Effects of Architecture on Information Leakage of a Hardware Advanced Encryption Standard Implementation
Abstract
Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a threat to many modern cryptosystems. Many countermeasures exist, but are costly to implement and still do not provide complete protection against SCA. A plausible alternative is to design the cryptosystem using architectures that are known to leak little information about the cryptosystem's operations. This research uses several common primitive architectures for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and assesses the susceptibility of the full AES system to side-channel attack for various primitive configurations. A combined encryption/decryption core is also evaluated to determine if variation of high-level architectures affects leakage characteristics. These different configurations are evaluated under multiple measurement types and leakage models. The results show that different hardware configurations do impact the amount of information leaked by a device, but none of the tested configurations are able to prevent exploitation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 13, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA568668
Entities
People
- Eric A. Koziel
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology