

Haiti: Two Decades of Intervention and Very Little to Show

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Haiti: Two Decades of Intervention And Very Little To Show by MAJ Nathaniel T. Crain, United States Army, 47 pages.

This research asked the question why had US military intervention in Haiti in the past 20 years not produced long-term stability. Haiti is a nation of internal division and racial tension, suffering from years of upheaval, external intervention, and oppression. Haitian history is rife with political divisiveness and treachery, with only three peaceful transitions of Haitian authority in the years prior to the 1994 US intervention to reinstate Jean Bertrand Aristide.

To understand the United States military involvement in Haiti during the past 20 years and explain why this involvement has not produced long-term stability, the research outlined the strategic aims of the United States Government and the policy objectives associated with each commitment to military action. Although the US orchestrated a peaceful transition in 1994, US aims were shortsighted and focused too specifically on security forces to affect long-term stability. The primary US aim was to provide a secure and stable environment. US forces adequately provided security and stability for a short duration until the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) could assume control.

The research evaluated US policy through the lens of contemporary modernization theory. Foreign aid acts as a catalyst for modernization when a society meets certain internal conditions of acceptability; political climate, economic security, and cultural openness to modernization. The research measured those internal conditions against the stated objectives of the intervention. This evaluation revealed that United States policy between 1994 and 2010 was disjointed and unclear. Combined with a poor political climate in Haiti, economic collapse, and cultural reluctance to accept modernization, Haitian growth and development stagnated which in turn prevented its long-term stability.

The US was doctrinally deficient, with the Army having no doctrine focused specifically on stability until December 1994, three months after the first US intervention. The December 1994 FM 100-23 *Peace Operations*, the February 2003 FM 3-07 *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, and the December 2003 *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* only address civil security and civil control as military tasks. In both the 1994 and the 2004 interventions, the Haitian population eventually grew dissatisfied with the continued corruption and limited success beyond minor gains in civil security and civil control.

The evidence leads to the conclusion that US military intervention in Haiti has not produced long-term stability due to limited aims, a focus on security forces, and doctrinal limitations. With a goal of security and ultimately stability, United States military intervention has characterized the United States approach to Haiti, but has failed to achieve long-term strategic results. Military intervention can only be a small part of a larger whole of government effort to produce long-term strategic ends in Haiti.

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Introduction

Misery in another country is prosperity in Haiti.¹

A father to his son as he prepared to depart on a boat for Miami

On July 27, 1915, the United States began its military involvement in Haiti when it sent 330 United States Marines to Port au Prince to protect United States economic interests and United States corporations.² The Marine contingent remained on the island until 1934, enabling the first free elections since 1917. The Marine presence on the island for nearly 20 years may have indirectly legitimated military rule by establishing U.S. Marines as the legitimate authority in Haiti and by failing to prepare Haiti to govern itself.³ The Marines were clearly in charge of Haiti during that period, and "within ten years of the Marines' departure, the Haitian Army conducted its first coup d'etat."⁴ Haiti would see six more coups in the 15 years that followed before the people elected Francois Duvalier.

Direct and indirect United States involvement in support of various unstable Haitian governments marked the following five decades, culminating with tacit support for the brutal Duvalier regimes. Although he violently suppressed potential rivals, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier won the support of the Haitian masses, which enabled him to exercise control through his cult of personality and to pursue greater Haitian modernization. During the Duvalier period, United States policy in Haiti focused on its agrarian society and sought to modernize Haiti by

¹ William W. Mendel, "The Haiti Contingency," *Military Review* (January 1994): 50.

² Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervention": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 7.

³ John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 27-30.

⁴ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 16.

encouraging a shift from agriculture to manufacturing. This shift in production also drove Haiti to greater dependence on external markets for materiel and expertise.⁵

Papa Doc's death in 1971 forced Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier to assume the position of "President for Life." Baby Doc proved to have no interest in governing the people and squandered what little popularity he had by living extravagantly at the expense of his people and by seeking the favor of the Haitian mulatto elite. Baby Doc's exploitation of the people and his brutal repression of dissidents drove scores of Haitians to depart by boat for the United States. A military junta under Lieutenant General Henri Namphy forced Baby Doc into exile, but the junta used equally brutal means to control the population. The junta did not establish a similar cult of personality. On September 11, 1988, Namphy's regime executed a large-scale crack down on unrest, killing 13 near the congregation of former catholic priest, Jean Bertrand Aristide. In the wake of further instability, Namphy installed an interim president, but popular discontent and large-scale unrest expanded, and Aristide helped found the Lavalas party (Creole for "we will wash away") to counter Namphy's policies.⁶

In 1990, Haiti elected Aristide president. Aristide appealed to the populace because he seemed to have the interests of the people in mind and his Lavalas party advocated a socialist shift of wealth to the people. Aristide's socialist agenda faced opposition from the wealthy island elites. Aristide also suggested that he would crack down on the illicit drug traffic. This shift in policy toward the drug trade did not sit well with the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H), because the military profited from drug trade payoffs. Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, Aristide's chosen chief of staff of the Haitian Army, overthrew Aristide in a coup on September 30, 1991. Cedras launched the coup largely because Aristide represented socialism and a shift in power from the

⁵ Ballard, 34-40.

⁶ Ibid., 38-40.

Haitian elite who had dominated Haiti for generations and because Cedras personally expected to lose income from a crackdown on the drug trade.⁷

The shift to manufacturing during the Duvalier regime had effectively made Haiti dependent upon the US and enabled the US to impose an embargo against the Cedras Junta. The embargo failed to topple the Cedras regime, but increased Haiti's economic distress. In 1994, the United States undertook Operation Uphold Democracy and restored Jean Bertrand Aristide as President. A decade of Haitian dissatisfaction, political infighting, and failed economic and social policies by both Aristide and Rene Preval led to widespread rioting in 2003 and 2004. Operation Secure Tomorrow in 2004 deployed a contingent under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1529 to Haiti after another coup overthrew Aristide during his second non-consecutive term as president.

Despite repeated interventions, and US and UN efforts in Haiti, the country remains unstable and faces continuing challenges to its development. Hence, the question: why have these past efforts failed to produce long-term stability? The answer to that question may inform future efforts to promote stability and provide humanitarian relief.

To determine why US and UN interventions failed to produce political stability and development, it was necessary to limit the focus of the research. Political development efforts are dependent on both the internal and external context. Thus, analyzing US policy in 1915 would require investigating a political and economic context that is both chronologically distant from current conditions and which no longer exists. Therefore, the research focus was limited to the period 1994 to 2010, from Operation Uphold Democracy to the Leogane earthquake, with the hope that the research would help improve US policy or doctrine. Evidence gathered on the results of US and international humanitarian assistance in the wake of the 2010 earthquake was

⁷ Alex Dupuy, *Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 71-91.

excluded because the policy focus differed greatly from the previous interventions and initial evidence suggests the assistance has been more effective. The results of Operation Unified Response in 2010 on Haitian long-term stability are difficult to assess because only two years have passed and more time will be necessary to evaluate long-term results. Thus, most of the evidence focuses on the impact of the U.S. military in Haiti during the period prior to the earthquake. Case studies of the two military interventions in Haiti during the selected period provided the framework for analysis.

To understand the United States military involvement in Haiti during the past 20 years and explain why this involvement has not produced long-term stability, the research outlined the strategic aims of the United States Government and the policy objectives associated with each commitment to military action. The 1995 National Security Strategy outlined the Clinton administration's policy toward developing nations, while the guidance given to JTF-180 throughout the planning process provided the strategic aims. UN Security Council Resolutions beginning with UNSCR 940 provided the record of guidance to the various UN missions to Haiti. It was important to identify the policy objectives, because the military can be expected to direct most of its efforts toward defined goals.

Once the objectives were clear, the theoretical framework provided the means to evaluate the policy. The works of Talcott Parsons, David Apter, S.N. Eisenstadt, and Samuel Huntington provided a background of modernization theory. The work of Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel was needed to explore current thinking on modernization theory. The central idea of modernization is that tradition inhibits social progress until enough modernization forces fundamental internal change. Modernization is what Inglehart and Welzel refer to as “a syndrome

of social changes linked with industrialization.”⁸ The research evaluated US policy through the lens of contemporary modernization theory.

