operational art practiced by a government. Some within the U.S. military will indict this monograph's interpretation of operational art, to include the broadened definition it just offered to account for all the instruments of national power, as flawed. Some might even say it is blasphemous. While the broadened definition offered

³⁰ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: *Unified Land Operations*, 9.

here does increase operational art in scale, the differences between it and the joint definition do not shift the scale of operational art any more than the differences between the current joint and Army definitions do. In fact, the differences between the three definitions illustrate that operational art differs in scale at different levels. Therefore, by broadening the concept of operational art to account for the organization, employment, and integration of *all* of the instruments of national power, not just military forces, this definition fills the current void in doctrine.

Other skeptics will claim strategy does for diplomatic, informational, and economic power what operational art does for military forces. To support this counter claim these individuals must show why the same strategic logic that accounts for the organization, employment, and integration of these instruments of national power during discreet national events fails to do the same for military forces. For argument's sake, let us assume these skeptics could prove the organization and employment of military forces is more important than the organization and employment of the other instruments of national power, and therefore does warrant the military having its own distinct concept to organize, employ, and integrate its forces. If this is the case, then these skeptics must answer how operational art does not devour strategy. Essentially, this line of logic necessitates the existence of an "operational level" of war for military forces, which does allow the military the freedom to resist the role politics should play in determining campaign objectives by usurping the role of strategy.³¹ To obviate such a messy and divisive discourse, the broadened definition of operational art offered here does not attempt to equal or replace strategy. It remains subordinate to strategy because it continues to adhere to the same strategic logic that governs the integration of all the instruments of national power.

³¹ Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, "The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art," *Joint Force Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 113.

Finally, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning* does state that operational art “helps commanders and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives.”³² However, *facilitating* the integration of other agencies differs from the deliberate organization, employment, and integration of those agencies. Despite current doctrine’s failure to allow the concept of operational art to extend past military forces, doctrine does support the idea that the practice of operational art can occur at various echelons. By clearly stating that, “operational art is not associated with a specific echelon or formation, nor is it exclusive to theater and joint force commanders” Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, which serves as the proponent for operational art in joint doctrine, challenges the conventional wisdom that believes operational art occurs at the joint force command, and possibly the Corps, level.³³ By deconstructing this antiquated paradigm, ADP 3-0 allows “any formation” to practice operational art.³⁴ Given the U.S. military’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Brigades and Battalions of Soldiers and Marines often operated along multiple lines of effort independent of their higher headquarters, most officers likely understand these changes to mean that “lower” echelons, such as the Division, Brigade, and Battalion, can practice operational art. Although valid, such a conceptualization of this key change imprisons the latest evolution of doctrine within the limited scope of the

³² United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 5-0: *Joint Operation Planning* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 2011), III-1.

³³ Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0: *The Operations Process* (Washington, D.C.: Army Publication Directorate, 2010), 2-2; Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: *Unified Land Operations*, 9; United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 5-0: *Joint Operation Planning*, III-4. FM 5-0 states that joint force commanders (combatant commanders and their subordinate joint task force commanders) and their component commanders (service and functional) conduct operational-level planning, i.e. – operational art. JP 5-0 states that operational art is “generally the joint force commander’s responsibility.” While these differences more than likely result from repetitive changes to doctrine, they will continue to cause confusion amongst the force until they are re-written to corroborate one another.

³⁴ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: *Unified Land Operations*, 9-10.

military's recent experiences and fails to account for the fact the liberal wording in doctrine allows operational art to occur at higher echelons as well.

Because the rigidity of doctrine results in the lack of a concept to account for the employment and integration of all the instruments of national power, this monograph will employ the broadened definition of operational art it advances to evaluate the U.S. government's actions in Latin America during the Cold War.

Application

History supports the claim that operational art can occur above the theater and joint force command level as demonstrated by the relationship between Josef Stalin and Stavka during WW II.³⁵ Stalin, as head of both the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union, often intervened in Stavka's planning and execution of operations to ensure the courses of action they developed adhered to communist strategy to accomplish the most in both military and political terms.³⁶ By directing Stavka to shift its operational forces and logistics to support points of concentration along attack axes, Stalin ensured that Operation Bagration allowed the Red Army to knock Finland out of the war, seize Minsk, sever the lines of communication between German Army Groups Center and North, conquer the remainder of Poland, Hungary, Austria, and Romania, and race to Berlin as "liberators" during the Summer of 1944.³⁷

³⁵ David Glantz and Jonathan House, *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 62-63. Stavka, short for Stavka Verkhnogo Glavnokomandovovaniia, was the term the Soviets used to refer to the Supreme High Command council and the General Staff that served it. Equivalent to a national security council, Stavka consisted of Stalin as titular Commander-in-Chief, the Soviet War Commissar, and a handful of its most senior military commanders.

³⁶ Ibid., 195.

³⁷ Ibid., 180+195-216.

The relationship between Anwar Sadat and the Egyptian military, and to some extent the entire Arab world, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 provides another example of the practice of a type of operational art at the national level. Sadat understood Egypt had to wage a limited war with political, not territorial, objectives to discredit Israeli security theory in pursuit of greater dialogue and integration with the western world, particularly the United States.³⁸ To achieve this national objective, Sadat established an alliance with Syria to coordinate simultaneous offensive action against Israel from the North and South, leveraged military deception to hide Egypt's true intentions, and persuaded the rest of the Arab world to impose an oil embargo that forced the West to intervene in the conflict and adopt more pro-Arab policies. Throughout the conflict, Sadat ensured the Egyptian Army remained wed to the limited military objectives he had set for them to preserve their operational force while inflicting the heaviest possible losses against the IDF.³⁹ Sadat's uncanny ability to formulate policy, strategy, and an operational approach that organized, employed, and integrated discreet diplomatic, informational, and economic events with conventional military operations demonstrates the practice of operational art at the national level. When combined with Stalin's influence within Stavka, these two historical examples prove it is possible for the U.S. government to have practiced a type of operational art in its defense of the Western hemisphere during the Cold War.⁴⁰ Because field commanders sequence tactical activities while national authorities sequence discreet national activities, such as joining an

³⁸ George Gawrych, *The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1996), 13.

³⁹ Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 101+130-131.

⁴⁰ Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, 170. Clausewitz stated "historical examples clarify everything and also provide the best kind of proof in the empirical sciences." However, he also warned that abstract discussion of a historical event might make it impossible to distinguish it with any significant detail. In an attempt to balance brevity with detailed discussion, this monograph employs these two examples to prove that it is in fact possible for a government to practice a type of operational art that encompasses the instruments of national power while remaining subordinate to strategy.

alliance or ratifying or vetoing a free trade agreement with a particular nation, to contribute to the same overall objectives it hardly seems like a stretch to say operational art occurs at many levels simultaneously.

While Stalin and Sadat differ from the traditional, military commander one expects to find, these cases share an all-important characteristic with MG Winfield Scott's Mexico City Campaign of 1847, General Helmuth von Moltke's defeat of France during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, and GEN Douglas MacArthur's campaign in the South Pacific Ocean in 1944: they are inherently offensive in nature. To the contrary, the application of operational art in the defense becomes much more difficult to assess. After all, measuring success according to what one has not lost as opposed to what one has gained poses a significant challenge not easily overcome by empirical analysis and subjective measures of effectiveness. This inability to measure operational art in the defense creates a paradox because although "the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive," offensive action must punctuate the defense periodically to maintain the status quo.⁴¹ Because the defense consists of waiting and acting, the entire purpose of the defense lies in its ability to create an opportunity that offensive action can exploit.⁴²

Since the sudden, powerful transition to offense constitutes the greatest moment for the defense, it logically follows that the defender should remain prepared to strike when an opportunity presents itself.⁴³ For many, to include Clausewitz, this transition undoubtedly means offensive, military action. However, nearly two centuries have passed since Prussia's God of War penned his "formless mass of notes," and in that time warfare has expanded across spatial

⁴¹ Ibid., 358+370.

⁴² Ibid., 379.

⁴³ Ibid., 370.

domains, such as air and sea, and abstract dimensions, such as diplomacy, information, and economics.⁴⁴ In light of the changing characteristics of war, it now appears possible for “the flashing sword of vengeance” to take the shape of covert action that creates and supplies a paramilitary force or the building of another nation’s democratic institutions provided these discreet events create the conditions that support a desired state.⁴⁵ Although the decisions to pursue such events constitute policy decisions, their implementation occurs through the development and execution of a campaign that purposefully integrates the instruments of national power according to strategy. Despite the fact that these campaigns are not inherently military in nature, they constitute an offensive action that punctuated America’s defense of the western hemisphere to maintain the status quo by one of the other instruments of national power.

Given this information, it now appears entirely possible for operational art to occur at the national level to maintain a negative object. When executed with alacrity and intellect, history has shown this practice can yield strategic success. Furthermore, this practice does not appear to stretch the concept of operational art irrevocably, as noted by recent doctrinal changes. However, before moving into case study analysis to support the remainder of this monograph’s hypothesis, it remains prudent to determine if a deliberate logic structured U.S. policy towards Latin America, as doing so will shed a great deal of historical light on the nature and intent of U.S. actions in the Western hemisphere up to, and throughout, the Cold War.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 69. In a note dated July 10, 1827, Clausewitz described the first six books of *On War* as “a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly reworked once more.”

⁴⁵ Ibid., 370.

The Monroe Doctrine

Origins

On September 17, 1796, President George Washington delivered a farewell speech to the people of the United States in which he beseeched them to observe good faith and justice towards all nations, cultivate peace and harmony with all, and to protect America's newfound peace and prosperity from the toils of European ambition, fear, avarice, and envy.⁴⁶ The sagacity and judiciousness threaded throughout Washington's message reflects the intellectual, political, and spiritual gestalt that had inflamed the passions of our Founding Fathers during their quest for independence, and their subsequent success led them to believe Providence desired America to shine as a light of liberty, freedom, and equality in an otherwise dark and unjust world. As a result, foreign policy existed for the sole purpose of defending and nurturing the nobility of American patriotism and sacrifice.⁴⁷ Fanciful as this might sound, America's first generations managed to preserve, and improve upon, the more perfect union their forefathers had created by adhering to a unilateral foreign policy that benefitted from America's unique geographic and demographic advantages.

Isolated from Europe's Napoleonic Wars, America's first palpable foreign policy crisis, save the War of 1812 with Britain, arose on September 15, 1821 when the Kingdom of Guatemala declared its independence from Spain, only to collapse in March 1823 leaving the states of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica in its wake.⁴⁸ As his

⁴⁶ James W. Gantenbein, *The Evolution of Our Latin-American Policy: A Documentary Record* (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1971), 3-5.

⁴⁷ Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 37.

⁴⁸ Robert H. Holden, *Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821-1960* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 29-30.

second term neared its end, President James Monroe felt the need to extend the foreign policy prescriptions of former-Presidents Washington and Jefferson.⁴⁹ Concerned the European powers might threaten the safety and security of these newly independent states, Monroe turned to John Quincy Adams, his Secretary of State and eventual successor as President, for advice. As a Harvard trained lawyer and career diplomat and politician, Adams possessed the intellectual acumen required to word the President's speech in a manner that discouraged European encroachment into the Western hemisphere without offending their honor or inciting their anger.⁵⁰

Following a period of intense reflection, Adams penned a fifty-two paragraph statement that President Monroe delivered in writing on December 2, 1823. Of these fifty-two paragraphs, only three came to constitute the sacred national dogma known as the Monroe Doctrine.⁵¹ These paragraphs laid out three propositions that essentially divided the world into two spheres of influence and whispered a warning to the European powers. By declaring that the "American continents, by the free and independent conditions which they assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers," paragraph seven introduced the non-colonization principle.⁵² Paragraph fifty, which contained the core principle of the Monroe Doctrine, warned the European monarchies that the U.S. would "consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this [the Western] hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."⁵³ Lastly, paragraph fifty-one reaffirmed the principle of non-interference President Washington pronounced in his farewell address by

⁴⁹ Dent, 1.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 2-3.

