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14. ABSTRACT Given its political and economic influence, strategic location along the Gulf of Guinea, and vast resource capacity (e.g. energy, people and geographic size), Nigeria provides the United States the best opportunity to meet its regional objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. However, key to ensuring effective and efficient engagement of, with, and through Nigeria will be understanding (and respecting) their roles and goals within international, regional and sub-regional organizations. In particular, the U.S. should look to Nigeria's position as a leader in peacekeeping as a prime leverage point. Their historical and (mostly) credible roles played in these operations across all three levels of organizational leadership provide entrance points for U.S. direct and indirect engagement. Additionally, Nigeria's ability to influence the level of credibility and legitimacy these organizations maintain will be instrumental in allowing the U.S. to fulfill its national interests of stability and strategic access. By leveraging Nigeria's position as a regional, continental and international leader in peacekeeping operations, the United States can enhance and promote long-term stability in Western Africa.					
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CAPSTONE RESEARCH PAPER

Leveraging Peacekeeping Partners: African Continental Progress One Sub-Region at a Time

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations based on the following assigned topic:

- What international organizations or stakeholders (e.g., Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], the African Union [AU], etc.) are associated with Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea and in what interests/activities are they involved? How might the United States leverage their capabilities?

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: //SIGNED//

01 November 2012

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Abstract

Given its political and economic influence, strategic location along the Gulf of Guinea, and vast resource capacity (e.g. energy, people and geographic size), Nigeria provides the United States the best opportunity to meet its regional objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. However, key to ensuring effective and efficient engagement of, with, and through Nigeria will be understanding (and respecting) their roles and goals within international, regional and sub-regional organizations. In particular, the U.S. should look to Nigeria's position as a leader in peacekeeping as a prime leverage point. Their historical and (mostly) credible roles played in these operations across all three levels of organizational leadership provide entrance points for U.S. direct and indirect engagement. Additionally, Nigeria's ability to influence the level of credibility and legitimacy these organizations maintain will be instrumental in allowing the U.S. to fulfill its national interests of stability and strategic access. By leveraging Nigeria's position as a regional, continental and international leader in peacekeeping operations, the United States can enhance and promote long-term stability in Western Africa.

Introduction

“As we look toward the future, it is clear that Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular. . . . Addressing the opportunities and challenges in Africa requires a comprehensive U.S. policy that is proactive, forward-looking, and that balances our long-term interests with near-term imperatives.”¹

- President Barack Obama
U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa
June 14, 2012

As the United States (U.S.) moves forward in the 21st Century, inextricable ties around the globe are becoming more prevalent. As such, U.S. interests on the African continent have taken on growing strategic importance. For the U.S., core national interests in sub-Saharan Africa are clear in “ensuring the security of the United States, our citizens, and our allies and partners; promoting democratic states that are economically vibrant and strong partners of the United States on the world stage; expanding opportunities for U.S. trade and investment; preventing conflict and mass atrocities; and fostering broad-based, sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation.”² Additionally, Africa provides key sources of energy imports (Nigeria ranks in the top five suppliers of U.S. oil imports) and offers ideal (and profitable) investment opportunities in the energy, mineral, and telecommunications mineral sectors.³ Though guided by these clearly stated goals and practical linkages, the challenge for the U.S. is how to achieve them in a sub-region, let alone the larger continent, that has historically been rife with conflict, corruption and instability.

In addressing issues and working toward its goals in Africa writ large, the U.S. has looked to leveraging the resources, economies and governments of sub-regional “anchor states.” These major African players (generally recognized as Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt) provide the U.S. key regional partners through which broader influence is attempted. In the sub-Saharan / Western Africa region, Nigeria fills this role as an anchor state. Several

factors, including its relative economic wealth, vast oil and gas reserves, large Muslim population and leadership role in African affairs have made Nigeria a key U.S. strategic ally on the continent.⁴ Nigeria's leadership in continental peace operations spans from their key roles in the sub-regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the still growing regional organization of the African Union (AU). Additionally, Nigeria has been a significant contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions across the globe, consistently ranking among the top five troop providing nations.⁵ Nigeria's sub-regional, regional, and international political influence coupled with its relatively significant economic resources has allowed the country to play key roles in conflict mediation and peace and stability operations across Africa.

Given its political and economic influence, strategic location along the Gulf of Guinea, and vast resource capacity (e.g. energy, people and geographic size), Nigeria provides the United States the best opportunity to meet its regional objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. However, key to ensuring effective and efficient engagement of, with, and through Nigeria will be understanding (and respecting) their roles and goals within international, regional and sub-regional organizations. In particular, the U.S. should look to Nigeria's position as a leader in peacekeeping as a prime leverage point. Nigeria's historical and (mostly) credible roles played in these operations across all three levels of organizational leadership provide entrance points for U.S. direct and indirect engagement. Additionally, Nigeria's ability to influence the level of credibility and legitimacy these organizations maintain will be instrumental in allowing the U.S. to fulfill its national interests of stability and strategic access. By leveraging Nigeria's position as a regional, continental and international leader in peacekeeping operations, the United States can enhance and promote long-term stability in Western Africa.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): A Sub-Regional Approach

Nigeria's leadership role in peacekeeping operations begins at home within the West African sub-region. David Francis, Professor of African Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford, refers to the area as a "bad neighbourhood," citing its dubious historical honor of having "the highest incidence of military coups and interventions in civilian politics in Africa."⁶ As many of the conflicts that arise in the sub-region do not stay localized, outside factions have been known to interfere through standing political alliances, informal commercial agreements and exploitation of foundering economies. Additionally, today's reality of trans-national threats to stability and security by organizations such as Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) have amplified potential problems in the region.

As an attempt to normalize mutual support across the region, West African states formed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975. These 15 nations look to ECOWAS as an instrument to better integrate and coordinate their economic, political and security strengths in a collective bloc manner for the development of the region writ large. As the organization continued to mature, collective security agreements were formed, similar to those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as a hedge against traditional military external threats.⁷ However, due to the nature of West African conflicts, ECOWAS was quickly forced to alter its collective security arrangement to cover a much wider aperture of security issues, including peacekeeping, following the breakout of fighting in Liberia 1989.

As the situation in Liberia deteriorated into a regional crisis that included massive numbers of refugee migrations, severe human rights violations, and mass atrocities, the members of ECOWAS were effectively forced to shift their security stance from conflict management to conflict prevention.⁸ In doing so, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring

Group (ECOMOG) was formed from which, ideally, a traditional peacekeeping mission could be embarked upon to de-escalate the violence in an attempt to mediate a more peaceful transition of government. This regional security initiative was implemented through pressure placed on the ECOWAS partners by the former military dictator of Nigeria, General Babangida. Through his preponderance of force, financial means and political influence, he “effectively directed the creation of ECOMOG, citing the imperative of Nigeria’s foreign and security policy, as the justification for the establishment of the regional peacekeeping and intervention force.”⁹ However, as previously discussed, due to the traditional nature of West African conflicts, traditional peacekeeping would not cover the scope of intervention required to attain the level of peace needed in Liberia.

Traditional peacekeeping (e.g. missions defined by the UN Charter Chapter VI) is conducted at the behest of the warring parties under a cease-fire agreement as a neutral force that is in place to build trust between the combatants in order to prevent further violence. However in Liberia, ECOMOG’s mission was severely ill-defined. Forces found themselves in the position that many “peacekeeping” forces have found themselves in Africa; directly involved in complex issues that span largely un- / poorly-governed spaces with underlying political and social grievances. Hence, the mission quickly shifted from “peacekeeping” to “peace enforcement,” akin to a UN Charter, Chapter VII mission in which force becomes authorized in the intervention.¹⁰ The situation in Liberia was a precursor to multiple ECOWAS “peacekeeping” interventions across the region, including Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire. Within these conflicts, “mission creep” has caused a continued migration of effort away from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, humanitarian aid, and in some cases, counter-insurgency.