Foreign aid acts as a catalyst for modernization when a society meets certain internal conditions of acceptability; political climate, economic security, and cultural openness to modernization. The research measured those internal conditions against the stated objectives of the intervention. If the objectives of the intervention did not include an attempt to improve those conditions in Haiti, then the objectives were shortsighted, because they did not seek fundamental change in Haiti from the perspective of modernization theory. This evaluation revealed that United States policy between 1994 and 2010 was disjointed and unclear. Combined with a poor political climate in Haiti, economic collapse, and cultural reluctance to accept modernization, Haitian growth and development stagnated, which in turn prevented its long-term stability.

The research evaluated the involvement of the United States military over time using the available doctrine to determine if the doctrine adequately supported the need and if the forces in Haiti adhered to the doctrine. The research determined that doctrine available at the time of each intervention provided inadequate guidance on actions to affect long-term stability in Haiti. Although the military efforts during each intervention achieved their established objectives and those objectives adhered to the prevailing doctrine of the time, the limited aims of each intervention and the lack of resources allocated (in terms of troops, time, and equipment) directly contributed to a failure to achieve long-term stability in Haiti. The evidence leads to the conclusion that US military intervention in Haiti has not produced long-term stability due to limited aims, a focus on security forces, and doctrinal limitations.

⁸ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “Development and Democracy: What We Know About Modernization Today,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2009):33.

Theory

Development Theory

Development theory is a collection of theories that relate specifically to the social and economic improvement in nations. In *Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions* Jan Nederveen Pieterse defines development as "organized intervention in collective affairs according to a standard of improvement."⁹ While the aim of development theory is to describe these issues, it is often a vehicle for prescribing approaches to developing nations.

Development theory in its various forms drives United States foreign policy and has since World War II. The May 2010 National Security Strategy set as a top national security priority "supporting the development of institutions within fragile democracies, integrating human rights as a part of our dialogue with repressive governments, and supporting the spread of technologies that facilitate the freedom to access information."¹⁰ These policies are not unique to the Obama administration, with much of the post-Cold War thought on development arising at the time of the 1994 Haiti intervention. In February 1995, the Clinton administration identified the need to promote sustainable development abroad and noted four key elements of sustainable development: "broad-based economic growth; the environment; population and health; and democracy."¹¹ The Clinton administration noted the need to encourage developing nations to embrace democracy and free market economic systems and recognized the need for improved governance. This indicates that the US understood the internal conditions for modernization at the time of the Haitian intervention and a desire to use development to advance US national interests.

⁹ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Development Theory: Deconstructions/reconstructions* (New York: Sage Publications Ltd, 2002), 3.

¹⁰ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 2010), 5.

¹¹ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1995), 22.

Successfully using development as a means to advance foreign policy requires acknowledging that each society is inherently different and requires a unique approach. Foreign policy may find short-term success in one country under a particular development theory, but that success is not a universal concept that will bring similar results to every other country. As S.N. Eisenstadt identifies in *Building States and Nations*, we must evaluate each case "in terms of its own history and traditions."¹² Nederveen Pieterse also notes that the cultural matters present in the individual society impact specifically on the development capacity of that society and that development theory is the means to describe the issues involved.¹³ According to Talcott Parsons, "a set of "normative expectations" pertaining to man's relation to his environment delineates the ways in which adaptation should be developed and extended."¹⁴ Those "normative expectations" adjust within a society as fundamental change takes root, which is the goal of modernization. Without a viable attempt to understand and interpret the individual values and beliefs of a society, however, it may prove difficult to shape the development process in a way that provides continuity and long-term stability.

Huntington also identifies the need for participation in governance and the need for strong institutions to secure stability, referring to the "degree of community in a complex society."¹⁵ Huntington saw this component as a reflection of the total strength of the political institutions of the country, and noted that Duvalier's Haiti lacked "both effective traditional and effective modern political institutions,"¹⁶ which made Haiti post-Duvalier inevitably unstable.

¹² S. N. Eisenstadt, *Building States and Nations*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc, 1973), 49-51.

¹³ Pieterse, 5.

¹⁴ Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *American Sociological Review* 29, no. 3 (Jun.1964): 341.

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 10.

¹⁶ Huntington, 398-99.

Duvalier was able to control Haiti, as previously mentioned, through his cult of personality and violent repression. After Papa Doc's death, Baby Doc was unable to control Haiti in the same way and the country faced its most unstable period since the turbulent 1950s.

A lack of participative government and a failure to establish effective systems within the government continued to plague Haiti up to the 2010 earthquake. Neither the 1994 nor the 2004 interventions managed to help Haiti build those systems, and a perception of corruption in the election process produced widespread distrust of the government. The UN presence in Haiti following the 1994 intervention and after the 2004 intervention consisted of significantly under-resourced forces attempting to accomplish narrow objectives. Military and police forces in Haiti only focused on improving security. The narrow aims of both interventions, despite more than a decade of engagement with Haiti, yielded very little in terms of development or improved security.

With each administration, the United States revised its policy toward the Caribbean, but sought to influence development primarily through disconnected projects or military intervention. The prevailing thought during the Cold War seemed to be that cultures and political systems would change dramatically strictly through capital investment or military intervention. Another prevalent idea has been the notion that forcing change in government will lead to sweeping economic growth. As Jean Grugel, currently a professor of International Development at Sheffield University, identifies, "international support for democratization, especially from the US, is part of a wider policy-orientation linking changes in the political system to economic reform and the creation of market based economies."¹⁷ As President Clinton noted in the 1995 National Security Strategy, "Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten

¹⁷ Jean Grugel, *Politics and Development in the Caribbean Basin: Central America and the Caribbean in the New World Order* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 241.

our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development.”¹⁸ The lack of a unifying concept has plagued efforts to shape Haiti, because subsequent administrations failed to build on the successes of previous administrations and in some cases even managed to undermine some of those successes.

Huntington recognized that the greatest fault with United States intervention during the Cold War period was relying on financial subsidy; assuming that legitimacy or at least some form of liberty would spring forth with enough financial support.¹⁹ Huntington's understanding of US Cold War foreign policy toward the Caribbean is relevant because the shortsighted aims of the 1994 and 2004 interventions followed this model. Despite the use of military forces for temporary security in Haiti, the US and the UN applied very few resources to set the conditions for fundamental change in Haiti. No amount of US money or military assistance could legitimately produce such stability without Haitian support, involvement, and leadership. The subsequent failures of US policy in fostering long-term stability and legitimacy were predictable. Huntington quotes James Madison, who wrote in *The Federalist No. 51* that the challenge is not only imbuing the government with authority over the citizens, but also the desire to "control itself".²⁰

The key forms of development theory considered in this examination of Haiti were dependency theory and modernization theory. Those two forms of development theory best describe US foreign policy and Haiti at the time of the interventions. Dependency theory focuses on the aspects of external influences on a society and how those influences negatively affect development. Modernization theory focuses on factors that influence internal social improvement. Dependency theory stresses that relying on assistance from developed nations weakens the

¹⁸ Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 1.

¹⁹ Huntington, 399.

²⁰ James Madison, *Transcript of Federalist Papers, No. 10 & No. 51 (1787-1788)*, Our Documents, <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=10&page=transcript#> (accessed December 24, 2011).

developing nations. The current modernization theory stresses the positive influence that properly applied resources can have on the political and cultural systems of a society. Dependency theory can best describe how Haiti's reliance on foreign support made the 1994 embargo seem an appealing method to pressure Cedras to reinstate Aristide. Nevertheless, the embargo only managed to further damage Haiti's economic security. Modernization theory formed the theoretical basis for evaluating the US policy, because it provided a clear set of required conditions for development; political climate, economic security, and cultural openness to modernization.

Dependency Theory

Dependency theory grew from the backlash against modernization theory in the wake of several apparent failures in the 1950s and 1960s. These failures occurred despite heavy investment from developed nations. Investments with the intent of proving the superiority of the respective political philosophies managed to destabilize several economies. As the political science community sought to explain the struggles in Latin America, dependency theory began to emerge with the underlying goal of disproving modernization while explaining the dependency cycle that caused significant instability in the developing world.

According to Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, the economic trend in developing countries is toward growing disparities in income distribution and toward economic collapse. This trend is seen as a result of trade under unequal terms. The developing country depends on exporting raw materials to the developed countries for income and must import finished goods from those developed countries.²¹ Dependency theory focuses primarily on negative outcomes from external involvement that serve only the interests of the developed nation. The disparity of income

²¹Raul Prebisch, *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems* (New York: United Nations, 1962), 3-8

between the developed and developing nation set the conditions for the collapse of the developing nation. The economic disparity between the two nations tends to be even less significant than the destabilizing effect of this trade imbalance.

During the Duvalier regime, the shift from agriculture to textiles provided less wealth to the Haitian people, but more wealth to the Duvaliers at the expense of the people, primarily because the money made in the textile industry was easier to tax than the money made by subsistence farmers. This is reflected in the Haitian annual % GDP growth over the period. From 1965-1980, when Haiti was still predominately agrarian, annual GDP growth was .9% in Haiti. From 1980-1990, after the shift to textiles, annual GDP growth was -2.3%. From 1990-1991 GDP growth was -1.5%.²²

Although the US interest was not to create a dependent partner in Haiti, the result was the Haitian people relying further on the regime and a Haitian economy that could be manipulated through an external trade partnership. The shift to textiles financially tied the Haitian GDP to the international community, because Haiti needed to import the raw materials and the factory repair parts from other nations. The Haitian reliance on import materials for the textile industry made the use of a trade embargo in 1994 a cause of further economic destabilization. By the end of 1994, the GDP growth rate had declined to nearly -12%.²³ The embargo damaged the Haitian economy so significantly that it was only beginning to rebound at the time of the 2010 earthquake. US HOPE and HELP legislation enabled the US to become Haiti's largest trading partner, accounting for 66% of Haiti's total exports and 90% of Haiti's textile and apparel exports. Textiles account for 68% of Haitian exports and 10% of total Haitian GDP.²⁴ Per capita, GDP

²² Grugel, 183-184.

²³ "World Development Indicators," World Bank.org, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog> (accessed January 22, 2012).

²⁴ U.S. International Trade Commission, *Textiles and Apparel: Effects of Special Rules for Haiti on Trade Markets and Industries* (Washington, DC: USITC, June 2008), 1-8.

remained consistently above \$600 for the first time in Haitian history from 2007-2009.²⁵ The growth in the Haitian economy after the implementation of US trade preference legislation indicates that the import substitution that negatively impacted Haiti during the Duvalier administration and destroyed the Haitian economy during the 1994 trade embargo was a significant factor in growing Haitian economic security after the 2004 intervention.

Modernization Theory

Merriam-Webster defines modern as “of, relating to, or characteristic of the present or the immediate past.”²⁶ If to modernize is to make something modern, then the idea behind modernization theory is to help a nation develop into a more industrial and connected nation that is capable of self-sustainment. Modernization theory is a form of development theory that describes the progressive improvement of nations, primarily through external economic influence. Regional and international powers can greatly influence developing nations to modernize by providing material wealth, by introducing new technologies or techniques, and by investing in the developing nation's own industries and institutions.

Talcott Parsons, widely regarded as the first and most preeminent of modernization theorists, theorized that the “inner momentum” of modernity would allow it to overcome all previous cultural and political norms and predicted that all societies, given enough time, would become modern. In *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, Parsons identified modern systems as those that “display greater generalized adaptive capacity.”²⁷ This means that the system is more stable and able to react well to changes. This is why modernization theory is

²⁵ “World Development Indicators.”

²⁶ “Modern,” Merriam-Webster.com, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modern> (accessed February 8, 2012).

²⁷ Talcott Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 109-110.

particularly well suited for discussing stability operations. According to FM 3-07, stabilization is “the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development.”²⁸ Modernization is the theory behind setting the conditions for successful long-term development.

David Apter, in *The Politics of Modernization*, classified societies by their structure and ideology. a society's structure and ideology determined their level and potential for modernization. Apter saw that highly structured societies with a traditional ideology made the best use of coercion, with members of the society carrying forth orders without question. These coercive governments manifest in authoritarian regimes that are successful in providing authority but lack external legitimacy. Societies with limited central governments and a secular ideology, produced a system that required greater access to information to accommodate the greater freedom of thought. Modernization expands the number of roles people fill in a polity. The need for information stems from the larger number of roles and increased individual awareness that compels the individual to seek higher education and social and political improvement. Governments in these polities are more likely to evolve into successful representative democracies. Although the process would create demands on the government in the long-run, the government would become more stable and effective.²⁹

Modernization does not equate to democratization, however. Rather, as modernization succeeds, it brings about changes that make a shift to representative government more likely. “Modernization brings rising educational levels, moving the work force into occupations that require independent thinking and making people more articulate and better equipped to intervene

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,, October 2008), Glossary-10.

²⁹ David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967): 458-460.

in politics.”³⁰ This shift leads to the people demanding representative government, democratic institutions, and civil and political liberties. The analysis of Haiti took into account the conditions for and pressures of effective democracy. Inglehart and Welzel describe effective democracy as empowering the people and transferring power from the elites.³¹ In studying and analyzing Haiti, attention was focused on signs that the people demanded more government accountability and look for a shift in power from the elites to the people.

Samuel Huntington, in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, makes the point that the greatest separation between the developed and undeveloped nations is not in the form of government, but the degree of government and the governance provided. Political institutions, according to Huntington, represent "moral consensus and mutual interest."³² In essence, the people are the determining factor in development, because legitimacy is derived from their consent. This is the inherent challenge in any fledgling society. Overthrowing a government or holding new elections is comparatively easier than building legitimacy for a government. In Haiti, this challenge manifested relatively consistently in violent upheaval.

David Apter noted that improving internal political and economic systems normally leads to more stable government.³³ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel expounded on the idea of internal system improvement in their March 2009 *Foreign Affairs* article by stating that "modernization is a syndrome of social changes linked with industrialization."³⁴ Simply generating economic growth, promoting a free market economy, or replacing a sitting government with a form of democracy is not enough to generate the changes linked to development through modernization. Rather, the changes must be internal and rooted within the

³⁰ Inglehart and Welzel, 37.

³¹ Ibid., 41.

³² Huntington, 10.

³³ Apter, 63-68.

³⁴ Inglehart and Welzel, 33.

society to be successful. Peadar Kirby observed when commenting on the Celtic Tiger Irish economic boom of the 1990s, "sustainable development results from the fostering of an endogenous growth dynamic."³⁵ The endogenous growth dynamic is the systemic change that contemporary modernization seeks to create. W.W. Rostow, influential author of the seminal *The Stages of Economic Growth*, noted "that inner confidence – the confidence that, to a significant degree, the nations and peoples of the developing world have the capacity to shape their own destinies in a modern environment – is the most important single component for successful economic and social development."³⁶ For Haiti to successfully modernize and, thereby, achieve long-term stability, Haiti must ultimately establish the systems that will enable progress and Haitians must lead the internal change.

Thus, social science theory leads to the theory of modernization that argues; a culture must meet certain internal conditions of acceptability in order to modernize successfully: political climate, economic security, and cultural openness to modernization. The research examined the Haitian problem by applying this theory to US policy decisions and strategic aims. The evidence gathered suggests that US policy did not focus on the long-term stability of Haiti, because very little attention was devoted to encouraging the endogenous growth dynamic. The only evidence to suggest a US policy interest in Haitian long-term stability is the enactment of the HOPE and HELP legislation after the 2004 intervention to establish trade preference for Haitian goods, which improved Haitian economic security prior to the 2010 Leogane earthquake.

³⁵ Peadar Kirby, "Development Theory and the Celtic Tiger," *The European Journal of Development Research* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 318.

³⁶ Rostow, W.W., *Politics and the Stages of Growth* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1971), 317.

Case Study Analysis

Operation Uphold Democracy, 1994

A turbulent period that followed the exile of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier in 1986 saw four leadership changes in four years including two military coups. Finally, in 1990, the Haitian people elected an outspoken and anti-US priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in the first free elections in Haiti since 1957. This success was short-lived as a military coup under Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras overthrew Aristide in 1991. General Cedras overthrew President Aristide primarily because Aristide advocated a socialist agenda that threatened the wealthy elite of Haiti and because Aristide sought to combat the illicit drug trade from which Cedras personally profited.. Aristide had discovered Cedras regime had planned to assassinate him in the airport in the ensuing chaos of the coup, but had failed. Aristide noted that "the coup experienced its first setback."³⁷ Because the assassination failed, Aristide was able to condemn Cedras as a criminal to the international community and bring international pressure on the Cedras regime.

Cedras' brutal regime used the Force Armée d'Haiti (FAd'H) military organization and pseudo-secret police to drive a significant number of Haitians off the island. As droves of Haitians in boats began heading toward the United States, President George H. W. Bush turned them away. President Bush wanted to avoid an influx of displaced Haitians that he felt would be beyond the capacity of the United States to handle. William Mendel noted in a 1994 Military Review article, "the impact of thousands of Haitians in south Florida – still recovering from Hurricane Andrew 18 months after it struck – could overwhelm state and county services."³⁸ In an effort to force the Cedras regime to negotiate, the UN issued UNSCR 875, which embargoed oil and arms shipments to Haiti.

³⁷ Jean-Bertrand Aristide, *Dignity* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 43.

³⁸ Mendel, 48.

The UN embargo managed to have far-reaching effects. It virtually destroyed Haitian economic security by severely damaging the textile industry that the United States encouraged Haiti to adopt during the Duvalier regime. Because the embargo only allowed food and humanitarian aid into Haiti, the textile industry that relied on imported raw materials lost the means to continue operations. The embargo cost Haiti an estimated 100,000 jobs and in 1994, the Haitian gourde collapsed, falling by 60 percent in the international currency market.³⁹ From the time of the 1991 Haitian coup to the total trade embargo in 1994, Haitian per capita GDP declined nearly 50% to a paltry \$238.51.⁴⁰ The Haitian economy collapsed completely prior to the 1994 US intervention. The collapse reduced the Haitians to desperation and led to greater violence and instability. To produce long-term stability, economic security needed to be a top priority for the United States, but the national policy objectives for Haiti were disjointed and unclear.

When William J. Clinton campaigned for the US presidency in 1992, his campaign platform contained a policy dedicated to not turning Haitians away from the United States. As the crisis' scale grew after Clinton's inauguration, he faced the same predicament his predecessor faced and he, like President George H.W. Bush, adopted the same policy. The United States began turning away droves of Haitians on boats. In an effort to salvage some political credibility, President Clinton garnered the support of Aristide for the policy in exchange for the understanding that he would help restore the former president to power. The UN sponsored the July 1993 Governors Island accord. After months of rejection, the Cedras government agreed, in exchange for amnesty, to permit Aristide's return and to leave power in October 1993.⁴¹ However, contrary to the conditions of the accord, the Cedras regime began taking measures to ensure its survival. The resistance to Cedras grew rapidly after the regime kidnapped and murdered Antoine

³⁹ Ballard, 119.

⁴⁰ "World Development Indicators."

⁴¹ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 33.

Izméry, referred to by Aristide in his memoir as "the bravest and most determined person to confront the unacceptable situation."⁴² In Haiti, confusion reigned. People were uncertain of US intentions. They did not know whether the Cedras government would actually leave, and whether Aristide would return as president.⁴³ On September 23, 1993, the UN passed UNSCR 867 calling for an international presence to support a transition from the Cedras regime to the legitimate Aristide government. UNSCR 867 called for the "establishment and immediate dispatch of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)"⁴⁴

Shortly before the Cedras regime was to relinquish power, the UN sent the USS Harlan County to Port au Prince. Embarked aboard was the Haiti Assistance Group (HAG). The HAG was there to assist with the government transition and to facilitate Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). The HAG's mission was to assist in providing for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), but US Special Operations advisors on the ground informed the HAG that the FADH did not want assistance. Armed with UNSCR 867, and while the Harlan County was enroute to Haiti, the US changed the mission of the HAG. The HAG was instructed to oversee the peaceful transition of government. The Harlan County, however, was unready to face opposition from the Cedras regime. As military service-members exited the ship, a large angry crowd greeted them. The crowd shouted anti-American slurs and "Remember Somalia!" and awoke among the Americans the painful memory of the Battle of Mogadishu only a few weeks prior. Cedras considered the arrival of the Harlan County a hostile act and intended to prevent the transition.⁴⁵ The Harlan County turned around and left Port-au-Prince. The United States had to

⁴² Aristide, 137.

⁴³ Bob Shacochis, *The Immaculate Invasion* (Westport, Conn.: Viking Adult, 1999), 26-30.

⁴⁴ United Nations, *UNSCR 867* (United Nations Security Council, 23 September 1993).

⁴⁵ Shacochis, 30-32.

reconsider its plans, given the change in the political condition.⁴⁶ Cedras gained credibility as the Haitian people saw the Harlan County's departure as a victory.

Planners in the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) J5 scrapped the initial NEO and began preparing a plan for a forcible entry. The plan was code-named "Dragon's Blood." A larger force was necessary for a forcible entry and required a longer commitment and greater involvement in Haitian internal affairs. Commander In Chief (CINCUSACOM) Admiral Paul Miller recommended that a JTF stand up and that LTG Henry H. Shelton, Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, command it. Shelton and XVIII Airborne Corps became the Joint Task Force (JTF-180) for the Haiti mission.⁴⁷

The pressure on the United States mounted after Cedras refused to step down on October 30, 1993. Another diplomatic solution called for Cedras to transfer power in January 1994, but Cedras neither acknowledged the request nor made any indication that he would relinquish power. In the wake of Cedras' continued belligerence, the USACOM J5 "Jade Green" Cell transferred the work on "Dragon's Blood" to XVIII Airborne Corps' JTF-180 planners.

The plan, now known as OPLAN 2370, called for eight airborne battalions and a Joint Special Operations Task Force to jump into Port-au-Prince and Cap Hatien.⁴⁸ The mission statement in OPLAN 2370 called for JTF-180 to neutralize Haitian armed forces and police in order to protect US citizens and interests, designated Haitians, and third country nationals. The planners recognized that Cedras would oppose entry by U.S. forces because the plan identified the need to neutralize belligerent forces. OPLAN 2370 listed the following tasks: restore civil order, conduct nation assistance to stabilize the internal situation, and assist in the transition to a democratic government in Haiti. These tasks make clear the aim was to secure Haiti and establish

⁴⁶ Shacochis, 33-34.

⁴⁷ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 45-47.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 43-47.

temporary stability to enable Aristide's return to the presidency. General Shelton's stated intent also makes clear military operations would be of short duration, "[provide] rapid transition to Civil Military Operations and USFORHAITI [US Forces Haiti]." ⁴⁹

The Operational level planners at XVIII Airborne Corps designed OPLAN 2370 to accomplish the initial policy objectives in Haiti. The objectives were "the establishment of a safe and secure environment suitable to the restoration of the Aristide presidency and the near-term conduct of national elections." ⁵⁰ This political aim was shortsighted in that the idea of establishing stability is secondary. The plan seems to have assumed that the UN or Aristide's government would be able to establish long-term stable conditions. While this desire to rapidly transition responsibility to the UN and civilian agency meets the political intent of reinstating Aristide and militarily disengaging, it does not address the preconditions for long-term stability. The administration and the subordinate military leadership were only concerned with the short-sighted goals of quickly restoring Aristide and rapidly transitioning the mission to the UN.

After the Harlan County debacle, the plan focused on forcing entry into Haiti. The connection between the Haitian military and Colombian drug cartels became apparent on 7 June 1994. This connection raised additional concerns for planners. The staff began to see the potential of an operation similar to 1989's Operation Just Cause in Panama. ⁵¹ The drug-trafficking problem on Haiti required that the administration address the environment. The policy called for building democratic institutions that were strong enough to deny safe havens to drug-trafficking organizations. ⁵² The national policy on drug-trafficking may have given the administration additional cause to seek long-term stability. However, the administration did not adjust the

⁴⁹ Cynthia L. Hayden, *JTF-180 Operation Uphold Democracy Oral History Interviews* (Fort Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps & Fort Bragg Training Center, 1995), 4.