⁵¹ Ibid., 3. To read the full text of the Monroe Doctrine reference Appendix A.

⁵² Ibid; Gantenbein, 323.

⁵³ Dent, 3; Gantenbein, 324.

emphasizing that America's foreign policy towards Europe, "which [was], not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers," remained unchanged.⁵⁴

Delivered with little fanfare, Monroe's loquacious message to Congress received an outpouring of support from the American public, as well as the Latin American governments it shielded from European encroachment. Although it did not become known as the "Monroe Doctrine" until the 1840s, these three paragraphs buried deep within the President's message formed the structure and rationalization of U.S. foreign policy for 170 years and have been cited by numerous presidents and policymakers to justify U.S. intervention in Latin America, particularly during the Cold War.⁵⁵

Codification as Policy

Two decades after President James Monroe delivered a handful of foreign policy prescriptions to Congress, President James K. Polk sat atop a nation poised for expansion. As the U.S. consolidated both its revolution and its grip over the territories that comprised the Louisiana Purchase, American public sentiment coalesced around the belief that America's commitment to liberty entitled and demanded its expansion.⁵⁶ As Congress worked out the final details of the annexation of Texas in December 1845, Polk grew leery of British ambition in the Oregon Territories. With his eyes cast towards California's Pacific Coast, Polk understood the U.S. had to rid the area of British influence before he could trigger a war with Mexico to acquire roughly

⁵⁴ Dent, 3; Gantenbein, 324-325.

⁵⁵ Dent, 4.

⁵⁶ McDougall, 78.

530,000 square miles of terrain, which, along with the annexation of Texas, would fulfill America's Manifest Destiny for the remainder of the 19th century.⁵⁷

To tear down the British barrier to America's God-given right to expand, Polk became the first U.S. President to reaffirm the warnings the Monroe Doctrine issued to European powers. Similar to Monroe, Polk delivered his warning during an annual message to Congress on December 2, 1845. However, unlike Monroe, Polk did not bury a veiled threat deep within a rambling text. Instead, Polk clearly acknowledged the sovereignty and independence of the nations of America and reaffirmed their right to regulate their own internal affairs. By stating that, "it is alike to our safety and our interests, that the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent," Polk established that America would not view European interference in the Americas with indifference.⁵⁸ By reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine, this statement eventually led to the expulsion of British influence from the Oregon Territory, whose incorporation into the U.S., in conjunction with the land ceded by Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, fulfilled America's geographic predestination by dumping coal into the locomotive of expansion.

As the century wore on a resurgent Germany, emboldened by its success during its wars of unification, replaced Great Britain as the major threat to the American hemisphere and necessitated a reevaluation of America's foreign policy priorities. If Polk reasserted the Monroe Doctrine in response to the meddlesome British, then President Theodore Roosevelt fortified it to

⁵⁷ Timothy D. Johnson, *A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 267-268; McDougall, 84.

⁵⁸ Gantenbein, 328-329.

confront the newfangled German menace. Having enjoyed a privileged upbringing that afforded him generous educational and travel opportunities, Roosevelt came of age in a time where social Darwinism and Mahanian thought dominated a political culture interested in the messianic spreading of republican democracy and liberty.⁵⁹ Sensing that the collapse of Europe's traditionally dominant, colonial powers would allow for a tectonic shift in global power away from Europe and towards the U.S., Roosevelt believed America should capitalize on its newfound industrial might to expand its influence and access to overseas markets.

In what by now had become a familiar pattern, President Roosevelt laid out his expansionist designs during an annual message to the United States Congress. In doing so, Roosevelt marked the beginnings of the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine on December 3, 1901 by stating that, "the Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States."⁶⁰ Up to this point in time, no previous U.S. President had gone so far as to suggest that the other nations of the Western hemisphere should adopt the Monroe Doctrine as their foreign policy. Although this did constitute a slight change in America's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt assured his critics of its necessity because it had the potential to secure a permanent peace in the Americas.⁶¹ However, a mere sixteen months later Roosevelt's application of the policy changed drastically. During an address in Chicago on April 2, 1903 he famously decreed that, "I believe in

⁵⁹ Henry J. Hendrix, *Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 5+8. Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Seapower Upon History* provides a sweeping justification for the expansion and modernization of the rather small and inconsequential navy the U.S. possessed just prior to the turn of the nineteenth century. Mahan believed the U.S. should capitalize on its industrial might to expand its influence and access to overseas markets as Europe's traditionally dominant, colonial powers had begun to collapse. Because sea power had historically determined national supremacy, Mahan advocated the U.S. raise a strong, modern navy organized around the battleship and trained to destroy an enemy maritime force in decisive battle.

⁶⁰ Gantenbein, 359.

⁶¹ Ibid.

the Monroe Doctrine with all my heart and soul... but I would infinitely prefer to see us abandon it than to see us put it forward and bluster about it, and yet fail to build up the efficient fighting strength which in the last resort can alone make it respected by any strong foreign power whose interest it may ever happen to be to violate it. There is a homely old adage which runs: "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far." If the American nation will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch of the highest training a thoroughly efficient navy the Monroe Doctrine will go far."⁶²

Although his lofty rhetoric betrayed an imperial ambition that reeked of social Darwinism, racism, and elitism, Roosevelt understood that America's Manifest Destiny should not, could not, and would not stop at the Pacific Ocean. The time had come for the same indomitable American spirit that had conquered the American West to *fully* embrace and acknowledge its God-given mission of spreading the benevolent institutions of republican democracy and capitalism to the poor oppressed peoples and nations it encountered.⁶³ By proselytizing America's peculiar values in places such as the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, and Panama, Roosevelt poured the foundation for an American empire built on a market polygamy that allowed it to have multiple partners, each of whom remained subordinate to it.⁶⁴ Framing American interests in a manner that purported idealism at home and power politics abroad, the "big stick" of the Roosevelt Corollary represented a radical departure in American foreign policy, positioned America to serve as gendarme and bill collector in the western

⁶² Ibid., 361.

⁶³ Hendrix, 176.

⁶⁴ Grandin, 211.

hemisphere, and reconciled America's Kantian idealism with its newfound Hobbesian realism to justify a century of neo-liberal expansion.⁶⁵

While America's interference and intervention in Latin America did grow steadily over time, it would be a complete mischaracterization of history to represent U.S. involvement in the region as having enjoyed a rare linear, as opposed to cyclical, development. For instance, in the wake of WW I the U.S. recognized that for the first time in history no European or Asiatic nation posed a challenge to its power either in the Caribbean or throughout the Americas.⁶⁶ Determined to reassess the aggressive policies that deployed U.S. Marines to the shores of Caribbean states no less than twenty times under Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, President Herbert Hoover coined the term "Good Neighbor" to describe his administration's move away from intervention to engender good will within the western hemisphere.⁶⁷ Unfortunately, neither the Latin American governments nor history appreciated Hoover's efforts to return to the origins of the American system decreed by Monroe, albeit for different reasons. For their part, Latin America's indigenous regimes viewed Hoover, a Republican, through the prism of the "big stick" and dollar diplomacy, while history, although cognizant of Hoover's altruistic intentions, credits President Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the architect of the Good Neighbor Policy.⁶⁸

This results from Hoover not having a second presidential term to see his policies through, leaving the opportunity for Cordell Hull, FDR's Secretary of State, to sign an initial pledge of nonintervention at the Montevideo Conference of 1933, which he later cemented with

⁶⁵ McDougall, 115. For more information on the various interpretations and corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine, reference Appendix B.

⁶⁶ Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1961), 3.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 5+123.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 127-128.

an unqualified pledge of nonintervention during the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936.⁶⁹ By affirming its support for the policies of nonintervention, the refusal to employ armed force to secure U.S. policy objectives in Latin American countries, and noninterference, the refusal to influence the domestic political affairs of its neighbors, FDR removed the taboo associated with the Monroe Doctrine in Latin American politics.⁷⁰ In addition to restoring the Monroe Doctrine's utility in warding off European interlopers, FDR allowed the concept of reciprocity, or respect for the sanctity of U.S. economic interests and friendly compromises on policy concerns, to take root. As a result, nearly all the Latin American nations accepted U.S. leadership during WW II, as evidenced by American solidarity in the wake of Pearl Harbor and Mexico's refusal to sell oil to Japan after 1941.⁷¹

The Good Neighbor Policy served the interests of all involved parties through WW II and beyond, as the Truman administration's decision to reaffirm its predecessor's position towards Latin America facilitated the drafting of the constitution for the Organization of American States (OAS) at Bogota in 1948.⁷² However, the era of inter-American reconciliation and good will would not last for much longer as the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who took office in January 1953, precipitated another radical reassessment of U.S. foreign policy. As realpolitik locked the U.S. and the Soviet Union into a Cold War, Eisenhower, along with his trusted Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, saw fit to repudiate a number of Truman's policies. By replacing the Good Neighbor Policy with an increasingly unilateral "Good Partner" Policy,

⁶⁹ Ibid., 118-120+128.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 159.

⁷¹ Ibid., 313; Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 1.

⁷² Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 132.

the Eisenhower administration did its best to resurrect the “big stick,” which it saw fit to swing in Guatemala in 1954 as the CIA-backed army of Castillo Armas deposed President Jacobo Arbenz.

Although President John F. Kennedy did attempt to assuage Latin American angst with the Alliance for Progress, a program that pledged \$20 billion in foreign aid and assistance to the region for the next ten years, his support for the CIA’s failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 further dismantled the Good Neighbor Policy.⁷³ This pattern continued under President Lyndon Johnson, who backed the invasion of the Dominican Republic, President Richard Nixon, who winked at the ouster of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, and ended under President Jimmy Carter, whose foreign policy failures are legion.⁷⁴ These tumultuous events multiplied the acrimony in the American political landscape, created a sense of bewilderment amongst America’s working classes, and left the nation in search of a hero. Enter Ronald Reagan, the Hollywood actor and former Governor of California whose administration reinstituted the Monroe Doctrine and resurrected Roosevelt’s “big stick” to ensure the agents of the Soviet Union’s evil empire would not “destroy the fragile flower of democracy and force communism on our small Central American neighbors.”⁷⁵

With the exception of Teddy Roosevelt and perhaps Dwight Eisenhower, all other U.S. Presidents pale in comparison to Reagan’s uncanny ability to integrate the instruments of national power in pursuit of political and strategic objectives, evidenced by his administration’s manipulation of its economic and military policies to export democracy and “rollback” communism. Standing at the vanguard of liberal democracy and capitalism, Reagan reaffirmed

⁷³ Marcos Cueto, *Cold War, Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico 1955-1975* (Baltimore, MS: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 26; Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 190.

⁷⁴ Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 190+208-209.

