United States Army's Current Capability to Conduct Combined Arms Maneuver
Abstract
The U.S. Army is concluding its responsibilities in the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq by conducting Counterinsurgency Operations now doctrinally associated with Wide Area Security (WAS). This monograph explores whether the U.S. Army is prepared for Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) as an integral part of its Unified Land Operations. The author argues that the U.S. Army is currently not ready to successfully deploy and execute Major Combat Operations now associated with CAM due to training and organizational deficiencies. The monograph examines two historical case studies of the Army transitioning from a predominantly WAS force to a CAM force to obtain lessons learned from the transitions. The first historical case study timeframe is from after the Philippine War through WWI, focusing on major developments that were accomplished before WWI and then lessons learned from WWI. The second historical case study timeframe is from after the Vietnam War through the Persian Gulf War, focusing on major developments that were accomplished before the Persian Gulf War and lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. The monograph also examines a near-peer military competitor with the United States, China, with which a political and economic conflict could result in a military CAM operation. Lastly, the monograph examines current U.S. Army capabilities and limitations, and provides some recommendations to improve the U.S. Army's ability to conduct CAM.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA566895
Entities
People
- Gordon A. Richardson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College