⁵⁰ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 108.

⁵¹ Ballard, 76.

⁵² Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 11.

strategic aims of the mission. The military plan to restore Aristide as president and transition to UN responsibility envisioned a quick strike and a rapid exit..

CJTF-180 continued to assume the requirement to force entry into Haiti, but explored a permissive entry option as a branch to the plan. As OPLAN 2370 reached 82nd Airborne Division for refinement, CINCUSACOM notified 10th Mountain Division, designated it CJTF-190, and ordered the division to plan OPLAN 2380, an unopposed entry into Haiti. OPLAN 2380 placed JTF-190 subordinate to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).⁵³ This revelation did not come to fruition, however, as the UNMIH did not assume operational authority from the 25th Infantry Division until 31 March 1995. The assumption that the UNMIH would be the higher headquarters of CJTF-190 reflects an unrealistic expectation that the UN would quickly produce a headquarters that could command and control operations in Haiti. The UN Mission would involve multiple coalition partners that would have to operate under restrictions from their national leaders. These coalition partners needed to deploy forces rapidly to assume leadership and partnership with the US forces. The challenges posed by the UN coalition necessitated that the US would have the preponderance of forces and the leadership of any UNMIH. OPLAN 2380 recognized the UNMIH, because the UN passed Security Council Resolution (SCR) 940 on 31 July 1994, authorizing member states to: “. . . use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership . . . and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment.”⁵⁴ The UN mandate to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment implied a broader strategic aim with a focus on long-term Haitian stability. The US strategic aims, despite the new language, remained shortsighted.

The OPLAN 2380 mission assumed the UNSCR language that called for a stable and secure government of Haiti, a government that was functional. The addition of the term functional

⁵³ Hayden, 5.

⁵⁴ United Nations, *UNSCR 940* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 31 July 1994).

governance indicates the need for a measure of performance to evaluate functionality and a longer deployment to stabilize Haitian governance. OPLAN 2380 required CJTF-180 to support UNMIH. This requirement to support the UNMIH rather than transfer authority to them supports the assertion that OPLAN 2380 assumed the UNMIH would command the operation. The final mission task was to transfer command of the mission to sector commanders. Although the task to hand over the mission was ambiguous at best, it also conveyed a longer mission requirement because the designated sector commanders could be from UNMIH partner nations and they would clearly require time to deploy their forces. The JTF-190 commander's intent established as end state condition secure and stable sectors under the control of UNMIH.⁵⁵ Although the end state makes clear that UNMIH would provide the sector commanders, the guidance left unclear the timeline and the means by which to measure when sectors were secure and stable.

The commander's intent claims “[s]tability will be established, primarily by our presence, in order to deter violence and promote civil order.”⁵⁶ Stability in this case only encompasses the civil security and civil control tasks, as the intent continues to note that “[t]his will set conditions for the UNMIH [United Nations Mission in Haiti] to reestablish essential services and professionalize Haitian military and public security forces.”⁵⁷ The commander's intent indicates a broader aim, but places the burden for achieving stability on the UNMIH, which did not exist. Placing the burden on UNMIH left the aim for US forces shortsighted because the US mission was limited to establishing civil security and civil control prior to handing the mission over to UNMIH.

The establishment of a UN Mission in Haiti set the conditions that would enable CJTF-180 and CJTF-190 to withdraw from Haiti. Prior to the UN mandate, it was unclear what

⁵⁵ Hayden, 5.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

organization would assume responsibility from the CJTF. CINCUSACOM adjusted the plan to include a Marine contingent designated Special Purpose Marine Air/Ground Task Force Caribbean that would seize Cap Hatien and the State Department negotiated for eight regional nations to participate as part of a Caribbean Command (CARICOM).⁵⁸ By September, both the 82nd and the 10th were preparing to deploy and accomplish their respective OPLANs. Because the operating environment in Haiti remained ambiguous, CINCUSACOM directed CJTF-180 to combine the two existing plans into an option dubbed OPLAN 2375. That option provided for an initial opposed entry as per OPLAN 2370 that lasted two days then transitioned to a permissive environment as per OPLAN 2380.

OPLAN 2375 restored the OPLAN 2370 task to neutralize Haitian police and military, due to the unknown environment in Haiti. OPLAN 2375 added the requirements: restore civil order; conduct nation assistance to stabilize the internal situation; and assist in the transition to a democratic government in Haiti.⁵⁹ How JTF-180 would assist in the transition to a democratic government in Haiti is not immediately clear, but the commander's intent identifies civil military operations (CMO) as decisive and notes the task to conduct foreign internal defense (FID). Both CMO and FID would theoretically have contributed to greater security. CMO would establish a working relationship with both the local government and civilian organizations with a wider mandate for stabilizing Haiti. FID would provide Haiti with the tools to secure itself in the intermediate to long term. JTF-180 would force entry, initially secure Haiti, and then handover the stabilization mission to JTF-190. OPLAN 2375's scope was less shortsighted than the previous OPLANs because it discussed stability operations beyond civil security and civil control by noting Civil Military Operations in support of a transition to a democratic government. However, the planning did not incorporate civilian representatives that might have participated in

⁵⁸ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel,, 62-65.

⁵⁹ Hayden, 5.

that transition. Planning for the forced entry mission may have required a greater degree of operational security, but involving civilian planners may have provided greater clarity to the capabilities and limitations of partner organizations. Ultimately, the military planning remained shortsighted in that very little attention was given to the stability mission beyond security.

In a September 15, 1994 address to the nation, President Clinton made clear his intent. Mr. Clinton stated, "the United States must protect our interests, [to] stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, [to] secure our borders, and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us."⁶⁰ This speech informed Cedras that United States intervention was imminent, and forced him to consider the consequences of continuing to refuse to step down. After receiving the required presidential approval, CINCUSACOM issued the Execution Order (EXORD) to JTF 180 for midnight 18 September.⁶¹

In a last ditch effort to avoid military conflict, President Clinton sent to Port-au-Prince his emissaries to negotiate a settlement: former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and retired general Colin Powell. They met with regime president Emile Jonassaint on 18 September, a mere 7 hours before the planned invasion. During the course of the negotiation, General Biamby, a leader in the junta, informed Cedras that according to his contacts the 82nd Airborne was departing from Pope Air Force Base and that the attack was imminent. Although Cedras may have begun to waiver, he still refused to relinquish control, but President Jonassaint agreed to accept the Carter mission's terms.⁶² The Carter-Jonassaint Accord, signed only hours before the 82nd, already mid-flight, would assault into Haiti, forced planners to develop a final plan, dubbed

⁶⁰ William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation On Haiti.," The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/we/index.php?pid=49093> (accessed January 16, 2012).

⁶¹ Ballard, 97.

⁶² Ibid., 98-99.

OPLAN 2380 Plus. OPLAN 2380 Plus merged all of the existing plans into a single option and noted the uncertain environment in Haiti.⁶³ The largest airdrop since World War II turned around in mid-flight as word reached the 82nd that the environment no longer required a forced entry.

The confusion that affected the planning process had an even greater effect on the execution. As elements of the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of 10th Mountain Division entered Port-au-Prince on the morning of 19 September, they did so with the understanding that the environment was not yet defined. As previously outlined, the planning process leading to the intervention on 19 September faced significant challenges politically and as the force packages and missions changed, so too did the expected environment. Recently returned from Somalia, where the situation had rapidly deteriorated, CJTF-190 and 10th Mountain Division Commander MG David C. Meade was determined not to allow the same thing to happen in Haiti.

From the beginning of Operation Uphold Democracy, CJTF-190 elements in Port-au-Prince operated under strict force protection guidelines that limited their interaction with the civilian population. MG Meade's force protection posture isolated CJTF-190 from the civilian population at the port and limited contact with civilians. This limited the success of the CJTF-190 mission in Port-au-Prince because the limited military presence around the city allowed former regime enforcers to continue their violent tactics. CJTF-190 in Haiti failed to define sectors early, did not respond to escalating tensions between the FAd'H and the civilians, and failed to engage civilians that brought valuable information about the whereabouts of FAd'H commanders and incidents of violence and unrest.⁶⁴

MG Meade's established force protection posture seemed to evoke a siege mentality, and did little to improve the security situation in Port-au-Prince.⁶⁵ The command policy in Port-au-

⁶³ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 78.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 96-99.

