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THESIS

**UNDERSTANDING “SWIFT TRUST”
TO IMPROVE INTERAGENCY
COLLABORATION IN NEW YORK CITY**

by

Michael J. Fahy

September 2012

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Robert Josefek
Christopher Bellavita

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**UNDERSTANDING “SWIFT TRUST” TO IMPROVE
INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION IN NEW YORK CITY**

Michael J. Fahy
Battalion Chief, New York City Fire Department
J.D., New York Law School, 1998
B.A., Binghamton University, 1994

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requirements for the degree of

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2012**

Author: Michael J. Fahy

Approved by: Robert Josefek
Thesis Advisor

Christopher Bellavita
Second Reader

Daniel Moran, PhD
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

For over a decade, homeland security leaders have urged emergency response agencies to improve their collaborative capacity. Collaboration and coordination is critical to homeland security effectiveness. The homeland security threat scenarios facing NYC, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and high consequence accidents, require a synergistic response from first arriving responders.

To understand the foundation of collaborative relationships among the FDNY and NYPD, this thesis examines the concept of “swift trust.” Swift trust is a unique form of trust that occurs between groups or individuals brought together in temporary teams to accomplish specific tasks, often under time constraints. This thesis examines swift trust formation in military, business, and virtual collaborative studies. It applies the factors critical to swift trust formation in those areas to interagency incidents involving the NYPD and FDNY. Among the factors affecting the formation of swift trust between NYC first responders are initial interactions and communications, identification of roles and assigned tasks, formulation of a team identity, and organizational culture.

The conclusions drawn from this research reveal organizational and procedural barriers preventing the formation of swift trust at interagency incidents. Additionally, current training is largely ineffective at developing swift trust.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	PROBLEM SPACE	2
B.	SWIFT TRUST AND TEMPORARY GROUPS.....	4
C.	BACKGROUND	5
1.	Incremental Improvements.....	5
2.	Information Sharing	6
3.	Systemic Problem.....	7
4.	Complex Systems	7
D.	RESEARCH QUESTION	9
1.	Primary Question.....	9
2.	Secondary Question	9
E.	PRIOR RESEARCH	9
F.	METHODOLOGY	11
G.	ARGUMENT	11
II.	LITERATURE REVIEW	15
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	15
B.	BACKGROUND	15
C.	TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS	16
D.	SWIFT TRUST IN TEMPORARY GROUPS.....	18
1.	Team Identity and Trust	19
2.	Role Clarity and Trust.....	20
3.	Organizational Culture and Trust	21
4.	Trust and Communication.....	23
E.	CONCLUSION	23
III.	SWIFT TRUST STUDIES	25
A.	MILITARY GROUPS.....	25
1.	Unit Cohesion	26
2.	Team Identity	28
3.	Organizational Culture	28
4.	Swift Trust in Leaders.....	29
5.	Swift Trust in Military Groups—Themes	30
B.	BUSINESS GROUPS.....	31
1.	Swift Trust Exercise.....	31
2.	Swift Trust in Business Groups—Themes.....	34
C.	VIRTUAL GROUPS	34
1.	Global Virtual Teams	35
2.	Case Study	35
3.	Swift Trust in Virtual Groups—Themes	38
D.	THEME SUMMARY	38
1.	Swift Trust Matrix	39

IV.	DISCUSSION	41
A.	INTERAGENCY RESPONSE IN NYC	41
B.	BACKGROUND	41
C.	INITIAL COMMUNICATION AND INTERACTION.....	42
	1. Inability to Communicate.....	42
	2. Inability to Meet.....	44
	3. Shortcomings of Unified Command During the Initial Meeting ...	45
	4. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD	46
D.	ROLE CLARITY	47
	1. Role Redundancy	47
	2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD	49
E.	TEAM IDENTITY	50
	1. NYC Urban Search and Rescue Team—NY-TF1.....	51
	2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD	52
F.	LEADERSHIP	53
	1. Negative Trust Perceptions	53
	2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD	54
G.	ORGANIZATIONAL BIAS	55
	1. Social Identity Theory	55
	2. Information Sharing	56
	3. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD	57
H.	INTERAGENCY TRAINING	58
I.	LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: SWIFT TRUST AS PRACTICED WITHIN THE FDNY	60
J.	SUMMARY	61
V.	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	63
A.	REVISE CIMS TO CLARIFY OPERATIONAL ROLES	63
B.	END OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCIES BETWEEN THE FDNY AND NYPD.....	64
C.	CREATE A “ONE TEAM” STRATEGY	64
	1. Require Completion of CIMS After Action Review Worksheet ...	65
	2. Enhance Interagency Drills.....	66
	3. Formulate Realistic Dispute Resolution Avenues	67
	4. Establish an FDNY-NYPD Interagency Collaboration Medal	67
	5. Leadership Commitment.....	68
	APPENDIX.....	69
	LIST OF REFERENCES	71
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	79

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Integrating Trust and Distrust: Alternative Social Realities	32
Table 2.	Within and Cross-Category Case Analysis.....	37
Table 3.	Swift Trust Matrix.....	39

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Review
CIMS	Citywide Incident Management System
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
ESU	Emergency Service Unit
FDNY	New York City Fire Department
FDOC	Fire Department Operations Center
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
ICS	Incident Command System
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NYC	New York City
NY-TF1	New York City Urban Search and Rescue Task Force
NYPD	New York City Police Department
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SSTR	Security Stability Transition Reconstruction
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue

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I. INTRODUCTION

Thousands of times each day, New York City (NYC) firefighters and police officers respond to standard calls, such as structural fires, medical emergencies, and criminal investigations that do not involve or require collaboration with emergency responders from other agencies. However, large-scale events, whether terrorism related, or man-made or natural disasters, require such collaboration. These incidents are complex endeavors that require the building of a synergistic response network.¹ To achieve that synergy, individual agency-specific missions must be accomplished simultaneously, collaboratively, and with an understanding of other agencies' missions.²

For over a decade, homeland security leaders have urged emergency response agencies to improve their collaborative capacity. By mandating that federal, and later state and local agencies use the National Incident Management System (NIMS) in managing domestic incidents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 called upon all levels of government to establish the capacity to work “efficiently and effectively *together*.”³ Furthermore, in addressing national preparedness, HSPD 8 granted federal assistance for state and local agencies to build capacity for collaboration in response to major events, including terrorism.⁴ Events like the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina demonstrate that no single agency has the capacity to address all aspects of these major incidents. This thesis builds upon prior research that found interagency and interpersonal trust to be a critical factor in fostering collaboration between individuals,

¹ Joseph W. Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the World Trade Center,” in *Psychology of Terrorism*, ed. Bruce Bongar et al. (Oxford University Press, 2007), 214.

² Joseph Duggan Jr., “The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team (NY-TF1): A Case Study of Interagency Effectiveness” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 30, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=5545>.

³ United States Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidents, February 28, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html>. (author’s italics)

⁴ United States Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness, December 17, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html>.

groups, and organizations.⁵ Continued research is needed to understand various factors influencing inter-organizational collaboration. Specifically, this thesis examines the factors affecting the formation of “swift trust,” a trust that forms between individuals or groups without a prior relationship, and the barriers preventing members of the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) and New York City Police Department (NYPD) from developing swift trust, thus inhibiting collaboration.

A. PROBLEM SPACE

The need for collaboration and coordination is generally assumed at large-scale interagency incidents. It has been argued that the failure to coordinate, exhibited by a lack of information sharing, resulted in emergency responder deaths at the World Trade Center on 9/11.⁶ Responses to terror attacks and major natural disasters, like Hurricane Katrina and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, exemplify this need, and for 10 years, government commissions, consultants, and homeland security directives have called for better collaboration and coordination among emergency response agencies.⁷ The thinking is that a lack of coordinated response leads to a duplication of effort among first responders; the lack of collaboration results in a less effective response, and ultimately, a less effective response means greater loss of life and property and longer recovery time following an incident.

Decades of study into the importance of collaboration and coordination during emergency operations management resulted in numerous initiatives. In the 1970s, massive wildfires in the western United States requiring the collaboration of numerous agencies led to the development of systems and training, and eventually, the Incident

⁵ Aneil K. Mishra, “Organizing Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust,” in *Trust in Organizations*, ed. Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1996), 276.

⁶ J. Randall Lawson and Robert L. Vettori, “NCSTAR 1–8, Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster, The Emergency Response Operations,” *National Institute of Standards and Technology*, September 2005, 174, http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=101049.

⁷ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 321, 397; Fire Department of the City of New York, “McKinsey Report: Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness,” 61–62, August 19, 2002, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/toc.html; Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5.

Command System (ICS) and NIMS. In 2003, HSPD 5 mandated NIMS, calling for a “comprehensive national incident management system” to manage the “prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”⁸ In 2004, New York City adopted similar protocols for managing emergency responses called the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS).⁹ However, CIMS has not brought about the necessary operational collaboration among the emergency response agencies.

These written policies, while necessary as practical guidelines and required for federal funding,¹⁰ have not proven an effective strategy for addressing the underlying problems inhibiting greater collaboration. In fact, in some ways, CIMS exacerbates collaboration problems by perpetuating redundant capabilities and encouraging interagency competition through “first to arrive” protocols between the FDNY and NYPD.¹¹ Furthermore, collaboration difficulties extend beyond major incidents to more common ones that fall within the tactical capabilities of both agencies. For instance, currently, the NYPD and FDNY both conduct search and rescue operations at incidents, such as structural collapses, train or automobile accidents, and water rescues. It is not uncommon to have police and fire units operating separately without integrating their search plan or establishing a unified command early in an incident.¹² The vast majority of interagency incidents are resolved successfully, whether collaboratively or not, without noticeable disagreement. However, in some cases, these incidents grow into public interagency disputes. Recently, members of the FDNY and NYPD failed to collaborate during the successful rescue of three workers hanging from a scaffold 17 stories above

⁸ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5.

⁹ New York City Office of Emergency Management, Citywide Incident Management System, April 6, 2005, (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/about/about_cims.shtml. NYC began operating under CIMS protocols on May 14, 2004.

¹⁰ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5.

¹¹ New York City Office of Emergency Management, CIMS: Primary Agency Matrix, Annex A, April 6, 2005, 4, (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/about/cims_matrix.shtml.

¹² Thomas J. Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management: Fostering Trust to Enhance Collaboration in Complex Adaptive Emergency Response Systems” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=30814>.

the ground.¹³ Incidents like these, publicized in the press as the “battle of the badges,” continue to embarrass NYC’s highly respected police and fire departments. Despite incremental improvements in the collaborative capacity of the FDNY and NYPD, difficulty in collaborating still exists at the initial responder level. Something is missing.

B. SWIFT TRUST AND TEMPORARY GROUPS

Historically, researchers viewed trust as a “dynamic phenomenon,” that develops and strengthens over time.¹⁴ However, research has identified a large degree of trust among individuals and groups early in relationships.¹⁵ The research found that temporary groups display behavior that presupposes trust without any history of trust development among the group.¹⁶ Swift trust is a unique form of trust that occurs between groups or individuals brought together in temporary teams to accomplish specific tasks, often under time constraints.¹⁷ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer coined the term “swift trust” in 1996 as a concept for understanding how temporary systems functioned.¹⁸ In their research, they observed that despite the lack of traditional sources of trust, such as familiarity and shared experiences, temporary groups can work on tasks that require great complexity, often involving high risk outcomes. Interagency responses involving the FDNY and NYPD in NYC exhibit some of the qualities of temporary groups. The literature on swift trust offers some hope in understanding the factors necessary for trusting, collaborative interagency responses from the moment agencies arrive at an incident.

¹³ Al Baker, “17 Floors Up, Rescue of 3 Shows Clash of Agencies,” *New York Times*, A17, April 14, 2012, http://nytimes.com/2012/04/14/nyregion/skyscraper-rescue-shows-clash-of-ny-police-and-fire-depts.html?_r=2.

¹⁴ Roy J. Lewicki and Barbara Benedict Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” in *Trust in Organizations*, ed. Roderick R. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1996), 118.

¹⁵ D. Harrison McKnight, Larry L. Cummings, and Norman L. Chervany, “Initial Trust Formation in New Organizational Relationships,” *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 3 (July 1998).

¹⁶ R. A. Goodman and L. P. Goodman, “Some Management Issues In Temporary Systems: A Study of Professional Development and Manpower—The Theater Case,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (September 1976): 494.

¹⁷ Roxanne Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, Cebrowski Institute, September 7, 2006.

¹⁸ Debra Meyerson, Karl E. Weick, and Roderick R. Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” in *Trust in Organizations* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 1996), 168–95.

C. BACKGROUND

Despite the Presidential Directives and federal mandates, and the criticism of the response to the World Trade Center and recommendations to improve collaboration and coordination in works like the *9/11 Commission Report* and the *McKinsey Report*,¹⁹ NYC emergency response agencies continue to face difficulty collaborating, particularly in the early stages of an incident. However, progress has been made in collaboration and coordination among NYC's emergency response agencies in the area of pre-incident planning. The FDNY greatly increased the number of tabletop exercises involving multiple agencies and interagency drills over the past decade.²⁰ Additionally, Incident Action Plans are written and interagency meetings are conducted for most major planned events in NYC. Furthermore, some improvement at extended operations has occurred in which higher levels of command from various agencies arrive at an incident scene. These efforts, while important and commendable, do not adequately address more systemic problems preventing collaboration and coordination early in interagency incidents.

1. Incremental Improvements

The lack of a comprehensive collaborative incident management system in NYC is not due to a lack of effort. Since 9/11, FDNY leadership has demonstrated its willingness and desire to collaborate with other agencies in various ways.²¹ One of the objectives highlighted in its most recent Strategic Plan is to “expand terrorism and disaster preparedness training through intra- and inter-agency exercises to further enhance the Department’s all-hazard response protocols.”²² Interagency drills, tabletop exercises, and full-scale exercises continue to be the primary way in which the FDNY

¹⁹ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 319; Fire Department of the City of New York, “McKinsey Report: Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness,” 62.

²⁰ Joseph W. Pfeifer, “Revisiting the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness,” *With New York Firefighters: WNYF*, no. 3 (2011): 11.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Fire Department of the City of New York, “FDNY Strategic Plan 2011–2013,” 11, (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/publications/FDNY_strategic_plan_2011_2013.pdf.

prepares its members to work collaboratively with other agencies.²³ However, this strategy, while effective at understanding some tactics of other agencies under specific, pre-planned scenarios, is not a comprehensive strategy for improving collaboration. In fact, one fire chief noted, “these drill scenarios become more of a competition between agencies determined to display their own capabilities, rather than an agency deploying its individual resources in support of the joint achievement of incident objectives and strategies.”²⁴

2. Information Sharing

In terms of information sharing in furtherance of collaboration, the FDNY continues to make technology improvements in the areas of communications and incident command within the department. Radios with greater wattage improved the communications between firefighters and commanders at an incident scene. Also, firefighters can now communicate with FDNY EMS personnel at an incident. Additionally, the FDNY built an information-sharing framework that connects members at an incident to commanders in the Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC).²⁵ This link did not exist on 9/11 and greatly improves the flow of information within the department, particularly when the FDOC is being used as a base of operations when multiple incidents occur simultaneously in various parts of the city. FDNY radios also have a frequency on which to communicate with NYPD radios and FDNY chiefs are given an interoperable radio to be used if an incident dictates. However, these are rarely, if ever, used in the initial stages of an incident. Just as interagency drills do not necessarily ensure collaboration, interoperable radios alone do not either. These improvements have been incremental or sustaining and are designed to address specific problems existing on 9/11 and in the years since, such as technological barriers

²³ Fire Department of the City of New York, “FDNY Strategic Plan 2011–2013,” 12.

²⁴ Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 1.

²⁵ Fire Department of the City of New York, “FDNY Counterterrorism and Risk Management Strategy,” 20, December 2011, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/publications/FDNY_ct_strategy_2011_12.pdf.

preventing effective interagency communications.²⁶ However, they do little to address other barriers to collaboration, the problem behind the problem.²⁷ A better radio or interagency drills alone do not solve these problems.

3. Systemic Problem

The emerging problem is that, despite the agencies' recognition of the need for collaboration, difficulty persists at the initial responder level in the early stages of interagency incidents. This problem has not been solved by CIMS, the pre-incident planning and tabletop exercises and drills, or by the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (OEM), the NYC agency charged with creating and overseeing a collaborative emergency response. It has also become clear that the problem is not the lack of technology or the failure to achieve full interoperability. While the vast majority of incidents are resolved without agency disputes, the lack of public conflicts does not signal achievement of interagency synergy. Rather, in the complex system that is emergency response, challenges to collaboration are "largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational."²⁸ This research inquires into the positive effect of swift trust on overcoming those challenges.

4. Complex Systems

Understanding the collaborative capacity of organizations has become increasingly important in an interdependent organizational environment. Homeland security response and other multi-agency responses are complex systems. Complex systems are those with numerous agents or elements interacting with each other and their environment. In complex systems, understanding one element or building block of the

²⁶ Pfeifer, "Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the World Trade Center," 208.

²⁷ Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy* (Routledge, 2010), 4. Kindle edition, 456 of 7633.

²⁸ Larry Wentz, "An ICT Primer Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction," *Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University*, 2, July 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP31%20ICT%20Primer.pdf>.

system does not lead to an understanding of the overall system. The complexity of the system “is determined by the number and diversity of interacting components.”²⁹ Complex systems are also nonlinear. In other words, the system’s future behavior cannot be accurately predicted by the behavior of an individual part of the system.³⁰ Responses to homeland security incidents exhibit the characteristics of complex systems.

These incidents require the response of multiple organizations to achieve organizational goals that no single organization could achieve independently.³¹ Unlike the traditional hierarchical relationships existing within many of the agencies charged with homeland security and emergency response, in these systems, relationships are not defined in a hierarchical intra-agency manner but rather across agency divides. Operating in this complex system has, on occasion, proven difficult for strong, traditionally hierarchical organizations like the FDNY and NYPD.

As difficult as it has proved to address the problems of past incidents, it should be noted that terrorist networks adapt and innovate rapidly to exploit gaps in security and response. Events like the Mumbai attacks in 2008, which involved multiple targets and multiple attack methods including active shooters, explosives, and fires, demonstrate the capabilities of terrorists determined to adapt their tactics in an effort to maximize an attack. While it is essential to attempt to fill in the gaps exposed in past incidents, responder agencies must also demonstrate the capability to innovate within this complex adaptive system to prepare for future incidents. The increased frequency of natural disasters and their cascading effects exhibited in events like Hurricane Katrina and the Fukushima nuclear disaster show that non-terrorist events also require an innovative interagency response.

In incidents like these, first responders become victims of the disaster and departments become unable to respond adequately. In these situations, the close

²⁹ James Jay Carafano, “Complex Systems Analysis—A Necessary Tool for Homeland Security,” *Background: The Heritage Foundation*, no. 2261, April 16, 2009, 2.

³⁰ Philip Anderson, “Complexity Theory and Organization Science,” *Organization Science* 10, no. 3, (May–June 1999): 217.

³¹ Tammy E. Beck, Ph.D., “Understanding Swift Trust in Temporary Interorganizational Relationships” (PhD diss., The University of Texas at San Antonio, 2006), 5.

relationships and collaborative partnerships that may have been built by the local agencies are destroyed by the incident itself. Other responders that come to help must find ways to form new collaborative relationships fast. Most importantly, the complex adaptive system requires that such innovation be done with an understanding of the potential impact on the whole system. Thus, agencies involved in homeland security response must demonstrate a “willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally and by building new mechanisms for interagency and multijurisdictional cooperation.”³²

D. RESEARCH QUESTION

1. Primary Question

What factors influence the formation of swift trust and how can NYC police officers and firefighters utilize what is known about swift trust to improve interagency collaboration during the initial stages of an incident?

2. Secondary Question

Given what is known about swift trust, what effect does the current incident management system, the FDNY and NYPD response policies, and the FDNY’s efforts to improve collaboration have on the creation of swift trust and on collaboration and coordination during the initial stages of an incident?

E. PRIOR RESEARCH

This thesis builds upon the research of several FDNY colleagues. Chief Thomas Currao examined the effect of trust on fostering interagency collaboration. He found that trust acts as a catalyst for interagency collaboration that enhances information sharing and problem solving between agencies.³³ In his work, he briefly mentioned swift trust as another form of trust with possible implications for emergency management. Other

³² John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Networks: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Rand, 2001), 54, <http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/afgjp/padm610/networks%20and%20netwar.pdf>.

³³ Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management.”

colleagues have written theses on collaboration and coordination between the FDNY and NYPD. Chief Joseph Duggan examined NYC's Urban Search and Rescue Team (NY-TF1), which deploys to large incidents outside of NYC and consists of both FDNY and NYPD personnel. He used the NY-TF1 as a case study for improving interagency collaboration between the FDNY and NYPD in NYC.³⁴ Additionally, Captain Sean Newman explored the possibility of combining FDNY and NYPD members into joint "swarm units" to address potential Mumbai style attacks involving active shooters and the use of fire as a weapon.³⁵ Finally, Chief John Esposito and Captain Joseph McGeary examined the shortcomings of CIMS and its potential barriers to collaboration.³⁶ This research adds to the knowledge of interagency collaboration by examining the concept of swift trust and its effect on collaboration among temporary groups.

Swift trust research developed out of research into trust and its influence on organizations. In particular, it grew out of the study of the effectiveness of temporary groups. Researchers first examined the effects of swift trust in the business environment. Businesses and groups partner, merge, and form smaller temporary working groups. Increasingly, workers find themselves collaborating with others in different parts of the country or world. Swift trust allows individuals to collaborate with people with whom they have no prior personal relationship. There has been a particular focus on virtual groups due to the growth of telecommuting and globalization. Additional areas of swift trust research include the study of military organizations and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). Like other organizations, military groups increasingly collaborate with others from different disciplines, or branches of the service.

Finally, this research draws upon and advances the research into organizations and groups. The study of how individuals collaborate within organizations and between

³⁴ Duggan, "The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team."

³⁵ Sean S. Newman, "Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units Facing Paramilitary Terrorism" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=5482>.

³⁶ John M. Esposito, "New York City Fire Department Chief Officer's Evaluation of the Citywide Incident Management System as it Pertains to Interagency Emergency Response" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691272>; Joseph P. McGeary, "Applying Goldwater-Nichols Reforms to Foster Interagency Cooperation Between Public Safety Agencies in New York City" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=471886>.

organizations is beneficial to diagnosing potential problems achieving interagency collaboration. Additionally, swift trust is an area of study with a particular importance to understanding temporary groups. As this thesis demonstrates, firefighters and police officers collaborating at an incident can be viewed as a temporary group, each with individual missions in support of one mission. By understanding the foundations to swift trust in other contexts, the author intends to draw comparisons to the situation existing among emergency responders in NYC. A more thorough review of the literature in these areas follows in Section II.

F. METHODOLOGY

The primary methodology for this research is a review of the existing literature on swift trust and a secondary analysis of previously tested swift trust studies. The author examines studies into swift trust performed in the business, military, and virtual collaboration environments. From that analysis, the author extracts common themes relevant or necessary to the formation or prevention of swift trust. He then applies those common themes to emergency response procedures and policies in NYC to determine the effectiveness of swift trust development among FDNY and NYPD members. Next, he examines the training and procedures used by the FDNY to enhance its collaborative capacity to determine their effect on swift trust. The goal is to identify structures or requirements that could be enacted to form swift trust and improve collaboration.

G. ARGUMENT

Collaboration among agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions is “critical” to homeland security effectiveness.³⁷ The homeland security threat scenarios facing NYC, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and high consequence accidents, require a “task force mindset”³⁸ among the first arriving responders. It is the critical decisions

³⁷ Susan Hovevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas, “Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland Security,” prepared for the Office of Domestic Preparedness, I, November 1, 2004, <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456228>.

³⁸ Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 2; Duggan, “The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team (NY-TF1), 42.

made at the early stages of an incident that can have the greatest positive or negative impact on the overall emergency response. To understand the foundation of collaborative relationships among NYC first responders from different agencies, this thesis examines the concept of “swift trust.”³⁹

Numerous studies have examined trust and its role in fostering collaboration.⁴⁰ Trust can take a variety of forms, including institutional trust, organizational trust, and trust in leadership. However, swift trust is a unique form of trust that occurs between groups or individuals brought together in temporary teams to accomplish specific tasks, often under time constraints.⁴¹ Individuals tasked to work together require an initial level of trust.⁴² Swift trust deals with issues of uncertainty, vulnerability, risk, and expectations.⁴³ The research found various factors that can enhance or prevent the formation of swift trust, and thus, affect collaboration.

Interagency emergency incidents bring together responders from various agencies to accomplish complex tasks, often under severe time constraints. These types of responses require interagency coordination and collaboration. Collaboration is the act of joining together with another for a purpose. Coordination is harmonizing actions in furtherance of a purpose. In these scenarios, emergency responders representing separate organizations exhibit the characteristics of temporary groups working towards individual goals in support of an overall mission. These inter-organizational groups exhibit characteristics in which swift trust may be a useful concept. By examining the mechanisms through which swift trust forms, NYC first responders and their agencies can take specific actions to develop and enhance swift trust and improve collaboration at the first responder level. Additionally, swift trust provides a flexible framework through

³⁹ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 166.

⁴⁰ Ibid.; Kurt T. Dirks and Donald L. Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings,” *Organizational Science* 12, no. 4 (July–August 2001), <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/openurl?volume=12&date=2001&spage=450&issn=10477039&issue=4>; Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks.”

⁴¹ Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 4.

⁴² Clara Popa, “Initial Trust Formation in Temporary Small Task Groups: Testing a Model of Swift Trust” (Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, May 2005), 2.

⁴³ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 167.

which disparate groups can work together. Among the improvements needed to form swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD are better and more frequent initial interactions and communication among the responders, identifying clear roles and assigning tasks early in an incident, formulating a team approach to interagency incidents, and transforming the organizational cultures from ones suspicious of others to ones willing to work across agency boundaries.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

It has become increasingly clear that emergency response in the 21st century requires collaboration. The need for collaboration is generally assumed at large-scale interagency incidents because it “enhances the probability of mission completion by leveraging dispersed resources.”⁴⁴ Collaboration benefits organizations by reducing costs, improving relationships, streamlining delivery of services, and improving information sharing. To improve the collaborative capacity of emergency response agencies, it is essential to examine the factors that influence collaboration. Numerous researchers argue that trust is a factor that benefits collaboration.⁴⁵ However, traditional forms of trust often take time to build, which is often not possible in the initial phases of emergency responses. Due to the unique nature of emergency response, this review examines the literature on swift trust and its influence on collaboration.

B. BACKGROUND

Trust has many definitions and has been described as a reliance or confidence in the integrity or ability of a person or thing.⁴⁶ Distrust is defined as suspicion of one’s integrity, agenda, or capabilities. Trust places the trustor in a vulnerable state based on the belief that the person or group being trusted is competent, open, concerned, and reliable.⁴⁷ Another definition focuses not on the vulnerability of the trustor, but the reliability of the trustee. It states that trust “is a judgment or a confidence estimate that an

⁴⁴ Gail Fann Thomas, Susan Page Hocevar, and Erik Jansen, “A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an Interagency Context,” Naval Postgraduate School, 2, September 25, 2006, <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=469721>.

⁴⁵ Dirks and Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings”; Mishra, “Organizational Responses to Crisis”; Bill McEvily, Vincenzo Perrone, and Akbar Zaheer, “Trust as an Organizing Principle,” *Organization Science* 14, no. 1 (January–February 2003).

