The United States in Pakistan: Toward a More Unified Effort
Abstract
This paper considers the relationship between the U.S and Pakistan since 9/11, recognizing that the U.S. has had limited success in achieving its goals in-Pakistan. Specifically, this paper asks: how can the U.S. move forward in Pakistan to better achieve its long-term security aims? Since 2001, the U.S. has largely failed to effectively influence Pakistan s strategic calculus and behavior a necessary objective to achieve the U.S. aim to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda in its Pakistani safehavens. Indeed, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen recently suggested in public what many officials have privately known for some time that the current approach is not working. This paper explores the state of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship by evaluating the quality of the U.S. whole-of-government approach and our ability to achieve unity of effort in how we engage Pakistan. This paper finds that the U.S. approach to Pakistan had lacked unity of effort in at least three important ways. Consequently, this paper argues that the U.S. must synchronize its efforts across the interagency spectrum to be more effective at influencing Pakistan s strategic calculus. This paper makes specific recommendations for improving U.S. unity of effort within a more realistic and potentially more effective strategic approach to Pakistan.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 25, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA568540
Entities
People
- Anthony Demartino
Organizations
- Center for a New American Security