⁶⁵ Hayden, 6.

Prince conflicted with the requirement to generate a stable and secure environment. As retired Special Forces Master Sergeant Stan Goff related in his memoirs, “US soldiers were sitting behind bunkers, aiming machine guns at curious but harmless crowds . . . Americans were standing by as Haitian cops and Attaches (auxiliary thugs) executed business as usual tactics against the general population.”⁶⁶ The FAd'H brutality in Port-au-Prince continued despite the presence of an entire BCT and the CJTF-190 headquarters in the port. Even the limited civil security and civil control aims met with limited success in Port-au-Prince due to the force protection posture that kept most of the US forces behind a fence and isolated from the population.

In Cap Hatien, however, the elements of CJTF-190 under COL James M. Dubik interpreted the mandate differently and acted accordingly. It is evident that 2BCT saw part of their mandate as requiring them to remove the FAd'H from power in the cities and the BCT acted aggressively to do so. The Marines set the tone early in Cap Hatien. However, when the FAd'H engaged the Marines in Cap Hatien, the Marines returned fire, killing the culprits. This act established the CJTF-190 as the legitimate authority in Cap Hatien. 1BCT in Port-au-Prince did not establish itself in the same way as 2BCT. The Harlan County debacle delegitimized to many Haitians US authority in Port-au-Prince. Rampant FAd'H reprisals continued in Port-au-Prince with very little intervention from 1BCT.⁶⁷ CJTF-190 failed to achieve their limited security aims prior to transitioning with UNMIH and left CJTF-180 commander General Shelton questioning 10th Mountain Division leadership early in the mission.

Security was clearly the primary mission for the United States military in Haiti because it would allow for the successful return of President Aristide. The goals of Operation Uphold

⁶⁶ Stan Goff, *Hideous Dream: A Soldier's Memoir of the US Invasion of Haiti* (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Soft Skull Press, 2000), 109.

⁶⁷ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 108-111.

Democracy to this end were to decapitate the military dictatorship, restore the elected President of Haiti, and turn the operation over to UN control in six months.⁶⁸ All of these goals were accomplished, which seems to suggest Operation Uphold Democracy was successful overall. Despite the significant challenges that CJTF-180 faced in Haiti, CJTF-180 restored Aristide as president. The strategic aim of the operation, merely providing a temporary stable and secure environment, however, limited progress toward Haiti's long-term stability because CJTF-180 never identified a clear objective to develop Haitian internal systems and did not foster Haitian involvement in modernization.

US forces had very little doctrine to guide them in peace operations during Operation Uphold Democracy. The December 1994 FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* recognized that the frequency and challenges of peace operations had increased dramatically since 1988.⁶⁹ It is with this in mind that the US military developed doctrine to support what had become a much more prevalent form of engagement. Engaging developing nations in this way grew from the national strategic aim of promoting development abroad.⁷⁰ FM 100-23 identifies three forms of peace operations: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.⁷¹ FM 100-23 is descriptive but intentionally vague. The manual observed that it is more useful to understand the principles of peace operations and the types of forces required to deal with them.⁷² Peacekeeping best describes the US intervention in 1994 because US forces acted with the consent of the

⁶⁸ Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds. *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti-A Case Study* (Washington: National Defense University, 1995), 25.

⁶⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1994), v.

⁷⁰ Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 22.

⁷¹ , FM 100-23 *Peace Operations*, 2.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 2.

belligerents, only used force in self-defense, and easily maintained impartiality.⁷³ However, support to diplomacy equates more with stability operations, seeking to contribute to stability and the creation of conditions necessary for the peaceful resolution of disputes.⁷⁴ FM 100-23 gave no specific guidance and only vaguely described the forms of peace operations. The manual did not identify any associated tasks nor specify how to accomplish those tasks. This leads to the conclusion that the US military was doctrinally deficient prior to and during the 1994 intervention.

Perhaps the greatest military achievement for CJTF-180 was its successful application of Somalia lessons to the 1995 handover in Haiti.⁷⁵ The 25th trained on stability tasks at the Joint Readiness Training Center, brought experts in from the Center for Army Lessons learned, and had developed 20 vignettes to help their troops prepare for potential Haitian scenarios.⁷⁶ In Cap Hatien, which transitioned to the 3rd Brigade of 25th Infantry Division, a junior officer remarked that “the brigade demonstrated a military unity of effort within the brigade and with coalition forces.”⁷⁷ The Division was the Multinational Force, with participants from 27 Nations, including Nepal, Bangladesh, and Guam, but each brigade operated as a joint coalition. 3rd Brigade secured Cap Hatien and 2nd Brigade secured Port-au-Prince prior to transferring the security mission to the UNMIH. With a still relatively large military contingent under the 25th Infantry Division, maintaining security was somewhat more manageable, despite the complexities. The follow on mission faced a considerably greater challenge than the US mission, with UNSCR 975 limiting

⁷³ FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 12.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷⁵ William J. Dorch, “Supporting the Peace: The End,” *Prism* 2, no 1 (December 2010), 52.

⁷⁶ Ballard, 137.

⁷⁷ Bruce E. Stanley, *Where's Cap Hatien? Validating the Principles of Peace Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, August 10, 2000), 32.

the UNMIH to 6000 troops.⁷⁸ Because UNMIH expressed concern about the ability of 6000 troops to secure Haiti, the MNF reduced its size to 6000 for 90 days to validate the force requirement.⁷⁹ Downsizing the 25th presence proved that a coalition force of 6000 could secure the Haitian population centers. It did not account for the more restrictive UN mandate for the UNMIH mission.

The UNMIH under US MG Joseph W. Kinzer also had only FM 100-23 to guide operations and was constrained as a UN force under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which calls for a peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement (Chapter VII) posture. Kinzer noted “the situation on the ground was not as pacific as the definition would indicate.”⁸⁰ On January 30, 1995, the UN passed UNSCR 975. The resolution called for transferring authority for the UN Mission from JTF-180 to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in March 1995. Under MG Joseph W. Kinzer, UNMIH sought to build on the successes of CJTF-180 and set the conditions for stability in Haiti. UNMIH wanted to provide a basis for stability by concentrating on building a reliable Haitian National Police (HNP) force. With 6000 soldiers authorized to UNMIH (compared to more than 20,000 present in Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy), the ability to continue to maintain control of a deteriorating security situation became far more challenging. UNMIH did not have the force structure to secure all of Haiti, so UNMIH had to deliberately prioritize assigning resources to secure the population centers.⁸¹ Limited resources applied thinly across various sites to secure Haiti and to facilitate Aristide’s return and subsequent election set the conditions for growing popular unrest, as Aristide supporters clashed with anti-Aristide forces.

⁷⁸ United Nations, *UNSCR 975* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 30 January 1995).

⁷⁹ Joseph W. Kinzer, *Success in Peacekeeping – United Nations Mission in Haiti: The Military Perspective* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996), 6.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 1-2.

⁸¹ Ibid., 16.

As security responsibilities transitioned to the UN, the situation was already beginning to devolve into anarchy. Very few Haitians believed the approaching elections would fundamentally change Haiti. Democracy was not yet a Haitian concept. The Provisional Electoral Commission, comprised primarily of Aristide's Lavalas party members, set up a program to educate voters and set the conditions for a successful election under the supervision of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICVIH).⁸² The Haitian people saw the Lavalas party as corrupt due to the way it rewarded party loyalty above merit. Not all of the candidates were on the ballot; some candidates were mislabeled; and the public sentiment reflected once again distrust for the government. When Haiti conducted legislative elections June 4, 1995, Aristide's Lavalas party won a significant majority. Large groups of Haitians protested. They burned several polling stations to the ground and burned their ballots in the streets rather than lend any credibility to an election process they saw as rigged.⁸³ Limited aims prior to the UNMIH mission had contributed to this failure by not addressing Haitian governance beyond restoring Aristide. CJTF 180 accomplished very little to foster legitimacy during the 6 months prior to the legislative elections because the mission assumed civilian agencies and the UNMIH would restore effective governance. CJTF 180's shortsighted aims were focused on civil security at the expense of stability. Limiting those aims meant UNMIH, an insufficiently resourced mission, would have greater responsibility for promoting stability.