⁴⁶ Stephen M. R. Covey, *The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 5; Piotr Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.

⁴⁷ Mishra, “Organizational Responses to Crisis,” 265; Denise M. Rousseau et al., “Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust,” *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 395.

organization or a person is going to act in a predictable way.”⁴⁸ Issues of trust affect everyone’s personal and professional lives. Trust has been studied from perspectives of anthropology, sociology, social psychology, economics, and political science.⁴⁹ In addition to the varying fields that study trust, there are varying types of trust to be studied. Some of these subgroups applicable to collaboration include institutional trust, interpersonal trust, and inter-organizational trust.

Institutional trust is “trust that develops when individuals must generalize their personal trust to large organizations made up of individuals with whom they have low familiarity, low interdependence, and low continuity of interaction.”⁵⁰ Interpersonal trust has been described as a mediator between people.⁵¹ It is trust between individuals, which is usually developed over time from numerous past interactions.⁵² Inter-organizational trust is often an outgrowth of interpersonal trust in which individuals with interpersonal trust represent different organizations and transfer the trust they developed between themselves to the others’ organization.

C. TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS

A significant amount of research into trust and its effects on organizations has been conducted. Scholars agree that trust benefits organizations. Some have observed that trust results in positive direct benefits, such as better attitudes and improved performance

⁴⁸ Eugene J. Webb, “Trust and Crisis,” in *Trust in Organizations*, ed. Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 1996), 290.

⁴⁹ Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory*, ix; Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” 115.

⁵⁰ Abdo Nahmod, “The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY, and EMS in New York City: A Focus on the First Line Officer” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=27182>, quoting Roy J. Lewicki and Barbara Benedict Bunker, “Trust in Relationships: A Model of Development and Decline,” in *Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice*, ed. Barbara B. Bunker and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1995).

⁵¹ Ban Al-Ani and David Redmiles, “Trust in Distributed Teams: Support Through Continuous Coordination,” *IEEE Software* 26, no. 6 (November–December 2009).

⁵² Thomas Foulquier and Claude Caron, “Towards a Formalization of Interorganizational Trust Networks for Crisis Management,” Presented at the 7th International ISCRAM Conference, May 2010, http://www.iscram.org/ISCRAM2010/Papers/106-Foulquier_etal.pdf.

among employees.⁵³ Others argue that trust creates conditions under which positive outcomes, like collaboration among groups, can occur.⁵⁴ McEvily et al. found trust to generate efficiencies by “conserving cognitive resources, lowering transaction costs, and simplifying decision making.”⁵⁵ Dirks found that trust was a mediating variable between motivation and group performance.⁵⁶ Trust was also found to be an important element of team building.⁵⁷ It also enables individuals and organizations to address conflicts more efficiently and with less tension.⁵⁸

Trust provides a variety of benefits to inter-organizational relationships as well. Important to this research, trust has been shown to influence an organization’s intention to collaborate.⁵⁹ Trust also lessens the time and effort needed to cooperate.⁶⁰ Further research on trust suggests it has a positive influence on learning between collaborative partners.⁶¹ In terms of direct effects on collaboration, and of particular importance to emergency responders, trust is important in facilitating communication and information sharing between groups and individuals.

⁵³ Roderick M. Kramer, “Trust and Distrust in Organizations,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 50 (February 1999).

⁵⁴ Dirks and Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings,” 455.

⁵⁵ McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, “Trust as an Organizing Principle,” 99.

⁵⁶ Kurt T. Dirks, “The Effects of Interpersonal Trust on Work Group Performance,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 84, no. 3 (June 1999).

⁵⁷ Popa, “Initial Trust Formation in Temporary Small Task Groups,” 4.

⁵⁸ Akbar Zaheer, Bill McEvily, and Vincenzo Perrone, “Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance,” *Organization Science* 9, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 144, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/openurl?volume=9&date=1998&spage=141&issn=10477039&issue=2>.

⁵⁹ Jakki Mohr and Robert Spekman, “Characteristics of Partnership Success: Partnership Attributes, Communication Behavior, and Conflict Resolution Techniques,” *Strategic Management Journal* 15, no. 2 (February 1994); Beck, “Understanding Swift Trust in Temporary Interorganizational Relationships,” 10.

⁶⁰ Beck, “Understanding Swift Trust in Temporary Interorganizational Relationships,” 10.

⁶¹ Daniel Z. Levin and Rob Cross, “The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating Role of Trust in Effective Knowledge Transfer,” *Management Science* 50, no. 11 (November 2004); Mark Dodgson, “Learning, Trust, and Technological Collaboration,” *Human Relations* 46, no. 1 (January 1993): 91, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/30047959?seq=4>.

D. SWIFT TRUST IN TEMPORARY GROUPS

Another area of scholarship focuses on trust and its effects on temporary groups. Business and government organizations combine individuals with differing skill sets and backgrounds to solve problems. In these temporary systems, tasks and personnel are usually less well known than in more stable systems.⁶² They also involve people with little or no history of working together.⁶³ These temporary groups bring to light social factors that foster or hinder collaboration.⁶⁴ Although trust has been studied extensively, the concept of swift trust is still relatively new. Swift trust appears to have applicability to emergency responders facing interagency incidents requiring collaboration.

The traditional understanding of trust views it as something that takes time to develop and strengthen.⁶⁵ However, research into temporary groups and systems identified a large degree of trust early in relationships.⁶⁶ Goodman and Goodman first studied temporary group behavior and found it to presuppose trust despite no existent history of trust development.⁶⁷ This phenomenon was later expanded upon and identified as swift trust, which occurs between temporary groups or individuals brought together in temporary teams to accomplish specific goals.⁶⁸ Meyerson et al. built upon the research into temporary groups by identifying social constraints and resources in temporary systems that allow trust to form.⁶⁹ In these cases, temporary group behaviors presuppose trust and “act as if trust were present, but their histories seem to preclude its development.”⁷⁰

⁶² Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 158.

⁶³ Goodman and Goodman, “Some Management Issues in Temporary Systems,” 495.

⁶⁴ Popa, “Initial Trust Formation in Temporary Small Task Groups,” 3.

⁶⁵ Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships,” 118.

⁶⁶ McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany, “Initial Trust Formation in New Organizational Relationships,” 480.

⁶⁷ Goodman and Goodman, “Some Management Issues in Temporary Systems,” 494.

⁶⁸ Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 4.

⁶⁹ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 168.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 167.

The authors identified the following characteristics of temporary groups or systems with the potential for swift trust development.

- “Participants with diverse skills are assembled by a contractor to enact expertise they already possess.
- Participants have limited history working together.
- Participants have limited prospects of working together again in the future.
- Participants often are part of limited labor pools and overlapping networks.
- Tasks are often complex and involve interdependent work.
- Tasks have a deadline.
- Assigned tasks are non-routine and not well understood.
- Assigned tasks are consequential.
- Continuous interrelating is required to produce an outcome.”⁷¹

Meyerson et al. argue that by managing issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk, and expectations, swift trust develops. The concept of swift trust takes trust out of the personal form and focuses it on actions or tasks. Swift trust becomes a strategy for groups or individuals to manage vulnerability based on their roles rather than interpersonal relationships that have not had time to form. The authors put forth several propositions to increase the likelihood of swift trust among temporary groups. They argue that swift trust is more likely to develop when individuals working together are drawn from smaller labor pools, interact based upon their roles within the group, and understand and work within their roles.⁷²

1. Team Identity and Trust

Dr. Roxanne Zolin studied swift trust and the difficulty in communication and collaboration among U.S. military forces, multinational forces, and NGOs engaged in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTR). Her research revealed that national, organizational, and cultural differences were not the only

⁷¹ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 169.

⁷² Ibid., 181.

impediment to effective collaboration.⁷³ She argued that an “initial condition for swift trust is that participants perceive that they belong to the temporary team.”⁷⁴ Zolin concluded that if members of the temporary team were drawn from organizations or labor pools too large, swift trust formation would be unlikely.⁷⁵ She argued that in such cases, group members would not perceive themselves as part of a team, know each other, have the same colleagues, or anticipate working together in the future.

In this point, Zolin differs somewhat from Meyerson et al. who argued that members of temporary groups need not have worked together in the past or have the possibility of working together in the future to develop swift trust.⁷⁶ While Meyerson et al.’s argument that swift trust development did not require past or future work relationships, there was consensus with Zolin’s conclusion that the smaller the labor pool from which a temporary group is drawn, the easier it is for swift trust to develop as there would exist a greater chance of interacting with an individual in the future. That possible future interaction increased the likelihood of swift trust development in the first interaction as an individual’s reputation as someone trustworthy would follow this person.

2. Role Clarity and Trust

Another factor identified as important to the formation of swift trust is role clarity. Swift trust in temporary groups is facilitated by “establishing and communicating clear roles within the team.”⁷⁷ In temporary systems, strangers build trust faster by dealing with each other through their roles rather than through personal relationships. Uncertainty is muted as expectations are more stable and defined in terms of tasks and expertise.⁷⁸ Reducing uncertainty is important as uncertainty results in a reluctance to trust.⁷⁹ When

⁷³ Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 3.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 167.

⁷⁷ Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 4.

⁷⁸ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 173.

⁷⁹ Popa, “Initial Trust Formation in Temporary Small Task Groups,” 14.

studying trust among soldiers, Colonel Christopher Paparone similarly found that among the variables upon which swift trust is built is role clarity.⁸⁰ Similarly, McEvily et al. identified reducing role redundancy as a way to increase trust within organizations.⁸¹ Meyerson also posited, “blurring of roles will lead to a slower build of trust.”⁸²

3. Organizational Culture and Trust

Several authors have argued that trust between groups or individuals is influenced by the organizational cultures those individuals represent. Organizational culture has been described as a community built on shared interests and obligations.⁸³ An organization, influenced by its philosophy and the values of its leaders, makes choices that come to define its culture.⁸⁴ Members learn these sets of shared assumptions and beliefs and consider them valid. These beliefs are then taught to new members of the organization and the culture becomes more ingrained.⁸⁵ Trust forms more easily between members of the group with these shared beliefs as they can be relied on to act consistent with these beliefs.⁸⁶ Alternatively, individuals tend to distrust those outside the organization and its culture because uncertainty exists as to how they will act in a given circumstance. Additionally, the more the organization creates a climate of trust within its organization, the better the conditions for swift trust to grow in the temporary group.⁸⁷

⁸⁰ Christopher R. Paparone, “The Nature of Soldierly Trust,” *Military Review* 82, no. 6 (November/December 2002): 48, <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/225317990/1344A85BD66272433D9/1?accountid=12702>.

⁸¹ McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, “Trust as an Organizing Principle,” 96.

⁸² Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 181.

⁸³ Rob Goffee and Gareth Jones, “What Holds The Modern Company Together?” *Harvard Business Review* 74, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 134.

⁸⁴ Pierre A. Balthazard, Robert A. Cooke, and Richard E. Potter, “Dysfunctional Culture, Dysfunctional Organization: Capturing the Behavioral Norms That Form Organizational Culture and Drive Performance,” *Journal of Managerial Psychology* 21, no. 8 (2006): 715, http://www.divisionescolpsic.org/organizacional/articulos-docs/Dysfun_culture_drive%20perfor.pdf.

⁸⁵ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 17.

⁸⁶ Nahmod, “The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY, and EMS in New York City,” 16.

⁸⁷ Peder Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” *Team Performance Management* 17, no. 7/8 (2011): 357.

Paparone described U.S. Army culture as an impediment to swift trust, particularly regarding the changing nature of the soldiers' work, and the history and culture of the organization. In *The Nature of Soldierly Trust*, Paparone describes the complex contemporary operating environment of soldiers and the need for the Army to adjust to these new complexities. Soldiers often find themselves working with soldiers from other units, law enforcement personnel, and relief workers from NGOs. The environment into which soldiers are thrust requires that they quickly establish working relationships with individuals, teams, and groups who are strangers to one another. According to Paparone, trust between the Army and other organizations, in furtherance of common objectives, is not part of the organization's culture, which makes working with these groups more difficult.⁸⁸ Meyerson et al. also identified the issue of organizational culture as a factor affecting swift trust or swift distrust.⁸⁹ They found that in temporary systems "organizational culture, industry recipes, and cultural identity-based stereotypes" drive perceptions.⁹⁰

The lack of trust resulting from organizational culture has been identified as a cause preventing collaboration among emergency responders as well. In examining the failure of emergency response agencies to collaborate, Donahue and Tuohy argued that a culture of distrust exists between many of these organizations, and the lack of trust makes them either unable or unwilling to collaborate.⁹¹ The authors argued that the greater the significance of the incident, such as a major disaster or homeland security related incident, the greater the problems of trust, commitment to collaborate, and competition among emergency response agencies.⁹²

⁸⁸ Paparone, "The Nature of Soldierly Trust," 46.

⁸⁹ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, "Swift Trust and Temporary Groups," 182.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy, "Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How Can We Learn From Them," *Homeland Security Affairs* II, no. 2 (July 2006): 6, <http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.2.4>.

⁹² Ibid.

4. Trust and Communication

Researchers identified trust as a factor influencing an effective interagency federal response at the Pentagon on 9/11.⁹³ In comparing the responses to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, they noted greater interagency collaboration present at the Pentagon.⁹⁴ In contrast, the emergency response agencies in New York City lacked the ability to collaborate adequately during the initial response.⁹⁵ The literature identifies trust as a factor important to information sharing. This trust is vitally important as “coordinated action among a disparate group of actors depends fundamentally on their access to timely, valid information...” and the need for collaboration intensifies as the number of organizations involved increases and the incident grows.⁹⁶ Similarly, FDNY Assistant Chief Joseph Pfeifer argued that building a “synergistic approach” to emergency response at interagency incidents requires the free flow of information among the different groups.⁹⁷ Mishra also found that trust had a moderating effect on collaboration by increasing the “communication of undistorted, truthful, or candid information.”⁹⁸

E. CONCLUSION

This literature review presented some of the scholarship on trust, swift trust, and the effect trust has on collaboration in general and among first responders. It provides a background to understanding the potential relationship between swift trust and collaborative interagency response. It further confirms that there exist many areas of homeland security in which groups and individuals from differing agencies must

⁹³ Louise K. Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism and Other Extreme Events,” *Publius* 32, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 42.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*; *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 314.