⁷⁵ Karl Bermann, *Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United States since 1848* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1986), 299.

the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, permanently locking America's Hobbesian realism and Kantian idealism into a continuity that protected American interests as it embroiled Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador in a decade of near constant conflict. The convergence of these seemingly divergent philosophies brought American foreign policy full-circle, for just as Monroe's America stood prepared to expand geographically, so too did Reagan's America stand ready to extend its political and economic system. While the *ways* and *means* differ, as the former depended upon America's pioneer spirit and the railroad and the latter relied upon technology and globalization, the *ends*, the expansion of American influence, mirror one another. In light of this historical evidence, research can reasonably conclude the Monroe Doctrine provided a deliberate logic that governed U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America throughout the Cold War. This means the non-colonization principle remained central to U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, any attempt by a foreign power, i.e. the Soviet Union, to extend its communist system to any portion of the western hemisphere proved anathema to American priorities and interests and would be met with resistance.

Latin America during the Cold War

Violence as the Power Relation in Society

Latin America has had a radically different historical experience from other civilizations due to the use and exploitation of violence in society. This pattern pre-dates recorded history and served as the defining characteristic of its greatest civilizations, all of whom practiced ritualized slaughter.⁷⁶ Aztec society revolved around warfare and large-scale human sacrifice, the Mayas eviscerated their victims and offered their still-beating hearts to the high priests, and the Incas

⁷⁶ Robert Buffington and Lila Caimari, *Keen's Latin American Civilization: History and Society, 1491 to the Present*, ed. Robert Buffington, Ninth ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), 1-2.

dominated weaker tribes by sacrificing their children and appropriating their wives.⁷⁷ Although these civilizations represent the height of Native American cultural development prior to the arrival of the Europeans, they did not hold a monopoly on violence as demonstrated by the collective cannibalism practiced by the Tupi of Brazil and the barbaric splendor of Kanaima practiced by the Patamuna of the Guyanan highlands.⁷⁸ Although the scale of violence differed from society to society, the Patamuna's dark shamans used the practice of Kanaima to maintain their power over Patamunan society just as the Mayan priests used ritualistic sacrifice to perpetuate the Maya's dominance over smaller, weaker tribes. Despite their brutality, these forms of ritualistic violence enforced a socio-cultural power structure that regulated pre-Latin American society.

As the Spanish and Portuguese began their infamous "conquest" of the region in the 1500s, they responded to the ferocity of the indigenous societies in kind. After Hernan Cortes and his Conquistadors bathed Tenochtitlan in a river of Aztec blood, the Spanish created social constructs that preserved wealth and privilege for a select few by structurally separating society along racial lines.⁷⁹ Because indigenous groups tended to live apart from white society and existed at or near the bottom of the colonial social order, they often managed to maintain their cultural and communal identities. This separation of society by class maintained social order during the colonial period. However, its failure to allow dialogue and negotiation between castes

⁷⁷ Ibid., 4+19-20+29-30.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 34-35; Neil L. Whitehead, *Dark Shamans: Kanaima and the Poetics of Violent Death* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 14-15. Ethnographers have noted the Tupi of Brazil would club their victims to death before they cut them to pieces, bathed their male children in the victim's blood, fed the entrails to the women, and impaled the head on a post as a trophy. As ferocious and unrestrained as this may sound, it pales in comparison to Patamuna's practice of Kanaima. This form of dark shamanism features the violent mutilation of the victim's mouth and anus, into which various objects such as astringent plants and aromatic herbs are inserted to facilitate the process of auto-digestion and create a putrid, honey-like juice the killers will drink once the victim has expired.

⁷⁹ Buffington and Caimari, 149-150.

set the stage for future acts of political and revolutionary violence during the state formation process that followed decolonization.⁸⁰

Exploiting this cultural affinity towards violence, Latin American governments often launched state-sponsored expeditions of terror to dominate and subdue their populations as they consolidated their national borders during the late-19th and early-20th centuries. This process resulted in the state's monopolization of the legitimate use of violence in society and often elicited a radical response from indigenous peoples and leftists.⁸¹ The cyclical nature of violence in Latin American society created the phenomenon of "violence begets violence" in which excessive state violence provoked political violence from below, which in turn justified the expansion of state violence in response. Guatemala stands out from other Latin American states during this timeframe because it managed to concentrate its coercive capacity in a functioning and coherent Army by the 1860s.⁸² Because no well-defined idea of a state or citizenship existed apart from the armed forces, Guatemala essentially had an army before it had consolidated itself as a nation. This army-centered dynamic ensured that no politician could take and hold office without the express support of the army and led to the militarization of Guatemala's domestic politics.⁸³ This use of institutional violence left an indelible mark on Guatemala's state formation process and remained a prominent feature throughout the Cold War.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Holden, 11.

⁸¹ Magaly Sanchez, "Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 606, Chronicle of a Myth Foretold: The Washington Consensus in Latin America, no. (Jul., 2006): 179-180.

⁸² Holden, 57.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Martha K. Huggins, ed. *Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal Violence* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991), 75-76.

Endemic throughout Latin America, this institutionalization of violence provided the context for the transformation of individual acts of private violence to take on the form of public violence during the Cold War. As boom-bust crop cycles and demographic trends combined to accentuate the fault lines within society, individuals stopped committing violent acts in “their own name” and used violence to either challenge or defend the status quo.⁸⁵ Under these circumstances, the rape of a political dissident by a Chilean soldier no longer represented an intimate act of private violence in which one man dominated and terrorized one woman, but instead represented the domination and suppression of entire groups of dissidents by Pinochet’s military junta. In a similar vein, the 1968 assassination of John Gordon Mein, the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, one block from the U.S. consulate in Guatemala City by members of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) did not constitute a criminal act punishable through the judicial system but an overt act of political violence and terror. Designed to induce fear and submission, these display-oriented acts of violence provided both institutional and counter-institutional forces with a psychological weapon they used to terrorize society throughout the Cold War.⁸⁶

While some blame the two superpowers, particularly the U.S., for the untold death and destruction the Cold War wrought in Latin America; others note the source of Latin American public violence during the timeframe was a socio-economic and political culture made in Latin America, by Latin Americans.⁸⁷ Similar to the debate as to whether or not Napoleon was the father of operational art or the undertaker of classical warfare, the debate over the root cause of violence in Latin American society will persist. However, a consensus does exist amongst

⁸⁵ Holden, 12.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁸⁷ Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 55-56; Grandin, 71; Holden, 158.

scholars that violence played a key role in defining power relationships within Latin American society during the Cold War, and that both superpowers attempted to leverage it to their advantage.

U.S. Strategy: A Geographic Approach

The violence and insecurity that plagued the global south, particularly Latin America, from the mid-1950s through the 1990s more than likely results from the confluence of geopolitics and history, as America's pre-occupation with the prospective battlefields in Europe and the northeast Pacific marginalized Latin America in U.S. defense planning.⁸⁸ As a result, U.S. policy towards the region became an economy of effort designed to stop communist adventurism in Latin America by demonstrating a national resolve to meet communist advances with armed resistance.⁸⁹ Because security and stability in the western hemisphere underwrote America's ability to grow the global economy and contain international communism, the U.S. could not afford to lose any of the Latin American countries from its sphere of influence.⁹⁰

Despite the fact that Latin America never played a prominent role in the global military balance, it would be inaccurate to insinuate the U.S. never paid close attention to the area. In fact, during the early stages of the Cold War U.S. officials recognized the criticality of some areas, such as Mexico, compared to others, like Ecuador. Because Mexico and the greater Caribbean suffered from dire poverty and political instability, many U.S. officials feared a marriage of Mexican poverty with Soviet populism would destabilize Mexico's weak government, as well as

⁸⁸ Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 1; Margaret Daly Hayes, "Security to the South: U.S. Interests in Latin America," *International Security* Vol. 5, no. 1 (Summer, 1980): 131.

⁸⁹ Schoultz, 13-14.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 310.

the region as a whole.⁹¹ To prevent the emergence of a “red beachhead” or a “second Cuba,” the U.S. used geography to define its strategic interests and priorities. By analyzing each state’s proximity to the continental U.S., its proximity to other areas of security concern, and its political, military, and economic capabilities, U.S. strategists delineated three specific sub-regions in Latin America: the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico, the South Atlantic, and the west coast of South America.⁹²

Of these three areas, the U.S. has traditionally defined the Caribbean Basin as its highest security concern because the region constitutes America’s southern flank and holds vital economic interests. Defined geographically as Mexico and those nations which possess a Caribbean coastline north of the equator, this area serves as a critical link in U.S. economic and military activity.⁹³ The region’s distinct oceanic quality, combined with its history of being the poorest and most politically unstable region in the hemisphere, left it vulnerable to ideological penetration. This generated fear amongst U.S. policymakers as Castro’s rise to power in Cuba in 1959 resulted in the establishment of a Soviet client state just 94 miles south of the southernmost point of the continental U.S.⁹⁴ Operating from Cuban bases, the Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean Basin threatened America’s principal source of raw materials, lightering facilities in the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands that processed and transferred nearly fifty percent of America’s oil imports, and a network of intelligence and communication stations scattered throughout the region.⁹⁵ The fact that the Soviets had the potential to disrupt the Panama Canal,

⁹¹ Ibid., 71-72.

⁹² Hayes: 134.

⁹³ Ibid., 135.

⁹⁴ Howard J. Wiarda and Mark Falcoff, *The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1987), 15.

⁹⁵ Hayes: 135-136; Wiarda and Falcoff, 15.

which facilitated global transshipping in addition to allowing America's one-and-a-half ocean Navy to claim a three-ocean capability, complicated matters and ensured the U.S. would have a disproportionately high level of involvement in the region.⁹⁶

The South Atlantic, defined geographically as the Atlantic Ocean south of the Equator and strategically as the area south of the Tropic of Cancer, encompasses South America's Atlantic coastline and extends east from the Straits of Magellan to South Africa's Cape of Good Hope.⁹⁷ This region has always served as a major maritime trade route, and the closure of the Suez Canal following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war further elevated the region's importance as supertankers from the Persian Gulf moved close to 25% of U.S. oil imports and nearly 60% of European and Brazilian oil imports through the region. Beyond the petroleum trade, this area also linked the growing economy of Brazil with the U.S. and forged a southern, maritime link between the economies of Brazil and Argentina with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.⁹⁸ Because both superpowers maintained a minimal presence in the region, its states, most notably Brazil and Argentina, failed to commit to an ideological or military opposition to the Soviet Union. While some interpreted this hesitancy as a rebuff to U.S. power, others more accurately understood it as an affirmation of independence to protect their own interests in the deep-sea resources and raw materials of Antarctica, while simultaneously giving tacit recognition to the complementary roles they played to U.S. defense of the region.⁹⁹

South America's Pacific Coast, the third and final sub-region of U.S. interest, encompasses Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and to some extent Colombia, although Colombia has

⁹⁶ Dent, 12-13; Wiarda and Falcoff, 14-15. For a more detailed discussion of U.S. involvement throughout Latin America during the Cold War reference Appendix C.

⁹⁷ Hayes: 139.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 140.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 142-143.

traditionally been thought of as part of the greater Caribbean Basin. Because these states did not guard a transoceanic shipping route or provide the U.S. with strategic access to the Pacific Ocean, U.S. contingency planning for the region revolved around the need to maintain access to ship repair facilities, refueling stations, and an array of raw materials.¹⁰⁰ Although U.S. involvement in the ouster of Salvador Allende in Chile during September 1973 defies this logic, it does support the ranking of U.S. sub-regional priorities by confirming the Soviet's inability to support a regime so far removed from its sphere of influence.¹⁰¹ While the region's geographic separation from the U.S. did result in a number of disagreements over economic priorities, it did not reduce its commitment to the collective security of the Americas as the issues of territorial integrity, internal security, and development dominated the region.