Initial attempts at building police capacity in Haiti, one of the critical requirements for establishing security, failed to garner public support because the only experienced police were former FAd'H. In October 1995, Ray Kelly, who had just departed as the New York Police Department chief, took over the daunting task of reforming the Haitian National Police. Kelly's

⁸² John T. Fishel and Andres Saenz, eds, *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti* (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 15-17.

⁸³ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 136-137.

office began the task with 7000 FAd'H members, and through vetting, reduced the number by 3000, leaving the operational Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) at around 4000 total.⁸⁴ The use of former FAd'H in the IPSF was justified to the people as a necessary interim solution until the Haitian National Police could produce an alternative. It was difficult, however, for the people to feel comfortable with a police force that wore the FAd'H uniform, still employed members of the FAd'H, and used some of the same brutal tactics. Even the International Police Monitors (IPM), sent to Haiti to guard against, prevent, and report human rights violations did not observe the IPSF regularly because they did not feel safe going on patrol. The lack of support from the IPM and the overall ineptitude of the IPSF forced the 16th Military Police (MP) Brigade under COL Michael Sullivan to guide and control the IPSF by stationing MP Companies at each of the six major police stations in Port-au-Prince.⁸⁵

What the IPSF lacked in respect from the Haitian public, the newly founded Haitian National Police (HNP) Academy was supposed to overcome. IPSF members were barred from attending this academy, which kept the FAd'H out of the HNP and led to greater credibility with the Haitian population. The HNP, however, was completely inexperienced. They were described as “excessively polite, hence commanding insufficient respect, and too few in number.”⁸⁶ Ultimately, because the UN mandate called for the Haitians to be fully responsible for their own security by March 1996, this lightly armed, poorly trained, inexperienced force of 5,000 had to maintain the security of nearly 8 million people.⁸⁷ The limited aim of the UN mission in Haiti was to establish short-term security and fully transfer security responsibility to Haiti. Theoretically making Haiti responsible for security contributes to stability in Haiti and

⁸⁴ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 137.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 137-140.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 142.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

encourages Haitian participation. However, civil security and civil control were the only aspects of stability the mission sought to accomplish, and that greatly limited Haitian progress toward long-term stability.

Aristide completed his term in 1996. During his term, he had demobilized the old Haitian military and, with UNMIH assistance, he had set the conditions for the HNP to be successful.⁸⁸ Haitian law required that Aristide step down as president after a single term. Rene Preval won the 1996 elections, but charges of voter fraud and boycotts of the national election resulted in public outcry and destabilized the environment. In his first term as president, Preval took measures to nationalize industry in Haiti and introduced economic austerity, a controversial practice which came in the form of spending cuts, which quite literally forced policymakers to transfer fewer resources to those they favored.⁸⁹ Politically this posed significant issues for Preval with his legislature and led to calls for his resignation, partly from Aristide supporters.⁹⁰ Preval's economic policies, despite failing to achieve approval by the Haitian legislature, indicated long-term stability goals in Haitian leadership. Preval's vision for Haiti's economic security led to greater support from American leaders that looked to promote trade preference for Haiti and generate internal stability.

The UN remained after the mandate for UNMIH expired, first as the UN Security Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) in 1996, then the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) in 1997. UNSMIH established a criminal investigation unit and renovated 20 police stations. Preval requested the UN Security Mission remain in Haiti, and UNSCR 1086 provided some additional

⁸⁸ Ballard, 216-217.

⁸⁹ Brian S. Wesbury and Robert Stein, "Government Austerity: The Good, Bad and Ugly," *Forbes.com*, <http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/26/government-spending-taxes-opinions-columnists-brian-wesbury-robert-stein.html> (accessed January 16, 2012).

⁹⁰ Ballard, 98-99.

time, extending the mission termination date out to May 1997. With a day remaining on the UNSMIH mandate, UNSCR 1123 established UNTMIH, which departed in November 1997.⁹¹

On November 28, 1997, UNSCR 1141 established the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) with a yearlong mandate. MIPONUH had a force of 300 police trainers from 11 nations. The MIPONUH successfully professionalized the HNP, as evidenced by the internal accountability measures that removed several corrupt leaders, including the director of the police Judiciaire. The HNP failed to secure the countryside, however. The majority of the HNP patrolled the cities. That was necessary because most of the supplies and the HNP leadership were in the urban areas. The failure of the HNP to secure the countryside, in turn, led President Preval to call for a rural police force to monitor the mountainous and challenging terrain outside the cities, but he could garner no popular support.⁹²

The HNP demonstrated greater competence throughout 1998 in Port-au-Prince, but the situation was tenuous enough for the UN to extend the charter for MIPONUH by another year. The great successes for the HNP were in the streets, where shootings went from 59 in 1996 to just 3 a few years later. However, the HNP failed to stem the tide of political violence and refused to discipline its own members.⁹³ Between January and June 2000, Human Rights Watch reported “at least 70 cases of murder, intimidation, beatings, and assorted thuggery,” most of which reflected the political climate.⁹⁴ In an apparent attempt to regain his relevance, Aristide split from the Lavalas party and established the Lavalas Family party. As Preval struggled to implement sweeping economic changes, Aristide again appealed to the socialist desires of the people through the Lavalas Family party. The discontent Aristide developed spilled out into violent street

⁹¹ Fishel and Saenz, 15-24.

⁹² Ibid., 24-26.

⁹³ Ibid., 25-26.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 27.

confrontations between the two parties, but also won him the 2000 election and a second non-consecutive term as president.

The UN missions that followed UNMIH focused predominately on security and accomplished very little beyond building the HNP. The UN missions suffered from the same shortsighted aims as CJTF-180. With very little attention given to the Haitian endogenous growth dynamic and real substantive change in Haiti, it is small wonder that the short-duration UN missions only produced a need for extensions and additional UN missions. Ultimately, Haiti did become politically stable during the period following Operation Uphold Democracy, because stability had never been fully addressed.

Operation Secure Tomorrow, 2004

None of the successes claimed in the decade prior to 2004 seemed to matter much when another coup threatened to destroy Haiti from the inside. The political infighting of Lavalas and Aristide's Lavalas Family political parties saw both sides using violence to intimidate the population. Dissatisfaction among Preval supporters led to violent protests and claims of election fraud even before Aristide could assume responsibility for the presidency.

Claims of election fraud and challenges in the political system combined with failures to address the 1996 and 2000 election results to create a public unrest bordering on anarchy. When Aristide assumed his second term of office in 2001, political violence was again rife, as Haiti's factions took reprisals against each other. As Aristide's presidency faltered and protests increased, Ambassador Brian Dean Curran left Haiti citing his fear that Haiti was headed for a cataclysm.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Walt Bogdanich, "Mixed U.S. Signals Helped Tilt Haiti Toward Chaos," *New York Times* January 29, 2006.

Under external US and French pressure to resign and amid a collapse of internal security, Aristide resigned and fled into exile on February 29, 2004. In a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 10, 2004, Representative Maxine Waters of California called for an investigation into the U.S. involvement in Aristide's overthrow. She alleged that the United States made Aristide's resignation "a pre-condition to introducing United States forces to restore order."⁹⁶ Waters' statement only makes sense if taken in the context that Aristide's socialist agenda and desire to reduce the influence of the wealthy elite leadership in Haiti did not serve American interests. However, the United States found itself engaged in two theaters of war in 2004 and had very little interest in armed intervention in a third. Although the 2002 National Security Strategy focused largely on international terrorism, it maintained a commitment to improving stability in emerging markets.⁹⁷ The Bush administration had outlined a plan for improving stability in developing nations through building effective governance and economic security. These US policy objectives for the developing world suggested a plan that could have potentially driven Haiti and other developing nations to modernize, according to modernization theory.