Although interventions performed by ECOWAS have been partial successes, many question the validity and legitimacy of the organization's involvement, especially in light of its *de facto* leader, Nigeria. In the case of Liberia, the push for early intervention championed by Nigeria was initially questioned by many West African states. Perceived as a risk to its own national security, Nigeria was forceful in encouraging intervention against Charles Taylor's forces in Liberia. Against much resistance by nations such as Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria succeeded in gaining support for the operation. Providing the bulk of the resources, Nigeria was successful in furthering its geo-strategic interests via the sub-regional organization, though one member of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) noted that "ECOMOG... is nothing but a convenient camouflage for an effective Nigerian war machine."¹¹ Given the fear of "Nigerianisation" and a sometimes perceived sense of "pax Nigeria," some argue that overbearing Nigerian leadership has actually inhibited the potential of ECOWAS as a whole.¹²

Although some would point out the detractors of Nigerian leadership in the sub-region and the legitimacy of the ECOWAS organization and intervention policy as a whole, one cannot ignore the advantages that each brings to the table of stability. First, Nigeria is the undeniable economic, military and political leader in the sub-region. Given the preponderance of force and resources it provides to missions across the area, one cannot argue that it does not recognize its vested interest in preventing potentially destabilizing issues. Secondly, intervention by ECOWAS, under Nigerian leadership, provides a true sense of security for all players in a highly volatile region of the world. Their ability and willingness to take immediate collective action against potential threats to already tenuous holds on power have allowed many to ensure regime survival.¹³ Finally, Nigerian leadership brings to ECOWAS what many others could not: external resources. Given the endemic issues of most peacekeeping (especially African)

organizations, external economic, diplomatic and military support is absolutely crucial for success. Due to its strategic positioning and importance to the U.S. in particular, Nigeria is best postured in West Africa to garner these critical resources. Through its multi-lateral and bilateral support mechanisms, Nigeria brings expertise, training capacity and resources that can be leveraged by the entirety of ECOWAS for West African stability across an array of conflict issues. In today's complex environment in which peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions are becoming more and more intertwined with counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, the U.S. may find strategic value in supporting a hegemonic power like Nigeria in African sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS.

The African Union (AU): African Solutions to African Problems

Nigeria plays a key role beyond its sub-region of West Africa. Looking across the African region, the African Union (AU) continues to grow in prominence and influence. As a leading proponent of an "Africa First" approach, Nigeria has led the building of continental peace and security efforts in the AU. As the only country to sit on the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) every year since its inception in 2004, Nigeria has been instrumental in developing the AU's ideal objectives for regional collective security and responses to sub-regional issues.¹⁴ The AU has also leaned heavily on Nigeria's political will with regard to funding continental security efforts. Due to severe fiscal challenges faced by most African nations, the AU has attempted to maintain a Peace Fund as an encouragement to regional actors to participate in peacekeeping operations. Managed through significant Nigerian leadership on the PSC, the fund is designed to help offset the costs to African governments' efforts to assist in destabilizing conflicts. However, inequitable funding participation has resulted in Nigeria being one of only five nations that provide 75 percent of the entire budget. Despite the already heavy

load incurred by Nigeria (approximately 15 percent), recent political upheaval in two of the most significant donor countries (Libya and Egypt), Nigeria may be forced to increase its share of contributions if the Peace Fund is to survive.¹⁵ Through efforts of a few leading countries such as Nigeria, the AU continues to make strides toward establishing an effective system for creating continental solutions to African conflicts.

Formed upon the foundations of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the AU has decidedly taken a different tack with regards to their role in conflict management across the continent. Following the formation of the AU in the early 2000's, the AU's new stance was once described as "a shift from the old norm of 'noninterference' in armed conflicts to a new posture of 'nonindifference' to member states' internal affairs."¹⁶ Though the AU has shifted to a posture of "nonindifference," it has however maintained certain key elements born of the OAU, specifically those regarding recognition of state sovereignty to the maximum extent possible, a hesitation to use force if possible, and a strong anti-imperialist (hence external influence) aversion whenever feasible. In the aftermath of centuries of imperialist and Cold War-based interventions, "a consensus is emerging in Africa... centered on the need to establish and promote institutional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, as well as for states and nongovernmental organizations to be more proactive in peacekeeping in the continent consistent with the notion of African solutions to African problems."¹⁷ As such, with regard to the recognized imperative of security and stability as a precursor for good governance and growth of the continental states, the AU has been firm in reiterating its intolerance of "unconstitutional changes of government" and commitment to a "limited right of intervention" in the prevention of severe human rights violations.¹⁸

As the AU has recognized these two imperatives that may lead to involuntary intervention, it has done so, much like the sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS have, partly out of a sense of necessity. As one looks back to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, it is not lost on either the AU or ECOWAS that an imperative to act will be felt most greatly by them; the countries most affected. In Liberia, despite human rights violations and atrocities that were taking place, the UN failed to act until three years into the conflict. Additionally, failures of the UN missions in Somalia in 1994 and Angola in 1999 have also laid the backdrop for the AU to envision a prominent role in African peacekeeping interventions. In organizing themselves for potential armed conflict intervention, the AU is working toward the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF), comprised primarily of troops organized within regional brigades. As such, Nigeria will play a prominent role in the West African brigade, comprised primarily of ECOMOG forces. As in direct intervention by ECOWAS, Nigeria's experience and resources will propel them to leadership positions within the ASF as well. Additionally, AU planners currently envision ASF brigades operating within their home regions to the maximum extent possible, thereby further strengthening Nigeria's role in ASF operations.¹⁹

Still yet to be fully tested, the ASF construct may encounter issues early-on once engaged, as the current AU doctrine restricts the use of AU brigades to a series of six scenarios strictly focused on peace operations (see Table 1). Notably, these operations “do not authorize the ASF to engage with other security challenges, such as those associated with counterterrorism, antipiracy and maritime security, disaster management, or broader questions of security sector reform.”²⁰ These restrictions, coupled with endemic political jockeying, financial and /or resource shortages, and expansive challenges with regard to interoperability and command and control (C2), have potential to make the ASF an impotent force if not well managed and led.

Even with the identified potential issues, the AU has recently engaged in joint AU-UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Sudan.

Table 1. African Standby Force Design Scenarios²¹

Scenario	Description	Deployment requirement (from mandate resolution)
1	AU/regional military advice to a political mission.	Thirty days
2	AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.	Thirty days
3	Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission.	Thirty days
4	AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building).	Thirty days
5	AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers.	Ninety days with the military component being able to deploy in thirty days.
6	AU intervention, e.g., in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.	Fourteen days with robust military force*

Moving forward, Nigeria will continue to play a pivotal role in future AU-sanctioned peacekeeping operations as the ASF continues to be formed.

The United Nations (UN): Keeping the Peace on a Global Level

Underpinning most peacekeeping operations around the globe is the activities of the UN. Through its worldwide membership and Security Council, the UN plays an important role in providing legitimacy to, advocating for and oversight of global missions. Through its Charter, the UN takes primary responsibility for ensuring peacekeeping interventions are conducted in accordance with international norms. However, an important point germane to Africa in particular, is the fact that although the UN is looked to as the leader in the broader political sense, the Secretary-General has acknowledged the important roles that regional and sub-regional organizations such as the AU and ECOWAS play in the peacekeeping mission. As such, the UN has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the improvement of these collective security organizations' capacity and capability to conduct peacekeeping missions, and acknowledged the UN's role as a supporting mechanism in some instances.²² Nigeria serves as an ideal example of a nation who has been able to bridge this array of varied operations starting within days of its independence in 1960. Providing police and / or military forces to 24 of 51

UN peacekeeping missions between 1960 and 2004 in addition to six other OAU/AU and ECOWAS operations, Nigeria continues to be an international leader in peacekeeping efforts.²³ Today, Nigeria's expertise in peacekeeping efforts at an international level is once again on display, as Major General Moses Bisong Obi, Nigerian Army, continues to serve as the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Force Commander following his previous success as the Force Commander of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

