Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector: A Coercive Failure?
Abstract
Coercion theory centers on an actor's ability to influence the decision making of an opponent. This monograph examines two military operations that occurred in Libya in 2011, Operation Unified Protector and Operation Odyssey Dawn, through the lens of coercion theory. The monograph seeks to answer the following question: If the United States and its allies attempted to apply coercion theory against Gaddafi preceding and during military operations, why did he seemingly exhibit no behavioral changes prior to his death? This monograph purports that even though Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector succeeded in supporting the removal of the Gaddafi regime, ultimately they represent a coercive failure. The military operations in Libya in 2011 illustrate several central tenets of coercion theory. First, for coercion to be possible, the stated desired behavioral change must actually be intended. Furthermore, coercive demands must contain a plausible way out. Also, national and coalition objectives and agendas must be thoroughly enumerated and accounted for. Most importantly, whereas coercion theory provides military planners with an excellent starting point for asking relevant questions, it cannot serve as a formulaic overlay to inherently complex and unfamiliar situations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 06, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA569667
Entities
People
- Richard A. Goodman
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College