America's Post-9/11 Grand Strategy: Matching the Response to the Threat, and Implications for U.S. National Power
Abstract
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration chose to pursue a broad, offensive, and preemptive campaign against terrorists and their purported state sponsors, versus executing a focused response against Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. This monograph argues that over the course of the next decade, this broad strategy, primarily leveraging military power, diverted manpower and resources away from the immediate threat, emboldened al Qaeda, and weakened the comprehensive national power of the United States. On 9/11, bin Laden and al Qaeda were immediately identified as the perpetrators. However, as rapidly as this determination was made, President Bush made the decision to expand the scope of the nation's response. Instead of focusing on bin Laden and al Qaeda, the United States would target the entirety of terrorism, to include its state sponsors. This agenda was reinforced during numerous September 2001 Presidential speeches, and then expanded over the course of the next year to incorporate preemption as a pillar of the strategy known as the "Bush Doctrine." Further, despite wide-ranging advocacy for soft power approaches in response to 9/11, the administration adopted a strategy reliant on military action. The National Security Council was unable to develop a focused and integrated whole-of-government approach to counter the threat. At the same time, the President's broad goals facilitated divergent strategic aims, such as the pursuance of regime change in Iraq. Within weeks of the 9/11 attacks, efforts began to develop and refine the Iraq war plan, diverting attention from Afghanistan and al Qaeda. Additionally, the invasion of Iraq, and eventual deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan exemplified the United States' misunderstanding of bin Laden's grievance with U.S. presence in the Middle East. After a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, al Qaeda has not been contained, and instead has expanded.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA566893
Entities
People
- Roy P. Fatur
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College