The UN's deference to other organizations stems from past UN difficulties, especially in Africa (e.g. Somalia and Angola), a shortage of resources, and the potential lack of consensus support for action and / or troop commitment from member countries. Deference to these organizations may also bring broader concerns along other fronts as well. Interests, power perceptions, capacity and authority are consistent looming issues when operations fall outside of the UN's purview.²⁴ Reviewing Nigeria's role in Liberia vis-à-vis ECOMOG, because there was no oversight and validation of intervention legitimacy by the international authority on peacekeeping, Nigeria was able to pursue the intervention under the umbrella of regional security though some parties suspected higher self-interests goals were the real cause. Hence, though Nigeria's self-interests were immediately fulfilled (and in this case true atrocities were somewhat tempered), greater economic, diplomatic and military interests may have been viewed differently if the UN would have had earlier oversight. Until UN oversight began (3 years after the conflict started), power perceptions of Nigeria were also at stake. Because of the Nigerian defined role of troops, the lack of peacekeeping doctrine and the absence of a balanced, neutral overseer (e.g. UN blue-helmets), their troops quickly turned peacekeeping operations into violent peace enforcement, taking advantage of the poorly governed state. This contributed to the Liberian re-defined ECOMOG acronym to "Every Car or Movable Object Gone."²⁵ Capacity is yet another

concern of non-UN controlled peacekeeping operations due to the usually limited military capacities, economic contributions, or lack of political will of organizations to effectively prosecute the mission at hand. Nigeria, however, has performed admirably well in this category, ranking as one of the perennial top five peacekeeping troop contributing nations to not only UN, but also AU and ECOWAS derived missions. Currently, Nigeria ranks number five in the world, contributing nearly 21 percent of total police, military troops and observers to UN sponsored missions (5596 personnel deployed as of 30 September 2012), in addition to several hundreds of others deployed in support of ECOWAS operations.²⁶ Finally, as the UN maintains the moral and legal authority, accepted by the nations of the world through their Charter, some argue that peacekeeping missions should fall directly under their authority only. As such, the UN should maintain the ability to call upon global peacekeeping troops for internationally recognized requirements, while not having to be concerned with regionally focused groups detracting assets towards a lesser priority.

Given these potential issues, there is a significant role for the UN in coordinating along all three levels of peacekeeping forces. The UN's ability to muster support from a broad base of resources is unmatched. The U.S. provides more than 27% of the UN's peacekeeping budget alone, far more than any single country or regional organization could muster on their own.²⁷ Additionally, although progress is being made toward the establishment of a responsive ASF in the AU, for example, none of the brigades are currently resourced to effectively function without significant external support from outside organizations such as the UN.

Nigeria has proven to be able to successfully work across these levels of peacekeeping operations as evidenced in their police forces' recent commendation for their role in the ongoing hybrid UN-AU United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), in which the Special

Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), Mrs. Hilda Johnson, described them as some of the “most resourceful and competent personnel in the mission,” and lauded the government of Nigeria for their “strategic partnership and contributions toward global peace.”²⁸ Through support of major contributors such as the U.S. and dedicated nations such as Nigeria, UN peacekeeping operations will remain the stalwart around the globe, but will require continued efforts to coordinate and integrate their efforts at all levels.

Conclusion

Integrated U.S. Partnership at All Levels is the Key to Security and Stability

“Should we falter in our commitment to developing African peacekeeping capacity, the consequence will be heavier burdens on the international community as a whole, whether through the deployment of more “blue-helmet” operations, or even direct military intervention in cases where national security is at stake. We strongly believe that the only way to achieve sustainable, long-term stability on the continent is to provide our African partners with the tools needed to bring about that stability themselves.”²⁹