This division of Latin America into three distinct sub-regions, each with its own challenges and opportunities, by U.S. strategists did oversimplify Latin America's rich historical and cultural heritage. To suggest the creole population of Suriname shares similarities with the indigenous peoples of north Mexico epitomizes western reductionism, yet strategists and military planners had to employ some sort of logic while defining U.S. interests throughout. By creating these three distinct sub-regions, they facilitated the construction of U.S. plans and priorities according to strategic, geographic points and areas. The strength of this approach lay in its simplicity, as its balance between parsimony and adequacy focused U.S. efforts where they were needed most to prevent the emergence of a second "red beachhead" in the Americas.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 144-145.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 145.

Soviet Strategy

In the wake of WW II, the Soviet Union strove to mold the internal development and external orientation of the third world by capitalizing on the anticolonial nationalism that gripped much of the global South.¹⁰² Following their consolidation of power in Eastern Europe and much of Northeast Asia, the Soviets sought to destabilize unfriendly regimes around the world, but they specifically designed their economic policies and KGB subversion to expand their influence into Southeast Asia.¹⁰³ Realistic about the limits of Soviet power, the Kremlin seemed content to use diplomacy and cultural exchange to expand their influence in the Western hemisphere until the Cuban revolution gave a voice to the region's growing militancy. The appeal of the Soviet economic model, on display in Cuba for the entire hemisphere, sent reverberations of revolution from Mexico to Chile as many peasants cried out for land and wage reform.¹⁰⁴ Seizing upon the growing tide of anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism, the Soviet Union adopted a more aggressive and activist strategy that emphasized long-term gains.¹⁰⁵

This strategic approach used Latin America's history of violence and its attraction to monolithic systems of thought to prey upon the social and economic issues that favored Soviet expansion into the region. The dissemination of propaganda throughout the countryside fomented political instability as endemic poverty and inequality gripped much of the region. This led to the rise of labor unions as a major political force within most countries, particularly those nations located in the Caribbean Basin, the critical area identified by U.S. strategic planners.¹⁰⁶ By turning Cuba into an air, naval, and intelligence base, the Soviets extended their operational reach

¹⁰² Brands, 22.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 25.

¹⁰⁵ Wiarda and Falcoff, 58-59.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 57-58.

into America's soft underbelly. Beyond its military value, Cuba also served as a propaganda center, training ground, and arms depot for revolutionaries in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Grenada, and beyond.¹⁰⁷

In addition to channeling large sums of economic and military aid to the region via Cuba, the Soviets also waged a charm offensive through the United Nations and its embassies. While establishing diplomatic relations with nearly every country in Latin America, the Soviets expanded their role in the United Nations and amplified their ability to collect and disseminate information and influence regional developments.¹⁰⁸ This led to the sophistication of Soviet scholarship on Latin America, which in turn facilitated a rise in cultural and educational exchanges that brought hundreds of union leaders, workers, students, and politicians to Moscow for official indoctrination into Marxist-Leninist thought.¹⁰⁹

Although the Soviet Union and Cuba never had an agreed upon grand strategy, the two states did cooperate and work closely together throughout the Cold War to gain and maintain a communist influence in the Western hemisphere. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961 underlines the effectiveness of Soviet strategy during the period and confirmed the fears of U.S. strategists who sought to prevent the incursion of Soviet ideology into the region. Although the Soviets grew disillusioned over the prospects for mass revolution in Latin America after the CIA helped Augusto Pinochet depose Salvador Allende in Chile, they did continue to disseminate propaganda throughout the Western hemisphere and channeled economic and military aid to Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador.¹¹⁰ Despite their perceived setbacks in

¹⁰⁷ Brands, 41; Wiarda and Falcoff, 56.

¹⁰⁸ Wiarda and Falcoff, 55-56.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 56-60.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 86+124-125.

the region, the Soviet strategy towards Latin America elevated their status throughout the third world and did to some extent undermine American interests and influence in the region.

Latin America: A Gallery of Operational Art

Inter-American Military Education Programs

On March 11, 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed the Lend Lease Act into law. This legislation gave the President the authority to provide military subsidies to allied nations during WW II and set a precedent for the massive aid programs that would follow during the Cold War.¹¹¹ Most literature regarding the Lend Lease Act focuses on the \$48.9 billion in assistance given to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and Russia, pays little attention to the \$493 million spent throughout Latin America, and ignores the paltry \$5.4 million in equipment transferred to the Central American states.¹¹² Although the military transfers and aid disbursed around the world did dwarf the meager amount of assistance given to Central America, the equipment and aid delivered to the isthmian nations appears rather substantial when viewed as a percent of each nation's estimated annual procurement budget for national defense from 1941-1945. Besides expanding and modernizing the Central American states' military forces, these transfers established U.S. military missions in every Central American capital.¹¹³ Once established, these missions reported on the need to instruct and train the Central American militaries on the operations and maintenance of the U.S. equipment they received through the Lend Lease Program, thereby justifying the extension of the Military Assistance Training

¹¹¹ Holden, 113.

¹¹² Ibid., 120. For more information on the amount of military aid transferred to the Central American states under the Lend-Lease Act reference Appendix D.

¹¹³ William H. Ormsbee, "U.S. Army School of the Americas: Profile of a Training Institution," *Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management* Vol. 7, no. 2 (Winter 1984-1985): 83.

Program (MATP) to Central America.¹¹⁴ Expanding this program required infrastructure and resources not present in Central America in 1941, thus warranting the establishment, or expansion, of permanent U.S. bases in the region.

In line with the Monroe Doctrine, one of the goals of U.S. strategy during the 1940s and 1950s was to train and equip security forces to repel an attack from a non-hemispheric power, i.e. the Soviet Union or one of its client states.¹¹⁵ Having secured a foothold in the geographically strategic Caribbean Basin through the Lend Lease Act and the MATP, the U.S. established inter-American military education programs as the cornerstone of its indirect approach to hemispheric security. In addition to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Central American militaries, these education and training programs served as diplomatic and informational weapons throughout the Cold War. As these programs expanded to include the South American militaries, they established friendly relationships with and amongst the U.S. and Latin American militaries that contributed to the psychological construction of inter-American solidarity.¹¹⁶ The U.S. exploited this political psychology by designing a narrative that framed hemispheric solidarity as the solution to the problem of Soviet aggression, while comprehensive curricula that educated students on tactics as well as the efficacy of liberal democratic governance provided the ways in which human agency would prevent communist expansion (reference Figure 1).¹¹⁷ To achieve

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Gill, 63.

¹¹⁶ Barry L. Brewer, "United States Security Assistance Training of Latin American Militaries: Intentions and Results" (Air Force Institute of Technology, 1995), 1-2.

¹¹⁷ Deborah Stone, "Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas," *Political Science Quarterly* 104, no. 2 (Summer, 1989): 283+293-295. In this article, Stone discusses the relationship between problem definition and agenda setting. She demonstrates how situations come to be seen as caused by human actions and amenable by human intervention, as opposed to ascribing a situation to the realm of fate. By exposing Latin American soldiers to democratic governance, political transparency, and the idea that society benefits from a military that is subordinated to political masters, military educational programs attributed the moral responsibility for political reform to the Latin American militaries. Although not

this objective, the U.S. had to maintain its influence with the region's militaries and governments, which it did by establishing a series of schools that mentored officers through the ranks.

Beginning in 1943, the U.S. Army began inviting Latin American soldiers to the Canal Zone service schools that existed to train U.S. personnel stationed in Panama.¹¹⁸ By December 1946, the War Department, influenced by reports from the U.S. military missions in the region, recognized the contribution military education could make to hemispheric security and officially established the Latin American Training Center, Ground Division at Fort Amador, Panama.¹¹⁹ The school moved to Ft. Gulick, Panama in 1949 to accommodate the increasing number of Latin American attendees and changed its name to the U.S. Army Caribbean School, which it later changed to the U.S. Army School of the Americas in July 1963 to reflect its hemispheric orientation.¹²⁰ Initially, the school offered basic hands-on training with equipment and month-long tactics courses. However, the curriculum changed when the Mutual Security Act of 1951 provided for direct grants of military equipment to selected states under bilateral agreements called Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements.¹²¹

always successful, these programs did socialize the idea that the Latin Americans could both defend themselves and play a pivotal role in hemispheric defense.

¹¹⁸ Ormsbee: 83.

¹¹⁹ Gill, 26; Ormsbee: 83.

¹²⁰ Ormsbee: 84. In July 1963, the U.S. Army Caribbean School changed its name to the U.S. Army School of the Americas to reflect its hemispheric orientation. The School of the Americas relocated to Ft. Benning, GA in October 1984, and in January 2001 changed its name to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. It continues to operate at Ft. Benning, GA.

¹²¹ G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, Second ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 283. The passing of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 created the opportunity to sign sixteen Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements throughout the next decade. Agreements were signed with Cuba, Colombia, Peru, and Chile in 1952, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay in 1953, Nicaragua and Honduras in 1954, Guatemala and Haiti in 1955, Bolivia in 1958, El Salvador, Panama, and Costa Rica in 1962, and Argentina in 1964.

As demand for the school increased, its curriculum expanded to accommodate a larger student body that grew to include members of Latin American national police and intelligence forces. As course demographics shifted from enlisted soldiers to company and field grade officers, the coursework re-oriented its focus towards internal security, planning for military civic action, intelligence, and basic medical aid.¹²² Emphasizing practical application in all its courses, students at the School of the Americas would visit Panamanian villages to learn how to assess communal needs and develop pragmatic solutions in a resource constrained environment. While not surveying roads, analyzing local water supplies, or studying U.S. training manuals, course cadre encouraged students and their families to socialize with one another and U.S. service members. In addition to informal social activity, organized athletics and official receptions enhanced the relationships forged in the classroom and created a sense of loyalty towards the U.S. and one another.¹²³

In the 1960s, the School of the Americas turned its attention towards counterinsurgency and nation building to complement the civic action programs instituted by President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. By mid-decade, twenty-three of the school's forty-two courses emphasized technical skills such as road and bridge construction and repair, well drilling, water purification, and basic hygiene and medical aid.¹²⁴ Although these skills may not seem like potent weapons against communism, Jules Dubois, a celebrated correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*, noted in 1964 that:

“Much more than the Alliance for Progress, the impact of the USSOUTHCOM on [the] Latin American military both frightened and angered the Communists and their fellow travelers and useful chauvinists. The successful training which the Latin American

¹²² Kenneth W. Barber, “U.S. Military Schools for Latin America: A Unique Plus for Uncle Sam” (U.S. Army War College, 1966), 14.

¹²³ Ibid., 15; Gill, 68.

¹²⁴ Ormsbee: 85.

[military] men were receiving at the counterinsurgency school in the Canal Zone... erected a most impenetrable roadblock in the forward march of the Communists' plans quickly to take over Latin America. They feared more than anything else a solidified and unified military that was confident in its own ability to combat them [Communists] and that could not be cowed by smear and invective, much less by the subversive, terrorist and guerrilla tactics which they were taught in Communist Cuba."¹²⁵

To build upon the success of the School of the Americas, the U.S. opened the Inter-American Defense College at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. in 1962. This school operated on a model similar to that of the U.S. National War College to educate senior field grade officers in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel on the Inter-American System and the political, social, economic, and military factors that constitute essential components of inter-American defense.¹²⁶ The fact that most students sent to this school had been identified as having the potential to "play a significant role in the solution of future hemispheric defense problems," supports the claim that U.S. military schools served as diplomatic and informational weapons meant to shape the minds of Latin America's rising military stars during the Cold War.¹²⁷ Similar to School of the Americas, students at the Inter-American Defense College took numerous field trips. However, instead of visiting remote villages, these students visited U.S. Congress, military installations and industrial facilities, and the United Nations.¹²⁸

Although a U.S. Army general officer served as the school's Director, the Inter-American Defense Board designated two governments, other than the U.S., to appoint the school's Assistant Director and Chief of Studies, who in turn had twelve senior officers and civil servants from Latin America's Armies, Navies, Air Forces, and State Departments as assistants.¹²⁹ Any member

¹²⁵ Ibid., 86.

¹²⁶ Barber, 7+9.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 9; Gill, 113.

¹²⁸ Barber, 9-10.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 8.

of the Inter-American Defense Board could nominate faculty members, and each nation could send up to five attendees per year.¹³⁰ This Habermasian approach to appointing the school's leadership, nominating its faculty, and selecting its student body constituted a truly inter-American effort.¹³¹ Furthermore, the collaborative environment it established built upon the relationships developed at the School of the Americas, as many students who attend the School of the Americas went on to attend the Inter-American Defense College as well, thereby perpetuating U.S. influence in Latin America. By strengthening these strategic relationships, the U.S. successfully used this school as a precision guided weapon of diplomacy and information in its denial of communist penetration in the Western hemisphere during the Cold War.

For their part, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force also established and maintained training programs to educate their Latin American counterparts. Instituted by a U.S. Coast Guard mobile training team in 1961, the U.S. Navy took responsibility for the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School operated out of Rodman Naval Base in Panama.¹³² This course taught small craft and riverine operations to the region's naval forces and continued to operate out of Rodman Naval Base until it relocated to the John C. Stennis Space Center in Mississippi, where it continues to operate today. Pre-dating the official establishment of the Latin American Training Center's Ground Division, the U.S. Air Force opened the USAF School for Latin America in 1945 to accommodate a request from the Peruvian Government to train their aircraft

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Cahn, ed., 1115-1117; Bernd C. Stahl, "Whose Discourse? A Comparison of the Foucauldian and Habermasian Concepts of Discourse in Critical Research," in *Proceedings of the 10th Americas Conference on Information Systems* (New York, NY: August 2004), 4330-4331. Jurgen Habermas is a German born philosopher who has spent his career writing and speaking out on a variety of issues in German society. His major political work *Between Facts and Norms* established a "discourse theory" of deliberative democracy around the idea of legitimation by the appeal to reasons that are tested in public discourse among free and equal citizens of a constitutional democracy. He advocates for democratic government informed by critical, public discussion with its citizenry.

¹³² Brewer, 4-16.

mechanics.¹³³ Although comparatively less important than the School of the Americas, this school has been invaluable in training other states' mechanics to maintain the U.S.-made equipment their governments purchased through bilateral defense agreements. Initially located at Albrook Air Force Base in Panama, this school, now known as the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, continues to operate out of Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, TX.

Despite the fact the military education system erected by the U.S. to train Latin American militaries during the Cold War does not resemble a traditional campaign, it functioned remarkably similar to one. By establishing a series of schools to mentor Latin American officers through their careers, the U.S. military ensured it would interact periodically with senior officers and civil servants at installations in Panama and throughout the U.S. for the express purpose of indoctrinating the Latin American militaries in democratic theories of governance. The military civic actions programs taught at the School of the Americas and the political and economic theory taught at the Inter-American Defense College combined to influence the conduct of the Latin American armed forces and stifled Soviet attempts to establish a second Cuba in the West. By playing a discreet yet highly effective diplomatic role during the Cold War, these schools fostered personal relationships that contributed to the growth of a hemispheric military apparatus and inter-American solidarity.¹³⁴ Furthermore, their success demonstrates how policy and strategy guided the deliberate organization, employment, and integration of the instruments of national power into military schools designed to deny communist penetration of the western hemisphere during the Cold War.

¹³³ Ibid., 4-11.

¹³⁴ Barber, 33; Gill, 236.




Figure 1: Operational approach to create inter-American solidarity through military education, 1946 to the present.

The Makings of the Guatemalan Military Project

While all the Central American states have demonstrated their willingness to use force to subdue their indigenous populations, none managed to consolidate their coercive capacity into a national army as early or as consistently as Guatemala.¹³⁵ Nearly the size of Tennessee, Guatemala's topography, climate, and ethnic diversity combined to ensure any semblance of a national identity would remain fragmented and challenged by its disparate peoples who remained

¹³⁵ Holden, 57.

geographically isolated from one another.¹³⁶ Perhaps the best way to reconcile Guatemala's dominant Sierra Madre Mountains that reach heights in excess of 13,700 feet with its pristine Pacific beaches is to liken the state to "a Turkish bath on a gigantic scale, with the chilly room at an altitude of 7,000 feet and upwards, opening out to the steam room at 3,000 feet and below."¹³⁷ This harsh geography served to create physical barriers to social interaction causing sharp, social cleavages between Guatemala's wealthy landed elites and its peasant population, as the consolidation of the country's power and wealth amongst an elite political and military class resulted in Guatemalan politics devolving into a plutocracy whose political survival depended upon a brutal military oligarchy.

Since the 1860s, this unhealthy political dynamic fostered nearly a century's worth of instability marked by dictatorial regimes and military coups that provoked U.S. intervention in 1920, 1921, and 1931.¹³⁸ Fortunately, this pattern appeared to end in 1944 when urban workers, students, the landed elites, and the military joined ranks in an unprecedented, and never again replicated, show of unity to overthrow the brutal dictatorship of General Jorge Ubico.¹³⁹ Having ushered in "ten years of spring," the 1944 Revolution institutionalized the military's autonomy, politicized its officer corps, and created a military worldview that believed the military was above

¹³⁶ Department of the Army, *Guatemala: A Country Study*, ed. Richard F. Nyrop, Second ed., Foreign Area Studies Area Handbook Series (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1983), 1-15.

¹³⁷ Victoria Schofield, *Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 56. British historian Arnold Toynbee described the geography and climate of Afghanistan as "a Turkish bath" due to its vast number of climatic zones. Although Afghanistan and Guatemala lie halfway around the world from one another, Toynbee's quote is applicable to Guatemala because of the geographic disparities contained in so small an area.

¹³⁸ John Donovan, *Red Machete: Communist Infiltration in the Americas* (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962), 188.

¹³⁹ Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 10.

civilian law.¹⁴⁰ These factors weighed heavily upon Guatemala's political future, as President Jacobo Arbenz began to push an agenda of social justice and collective economic rights. Beginning in 1952, Arbenz instituted the most comprehensive land reform in Central American history as his government expropriated and redistributed over 500,000 hectares of land to approximately 100,000 peasant families by June 1954.¹⁴¹ Cognizant these measures would alienate the wealthy and certain segments within the military, Arbenz moved to protect his progressive land reform policies by creating and arming a civilian militia.

In addition to angering the landed elites and antagonizing the military, these policies infuriated the United Fruit Company, who lost large swaths of land due to Arbenz's land reform policies, and its subsidiary the International Railways of Central America (IRCA), who faced emboldened unions and virulent workers due to recent labor legislation.¹⁴² It just so happened that John Foster Dulles, a former attorney who represented the IRCA while a member of the powerful law firm Simon and Crowell, was serving as President Eisenhower's Secretary of State at the time. In addition, his brother, Allen Welsh Dulles, served as the director of the CIA, meaning the two brothers, who held the complete trust of the President, could ensure the CIA's operations in Guatemala remained independent of the State Department's bureaucratic oversight.¹⁴³ While rumors circulated that Arbenz's personal library housed the works of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, the CIA uncovered a nefarious plot that labeled Czechoslovakian military hardware as household goods and shipped it via Swedish freighters to Guatemala.¹⁴⁴ Fearful of the establishment of a "red beachhead" in the Caribbean Basin, the Dulles brothers became

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 11-13.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴² Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 154-158.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 158.

¹⁴⁴ Donovan, 174.

increasingly concerned over Arbenz's communist-tilt, and, in conjunction with President Eisenhower, determined the U.S. should remove him.

Although referred to as the “two-track policy,” the logic that drove the Eisenhower administration's removal of Arbenz actually resembled an operational approach instead of a policy or strategy (reference Figure 2). In this instance, the two tracks, one diplomatic the other military, constituted lines of effort that employed and integrated the instruments of national power during specific events designed to remove Arbenz while protecting the inter-American system and America's image in the OAS. Because the U.S. did not want to dispatch the U.S. Marines to do the job, the Eisenhower administration determined the CIA, who orchestrated the removal of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh the year prior, should organize, train, and equip a paramilitary army.¹⁴⁵ In addition to providing arms and training to COL Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan military officer living in exile in Honduras, the CIA provided logistical support, communications, and, most importantly, close air support. These activities occurred outside of the State Department's purview, as the CIA bypassed the U.S. Ambassador, Rudolph E. Schoenfeld, giving them near carte blanche to prepare their paramilitary army in the Guatemala-Honduras border region.¹⁴⁶ To preserve the CIA's freedom of action, the State Department replaced Ambassador Schoenfeld with John E. Purifoy, a former Army officer who mysteriously sent as many diplomatic cables to the CIA as he did to the State Department during the run-up to the operation.¹⁴⁷

Once the foundation for covert, military intervention had been laid, Secretary Dulles pursued the “second track” of the operational approach by securing a declaration of joint action

¹⁴⁵ Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 164-165.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 165.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

against communism in the Americas during the OAS 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas in March 1954.¹⁴⁸ Upon his return, Secretary Dulles commented the Declaration of Caracas effectively “[made] the international policy of this hemisphere a portion of the Monroe Doctrine... [as it] relates to the extension to this hemisphere of the political system of despotic European powers.”¹⁴⁹ Following Caracas, the State Department provided its American neighbors with lengthy dossiers that profiled communist activity in Guatemala and hinted at the need to remove Arbenz. Although some in the U.S. Government wanted to impose economic sanctions against Guatemala, Secretary Dulles realized an additional joint resolution from the OAS that recognized Guatemala as a threat to peace based on “extensive [communist] penetration” would grant the U.S. Navy the right to board and inspect cargo ships destined for Guatemala.¹⁵⁰ Essentially, this declaration implemented sanctions while avoiding significant debate within the OAS on the issue. On June 16, Secretary Dulles received the resolution he desired and with it the tacit approval of the OAS to “get rid of this stinker [Arbenz] and not to stop until [it] is done.”¹⁵¹

Just two days later, Armas and his Liberation Army crossed the Honduran-Guatemalan border at three points and penetrated twenty miles into Guatemala before meeting token resistance from loyalist troops.¹⁵² Although the country’s trade unions attempted to rush sympathizers to the front to repel the invasion, the Guatemalan Army, who had been paid by the CIA to not intervene, stalled union efforts and effectively marked the end of the regime. While B-26 bombers bombed Guatemala City, the international media filled the airwaves with stories of grave conflict and civil war. Within a few days, the Guatemalan military chiefs demanded

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 171.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 178-179.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 179.

