Finding Space in Deterrence: Toward a General Framework for "Space Deterrence"
Abstract
The literature on nuclear deterrence provides valuable lessons for improving our understanding of deterrence in space and the role of space in deterrence. The lessons of this literature are a first step in developing a deterrence framework for space. The three elements of a deterrence framework -- imposing costs, denying benefits, and encouraging restraint -- do not have to be present in equal measure. By its nature, deterrence is adversary- and context-specific. Within the framework presented here, the United States must tailor specific approaches to specific potential adversaries in different scenarios. Some combination of these three elements will be required, and the elements must be applied within an overarching framework that is consistent to ensure credibility against multiple actors. While many lament the U.S. dependence on space, those capabilities provide an unparalleled ability to project power globally across all domains. To ensure that the United States maintains the strategic advantage derived from those capabilities, it must develop a posture that not only deters counterspace operations but also ensures that space instability does not collapse the threshold for deterrence failure during a broader terrestrial crisis. Enhancing resilience, augmentation, and the ability to operate in a degraded environment all contribute to both deterrence in space and to the space component of strategic stability. Resilient space systems can support their assigned missions despite an adversary's purposeful interference. Augmentation of space systems through partnerships also provides an additional margin that makes it harder for a potential adversary to deprive forces of the space-derived capabilities that enable modern warfare. Some degree of degradation of the space environment is probable before and during a terrestrial conflict. U.S. and coalition forces must be prepared to conduct successful air, land, sea, and cyber operations in this degraded space environment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA569581
Entities
People
- James P. Finch
- Shawn Steene
Organizations
- Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense