Commander's Emergency Response Program: A Flawed Metric
Abstract
Throughout its military history, the United States has demonstrated poor institutional memory resulting in a tendency to reinvent the wheel. The development of counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam, for instance, yielded valuable knowledge about combating an irregular enemy. Regardless, the subsequent foray into a counterinsurgent environment during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) proved problematic as the United States scrambled to adapt to yet another asymmetric threat. Operationally, the selection of performance metrics by the United States in complex and adaptive battlefields has mirrored this argument. Throughout the entirety of OIF, the United States spent over $60 billion on reconstruction and stability, of which the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) cost the U.S. taxpayers over $4 billion. Reminiscent of the poor selection of performance measures in Vietnam, the metrics used to evaluate the effectiveness of the CERP proved insufficient and resulted in the waste of time, money, and resources. Adopting a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper examines various aspects of performance metrics and, ultimately, their effect on the CERP. The paper uses select historical cases to compare and contrast the selection of performance metrics in a conventional versus an irregular conflict. Empirical evidence also is used to test the effectiveness of metrics and their effect on outcomes. The analysis shows that the selection of performance criteria is more difficult in asymmetric environments. As the paper illustrates, the United States has wasted immense amounts of effort and money because poorly selected metrics are not always indicative of success. This fact, compounded by a lack of regulation and oversight, resulted in the CERP providing questionable outcomes for military leaders. It is vital that military commanders develop and implement metrics that are measurable and that provide an accurate assessment of progress.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 06, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA570014
Entities
People
- Michael J. Higgins
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College