¹⁵² Donovan, 176.

Arbenz's resignation, paving the way for Armas to assume the presidency.¹⁵³ Once in power, Armas halted the agrarian reform program, returned expropriated lands to the wealthy, to include United Fruit Company, and brutally repressed the communist movement by arresting and executing radical members of the country's trade unions.¹⁵⁴

There is little doubt that but for Secretary Dulles' diplomatic efforts and the CIA-backed army of Castillo Armas, Guatemala would more than likely have become part of a Soviet-Cuban Axis in the late 1950s.¹⁵⁵ Although this judgment remains speculative, it is a matter of fact that the operational approach crafted by the Eisenhower administration, commonly referred to as the "two track policy," created the diplomatic and military conditions necessary to remove a budding, communist threat from the strategically important Caribbean Basin. While this incident does represent the achievement of a strategic objective, by no means did it mark the end of U.S. involvement in Guatemala. In fact, the U.S. would remain engaged in Guatemala for more than three decades, exploiting the nation's affinity for violence through various economic and military assistance programs that reinforced a succession of brutal, anti-communist, military dictators.¹⁵⁶ Following Eisenhower, each successive U.S. administration reframed Guatemala's political environment, its irritating communist problem, and an array of potential solutions. Some preferred to work through non-coercive diplomatic and economic efforts, such as President Kennedy, while others saw fit to engage militarily, such as President Reagan. While the specific approaches determined by each successive administration are representative of the geo-politics of the Cold War at the time, they demonstrate the willingness amongst policymakers to organize,

¹⁵³ Ibid., 178; Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 167.

¹⁵⁴ Donovan, 178.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 181.

¹⁵⁶ Huggins, ed., 74.

employ, and integrate the instruments of national power to varying degrees and in various ways to achieve and maintain those conditions that repelled communist advances in Guatemala throughout the Cold War.




Figure 2: Eisenhower Administration’s operational approach to remove Jacobo Arbenz from power in Guatemala in 1954.

Soft Power in Mexico

Following the ouster of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, many of Latin America’s military juntas and autocratic dictatorships began to fall. Between 1956 and 1958 Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentina restored civil order, leaving Paraguay as the lone dictatorship in South America.¹⁵⁷ Although these events appear to have conformed to U.S. interests and priorities for

¹⁵⁷ Brands, 18.

the region, they betray the prolonged recession that gripped Latin America in the wake of the Korean War, which led to a twenty percent decline in trade between 1955 and 1958.¹⁵⁸ As these young democracies struggled to consolidate their immature democratic institutions, rapid economic modernization resulted in rampant corruption that fueled social unrest. The confluence of these factors confronted U.S. policymakers in 1958 when a mob of angry protesters attacked and nearly overturned Vice President Richard Nixon's vehicle in Caracas during his goodwill tour of South American capitals, and again in 1959 when the Castro brothers and Che Guevara fomented violent revolution in Cuba.¹⁵⁹

These events, combined with the impact de-Stalinization was perceived to have had throughout Latin America, led to a growing and palpable fear that Soviet populism would resonate with Mexico's political and intellectual elites, as well as its urban and rural poor. Recognizing that "those who [made] peaceful revolution impossible [would] make violent revolution inevitable," President Kennedy sparked a passionate discourse concerning the root cause of instability in Mexico, as well as what policies and programs the U.S. should adopt to address it.¹⁶⁰ Although a sharp ideological divide emerged in Congress as to whether poverty or communism bred instability in America's southern neighbor, policymakers and strategists universally believed that instability along America's southern flank held negative consequences for U.S. security.¹⁶¹ In an effort to appease both camps, the Kennedy administration, believing that targeted economic and social reforms would separate Mexico's poor from its subversive

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 20.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 30.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 45.

¹⁶¹ Schoultz, 20.

communist insurgents, blended economic and social policies with small scale, limited military engagement (reference Figure 3).¹⁶²

This approach resulted in the Alliance for Progress, a massive development program that pledged over \$20 billion in regional aid and assistance over the next ten years. Designed to attack the conditions that produced Castro, the Alliance sought to employ health programs, education, civil rights, and land reform as a means to channel a middle class revolution that would stave off a Castro-inspired revolution of Mexico's proletariat.¹⁶³ Combined with the creation of the Peace Corps and the United States Agency for International Development, the Alliance represented a departure from the past because it constructed a comprehensive security framework that rested on seemingly non-coercive, as opposed to overtly military, approaches.¹⁶⁴ Although the U.S. Military Assistance Program kept the Mexican Army supplied with arms during this timeframe and the School of the Americas, assisted by the Central Intelligence Agency, continued to educate its national police and army officers on counterinsurgency tactics, U.S. economic aid to Mexico outpaced military aid 129:1 from 1962-1969.¹⁶⁵ This novel, indirect approach to preventing the spread of communism took on various forms and routinely manifested itself through national health campaigns.

Efforts to eradicate malaria from 1955-1975 represent one such campaign, as the spraying of insecticides and distribution of informational pamphlets proved the fastest and cheapest means to deliver an answer to one of Mexico's most egregious social problems. Known

¹⁶² Ibid., 19.

¹⁶³ Brands, 45; Schoultz, 27.

¹⁶⁴ Edward A. Kolodziej, "Renaissance of Security Studies? Caveat Lector!," *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (June, 1992): 426.

¹⁶⁵ Brands, 47; Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas, *Revolution and Intervention in Central America*, Contemporary Marxism Series (San Francisco, CA: Synthesis Publications, 1983), 203; Huggins, ed., 231-235. For more information on the amount of economic and military aid the U.S. provided to Mexico and Central American from 1962-1969 reference Appendix F.

as the King of Diseases, malaria infected 36% of Mexico's population, was the third leading cause of death in Mexico, and posed a significant threat to U.S. and regional health security.¹⁶⁶ Framed by McCarthyism and the inflammatory rhetoric of the Cold War, parallels between the containment of malaria and communism, to include the need to eradicate the anopheles mosquito and communist sympathizers, those invisible agents that threatened to spread their respective evils throughout society, emerged in both the U.S. and Mexico.¹⁶⁷ The fact that a relatively inexpensive health campaign could simultaneously address humanitarian issues, regional security, and open the door for future political and economic cooperation guaranteed its popularity amongst policymakers of all persuasions. Perhaps James Stevens, who served as the U.S. Army's chief of preventive medicine during WW II before becoming Dean of Harvard University's School of Public Health, summed up these sentiments best when he stated:

“Powerful communist forces are at work... taking advantage of sick and impoverished people, exploiting their discontent... to undermine their political beliefs. Health is one of the safeguards against this propaganda. Health is not charity, it is not missionary work, it is not merely good business – it is sheer self-preservation for the United States and for the way of life which we regard as decent. Through health we can expand industrial production, strengthen our military forces, and maintain the high morale of all our people. Through it we can prove, to ourselves and to the world, the wholesomeness and rightness of Democracy. Through health we can defeat the evil threat of communism.”¹⁶⁸

Mindful of their poor image in Mexico, U.S. policymakers made the conscious decision to institute the malaria eradication campaign under the aegis of international organizations, like the United Nations and the World Health Organization, and multinational corporations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, to ensure America received credit for practicing altruism as opposed

¹⁶⁶ Cueto, 34.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 48.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 7.

to power politics.¹⁶⁹ This generated respect towards the U.S. throughout much of Latin America, as most developing states at the time preferred to receive aid from multilateral agencies instead of from one of the superpowers directly, and resulted in a broader basis of support for U.S. policies at the United Nations.¹⁷⁰ To turn this diplomatic act into an informational victory, the Department of State had hundreds of films and books, to include anti-communist cartoons and comic strips, translated into Spanish and distributed with anti-malaria and generic health pamphlets. The State Department also seized upon this opportunity to interview Mexican students studying in the U.S. and used the Voice of America to broadcast their favorable impressions of the U.S. into the heart of Mexico.¹⁷¹

By the mid-1960s the anti-malaria campaign had largely succeeded in containing malaria and the propaganda that accompanied it did help to thwart communist advances in Mexico. However, complications such as environmental degradation from the use of DDT, the lack of health service infrastructure in the state's rural periphery, and the Mexican Government's attempt to de-legitimize communal identity led to a defensive backlash from the peasant community.¹⁷² Although support for the program from the international community did begin to wane, it did so because of its perceived success and not because of the popular resistance that rose in response to Mexico's attempt to reform the societies and cultures of its indigenous peoples. This dynamic left Mexico with a discontent periphery that, despite being healthy and non-communist, longed to graft certain aspects of modernity into their indigenous culture and way of life. Fortunately, many

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 20.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 30.

¹⁷² Donna Lee Van Cott, *Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin American Security* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), 54; Cueto, 119.

of these discontent peasants lived in the Papaloapan Basin, an area known for its salubrious climate and rich agricultural production.¹⁷³

Located in the southeastern portion of the country, the Papaloapan Basin encompasses large swaths of terrain in the states of Oaxaca, Puebla, and Veracruz and extends towards Mexico's southern border with the restive, northern states of Guatemala. Known for its agricultural production, a flurry of activity engulfed the region beginning in the late 1960s when U.S. pharmaceutical firms discovered an abundant supply of barbasco, a wild yam that grows underground, in the area.¹⁷⁴ This interest resulted from scientific exploration that discovered a means to transform the simple yam into synthetic hormones, such as progesterone, cortisone, and oral contraceptives, and a cheap, abundant supply of the yam represented potential windfall profits for U.S.-based pharmaceutical companies.¹⁷⁵ The discovery quickly re-focused U.S. attention onto Mexico as policymakers viewed the recent U.S.-Soviet détente as an opportunity to consolidate and exploit the gains made by the Alliance for Progress. To facilitate the expropriation of the yam, the U.S. Department of Agriculture issued scientists at Penn State a permit to import near limitless quantities of barbasco, and the State Department provided them with a letter of introduction that described their work as "intimately related to national defense."¹⁷⁶

In addition to facilitating research, the U.S. Government worked closely with Mexico to ensure U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms received a majority of the permits required to harvest barbasco and paid fair tariffs on the yams they harvested and exported. For their part, the

¹⁷³ Gabriela Soto Laveaga, *Jungle Laboratories: Mexican Peasants, National Projects, and the Making of the Pill* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 23-32.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 2+45.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

Mexican Government was more than willing to accommodate U.S. interests as the discovery of the barbasco yam presented itself as another opportunity to integrate its rural poor into its growing urban, industrialized society.¹⁷⁷ Although Mexico did nationalize its pharmaceutical industry and organize thousands of unemployed workers in the Papaloapan Basin into unions, it did not do so as a reaction to the U.S. or its multinational pharmaceutical companies. Rather, these policies grafted Mexico's undesirable peasantry into society and created a positive dialogue between the government and its citizens regarding social issues, land reform, and inequality.¹⁷⁸ To address these grievances, the U.S. augmented the Mexican Government's capacity to provide health services and agricultural expertise by integrating philanthropic organizations and international institutions into a combined effort designed to establish Mexican control over its historically disobedient peasant population. By embracing programs such as the Rockefeller Foundation's Mexican Agricultural Program, Mexico managed to meet the needs of many of its rural poor and encouraged future investment from U.S. corporate giants provided they demonstrated responsible business practices while doing business in Mexico.¹⁷⁹

At times, the interaction of these nationalistic projects and indigenous priorities did result in the splintering of Mexican society along ethnic and cultural lines, and, in some cases, set the conditions for the formation of violent socio-political movements.¹⁸⁰ However, none of these smaller, indigenous movements posed a threat to Mexican national security, let alone U.S. national security. Although these nationalistic projects could have been modified to more adequately fulfill the needs of the peasants, the fact remains that these non-coercive approaches,

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 115+230.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 131-133.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 105.