⁹⁵ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 285.

⁹⁶ Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism and Other Extreme Events,” 30.

⁹⁷ Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced Responders at the World Trade Center,” 214.

⁹⁸ Mishra, “Organizational Responses to Crisis,” 273.

collaborate to accomplish tasks when emergency responders become simultaneously dependent on each other and vulnerable to each other's actions and decisions, and where trust is a relevant factor.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, "Trust As an Organizing Principle," 92–93.

III. SWIFT TRUST STUDIES

Researchers conducted several studies to examine the formation of swift trust and the effectiveness of swift trust in temporary working groups. The studies examined in this section represent contexts other than emergency response. The author has chosen examples of temporary groups from the military/NGOs, business, and global team (or virtual) collaboration perspectives. Drawn from this research are several themes that serve as foundations for swift trust development. Section IV discusses NYC's interagency response policies, procedures, and training to test the application of swift trust to emergency response in NYC.

A. MILITARY GROUPS

The contemporary roles and responsibilities of the U.S. military often require establishing working relationships with other groups with whom they have no previous personal or work experience. These groups include joint missions involving distinct military units, both within and between service branches, National Guard interaction with state and local authorities, and relief missions and projects involving military coordination with NGOs. Military leadership understands and emphasizes the necessity of working across agency boundaries. In recent years, the military has seen a shift both in the growing number and complexity of ad hoc teams formed on the ground for specific missions¹⁰⁰ and the non-combat SSTR operations.¹⁰¹ This new reality is reflected in the development and education of military leaders. For instance, the U.S. Army Leadership Field Manual states, "Strategic leaders focus research and development efforts on achieving joint, interagency, and multinational synergy for success."¹⁰² The military emphasizes joint operations to such an extent that officers who have not completed a joint duty assignment are precluded from promoting to the Brigadier General or Flag Staff

¹⁰⁰ Paparone, "The Nature of Soldierly Trust," 46.

¹⁰¹ Zolin, "Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks," 1.

¹⁰² United States Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, Army Leadership 6-22, (FM 22-100), 12-50, October 2006, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm6-22.pdf>.

positions.¹⁰³ In the interdisciplinary environment in which the military now works, researchers have begun to examine swift trust and its effectiveness in military groups.

1. Unit Cohesion

For years, the concept of cohesion has been widely accepted as either indicative of or responsible for a military unit's success.¹⁰⁴ However, as noted above, modern day military needs and structures may not provide the time and stability for the development of unit cohesion. Yet researchers found that when these traditional frameworks were broken up, new ones replaced them that allowed units, created ad hoc, to work effectively together. One group of researchers, embedded with the Israeli military, studied the formation of swift trust on temporary Israeli combat teams during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. At the time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were caught off guard by the size and military power of the Palestinian forces in the occupied territory.¹⁰⁵ Controlling the settlements and roadways required a reorganization and deployment of military units. The researchers conducted a qualitative study of these newly formed teams and found these "instant units" formed trust and worked effectively due to several factors.

The researchers observed the first meeting between members of the differing teams to be crucial. The meeting, usually brief due to the exigent circumstances of the need for an ad hoc combat team in the first place, included the exchange of names, group affiliation, experience, task assignments, and division of labor.¹⁰⁶ It usually occurred through private conversations between commanders of constituent units. These initial brief conversations reduced the uncertainty always present between groups with no previous relationship. One IDF commander noted the uncertainty that exists when joined together with a new group or individual, saying, "When you don't know, it worries you.

¹⁰³ 10 USC 619(a), (1986); McGeary, "Applying Goldwater-Nichols Reforms to Foster Interagency Cooperation," 156.

¹⁰⁴ Uzi Ben-Shalom, Zeev Lehrer, and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Cohesion During Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," *Armed Forces and Society* 32, no. 1 (October 2005): 63–64, <http://afs.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/32/1/63>.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 66.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 73.

You don't know what his capabilities are, what he knows."¹⁰⁷ Since time pressures hindered team members from developing first hand information regarding each other, these temporary groups formed "stereotypical impressions" based on "category-driven information,"¹⁰⁸ which often included the reputations of their individual unit and the organization from which they came. In addition to providing an initial orientation, the researchers found that reputations and the possibility of future interaction also served as a motivating factor to trust and be trustworthy as one's reputation would follow with future interactions.¹⁰⁹ Another interesting finding from this study was that trust formed and the group's ability to manage uncertainty grew as the temporary group accomplished small tasks. This also had a cascading effect as trust between team members over less critical tasks spread into more meaningful operational matters.¹¹⁰

Other interrelated factors contributing to swift trust in these groups included a willingness to share knowledge and learn from a different group. Similarly, the researchers found more trusting behavior between commanders and individuals with specialized expertise. A recognition of and deference to professional expertise existed regardless of military rank or overall command of the operation. Additionally, the researchers found that trust grew when tasks were assigned in a way that did not discriminate against a particular group, both in terms of the number of assignments and the quality of assignments. Lastly, they found that although groups differed, they were able to create a commonality using standard procedures and communication.¹¹¹ They argued that such standardization is a way to "institutionalize" swift trust as new members of the group or team will already know and utilize the same procedures and language.

¹⁰⁷ Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari, "Cohesion During Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," 73.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 74.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 76.

2. Team Identity

While the above study involved IDF members from different units, another study examined swift trust in temporary teams formed across organizational boundaries. In this study, the researcher collected data from U.S. and foreign military officers with experience working in SSTR groups to determine whether swift trust formed and how organizational culture affected swift trust.¹¹² The researcher also conducted interviews of individuals from organizations that responded to Hurricane Katrina, as well as participants in the Strong Angel III Disaster Response Demonstration that was designed to replicate a flu pandemic.¹¹³ This study found that workers in these cross-agency groups had difficulty establishing trust due to “perceived differences in organizational goals, strongly held negative organizational stereotypes of the other organizations, and perceived ideological differences.”¹¹⁴ It noted that swift trust could facilitate collaboration among military forces and NGOs if the individuals quickly perceive themselves to be part of a team. However, the research revealed this was unlikely to happen in these situations. The individuals forming these temporary SSTR teams were drawn from large organizations including the U.S. military, foreign militaries, and NGOs, which was found to be too large a labor pool and individual members could not view their new temporary group as a team.¹¹⁵ Additionally, this research revealed that the cohesiveness and culture of military teams make it difficult to develop trust with other organizations.¹¹⁶

3. Organizational Culture

While not a scientific study, a subject matter expert identified similar organizational cultural issues preventing swift trust between the military and other

¹¹² Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 5.

¹¹³ Strong Angel III, “Integrated Disaster Response Demonstration: Final Report” (2006), http://faculty.nps.edu/dl/hfn/documents/strong_angel_iii_exeecom_report_secdef_nov_06.pdf.

¹¹⁴ Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 7.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 5.

agencies. U.S. Army Colonel Christopher Paparone found that while trust between soldiers has always been high, “trusting other agencies in the pursuit of common objectives is certainly not a strength of Army culture.”¹¹⁷ Paparone writes that swift trust in the military arises out of crisis. He argues that swift trust’s development is based upon several variables. Among those are reputation, perceptions of trustworthiness, the prospect of future interaction, and role clarity.¹¹⁸

Paparone also describes several negative influences on the development of trust between military group members that he terms betrayals. The betrayals of swift trust include contract type, communication type, and competence type.¹¹⁹ In the first situation, contract type, groups or individuals betray expectations and boundaries that would involve a situation in which a group agrees to do something or abide by agreed upon rules, and fails to do it. The second, communication type, involves negatively impacting information sharing, feedback, and problem solving. Finally, competence betrayals involve disrespecting another’s skills or knowledge.¹²⁰

Paparone recommended that the Army continue training its members in inter-organizational activities. However, he also recommended the Army urge other organizations to participate in combined group training sessions.¹²¹ Most importantly, he recommended that leaders find ways to allow greater input into trust and inter-organizational activities from the bottom up. In his view, unit leaders have the most experience dealing with these issues of trust and are best suited to provide potential solutions.

4. Swift Trust in Leaders

Another study focused on factors that benefit or do not benefit the development of swift trust in leaders of temporary military groups. It consisted of surveying 591 military

¹¹⁷ Paparone, “The Nature of Soldierly Trust,” 46.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 52.

officers and cadets in Norway and Sweden regarding their experience working in temporary groups, the effectiveness of the groups, and the attributes of the group leaders.¹²² The results were divided into two categories that affected swift trust in leaders, individual-related characteristics and relationship-related characteristics. The individual characteristics were represented in personal characteristics of the leader including that individual's experience and competence. The relationship characteristics included communication, management style, and leadership. A similar number of positive responses occurred between the two categories; however, twice as many negative responses were received for relationship-related characteristics. The study found that leaders who met regularly and communicated consistently had a more positive impact on swift trust,¹²³ which is consistent with the previous studies' findings of the importance of communication to swift trust.

5. Swift Trust in Military Groups—Themes

- Swift trust formation is affected by perceptions of different organizational goals.
- Organizational culture of military affects swift trust negatively.
- Negative perceptions of other organizations hinder swift trust formation.
- Swift trust is enhanced by action-based tasks.
- Swift trust grows as small tasks are accomplished.
- Swift trust is more easily developed when based on subject matter expertise.
- Swift trust can be affected by the equitable distribution of group assignments, both in terms of the number of assignments and the quality of assignments.
- Swift trust may be less likely if temporary group members are drawn from large labor pools.
- The prospect of future interaction makes swift trust more likely.
- Initial meetings between team leaders to identify roles and assigns tasks increases swift trust.

¹²² Hyllengren et al., "Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups."

¹²³ Ibid., 362.

- Standardizing procedures and utilizing common language institutionalizes swift trust.
- Leaders positively influence swift trust development through regular, consistent communication with the temporary group.

B. BUSINESS GROUPS

Much of the research into swift trust and temporary groups has focused, not surprisingly, in the private sector. Companies in a variety of industries are experiencing uncertainty due to economic conditions, information technologies, and changing corporate structures. Businesses engage in partnering, joint ventures, mergers, and other work arrangements to enhance profitability. These inter-organizational relationships deal with issues of trust. Professor Terry Adler studied the importance of trust and distrust in the formation of business agreements.¹²⁴ He developed the Swift Trust Exercise to give business students experience in managing trust in a team environment. The exercise participants form contracts and other business agreements based upon their perceptions, team dynamics, and reputations of potential future business partners. Since contracts are agreements between two or more groups to perform certain duties, teams developing contract requirements do so based on perceptions of trust and distrust of the other groups.

1. Swift Trust Exercise

Adler's Swift Trust Exercise assigned the participants into four teams consisting of five to eight people. Each team was given a scenario in which it was a business entity entering into an agreement with another. The scenarios develop further as the teams must draft work statements and define their partnerships. The scenarios give the teams various details about their prospective partners. The information varies depending on the team but describes details that can be positive, negative, or purposefully vague. In this way, the

¹²⁴ Terry R. Adler, "The Swift Trust Partnership: A Project Management Exercise Investigating the Effects of Trust and Distrust in Outsourcing Relationships," *Journal of Management Education* 29, no. 5 (October 2005), <http://jme.sagepub.com/content/29/5/714>.

researcher creates four general groups of teams, representing low trust/low distrust, high trust/low distrust, low trust/high distrust, and high trust/high distrust, based on the Lewicki et al. framework. (See Table 1).

High Trust Characterized by Hope Faith Confidence Assurance Initiative	High-value congruence Interdependence promoted Opportunities pursued New initiatives	Trust but verify Relationships highly segmented and bounded Opportunities pursued and down-side risks/vulnerabilities continually monitored
	2 4 1 3	
Low Trust Characterized by No hope No faith No confidence Passivity Hesitance	Casual acquaintances Limited interdependence Bounded, arms-length transactions Professional courtesy	Undesirable eventualities expected and feared Harmful motives assumed Interdependence managed Preemption; best offense is a good defense Paranoia
	Low Distrust Characterized by No fear Absence of skepticism Absence of cynicism Low monitoring No vigilance	High Distrust Characterized by Fear Skepticism Cynicism Wariness and watchfulness Vigilance

Table 1. Integrating Trust and Distrust: Alternative Social Realities¹²⁵

For instance, the low trust/low distrust group attempts to work with an organization with which it has no previous relationship and little information on which to base decisions. The high trust/high distrust team is contracting with an organization it knows to be extremely competent based on past experiences. However, it is also aware of

¹²⁵ Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, "Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities."

some negative attributions of the group. The high trust/low distrust group is working with a known, competent firm with a good reputation. While the low trust/high distrust group is dealing with an organization it believes is trying to exploit it.

The exercise highlights several key issues affecting swift trust. Among those are perception, distrust, competition, differing organizational goals, and leadership. In the exercise, a team manager leads each team and decisions are made based upon the perceptions formed by the information provided. The exercise enhances understanding of perception and its relation to trust and distrust. Adler demonstrates that perceptions of trust or distrust of the potential future business partner influence the actions taken toward the other group, specifically the contracts formed. Hard contracting makes the contract requirements explicit and is more likely in high distrust perceptions. In these instances, teams perceive their potential partner to have differing goals, motives, and concerns. Therefore, in the groups with high distrust, contracts were defined in detail.¹²⁶ High distrust conditions are also more likely to escalate disputes between the parties. Additionally, these groups made caveats to their agreements, which allowed them to verify the potential partner's work prior to fulfilling their duties. In high trust perceptions, soft contracting was more likely and requirements were less stringent, more informal, and offered more opportunities for conflict resolution.¹²⁷ In these cases, teams perceived their potential partner to be trustworthy and felt assured their organizational goals did not conflict.

The Swift Trust Exercise also examines swift trust between partners who have a competitive relationship. Exercise participants must consider the trust they put in a partner who may also be a competitor. In these cases, competitiveness increases distrust, which makes the participants wary of the partner group. Therefore, in these inter-organizational settings, simultaneous issues of trust and distrust arise.¹²⁸ Another interesting result of Adler's exercise is that it demonstrated that trust perceptions involved both individuals and the teams as a group. Each group had a team manager who

¹²⁶ Adler, "The Swift Trust Partnership," 726.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 717.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 715.

integrated the varying individual trust perceptions into a team trust perception.¹²⁹ Organizations often realign individual perception or behavior to the group or team perception or behavior. Understanding how group perceptions of trust are formed and how an individual's perception can be changed to conform to the group is important to the study of swift trust in temporary groups.

2. Swift Trust in Business Groups—Themes

- Group and individual perceptions influence swift trust.
- Trust perceptions of individuals can be altered to align with the group perception.
- Groups sometimes manage both a collaborative and competitive relationship.
- High distrust leads to hard agreements or requirements for each party to follow.
- High distrust is more likely to escalate disputes between the parties.
- Low distrust leaves open the possibility for handling disagreements informally.
- Group leaders influence and align individual group members' trust perceptions with the group trust perception.

C. VIRTUAL GROUPS

Globalization and the interconnectedness of people and businesses create linkages between organizations previously unseen. Management and employees are distributed geographically, requiring a new understanding of work relationships. Virtual teams provide a solution to the pressures to increase flexibility and responsiveness while decreasing costs in dynamic business environments.¹³⁰ These collaborations exhibit many of the same challenges of other temporary work groups and the research into these settings suggests that swift trust is possible, but fragile.

¹²⁹ Adler, "The Swift Trust Partnership," 717.

¹³⁰ Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa and Dorothy E. Leidner, "Communication and Trust in Global Virtual Teams," *Organization Science* 10, no. 6 (November–December 1999): 791.

1. Global Virtual Teams

While this paper explores the difficulty emergency responders have in creating and maintaining trust in face-to-face interactions, swift trust research also explores the challenges presented between members of global virtual teams. Today, companies rely on teams that interact electronically to run their everyday business.¹³¹ These virtual teams evolve in network organizations and develop due to advances in information and communication systems. Virtual teams, like other temporary groups, form rapidly to work on designated tasks with little time for relationship building. They consist of members with differing expertise and representing different cultures, and dissolve when the team goal is accomplished or the need for the team no longer exists. What differentiates these temporary groups is that they work without any face-to-face interaction.

2. Case Study

Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa and Dorothy E. Leidner conducted a study involving 350 graduate students from around the world.¹³² They divided the students into teams consisting of four to six members. The teams were self-managing and charged with three group tasks. The first two assignments lasted one week each and were voluntary. The final project was mandatory and lasted four weeks. The only communication among the team members was through electronic means. The research questions the study attempted to answer include 1) Can trust exist in global virtual teams? 2) How might trust be developed in such teams? 3) What are the communication behaviors that might facilitate the development of trust?

The team members completed surveys of their experience and the researchers reviewed those along with all team communications. Based on these measurements, the researchers divided the teams into four broad categories: those that began the project with low trust and ended with low trust (LoLo), those that began low and ended high (LoHi),

¹³¹ Jarvenpaa and Leidner, "Communication and Trust in Global Virtual Teams," 791.

¹³² Ibid., 795.

those that began high and ended low (HiLo), and those that began high and ended high (HiHi). Twelve teams, three from each category, were then selected for case analysis.

The cases revealed that these temporary teams dealt with issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, and expectations. The researchers found that the teams that ended with low trust (LoLo and HiLo) were less able to deal with these issues than the other teams and, as a result, were generally ineffective. The commonalities observed in the teams that began their project with low initial trust (LoLo and LoHi) included a failure to make social introductions and a lack of enthusiasm or optimism for the group project. The teams that began with higher levels of initial trust (HiLo and HiHi) experienced the opposite, as they were both enthusiastic and engaged in social dialogue from the initial interactions. The groups that ended the project with low levels of trust (LoLo and HiLo) generally had fewer and less predictable communications, negative leadership, and a lack of individual initiative. Also, these teams were unable to cope with the initial task uncertainty and failed to clarify tasks among group members. Interestingly, the teams that began with high levels of trust and ended with low levels (HiLo) started the project with enthusiasm and social dialogue but were unable to transition from social dialogue to more task oriented communication. In contrast, the teams that ended with high levels of trust (LoHi and HiHi) were able to make that transition. They also benefitted from greater and more predictable communication.¹³³ The most effective teams, the ones that began the project with high levels of trust and ended it with high levels (HiHi), started the project with a great deal of excitement and group members were able to view themselves as part of a team.¹³⁴ Also, these groups and the (LoHi) groups communicated messages of encouragement and support for other team members throughout the project, even through setbacks and failures. These groups and the factors that influenced swift trust are identified in Table 2.

¹³³ Jarvenpaa and Leidner, "Communication and Trust in Global Virtual Teams," 807.

¹³⁴ Ibid.




Table 2. Within and Cross-Category Case Analysis¹³⁵

In answering whether the virtual teams exhibited trusting behavior, the study concluded that the trust of the teams that ended the project with higher levels (LoHi and HiHi) might have been swift trust.¹³⁶ They cited consistent communication and the successful transition from personal to action-based trust. The second research question asked how trust might develop in virtual teams. Of the 29 teams used in statistical analysis, only four teams began with low initial trust levels and ended the project with high trust levels. This suggests that the first communications, albeit electronic ones in this case, or the lack of communications, set the tone for how group members interrelated throughout the project.¹³⁷ This result seems consistent with Meyerson et al.'s view that in

¹³⁵ Jarvenpaa and Leidner, "Communication and Trust in Global Virtual Teams."

¹³⁶ Ibid., 810.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

temporary groups, unless trust forms quickly, “one may never trust at all.”¹³⁸ The last part of the study attempted to determine whether communication facilitated trust in the virtual groups. The study found that the teams that identified with higher levels of trust engaged in continuous communication and feedback and were better able to problem solve and resolve conflicts with technical and task uncertainty. The teams that did not become focused on communication of tasks reported low levels of trust at the end of the project, and experienced poor team results.

3. Swift Trust in Virtual Groups—Themes

- Consistent communication makes initial trust more likely.
- Communication that transitions from social to action-based positively influences swift trust.
- Initial communications between group members are vitally important to developing trust.
- Positive leadership and enthusiasm for the group project fostered higher levels of trust.
- Poor initial interactions made trust unlikely later in the group collaboration.
- Substantive feedback and encouragement even through group failures facilitate trust.

D. THEME SUMMARY

Prior studies of the development of swift trust in temporary groups have shown that several factors enhance or hinder the development of swift trust. The following swift trust matrix is a visual representation of those factors.

¹³⁸ Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 192.

1. Swift Trust Matrix

	Military	Business	Virtual
Factors			
Competition	X	X	
Organizational Culture	X	X	
Perception	X	X	
Communication	X	X	X
Initial Interaction	X	X	X
Task Assignment	X		X
Action Based	X		X
Reputation	X	X	
Future Interaction	X	X	
Role Clarity	X	X	X
Team Identity	X	X	X
Contracts		X	
Dispute Resolution		X	
Large Labor Pools	X		
Leader Influence	X	X	X
Standardized Procedures	X	X	

Table 3. Swift Trust Matrix

The researcher conducted a secondary analysis on themes collected from the above studies into swift trust in temporary groups found to affect the formation of swift trust. Prior researchers identified elements that consistently affect swift trust between groups or individuals. The most common themes found in the variety of contexts

examined with relevance to emergency responders include initial interactions of group members, consistent communication, identifying clear roles, forming a team identity, group leader influence, and organizational culture.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. INTERAGENCY RESPONSE IN NYC

Most interagency incidents in NYC are addressed professionally and with some attempt to collaborate and coordinate agency missions. However, barriers exist that prevent seamless collaboration and coordination in every case. Interagency incidents are complex endeavors that require a synergistic response from emergency response agencies.¹³⁹ These incidents “are representative of the complex adaptive systems in which the nation’s first responders must operate.”¹⁴⁰ When responders arrive at the scene of a multi-agency incident, they exhibit the qualities described in much of the research into temporary groups. In these instances, responders focus on accomplishing specific tasks, usually under severe time pressures. They must work through issues of uncertainty and trust that exist when working in groups or teams with which people are unfamiliar. This section analyzes interagency response in NYC and attempts to determine what factors exist that foster or inhibit swift trust consistent with the themes identified for swift trust formation.

B. BACKGROUND

When the author began this research, he described the problem to a police officer friend who works in a mid-sized police department. The friend wondered why such a problem existed as most firefighters and police officers in his jurisdiction had some familiarity and personal interaction with each other. For that reason, some background information on the NYPD and FDNY is necessary. Although often spoken of collectively as “first responders,” some might be surprised to know how little personal interaction police officers and firefighters have in NYC. The lack of familiarity between individual officers and firefighters exists for several reasons. First, the FDNY has approximately

¹³⁹ Duggan, “The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team,” 30.

¹⁴⁰ Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 2.

14,000 uniformed members consisting of fire and EMS personnel.¹⁴¹ The NYPD has approximately 34,500 uniformed members.¹⁴² Personnel transfers and promotions almost always entail moving to new assignments, both in terms of responsibilities and geographic locations within NYC. Additionally, agencies this large generally hire new people and lose veterans to retirement in fairly large numbers. Furthermore, work schedules of the two agencies differ greatly, which prevents individual police officers and firefighters who work in the same neighborhoods from interacting on a consistent basis. For instance, police officers and firefighters work different hours, and have different start and end times for their shifts that add to the infrequency with which individuals may interact. Furthermore, fire company response areas are not geographically aligned with local police precinct response areas. Additionally, attempts at interaction through participation in interagency exercises have marginal value in establishing personal relationships that could be beneficial to traditional trust during an interagency incident. Due to the above reasons, it is unlikely the same individuals who “practiced” together would respond to the actual emergency together. For police officers and firefighters with little personal interaction, attempting to work together in a collaborative way at an incident presents a problem. The themes identified as foundations for swift trust could present a solution.

C. INITIAL COMMUNICATION AND INTERACTION

1. Inability to Communicate

The swift trust studies suggest that a positive initial interaction and communication between group members or their leaders, at the beginning of the group’s formation, is vital to fostering swift trust.¹⁴³ Additionally, continued regular

¹⁴¹ Fire Department of the City of New York, FDNY Vital Statistics, CY 2011, (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/vital_stats_2011.pdf.

¹⁴² New York City Police Department, “FAQ,” (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/faq/faq_police.shtml#1.

¹⁴³ Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari, “Cohesion During Military Operations,” 73.

communication is important for sustaining that trust,¹⁴⁴ which presents a problem at interagency incidents as communication between agencies is problematic for several reasons. In NYC, members of the FDNY and NYPD are sometimes either reluctant or simply unable to communicate with each other early on at an incident scene. This lack of communication creates uncertainty and inhibits swift trust. Types of information often not communicated between agencies include tactical operations already completed or still in need of completion, adequacy of assets and personnel on scene, and tactics chosen to resolve the emergency by the first arriving agency. Additionally, while CIMS directs the agency with a “core competency” in a particular subject matter to give tactical direction to members of other agencies engaged in those operations, that tactical direction between the FDNY and NYPD is rarely given.¹⁴⁵ A larger discussion of this problem follows in a later section of this paper.

The lack of a brief personal interaction or communication at the beginning of an incident also potentially creates a sense of distrust as the lack of information sharing could be viewed as a deliberate attempt to deny the other agency information. The distinction between the reasons for not sharing information is important as the data suggests a perception that information is being deliberately denied or purposefully vague creates high distrust. While the potential exists that the failure to provide information is deliberate, it is just as likely that the reasons are due to no fault of the responders. For instance, first arriving responders might be engaged in tactical operations or they could be unaware that another agency has arrived on scene. Furthermore, the lack of information could result from the lack of interoperable technology or the physical logistics of the incident site. For example, if members of one agency are operating somewhere inside a building or in a subway station, they may have no way to transmit information to the next arriving responders from another agency. Although FDNY radios

¹⁴⁴ Jarvenpaa and Leidner, “Communication and Trust in Global Virtual Teams,” 809.

¹⁴⁵ John M. Esposito, “New York City Fire Department Chief Officer’s Evaluation,” 21.

can communicate with some NYPD radios,¹⁴⁶ firefighters, police officers, or first line supervisors almost never communicate this way during the initial stages of an incident.

2. Inability to Meet

One issue preventing an initial interaction stems from a discrepancy existing during the initial stages of many interagency responses between the number of firefighters and the number of police officers the agencies dispatch. The FDNY sends multiple units to most potential interagency emergencies. The FDNY has a greater capability to utilize manpower to establish command posts and exchange information while not detracting from the simultaneous tactical operation. Each engine company is staffed with an officer (either a Lieutenant or Captain) and four firefighters. Each ladder and rescue company is staffed with an officer and five firefighters. Additionally, a Battalion Chief and firefighter also respond to most interagency incidents. It is not uncommon to have 20 to 30 FDNY members arrive at an incident within four or five minutes of being dispatched. Among those FDNY members is a clearly identifiable Chief Officer who establishes incident command.

In contrast, NYPD patrol units consist of two police officers. The NYPD Emergency Service Units (ESU) are also staffed by two members. ESU officers hold the rank of detective but usually operate in a SWAT/Rescue function rather than an investigative capacity. Generally, NYPD members leave their vehicles unmanned in the vicinity of the incident and proceed to the point of operation. The FDNY always leaves some members outside the building or immediate incident scene, near the fire apparatus. FDNY protocols require regular updates to the FDNY dispatcher, which is primarily accomplished through the radio in the fire truck. The NYPD, on the other hand, leave their vehicles as they communicate with police dispatchers through portable radios. The result is that sometimes fire department units arrive at an incident only to find an unoccupied NYPD vehicle and with no way of obtaining information from the NYPD officers on scene.

¹⁴⁶ Fire Department of the City of New York, *Communications Manual*, FDNY/NYPD TAC “U” Channel, ch. 11, add. 4, November 16, 2005, 1.

Another issue preventing the initial interaction and communication is the discrepancy in ranking officers at a scene. As mentioned above, FDNY responses always include Lieutenants and Captains, and routinely include Battalion Chiefs. NYPD responses to many common interagency incidents rarely include any officer above the rank of Sergeant initially, the equivalent of an FDNY Lieutenant. When the agencies arrive at a scene simultaneously, there is usually no NYPD representative of equivalent rank to the ranking FDNY representative willing or able to take part in a unified command. This discrepancy of who should talk to who creates an awkward situation for members of both agencies. Additionally, as ESU officers are detectives and are under a separate command, an FDNY Lieutenant, Captain, or Chief may potentially be conferring with an NYPD officer or Sergeant who either lacks authority or is unwilling to direct the ESU member's actions.

3. Shortcomings of Unified Command During the Initial Meeting

CIMS requires the establishment of a unified command structure at unified command incidents. Representatives from each agency are directed to determine objectives, strategies, and plans jointly.¹⁴⁷ If the FDNY arrives after another agency is on scene at a unified command incident, the FDNY incident commander is directed to confer with the other agency representative at the established command post.¹⁴⁸ In instances in which the FDNY arrives and a command post has not been established, the FDNY incident commander establishes one, which might seem to indicate a meeting of agency representatives always occurs. However, the NYPD does not establish command posts initially. Furthermore, in the early stages of an incident, it is uncommon for an NYPD officer or Sergeant to approach an FDNY Battalion Chief to establish a unified command.¹⁴⁹ This often leaves the FDNY commander at the command post without an NYPD counterpart after the first arriving members from the NYPD have already

¹⁴⁷ New York City Office of Emergency Management, *Citywide Incident Management System*, April 6, 2005, 24.

¹⁴⁸ Fire Department of the City of New York, *Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) Quick-Guide*, All Unit Circular 276, March 23, 2007, 1–3.

¹⁴⁹ Esposito, "New York City Fire Department Chief Officer's Evaluation," 30–31, 36.

deployed and are engaged in tactical operations. Attempting to build trust and coordinate the plan later in the incident becomes more difficult. Instead, the agencies continue the initial operation by addressing the incident separately, and without communicating and coordinating.

4. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD

As the swift trust studies suggest, a failure to meet and communicate early in a temporary group formation results in temporary group members less likely to form swift trust. In the study of Israeli military groups, the researchers identified the first meeting, albeit brief, between leaders of differing units to be pivotal to establishing trust.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, the study of virtual groups found either no interaction between team members at the beginning of the group project or poor first interactions to be so damaging to trust development that few of the virtual teams were able to progress from low initial trust to high trust.

Communication was also found to be vital to swift trust development. The swift trust exercise demonstrated that continuous communication and verification of their partner groups was effective in building trust and lowering distrust between business partners. The study of virtual teams also demonstrated that the high trust groups were those that communicated regularly. This finding was similar in the study of military groups in which researchers found that communicating even simple tasks early in group settings both established trust and positively influenced trust later during more complicated tasks. Additionally, in military organizations, the lack of communication was seen as an inhibitor or betrayal of trust.¹⁵¹ In applying the swift trust factors of initial meeting and communication to the reality of interagency responses in NYC, one can see the difficulty existing between the FDNY and NYPD in forming swift trust. This is not to suggest that the failure of communication always leads to ineffective results. In fact, most incidents are ultimately handled professionally in spite of a lack of communication or

¹⁵⁰ Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari, "Cohesion During Military Operations," 73.

¹⁵¹ Paparone, "The Nature of Soldierly Trust," 49.

interagency meeting. However, this lack of initial communication makes swift trust less likely, and in cases in which the incidents develop into prolonged or complex endeavors, collaboration and coordination becomes more difficult.

D. ROLE CLARITY

Another area presenting difficulty for the formation of swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD is the establishment of clear roles at interagency incidents. The swift trust data determined clarifying roles early in a project was important to the development of swift trust.¹⁵² Role clarity helps reduce uncertainty that causes the slower build of trust. Identifying clear roles at many interagency incidents in NYC is difficult for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, FDNY and NYPD responders have difficulty seeking out counterparts early in an operation to share information regarding their capabilities or tactics, or to decide on strategies. The initial meeting and communication does not occur and roles are not clearly defined. Instead, units operate independently without communicating their roles or understanding the roles of others, and swift trust is unlikely.

1. Role Redundancy

Second, despite years of complaints and criticism, NYC first responders operate under an incident management system that perpetuates role redundancy. It is unfortunate enough that NYPD and FDNY members fail to communicate their roles and understand the other's, but CIMS only increases the confusion through no fault of the individual responders. For instance, search and rescue is often conducted simultaneously by the FDNY and NYPD, which is common at structural collapses and water rescues. Additionally, groups work independently of each other rather than collaboratively, which results in inefficient and redundant operations. It is not uncommon to have police and fire

¹⁵² Zolin, "Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks," 4.

units operating separately without integrating their search plan or establishing a unified command. In some cases, these incidents even grow into public interagency disputes.¹⁵³

CIMS attempts to define agency roles and responsibilities at various incidents. However, CIMS actually exacerbates collaboration problems by blurring agency roles and capabilities, and encouraging competition by designating command of some incidents to the agency that arrives first regardless of the individual responder's training, equipment, or experience.¹⁵⁴ For instance, an automobile accident requiring extrication of a victim is designated an FDNY/NYPD single command incident (first to arrive).¹⁵⁵ In other words, the agency arriving first commands the incident. However, it does not account for the manpower, capabilities, or equipment of that initial agency on scene. Additionally, while the system is established as a framework for command, it does not, nor could it, clearly delineate operational roles and responsibilities for all scenarios. Unfortunately, a number of incidents occur, most notably scaffold emergencies (requiring rescues) that the document does not clearly identify but fall within the training and capabilities of both the FDNY and NYPD. While the FDNY "core competency" of responsibility for life safety and search and rescue appears to put the FDNY in command of these incidents, and also responsible for giving tactical direction to any other agency involved, the reality is that NYPD ESU officers receive training and equipment to address these as well, which ultimately leads to confusion when both agencies arrive at the incident. The lack of clearly defined roles is an impediment to swift trust, and ultimately, collaboration. As noted in the studies, swift trust is facilitated by "establishing and communicating clear roles within the team"¹⁵⁶

Some argue that redundancy is a good thing because it provides a safeguard. The thinking is that it is better to have both agencies capable of accomplishing the job. This

¹⁵³ Sabrina Ford and Rebecca Harshbarger, "Command Spat at Dangling Scaffold Rescue," *New York Post*, April 14, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/nypd_holds_sway_1MHe59CI0oFKZ3fal0zaNI; Dan Trudeau, "NYPD, FDNY Clash at Site of Rescue for Jamaica Man," *Times Ledger*, July 3, 2003, <http://www.timesledger.com/stories/2003/27/20030703-archive166.html>.

¹⁵⁴ New York City Office of Emergency Management, CIMS: Primary Agency Matrix, Annex A, 4.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Zolin, "Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks," 4.

view was expressed by a former OEM official who stated it was, “better to have two agencies with that go getter, can-do attitude to bring to bear on the kinds of difficult situations that we have in New York City, than to have no agencies that can do that.”¹⁵⁷ This thinking confuses resiliency and duplication.¹⁵⁸ In a resilient system, the redundancy is reserved as a back up to protect against the potential failure of the primary system. When the FDNY and NYPD spend money on the same training and equipment, and then respond to the same incidents at the same time, an unnecessary duplication of services occurs. It is also confusing and demoralizing to the responders who feel they have the training, motivation, and capability to accomplish the task, only to arrive and find another agency doing what they believe to be their primary job. Instead of having a back-up system in place as a protection for the primary system, the FDNY and NYPD role redundancy creates and encourages the two proud agencies to compete for primacy. Competition among agencies is repeatedly cited as a reason for the failure to collaborate.¹⁵⁹ In cases like these, in which a blurring of roles arises, swift trust development is unlikely.

2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD

One of the factors identified as important to swift trust development is establishing clear roles for group members. The virtual collaboration study found that groups with the highest levels of trust established roles for all members. The study into military organizations and NGOs working together in SSTR operations found establishing clear roles necessary for swift trust but difficult to accomplish.¹⁶⁰ That research found that the unpredictable nature of the work and grouping of individuals with different backgrounds and levels of training made establishing clear roles difficult.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 71 (quoting Brad Gair of the NYC OEM).

¹⁵⁸ McGeary, “Applying Goldwater-Nichols Reforms to Foster Interagency Cooperation,” 50. McGeary gives a detailed historical account of the development and implementation of CIMS.

¹⁵⁹ Donahue and Touhy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How Can We Learn From Them,” 6; Pfeifer, “Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the World Trade Center,” 211.

¹⁶⁰ Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 4.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

The FDNY and NYPD face similar problems in this area. Levels of training and experience among responders, both within and between agencies, differ, as do procedures and protocols. In addition, FDNY and NYPD members have the added burden of an incident management system that blurs the roles of responders that ultimately hinders swift trust.

E. TEAM IDENTITY

The swift trust studies also support the notion that swift trust is less likely to develop if groups are unable to create a feeling that the new temporary group is one team with a common mission.¹⁶² They point out that leader enthusiasm for the temporary group and distributing assignments equitably was a factor in establishing the team mindset.¹⁶³ Despite the importance of developing a team approach to interagency incidents, FDNY and NYPD members are ill equipped to establish that mindset early in an incident. The NYPD and FDNY are extremely professional and effective operating independently, and the majority of emergency responses in NYC are within the capabilities of a single agency. Additionally, given the scarcity of large-scale interagency incidents, little practical opportunity exists to develop a cross-agency team mindset. Even at standard interagency incidents, many only see their agency's mission and are unable to view their mission as part of a larger mission. That larger mission is one in which a variety of agency goals may have to be accomplished simultaneously, and without interference from another. The agencies have differing priorities that, at times, conflict. For instance, in the case of a hazardous materials incident, the FDNY is concerned with mitigating the problem, decontaminating people, and treating and transporting injured persons. The NYPD focuses on investigating the incident to determine if a criminal or terrorist connection exists and preserving the scene for evidence collection. Both organizations have important missions that could benefit from a team approach to the problem.

¹⁶² Zolin, "Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks," 4.

¹⁶³ Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari, "Cohesion during Military Operations," 75; Jarvenpaa and Leidner, "Communication and Trust in Global Virtual Teams," 807–08.

1. NYC Urban Search and Rescue Team—NY-TF1

The NIMS, as represented through CIMS, provides a framework through which to view a particular agency's role as part of an overall team mission. However, for the reasons stated earlier, attempting to establish this system early in an interagency incident is difficult. However, some FDNY and NYPD members do work together in teams successfully. The Urban Search and Rescue Team, New York Task Force 1 (NY-TF1), is the only one in the country comprised equally of police officers and firefighters.¹⁶⁴ This group deploys to disasters outside of NYC and forms into search, rescue, and support teams or task forces by mixing members of both agencies based on expertise. Task force leadership is shared and transferred with each deployment. The task force model has proven successful and was studied as a best practice for enhancing NYC interagency collaboration by Battalion Chief Joseph Duggan in his thesis, *The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team: A Case of Interagency Effectiveness*.¹⁶⁵ It is ironic that for police officer and firefighter members of NY-TF1 to work so collaboratively during deployments, they must ignore standard NYC emergency response practices. It should be noted also that when NY-TF1 deploys to an incident, task force leaders meet and roles are clearly defined at the outset.¹⁶⁶

NY-TF1 provides an excellent example of trust between members of a temporary interagency group performing tasks in a coordinated and collaborative fashion that individual components of the group could not accomplish alone. Each task force component is critical to the success of the overall mission and team members “do not operate outside of their assigned role and position.”¹⁶⁷ When the NY-TF1 deploys, roles are established and no duplication of effort occurs. Currently, barriers exist among other members of the FDNY and NYPD in NYC preventing this “one team” approach.

¹⁶⁴ Duggan, “The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team,” 3.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 61.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

To develop a team identity, members must be familiar with the operational abilities of their agency counterparts. Members of the NY-TF1 receive cross training with their counterpart's disciplines. They also operate under standard operating procedures and use standardized equipment, which differs from typical FDNY and NYPD members in NYC who have little knowledge of their counterpart's procedures, equipment, or capabilities. Additionally, unlike interagency incidents in NYC, members of NY-TF1 utilize common language and terms to communicate with colleagues during an emergency incident. Despite direction to refrain from using agency specific language,¹⁶⁸ interagency incidents often involve the use of agency specific jargon and codes foreign to members of other agencies. Additionally, in NYC, safety standards appear to differ between agencies. Safety actions common to FDNY members, such as de-energizing electric power prior to working near energized subway rails or stabilizing vehicles prior to extricating victims, do not seem to be priorities for NYPD ESU members. Perhaps they lack the needed manpower to accomplish these support tasks simultaneously with the rescue tasks. These differences in protocols and procedures prevent the formation of a team identity and inhibit trust and collaboration. As one agency attempts to abide by its agency specific safety protocols, another agency continues with the operation. A team approach to these incidents requires the FDNY and NYPD to follow the same safety protocols, utilize the same procedures, and communicate using the same language at interagency incidents.