The US contributed little more than leadership to the UN Mission, Operation Secure Tomorrow, to reestablish security in Haiti. Greater commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq made sending a significant contingent of US forces far less possible than in 1994. On February 25, 2004, President George W. Bush informed Congress that he was sending 55 personnel to augment embassy staff. In a letter to congressional leaders on March 2, 2004, President George W. Bush committed 200 additional "combat-equipped military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces

⁹⁶ Maxine Waters, *Statement by Rep. Maxine Waters on the Overthrow of the Democratically-Elected Government of Haiti*, March 10, 2004.

⁹⁷ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy Report* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2002), 22.

command.”⁹⁸ Under the leadership of US Marine Brigadier General Ronald Coleman, the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) dubbed CJTF-Haiti stood up under the provisions of UNSCR 1529. UNSCR 1529 created the international force.⁹⁹ The force was not large enough to secure the country, however, and attempted to work through the HNP with limited success.

UNSCR 1542, approved unanimously on 30 April 2004, established the UN Stability Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to take all necessary measures to put an end to the violence and to "ensure that the continued promotion and protection of human rights and the establishment of a State based on the rule of law and an independent judiciary.”¹⁰⁰ MINUSTAH took longer than expected to arrive, and provided very little force structure for securing the country. This allowed the violence in Haiti to expand. Although the UNSCR 1542 aim was for MINUSTAH to produce stability in a much broader sense, the mandate did very little to resource that aim.

The doctrine provided to MINUSTAH at the onset of the 2004 crisis gave even less practical guidance than the 1994 FM 100-23. The December 2003 edition of the Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations contained some effective techniques and procedures for CMO and for planning to limit the duration of the UN mission itself, but failed to provide an operational framework to guide subsequent groups of UN peacekeepers. A UN peacekeeping operation is designed to be temporary.¹⁰¹ Clearly, if the goal is for the operation to be temporary and requires a defined exit strategy, the aims of any UN mission would be limited. The UNSCRs set the limits on the 2004 military intervention by establishing the initial timeline. By limiting the operation to 90 days and providing a limited force to conduct

⁹⁸ George W. Bush, *Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Further Deployment of United States Military Forces in Haiti*, March 2, 2004.

⁹⁹ Fishel and Saenz, 41.

¹⁰⁰ United Nations, *UNSCR 1542* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 30 April 2004).

¹⁰¹ United Nations, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, December 2003), 1-42.

the operation, UNSCRs 1529 and 1542 kept the military aims from extending beyond the same shortsighted focus on security forces that plagued the 1994 intervention. The lack of any defined doctrine to assist the UN mission only served to undermine any progress in all stability tasks beyond security.

In contrast to the UN mission, United States policy toward Haiti in the wake of the 2004 coup focused on establishing the conditions for stability beyond the military. The United States foreign policy objectives for the intervention included "stabilizing the security situation, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, promoting the formation of an independent government, restoring the rule of law, and encouraging steps to improve Haiti's dire economic conditions."¹⁰² In the 2002 National Security Strategy President Bush clearly stated his intent to promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's shores.¹⁰³ The broader focus by the Bush administration on Haitian development suggests a departure from the Clinton administration's policy and demonstrates a more coherent framework for building stability.

Aristide's departure improved the US commitment to and relationship with Haiti. Although Haiti remained without effective governance for two years following the 2004 ouster of Aristide, Preval won the 2006 election and quickly established a desire to reform Haiti economically and capitalize on the US interest in developing nations. Haiti's economic security saw a boost in 2006 from the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act, which established a US trade preference with Haiti and again in 2008, when the US extended the HOPE Act to HOPE II for 10 years. These two acts gave Haiti unprecedented trade preference and encouraged outside investors to see Haiti as a greater

¹⁰² Fishel and Saenz, 41.

¹⁰³ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy Report* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2002), 22.

opportunity than they had previously.¹⁰⁴ The per capita GDP in Haiti grew from \$311.44 in 2003 to \$658.12 in 2008 with the introduction of trade preference.¹⁰⁵ Preval's commitment to modernization and external interest in improving Haitian stability marked a shift from prior Haitian conditions and reflect that the policy agenda in the aftermath of the 2004 invasion was a clear improvement from the failure to capitalize on the success of the 1994 intervention. The UN military intervention in 2004 suffered from the same limited aims and doctrinal deficiencies of its 1994 predecessor. However, the US policy toward developing nations improved and focused on building the endogenous growth dynamic. Although Haiti remained unstable up to the 2010 earthquake, the conditions for modernization were beginning to emerge.

Conclusions

Haiti has a long and complex history, marked by significant violence and repressive authoritarian regimes. Since the 1915 intervention in Haiti, United States Foreign Policy has been inconsistent and has sent a message varying from complicit support for authoritarianism in Haiti to lack of concern about Haiti's political instability and needs. Although the United States intervened in Haiti in 1994 and provided a temporarily stable and secure environment that successfully facilitated the restoration of Aristide as president, the United States did not commit to change in Haiti at the internal institutional level. This failure was due to the limited strategic aim of providing only a stable and secure environment. Because the US focus was almost exclusively on security forces, and because the US forces deployed without the doctrinal foundation to affect fundamental change no serious efforts were made toward building Haitian institutional capacity.

¹⁰⁴ Maureen Taft-Morales, *Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 25, 2008), 23-24.

¹⁰⁵ "World Development Indicators."

The various UN Missions in Haiti had a more direct mandate to promote stability and modernization, but failed to change the political and cultural inhibitors to long-term stability. Successfully setting the conditions for long-term stability in Haiti would have required improving the political climate, developing economic security, and fostering openness to modernization. The majority of resources from the UN mandate concentrated on producing a short duration stable and secure environment and on establishing security forces. The long-term effects of occupation by the United States and the UN managed to have a destabilizing effect, as the personnel trained to provide Haitian security failed initially to gain the respect of the people, were inexperienced at handling the security challenge, and ultimately committed in human rights violations.

The Haitian political climate remained unstable during the period after the 1994 intervention up to the 2010 Leogane earthquake. Charges of election corruption and ballot fraud led to massive demonstrations that challenged Rene Preval's first term as president and led to the eventual overthrow of Jean Bertrand Aristide in 2004 and another UN intervention. Infighting between the Lavalas party and Aristide's Lavalas Family Party resulted in widespread violence, decreased security, and threatened to further destabilize the country during Preval's second term.

The Haitian economy was just beginning to overcome the 1994 embargo at the time of the 2010 earthquake. Predictably, the earthquake devastated Haiti economically and destroyed what little physical infrastructure existed. The governance successes of the mid to late 2000's under Rene Preval fell into shambles as the Lavalas Party and Lavalas Family Party continued to be at odds until the earthquake. The enactment of the HOPE legislation provided a significant boost to the Haitian economy. The Haitian GDP increased measurably. Haitian openness to modernization appeared to be changing rapidly. The policies of Rene Preval during his second term seem to indicate that Haiti was growing more open to modernization.

Haitian progress has faced repeated challenges that have forced the international community to intervene on multiple occasions. The two most notable interventions in 1994 and 2004 were due to near anarchy in the wake of two coups enacted during Aristide's two

nonconsecutive terms as president. In each of those cases, Aristide's strategic message of socialism and his counterdrug policy isolated him from the wealthy Haitian elite. Although this made Aristide popular among common Haitians, it also made him a threat to the elite and the system of patronage.

Haiti poses a unique problem for the United States. Close to American soil geographically, politically connected to American elite through a diaspora, but economically and socially bankrupt, Haiti has required a significant amount of United States attention since the turn of the 20th Century. As COL William Mendel assessed in a 1994 article for *Military Review*, Haiti's proximity to the United States and cultural ties of a large, black minority in the United States to friends and relatives in Haiti have caused Haiti to remain relevant to the United States in the long term and have driven United States efforts there.¹⁰⁶ With a goal of security and ultimately stability, United States military intervention has characterized the United States approach to Haiti, but has failed to achieve long-term strategic results. Military intervention can only be a small part of a larger whole of government effort to produce long-term strategic ends in Haiti.

¹⁰⁶ Mendel, 48.

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