- Jonnie Carson

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs
September 13, 2012

As the U.S. looks to accomplish its desired end states in West Africa, the leveraging of all three levels of peacekeeping organizations will become increasingly important. The destabilizing effects of conflicts across the region upsets economic development and investment, affects the education opportunities of populations, and presents security challenges that can quickly shift from local threats to trans-national. In doing so, it is imperative for the U.S. to impart a sense of ownership of these issues on our designated anchor states, encouraging them to take the lead. By burden sharing responsibilities of peacekeeping missions with Nigeria, for example, both countries can benefit. First, due to historical and cultural biases against excessive external involvement, providing Nigeria with “ownership” of the issue, backed by U.S. political (and potentially financial and materiel) support assists in providing the country with the

legitimacy required to take action. This legitimacy is provided not only to the international community, but also to their domestic populace. Secondly, burden sharing shifts direct responsibility away from the U.S., therefore greatly reducing requirements to send U.S. troops into harm's way for intervention. In 2011 alone, more than 100 UN peacekeepers were killed in the line of duty, amplifying the imperative of a U.S. policy of pushing for African solutions first.³⁰ Particularly important in the context of a military who not only conducts external peacekeeping support, but also internal counter terrorism actions against Boko Haram, the U.S. has been keen to provide assistance to bolster public confidence on military and police forces.³¹ This legitimacy is built not only through political support, but continued (and potentially increased) resource and training support through Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs such as the Africa Contingency operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOSTA), the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the DoD's Section 1206 programs which support counter-terrorism operations and foreign training.

U.S. support of Nigerian leadership within ECOWAS, the AU and the UN is instrumental in providing the U.S. with a "foot in the door" with regard to West Africa. As the undisputed power-player in the region, Nigeria's influence on regional actors may provide the impetus required for potential U.S. international intervention in a particular situation (e.g. UN action taken in Libya was in large part based on support of external influences from alliances such as the Arab League). Due to the complex nature of today's conflicts and the inextricable ties to trans-national terrorism, this support may provide extremely capable, complementary forces to offset U.S. shortfalls in a fiscally constrained future.

U.S. support of Nigerian leadership within a relatively powerful regional organization does not however come without associated risks. Along with previously discussed hesitations by

regional actors of further building of Nigeria as a hegemonic power, another particular concern to the U.S. may be other external power players' influence on Nigeria. As an example, China's political and economic influence across the African continent continues to grow, setting off concerns regarding a newfound "scramble by outside powers for access and influence in sub-Saharan Africa and strategic rivalry with the United States."³² Additionally, direct support of the Nigerian leadership role in ECOWAS and across greater African affairs must be balanced with the acknowledgement of the critical roles played by continental and international organizations in ensuring stability across the region as well. Finally, the U.S. must be cognizant of the governments of Nigeria's many failures on its domestic front. Key to maintaining an effective and credible partner in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations is a concerted U.S. effort to promote and encourage a Nigerian balanced approach to international and domestic conflicts.

In the end, effective support of Nigerian peacekeeping efforts and forces has great potential in supporting U.S. national interest goals in the region. Nigeria's role as an anchor state, providing great influence over not only sub-regional, but also greater regional and international efforts, can provide the U.S. with opportunities to share the burden across a highly volatile region of the world.

Recommendations

*"The foreign policy of the United States is built on the three Ds: defense, diplomacy, and development. The men and women in our armed forces perform their duties with courage and skill, putting their lives on the line time and time again on behalf of our nation. And in many regions, they serve alongside civilians from the State Department and USAID, as well as other government agencies, like USDA."*³³

- Secretary Hillary Clinton
Secretary of State
April 30, 2009

As the U.S. progresses into a period of new fiscal constraints and a concerted shift to the Pacific region, challenges associated with the African continent and the complex issues involved

with trans-national threats will further highlight the need to support our African partners. No doubt, burden sharing in Africa to push African solutions to African problems will require creative thinking and approaches to assisting our peacekeeping partners in Nigeria. Below are recommendations to improve Nigerian peacekeeping capabilities in order to strengthen U.S.-Nigerian relations, improve Nigerian peacekeeping and counter-terrorism capabilities, and reinforce Nigeria's role as a legitimate peacekeeping force.

- 1) Encourage Nigerian reforms of domestic democratic programs and military/police anti-corruption efforts to gain international support for an African seat on the UN Security Council.