¹⁸⁰ Cott, 68.

combined with the education Mexican police and army officers received at the School of the Americas and the Inter-American Defense College, prevented the spread of communism in Mexico throughout the 1960s. Additionally, this thoughtful approach, unlike the application of hard power in Guatemala in 1954, did not militarize Mexican society and leave a thirty-year legacy of violence and repression in its wake.¹⁸¹ This contrast becomes even greater and more dramatic when one compares the approach the U.S. employed in Mexico to its approach in Vietnam as the \$2 billion spent in Mexico throughout the 1960s and 1970s pales in comparison to the blood and treasure the U.S. hemorrhaged in Southeast Asia during the same timeframe for ostensibly the same reasons. In this context, the efficacy of soft power becomes apparent, especially when the instruments of diplomacy, information, and economic power are organized, employed, and integrated in a specific region, at a specific time, and with a specific purpose. While this case study analyzed just two of the key events that occurred during a cacophony of activity in Mexico during the 1960s, their ability to identify the causal processes at work in both U.S. policy and Mexican society provide greater meaning to a general narrative indicative of the environment at the time. Furthermore, their ability to depict the integration of deliberate acts of diplomacy, health and informational campaigns, and targeted economic aid programs demonstrates how the U.S. government's indirect approach purposefully organized and employed the instruments of national power through the integration of ends, ways, and means to create the social and economic conditions that prevented the spread of communism in Mexico.

¹⁸¹ David L. Clawson and Don R. Hoy, "Nealtican, Mexico: A Peasant Community That Rejected the 'Green Revolution'," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 38, no. 4 (October, 1979): 384.




Figure 3: U.S. operational approach to preventing the spread of communism in Mexico throughout the 1960s.

Conclusion

This monograph claimed the U.S. Government practiced a type of operational art in its defense of the western hemisphere during the Cold War. To support this claim, this monograph accomplished four key tasks. First, it defined how a government, responsible for policy and strategy, could practice a type of operational art. Second, it determined that a deliberate logic structured U.S. policy towards Latin America up to, and throughout, the Cold War. Third, it identified how policy guided the development of a strategic approach towards the region. Finally, this monograph demonstrated through case study analysis the U.S. Government did

in fact practice a type of operational art through the organization, employment, and integration of all the instruments of national power during discreet events in Latin America.

To accomplish the first task, this monograph identified a gap in joint doctrine regarding the relationship between strategy, operational art, and the instruments of national power. Inquiry into joint doctrine revealed the joint force does define and establish logical links between the concepts of strategy and operational art. It does this by stating that commanders and staffs support the achievement of political and strategic objectives by translating the prudent ideas set forth by strategy into campaigns and operations that organize and employ military forces through the integration of ends, ways, and means.¹⁸² Although this relationship provides strategic guidance to theater and joint force commanders regarding the execution of military force, it fails to account for the organization, employment, and integration of the remaining instruments of national power. Joint Publication 5-0 does state that operational art “helps commanders and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives,” but *facilitating* integration differs significantly from the deliberate organization, employment, and integration of the instruments of national power in a coherent manner.¹⁸³

Consequently, the current definitions of strategy and operational art in joint doctrine fail to identify where and how *all* the instruments of national power are organized, employed, and integrated according to the same strategic logic that governs the organization and employment of military force. To address this gap, this monograph offered a broadened definition of operational art that substituted the term “military forces” with the “instruments of national power” in the

¹⁸² United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 245+317.

¹⁸³ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 5-0: *Joint Operation Planning*, III-1.

current joint definition to define a type of operational art that a government could practice. While this broadened definition does increase operational art in scale, it does not equal or attempt to replace strategy because it continues to adhere to the same strategic logic that governs the development of military campaigns and operations. This concept receives support from Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, the proponent for the concept of operational art in joint doctrine, which states “operational art is not associated with a specific echelon or formation, nor is it exclusive to theater and joint force commanders.”¹⁸⁴ This change to doctrine acknowledges that operational art can occur at various levels simultaneously, higher as well as lower. History supports this doctrinal change, evidenced by the roles Stalin and Sadat played during WW II and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War respectively. Thus, theory, history, and doctrine combine to support this monograph’s broadened definition of operational art, as well as its claim that a government can practice it.

Next, this monograph showed how the Monroe Doctrine provided a deliberate logic that governed U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America throughout the Cold War. It accomplished this task by analyzing the origin and evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, to include its codification as policy. Intended to isolate the western hemisphere from Europe’s political maelstrom, the Monroe Doctrine divided the world into two spheres of influence.¹⁸⁵ President Polk reaffirmed the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to justify and facilitate America’s westward expansion during the mid-1800s, followed by President Theodore Roosevelt whose famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine established “big stick” diplomacy and laid the foundation for an overseas, American empire. The Roosevelt Corollary served America’s Presidents well throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, as Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan presided over interventions in Latin America to, as President Reagan said, ensure the agents of

¹⁸⁴ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: *Unified Land Operations*, 9.

¹⁸⁵ Dent, 3; Gantenbein, 323-325.

the Soviet Union would not “destroy the fragile flower of democracy and force communism on our small Central American neighbors.”¹⁸⁶

The deliberate logic of the Monroe Doctrine resulted in a policy of “no red beachheads” in the Western hemisphere. To maintain this political object, the U.S. used geography to define its strategic interests and priorities. By analyzing each state’s proximity to the continental U.S., its proximity to other areas of security concern, and its political, military, and economic capabilities, U.S. strategists divided Latin America into three specific sub-regions: the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico, the South Atlantic, and the west coast of South America.¹⁸⁷ Since Latin America was an economy of effort during the Cold War, this geographic approach allowed the U.S. to employ the instruments of national power to achieve its theater and national objectives by sub-region. The level of U.S. involvement in these distinct sub-regions corresponds with America’s strategic interests and priorities, and validates that U.S. strategy drove operations in specific regions of Latin America to achieve theater objectives.

Because strategy identified the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico as America’s highest security concern during the Cold War, this monograph purposefully chose to analyze three historical case studies from this region to support its hypothesis. Analysis of the formation and expansion of inter-American military education programs from 1946 to the present, the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, and the information and economic reform campaigns in Mexico during the 1960s revealed the U.S. government did in fact practice a type of operational art during its defense of the Western hemisphere. Research into the hemispheric military apparatus and inter-American solidarity cultivated at the School of the Americas and the Inter-American Defense College demonstrated how the U.S. used military education as a

¹⁸⁶ Bermann, 299.

¹⁸⁷ Hayes: 134.

precision guided weapon of diplomacy and information in the fight against communist penetration during the Cold War.¹⁸⁸ Inquiry into the Arbenz affair in Guatemala in 1954 revealed that the Eisenhower Administration's "two-track policy" to remove Arbenz constituted an operational approach that leveraged diplomacy and covert military action to create conditions that allowed for the removal of a budding, communist threat. Lastly, investigation of deliberate acts of diplomacy, health and informational campaigns, and targeted economic aid programs in Mexico during the 1960s showed how the U.S. government organized, employed, and integrated the instruments of national power to create the social and economic conditions that prevented the spread of communism from Cuba to Mexico.

These three case studies support the hypothesis the U.S. government practiced a type of operational art that integrated all the instruments of national power into either campaigns or major operations to deny communist penetration of the western hemisphere during the Cold War. Perhaps future research into the ouster of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973 by CIA-backed military dictator Augusto Pinochet, three decades of overt and covert involvement in Guatemala from the 1950s through the 1980s, counterinsurgency operations throughout nearly all of Central America during the 1980s, the infamous Nicaraguan Contra affair, and counter narcotics and counterinsurgency operations throughout South America's Andes Mountain range during the 1980s could provide further support to this monograph's thesis.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ Barber, 33; Gill, 236. For more information on the level of U.S. involvement in Latin America during the Cold War reference Appendix C.

¹⁸⁹ Robert J. Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); Luz Arce, *The Inferno: A Story of Terror and Survival in Chile*, trans., Stacey Alba Skar (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); Bermann; Laurence Birns, ed. *The End of Chilean Democracy: An Idoc Dossier on the Coup and Its Aftermath* (New York, NY: The Seabury Press, 1974); Brands; Buffington and Caimari; Cott; Dent; Ambassador Frank J. Devine, *El Salvador: Embassy under Attack*, First ed. (New York, NY: Vantage Press, 1981); Sam Dillon, *Comandos: The CIA and Nicaragua's Contra Rebels* (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1991); Dixon and Jonas; Donovan; Les Evans, ed. *Disaster in Chile: Allende's Strategy and Why It Failed*, First ed. (New York, NY: Pathfinder Press, 1974); Gill; Jeffrey L.

Of course proving one's thesis is important. However, to turn ones back on the future and look into the past to impose a relatively recent concept onto history does reek of presentism. Furthermore, while the U.S. Government's actions do appear to have resembled a type of operational art, difficulty remains, and will always remain, in identifying the true intentions of the actors in question. Therefore, to try to resolve whether the application of operational art in the case studies investigated occurred deliberately or serendipitously lies beyond the scope of this monograph because we do not know if the synchronicity between various government agencies was deliberate, except for perhaps the collusion between the Dulles brothers during the removal of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Thus, two important lessons learned constitute the true power of this monograph's narrative.

First, joint doctrine fails to identify where the instruments of diplomacy, information, and economic power are organized and employed, as well as how they are integrated through ends, ways, and means to achieve national objectives. Although outside the military's purview, recent

Gould, *To Die in This Way: Nicaraguan Indians and the Myth of Mestizaje, 1880-1965* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Grandin; Donald L. Herman, ed. *Democracy in Latin America* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1988); Holden; Rex A. Hudson, *Chile: A Country Study*, Third ed. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994); Huggins, ed; Harvey F. Kline, *State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1999); Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Change in Venezuela* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); Tim L. Merrill, *Nicaragua: A Country Study*, Third ed. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993); Schirmer; Michael K. Steinberg, "Public Memory and Political Power in Guatemala's Postconflict Landscape," *Geographic Review* Vol. 93, no. 4 (Oct., 2003); Joseph S. Tulchin and Gary Bland, eds., *Peru in Crisis: Democracy of Dictatorship?*, ed. The Woodrow Wilson Center Current Studies on Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); Mary B. Vanderlaan, *Revolution and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Wiarda and Falcoff; Daniel Wilkinson, *Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Peter Winn, *Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean*, Third ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006). Although not nearly complete, the sources listed in this citation are representative of a panoply of information and research done on U.S. involvement in Pinochet's Chile, counterinsurgency in Central America during the 1980', the Contra Affair in Nicaragua, and counterinsurgency and counter narcotics operations in South America during the 1980's. These references would provide a foundation for future research to build upon this monograph's thesis.

experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan should alert the U.S. military to the fact that it will no longer operate in a clearly defined military environment like the battlefields of WW II and the first Gulf War. Furthermore, while inter-agency cooperation has improved during the past decade, it remains far from where it could, or should, be. Accordingly, joint doctrine must be updated to identify the who, what, when, where, why, and how regarding the organization, employment, and integration of diplomacy, information, and economic power according to the same strategic logic that governs the execution of military force lest operational art devour strategy.

Second, regardless of whether the U.S. government deliberately executed a type of operational art in its defense of the Western hemisphere during the Cold War, research has shown that when its actions resembled what can be construed as a type of operational art, it was far more successful in achieving its theater and national objectives. This implies that if our government designs to be deliberate in the future it can purposefully harness the power of this concept to preserve its influence in Latin America and Africa as it attempts to maintain, and potentially expand, its influence in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.¹⁹⁰ In the final analysis, a whole of government approach that *truly* synchronizes *all* the instruments of national power through the integration of ends, ways, and means will be effective in preserving and expanding U.S. national interests despite future budget cuts.

¹⁹⁰ Barack Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* January 2012. The new defense priorities established by President Obama in January 2012 clearly define American interests as shifting away from Europe and towards Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: The Monroe Doctrine

Excerpts containing the “Monroe Doctrine” from the ANNUAL MESSAGE of President James Monroe to the United States Congress, December 2, 1823.

“At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. [Paragraph 7, message of December 2, 1823]

“It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers, The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider, any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on

the part of the United States indispensable to their security. [Paragraph 48, message of December 2, 1823]

“The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interpositions may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.” [Paragraph 49, message of December 2, 1823]¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹ Gantenbein, 323-325.

Appendix B: Monroe Doctrine Interpretations/Corollaries

Date	President	Secretary of State	Country / Region	Interpretation (or Corollary)
1823	Monroe	Adams	Americas	No colonization of Americas by European powers
1825	Adams	Clay	Americas	No specific obligation
1826	Adams	Clay	Americas	Third-power intervention
1828	Adams	Clay	Americas	No specific commitment
1845	Polk	Buchanan	Americas	No colonization in North America w/o U.S. Consent
1848	Polk	Buchanan	Americas	No transfer of territory
1861	Lincoln	Seward	Mexico	No return to mother country of colony
1865	Lincoln	Seward	Mexico	No establishment of monarchy
1868				(Calvo Doctrine is established)
1870	Grant	Fish	Americas	No transfer of territory
1895	Cleveland	Olney	Venezuela	Olney declares the U.S. sovereign in the Western hemisphere
1896				(Porfirio Diaz criticizes Olney Corollary)
1902	Roosevelt	Hay	Americas	(Drago Doctrine is established)
1904	Roosevelt	Hay	Dominican Republic	Chronic wrongdoing might lead to European intervention; "Big Stick" diplomacy inaugurated
1912	Taft	Knox	Mexico	Lodge Corollary declares no private foreign interests are allowed in Magdalena Bay, Baja California
1914	Wilson	Bryan	Americas	Attempts to multi-lateralize the Monroe Doctrine
1914	Wilson	Bryan	Americas	Recognition: unilateral interpretation and intervention
1920	Wilson	Colby	Americas	Regional understanding of U.S. (Article 21 of League of Nations Covenant)
1923	Coolidge	Hughes	Panama	Unilateral interpretation; no foreign interests near Canal
1928	Coolidge	Hughes	Americas	Clark memo attempts to repudiate Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
1928				(Sandino calls for abolition of Monroe Doctrine)
1933	Roosevelt	Hull	Americas	Good Neighbor Policy is enunciated
1933	Roosevelt	Hull	Americas	Collective efforts to establish a regional defense system
1936	Roosevelt	Hull	Americas	Multilateral issues of common concern to American states

1945	Truman	Byrnes	Americas	Collective intervention; Rodriguez Laretta Doctrine; Braden Corollary to the Good Neighbor Policy
1950	Truman	Byrnes	Americas	Kennan Corollary justifies harsh methods of rule to repel communist attacks in the hemisphere
1954	Eisenhower	Dulles	Guatemala	Leftist Arbenz regime is seen as threat to Monroe Doctrine
1961	Kennedy	Rusk	Cuba	Collective responsibility, but U.S. may take unilateral actions if Latin America defaults
1962	Kennedy	Rusk	Americas	Spirit is invoked to gain hemispheric/OAS support during Cuban Missile Crisis
1965	Kennedy	Rusk	Dominican Republic	Spirit of Monroe Doctrine is invoked to prevent "second Cuba" in the Caribbean
1970	Nixon	Rogers	Chile	Spirit is invoked to justify destabilization of Chilean government
1977	Carter	Vance	Americas	Carter tries to repudiate Kennan Corollary to Monroe Doctrine in a speech declaring our fear of communism is over
1982	Reagan	Haig	Falkland Islands	Supporters of Argentine position during the war bring up Monroe Doctrine
1983	Reagan	Shultz	Grenada	Spirit is invoked to remove Cuban influence on the island
1984	Reagan	Shultz	Central America	Spirit is invoked to remove communist influences from Central America in the Contra wars against Nicaragua
1987	Reagan	Shultz	Nicaragua	Reagan invokes Monroe Doctrine in State of Union Address to justify his Nicaraguan policy
1993	Clinton	Christopher	Cuba	Monroe Doctrine "dies" when Soviet brigade leaves Cuba

This chart represents the numerous interpretations of, and/or corollaries to, the Monroe Doctrine throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Text that appears in parentheses represents a response from an individual/state in Latin America, Example: (Sandino calls for abolition of Monroe Doctrine). Source: David W. Dent, *The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 8-11.

Appendix C: Levels of U.S. Involvement in Latin America

Country	19 th Century	20 th Century	Incidents of Military Intervention Since 1823
Argentina	Low	Medium	2
Brazil	Low	Medium	2
Bolivia	Low	Medium	2
Chile	Medium	Medium	2
Colombia	Medium	Medium	8
Costa Rica	Low	Medium	0
Cuba	High	High	12
Dominican Republic	High	High	8
Ecuador	Low	Low-Medium	1
El Salvador	Low	Medium-High	2
Grenada	Low	Medium	1
Guatemala	Low	High	1
Guyana	Low	Medium	0
Haiti	Medium	High	8
Honduras	Low	Medium-High	4
Jamaica	Low	Medium	0
Mexico	High	High	15
Nicaragua	High	High	18
Panama	High	High	23
Peru	Medium	Medium-High	2
Paraguay	Low	Medium	1
Trinidad	Low	Medium	0
Uruguay	Low	Medium	0
Venezuela	Low	Medium	0

Note: *Levels of Involvement* (high, medium, low) represent a more encompassing measure of intervention than the column listing specific incidents of military intervention. In this broader measure, involvement includes such acts as economic sanctions or pressures applied to international lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), drug policy certification, building political institutions in the name of democracy, supplying proxy armies to engage in anticommunist subversion, diplomatic non-recognition, covert intervention to change unacceptable political leaders or to determine the outcome of elections, coercing treaty rights to authorize military intervention or other forms of involvement, and armed intervention that is either unilateral or by invitation of the host government in Latin America or the Caribbean. A *low* level of involvements represents a general absence of armed military intervention and other forms of intervention. Low levels of involvement are generally associated with South America and English-speaking Caribbean countries during the 19th century. *High* levels of involvement are generally associated with close geographical proximity to the U.S. or the Panama Canal, combined with frequent usage of the Monroe Doctrine. *Medium* levels of involvement usually include a mixture of both military intervention and other forms of involvement in the internal affairs of the country. With only a few exceptions, medium levels of involvement are associated with South America and English-speaking Caribbean countries during the 20th century, particularly during times of war (including the Cold War).

Source: David W. Dent, *The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 12-13.

Appendix D: Lend Lease Transfers to Central American States, 1941-1945

<u>Country</u>	<u>Anticipated Value of Transfers (\$ millions)</u>	<u>Actual Value of Transfers (\$ millions)</u>	<u>National Defense Budget (\$)</u>	<u>Estimated Annual Procurement Budget (EAPB)</u>	<u>Annualized Lend lease Shipments as % of EAPB</u>
Guatemala	\$5	\$3.10	\$1.9 million (FY 1941)	\$380,000	102%
El Salvador	\$1.60	\$0.88	\$1.5 million (FY 1941)	\$303,120	97%
Nicaragua	\$1.30	\$0.89	\$970,000 (Est. FY 1940)	\$194,030	153%
Honduras	\$1.30	\$0.37	\$1.2 million (FY 1941)	\$236,800	52%
Costa Rica	\$0.55	\$0.16	\$563,209 (FY 1939)	\$112,642	46%

Source: Greg Holden, *Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821-1960*, 121-122.

Appendix E: Country Graduates from U.S. Military Schools as of 1989

Country / School	School of the Americas	Inter-American Air Forces Academy	Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School
Antigua	0	0	18
Argentina	585	365	0
Bahamas	0	0	45
Barbados	1	0	19
Belize	7	11	48
Bolivia	3,100	1,030	153
Brazil	320	244	0
Chile	2,043	1,436	0
Colombia	6,552	4,141	48
Costa Rica	2,260	88	187
Cuba	253	263	0
Dominica	0	0	17
Dominican Republic	1,967	1,075	188
Ecuador	3,105	2,873	54
El Salvador	5,362	1,514	418
Grenada	0	0	22
Guatemala	1,330	951	254
Guyana	0	21	22
Haiti	49	46	12
Honduras	3,127	1,843	548
Jamaica	4	12	0
Mexico	306	453	2
Nicaragua	4,309	811	170
Panama	3,589	1,321	466
Paraguay	1,042	493	97
Peru	3,796	1,204	18
St. Christopher	0	0	22
St. Lucia	0	0	20
St. Vincent & Grenadine	0	0	12
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	6
Surinam	0	6	0
Uruguay	928	598	22
Venezuela	3,084	2,010	74
TOTALS	48,678	26,491	2,967

This chart displays the number of graduates each nation had from each of the respective U.S. service component schools through 1989. Although the Cold War did not officially end until 1991, by all intents and purposes the superpower rivalry of the Cold War subsided with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Source: Barry L. Brewer, "United States Security Assistance Training of Latin American Militaries: Intentions and Results" (Air Force Institute of Technology, 1995), 5-7.

**Appendix F: U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Central America,
1953-1979**

	<u>1953-1961</u>	<u>1962-1969</u>	<u>1970-1979</u>	<u>Total 1953-1979</u>
<u>Mexico</u>				
Economic	342.1	518.4	1,672.1	2,352.6
Military	3.6	4.0	7.2	14.8
<u>Nicaragua</u>				
Economic	46.2	116.2	183.4	345.8
Military	1.9	10.4	20.3	32.6
<u>Panama</u>				
Economic	67.9	173.4	341.9	583.2
Military	0.1	3.0	11.8	14.9
<u>Costa Rica</u>				
Economic	71.5	115.7	118.0	305.2
Military	0.1	1.7	5.1	6.9
<u>El Salvador</u>				
Economic	14.3	115.1	89.0	218.4
Military	0.1	6.5	10.2	16.8
<u>Guatemala</u>				
Economic	134.7	170.8	220.5	526.0
Military	1.5	18.3	22.1	41.9
<u>Honduras</u>				
Economic	37.9	75.9	191.3	305.1
Military	1.1	8.0	19.3	28.4

Includes U.S. Export-Import Bank and other U.S. Government loans. Source: Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas, *Revolution and Intervention in Central America*, Contemporary Marxism Series (San Francisco, CA: Synthesis Publications, 1983), 203.

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