Comparing the OODA Loop's Effect on Operations at the Army Division and MAGTF Level
Abstract
In the last 10 years, the United States military has dealt with emerging counterinsurgencies in multiple operational theaters. To deal with the complex nature of counterinsurgency, organizational planning and operational processes increasingly focus on learning and adapting to a particular type of threat in a given environment. The developed processes help to increase the speed of the decision cycle in an attempt to retain the initiative and get the inside the insurgent's decision cycle. To do so, both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps interpret, doctrinally incorporate, and execute the influential ideas of John Boyd. Most importantly, the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop concept informs decisions and actions and serves as a basis for command and control. The first part of the monograph examines Coalition Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), an Army Division operating in Eastern Afghanistan in 2003-2004. The second part examines I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces (Forward), Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) operating in Al-Anbar Province, Iraq in 2006-2007. The monograph then compares the resulting patterns concerning task organization, tempo, and planning structure. The patterns of task organization for mission, decentralized command and control structure, and integrated planning driven by doctrine, increased the effectiveness of the MEF compared CJTF-180 in their respective area of operation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA566700
Entities
People
- Alexander L. Young
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College