2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD

The study of Israeli military units found the standardization of language and procedures enabled swift trust development and, more importantly, began the process of institutionalizing swift trust.¹⁶⁹ These differences may seem small, but they serve to enhance the feeling of unfamiliarity and prevent swift trust formation within the group. Establishing a team identity was integral to the formation of swift trust in several of the studies. In the virtual collaboration study, the groups with the highest levels of trust

¹⁶⁸ Fire Department of the City of New York, *Communications Manual*, Protocol for the Use of Interoperability Frequencies, ch. 11, add. 3, November 16, 2005, 1.

¹⁶⁹ Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari, "Cohesion During Military Operations," 76.

identified with and referred to other members as a “team” and a “family.”¹⁷⁰ One researcher found that participants’ perception that they belong to a new temporary team is an initial condition for swift trust.¹⁷¹ In contrast, the failure to develop a team identity was found to be an inhibitor of swift trust. The study of military units and NGOs found teams had difficulty forming swift trust because they could not perceive a common goal and the individuals involved were drawn from large organizations and likely would not know each other or have any prospects of working together again in the future.¹⁷² Similarly, firefighters and police officers who come together at an emergency incident have different procedures and communication. They sometimes have differing priorities and goals, which makes swift trust formation more difficult as the individuals are less likely to perceive themselves as part of one team.

F. LEADERSHIP

In each of the various swift trust studies explored above, leaders influenced the development of swift trust. Expressing enthusiasm for the temporary team, assigning tasks equitably, communicating clear roles for group members, and providing constructive feedback were all seen as positively influencing swift trust. Whereas expressing negativity toward the group or project, not communicating or interacting with the group, and criticizing publicly without constructive direction were all viewed as hindering swift trust. This situation poses another problem for emergency response in NYC as some in the FDNY feel the interagency protocols, and their enforcement, marginalize FDNY efforts.

1. Negative Trust Perceptions

Many leaders in the FDNY believe the NYPD does not follow interagency protocols consistently.¹⁷³ A survey of FDNY Chiefs recently found that while 86% of

¹⁷⁰ Jarvenpaa and Leidner, “Communication and Trust in Global Virtual Teams,” 807.

¹⁷¹ Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks,” 4.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Esposito, “New York City Fire Department Chief Officer’s Evaluation,” 51. This researcher did not take part in Esposito’s survey of FDNY Chiefs.

those responding to the survey believed the FDNY operated according to interagency protocols most of the time, almost 89% of respondents believed other agencies followed protocols half of the time or less.¹⁷⁴ Additionally, 85% of those responding to the same survey believed the FDNY sometimes received delayed notification to incidents involving multiple agencies.¹⁷⁵ In NYC, calls to 911 are received first by civilian NYPD operators. After an initial screening, notification is made electronically to the fire department dispatchers if fire department response is deemed necessary.¹⁷⁶ This delay in notification could potentially result in longer response times for the FDNY to multi-agency incidents. This delay also further erodes morale and increases negativity as some of these incidents are “first to arrive” single command incidents, and by the time the FDNY arrives, the incident may be resolved by another agency, which is usually the NYPD. If the FDNY Chiefs’ survey represents their feelings or perceptions of interagency incidents, it is likely those perceptions and feelings are transferred to the group as well.

2. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD

In Adler’s swift trust exercise, he found the group leader influenced trust perceptions and aligned individual perceptions of trust to the group perception. According to the recent Chiefs’ survey, a general feeling of distrust exists regarding the interagency incident management system. Additionally, a feeling of encroachment by the NYPD into areas traditionally reserved for the fire service prevails. It is hard for leaders in the FDNY to show enthusiasm for an interagency system many believe to be unfair. The goal of interagency collaboration should be to utilize an agency’s skill and expertise to accomplish a joint mission. However, in some areas, skills overlap. In the NYC emergency response context, this overlap results in competition and suspicion between the NYPD and FDNY. Suspicion of one’s competitor is natural despite whatever hurried

¹⁷⁴ Esposito, “New York City Fire Department Chief Officer’s Evaluation,” 52

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 56.

¹⁷⁶ Sarah Dorsey, “City Appeals Judges Order to Release 911 Report,” *The Chief*, April 20, 2012, http://dc37.net/news/pressclips/2012/pdf/chief_042012_911Report.pdf.

temporary collaboration is being formed.¹⁷⁷ To establish swift trust with a competitor, Adler's swift trust exercise demonstrated the importance of defining agreements. However, if the agreements between partners (in this case CIMS) are violated or too vague, swift trust cannot form. In addition, as the Chiefs' survey suggested, a perception exists that others do not follow the agreement (CIMS). Paparone described this belief as a contract type betrayal of swift trust. This perception of violation of trust, whether true or not, further harms swift trust formation.

G. ORGANIZATIONAL BIAS

Perhaps the biggest impediment to the formation of swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD is organizational bias. Organizational bias has the potential to affect any of the other elements of swift trust negatively. It can preclude communication, role identification, task division, and the team mindset necessary for swift trust. It can also negatively influence leadership to distrust other organizations and transfer that distrust to subordinates. To understand organizational or group bias, it is helpful to understand the foundations to a person's social identity and membership in a group.

1. Social Identity Theory

Under social psychologist Henri Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (SIT), individuals gain positive self-identity through membership in a group, which sometimes results in negative attribution of others not part of the group. He described social identity as "that part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership."¹⁷⁸ Generally, individuals of a particular group seek positive differentiation between themselves and others. Comparisons are made that are more favorable to the in-group and in a way to make them appear better than relevant

¹⁷⁷ Kapucu, Naim, Tolga Arslan, & Mathew Lloyd Collins, "Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to Catastrophic Disasters: Toward Network Centered Approach," *Administration and Society* 42, no. 2 (2010): 225–26, <http://aas.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/42/2/222.full.pdf+html>.

¹⁷⁸ Henri Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology* (Cambridge University Press, 1981), Introduction, 2, 255.

out-groups.¹⁷⁹ This results in a likelihood of positive stereotypes of the in-group and negative stereotypes of the out-group. Not surprisingly, this makes swift trust formation between the groups difficult. Zolin described the difficulty forming swift trust and establishing interpersonal working relationships between U.S. military organizations and NGOs due to negative stereotypes of the other organizations.¹⁸⁰

The in-group shares an organizational culture generally regarded as a set of shared assumptions and beliefs that members of an organization learn and consider valid. Trust is formed more easily between members of the in-group with these shared beliefs as they can be relied on to act consistent with these beliefs.¹⁸¹ Alternatively, individuals tend to distrust those outside the organization and its culture because it is unclear how they will act in a given circumstance. The lack of trust resulting from organizational bias has been identified as a cause preventing collaboration among emergency responders.¹⁸² In discussing how organizational bias influences first responders, FDNY Assistant Chief Joseph Pfeifer wrote:

Social identity that promotes the power of one organization over another produces two social outcomes during complex incidents. First, it creates a positive in-group bias toward those who are part of the same group and a negative out-group bias against those who are part of an alternate group. . . . Second, when under stress, people feel little obligation to share valuable information with those outside their group since the responsibility for acting is diffused within their group.¹⁸³

2. Information Sharing

Associated with and adding to the difficulty in overcoming group bias is the rival nature and history of the NYPD and FDNY. To form swift trust and begin to view the

¹⁷⁹ Thomas M. Hickman, "Intergroup Rivalry in Brand Communities: A Social Identity Theory Perspective" (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2005), 2.

¹⁸⁰ Zolin, "Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks," 7.

¹⁸¹ Robert Bruce Shaw, *Trust in the Balance* (Jossey-Bass, 1997).

¹⁸² Donahue and Tuohy, "Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How Can We Learn From Them," 6-7.

¹⁸³ Pfeifer, "Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced Responders at the World Trade Center," 207-08.

other group as a collaborative partner, the competitive culture between the organizations must change. Intergroup competition manifests itself by preventing both swift trust and effective collaboration and coordination. Refusing or failing to share information is a manifestation of organizational bias.¹⁸⁴ In contrast, openly sharing information and knowledge was seen as beneficial to the creation of swift trust in military groups.¹⁸⁵ The problem of organizational bias was seen at the World Trade Center on 9/11 when critical information was not shared between the emergency response agencies.¹⁸⁶ Although his larger argument is that organizational biases prevented information sharing, Chief Pfeifer argued that the competitive natures of the FDNY and NYPD, and the distrust that existed between the groups, created a long-standing bias on a systematic level that prevented collaboration.

3. Applying Swift Trust to the FDNY and NYPD

While organizational bias presents a major impediment to swift trust, some hope exists of changing the organizational cultures to be more trusting of the other organization. Despite group differences, individual police officers and firefighters share many of the same traits and values. Members of both groups often have similar backgrounds, come from similar neighborhoods, and attain similar levels of education. They are also dedicated public servants. However, despite these individual similarities, group bias still exists as categorizing the world and identifying individuals by the groups to which they belong are the foundation of intergroup relations.¹⁸⁷ Tajfel argued that categorization minimizes differences within groups and exaggerates differences between groups.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ Pfeifer, "Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced Responders at the World Trade Center," 211.

¹⁸⁵ Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari, "Cohesion During Military Operations," 75.

¹⁸⁶ Pfeifer, "Understanding How Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the World Trade Center," 210; Lawson and Vettori, *Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster*, 174.

¹⁸⁷ Fathali M. Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations* (American Psychological Association, 2008), 29.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 93.

Cross categorization is a theory focusing on the creation of overlapping categorizations to reduce group bias.¹⁸⁹ In this approach, individuals' cross categories and view themselves as members of multiple groups. For instance, in the emergency responder context, firefighters and police officers may arrive at a hazardous materials incident. Some members of each group may also have hazardous materials expertise. In this scenario, four groups are created: police officers without hazardous materials expertise, police officers with hazardous materials expertise, firefighters without hazardous materials expertise and firefighters with hazardous materials expertise. The creation of additional categories makes intergroup distinctions more complex¹⁹⁰ and aids in the reduction of group bias as members of the original groups (police and fire) now share common categories. It also allows individuals to recognize that differences exist within the in-group, which also reduces the significance of differences between the groups.

H. INTERAGENCY TRAINING

While the above sections describe the foundations to swift trust and the barriers that exist preventing swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD, it is important to also examine whether the FDNY training methods used to improve collaboration foster trust between individuals of different agencies or whether they affect trust at all. FDNY firefighters and officers receive interagency training in a variety of ways. All chiefs and most captains received CIMS training prior to NYC's adoption of CIMS.¹⁹¹ Additionally, officers and chiefs receive ICS and CIMS refreshers prior to or just following promotion to each new rank. These refreshers usually consist of classroom training and PowerPoint presentations and online ICS courses. FDNY officers and chiefs conduct the classroom training. Furthermore, the FDNY produced condensed ICS and CIMS manuals to govern

¹⁸⁹ Richard J. Crisp, Rhiannon N. Turner, and Miles Hewstone, "Common Ingroups and Complex Identities: Routes to Reducing Bias in Multiple Category Contexts," *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice* 14, no. 1 (2010): 32, http://leeds.academia.edu/RhiannonTurner/Papers/430702/Common_ingroups_and_complex_identities_Routes_to_reducing_bias_in_multiple_category_contexts.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 33.

¹⁹¹ Fire Department of the City of New York, *Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) Quick Guide*, All Unit Circular 276, ICS FAQ, March 23, 2007.

FDNY responses that are available to all firefighters, officers, and chiefs through the FDNY Intranet. The entire CIMS document devotes one page to training and notes the OEM will oversee a common CIMS training curriculum.¹⁹² The OEM does not train FDNY personnel in CIMS protocols and the classes are not conducted jointly with other agencies. The OEM allows agencies latitude to implement and train its own members.

This training does little to affect swift trust. When conducted with personnel solely from one's agency, discussions are less productive and sometimes devolve into a complaint session about incidents in which procedures were not followed. As the only members in the room are of the same agency, the complaints generally produce a one-sided conversation. Without personnel from OEM or the NYPD to give an alternate perspective, little is learned except to reinforce an opinion or perception. These discussions would be more productive if FDNY and NYPD personnel were giving their perspectives to each other.

Other interagency training opportunities include drills and tabletop exercises. Although the FDNY attempts to give these opportunities to as many members as possible, in general, these drills are infrequent and the department is unable to ensure all personnel receive the training. Additionally, interagency drills and tabletop exercises, while attempting to familiarize members with some operational capabilities of other agencies at a particular incident, do little to enhance long-term personal trust and even less for swift trust. These training exercises never involve creating mixed teams of NYPD and FDNY members. Additionally, in the author's experience, he has never seen either the NYPD or FDNY practice giving tactical direction to the other (as required under CIMS) at an interagency drill. Additionally, too often these drills are designed by and involve members assigned to training positions outside of response operations. These individuals are unlikely to be initial responders to an interagency incident.

¹⁹² New York City Office of Emergency Management, Citywide Incident Management System, April 6, 2005, 51.

I. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: SWIFT TRUST AS PRACTICED WITHIN THE FDNY

One way to illuminate the difficulties forming swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD is to demonstrate how it works within the FDNY. Swift trust exists and forms among firefighters each day. Throughout NYC, firefighters and fire officers with little history of working together find ways to collaborate and accomplish tasks. The case can be seen most vividly when examining the FDNY's practice of transferring newly promoted lieutenants, captains, and chiefs to new firehouses in areas of the city in which they have not worked previously. Prior to assignment to a permanent unit, the new officer begins to "cover" or work in different units each tour, which often means the fire officer is meeting the firefighters he is working with on a given tour for the first time. Additionally, staffing shortages or surpluses among firefighters require equalization of manpower that results in firefighters sometimes being detailed to other units in the city for an individual tour. It is not uncommon for an officer or firefighter to enter the firehouse and immediately receive an alarm requiring an emergency response. In this scenario, the members have barely had time to introduce themselves to each other. However, this lack of personal familiarity does not preclude an effective working relationship.