Nigeria's efforts toward domestic reforms have been recognized through their previous selection to the Africa Group as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. However, additional reforms to further instill legitimacy and credibility in their fledgling civilian-ruled democracy and professionalization of their military and police forces are critical in gaining international support of the establishment of a permanent African representation on the UNSC. Nigeria's vast experience in peacekeeping operations, not only on the African continent, but across the globe, could pay significant dividends to the UN peacekeeping efforts.

- 2) Integrate DoS and DoD funding lines and programs toward training of Nigerian forces for complex conflict missions.

In approaching support to Nigerian peacekeeping operations, the integration of DoS and DoD programs will be crucial in ensuring effective burden sharing can be achieved, along with avoidance of duplication of effort between the agencies. Additionally, as peacekeeping operations continue to be conducted in complex environments, many times including counter-terrorism (CT) / insurgency operations, coordination of State and Defense funding and training programs will become more important. As such, today's peacekeepers will be tomorrow's CT

forces, and we should train them in that light. As recognized by DoS, “Peacekeepers are being asked to do more than ever, from protecting civilians to taking increasingly forceful actions against those that threaten civilians or seek to spoil peace.”³⁴ This “robust peacekeeping” provides the impetus for combined funding lines for peacekeeping and CT training. As a specific example, DoS ACOSTA funding, which does not include training of maritime security or CT forces should be updated to include these functions which are currently authorized in temporary DoD security assistance funding (Section 1206).³⁵ These funds should be in addition to standing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs in place.

3) “Train-the-trainer” programs under GPOI and State Sponsorship Program activities should be expanded.

To further not only the military technical capability, professionalization of the Nigerian force should also take precedence. To accomplish this goal, existing “train-the-trainer” programs currently conducted under GPOI funding lines via the ACOSTA programs should be expanded. These programs are not only key in building current operational capability, but also provide tools to build a self-sustainable force for the future. Displaying its strengths to date, these programs have successfully trained more than 229,000 African peacekeeping troops since 2005.³⁶ These self trained forces will be instrumental in operationalizing the ASF. Additionally, the U.S. National Guard’s State Sponsorship Program (SSP) also has potential for expansion. Matching skilled U.S. units with Nigerian peacekeeping forces, the California Army National Guard has played a key role in providing peacekeeping related training (e.g. civilian policing) that has directly contributed to further professionalization of the Nigerian forces.³⁷ Training efforts focused on Nigerian force gaps in areas such as logistics, air mobility, and civil policing could also be accomplished on a wider scale through regional peacekeeping training centers such as the

Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Center. Additionally, these programs provide important reciprocal training and operational refreshment for U.S. forces that may be called to duty in complex, overseas environments in the future.

4) Assist in the expansion (direct and indirect) of Nigerian airlift capabilities and capacities.

As identified by all experts and observers of not only African, but worldwide peacekeeping missions, airlift capacity has proven to be an endemic problem. Given the proven capability and need for sub-regional and regional peacekeeping forces (to provide, if nothing else, a quick reaction capability), strategic and tactical airlift is a critical enabler for effective operations. Without these capabilities separatists, extremists and other spoilers may be emboldened due to peacekeeping forces' inability to respond in a timely manner.³⁸ The vast expanse of the African continent further exacerbates the criticality of timely airlift. Additionally, as the continent-wide ASF concept matures, airlift may determine if willing nations are able to contribute forces. As such, the U.S. should assist Nigeria and other African peacekeepers to form airlift pools and coalitions. These coalitions of air capabilities will help reduce costs for all involved (operations, pilot training, maintenance, etc.) and provide an additional channel for coordination that may contribute to the greater good. The U.S. has recently approached and encouraged African nations to pool assets in a manner similar to NATO, but commitment is yet to be seen.³⁹ The U.S. has also encouraged co-opting of private sector providers for strategic lift. Due to the severe military aircraft restraints inherent on the continent, the commercial sector may also provide critical lift capacity similar to the U.S. Civil Air Reserve Fleet (CRAF) and NATO commercial agreements.⁴⁰

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- ⁸ Ibid., 94.
- ⁹ Ibid., 111.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 95.
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- ²⁰ Ibid., 11.
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- ²² Adar, “Beyond Rhetoric,” 275.
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