By applying the swift trust foundations to the above scenario, several reasons appear for the formation of swift trust. First, regardless of the fact that the individuals may be unfamiliar with each other, they all have clearly defined roles at particular incidents. The officer can trust the firefighters more readily because he is not relying on a non-existent personal relationship. Rather, he can identify and trust in them based upon their firefighting assignment. This position defines the actions the firefighter will take depending upon the type of response and a variety of other factors. Both the officer and the firefighter are familiar with the roles and duties of each other's position. The uncertainty that may exist due to their personal unfamiliarity is overcome by dealing with each other based upon their roles rather than their personalities.

Additionally, swift trust forms easily as the officer and firefighters are a team at each incident. They arrive in the same fire engine or truck, wear the same uniform, and

are identified with the same unit number. The failure of any one member of the team reflects badly on the unit or team itself. Rather than looking to compete with another member of the unit, the members provide assistance to each other to ensure task completion and each other's safety. Furthermore, although they may not know each other, some likelihood of future interaction exists. This likelihood benefits swift trust as individual firefighters and officers have reputations that could be damaged by poor performance or lack of trust.

Also, the unfamiliar firefighters and officer use the same terminology and standard operating procedures at every incident that are standardized throughout the department so that despite working in a new area with new people, everyone coordinates actions because the procedures and terminology are understood. Finally, despite the lack of personal familiarity in the described scenario, all members share the same organizational culture. The firefighters and officer, who lack a personal history with each other, share a common in-group. This group shapes their identity and brings them closer together.

J. SUMMARY

This examination of the foundations to swift trust against the backdrop of interagency emergency response in NYC reveals several barriers to the creation and development of swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD during the early stages of an emergency incident. Both procedural and technical barriers exist that often prevent communication between agencies prior to one agency beginning tactical operations at an incident. Additionally, in contrast to some of the swift trust studies involving non-emergency settings, the nature of emergency incidents themselves pose a potential barrier to communication as units may be engaged in life saving operations with no time to communicate. Furthermore, NYPD response protocols do not provide either the necessary manpower or appropriate supervisory counterpart to engage in a meeting to discern roles and responsibilities at the beginning of the incident. Swift trust formation is further hampered by a confusing incident management system that encourages competition between agencies with redundant responsibilities. Additionally, that system

leaves a negative impression of interagency group work that further inhibits swift trust. Also, competition and organizational bias prevent the development of a “one team” mindset. Other barriers include differing standard operating procedures, equipment, and language.

Finally, FDNY training does little to enhance swift trust between the FDNY and NYPD. Training sessions to familiarize FDNY members with CIMS protocols are not conducted with other agencies, and thus, prevent discussion of operational problems. Furthermore, interagency drills, while important for familiarization, do little to enhance swift trust as they fail to address the barriers described above. Ultimately, attempts at establishing personal trust at these training opportunities, while perhaps helpful in the long term, will likely not help during the early stages of an incident, as the members who trained together and developed a personal trust will most likely not be at the incident together. Overcoming these barriers requires the FDNY and NYPD to make major changes.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Swift trust formation between the FDNY and NYPD in the initial stages of some interagency incidents will be extremely difficult. As stated earlier, most interagency incidents are resolved successfully. However, a successful resolution does not mean it entailed a collaborative response. While this might not make a difference for many smaller incidents, in a large-scale or homeland security incident, it very well could. Given the emphasis homeland security leaders place on collaboration and coordination among emergency response agencies, it would be useful for the FDNY and NYPD to explore other avenues to improve their collaborative capacity. One way is to enhance the foundations through which swift trust is formed. The following recommendations are made with the understanding that the intent to collaborate must be present between both agencies. Some of these recommendations require changes that can only be made at the highest levels of NYC government.

A. REVISE CIMS TO CLARIFY OPERATIONAL ROLES

All the swift trust studies find that identifying roles and tasks early in the group setting enhances swift trust. Unfortunately, CIMS is ambiguous in terms of operational roles at certain incidents. While it was enacted as framework for command, it also addresses operational roles by establishing core competencies. An agency with a core competency in a subject matter is empowered to give tactical direction to members of other agencies at incidents involving those competencies. However, CIMS does not explain how that is done, and it rarely is. Additionally, FDNY training procedures do not currently include giving tactical direction to another agency. Instead, uncertainty exists as to which agency will perform which role. Additionally, CIMS has not been revised since it began governing emergency response in 2005.¹⁹³ To comply more fully with federal mandates, all interagency incidents should involve shared command, regardless of the agency that arrives first. One specific change to CIMS needed is the inclusion of scaffold

¹⁹³ NYC adopted CIMS on May 14, 2004. Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed Executive Order No. 61 mandating its implementation on April 11, 2005.

emergencies in the command matrix. These kinds of emergencies are fairly common incidents that have been the cause of numerous interagency disagreements in recent years.

B. END OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCIES BETWEEN THE FDNY AND NYPD

NYC is fortunate to have extremely large, capable police and fire departments. Contrary to some arguments, the current policy of redundancy does not make the system more resilient. Training both departments to complete the same tasks is wasteful and promotes a competitive culture that ultimately hinders swift trust and collaboration. While it may seem that having two agencies with the ability to accomplish the same task is a beneficial redundancy, each agency has differing missions, safety standards, capabilities, manpower, and equipment. Instead of having multiple agencies capable of the same tasks, each agency should train and concentrate on their primary missions and understand the capabilities and missions of the other agencies. By gaining an understanding of their partners' capabilities, the responder is more likely to develop swift trust with those groups to accomplish the divided and agreed upon tasks.

C. CREATE A “ONE TEAM” STRATEGY

As part of the strategy to develop swift trust and improve collaboration, emergency responders from all agencies must begin to view themselves as part of a team. That team has member agencies with specific missions and diverse skill sets. Those missions must be accomplished in the same “physical space and time period.”¹⁹⁴ Too often the focus of interagency discussions is on who is in charge rather than how can they accomplish the mission together. This “one team” strategy will take a task force approach to interagency incidents. It will require cross agency training to familiarize members with their partner agency's capabilities as is done with the NY-TF1. Additionally, it requires utilization of standard operating procedures and language at interagency incidents. Furthermore, police officers and firefighters should be aware of and follow the same

¹⁹⁴ Duggan, “The New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team,” 30.

safety protocols at interagency incidents. Currently, differing standards lead to uncertainty about how an agency will address a particular incident. This uncertainty is detrimental to swift trust.

1. Require Completion of CIMS After Action Review Worksheet

In addition to CIMS revisions, the FDNY and NYPD should require completion of a standard CIMS After Action Review (AAR) worksheet. Currently, FDNY officers and chiefs have the option of submitting an AAR worksheet following an interagency incident in addition to their standard agency report. (See Appendix). However, typically each agency simply completes their standard agency report for each incident. Usually, an attempt is made to obtain the name and badge or shield number of a member of another agency and that information is included in the report. The author proposes the FDNY and NYPD develop a standard CIMS AAR worksheet to be completed by a member of each agency for all interagency incidents. It could be the responsibility of the agency commanders on scene or the first arriving officers. The report should be brief and include basic information about the incident, as well as names of the responders or their supervisors if present. The report should then ask for a description of any operational or interagency difficulties. Too often complaints about interagency problems are anecdotal. Someone heard this agency acted a certain way or that agency failed to do something. This report will begin to document operational problems. It will also be used during a dispute resolution phase described later in these recommendations. The report itself also serves as a potential incentive to operate collaboratively and exchange information as responders will be aware that their names, statements, and actions will be part of an official record. Included in the interagency report should be official times each agency was notified of the incident to address speculation that the FDNY receives delayed notification to some interagency incidents.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ Esposito, "New York City Fire Department Chief Officer's Evaluation," 56. Esposito's survey found 85% of fire chiefs surveyed believed they received delayed notification to an incident.

2. Enhance Interagency Drills

The FDNY has gone to great lengths to increase the number of interagency drills and improve the quality as well. However, even with increased drills, logistically, it is difficult, if not impossible, to give everyone these training opportunities. Even those who participate, generally get a “one shot” experience.¹⁹⁶ Also, although they involve multiple agencies, little interaction occurs between operational members of different agencies who will be the first to arrive at a real incident. These drills should be more realistic and allow first responding units of the NYPD and FDNY opportunities to develop and utilize swift trust.

Furthermore, each week FDNY units conduct a multi-unit drill that involves several fire companies from a particular area. Unlike the above mentioned interagency and tabletop exercises, all firefighters and officers participate in these multi-unit drills. The author proposes the FDNY request the NYPD send an ESU unit to participate in these drills once a month. These drills will focus on interagency type responses to familiarize members with the other agency’s procedures, as well as help to form the beginnings of personal relationships that could foster traditional trust. Unlike the large interagency drills, in which members participate from all over NYC, these multi-unit drills are area specific. These drills occur regularly and present a more likely probability that FDNY and NYPD members that drilled together may actually respond to a real emergency together. Working, planning, or drilling together repetitively “plays a critical part in building trust.”¹⁹⁷

Additionally, CIMS and ICS training should be conducted with integrated NYPD and FDNY members, which represents an opportunity to engage different groups in a collaborative learning environment to “learn together.” When conducted with personnel solely from one’s agency, discussions are unproductive and sometimes turn into a complaint session about incidents with interagency friction. These complaints go

¹⁹⁶ Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How Can We Learn From Them,” 16.

¹⁹⁷ Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event Security,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 3, no. 3 (September 2007): 13, <http://www.hsaj.org/?article=3.3.1>.

unaddressed as the only members in the room are of the same agency. These discussions would be more productive if FDNY and NYPD personnel gave their perspectives to each other.

3. Formulate Realistic Dispute Resolution Avenues

The current system of AAR is ineffective and should be overhauled. Many in the FDNY are so disillusioned by the process they choose not even to file an AAR worksheet in the first place. Currently, a formal After Action Review may be conducted if requested by an agency or recommended by OEM.¹⁹⁸ The lack of AAR requests could give the impression that problems do not exist. When CIMS protocols are violated, an open and honest format should exist for resolving and repairing any damage to the FDNY and NYPD relationship. The FDNY and NYPD should agree to create an advisory panel to review the required AAR worksheets mentioned above for interagency incidents. The panel should include representatives of the FDNY, NYPD, and OEM. The above referenced AAR worksheets should be the basis for panel reviews of individual incidents when operational problems occur.

4. Establish an FDNY-NYPD Interagency Collaboration Medal

Every year the FDNY honors members who have performed particular acts of bravery or skill in going above and beyond the call of duty. The FDNY Medal Day is a joyous occasion as members of the department recognize and celebrate their fellow firefighters. The mayor, Fire Commissioner, and FDNY Chief of Department bestow the medals. The author proposes the FDNY add a new medal to those bestowed at medal day for the fire company or individual that operated collaboratively with the NYPD in a successful rescue of a civilian. Sometimes these rescues are honored; however, the collaborative aspect is not acknowledged. This medal should stress the collaborative aspect of the rescue. Additionally, the NYPD member involved, his family, and coworkers should be invited to receive the medal at FDNY Medal Day alongside the

¹⁹⁸ New York City Office of Emergency Management, Citywide Incident Management System, April 6, 2005, 49.

FDNY member with whom he collaborated. Similarly, the NYPD could provide joint recognition for their members and FDNY members who engage in this type of collaborative rescue. This recognition will demonstrate the importance with which FDNY and NYPD leadership view interagency collaboration.

5. Leadership Commitment

As in all relationships, what organizations do has far greater impact than what they say.¹⁹⁹ Leaders influence what organizations do. These proposals to enhance swift trust and improve collaboration call for major changes to the way the FDNY and NYPD operate, as well as the way they view each other and themselves. These proposals require changes to interagency protocols and training procedures. They will not be easy or without cost.

Emergency response agencies do not operate in a vacuum at interagency incidents. Everyone is dependent on each other to share information, divide responsibilities, and accomplish individual tasks in support of the overall mission. Continuing to adjust systems and protocols for specific past failures has proven an insufficient long-term strategy. Interagency responses call for a new strategy that requires “leaders to drastically alter their perception of organizationally isolated response models.”²⁰⁰

The FDNY and NYPD promise the people of NYC collaboration and coordination and they owe them that. They also owe firefighters, police officers, and their first line supervisors the best chance at working collaboratively with each other right from the start. Those commitments can begin to be fulfilled by building the foundation of swift trust.

¹⁹⁹ Covey, *The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything*, 128.

²⁰⁰ Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units Facing Paramilitary Terrorism,” 30.

APPENDIX.



FDNY CIMS AFTER ACTION REVIEW WORKSHEET

Incident Details:

Borough: ☐ MN ☐ BK ☐ SI Box Number: _____ Date: _____
☐ QN ☐ BX Incident No: _____ Time: _____

Location: _____

Incident Type:

Primary Incident Code: _____ Secondary Incident Code: _____ Tertiary Incident Code: _____

Other: _____

On Scene:	1st?	Agency Rep.	10-84 Time
☐ FDNY	☐	_____	_____
☐ NYPD	☐	_____	_____
☐ DEP	☐	_____	_____
☐ OEM	☐	_____	_____

Specialized Resource on Scene First

☐ FDNY ☐ NYPD ☐ OEM Type: _____

Delayed Notification to FDNY

☐ Yes ☐ No Details: _____

Haz-Mat Details

Product: _____	Identified by: ☐ FDNY ☐ NYPD ☐ DEP
Search Performed: ☐ FDNY ☐ NYPD	Mitigation: ☐ FDNY ☐ NYPD ☐ DEP
Victim Removal: ☐ FDNY ☐ NYPD	Decon: ☐ FDNY ☐ NYPD ☐ DEP

Additional Comments

Other Actions Taken: _____

CIMS Protocol Followed? ☐ Yes ☐ No _____

FDNY Incident Commander: _____ Rank: _____

Staff Chief Notified? ☐ Yes ☐ No Time Notified: _____

Staff Chief Name: _____ Chief Responded? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Borough Commander to Notify: _____

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